home work

OVERCOMING OUR EVIL

Human Nature

and

Spiritual Exercises

in Xunzi

and Augustine

Aaron Stalnaker

Georgetown UniYersity Press/Washington, D.C.

As of January 1, 2007, 13-digit ISBNs will replace the current 10-chgit system.

Cloth: 978-1-58901-094-9

Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C.

© 2006 by Georgetown University Press. All rights resened. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical, including

photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without

permission in \Hiting from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Stalnaker, Aaron. Overcoming our evil : human nature and spiritual exercises in Xunzi and Augustine

I Aaron Stalnaker. p. cm. -- (Moral traditions series)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-1-58901-094-9 (cloth: alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 1-58901-094-9 (cloth: alk. paper)

1. Good and evil. 2. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, Saint. 3. Xunzi, 340-245 B. c.

4. Conduct of life. 5. Ethics. I. Title. II. Series.

BJ1401.S82 2006

205-dc22 2005027249

This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the American National

Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Librar;· Materials.

13 1 2 11 10 09 08 07 06 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

First printing

Printed in the United States of America

Acknowledgments Introduction Source and Citation Form:::-

Chapter One

Comparative Ethics Comparison in Religi' - Conceptual DiYersit:. :·. :

(

Structural Choices an::. ~ :- Bridging Religious\\-, :-: _, Why Xunzi and Aug'.1 -:::-. _

Notes

Chapter Two Contexts for lnterpretati.·::

Xunzi and Augustin( Bridge Concepts Notes

Chapter Three

U9ly Impulses and a .lL.:'~ Xunzi on Human'.::::·..:~_ Xunzi's Conceptio:-.

Notes

Chapter Four Broken lma9es ef the D:,:::,·

Augustine on Hur:-.:::-. : : :. : _ Augustinian Perscr~. -

Notes

Chapter Five C omparin9 Human"\'.::::;::

ReYisiting Bridge C _ :-. __

CHAPTER EIGHT

Reformations: Spiritual Exercises

in Comparative Perspective

Augustine and Xunzi both aim ultimately at perfection, although hmv they conceive of such a state differs dramaticallv. Thev also focus on rather dif- ferent issues as they chart the path toward this.1 perfection, which reflect their distinctive worries about the gravest spiritual dangers. Examining their differing interests in mapping these "stages of development" helps to pre- pare the ,,-ay for comparing their complex regimes of personal formation. As outlined in chapter 7, early on in his authorship, Augustine develops his sequential account of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, but under the pres- sure of his debate with Pelagianism he later submerges this account in favor of the simpler scheme of law and grace that he discerns in Paul's epistles. Xunzi, for his part, appears not to change his conception of a ladder of ethical development that stretches from the vast category of"pettiness" up through becoming "educated" and then "noble," to the final goal of sagehood.

As I implied in the last chapter, over the course of his embattled epis- copate, Augustine becomes more and more convinced that the dangers of spiritual elitism and religious arrogance generally outweigh the goods to be attained through in -depth analysis of the real differences between beginning and adnnced believers. He thus gravitates toward a scheme that draws a sharp line between those true believers who arc "under grace" and those "pagans" and "heretics" who are outside the fold, still "under the law," whether they realize it or not. This scheme also draws a second sharp dis- tinction between the living and the dead: It places all good Christians into the same fundamental status, dependent "under grace" on God's mercy, continuing to yearn for a time when their inner struggles ·will cease and thc)r will be fullv healed for eternal life "in peace." Xunzi bv contrast gives

./ ' ) ' all his attention to this period of religious discipleship, which Augustine seeks to level out. 1 Why this difference?

+ 246

Reformations: S:: · :_

Augustine's grmving ::-c - - tual achievement stem~ 1:- =~--

b- " .d " II -super 10 or pn e to a ,,._ :-_ Such arrogance afflicts nc,: =~ outwardly exemplan- Cl::-:-:_: law and grace unde~linc' :_-- _ between a life rooted in : : the distinction bet\wen L:::-..: vate humility in belien:r~ ~-- -:-: in this life, no matter h~ -.-.. ..: God. All aspects of the ~cL :-:- ~ hopes on God, instead of ::--c_- _ according to Augustine. u . perfect clarity, although p:-:c - _ ence of grace whenever ::,:> - action. But beyond such -.-. :-_ of baptism, even those \vl: such as virginity have no v . .:_- enough to willingly accep: =~: .::~ tine, which is most ccrtai:::- it (vir9. 44.45, 47).

Xunzi shares this corKc-::-·-_ that it conflicts with his cc-:::-:-.:. justice. Pride is not a speci.:.: :-: The most obvious human ,>:-: and the chaos and misrule ::-_.:_ The more subtle danger o:- ~- - at least in the aftereff~ct~ 11: - __ uncomfortable truth. But::-_-:_ for Godlike sovereignt:- p::- -. _. "you shall be as gods," Xui~z:.:.: th~ truth, wrong only in '> :: la_rger patterns of existence. - \: to have the authority and :.::- : - sec this as fundamentalh- c. - d~~ire, not its secret de~i--..:--: self-aggrandizement.

Indeed, Xunzi appea::-' : emperor as rhetorical cnt:, _:-:. aspiring rulers of his <la;. --=-:: - vision will not automatica.::- -

iT

1 al Exercises

?rspective

- _:-=-.:-~-tion, although how they - :~ c -. .J.bo focus on rather dif- :-_: - ?.crfection, which reflect -_:-:: chngers. Examining their : _c-.dopment" helps to pre- ;::~:c:' of personal formation. :---:::i. _-\ugustine develops his

':Jirit, but under the pres- . --~~ c-:-ges this account in favor

::--:-erns in Paul's epistles. :- _ cc~:ion of a ladder of ethical

; -- "pettiness" up through -::~:-:: ;ual of sagehood.

_:_:--C" of his embattled epis- :-.·. :need that the dangers

· _ · .:·1:1_1 outweigh the goods :_- _ :-cal differences between ::_- :::-::c' tmvard a scheme that

- " d " d -- -.-. :'.<J are un er grace an :_-__ =· 1id, still "under the law,"

::-3.ff~ a second sharp dis- ::__.:-- .J.11 good Christians into

" Gd' _ .:- ;race on o s mercy, - _ :- <ruggles will cease and

. __ ·· \:·_mzi, by contrast, gives

- _ ::: :c-,hip, which Augustine

Reformations: Spiritual Exercises in Comparative Perspective 247

Augustine's growing resistance to distinguishing a hierarchy of spiri- tual achievement stems from his alarm over the extreme danger posed by superbia or "pride" to all who attempt to make progress in righteousness.

2

Such arrogance afflicts not only proud Roman traditionalists but even some outwardly exemplary Christians, such as Pelagius. Augustine's scheme of law and grace underlines the absolutely fundamental distinction he sees between a life rooted in love of self and one rooted in love of God.

3 Even

the distinction between being "under grace" and "in peace" serves to culti- vate humility in believers by reminding them that perfection is impossible in this life, no matter how great their efforts to avoid sin and cleave to God. All aspects of the schema arc designed to prod Christians to cast their hopes on God, instead of relying on their ovvn strength. For us in this life, according to Augustine, no one can know his or her own spiritual state with perfect clarity, although presumably one can discern evidence of the pres- ence of grace whenever one is genuinely moved to take some holy, loving action. But beyond such wondrous signs of new life growing in the wake of baptism, even those who have been giYen the grace of a superior calling such as virginity have no way of knowing if their hearts have become pure enough to willingly accept martyrdom, the ultimate test of faith for Augus- tine, which is most certainly open to those who are married, if God grants

it (virg. 44.45, 47). Xunzi shares this concern about arrogance only in the derivative sense

that it conflicts with his central virtues of benevolence, ritual propriety, and justice. Pride is not a special or uniquely potent danger, in Xunzi's reckoning. The most obvious human difficulties stem from ignorant impulse-following and the chaos and misrule that stem from and exacerbate this sort of life. The more subtle danger of obsession shares some similarities with superbia, at least in the aftereffects of self-satisfaction and preference for illusion over uncomfortable truth. But instead of being centered on the "mimetic desire" for Godlike sovereignty prornked by Satan's promise to Adam and Eve that "you shall be as gods," Xunzian obsession must be a partial apprehension of t_he truth, wrong only in its limited scope and failure to comprehend the h1rger patterns of existence.+ Xunzi, in fact, thinks that every person desires to have the authority and lavish pleasures of an emperor, but he seems to see this as fundamentally a point about the strength and range of human desire, not its secret deviousness in deflecting moral self-cultivation into

~elf-aggrandizement. Indeed, Xunzi appears to use the prospect of becoming a glorious

emperor as rhetorical enticement in recommending Confucianism to the aspiring rulers of his day. This at least implies that the pursuit of such a vision will not automatically plunge a ruler into evil; it also implies that

248 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Xunzi is quite confident in his abilities as a wise counselor, and in the power of virtuous ministers to steer an ambitious king rightly (11/53/12-25; note also 4 I 16 I 1 Sff.). Despite this seeming nonchalance about the dangers of the quest for supreme power and position, Xunzi's own program of rit- ual reformation centers on the need for aspiring Confucians to incessantly practice their deference as a corrective for human self-assertion, ·which suggests that he takes the ethical problem of arrogance more seriously than it might at first appear.

These differences in their estimation of human desires for pmver and mastery point toward deeper differences concerning proper subjection. By subjection, as discussed in chapter 2, I mean the sense of human agency as ordered toward and in important respects constituted by some authorita- tive standard or entity. Both Augustine and Xunzi are too frequently saddled with rather stupidly authoritarian interpretations, ·wherein the "best" human life is the one marked by the most thorough growling before extant reli- gious and even political powers. 5 Both do reject untutored self-guidance as profoundly misguided, but much of their respective bodies of work can be read as efforts to explain the sort of "tutoring" necessary for a truly humane and just life to be possible. Augustine and Xunzi are concerned to make true human moral agency possible, despite difficulties, not to derail or jail it.

For Augustine, the ultimate authority is of course God, and more spe- cifically the triune Christian God as properly understood by the Catholic Church. As outlined in chapters 4 and 7, human beings cannot properly understand themselves, nor live well, unless they understand themselves in relation to God, Christ (including his body he;e on Earth, the church), and the Holy Spirit (e.g., en. Ps. 121.8). Such a relation must be subordi- nate, in the sense that Christ's word to believers, "even if obscure, is better and truer than any insights that we can gain by our own efforts" ( doct. Chr. 2.7.9). Such subordination and dependence is distasteful to fallen human- ity, precisely because vve have been rendered rebellious, riwn internally by lusts for dominance, covetous possession, and selfish enjoyment. In our zest to "be like gods," we create prisons for ourselYes out of habit, making our- selves ever more wretched. "Conwrsion" is the process of breaking these chains, of a gain in freedom, power, and even self-control; and the ongo- ing process of "making progress in righteousness" continues this increase in true agency. For Augustine, then, agency that is derived from and appropri- ately dependent on the divine is true, good, and potent; all other "agency" is in the end only a simulacrum, still subject to God's authority but struggling fruitlessly against this fact rather than accepting and indeed loving it. 6

Reformations: S:: ":_

Turning to Xunzi, tr.e -::_ 7C, or"Heaven,'' does occ·.::.::· : it is not the sort of entitY :'.· . .::.: - justice of events, nor is i: ::-.~ On his account, we must :- c .-: very different Way of Ht:2·. c: It might appear that Coe~.::..:::. classics, would be the ul:::·:·::.: that the real authoritv re'> fucian tradition. Onh· the·. •·::- are confusing and opaque : ::· Moreover, only the best an~ · cian ritual in such a \\-a, tl-l::.: :: articulated ritual masten : ' :: ultimate source for aspiri::; ,__·

Ritual is the means b, · · ·

by which to rectif;· [; c:.::- :· - are at peace in ritual ai:~ : then you have become :c -:; model; to oppose :rnur :c:. accept your teacher anc'. :.--.. this is like relying on a :- : : deaf person to distingc.:,:-_ ' foolishness. (2/8/J~,

Without reliance on .::. - people have no way to gai:·. ::. - morally "blind" and "deaf.":\..::.:· can we develop an under-':::.:·. the rituals themselws "n,2:< as discussed in chapter 6. ::.:: . :- will become "transformed."':'~­ tion ourselves without pai:·.:.::.. human agency is found in -.:-:-· Dao, that is, in actiYel;· g<Y :::-:- and beauty might prenil e·. :::-

Clearly both Augustine ::..:-. _ tion to just authorities as t~_-c :-. although they conceiYe tht: ? .::.:-: more specific comparison'. ~-

',' ;~ :ZATIVE PERSPECTIVE

_. ·..:..'lselor, and in the power -::·.;. c-ightly (11/53/12-25; :-.. :-:dance about the dangers :·~ ..:.::-.zi 's O\\TI program of rit- :·;. C >:1fucians to incessantly . -. _:-:·. :..:1 self-assertion, which ·: ;.:..;~ce more seriously than

.::-:·.:..:1 desires for power and .::·.::-.;proper subjection. By

. : . -:::Ee of human agency as -. · :::·_;ted bY some authorita-

. :o.:-e too frequently saddled :·. ·. ·.':!'ierein the "best" human ;.· · c- iing before extant reli- .. : -..:.:nutored self-guidance

. -·~ ::-:::\e bodies of work can :::·.;." necessary for a truly

:\.unzi are concerned to - :c ~:~nculties, not to derail

. ..:.:-:0e God, and more spe- ..:.:·. ~-:-rstood by the Catholic

..... :..:·. '.· eings cannot properly :~·- _ ·. ·..:nderstand themselves .-.~:--:-•Jn Earth, the church), ~ :-c:J.:ion must be subordi-

... ·. ·· ;e':en if obscure, is better ..:.:- )\\·n efforts" ( doct. Chr.

.. <>teful to fallen human- . - :::.:.i.s. riYen internally by · .. :<--:. c-njoYment. In our zest

..:.: of habit, making our- -.. ~: :·cess of breaking these

· .. :<ontrol; and the ongo- 2 • ·• .. 1:1tinues this increase in

~ ~:-: .. ·c-d from and appropri- 11 h " " . . :: :-:nt: a ot er agency rs

~ ' :o.-..:.thority but struggling ;. :..:·. '. :ndeed loving it. 6

Reformations: Spiritual Exercises in Comparative Perspective 249

Turning to Xunzi, the situation is not quite as clear, at least at first. Tian 7C, or"Heaven," docs occupy the supreme ritual position in the cosmos. But it is not the sort of entity that issues moral commands or ensures the ultimate justice of events, nor is it the source of the authority of the Dao, for Xunzi. On his account, we must be careful not to confuse the human Way with the very different Wa~· of Heaven, each of which involves quite distinctive tasks . It might appear that Confucian tradition, especially as accumulated in the classics, would be the ultimate authority for Xunzi, but he makes it clear that the real authority rests with the human beings who carry on the Con- fucian tradition. Only they know how to interpret the classic texts, which are confusing and opaque to the uninitiated, Xunzi thinks (1 /3/20-1 /4/4) . Moreover, only the best and wisest human beings have fully mastered Confu- cian ritual in such a way that they may teach it to others. This practical, fully articulated ritual mastery is the ultimate ground of their authority, and the ultimate source for aspiring Confucians. As Xunzi says:

Ritual is the means by which to rectify yourself. A teacher is the means by which to rectif;· [your practice of] ritual. ... When your dispositions

are at peace in ritual and your understanding is like that of your teacher,

then you have become a sage. Hence to oppose ritual is to be without a

model; to oppose your teacher is to be without a teacher. To refuse to

accept your teacher and the model and instead prefer to govern yourself:

this is like rel;·ing on a blind person to distinguish colors, or relying on a

deaf person to distinguish sounds; you have no "·ay to abandon chaos and

foolishness. (2 I 8 I l--4)

Without reliance on a teacher and the external models he provides, people have no way to gain a sense of what is truly good. At first, we are all morally "blind" and "deaf," Xunzi thinks. Only with carefully guided practice can we develop an understanding of and taste for the Way, which is what the rituals themselves "mark out" (17/82/22-17/83/1). 7 And eventually, as discussed in chapter 6, after many years of practice, our tastes or desires will become "transformed," Xunzi thinks, so that we can continue the tradi- tion ourselves without painful strain and without error. Thus for Xunzi true human agency is found in sen·ice as the "ministers" or indeed "agents" of the Dao, that is, in actively governing themselves and the world so that justice and beauty might prevail everywhere.

Clearly both Augustine and Xunzi require individually chosen subordina- tion to just authorities as the necessary precondition for true human agency, although they conceiw the particulars rather differently. Before moving on to more specific comparisons, however, we can sharpen some of the differences

250 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

between them by noting the distinctive "spiritual geographies" imagined by Xunzi and Augustine as the spaces defining human agency.

As noted in chapter 5, Augustine conceives of desire, and indeed all love, as having a. vertical dimension that relates it to God, presumed in this image to be "above" us and other worldly things. The voluntas-aspect of each of our mind's "inner words" is striving either "up" toward God or "down" toward various changeable physical realities. This radical disjunction explains many very basic features of Augustine's understanding of the reli- gious life. First, it means that at the basis of any human life is a fundamental orientation, either correctly ordered toward God, or incorrectly away from him, which in this spatial scheme must be an opposite orientation. Second, this explains Augustine's strong interest in conversion -literally, "turning around" to face God as one should. Sin is not missing the target occasionally, as implied by Xunzi's formulation of fine character as "hitting the target" one hundred times out of one hundred (1/4/12); for Augustine, sin does not even aim at the target but away from it. Augustine does have a variety of goal or target metaphor operating, in the sense that beatitude in the pres- ence of God is the end of all of our striving; \\-hat is unique is his insistence on how radically misguided sin must be, as well as the difficulty implied by the image of rising up to the heavens against the pull of our carnal "gravity" dragging us back to Earth.

In contrast to this picture, the space implied by Xunzi's conception of moral agency is, first of all, fundamentally horizontal: We are lost, and we seek a way through the ·world, \\ith travel through space serving as an image for travel through time. There is no different realm to ascend to in Xunzi's Confucianism. Xunzi does use the metaphor of a fork in the road to underline the gravity of choosing the right path to follovv, and he insists that a seemingly small error at the start can lead to terrible results later on ( 11I5 3 I 2 5-2 6). And as noted in chapter 6, he yearns for a clear distinction between what is "within" the Way and what is "outside" it. But his concep- tion of obsession as focused on partial truths that obscure our awareness of broader issues suggests that it is at least logically conceivable for Xunzi that even non-Confucians might make "errors" without being radically mis- guided. Of course, Augustine distinguishes betvveen more and less serious sins, as does Xunzi, and Xunzi does not hesitate to denounce the grievous errors of numerous opponents, including fellow Confucian Mencius, so it would be easy to overstate their differences here. The key issue is simply to note that Augustine's imagination of moral space drives him frequently to quite radical diagnoses of sin and evil, as in his disputes with, for example, the Donatists and Pelagians.

This difference in ice._::::-. in Xunzi's lack of intere-: ~:-.. 6. According to Xunzi. '-'-cc -:.:. entation. Our "bad" inr:a> -- they overreach and the::-c ::- · start out insensible), nc ~ :. __ :.

good. Xunzi's follmwrs. a: . _:. cian education, beginni1:.:: :· . would in any case seem t~ - · wrong by following Olk·, one's own resources for -c:-::- _ as with Augustine.

In the rest of this c}_::.::-:c - broad differences, exami:~::· . ..: views of the "will,'' as '';:: :_ ~ - personal formation, as rt>'. of modern virtue theon. : ::-. _ of these comparisons, d.c:.;::. and Xunzi as a general T intellectualism."

VIRTL

In chapter 2, I argued for .:. : concept,'' in this studv ·, :c:-(: _

several related topics trec.:c- •~ :- · human action; their asse_,,,::,_:·.: commitment; and am· char:._:. afflict human decisio~ anc c - pare their theories of hur:~.:.:: :·. sible to give a much more ::-:-c _ covering a more tighth· iL7c: ..::- ing attentive to broad~r (' :-~-. istic afflictions. Specificalk · between Xunzi and Au2:u~:::-. ,_ concern that both men~ <L:- _ think, feel, and act in par::_·_: desires, and aversions that::: tions and goals, both prox::-:-. .:.: ties humans may have to ci: :: '·: :-

'.'=~.:Z.:..TIVE PERSPECTIVE

.:.::. ;cographies" imagined by --::.:-_ J_;enc;-. - - , .f desire, and indeed all :.:::' :t to God, presumed in

:~.:,:gs. The voluntas-aspect . " " d Gd ; c::"1er up towar o or

:: c'. This radical disjunction _ , ·.:.'.1derstanding of the reli-

::·.:.::1an life is a fundamental : . •r incorrectly away from

:-= 'ite orientation. Second, . l" 11 " . :-_- :::-,10n- itera y, turnmg

_" =--; the target occasionally, "h" . h " -::. .:(r as ittmg t e target

· ~ : for Augustine, sin does ;- <:1e docs have a variety of · :::-_:..: beatitude in the pres- .-.:_: : ' unique is his insistence

:_, :he difficulty implied by 11 t" l " . " :: ·.:.,~ o our carna gravity

: _ : ~':' Xunzi's conception - :-:z•Jntal: We are lost, and ::-_:- -.:gh space serving as an

- _-~::t realm to ascend to in : ::. - ::-_ •r of a fork in the road

·- :_ :::-_ : J follow, and he insists __ : :errible results later on · _ :.:-:1,0 for a clear distinction

.:.:-:cie" it. But his concep- :-_:_: :•bscure our awareness _ :..:-: conceivable for Xunzi · : :~. cJ.t being radically mis- . :::::more and less serious

: denounce the grievous .:_· •:1fucian Mencius, so it

- -:-~.e ke;- issue is simply to ::·i,es him frequently to

·=-:.::es \\·ith, for example,

Virtue and "The Will" 251

This difference in imagining the nature of the moral life also plays out in Xunzi's lack of interest in conversion, discussed above in chapters 5 and 6. According to Xunzi, we start out lost and ignorant, lacking reliable ori- entation. Our "bad" innate impulses do misguide us, but mostly because they overreach and thereby conflict \vith important values (to which we start out insensible), not because they direct us absolutely contrary to the good. Xunzi's followers, at least, seem to have thought that lifelong Confu- cian education, beginning in childhood, was the ideal (27I134I16). There would in any case seem to be no religious use, on Xunzi's account, in going wrong by following one's own devices, in order to see the bankruptcy of one's own resources for self-direction and to turn dramatically back to God, as v1-·ith Augustine.

In the rest of this chapter, I explore some of the details beneath these broad differences, examining several issues raised by comparison of their views of the '\.vill," as well as their differing emphases in the practice of personal formation, as these are illuminated by and speak to some aspects of modern virtue theory. I then pursue a constructive point that grows out of these comparisons, developing enduring similarities between Augustine and Xunzi as a general moral psychological outlook that I call "chastened intellectualism."

VIRTUE AND "THE WILL"

In chapter 2, I argued for a comparative conception of "the will" (a "bridge concept," in this study's lexicon) that was in effect an umbrella covering several related topics treated by both Xunzi and Augustine: their accounts of human action; their assessments of human capacities for choice and decisive commitment; and any characteristic limitations, flaws, or dangers they think afflict human decision and action. After elaborating and beginning to com- pare their theories of human nature and personal formation, it is now pos- sible to give a much more precise account of "will" as a psychological term covering a more tightly integrated set of ethical issues, while still remain- ing attentive to broader concerns about human agency and its character- istic afflictions. Specifically, we can now say that "will" as a bridge concept between Xunzi and Augustine should include four related areas of ethical concern that both men share: first, more or less enduring dispositions to think, feel, and act in particular ways; second, more momentary feelings, desires, and aversions that move us to act in specific situations; third, inten- tions and goals, both proximate and ultimate; and fourth, whatever capaci- ties humans may have to consent, assent, or dissent from particular actions,

252 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

that is, the capacity to choose to do or refrain from doing something. This more precise set of distinctions and topics inYites deeper specific compari- sons, which I pursue in the rest of this chapter. We should note that seeing these areas as closely related, deserving joint analysis, shows how deeply Augustine has influenced the West, because Xunzi does not group these concerns into one named system like "the will." Nevertheless, he does treat each of them in varying degrees of detail, and we can reconstruct their logi- cal relations to each other within his psychology and ethics.

This set of topics also allows me to relate comparative study of "the will" to what has come to be called virtue ethics. My goal in doing this is not to add even more complication to the current project, but to articulate some of my main arguments in a vocabulary familiar to contemporary ethicists. Indeed, "virtue" is the most common contemporary way of talking about growth in moral discernment and excellence, even if that development, the main subject of the current study, is not made central to most inquiries into virtue ethics.

"Virtue" is famously ambiguous between a general sense of fine charac- ter, and more specific excellences that together make up such a character, such as courage and wisdom. A virtue in the latter sense may be under- stood as a good disposition, that is, "a disposition to act, desire, and feel that involves the exercise of judgment and leads to a recognizable human excellence or instance of human flourishing." 8 Both Xunzi and Augustine have well-developed understandings of what might count as general human excellence, although I hope to have shmvn in this study how moral forma- tion may rest on rather different sorts of virtues, reflecting different stages in this ongoing process, so that looking only at perfected virtue would miss much of importance. This point is clearest with Xunzi, who as just argued above makes sharper distinctions among aspiring Confucians than Augustine often wishes to draw among aspiring Christians. 9 (I discuss this issue further below when comparing their accounts of continence.) And although only Augustine, who draws on the massive tradition of Greco- Roman ethical philosophy, has the terminology to speak of particular excel- lences as distinct "virtues,'' Xunzi also discusses several specific excellences that fit together in systematic ways, including the m?st important: ren {::::., "b 1 " "h " . - ''" . " ] ' yllj " . 1 . " enevo ence or umaneness ; y1 ~' 3ust1ce ; 1 1£, ntua propnetv ; xu ff&, "emptiness" or "intellectual openness"; yi ~, "unity"; and Jing •¥, "tranquillity." 10 Although to consider their differing lists of particular vir- tues in detail would require another book-length study, over the course of this chapter I do address Xunzian analogues to Augustinian continence, and I comment further on what is implied by Xunzi's consideration of ritual propriety as a crucial ethical virtue.

Virtue, then, is a IT;J.::c: :- feel, desire, and act-prc-·.::~-­ wise practical judgment\>.::_ - dispositions are not mere- :-:: :_ Stated so generally, it .;:::-:::-:~-. ,- that, broadly speaking. bi ::- ~- _ beings come to possess tr.::::- - a matter of love or roh1~: _:__-. : mind (memory, understa:-. :::--_ the mind conforms to anc :-::::· tues involve both our reh::· _ for the desires and emotii :-_, -- PJ) to an articulate unde:-<c.:-_ way oflife. As always, hm' c _:- consider the details.

As noted in chapter ; . ~·~ _ to clearly mark the dis ti:-.,: dispositions (qing 'lfi> anc :-.- fortunately, uses qing to :-e:~:­ For his part, Augustine U'c- ::- positions and desires or ec :: of love, whether properl_1 as covetous cupiditas. This c.:~-.: by calling into question sec c : lasting, dependable dispo<:: : a steady, powerful inclinati _ :-_ : beings to defect once aga.::-. ::- good self-command to ;l-c:c ~: _ psychology of delight does :--:- both caritas and cupiditas c': :-_,: with desires both hoh- anc :: :- teousness ," especially ,in pr::~:: ratio of these underlving di<: .

Where Augusti;e ;nd \.:: tion as a means of effectin.: :~­ in particular as being pri1~-::.:.:-: toms" or practices; he ta lb of goodness, via repetiti,-e C : of a reconstructed charactc:-. -_ possibility of "deviant" and .. :_.-_:. generally be restrained anc ~- :-

'.' :::.. :C."'.-:-IVE PERSPECTIVE

. ::: · :::1 doing something. This

. : . - : ~ eper specific compari- :- ·::;: should note that seeing

::.:-.::.::.sis, shows how deeply ·,: ..::j: does not group these - ': ::c·,ertheless, he does treat · . :.m reconstruct their logi- -· '" .: 'thics '.::'. -.lU t.: •

. d f" h ·11" :::·.?::.:-anve stu yo t e w1 ; .1l in doing this is not to

·c::~. but to articulate some contemporary ethicists.

·· ::- .1r: \\·a:• of talking about : · :::-. :;·that development, the . :: ::-. :::.1~ to most inquiries into

.::"'::-.c-ral sense of fine charac- . ::- :~-.1ke up such a character,

. .:.::c-:- sense may be under- .. :: ::-. to act, desire, and feel ~ : - :' : a recognizable human · · :=, . :~ '\.unzi and Augustine -..;~.:count as general human :_.- - -:udv how moral forma- . - . ::-d1ecting different stages

.:.: ::ierfected virtue would ·:-: -,,_·ith Xunzi, who as just

·-..:: :'.'Diring Confucians than :-. ;- :~.-ristia~s. 9 (I discuss this

·..::;,:' of continence.) And :--..:.-<n' tradition of Greco- : -::::eak of particular excel-

. - - :< er al specific excellences : :-".::- :-.:rnst important: ren 1=,

··. :: "'~,"ritual propriez;; - .. ~. ''unity"; and Jing fl¥, :: . ::::-.; lists of particular vir- ;-.:·. -:·J.d;-, over the course of ~- ..:;..:.,tinian continence, and

' consideration of ritual

Virtue and "The Will" 253

Virtue, then, is a matter of having well-formed dispositions to think, feel, desire, and act-presuming, of course, that life is complicated and that wise practical judgment will be essential to good human action, so that such dispositions are not mere reflex actions or thoughtless habitual responses. Stated so generally, it seems clear from the interpretations offered here that, broadly speaking, both Augustine and Xunzi are concerned that human beings come to possess true virtue. In Augustinian terms, virtus is primarily a matter of love or voluntas, but it always involves all aspects of the triune mind (memory, understanding, and will) and reflects the degree to which the mind conforms to and relies on God. In Xunzian terms, Confucian vir- tues im·olve both our relatively settled dispositions or qing, which account for the desires and emotions vve feel, and also our patterns af assenting (ke PJ) to an articulate understanding of the Dao as one's ethical standard and way oflife. As always, however, the most intriguing points develop when we consider the details .

As noted in chapter 5, Xunzi has an ethical vo<;:abulary that allows him to clearly mark the distinction between longer-lasting if still changeable dispositions (qing ·iw) and more momentary desires (yu :frX). He also, less fortunately, uses qing to refer to our more transient emotions or feelings . For his part, Augustine uses the same words interchangeably for both dis- positions and desires or emotions-that is, he refers to all of these as forms of love, whether properly ordered to God as the divine love caritas, or not, as covetous cupiditas. This ambiguity suits his religious purposes, however, by calling into question some aspects of the very idea of a virtue as a long- lasting, dependable disposition toward the good. For Augustine, this idea of a steady, powerful inclination to goodness presents a temptation to human beings to defect once again from God and to prefer our own seemingly good self-command to obedience to the Lord. Nevertheless, Augustine's psychology of delight does rest on the idea of underlying dispositions, of both caritas and cupiditas considered as deep inclinations, which inflame us with desires both holy and profane. And his account of "progress in righ- teousness,'' especially in practices like fasting, seeks directly to change the ratio of these underlying dispositions to each other .

Where Augustine and Xunzi differ is in their estimation of habitua- tion as a means of effecting this transformation. Xunzi understands ritual in particular as being primarily a method of re-habituating human "cus- toms" or practices; he talks of this in terms of the gradual "accumulation" of goodness, via repetitive Confucian disciplines, into the deeper "artifice" of a reconstructed character. As argued in chapter 5, Xunzi recognizes the possibility of "deviant" and "chaotic" customs, but he thinks such things can generally be restrained and even reformed by good government, and so are

254 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

above all a political problem. In his account of personal formation, Xunzi attends almost exclusively to the power of habit formation for good. Augus- tine however reserves consuetudo or "habit" almost exclusivel)' for evil, mis-' ) guided dispositions, those "chains" of perverse love that drag us away from God. Most important, according to Augustine, even the best Christians are always capable of willing evil, of defecting from God's providential order. In the wake of the Fall, even the elect are incapable, without grace, of fully and completely willing the good. Concupiscence continually besets us, tug- ging our souls away from spiritual matters to the concerns of "the flesh."

Why this difference? As noted above, Augustine conceives of most spontaneous human desires as results of our concupiscence, that is, of cov- etousness as a deep disposition within the mind. Thus habits formed on the basis of these loves cannot be for good. Conversely, our genuinely good dis- positions are fundamentally gifts from God, always a matter of inspiration. The most helpful spiritual exercises provide occasions for this inspiration to occur. Augustine's view of concupiscence leads him to suspect "delight" in any earthly thing, even those things used in holy worship, which makes it nearly impossible for him to conceive of habituation as good, because it seems to trade on our fondness for pleasure. Indeed, the only sort of habitu- ation Augustine seems to countenance is that of restraint, which quells car- nal pleasure to make room for God-given delight in the good to burst forth. This suggests that the thoughtlessness of habituation as a sort of condition- ing strikes Augustine as dangerous, especially if used to reinforce pleasures. But habi~uation seems dangerous to him even if used for what might seem like good ends, because whatever independent effectiveness it might pos- sess as a technique of self-shaping makes it usable for human projects of defiance. For Xunzi, though, this "directionless" quality of habituation is no problem at all~at least it does not automatically lead us a\vay from the Dao, and more to the point wise teachers can enlist it to lead earnest stu- dents to the Dao. As noted, in contrast to Augustine, Xunzi thinks desire has only one form, and that it cannot be destroyed but only redirected, and to a certain extent heightened or suppressed.

This disagreement about the manipulation of desire through repe<jted practices reflects another aspect of what I called above their differing spiri- tual geographies. One could reasonably say that Augustine thinks habituation is both stronger and weaker than Xunzi contends, depending on whether it goes along with or thwarts our spontaneous carnal impulses. On Augustine's account, sinful habit can take hold of us instantly, as when Augustine's friend Alypius "drank in savagery" during one forced trip to the gladiatorial shows (coef. 6.8.13). Or it can never really take hold at all, if it aims to thwart our concupiscent desires all by itself, because it will merely end up refin-

ing them by cloaking the:"'.-_ ::-_ craft metaphors of res!-:::.:: :-_..: suggest that although oc~ : : ~ are adaptable to change' ::- in response to conscioc<- sufficiently. -

Although Augustine'' ~ _ strongly, this is not realh "' :--~~ obvious level, the ques.t:, :- _

sex, and personal contac: ::.:-: destroying, as drugs lib: :-:-__ ~­ carefully regulated. Put ~~=- - that, except in unusual c C.' e - . -- ingly, and even our real c:(::..::_ But Augustine's account:- -=-- face implications of his e:x::- :-- honestly dedicating our'(:- . - - we remain prone to self-~~ __ our minds remain inclint:-:: : considerations, and this :e:-_ c _ to undermine and corrup: _:-

To engage these is,;;uc- : _ and Xunzi conceive of \vl~::.: __ the lineaments of their p1 -::: understandings of inten;i, ,:-_ :::- 7. Augustine makes a di:,t:~ _-:: "final" ends that motinte :-:-_ :- _ final end of the voluntas a' ::. -.-. - corresponds strikingh- "-e:: : - tled intention, our ~ltimc::,: ~­ speaks of it in the sense of:::- reflects the fundamental o~::::-_­ intention overlaps with ov : tions seem to reflect our se. :-_ of the very highest \YOrth. ::.:-_ : for that goal. But at the sr~ _ and reflect more than " e c ::.:- and desires. Although .--\u5c> :-::_ this possibility than Xunzi. '\: .::- cuss more fully below. Bo:~­ tual exercises is the projec:- : _

.' ::. ~ATIVE PERSPECTIVE

: ::: c:-sonal formation, Xunzi ~ : :-:11ation for good. Augus-

< exclusively for evil, mis- ·. c that drag us away from

. ::· en the best Christians are :-·_ God's providential order. : ::·:-:c. \Yithout grace, of fully . _ :·mtinually besets us, tug- :-_~ :oncerns of "the flesh." .:._:-.:.,tine conceives of most :· ... ·.:.?iscence, that is, of cov- : -:-~.us habits formed on the · . >. uur genuinely good dis- .. :::·' l matter of inspiration. : : :: -'.ons for this inspiration

. -:: : , him to suspect "delight"

. :-. ::. \\Orship, which makes - :~·.:.1tion as good, because it _ .. ~-the only sort ofhabitu- : :-::..::raint, which quells car- :.~ ::-. the good to burst forth. .. ::~: •:1 as a sort of condition- :· .:.'cd to reinforce pleasures. .: .:.•eccl for what might seem ~ c::.(·ctiveness it might pos- ·c.:-:C- for human projects of __ .. quality of habituation is

~: .. c.:::,· lead us away from the .:-.::-tit to lead earnest stu-

, ~::-. ~. \::unzi thinks desire has : .:.~ Jnly redirected, and to

:· .:ic~i;·e through repe~ted . c.~- •Ye their differing spiri-

. ~ . .:. .. >'-tine thinks habituation ·_: ·. -~epending on whether it ·:-.c.: ::"1pulses. OnAugustine's ·. >\',hen Augustine's friend

~:-:::: ~'' the gladiatorial shows c.~ ::IL if it aims to thwart ··. :'.l merely end up refin-

Virtue and "The Will" 255

ing them by cloaking them in the subterfuges of pride. By contrast, Xunzi's craft metaphors of reshaping stiff, difficult materials into a beautiful form suggest that although our dispositions will tend to remain as they are, they are adaptable to changes in circumstances, and to growth or contraction in response to consciously contrived experiences, at least when repeated sufficientlv. ,

Although Augustine is doubtless correct to say that pleasure can move us strongly, this is not really what is at issue between the two figures; at the most obvious level, the question concerns whether everyday pleasures of food, sex, and personal contact are as potently habit forming, and potentially soul destroying, as drugs like methamphetamine, and therefore need to be very carefully regulated. Put this way, it seems obvious that Xunzi is right to say that, except in unusual cases, pleasures move us strongly but not overwhelm- ingly, and even our real delights need practice to become refined and strong. But Augustine's account is more insightful when considered below the sur- face implications of his extreme remarks on habit: His point is that even after honestly dedicating ourselves to goodness, with real desire for that prospect, 1

we remain prone to self-deception precisely because at a very deep level our minds remain inclined to seek our own pleasure regardless of any other considerations, and this tendency (concupiscentia, cupiditas) always threatens to undermine and corrupt ~ur ongoing efforts at personal formation .

To engage these issues further, we need to examine how Augustine and Xunzi concei.-e of what is often called the "divided self." To get at least the lineaments of their positions before us, \Ne should briefly revie\'.' their understandings of intention and consent, as analyzed in chapters S through 7. Augustine makes a distinction between "proper" or immediate ends and "final" ends that motinte more specific voluntates or '\vills" in the plural. The final end of the voluntas as a whole is its settled, long-range intention, and this corresponds strikingly well to Xunzi's predominant sense of zhi ;:t, as a set- tled intention, our ultimate aspiration or goal. (Although Xunzi sometimes speaks of it in the sense of proximate intention as well, zhi for him generally reflects the fundamental orientation of the heart/mind.) For both of them, intention overlaps with our dispositions in complex ways: Ultimate inten- tions seem to reflect our second-order judgments and desires about what is of the very highest worth, and for both seem to reflect a genuine yearning for that goal. But at the same time, those intentions may be self-deceptive and reflect more than we care to admit our less-than-perfect dispositions and desires. Although Augustine is much more alert to and concerned about this possibility than Xunzi, Xunzi does recognize it at nrious points, as I dis- cuss more fully belmi\·. Both of them also think that a central aspect of spiri- tual exercises is the project of unifying our proximate intentions around the

256 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

ultimate intention of following God or the Way-and, indeed, uniting and purifying that ultimate intention itself. "Purity of heart is to will one thing" is a slogan both could happily embrace, although they would explicate it quite differently.

Significant differences emerge, however, in their accounts of choice and its relation to intention and desire, as discussed especially in chapter 5. According to Augustine, consent and dissent from possible actions "belong to the will (voluntas)"; by this, he means that arbitrium, that is, choice or deci- sion, is a subsidiary power of voluntas (spir. et litt. 34. 60). In other words, on Augustine's account, we follow what ,,.,-e lm-e, because it delights us, and our consensio "agreement" or "consent" to those delights is our freely given deci- sion to pursue them in particular circumstances. We are not constrained by any outside forces in our deliberations about how to satisfy our wishes, but the basic orientation of our loves remains relatively impervious to reflec- tive choice, in Augustine's picture. As I put it in chapter 5, for Augustine our second-order choices to assent or dissent from particular courses of action are only logically superior to our desires, and before God's saving grace allows us to convert to Christianity we will not infrequently find ourselves "consenting" to habitual activities that we find loathsome, and that we ineffectively wish to stop doing. Only God can pour Christian love into our hearts in sufficient amounts to outweigh our carnal predispositions and fire our imaginations with a truer understanding of the beatitude we have mistakenly sought in worldly goods. We can contribute to the consolidation of God's gifts through eager Christian service, but this is always a response to prior divine initiative.

For Xunzi, however, even the uncultivated have full possession of the innate power to assent or dissent from particular desires, although such "petty" people analyze and evaluate the world only in terms of what will benefit them by satisfying as many of their desires as possible. Thus they will not in fact dissent from their desires very often-presumably only in cases of immediate physical danger. When such people experience the anxiety and fear that stem from the social chaos of unrestricted interhuman conflict over goods, they may search out some better way of life. They are capable of assenting to the idea oflearning a new way oflife, and putting themselves before a teacher-if they are lucky enough to come across one who seems to promise a better Way. They are incapable of acting like a noble man, let alone a sage, but if offered the chance they can at least begin the long jour- ney necessary to reach such goals.

As noted in chapter 5, however, these sketches leave to the side some of the most interesting issues regarding conflict within the self, to which we now turn. A striking similarity in Xunzi's and Augustine's views is their

distinction between pos:::· ~ Both see the unredeemec :- _ pily vicious" initial peri1 ~ :. . which tend when follm, c- ~ --.: for both individuals and ::: :: - both suggest that an ew:-. :-:·

people begin to recognize = ..: : ate desires, to use Ch~arle- -=-=:.- are certainly varies. For :..·..::: nal" orientation of pri' ate -~ ~ _ God, the supreme gooci. :: - lences of the Confucian\\-.::.- . -

them to commit to the 1~~: ·=-- which in turn can slmdY <:-: :- indestructible. For both c. :· -:_:-_ -: because it leads evcntualL --.: confusion, vacillation, ar~::: :: _ both seek a state of perfec:- - and we freely, effectiwh-. .::.:·_ Xunzi thinks that such a;:.::.::: . life, who can share the be:·_-:::-: and good government, '' ~.-,:-_ will be free from uncenc.::~ :· and that earthly peace is .::.:-,, . .::. will be untroubled and ab<. :::·

Augustine and Xunzi <c-c-:- mate of the wretchedness 1:.:- ·_::-

for pleasure, dominance. a:~ ~ tion. They both portray fr_c- --: least some spiritual ex~rci'c' : they conceive of this rest:.::.~:-.: restrains some desires but}-_-:::.:: ferences over consent loo~: :;: ing the situation of Chris::c.:-_.

h h " ,, w et er petty or more c.c ~- - :- We can focus the issut:-' ·=--

Augustine devotes a free;;:c.~­ According to Augustine, cc·:~:::­ the Holy Spirit, "whereb_,, -,, ~ (cont. 1.1, 5.12). Though i: ce:- chastity, its deeper me;nin; :

:..'.;:_.',TIVE PERSPECTIVE

-.:.::-id, indeed, uniting and : ~.d.rt is to will one thing"

:;:--_ :he::,- would explicate it

~:. ::-::- accounts of choice and c ~ ;especially in chapter 5. :~~ ::iossible actions "belong

:- • :.::-:: . that is, choice or deci- ~..:... 60). In other words, on

. _.:..><'it delights us, and our ::.>:sour freely given deci- ' -.':e are not constrained by -, :,, ,:atisfy our wishes, but

~:- ::-::-: impervious to reflec- _:-_ : ~-apter 5, for Augustine -::- :n particular courses of _ ' . .:.::-id before God's saving

-, ::: not infrequently find · ::- :-ind loathsome, and that

_ .:.:-_ :Jour Christian love into .:- ~ .:.:-::1al predispositions and :·._: :·i the beatitude we have -_-:-:-::=-'..:.te to the consolidation - .:.: :'.-tis is always a response

: :--_:_·. e full possession of the

. _::.::- desires, although such :~>. in terms of what will

· _ - > possible. Thus they will - --~:--.:sumably only in cases

:=:-:- experience the anxiety -~:-: :tcd interhuman conflict

life. They are capable : : :-:- . and putting themselves _ :~~ ::- across one who seems -:.::::~2 like a noble man, let .:.: :-:-a:t begin the long jour-

~ ~ :--_-:-' le aw to the side some _: ·.·:ithin the self, to which

:·_ ~ .-'.l.'..lgustine's views is their

Virtue and "The Will" 257

distinction between positive and negative kinds of personal disintegration. Both see the unredeemed or uncultivated person (perhaps after a brief"hap- pily vicious" initial period) as torn between conflicting first-order desires, which tend when followed to produce profoundly harmful consequences for both individuals and the community. And yet to escape such dissipation both suggest that an even more profound internal chasm needs to open, as people begin to recognize qualitatively higher values that overrule immedi- ate desires, to use Charles Taylor's language, although what they think these are certainly varies. For Augustine, we need to turn away from our "car- nal" orientation of private delight in lower, earthly goods, and turn toward God, the supreme good. For Xunzi, we need to be exposed to the excel- lences of the Confucian Way, which will attract many people sufficiently for them to commit to the more onerous program of cultivation he advocates, which in turn can slowly strengthen their commitment to that Way until it is indestructible. For both of them, then, the second disintegration is salutary because it leads eventually to a unified focus on the good that transcends all confusion, vacillation, and personal disintegration. Put in modern terms, both seek a state of perfect virtue wherein all internal conflict disappears and we freely, effectively, and capably will to live righteously. Of course, Xunzi thinks that such a state can be attained by at least a tiny number in this life, who can share the benefits of sagehood with others through teaching and good government, whereas Augustine argues consistently that no one will be free from uncertainty and internal conflict until the resurrection, and that earthly peace is always flawed and fragile, whereas eternal peace will be untroubled and absolutely secure.

Augustine and Xunzi seem to agree in large measure in their low esti- mate of the wretchedness of unregenerate humanity, caught between desires for pleasure, dominance, and safeFy that seem to preclude mutual satisfac- tion. They both portray the self-restraint of such impulses as crucial to at least some spiritual exercises that will help us make progress in virtue, and they conceive of this restraint as part of a two-sided training process that restrains some desires but heightens or magnifies others. But here their dif- ferf".nces over consent loom large, even if we restrict ourselves to compar- ing the situation of Christians "under grace" and of aspiring Confucians, whether "petty" or more accomplished.

We can focus the issues by considering one of the few virtues to which Augustine devotes a freestanding treatise, continentia or "continence."11

According to Augustine, continence is a "spiritual virtue" that is "a gift" from the Holy Spirit, "whereby we control and rule anq conquer carnal desire" (cont. 1.1, 5.12). Though it certainly refers to the ability to preserve sexual chastity, its deeper meaning concerns the ability to stop the inward consent

258 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

of the heart to any sinful desire, precisely by putting a "gate" on the "inner mouth" of the heart to stop it from uttering sinful "words" internally ( 1 . 1- 2. 3). The ambiguities of Augustine's discursive model of the psyche ha\T already been addressed in chapter 5, where I developed a slightly revised Augustinian account of inner discourse that includes '\vords" \Ve do not consciously consent to, precisely in the form of the fleshly temptations of concupiscence. Continence, then, refuses to agree to follow such words, which bubble up within us from the fault in our human nature, as exacer- bated by past sinful habits but also diminished by the grace of baptism and Christian worship (7. 18-8. 19). Thus continence is a virtue found only in Christians under grace, who have been inspired by God to fight inwardly in a ferocious struggle against concupiscence, as they "crucify" fleshly desires in Christian "combat" (3.6-9, 8.20, 7.18). In other words, for Augustine con- tinent dissent from sin is the engine that makes practices such as fasting and sexual restraint possible as true spiritual exercises, which over time cause not only our sins to decrease but even our carnal desires themselves (8. 20). However, given the conflict of the different sorts of delight that make up our voluntas, this refusal of consent to sin is only made possible when "the Lord gives a sweetness that is beneficial, making continence more pleasur- able," to counter the sweetness of satisfying sinful desire ( 3. 7). 12

So continence is a virtue that presupposes both a delight in sinning that must be restrained, but also a stronger delight in goodness that is given to us by God, and that makes possible our refusal to consent to sin. 13 Thus Augustine's account of the Christian life of inward struggle presupposes not the grim refusal of all delight but the earnest preference for a superior delight to an inferior, for the "gentle joy of sanctity" over lingering carnal temptations ( 14. 31). Augustinian continence both reflects and heightens the increasingly strong love for God that motintes Christian believers who are progressively purifying their imaging of God. 14 But in this life, even under grace, this inward combat is tinged by fear and uncertainty (11.25) and the alarming possibility of relapse, because despite all our new and holy inclinations, we might reenact the Fall yet again, more horribly. Augus- tine writes that in Christians "base carnal impulses" are "being continually suppressed by continence to prevent them from rising up again. If anyone ceases to put them aside in this way, as though safe from them, they will launch themselves at the stronghold of that person's soul, and overthrow it and make it their slave again, a foully mutilated captive" ( 14. 31). 15 Thus continence is an ongoing necessity; it can never be forgotten or neglected for an instant. Augustine's insistent language of struggle, combined with his urgent pleas to trust in God, not in oneself and one's own powers of self- restraint, which are bound to fail ( 5. 12), all suggest that Augustinian virtue

is best understood as cc;~:::· __ in dependable excellen.:-c- trusting entirely in Goe·, - expectant, obedient im\·c.:- ~ :

In comparison \vi th ::~: - : nence at the center of the \..-:-_: ment is strikingly thin. Ee - appears to be relatiwh- c·_::·_: the power of assent is .crn:~::· cerned with how \Ye mi_:~.: • mentally an intellectual:_:~~ -_-- his thorough treatment 11: •-: .::.:

Xunzi speaks of sor::L-::-__ : discussions of unitv as a \-':-:· __ ongoing Confucian pract::c . .::. cian ethical achievement. :> ~ ness to becoming an "ec1t:.c :c~: obscurity of intent" as on-c -:-:- to follow the Way. If m; ::~: _ :· pursuit of the Way, like ::~: - l;lJB "" " "' " . Jt?f';:, impetuous or scattc:- __ that educated men arc t~- , _ a steadfastness such that :'.~ _ - have heard" from their tee.::_ who have not yet reach(·,~ ::·_,. their moral deliberation. :.:·_ ~ of the Dao is still relati,-t:+ : _ :- but have not yet trul;· n~:. : _ practice.

So far, this might -occ:::·_ but Xunzi's psychologicai ::~ "disunity" and disorderiL_: _ deep distinction bet\YetT~ spontaneous rcsponsivelk"- ~ tions and desires and, <T. ::- _ desires that consist in uc __ domestication of conflic: -,_ ::: our considered, reflectih- '-- _ is so because, accordin2_ t ' courses of action is nev~r • :c --·~ Dao, I have made some ' :-:

.': .'..: .:.- '.': PERSPECTIVE

_ ::::-.; :. ··gate" on the "inner ···.·. ·rcL'' internally (1.1- ~cl of the psyche have

:Jed a slightly revised . _: :c:' ··1vords" \\·e do not

- :.-.e ::eshl;· temptations of follmv such \vords.

- :-.·_::~-.1:1 nature, as exacer- :_:.~· ;race of baptism and . , .:. \ irtue found onk in

·--:: · to tight im,·ardl; in - :r·_:::t\··· fleshk desires in

:<". for :\ugustine con - -.-:.. :::c< such as fasting and ·. · .. ,.. :::ch over time cause

__ -::-c< themselws (8.201. : ~clight that make up

:·:-.:,~·: '.Jossible \vhen "the ; . :-.::::e,1Ce more pleasur-

: __ ><:-e i3.7).:' :.- .:. :di;ht in sinning that

_ ::kss that is giwn to - : · ::sc-nt to sin~ 13 Thus

:.::- : , ::cu;glc presuppo,;e< . -: :::-c:c:-cr:ce for a superior · _ :: :• ·· ··.er lingering carnal

:· :-c::e.:t,; and heighten< - . · ·~·_:_r:.O::an bcliewrs \dK•

_ - 3·_;: in this life, ew1: :.- :::·_ : ·.:.!:certaintv ( 11 . .:'.:;

_ .. _._,::::e all our ne"· anc:

:.;:. : .. ::·. •:-c· horn bl;·. :\ugu'- .. ::.-·c ··~,c-ing continuall:·

- - -- ; _:~ again. If an; one · :.: _ :::- :~: them, thcv '' i;:

:·. '. ' c_;:. and overthrov. _:.::::· .. e··, J+.311.:;Thi.:-

: ::- ; ·~tc1: or ncglcctc ~ · :- _:,:,::e. :.:1mbincd 11·ith hi,

· -,.::~ po1\·ers of sc::·-

.::.::. -: ::-.::.: A.•.:.;u-tinian virt:i~

Virtue and "The Will" 259

is best understood as continuous striving for something higher, not repose in dependable excellences of character. Augustinian virtue risks the self by trusting entirely in God's pm,·er and mercy, carefully retaining a humble, expectant, obedient inward posture.

In comparison with this full Augustinian treatment, which places conti- nence at the center of the Christian life of spiritual exercises, Xunzi's treat- ment is strikingly thin. He seems to have a similar concept, but the idea appears to be relatively uninteresting to him theoretically because he thinks the pmver of assent is common to all humans, and so he is much more con- cerned with how we might learn to what we should assent. This is funda- mentally an intellectual and even epistemological problem, which motivates his thorough treatment oflearning and the virtues of the heart/ mind. 16

Xunzi speaks of something analogous to continence in two places: his discussions of unity as a virtue and goal of the heart/ mind that should guide ongoing Confucian practice; and his discussion of the lower levels of Confu- cian ethical achievement, especially surrounding the transition from petti- ness to becoming an "educated man." 17 In the first area, unity implies "dark obscurity of intent" as one struggles as an uncelebrated, unskilled beginner to follow the Way. If my intention is unified, then I will be steadfast in my pursuit of the Way, like the single-minded earthworm rather than the zao ft*, "impetuous" or "scattered" crab (1/2/13). In the second area, we hear that educated men are those "whose enactment of the model has reached a steadfastness such that they do not let selfish desires disorder what they have heard" from their teacher (8/30/12-13). This implies that aspirants who have not yet reached this stage still allow "selfish desires" to disorder their moral deliberation, and it implies further that their intellectual grasp of the Dao is still relatively tenuous--it is something they have heard about but have not yet truly made their own through deep understanding and practice.

So far, this might seem hard to distinguish from Augustine's picture, but Xunzi's psychological model implies a very different treatment of such "disunity" and disordering conflict within the self. Most crucially, Xunzi's deep distinction between, on the one hand, our initially innate system of spontaneous responsiveness to our environment that includes our disposi- tions and desires and, on the other hand, the reflective and deliberative desires that consist in our judgments of assent, implies a localization and domestication of conflict ·within the self. Such conflict is always between our considered, reflective judgments and our spontaneous impulses. This

I

is so because, according 'to Xunzi, the actual power to assent to particular courses of action is never lacking, even in beginners; when I stray from the Dao, I have made some sort of error, whether of evaluation or perception,

260 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

about what the Dao is or how it relates to the situation before me. If we just learned more, or thought through the implications of what we had learned, or more creatively drew analogies from it, we would not err so badly again. Crucially, Xunzi seems to think that "selfish desires" can "dis- order what [aspirants] haYe heard" by "pulling" and "tilting" our perceptions so that we are blind to anything but our own immediate benefit or pleasure (21I105/7-8). Indeed, his stress on how desire can constrict and skew our perceptions, and thus undercut our capacities to deliberate from the very start, is essential to the plausibility of his psychology of assent and desire. Unless we actively address such difficulties, our vulgar innate desires will not only "tilt" our perceptions but also incline us toward corrupt inter- pretations of the Way, in which personal benefit or pleasure play too large a role, rather than an appropriately limited one. This means that internal conflict tends in the end for Xunzi to be a relatiYcly simple and clear phe- nomenon: our impulses are bad; but if we understand things properly, we will be reflectively moved to restrain and eventually reshape them. At least for aspiring Confucians in a good enYironment, Xunzi in effect localizes, delimits, and demystifies our impulses to evil by making them strictly a mat- ter of our spontaneously reactive disposition. 18 A Xunzian Confucian can then think of himself as fundamentally what he assents to, with a holdover of first-order desires that are no long~r truly his own, because he decisively rejects them, and that he can patiently work on like a steadfast artisan work- ing on a grand work of art. The larger and grovving portion of first-order desires he does approve of will sluvdy and steadily eclipse the rest, until there are no more misshapen desires left within him and his self-crafting will at last be completed.

Xunzi's treatment of unity as both goal and virtue implies two main existential worries: first, the possibility of "obsession" derailing continued learning about and appropriation of the Way; and second, the Yery alarming (to Xunzi) possibility that someone might begin Confucian study and then give up because it was too frustrating or slow, or simply because they got distracted from it somehow and stopped paying attention to the task of self- improvement. This helps to explain his stress on communal support, which leads him to coin a seemingly unique idea of proto-continence: Educated men can command themselves well enough to follow the Way, as long as they are part of .a dependable Confucian grouping that can keep pressing and guiding them onward and correcting their errors on specific points. Only when such people are truly dependable when alone or in antagonistic circumstances have they become noble men, who seem more than con- tinent in their delight in "the [Confucian] model" of conduct, but not yet perfectly, effortlessly virtuous.

This is still conside::-c.:- :- _ tion of the inner conflic: -.-.~::..-­ William Babcock \\Tik,'. ~- _ localization of differing cc:-.::: tray a true internal stri.:::::.~::>: spiritual desires are our;,~. :-_ minds that battle for sup:-::-:-·_: resistance to itself "-ill c.:-.- ::_- tive sense, of incompreh(-:>:: quarantined by placing 'i:::·..:: of the soul, when our ov. :-_ : :-_:

Not only that, but ac _ - - vided that superior deli:::-.: :·_ minds may still "defect:; ::- :-· (cont. 5.12-13, 8.20, 1+.~: ous offense, a lifetime o:- : :-_ - has predestined such a ca:::.-::-

For Xunzi, by contrc.<:. :~ appropriate to aspirant~ c.:-_ -~ _ positions are more and n11: :- 0 -:. practice. Though unit:> rc:::::.:.:- tually gives way to the ··,:-_::_ when what we would ca:: : : : noble man, who still mu't :-:-::. tal battle has been won._-\:-:::--__

of speech, conduct, and c--_ ~ -: tally settled their ne>Y oric:::::. them to fear their remaiE::-.:::: . they might be cause for sb:--::::: in society at large, such me-:: _ their pursuit of sagehooc_ -:-_--_ overestimate their grasp ·: :- :~ become distracted by em:,::·.; as temptations.

To sum up the discuss' :-_ - intriguingly different ace·:·..::-: that each enjoins. Each of::-.:: lessly splendid sagehood f- ::- :< ti on to God for Augustine -: state of normal human be::-.::' ther along their respecti w- ? ~:

':.'.. ;:.'., TIVE PERSPECTIVE

-::·..:3.tion before me. If we -.:- .::1tions of what we had :-:-. ::. \Ve would not err so

·.::.: ··,clnsh desires" can "dis-

:.::-. : ··:i: ting" our perceptions ·.:·:-. c:c ~iate benefit or pleasure

_ ::.:-. constrict and skew our ~c:iberate from the ven

·. ;Y of assent and desire. · ·..:l;ar innate desires will ..:' -::rn,·ard corrupt inter-

- · ::- ?leasure play too large -:-'.-:i< means that internal

- ,>. 'imple and clear phe- ,--:::.Ld things properly, we ~::..::. reshape them. At least :. '\:·.u:zi in effect localizes, :-.-.::.:.::.:::1::: them strictly a mat-

.:._ '\: °J.nzian Confucian can ::."e::-.ts to, \Vith a holdover

- ·.' :-.. because he decisiveh· ... -:. ::. 'teadfast artisan vrnrk-

:::-.; portion of first-order ::. ::>. eclipse the rest, until ·· :-::-:: and his self-crafting

· :::-:·Je implies two main - . -': ::-.·· derailing continued

c

. - .. :id. the very alarming ::-. _. :-.:·.h.:ian study and then

::- -::::pl; because they got ::. :: : ::-.:: m to the task of self- - ::·.::-:unal support, v,chich

·· :- : . <·Jntinence: Educated

:: "' the Way, as long as : :-.; :::-.a.t can keep pressing - ::-:- '::-s on specific points.

::..· ·ne or in antagonistic .ceern more than con-

.. :· conduct, but not yet

Virtue and "The Will" 261

This is still considerably less radical, however, than Augustine's concep- tion of the inner conflict within good, aspiring Christians "under grace." As William Babcock writes, Augustine's anti-Manichean account provides no localization of differing centers of desire but instead develops a way "to por- tray a true internal struggle of the self against itsclf." 19 Both our carnal and spiritual desires are our own desires, our own "inner words" within our own minds that battle for supremacy. This implies that for Augustine the mind's resistance to itself will always retain an element of mystery in the nega- tive sense, of incomprehensibility, just like the Fall. Inner conflict cannot be quarantined by placing sinful impulses only within the body, or a lower part of the soul, when our own inner discourse is divided against itself.

Not only that, but according to Augustine even when grace has pro- vided that superior delight in the good that makes continence possible, our minds may still "defect" from this stronger yearning by consenting to sin (cont. 5.12-13, 8.20, 14.31). If such consent is given to a sufficiently seri- ous offense, a lifetime of continence can be destroyed in an instant, if God has predestined such a catastrophic warning to others (persev. 22. 61).

For Xunzi, by contrast, the vigilant attention to pursuing unity that is appropriate to aspirants and even educated men slowly fades out as our dis- positions are more and more thoroughly reshaped through steady Confucian practice. Though unity remains as a virtue, "dark obscurity of intent" even- tually gives way to the "shining brightness of illumination" ( 1 I 2 I 13-14), when what we would call continence is no longer necessary. Even for the noble man, who still must practice self-overcoming of a sort, the fundamen- tal battle has been won. Although noble men still make occasional mistakes of speech, conduct, and understanding, they have nevertheless fundamen- tally settled their new orientation to the Way, so that there is no reason for them to fear their remaining imperfect impulses or misjudgments, even if they might be cause for shame (8I30I13-15). For Xunzi, if the Way prevails in society at large, such men can only be considered happy, as they continue their pursuit of sagehood. The real danger concerns aspirants who might overestimate their grasp of the Way, or give up on it foolishly, or simply become distracted by enticing possibilities that they do not even recognize as temptations.

To sum up the discussion so far, Xunzi and Augustine are proposing two intriguingly different accounts of the long quest for the ethical perfection that each enjoins. Each of their distinctive ideas of such perfection (effort- lessly splendid sagehood for Xunzi, and eternal beatitude in perfected rela- tion to God for Augustine) stands in sharp contrast to the petty or sinful state of normal human beings, and serves to goad and entice aspirants fur- ther along their respective paths. These ideals, in other words, are meant to

262 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

induce passionate striYing within the religious life, and a sense of dissatisfac- tion with one's current state of existence, perhaps even a sort of positive anxiety to be transformed.

Xunzi's account of this striving is relatively more straightforward. Throughout the process of moving from pettiness to nobility, we have a humbling awareness of how far we remain from the ideal of the sage, who spontaneously desires to follow the Way alone, and who is so skillful in his ritualized interpersonal mastery that he has no trouble responding ·well to any unusual person or situation. But if we remain steadfast in our prac- tice of Confucian spiritual exercises, according to Xunzi, vve will gradually notice the change in our desires, in concert with the increasing depth of our understanding. It would seem, then, that practice is initially quite difficult but becomes noticeably easier as we progress for Xunzi, although I suspect that Xunzi and other Confucians proffer the sage ideal at least in part to keep those who perceive themselves to be noble from overestimating their mastery of self and the arts of the Way. But even so, it would seem that a noble man would be right to feel growing self-assurance and ease, even as he continues to strive for greater creativity, flexibility, and insight in his ritual practice, and his teaching of beginning Confucians.

For Augustine, however, his teachings about the inevitable imperfec- tions of personal cultivation in this life, as compared with the beatitude that is our true goal as human beings, combine to lead to what might be called a double ideal: one suited to our present existence under grace, and another more ultimate one. Though in the next life we will enjoy perfect, untroubled rest and the barely imaginable joy of having our greatest desire eternally satisfied, in the current life our situation is fundamentally one of expectation. This means that in a certain sense, even as our loves become more integrated through Christian discipleship, our yearning and striving only increase in intensity-as long as we are still pilgrims on the way home to the heavenly Jerusalem. Augustine ·writes: "Our task lies in desiring. Holy desire is the whole life of good Christians .... Thus God, by deferring [what we yearn for], stretches our desire; by the desiring, stretches the soul; by stretching, makes it more capacious. Let us therefore desire, broth- ers, because we shall be filled" (ep.Jo. 4.6). 20

Augustine suggests that we should work to increase our spiritual hun- ger and even dissatisfaction 1, that we might strive all the more and become inwardly capable, through greatness of love, for true beatitude. Though increasingly intense caritas may be satisfied in part through regular prayer and worship and the practice of other spiritual exercises, it demands as well vigorous striving to love other human beings through active, extensive benevolence. In this sense Paul, rather than Christ, becomes the model for

Christians in this life, ac C·: :- _ :· stretches out to what lie< ,0 __ ::. union with Christ in bea::: __

In other words, .--\us.;_<:::·_, many in the West, althZu.:::- a life of ever-increasin!Z :~::.-­ yet disciplined striving-{:- -~ to require continuing an:::.; :· resistance to be overcon~;:. other in turn. Of course_.:;___:_::- tendency, most notabh ... :::. ~­ suggests that genuine pe:---:- _ piscence is the finest achic·. ~~ life. But the basic structu:-~ striving is present nonethe::c--

In contrast, Xunzi im::..::::· __ less action," in Edward s:::-_ -_ one's desires, thoughts. sk.:::-~ middle course where ritu::.: :. a shared early Chinese idc: ::.: human state. 23 Though :'\.-..::·.:: an extremely demandinz c-:~ : _ and striving that are es;c:-.::::._ stages of life gradualh- di--::: the proper shape. Thc\\·a"' :.> one may skip along it "it~. ~:­ beatitude, which is essen:'::.::- mentally a matter of acti \ c c :: _ capable moral leader. ( Tf.e -'-_ ~ within and beyond the cl--·..::-_ although it eschev1/s hope :- _ - here on Earth.)

The extreme difficult··. however, suggests that :X~r.c: _ would ordinarily come \\it~.::.. __ if our dispositions are not f..:::- the internal rewards of a :~..::·:­ themselves, in this sort of,:,:.

the Way more widely in tr> ' __ ity of the ideal makes the r..:-- further progress possible ;- :- _

':.:. ;,.:., TJVE PERSPECTIVE

: : . .:.:1d a sense of dissatisfac- - ::_ :: (H~n a sort of positive

: > :11ore straightforward. --. :: '' :o nobility, we have a

·:: ~-"" ideal of the sage, who .:.:: :: '.\ho is so skillful in his ::- _::bie responding well to

~-- .:.::-_ "tcadfast in our prac- : :\:'..lnzi, \Ve will gradually

- :~_:: increasing depth of our __ :: :" initially quite difficult - :\:-..::1zi, although I suspect

.:.;: :ieal at least in part to . _ ::- :1~ owrestimating their : :-. " . it \Vould seem that a

-.:.- ,-_::-.:.nee and ease, even as _:,::-=-::it:. and insight in his ·-_:·_:::ans.

_::: :.:le ine,-itable imperfec- :--_ :: .:.:-c-d \Vi th the beatitude

:ead to what might be _ ·.:: <ence under grace, and ::_ "'e \\·ill enjoy perfect,

: : . .:.-. :ng our greatest desire :: : " fundamentally one of _ · ::~ 1~ our loves become

_:::- :'earning and striving .. :: ::;:-'.ms on the way home _:-:.:..;;:,;_lies in desiring. Holy

-:-::-..:" God, by deferring :.- :: '.c-,iring, stretches the

: _::, :'.:c:-efore desire, broth-

:·_.:-,:.:_.;;c our spiritual hun- .:.:: :~e more and become - ::--..:e beatitude. Though

-- .:.:-: :'.:rough regular prayer . .:.. ::'.:ercises, it demands as ;- :~x :'ugh actiYe, extensive

:- , : . :·(·comes the model for

Virtue and "The Will" 263

Christians in this life, according to Augustine: Paul forgets what lies behind, stretches out to what lies ahead, and presses on intently toward the ultimate union with Christ in beatitude (Phil 3: 13, Trin. 9. 1 ; see also s. 400. 1). 21

In other words, Augustine counsels an ideal that continues to fascinate many in the West, although often in a radically altered, Nietzschean form: a life of ever-increasing passion, which is marked by increasingly intense yet disciplined striving for spiritual perfection. This heroic striving seems to require continuing antagonistic contests, with significant challenges and resistance to be overcome, where great acts and great passion incite each other in turn. Of course Augustine undoubtedly also questions this heroic tendency, most notably via his skeptical interrogation of superbia, and he suggests that genuine perseverance against the ongoing threats of concu- piscence is the finest achievement believers may reasonably hope for in this life. But the basic structure of continuing struggle, effort, and impassioned striving is present nonetheless.

In contrast, Xunzi imagines that the ideal human state is one of "effort- less action,'' in Ed\vard Slingerland's apt phrase. 22 In such a sagely state, one's desires, thoughts, skills, and actions are all perfectly integrated in "the middle course where ritual flows." As Slingerland argues, this vision reflects a shared early Chinese ideal of effortlessly skillful mastery as the ultimate human state. 23 Though Xunzi undoubtedly pictures the Confucian path as an extremely demanding endeavor in its earlier stages, the sense of struggle and striving that are essential to any movement from pettiness to higher stages of life gradually dissipates as one's dispositions are reformed into the proper shape. The Way gets easier as one walks it over a lifetime, until one may skip along it with unselfconscious delight. But unlike Augustinian beatitude, which is essentially contemplative, Xunzian sagehood is funda- mentally a matter of active engagement with the world as a preternaturally capable moral leader. (The Augustinian life of inspired corporate charity within and beyond the church, however, is equally active and engaged, although it eschews hope for perfect peace or flawless moral leadership here on Earth.)

The extreme difficulty of actually living this sort of sage-leader ideal, hovvever, suggests that Xunzi is trying to ward off the self-satisfaction that would ordinarily come with high rank, an ample salary, and social influence, if our dispositions are not fully transformed (23I116I25-23I117 I 1). Even the internal re\vards of a fully ritualized life are obviously insufficient by themselves, in this sort of vision, without political effectiveness in ushering the Way more widely into society. In other words, for Xunzi, the extrem- ity of the ideal makes the pursuit o(perfection asymptotic, with significant further progress possible for eYen the highly virtuous and very capable. As

264 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Confucius.'s celebrated disciple Yan Hui is reported to say of the Way in Ana- lects 9 .11, "The more I look up at it the higher it seems; the more I delve into it, the harder it becomes. Catching a glimpse of it before me, I then find it suddenly at my back. The Master is skilled at gradually leading people on, step by step. He broadens me with culture and restrains me with the rites, so that even if I wanted to give up I could not." 24 For Xunzi, as with other early Confucians of his outlook, following the Dao with sagely perfection is a vast challenge, and it requires a lifetime of commitment to master.

Augustine goes even further, however, undercutting the pretensions of human virtue decisively. In this life, everyone still has far to go, according to Augustine. Though believers should have confidence in the Lord, pride is always a dangerous, devious enemy.

For both figures, long-term or even unceasing striving is necessary in part because aspiring Christians and Confucians, on their accounts, are seeking to live an ideal that they only dimly and partially understand. As with many of the most important endeavors in life, both Augustine and Xunzi think that personal formation is a long-term project to which we must commit ourselves before ·we fully understand it, in part because its difficulties would terrify us if we knew them in advance.

SPIRITUAL EXERCISES AND THE MANIPULATION OF INNER AND OUTER

One of the striking similarities between Augustine and Xunzi is their shared conviction that learning is a foundational spiritual exercise. People cannot flourish without learning. Put another way, we do not innately possess the resources necessary to live a good life, and so we must learn from others the most important, indeed sakific, facts about human existence. More- over, learning must continue throughout our lives. It is not as if there are a few earthshaking truths we must grasp, after which all is resolved. It might seem, then, that both Xunzi and Augustine ·would insist on the necessity of external assistance because of the paucity of internal resources available to uncultivated people. Though this is true in a general sense, it obscures important differences in their treatments of what is ''i~ner" or hidden and what is "outer" or visible, differences that help explain many of the dissimi- larities between their overarching accounts of spiritual exercises. (I return to their shared emphasis on learning in the third section of this chapter.)

So far, much of this chapter has focused on moral psychology, but to grasp the deeper organizing principles in Augustine and Xunzi's regimes of personal formation, we need to note as well their partially divergent

Spiritual Exerc's;::: = -

conceptiops of a related : _ :: : . other words, what coun> > : this issue, Augustine sit- -::..:2:- reflection, which he hel:::e ~ -:- ating human actions is\~ ~.e::-__ means they must be pw[~c:- · to the right ultimate enc. ·=- c 2 reference at play here c, :: . : :- taken, and Augustine eD:-: :-_ intentions, intermediate :.. _ 2: - pleasure, which determi::._ e ::- no matter how minor. T'.::' :-:· seem to perfectly fulfill ti>-:: terms of performance. c2:: -:_ motivated by and "referre.::-- : An example would be d, ::·.:.. proverbial old lady acros< ::- ~ - gaining a good reputation s ::-. and thus power.

A corollary of this co::, c::: is secondary at best, for A:..:~.:­ good, even the evil "·ill< - action will in some objec::· .. dential design, and thus be _ thwarted, one may still re<>- one's efforts. For Augmtir:e. ::- on individual intention ar: : :-. "Love, and do what vou \\·:::. a root nothing but g~od cc.::-_ :

For Xunzi, the situati,- ·: action must be manifest i:: _ such action must be matc::e -~ the "middle course "·here :-: :-_ defines slwn ',§:, "good,'' ar:.:: : present, what all under He c.>. erly patterned, peaceful. a::.:: vicious, perverse, and cha, :: . ·· ness for Xunzi seem to cor:.c:-· involving proper social ore:~:- : is the debate over the charc.:: _

'.' :.:. :?.-'1-:-iVE PERSPECTIVE

::-: c_: ~ :o say of the Way in Ana- :- :: 'Cems; the more I delve - : : ,- it before me, I then find

;:-::~uall;· leading people on, : :--_'trains me with the rites, -:- For Xunzi, as with other ~ __::_- -,,ith sagely perfection is :·:·.:-:::tment to master.

: -: ::- :·_:_ ning the pretensions of -:::: has far to go, according

-·_:-:~;:-:-ice in the Lord, pride is

>:::;. 'triYing is necessary in _ :::-. '. on their accounts, are :::-. -~ '.:lartiallv understand. As

" ,

_:·_ :;te. both Augustine and ;-: :: :-r:1 project to which we :--:c.::d it, in part because its :·_ ::. .:·.-ance.

AANIPULATION "ER

:.:~c- c.:1d Xunzi is their shared :.::::: e:wrcise. People cannot

~: :-iot innately possess the -- :: :~rnst learn from others _: :-_.Jman existence. More- - :: '_ I! is not as if there are a

- :-_:'.-:all is resolved. It might .: ~ '.nsist on the necessity of : :·_: c-:-nal resources available ::. ;.:::-ieral sense, it obscures

- :-_::: :s .. inner" or hidden and _ ·,: :: : :iin many of the dissimi-

' :--'::-'.::Jal exercises. (I return < <:ti on of this chapter.)

·_ :~: 1 1ral psychology, but to ;-<'.-'le and Xunzi's regimes

:ht>ir partially divergent

Spiritual Exercises and the Manipulation of Inner and Outer 265

conceptions of a related topic: what is morally required of human beings. In other words, what counts as a good or right action, for each of them? On this issue, Augustine sits squarely within a central stream of western ethical reflection, which he helped shape. For Augustine, the crucial issue in evalu- ating human actions is ,;ihether they stem from a rightly directed will. This means they must be properly motivated by

1

caritas, and properly "referred" to the right ultimate end, beatitude with God (Trin. 11.10). The notion of reference at play here concerns the reason or end for which an action is taken, and Augustine envisions logical links between immediate proximate intentions, intermediate goals, and the ultimate ends of beatitude, glory, or pleasure, which determine the moral quality of every particular voluntas, no matter how minor. This means, crucially, that for Augustine actions that seem to perfectly fulfill the requirements of some duty, at least outwardly in terms of performance, can still be fundamentally evil if they are ultimately motivated by and "referred" to some wrong end, such as personal glory.

25

An example would be doing some visibly good deed, such as helping the prm·erbial old lady across the street, for an ultimately selfish reason, such as gaining a good reputation so that one might be entrusted with responsibility

and thus power. A corollary of this conception is that the actual outcome of one's efforts

is secondary at best, for Augustine. Indeed, because God uses all things for good, even the evil wills of sinning humans, according to Augustine every action will in some objective, external sense become part of God's provi- dential design, and thus be just and right. If one's own aims in action are thwarted, one may still rest assured that God has justly and wisely overruled one's efforts. For Augustine, in sum, moral evaluation hinges fundamentally on individual intention and motintion. As Augustine famously counsels, "Love, and do what vou will .... Let the root of love be within. From such , a root nothing but good can come forth" (ep.Jo. 7.8).

For Xunzi, the situation is more complicated. On his account, right action must be manifest in correct outward form, although to be perfect such action must be matched by appropriate emotions and desires; such is the "middle course where ritual flows." In his criticism of Mencius, Xunzi defines shan ~,"good," and e ~'"bad," as follows: "From antiquity to the present, what all under Heaven have called good is what is correct, prop- erl_y patterned, peaceful, and orderly. What is called bad is what is slanted, vicious, perverse, and chaotic" (23/ 115I1-2). The root meanings of good- ness for Xunzi seem to concern publicly observable states of affairs, mostly involving proper social order. But the context in which this remark is made is the debate m·er the character of human xing or instincts, which suggests

266 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

that the quality of human impulses is also at issue. Moreover, badness for Xunzi seems to include certain qualities of volition, such as viciousness and perversity.

To grasp what Xunzi has in mind, recall that for him the Way is "marked out" by the rituals (18/82/22-18/83/1). As discussed in chapter 6, to follow the Way one must behave in a ritually appropriate manner, which requires a certain sort of personal demeanor as well as a wide range of spe- cific behaviors, across all spheres of human activity, including but going well beyond particular important ceremonies. Moreover, the minute details of ritual incarnate general norms of justice (yi ~), and so they are crucial to the right ordering of society. Indeed, Xunzi says at one point that the Way is essentially a matter of creating community, by properly ordering, harmonizing, and nourishing people, so that they may flourish together ( 12 I 5 9 I 11-16). All of this suggests that right actions, on Xunzi 's under- standing, both aim at and succesifully achieve the outward manifestation of a properly patterned society. 26

This insistence on excellent observable form might suggest that Xunzi does not care particularly much about proper motivation and intention, but this would be mistaken. (It would also make rather mysterious his insistence on spiritual exercises designed to reform our dispositions and desires.) It is clear that Xunzi thinks we must possess the proper emotions and dispositions to fully exemplify the Way. One of his more general ways of making this point is his insistence that right action (i.e., action in accord with ritual and justice, and thus the Dao as well) must manifest the virtue of ren 1=, which for him means something like "benevolence," "caring,'' or "humaneness" (8/28/15). Indeed, he explicitly rej'tcts actions that are not based on ritual and justice but that accidentally hit on ·what is outwardly fit- ting, because he thinks such actions are not truly benevolent and 'vvill thus necessarily "fail,'' perhaps because they vvill fail to move their recipients appropriately (8I33I14). For him, it appears that full)· good actions must both be motivated by and manifest the benevolencoe, justice, and beautiful propriety characteristic of the Confucian Way. I

This generates an interesting complication, given Xunzi's account of assent overruling our inadequate emotions and desires. To put the point briefly, his psychology and personal format1on program suggest that most people, not being sages, will need to frequently push themselves toward proper outward observances of ritual and just action in ways that pull back from or go beyond their felt emotions and desires. Such actions, for him, must in some significant sense be good, because their ultimate goal is enact- ing the Way, even though they are imperfect in their flawed motivation. He

thus prioritizes correct ,: ~:- · in complex ways to our c, >: and to our initialh· mi~di:-:: _: _

These diff ere~ces iE ::-___ :- or right action play out ::: :_ and Xunzi each recomi~L:-. __ and serve to help interna.::::: study. Xunzi's overarchir< _ outward form (nenli ~::_:~'O_. devote much of his atkL:: :-_ like ritual and music. -;;-_:_ - -

their appearance and po<:: :-_ aiming throughout to er::-:..:_ "beautiful,'' as well a~ ii.:-: :~ outward-their attenti1x: : - : with othep. They thm c..::: :. and sensitivity to the nu:-::_:- forms create and enforce.

When Augustine m, ,·_ c - ing primarily to s;mbi,::_ ::._ practices such as petitiD:-_::.:-- practices of self-restrain: ,-.: _ · stood symbolically, anc :: - - with more positiw, artic-.::::.: _ self-examination, as in ti~c :..:_: what Foucault has calkd :.. ··:: _ scrutinizes one's inner i:~:::.: seemingly outward act:\:::·_ - refraining from eating fc:· :.. :

Because the mind fee.-"-..:~ and will/love, which cxi-:- ::.~ cial issues in personal for:-:·_::.:: one's inner discourse at ::.::- ..: it and properly direct i: :. - plished by refusing cmbc-:·_: · action, by as it were ''rcL::::· . ..: and by using the proper tc :-:·~­ tion of self and world. In<_::. _ just harmonization \Vi th - --

our, true self by correct:'.

: '.' :.'.,~.ATIVE PERSPECTIVE

:---.:c. :\loreover, badness for __ :: ·:1. such as viciousness and

-_ ~: :- 1:- him the Way is "marked

-.- ~:-cussed in chapter 6, to

"-??ropriate manner, which c., -.·. dl as a wide range of spe- :: - ::: . including but going well

:-:c: ':c-r. the minute details of ?[:_ . and so they arc crucial

:~ : '1:·s at one point that the :-_ .::-_:::,. b;- properly ordering, ,- ::-.c:, may flourish together

c.::ions, on Xunzi's under- -..:nYard manifestation of a

:-::~ :~1ight suggest that Xunzi - _ :- ~: JtiYation and intention,

:·:-_c.;.;_c rather mysterious his :-cc:- 1:-m our dispositions and

- -- '''-°SS the proper emotions :- his more general ways

- : :. .:: : 1:1 ti. e., action in accord - _ :: =~rnst manifest the virtue __ .-_c ···:·c-neYolence," 'tearing," or

:-c:'ects actions that are not :-. : n \\·hat is outwardlv fit-,

. ___ . :0 eneYolent and will thus . ___ moye their recipients

- ::·.c.: :ull;· good actions must _ :c:-.:c-. justice, and beautiful

:· . .:_:Yen Xunzi's account of c.:-. ~ ..:c-sires. To put the point

--_ :·:- 1;ram suggest that most ·_:_· :rnsh themselves toward

-: :..-.:: -,n in ways that pull back _, :·(·s. Such actions, for him,

_ - c: :heir ultimate goal is enact- ::·. :heir flawed motivation. He

-----

Spiritual Exercises and the Manipulation of Inner and Outer 267

thus prioritizes correct outward form and performance, but he relates this in complex ways to our considered intentions manifest in what we assent to, and to our initially misdirected dispositions and impulses.

These differences in their conceptions of what counts as genuinely good or right action play out in the regimes of spiritual exercises that Augustine and Xunzi each recommend, especially those that go beyond textual study and serve to help internalize or genuinely realize the lessons learned in such study. Xunzi's overarc~i~ii concern 'with proper social order and beautiful outward form ( wenli >Cm, "proper form and good order") leads him to devote much of his attention to what may be called performative practices like ritual and music. Such practices order persons in terms of not only their appearance and positioning but also their interrelations within groups, aiming throughout to create forms and patterns that are mei ~, "fine" and "beautiful," as well as just. In this sort of practice, individuals are pulled outward-their attention is focused on timely and appropriate interactions with others. They thus cultivate alert awareness of others and their actions, and sensitivity to the numerous moral and aesthetic distinctions that ritual forms create and enforce.

When Augustine moves beyond study, by contrast, he advocates turn- ing primarily to symbolic activities such as the Eucharist and discursive practices such as petitionary prayer, contemplation, and confession. Even practices of self-restraint, such as 1fasting and celibacy are repeatedly under- stood symbolically, and he clearly envisions them as being simultaneous with more positive, articulate practices of prayer, mutual exhortation, and self-examination, as in the a1;mual Easter vigil. All these exercises encourage what Foucault has called a "hermeneutics of the self," wherein one carefully scrutinizes one's inner impulse's and thoughts, even when these concern seemingly outward activities such as partaking in the bread and wine, or refraining from eating for a period of time. 27

Because the mind for Augustine is a trinity of memory, understanding, and will/love, which exists as an ongoing stream of"inner words," the cru- cial issues in personal formation are to discern the quality and "direction" of one's inner discourse at any giyen moment, and to do all one can to reshape it and properly direct it toward its true end. These goals may be accom- plished by refusing consent to sinful internal words before they issue in action, by as it were "reciting" im'.·ardly the discourse one wishes to adopt, and by using the proper terms to analyze and articulate one's own concep- tion of self and world. Instead of finding one's rightful place in beautiful and just harmonization with other ritual actors, for Augustine we are to find our true self by correctly discerning our own deep inner relation to God.

268 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

By locating and relying on this divine fountain within, vve may confidently go forth to love neighbor and even enemy; but without it, we are lost, both inwardly and outwardly.

To put the contrast schematically, Augustine pursues an "inside-out" model of personal formation, while Xunzi pursues an "outside-in" model. 28

In other v\TOrds, Augustine's exercises focus as much as possible on the mys- terious source of our actions in our inward "heart of hearts." By working to restrain concupiscent impulses so that God's love and wisdom may enter in and inspire us to righteous action, spiritual exercises directly address what is J_Ilost inward to change what generates our outward behavior. Xunzi instead suggests that the most potent strdtegy for effecting lasting inward change is to focus on what we can control reasonably well-our outward moYe- ments, gestures, and speech-and by working to perfect these observable actions, slowly and indirectly reforming the impulses that moye us spontane- ously, until at last they lead just as surely to outwardly perfect action.

This contrast helps to explain some of the striking differences between Augustine's and Xunzi's programs for personal formation. Xunzi gives remarkably little attention to the sorts of meditations that seem so integral to the various forms of Augustinian prayer, for instance. Xunzi makes exer- cises such as the memorization and recitation of classical poetry subsidiary and introductory parts of his account of Confucian study and learning, and he explicitly warns against making them more central than ritual practice under the personal guidance of a wise teacher ( 1 I 3 I 7-1 I 4 I 4). And though Xunzi does mention self-examination occasionally in his writings, it occupies noth- ing like the central place confession and self-scrutiny do for Augustine ( 1I1 I 5, 1/4/16-19, 2/5/3-6, 216112, 11/54/13; cf. 1/1/12-15). As argued in chapter 6, Xunzian self-examination seems to be a self-interrogation con- cerning one's treatment of close and distant human beings, and whether one has conscientiously enacted what one teaches and purports to follow, rather than a careful sifting and interpretation of thoughts and desires to ferret out hidden sinfulness.

Furthermore, in contrast to the relatively direct pageantry of Xunzian ritual, Augustinian rituals such as the Eucharist are shot through with sym- bolism, and, they are meant to be occasions for the contemplation of sym- bols. As Robert Dodaro has argued, "Behind [Augustine's] enthusiasm for liturgical symbolism lies a Platonic sensitivity to the movement from visible to invisible orders of reality." 29 According to Augustine, as we move men- tally from the physical reality of the bread and wine to their Christian sym- bolic meaning, to their spiritus or inner meaning, our minds are excited and drawn "upward and inward" to God's eternal truths in a way that would be difficult to achieYe without allegory and symbolism ( ep. 5 5. 21). For Xunzi,

Spiritual Exe::=:

the details of the rit·..;_o__ - :-.. monly understood to c-:x:-::-c - this meaning is not iL c.: __ : and somewhat literal. .> · plete or unusable, to =~-. :.:- .-: - person were simph c ·. -=-< using any of these imp:c::-:·. _-:..

Let us pursue one c·..:. :-_ . inside-out and outsic:c-:::-_ ---

intriguing and deep ci·<:::-. the value of pretence ::-. - - _ .:

proscription of h-ins;. "" '.-.: _ :·. was a departur~ fr~L :: ::.- .. the topic (mend., c. ,"T.c:< most forms of sin, \\·:~:: :-__ · who are "before the la· ... ·· ::-. goodness of the end \\,~ ~ _-. sciously overvaluing i: ::-::_::.:

l . ( ,[ 1 ' - -rea ity e.g., co0 . .:. . ~ .. _ - for Augustine is the Tr:.:::-. . tion from God and Go::·, :-

under any circumstaL:c: - . :-. doing so (mend. 42.i. b::cc _ lie about matters of re;:_.:: :-. gious instruction or tr::.::-.:: .:: particularly heinous 1 ~o:< -

This absolutist con::::-:: of the religious life as ::. . . ..

and outwardly, so tha: :::-. " , truth telling and l_,;ing c.' ;- : t . "E d me, very prou pers · :-. : · to be what he is not; he ::.:-.: Israelite" or genuine beL· .. :- guile (dolus, lit. 'artifice· :- : ascend? How do theY as:c:-. _ · more splendidly said. J-..:-: :_. sumptuous wants to ap:= c: :.:- who confesses does not "" ~-. what He [i.e., God] is·, c::: .~ pretense or outward an::-:..-: . dissemble about its true-:::.:,

'.' ;:_ :ZATIVE PERSPECTIVE

·<:hin, 1ve may confidently · ::'.1out it, we are lost, both

--:-.c oursues an "inside-out" · - ..: ::-- ~n "'outside-in" model. 28 :-::·..:..:i as possible on the mys- -.:.:-: 1f hearts." By working to

· -- .:.:1d \Visdom may enter in .:- ::-c-s Jirectly address what is ·- · c.::-2. behavior. Xunzi instead _ :::::..;_ lasting inward change

· ce 11-our outward move- .: : '.Jerfect these observable :: ..::'c' that move us spontane- - :· .:.c-dl:· perfect action.

-:<~~ng differences between :-. .o.: '~xmation. Xunzi gives

.. :.:.-:-: ,ns that seem so integral - _:-_ -:i:1ce. Xunzi makes exer-

: ..::2ssical poetry subsidiary .. :..:·.-::.:cl: and learning, and he ::-c.: :.'.1J.n ritual practice under - - : ..:.. +). _.\nd though Xunzi -, ··ritings, it occupies noth-

for Augustine ( 1 I 1 I 5, 12-15). As argued in

: _ 2 ,-elf-interrogation con- : ..:::..:211 beings, and whether

~ _ :. ::.- ' 2:1d purports to follow, :'.10ughts and desires to

. -c ,t pageantry of Xunzian -: c.:-c -hot through with sym-

:- :::::- contemplation of sym- . ~--;;i~tine's] enthusiasm for

: :::( movement from visible -_..:;..:stine, as we move men-

_:-:c- to their Christian sym- : . ..:. :.;,r minds are excited and ::-·..:::1, in a way that would be

.:-:11 12p . .)5 .21 ). For Xunzi,

Spiritual Exercises and the Manipulation of Inner and Outer 269

the details of the rituals he discusses haYe meaning in that they are com- monly understood to express certain feelings and thoughts; yet the mode of this meaning is not in any obvious sense symbolic but rather conventional and somewhat literal, as when the grave goods are all in ~ome way incom- plete or unusable, to mark the fact that, although mourners wish the dead person were simply moying to a new abode, he or she 1Yill not actually be using any of these implements (19/95/6-13).

Let us pursue one such issue in greater depth. The basic contrast between inside-out and outside-in strategies of personal cultivation helps explain an intriguing and deep disagreement between Augustine and Xunzi concerning the value of pretence in self-formation. Consider first Augustine's absolute proscription oflying, which he discusses in two separate treatises, and which was a departure from earlier, somewhat less strict Christian reflection on the topic (mend., c. mend.). 3° For Augustine, lying appears to be essential to most forms of sin, vvhich except in unusual cases (e.g., the unevangelized who are "before the law") require that we lie to ourselves about the relative goodness of the end we pursue, such as human companionship, by semicon- sciously oyervaluing it relative to God's unchanging hierarchical ordering of reality (e.g., corif. 2.3.7, 2.6.14, 2.8.16, Gn. litt. 11.42.59). Because God for Augustine is theTruth (conj 3.6.10, c. mend. 40), lying is at root a defec- tion from God and God's ordering of reality, and so it may never be excused under any circumstances, no matter what other evils might be avoided by doing so (mend. 42). Indeed, for Augustine, the worst sort of deception is a lie about matters ofreligion; he views any sort oflying in the midst

1 ofrdi-

gious instruction or training, purportedly for someone's spiritual good, as particularly heinous (mend. 1 7).

This absolutist conception of truthfulness leadsAugustine'to exalt a vision of the religious life as a continuing confession of the truth, both inwardly and outwardly, so that the Christian life can be seen as a contest between truth telling and lying as general modes of existence. Ac;:cording to Augus- tine, "Every proud person is an impostor .... Any proud person pretends to be what he is not; he cannot do otherwise." In contrast to this, the "true Israelite" or genuine believer who "ascends to Jerusalem" is one "in whom no guile (dolus, lit. 'artifice') is to be found." Augustine concludes: "Why do they ascend? How do they ascend? To confess to your name, oh Lord. It cannot be more splendidly said. Just as pride presumes, humility confesses. The pre- sumptuous wants to appear to be something they are not; just so someone who confesses does not want to appear other than they truly are, and loves what He [i.e., God] is" (en. Ps. 121. 8). On Augustine's account, it appears that pretense or outward artifice is always a mark of human pride, which seeks to dissemble about its true state as subject to God. This world-oriented guile is

270 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

radically opposed to the truth-confessing love of God. The need for humble confession of dependence on God becomes only greater \'\·hen one takes up exalted positions within the community, such as ecclesiastical office or consecrated virginity. Indeed, a great danger in such a state is pretending to be humble outwardly, while inwardly one begins to revel proudly in the graces one has already been given, which destroys from within like a spiri-

tual cancer ( virg. 4 3. 44). Needless to say, such a vision of the dangers of pretense is dramati-

cally opposed to both the rhetoric and, to a lesser degree, the real position of Xunzi, who provocatively chooses wei ~ or "artifice" as his summary tertn for both the process of personal formation and good character itself (22/107/24). On Xunzi's account, we must meet objective moral stan- dards, which often take the form of observable public performances, despite the fact that our inadequately cultivated dispositions do not sponta- neously make us feel like doing so. We thus, in a very real sense, pretend to be more virtuous than we yet are, by imitating the clothes, gestures, words, and general demeanor of a noble man, even though this does violence to

our true feelings. Is Xunzi guilty of advising all aspiring Confucians to lie about their true

character? The charitable answer must be no, because a Xunzian aspirant is not deceiving himself, or even others, about what he is doing, ·which is learning to become good by trying to act the part. More precisely, when someone engages in "artifice" in Xunzi's technical sense, they are ke PJ, "assenting," to some particular plan of action based on preceding Iii J:I, "deliberation," about what is best, that is, what matches the Way in the cur- rent situation; or if they are true beginners, by assenting to directions given by their teacher, whom they respect and trust even though they do not yet understand him well. Though the aspirant will suffer the frustration of thwarting some of his desires, he will be achieving, however clumsily and imperfectly, what he aims for, which is a ritually correct performance. Even in the case of an educated man, Xunzi's partly cultivated Confucian, who assents to acting properly in public on the basis of his own assessment of some matter despite his countervailing desires, this cannot really be counted as deception, because of the essential role of his assent in making such an action possible. Such Confucians are neither deceived about their own internal states, because they overrule their inappropriate desires and emotions, nor do they deceive others, because they honestly cherish the

values conveyed by their performances. Xunzi's psychological separation of assent from the responsive system

of dispositions governing spontaneous desire and emotion thus makes pos- sible a fundamentally different form of pretence from anything envisaged

Spiritual Exe:c':o:::o ::

by Augustine. But ew:: ::. exactly Xunzi thinks "ac:::-. .:: - good. 31 Might it not sic:: ~ and mind as corrupt as c-·. c:- -

Xunzi's reply to s'.l,-~_ c.. very important dissin:i:c..:-::: _ practice and Xunzian r'.:-..:c..'. ~ cally relate to some hi.::;..c_ ~

reasons, in pursuit of gc' _ · .: did dramatic performc.:-_c:: · or goods external to tL -- :- famous, or running a,,-3.:· :.:_ :

Xunzian ritual is supp'~''"' : : making just and beau:::-_: sions. Moreover, actin.:: c icry, or at least believ~l- c - included. But Xunzian :-::..:~ of the ancient sages, an.:: :: _ - in as much detail as po--::-:_ to imitate in general bi.:.: : human beings. 33 Thus ~~-::- .. the advice of his teacher -· skill at acting in the con:c::·:·_-- exercise or not exerci<c- -- - Confucians generall;·. ··,;_;_: __ ··

the overarching art of L-. ::·_..:: life and is not somethin.:: :: ~ cultivated, based on ,,f::~: cians like Xunzi, genuiLc -,_: conception.

Moving to the Yocab·..:_c..:- of cultivating virtue thr· -..:;:- between virtue and skill ::-. learn to be virtuous b" .~ _ ::·. already have the prop~r ::-_: _ that though excellent cc· craft products, it is not c:-__ _ it is insufficient for virL ·_: · such actions must be cJ, ·::c knows what he is <loins: c.:-_ -~ furthermore does it o~:

'.' :.:.~,W,TIVE PERSPECTIVE

: ~,,d. The need for humble -- - _:::reater when one takes

__ :-_ ::,; ecclesiastical office or _:-_ , .:ch a state is pretending _ ;::> to revel proudly in the

~ ' :rom 'vithin like a spiri-

::: _ _ pretense is dramati- · <:- ~e;ree, the real position

:- ··:::-t:ihce" as his summary :-_ ::.:~=. good character itself

:-_-_-::': objective moral stan- - :.- : :: public performances,

~<-' )Sitions do not sponta- - ::-:-\· r<"al sense, pretend to

.>·':hes, gestures, words, .:_:::'.1 this does violence to

_:::>to lie about their true ~-:: 2·_:..;e a Xunzian aspirant

_ ~ - -~::: !1e is doing, which is

~ :::-: . .\lore precisely, when -_:-___ ::: sense, they are ke Pf,

--_ .- > :::: on preceding Iii JJi:, - :-·.:.:,~_e, the Way in the cur-

>'_:-_ :::1g to directions given _ -: _ - ec:1 though they do not

,uffer the frustration ~ _ -_:c· ::-:g. hmvever clumsily

c11rrect performance. cciltinted Confucian,

, , ,f his 0\\'!1 assessment _ _ . this cannot really be

: :- his assent in making _ ::~ _ :- deceiwd about their

__ - ::·.:::·propriate desires and

::~"':' honestly cherish the

::~ the responsive system :::~otion thus makes pos- ::- m anything envisaged

Spiritual Exercises and the Manipulation of Inner and Outer 271

by Augustine. But even a very charitable Augustinian might wonder why exactly Xunzi thinks "acting the part" of goodness will eventually make one good. 31 Might it not simply cultivate acting skill, while leaving one's heart and mind as corrupt as ever?

Xunzi's reply to such a query would be multifaceted_ First, there are very important dissimilarities between "acting" as a contemporary artistic practice and Xunzian ritual as a spiritual exercise_ Acting does not intrinsi- cally relate to some higher goal, and it can be pursued for any number of reasons, in pursuit of goods internal to the practice such as producing splen- did dramatic performances, or further cultinting one's skill as an actor; or goods external to the practice, such as earning a paycheck, becoming famous, or running away from one's own troubled existence. 32 By contrast, Xunzian ritual is supposed to be performed in order to follow the Way by making just and beautiful both everyday existence and important occa- sions. Moreover, acting covers any and all sorts of behavior-perfect mim- icry, or at least believable simulation, of the full range of human conduct included. But Xunzian ritual is focused on only one sort of character, that of the ancient sages, and it is meant to encode and vivify their mode of life in as much detail as possible, so that the aspiring Confucian is not learning to imitate in general but to imitate the mode of life of the wisest and best human beings. 33 Thus the skill at ritual an aspirant cultivates by following the adYice of his teacher would be skill only at acting like a sage. Moreover, skill at acting in the contemporary sense is a specialized craft that one might exercise or not exercise ,vhenever one felt like it. But for Xunzi, and for Confucians generally, "skill" at ritual is equivalent to increasing mastery of the overarching art of living as a human being, which covers all aspects of life and is not something one sets aside, or even could set aside if sufficiently cultivated, based on whim or circumstance. 34 In other vmrds, for Confu- cians like Xunzi, genuine skill at ritual is identical to virtue itself, in their

conception. Moving to the vocabulary of "skill" recalls Aristotle's famous discussion

of cultivating virtue through practicing it, ·where he distinguishes sharply between virtue and skill in order to defeat the objection that one could not learn to be virtuous by doing virtuous actions, because such actions must already have the proper intention to be truly virtuous. 35 Aristotle suggests that though excellent outward form is sufficient to judge the goodness of craft products, it is not enough to judge the skill of the artisan. Moreover, it is insufficient for virtuous actions to merely possess the right qualities; such actions must be done by a person in the right state, that is, one who knows what he is doing and ''vhy (something good, because it is good), and furthermore does it out of a "firm and unchanging" state of character. On

272 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

this basis, he distinguishes between just actions, which are the sort that a just person would do, and performing such actions in the right way, in the manner that a truly just person would. Aristotle at this point simply asserts that the only way one can move toward actually possessing steady states of virtuous character is to frequently perform actions that outwardly manifest the good ("just actions"), as a way of practicing the deliberation that decides on what is good for its own sake, and of training emotions, desires, and discernment in order to see and judge in a consistently just manner.

Xunzi, however, can go well beyond this sort of account, given his view of the centrality of ritual skill to moral Yirtue. For him, this special sort of skill is much closer to virtue, and indeed is essential to its full possession. Where Aristotle distinguishes sharply between virtue and skill, Xunzi con- spicuously fails to make such a sharp distinction, although v\·e should note the disanalogies mentioned above between acting and ritual mastery.

Although the two sorts of practice do differ, Xunzian personal forma- tion seems to share significant commonalities with the process of becoming an excellent musician or dancer. 36 In such practices, one must learn many basic rules and also learn how to actually execute certain sorts of move- ments and, eventually, performances, so that they are beautiful and good, according to the standards of the practice in question. 37 Several related things happen as practice deepens. As one gains greater expertise, one begins to understand the rationale for aspects of the practice that initially seemed arbitrary, painful, or irritating. Skill of this sort, however, is just as much physical as mental-one learns how to play the violin beautifully V\ith one's fingers and hands as much as one's mind; one learns with both body and mind how to move smoothly and easily through various sorts of ritually regulated interactions. One also comes to better appreciate the subtleties that differentiate poor, middling, and fine performances. In tandem with this growing sensitivity, one gradually develops what can only be called artful style in one's own practice, although here there would presumably be room for a range of achievement. Indeed, Xunzi's near-assimilation of virtue vvith a certain sort of skill at living extends to his treatment of the sage, who may be distinguished from the noble man not only by his greater understanding of the Way and his perfected dispositions but also by his extraordinary skill at politically effectiYe moral leadership (8/30/15-17). Perhaps most cru- cially, as ritual mastery increases, one gradually delights more and more in the beauty of the art one is creating through performance, and in one's own and others' abilities to perform so well.

This last point is essential to the plausibility of Xunzi's Confucianism. At the end of chapter 5, I questioned whether Xunzi could adequately explain how petty people might come to be motivated by love for the Way itself

Spiritual Exerc":;:::; :::

rather than the benetits :~.:­ zi's ritual reformation r.:·. - ~ _

skill training just disCU''" ~. ing. As this regimen is ?·..:.::-- _ sources of satisfaction. ::"C- and will show that one·, :-: :- _ · Xunzi puts it. Profit or p~< : it is dramatically less in::- :-:~ marked by social justice. ·=-. :·. aesthetic culture that cc.;;: c - musical practice thus F ::> of evaluation, our sen~i~<::: desires. Xunzi's Confu::c.:-.-: of the contemporar;· a<-' .. :.: seeking.

On Xunzi's accou:1:. ::..:-: the basis oflearning. c1 ·:·_, _ tifiably say that someone -- :- comes from loving lik::-::.:· _ _- Xunzi thinks that the.:·..:.::..:.:- the most important hi..:.r.::c.- ~ distinguishable from an::::::. _ _-

A critic could certa':-.. · :: just moved the problen: • ····:~ the whole Confucian ~'-< _ :· · advancement, as marn :~.::­ edly did? Xunzi, like the c::- _ Analects, is fully a\vare 11i ::-__ _ no foolproof certaint;· t'.:::.: ; of submitting to a Coni·..:..:.c: goodness. Only if that p::- . _ kindle awareness of anc :::. -: zian virtue become pos<·=-:: probably put together t': :- · about how to choose '' - :-:.-_ those who follow the anc:c:·: which the duke responC.': ··:- and tucks an official table: - that this is not necessari> - Confucians to the \Ya\" tl-.c-· heart/mind) on the ~Ya\".

: '.' ::~RATIVE PERSPECTIVE

:-_ -.• ,,-hi ch are the sort that a . ::: - :-1s in the right way, in the ::_ -: 2.t this point simply asserts .::_ ?Ossessing steady states of :: ::s that outwardly manifest

:. ::-_c- deliberation that decides ::._::::-_; emotions, desires, and :-_-:.o:entl;- just manner.

:-: A- account, given his view _ :=: r him, this special sort of -- :::: :ial to its full possession. ~--::-rue and skill, Xunzi con-

·--· although we should note ::::-_; and ritual mastery. : : ::: :-. :\: unzian personal forma- . · : ::--_ the process of becoming

·::.. ::ces. one must learn many ·- __ -::::e certain sorts of move- : ::-_;::. are beautiful and good, :- :::-:::estion. 37 Several related ;.:.::> greater expertise, one

: ::1e practice that initially - :~_:, sort, however, is just as

-- _ ::.: :he Yiolin beautifully with _ -· :-.e learns with both body . :- -:::;~- nrious sorts of ritually _ :: : :- :. ?preciate the subtleties

:-:-:-_Tees. In tandem with this :-_.:.: cm only be called artful

--.;.:d presumably be room _::.:--3.os::milation of virtue with - _::. ::-:: cnt of the sage, who may

:- : ~-:s greater understanding ::., ' : :i:- his extraordinary skill

: :-1 i). Perhaps most cru- _- :=.c:ights more and more in _ :-:- · :-n;ance, and in one's own

:-:\:unzi's Confucianism. At ::::-::: could adequately explain : _ ~ ':-:, loYe for the Way itself

Spiritual Exercises and the Manipulation of Inner and Outer 273

rather than the benefits they might perceive to "playing along" with it. Xun- zi's ritual reformation model hinges on the characteristics of performative skill training just discussed, combined with the process of Confucian learn- ing. As this regimen is pursued over time, one will become aware of new sources of satisfaction, new values, that vvill relativize all that went before and will show that one's previous concerns were indeed "petty" or "small,'' as Xunzi puts it. Profit or personal benefit is not evil, on Xunzi's reckoning, but it is dramatically less important and valuable than the Confucian form of life marked by social justice, beneYolent communal harmony, and the ritual and aesthetic culture that makes these possible. Confucian learning, ritual, and musical practice thus promise to transform our understanding and scheme of evaluation, our sensibilities, our capabilities and habits, and our tastes and desires. Xunzi's Confucianism is a comprehensive art of living well, shorn of the contemporary associations of that phrase with self-indulgent pleasure seeking.

On Xunzi's account, almost everything that makes life good grows on the basis oflearning, considered broadly. In the same way that we might jus- tifiably say that someone ·vvho never learned to read at all has missed all that comes from loving literature, and lived a stunted and deprived existence, Xunzi thinks that the culture of Confucian learning and practice opens up the most important human goods, without v\·hich human beings are barely distinguishable from animals. 38

A critic could certainly persist, howeyer, and question whether this has just moved the problem of"faking it" to a new level. Why could one not view the whole Confucian system as merely an excellent method for personal advancement, as many throughout premodern Chinese history undoubt- edly did? Xunzi, like the circle of Confucius's followers who produced the Analects, is fully aware of this problem, and in the end he thinks there can be no foolproof certainty that going through the "wood-straightening" process of submitting to a Confucian teacher will automatically lead to true inner goodness. Only if that process genuinely opens new horizons of life, which kindle awareness of and taste for previously unimagined goods, will Xun- zian virtue become possible. A story in one of the late chapters of the Xunzi probably put together by his students presents Confucius talking to a duke about how to choose worthy ministers. Confucius first suggests choosing those who follow the ancient ritual codes, including dress and demeanor, to which the duke responds: "Is anyone ·who dons court robes and court shoes and tucks an official tablet into his sash a worthy person?" Confucius replies that this is not necessarily so, and then he clearlv relates the excellence of Confucians to the way th~y focus their zni ~' "in"tentions" (i.e., direct their heart/mind) on the ways of the ancients and care little about food, which

274 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

seems to stand in here for personal interests in pleasure and advancement. He concludes, "Even if there should be some who abide by these [ways of the ancients] and still do wrong, they would be few indeed, vvould they not?"To which the duke can only reply: "Well spoken!" (31I144/27-31I14515). 39

The idea seems to be that it would be extraordinarily difficult to pursue Confucian training long enough to become observably excellent at ritual without being changed inwardly. If one never came to delight in the Way, one's dedication would flag and one would simply give up, or one would betray continuing pettiness through "slips" of the tongue or body. (This sug- gests that corrupt, lazy, or irreducibly "petty" students \Vould eventually by expelled from a Xunzian teaching group.) Xunzi thinks that the practices of learning, ritual, and music are themselves very potent, and when guided by a capable teacher and accompanied by other serious students, one v<>ill be "rubbed" daily by good influences that only heighten these exercises' effectiveness-but because the root issue is the transformation of the self- commanding human heart/mind, Xunzi must allow for all-too-explicable failures of cultivation, due to the intransigent pull of instinctive desires. Such failures may take the form of "apostates" from Confucianism vYho advocate some other Way, or the su Ru 1ft1fffi, "vulgar Confucians,'' whom Xunzi describes with scorn as those who ape the manner of a true ritualist and spout pointless quotations from the Odes, all for the purpose of enrich- ing themselves at the expense of others (8I32117-21 ).

Might the aesthetic delights of Confucian ritual become a sort of idol, so that the adept who sees and enjoys his growing mastery of ritual could fall prey to a final sort of immoral seduction, caring only about the beauty of ritual performance and forgetting the value of justice and benevolence? Though Xunzi does not explicitly entertain this possibility, it seems clear that he could understand this as a case of obsession by ritual. And though ritual is a fine thing, essential to personal formation and the conduct of a good life, for Xunzi, it is not the only or uniquely supreme human value. Apparent "mastery" of ritual without a deeper understanding and love for the Way, manifest in the equal possession of the virtues of benevolence and justice, vwuld be rigid and misguided (217/18-19). In other words, it would be merely counterfeit propriety.

To sum up, Xunzi thinks "artifice" is both necessary and saving because it allows us to learn, as embodied actors, how to live like sages. Such artifice is more like learning an art of performance than it is like pretending to be something one is not, because beginners cannot effectiYely pretend to be ritual masters, any more than I can pretend to be a concert violinist. Early- stage Confucians aspire to ritual mastery, but they only gradually approach such a state. In so doing, they are genuinely transformed, as long as they

persevere with a heart =~---=-­ is not something that or~c : :-_: of existence that permL:::_ - gradually grasps \vhat i' ::- _ watchful over onese If '>'. :-_ c :. eYen for a moment ( 3 : : -

One might say, thee:::-_.:.· and even demands it. \ \-:-_ c :- _ moral purpose decisiYc:: -- enabling true human a;e::-_. - much less finalitY. For \:-.::-. ever do, when we find ' -_:_-, _ learning and performaLc:. - and a more impressi\-(· :::-__ ·

altogether richer than"" c :_.:. _ desires that once mow·c.'. ..:. - ~­ the whole constellation : _ our increasingly sophisc::: ::_: _

CHAST

As noted at the beginni:-.; ing and significant co:~-.=~-­ shared stress on the nee-:.: : - of their respectiw pro;:-.:.:> that despite their ver:• <;-- out their religious pro;:-.:.:-_ - tion, one that is quite P' -.-. _ :- lectualism." Such a pos::: · :-. and reflection, but it q:.:c-:: thinking.

Augustinian Christi:::-_::· because they think tex: --:- ::_ -

learning are prerequisite' : Augustine, as noted in ci-_::-.-: pleas heroes of the fait'.-.. :- _ a web of crucial truths.-:_-: order to be saved and across anthropolog;·, pc:-- ·- Xunzi both beliew tha: '.-. .:.:- into existence ignorant ·: ::

',' :.:,:;:~TIVE PERSPECTIVE

:-_ :: : C"J.sure and advancement. :-_ :::~'ide by these [ways of the

::-_ ::eed, >Yould they not?"To - ~: 1++/27-31/145/5). 39

::: :- ~:narily difficult to pursue :- '::e:-•.-abh excellent at ritual

:- _ ::::~1c to delight in the Way, .:-:~::>. giYe up, or one would :-_: : ngue or body. (This sug- , -_: :c·:1b ,_-ould eventually by _:-_::: :hinks that the practices c-: ?<Jtent, and when guided

. _ :- -z:rious students, one will ::c:ighten these exercises'

- ::-::::1sformation of the self- \\ for all- too-explicable

-- - :: _:J of instinctive desires. : . --· ::-·)m Confucianism who

,._·_::pr Confucians," whom : - _ :~~ 11mer of a true ritualist

~--: :- the purpose of enrich-

: - --=-1 I. . :-::·_::::become a sort of idol,

:-~; mastery of ritual could _ ::.:-::~; only about the beauty

:- '-.istice and benevolence? -.:> Y>ssibility, it seems clear -_ < 1:1 b;- ritual. And though -:-~:::::,,n and the conduct of a _: __ ::. 'upreme human value. _ :- _::-_ ~crstanding and love for

- ::·:~1e,; of benevolence and

. '-: Y 1. In other words, it

_ --1r;· and saving because :- c: iike sages. Such artifice

::.:-_ :: i,; like pretending to be : (Ifcctivcly pretend to be

_- -e: J. concert violinist. Early- :-_-:; only gradually approach ::-msformed, as long as they

Chastened Intellectualism

..... ·····1~"',· • I~ ·: :!~ ..

I! :~:~,,

275

persevere with a heart/ mind focused on the Way, because ritual for Xunzi is not something that one engages in occasionally but rather a style or mode of existence that permeates all our activities and social interactions. As one gradually grasps ·what is truly at stake, one will even shen qi du 'fJt~3;}, "be watchful over oneself when alone," so that one never departs from ritual

even for a moment (3/ 11 /7). One might say, then, that Xunzi allows for something like inspiration--

and even demands it. Where Augustine solves the problem of sincerity and moral purpose decisively by insisting on the primacy of di>iine agency in enabling true human agency and virtue, Xunzi "solves" the problem with much less finality. For Xunzi, we come to experience a new sincerity, if we ever do, >vhen we find ourselves to be changed by our ongoing practices of learning and performance, when the Way we sought in order to find safety and a more impressive and pleasant form of life turns out to be something altogether richer than we had initially imagined possible, and we find that the desires that once moved us have been joined by new desires, subtly changing the whole constellation of our emotional life, in gradually better accord with our increasingly sophisticated understanding of what life is about.

CHASTENED INTELLECTUALISM

As noted at the beginning of the previous section, perhaps the most arrest- ing and significant commonality between Xunzi and Augustine is their shared stress on the need for study, learning, and reflection as the backbone of their respective programs of spiritual exercises. In this section, I argue that despite their very significant differences, this shared emphasis marks out their religious programs as variants of a common sort of ethical posi- tion, one that is quite pmYerful and attractive, which I call "chastened intel- lectualism." Such a position affirms the value of intellectual apprehension and reflection, but it questions the neutrality and absolute sovereignty of

thinking. Augustinian Christianity and Xunzian Confucianism are "intellectualist"

because they think text-based learning and intellectual reflection on this learning are prerequisites for living well as human beings. (And although Augustine, as noted in chapter 6, recognizes and respects illiterate holy peo- ple as heroes of the faith, he thinks that even such people have had to learn a web of crucial truths, stories, and symbols from someone, via language, in order to be saved and live righteously.) The common elements here stretch across anthropology, personal formation, and ethics itself. Augustine and Xunzi both believe that human beings have much to learn, that we come into existence ignorant of the most important truths, so that we must learn

276 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

at least these facts about our condition to live decent human lives, and much more to be capable of wise and just leadership in a community.

These views lead both Augustine and Xunzi to strongly emphasize education and to generate integrated accounts of its intellectual, moral, somatic, and aesthetic aspects. For both of them, proper understanding is essential to right living; progressively deeper wisdom is a concomitant of growth in virtue. Both think that the mastery of certain received texts helps us immensely toward these goals of understanding and virtue. These goals are not easy to achieve, but are needed nonetheless, because life is com- plicated and the best course of action is frequently unclear. This implies that some form of thoughtful deliberation, guided by traditional categories and modes of analysis assimilated through reflective practice, will often be required in order to choose and live well in a confusing and often disor- dered world.

This sort of position therefore judges ethical theory to be indispens- able to living rightly. Ethical theory plays several important roles in this sort of vision, most notably description, guidance, and inspiration. It describes the ethically ideal form of life, and it justifies its superiority on the basis of an overarching account of both human beings and the world we inhabit. Theory explains how and why this better mode differs from typical human existence, and it at least in part guides us to this new form oflife. Though the task of mastering ethical theory is therefore essential to living well, vvithout teachers, practice, and various forms of transhuman aid, theory will be insuf- ficient by itself to lead us to goodness. Guidance, then, includes not only the more familiar problem of sorting out which sorts of actions are typically for- bidden or required by various moral considerations but also a full response to the problem of personal appropriation of a new way of life. And to the extent that it can make compelling its analysis and contrast of typical human life and the perfected, flourishing life, ethical theory is thereby inspiring to its students, although this sort of contrast is most often made vivid through more traditional rhetorical arts such as storytelling and drama.

Augustine and Xunzi are each, however, "chastened" in their intellectu- alism. This makes their positions more sophisticated and promising than the kind of modern philosophical ethics that concentrates only on theories of the right or the good, leaving the question of how to actually appropriate and live such theories to the side as a nonissue~a maneuver that seems to presuppose a naive voluntarism, as well as an unreasonably benign account of human nature.

There are several aspects to this chastening. The most obvious aspect is the highly critical accounts of elements of human "nature" offered by Augustine and Xunzi, as discussed in chapters 3 to 5. Although they differ in

their analyses, the basic p ::-_: something that does not c :.-:-_ us in our current state, \\-:-.c::.-_ better form oflife or not.-.'. _ live well, often taking tb: : - people who help us esc::.::- _ toward something bette::-.

Neither Augustine ni ::- :< philosophy ofbootstrapp::~; According to Augustine. -.· : news" about Jesus Christ ::.:-__ God; we also need direc: ::-_: Furthermore, the onl:- ce ::.:-_ potential for a new start::~ _:: collective and institutio:~ :.:- Christ, who has deputize:.'. :._: or "whole Christ." Refoc~--::.­ through participation in ::-_ ::- that its members share. i::-.:: _:

Even on Xunzi's acc1 ·-.:.:-_:

save themselves from the::- :- Only when frustrated anc ::.::- instinctive urges. The:- nee : c cal progress. But if the:· :·.::- bad friends, they are ju< ::. · by their bad impulses. :\.c~ :- preserved and developed ::-: the dilemmas of the hmL:.:-_ humans remain "vulgar:· c::.:-_:

Although both thin1'.e:-' for anyone to progress ir_ ::-:; thinks we need transhum::.:-_ :. commonly read as a "deb 1-.:.:-_~: he is beloved by some n~ ~ _ of China) as a protosecul::.:-: '· this judgment is beyond ::> does rely on the efficac: __ interactions of qi \'\'ith an-=. :- cussions of music, Xunz: ::.:- listening to classical Zho'c:. ;:- _ evoke responses in us tha: :.::-

. '.' :.:,:;:ATIVE PERSPECTIVE

_ ~ :~:;t human lives, and much - .:·. :. community.

'~ .:::-.?; to strongly emphasize -,i its intellectual, moral,

.. :-:: . proper understanding is ···.:-:lorn is a concomitant of

: _:-:-:a.in received texts helps :- _:r.; and virtue. These goals . -::-.:-:c--os, because life is com- :.::::·.::: unclear. This implies . : _ ~ S:· traditional categories : _ ::·::- practice, will often be ::. _ ::fusing and often disor-

-_: c.: :~eor\· to be indispens-

-:.. :::-::portant roles in this sort c.~: ~ ::;spiration. It describes

· ::- -oc:.periority on the basis <:· c.:-.~ the world we inhabit. __ ~::·:-ers from typical human

· :-. _ ··. :·•rm of life. Though the

· . :·. ::3.: :o liYing well, without _:-:· c.:-. 2..id, theory will be insuf-

. ::·_(E. includes not only the ·:· : c.ctions are typically for- ::.·:: :·.' "='ut also a full response :.. :·. _ · "'av of life. And to the :..:· ~ : : r.trast of typical human

=-:· :s thereby inspiring to -: :·:en made vivid through .:·.;: 2:-.d drama.

. r > :c::ed" in their intellectu-

-_::.: = ::. and promising than the . : r. ::-2 ':es onlv on theories of , · r ··. ui actually appropriate . -- c. :-:~aneuyer that seems to .:-.:-:-:..;onably benign account

:-.; -:-~.e most obvious aspect . ,, ,, f'f' db : :-. .::-::an nature o iere y

: : ) .. -\!though they differ in

Chastened Intellectualism 277

their analyses, the basic point is that good human agency is an achievement, something that docs not come "naturally" (i.e., spontaneously and easily) to us in our current state, whether this is conceived as fallen from some earlier, better form of life or not. We need significant outside assistance in order to

live well, often taking the form of sustained, benevolent action from other people who help us escape our initial, rather bestial, existence and move

toward something better. Neither Augustine nor Xunzi could ever be accused of propounding a

philosophy of bootstrapping or rugged individualism in moral development . According to Augustine, we need not only to hear from others the "good news" about Jesus Christ and the way he provides for humans to return to God; we also need direct intervention from God to move us toward Him. Furthermore, the only means of gaining forgiveness from our sins and the potential for a nevv start in life is through baptism into the church, a human collective and institution that points beyond itself to its heavenly head, Christ, who has deputized his human members as parts of the totus Christus or "whole Christ." Reformation and eventual beatitude are only possible through participation in the common life of the church and the practices that its members share, including scriptural study and the Eucharist.

Even on Xunzi's account, however, individuals are not in a position to

save themselYes from their misguided desires purely on their own power. Only when frustrated and afraid will people look for guidance beyond their instinctive urges. They need a teacher and fellow students to make any ethi- cal progress. But if they turn to the wrong teacher or are afflicted with bad friends, they are just as likely to exacerbate the problems generated by their bad impulses. According to Xunzi, the tradition of the Zhou sages, preserved and developed by Confucians, holds the unique keys to resolving the dilemmas of the human condition. Without exposure to this tradition, humans remain '\·ulgar," dangerous to each other and everything else.

Although both thinkers clearly believe human assistance is required

for anyone to progress in righteousness, it might seem that only Augustine thinks we need transhuman aid as well, in the form of divine grace. Xunzi is commonly read as a "debunker" of traditional Chinese religious beliefs, and he is beloved by some moderns (including many in the People's Republic of China) as a protosecularist. Though a full consideration of the aptness of this judgment is beyond the scope of this chapter, I would argue that Xunzi does rely on the efficacy of at least one transhuman power, specifically the interactions of qi with and between human beings. 40 Particularly in his dis- cussions of music, Xunzi attributes almost magical power to singing and listening to classical Zhou poetry (with musical accompaniment), which can evoke responses in us that draw out properly humane emotions and desires,

278 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

contributing very quickly to our transformation. By causing us to take joy in the Way, music quite literally energizes us to follow it, building up our strength and commitment. Nevertheless, it must be noted that these effects are still predictable, almost technological, and are produced within human practices devised by past sages; such a picture is a far cry from Augustine's account of a transcendent God with perfect knowledge and an eternally unwavering will, who nevertheless enters time and supports and oversees every aspect of temporal existence.

A second, more subtle aspect of the chastening I am discussing is Augustine and Xunzi's shared tendency to combine what are often called "cognitive" and "affective" dimensions of human action. In Xunzi, we can sec this in his accounts of the interpenetration of perception and interpre- tation with desire and emotion, as vvell as the very idea of "assent" to the Confucian Way, which implies both deliberative reflection and a motivating recognition of action-compelling factors in some complex situation. For Augustine, we can see such a conception quite clearly in his account of the integration of memory, understanding, and forms of \vill or love in the mental "word" that is the beginning of any human action.

This shared tendency to integrated models of thought, emotion, and action helps show why spiritual exercises might be necessary, and how they might work: It is naive to think that we can just decide one day, having been convinced by an argument, to transform our lives and change who we are. The interplay of settled conviction and emotional responsiveness, and thus of habitual inclinations to action, can only be changed by reforming all these clements in tandem. Conscious exercises seem perfectly suited to this task, because they require reflective commitment, however minimal, to a set of forms or rules for behavior that guide us in the repetitive practice of alternative behaviors, and they prescribe alternative emotions as well. As practice continues, and reflection on it deepens, intellectual commit- ment and inclinational tendencies will, at least ideally, gradually increase together. It is thus unsurprising that one of the central aims of learning, and indeed of all spiritual exercises for Xunzi and Augustine, is the reformation of human emotions and desires.

This sort of picture provides a corrective to Hadot's stress in his accounts of Hellenistic spiritual exercises on universalizing reason restrain- ing the passions; I would argue that both Augustine and Xunzi have more subtle models of the human person, and especially the psyche. They both reject the thought that we could or should ever be free of our emotions, and they also reject the view that emotions arc essentially disruptive of good judgment and action; instead, they insist on the crucial importance of emo- tions and their reformation within the moral life. Indeed, on such a view,

" d d" ,, . h un erstan ing \Yit c.-,:: :_-__ responses to situation' -.· _ case, commitment to,;-,:::-::_ rationalism, even thm.:z:-_ :- _ essential to them. -

Their views are c~2,: _ :-__ accounts, true unders::-2:-_ ~::-.. practice aimed at assir:::::..: nity, and in the cosnrn-. -:-:> understood path of per'_:-_:..

ever become possible. =' _: ~ knowledge than an obsc: _ : prehensivc and tranqui: ::- _ -. although such a perspc,:: · the universal order, sci :: Put another way, Augu' ::-:::- _ cacy of a chosen religi1 ·..:, :- arrives only late in life:- :- ::- :.. God after the resurrect: :: . :

As a type of practiLc:. _ _- formation as voluntary --..: :- :- to a position recognizec > :.. a practitioner tries to 2' <~­ ment over any and all ir:: ::- ..:. - project of trying to ani::-_ .:. v11ould be unjustified. C :·. - _ differentiates spiritual e:xc::- _ grams of "thought refor::: ·· :- could be called "conditi': :-_::·_~ readings, and other pr:..-.-: __ situations, or our "inner ~:, _

This need for volun::..:-- . this sort of position is s::-< out the sort of suborc::::..: person experience of ac:·..::... compelling understand:::; gious practices~spiritc.:..: _ ered, critical judgment - : ~: view questioning and de~-.:.:_ education they propose. :. : __ sort of personal format'. -::

'.' :.: ;z.~TIVE PERSPECTIVE

3, causing us to take joy : :Im,- it, building up our

_,: :- c- noted that these effects . :o:--~ ::iroduced within human

_, :o :ar er;- from Augustine's ,-_:-_ -... ledge and an eternally _ :o:-_:: .oupports and oversees

·:o<::-:::ng I am discussing is ·- ::> ,,-hat are often called

:o:-_ :o.-::on. In Xunzi, we can

: ? c-:- ception and interpre- - ::-·. :<lea of "assent" to the :-::c::c-ction and a motivating

.--:: c- ~-·Jrnplex situation. For __ :o:-: ·, in his account of the

:-:·:: ,:,f "-ill or love in the .--=-=--~.._-::ion.

: ~'.iought, emotion, and -_: : ~ ::c-~-es;ary, and how they

_,: ~::-cidc one day, having ~ :- :: ·. c" and change who we :: _ ::-_::~ responsiveness, and ·. cl~anged by reforming

_._, 'ccm perfectly suited to _ ::--_ ::: :. hmYever minimal, to _ · :-. :'.:e repetitive practice

- : . :-:::.::,e emotions as well. . _ - :::-.-. intellectual commit-

-:0.::::. gradually increase __ :-_ :- :.: aims of learning, and

- _ _:-_:<::ie, is the reformation

l-Iadot's stress in his _:--:.iizing reason restrain-

:-·::::~ 2.nd Xunzi have more :c:> :he psvche. Thev both

• J J

- - _ ::-c·cC of our emotions, and

--c·:::aJ:- disruptive of good . _---_:cial importance of emo-

_::c. Indeed, on such a view,

Chastened Intellectualism

I !

J 1:: ~!111

.~ ;p,:,L:

279

"understanding" without the properly correlated dispositions and emotional responses to situations \•vould be either immature or counterfeit. In any case, commitment to spiritual exercises clearly does not rest on a simplistic rationalism, even though reflection and intellectual assent do seem to be essential to them.

Their views are chastened in another sense. On Xunzi's and Augustine's accounts, true understanding can only be attained in the context of a shared practice aimed at assimilating the correct view of human life in commu- nity, and in the cosmos. This implies that commitment to an only partially understood path of personal formation is required for full understanding to ever become possible. Detachment is thus less a precondition to genuine knowledge than an obstacle to it. Both promise an eventual return to a com- prehensiYe and tranquil perspective after sufficient personal development, although such a perspectiYe is largely constituted by its passionate assent to the universal order, so it could hardly be considered detached or neutral. Put another way, Augustine and Xunzi insist on the need for faith in the effi- cacy of a chosen religious path, because deep and universal understanding arrives only late in life for a few, on Xunzi's account, or in the presence of God after the resurrection, for Augustine.

As a type of practice, chastened intellectualists therefore view personal formation as voluntary submission to an authoritative teaching. Submission to a position recognized as authoritative is critical, in order that the dictates a practitioner tries to assimilate will be seen as binding, standing in judg- ment over any and all impulses she or he might feel. Without this, the whole project of trying to attain a definite intellectual, emotional, and moral shape would be unjustified. Conscious assent to a regimen of formative practices differentiates spiritual exercises from the use of propaganda or coercive pro- grams of"thought reform." However, spiritual exercises do make use of what could be called "conditioning," through the repetition ofrituals, meditations, readings, and other practices designed to affect our habitual responses to situations, or our "inner discourse" of reflection and evaluation.

This need for voluntary, conscious assent underlines the extent to which this sort of position is still intellectualist, and it also helps qualify and flesh out the sort of subordination to authority each envisions. Without first- person experience of actual improvement-combined with an increasingly compelling understanding of the justification, nature, and goal of one's reli- gious practices-spiritual exercises would cease to appeal to the consid- ered, critical judgment of practitioners. Both Augustine and Xunzi clearly view questioning and debate as central to the process of the thoroughgoing education they propose, at least for those literate elites who pursue the ideal sort of personal formation.

280 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Being a chastened intellectualist means that one views the task oflearn- ing not merely as gaining new information but primarily as the task of assim- ilating transformative knowledge into one's mode of existence. Looking specifically at Augustine's and Xunzi's accounts of learning, it is remarkable how similar they are. As noted, both insist on the authority of teachers over students, and of a unique and comprehensive set of classic texts, although exactly how they understand this nries. Both urge a rigorous program of assimilation of those texts, starting with as much memorization as possible, but accompanied by deepening practice in interpretation, ·which is essen- tial to proper understanding. The final goal is correct understanding, which intrinsically includes "practical" understanding of how to implement tradi- tional teachings in one's own life. For Augustine, true knowledge reaches the heart; for Xunzi, it permeates the whole body, including the heart/mind.

Subtle differences regarding the process of learning separate their views, however. For Augustine, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, the triune God is the ultimate authority. The Bible as the ·words of God directed to humans is thus also absolutely authoritative, with every word a significant source of meaning, and the whole serving as an inexhaustible storehouse of information about God's will; Augustine thus invests the Bible with an intrinsic authority that goes far beyond Xunzi's respect for the Con- fucian classics. Nevertheless, although some of the Bible is very simple and clear, expressed so that anyone can understand it and grasp the essentials of Christian teaching, significant portions are quite difficult to understand and challenge even the greatest exegetes. Here learned teachers play the role not only of conveying clear truths to a wider, often illiterate audience but also of explicating difficult passages and resolving apparent conflicts as they extend the range of shared understanding of the text. 41 Despite the impor- tance of teachers, and the necessity of obeying their direction, particularly in matters of ethics and spiritual exercises, Augustine's anthropology places God at the root of each person's soul and mind. His doctrine of direct illu- mination adds an ambiguous element that at least potentially undercuts the authority of teachers and their interpretations. 42

For Xunzi, though the classics are the authoritative teachings of the ancient sage-kings, as noted above, they are themselves so hard to understand that the authority of the teacher becomes paramount. Only the person-to-person transmission of wise insight and interpretive skill can lead to true learning. The inherent difficulty in understanding the classics also leads Xunzi to highlight the value of a good community of learners, without which it is impossible to reorient oneself fully to the Way. Though a shared community of learners is the normal state of affairs for Augustine, and is generally help-

fol, for example in me:-.::.-: not only recognizes be ::.: ' serve God by reformin; :::-. _ Bible itself, but sufticie:-. :: :

Xunzi, then, is cor.:= : c -- - basic knowledge and re::.: - learners to absorb sue~- : -:: ::. _ that real learning can be ::.:-. crucial agent is ahn:·s c~_:-:.­ For Augustine, human :e::._..- divine disciplina is to''""·: choked by the weeds c1:- , ::- . mo us defection of tffo - : :- the efficacy of Confuc'.::.:·_ truly virtuous teacher.

This general \n:· ' =· basic conundrums abc1c - models of a person ad·,. : ::. : ·: were discussed in cha;~:c:­ which persons are detine: ::.- sense ("first-order de<:-:c,- first-order desires the•. ·· ::.- distinction to studies s·..:.: ::-_ on agency is inherentl:, ::::. · Wetzel have argued . .:.' F:-::.:· _ _. ideas, is caught bet\\eer. :·· competing desires aboc :-_ of the move to have son: e __ order volitions," that is. e::·c terious, ungrounded. a::~ · with some desires.

However, "identitic.:::: :-. Xunzi and Augustine fr.. · · insufficient for a repent.:::-.: : ual desires for childrc-::: : be necessary to even he.·. c ::. appears frequently to be ::·_ - . of "identification" \Vith ' =-~-­ often be fruitless if tho-e : _ · therapeutic strateg:> "i;: ·=- ·:: -

.' ;..'.. ;o . .',TIVE PERSPECTIVE

:-.c 1iews the task oflearn- :-::~~::rih as the task of assim-

~c of existence. Looking ·: :c.arning, it is remarkable

·.: ::.·..:.:horitv of teachers over · :: •:-·classic texts, although ..:.:-;c ::. rigorous program of .-. :~~~·morization as possible, . :-:::-ctation, which is essen- :-:- .. ·: understanding, which : :--_ '·' to implement tradi-

. :::-..:.c ~.nmdedge reaches the :·.:.:.ding the heart/mind.

: :earning separate their : :- e ;i:r:ning of this chapter,

:=: :-: :: a~ the words of God :- :-::1::w, "·ith every word

• ::-·.:'.1s;: as an inexhaustible ..:-..:. <::~e thus invests the Bible :·~ ..:.:-.z: ·s respect for the Con- ::·.: 3:~lc is wry simple and . : ::.:~ :'. ;rasp the essentials of . >~..:·.ii t to understand and

:.:-:-.: ~ :C'achers play the role ::~:~ :Literate audience but

:-; ::.:::::1rent conflicts as they . :::,::.- Dcspitetheimpor- :_- c: :- :.=irection, particularly

-_ -:::-.ec ·, anthropology places

~: - :'. ".:trine of direct illu- ::. -: :: :e:-itiallY undercuts the

:::.::·:: :dchings of the ancient ::-.::.:-cl to understand that

<:· :hf person-to-person . ::.:~ :ead to true learning.

::.-•:..:' also leads Xunzi to . :.:-- ::-'. ,,·ithout which it is ~:- .::;!:a shared community ·_ · :::-.e. a.nd is generally help-

Chastened Intellectualism

.,;; .. :. •• .1r

1 ··1[.i!

1,::: "

!!

g~li••

~!Ii! ~1::::

~rn::

281

fol, for example in monastic and congregational settings, unlike Xunzi he not only recognizes but also highly respects supposedly solitary ascetics who serve God by reforming themselves alone, often without access even to the Bible itself, but sufficiently illuminated and inflamed by God directly.

Xunzi, then, is confident in the power of human teachers to impart both basic knowledge and real wisdom, and he is also confident in the power of learners to absorb such teaching. For Augustine, however, though thinking that real learning can be and usually is occasioned by human teaching, the crucial agent is always Christ, the "interior teacher" illuminating our minds . For Augustine, human teaching can and often does fail, when the "seed" of divine disciplina is tossed on rocky ground or partially accepted and then choked by the weeds of concupiscence. Xunzi, by contrast, despite the infa- mous defection of two of his most famous students, remains convinced of the efficacy of Confucian communities of learning vvhen they are led by a truly virtuous teacher.

This general way of looking at moral development can help resolve basic conundrums about character development generated by the abstract models of a person advocated by Harry Frankfurt and Charles Taylor, which vvere discussed in chapter 2. To revie,v, Frankfurt proposes a picture in which persons are defined as beings who not only have desires in the normal sense ("first-order desires"), but also "second-order" desires about which first-order desires they want to have. Despite the real utility of this basic distinction to studies such as the present one, Frankfurt's larger position on agency is inherently flawed, as Gary Watson and more recently James Wetzel have argued. 43 Frankfurt, at least in the original formulation of his ideas, is caught between two unpalatable options: first, an infinite regress of competing desires about one's desires, which would vitiate the entire point of the mm'e to have some desires trump others; or second, making"second- order volitions," that is, effective second-order desires, the result of a mys- terious, ungrounded, and voluntaristic personal commitment to "identify" with some desires.

However, "identification" in this sense is hardly a simple matter, as both Xunzi and Augustine show us. To take an extreme example, it is radically insufficient for a repentant pedophile to simply "not identify" with his sex- ual desires for children; long-term work at personal reformation would be necessary to even have a chance to change such impulses, and even this appears frequently to be insufficient. 44 For almost everyone, a mental effort of "identification" with some of our desires rather than others will quite often be fruitless if those desires are even moderately strong; instead, some therapeutic strategy will be required for substantive change. Both Xunzi and

-~

282 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Augustine provide much fuller pictures of how, via spiritual exercises, the gradual development of reflective commitment, in tandem with the reform of emotions and desires, can make considered evaluations of the good one's central motivation-without seeming to make such judgments a matter of brute, sovereign choice.

Taylor's related vievv of "strong evaluations" as the constituents of "moral frameworks" which give structures and ends to human lives, has the virtue of reintroducing social life and history into Frankfurt's general picture. However, Taylor in the end underplays the power of reflection on inherited and/ or unfamiliar moral frameworks, as well as the effectiveness of personal decision and intentional character formation, shrinking these to the "articulation" of the "moral sources" within the West that determine our moral horizons. Both Xunzi and Augustine make room for the recognition and pursuit of an integrated comprehensive good amid conflicts and dis- agreements. They also provide models that show how practice leads to the assimilation and deepening of such recognition, whether it be of the triune God or the human Way. And even though they disagree on precisely how assent or consent function, they provide subtle and believable accounts of both the difficulties and possibilities of personal decisions.

When considering the full range of both figures' programs of personal formation, we can see several basic differences separating their tvvo ver- sions of chastened intellectualism. As argued in the previous section, their subtly differing conceptions of the nature of moral requirements,. when combined with their more obviously differing anthropologies, lead Xunzi to advocate an "outside-in" model of personal formation that supplements learning with pervasively developed practices of performance; and lead Augustine to advocate an "inside-out" model of moral change that centers on discursive and symbolic practices that aim to assimilate Christian truth by reshaping the "inner discourse" of our triune minds.

Leaving aside global theological judgments as either quixotic, if pursued from putatively neutral grounds, or unilluminating, if they simply reflect previous confessional commitments, what can a contemporary student of these ancient ethical vocabularies conclude about their strengths and weak- nesses, with regard to the main themes of this study? Numerous arguments are possible here, but I concentrate on only a few, and even these can only be sketched rather than fully dewlopcd. Xunzi's account seems particularly capable of addressing the everyday struggle to domesticate and train our first-order desires, and thus better illuminates gradual progress in cultivat- ing virtue; he also, for related reasons, articulates a fuller and more positive role for human embodiment in the moral and religious life. Augustine's ethical vocabulary, conversely, seems better suited to addressing our ongo-

ing, second-order tendc:~_:-_ - work on ourselves. He al, :: called radical evil as a co:~:::·:_

As argued in chaptc::-' ~ rather sharp distinction '.- ·_ :· most basic type is desire. - :: tion of our relativeh· stab~c- ·:_ which is fundamentalh- a :· :-:- sible, or best in some ~itc: to envisage how second- :- __ be brought to bear on tl~ · ,._ ahvays trumps desire \\le:·_ ~ noted in chapter 5 some _ - that make it more belit:T::- .. psychological vocabulan ~~:::__. nomenon of impulse co~t::- .. our spontaneous impulse'.'.'. him a straightforward \\"-'.- : acter formation, which i-_~ "accumulation" of man,· "-- :: 1 1 " " d " 11'; s ow y cut an pu ei·..::-

crooked wood that has be:::· the process has been com:':~: which means that we no-: :·. instead, we gcnuineh· de::.:::·.:

fi 1 4s "y· · ,, . -. a ne mea . irtue m :.:-__ imply both a wise grasp , : :: for evaluating possible aL-r: :: - ate well, and also as a ref;:,'.-_: persistent Confucian prac:: _:

Part of what makes th:, - _ just the form, of the moE: -~ - it is impossible for anvoLc : rest, and respect, so the (·:'.-_: _ satisfy everyone's desire' ::-_ grand cultural achiewmer:: : - who have properly discc:-.~ small matter that Augusti:·_ e: · very restricted food inta~c. :c ing presence of sexual de,::-c even entertains celibacv J.' ::o

':.:. :;:.:i.TIVE PERSPECTIVE

· :-'- 'piritual exercises, the =~ :1ndem with the reform

· ::.>.:.:.:tions of the good one's -_,:1 iudgments a matter of

' ~

'1S the constituents of c:~.j,; to human lives, has

:-: ::~to Frankfurt's general - ::-_ :::- pm Yer of reflection on · . ::. ' ·.'. e 11 as the effectiveness =-~~2t'.on, shrinking these to

:: __ -.\-est that determine our

·m for the recognition ~ 2:11id conflicts and dis- :. '-' practice leads to the

· :.c:her it be of the triune : -2;ree on precisely how

::.:·. : "::ie lievable accounts of : :: -''10115.

;-..:.::-:::-< · ?rograms of personal - -::::2:-ating their two ver- ::: _- preYious section, their

:-2: requirements,. when ::.-· ::::-opologies, lead Xunzi

:-:::2:ion that supplements :· :·erformance; and lead

: :·.-. :-2! change that centers :.:-<:uilate Christian truth

:·:~: :: ,j,.

> ::::er quixotic, if pursued ::.:::-.;. :f they simply reflect ~ _ :·.:emporary student of

_: ::.-.:-:r strengths and weak- -:.:.~:-; :\umerous arguments

· . 2:d eYen these can only - ::. _:: ·..;.nt seems particularly

:::e<ticate and train our ;::-::. ~~::.:!progress in cultivat-

: _ - 2 :··u.Jer and more positive · __ :-:::i:;ious life. Augustine's _: _ : :1J addressing our ongo-

Chastened Intellectualism

l~i.i: 11:::. '·· .. ·1::,: . we IF

1~11 g~![

~iii! ,.§[)Ji ~W,

283

ing, second-order tendencies to rebel against the very idea of this sort of work on ourselves. He also provides a much better account of what can be

called radical evil as a continuing human potential. As argued in chapters 3 and 6, Xunzi's psychological model makes a

rather sharp distinction between two kinds of motivation. The first and most basic type is desire, yu -BJc, which he conceives as a spontaneous reac- tion of our relatively stable disposition, qing '11'!. The second is assent, ke PJ, which is fundamentally a form of judgment about what is possible, permis- sible, or best in some situation. This two-source model makes it rather easy to envisage how second-order evaluations of our first-order desires could be brought to bear on those desires, at least insofar as Xunzi thinks assent always trumps desire when the two come into direct conflict, although we noted in chapter 5 some complications to this seemingly simple position that make it more believable. The crucial point here is that Xunzi's moral psychological vocabulary makes it easy to theorize the common human phe- nomenon of impulse control, simply by separating a controlling power from our spontaneous impulses. Moreover, the terminology of"dispositions" gives him a straightforward way to fill out the psychology of long-term char- acter formation, which he describes metaphorically as "artifice," and the "accumulation" of manv actions consciouslv assented to over time, which

) )

slowly "cut" and "pull" our dispositions into new and better forms. Like crooked wood that has been steamed and forced to become straight, after the process has been completed, our dispositions have taken on a new form, which means that we no longer desire the "petty" things we once craved; instead, we genuinely delight in good actions and find them as satisfying as a fine meal. 45 "Virtue" in the fullest sense, for Xunzi, would then seem to imply both a vvise grasp of the Dao considered as a comprehensive "scale" for evaluating possible actions, which allows the good Confucian to deliber- ate well, and also as a refashioned set of dispositions, both achieved through persistent Confucian practice of study, ritual, and music.

Part of what makes this seem achievable for Xunzi is the nature, and not just the form, of the moral demands he thinks are imperative. Xunzi thinks it is impossible for anyone to extirpate basic desires for food, sex, safety, rest, and respect, so the ethical challenge is to create a form of life that can satisfy everyone's desires in a beautiful, harmonious, and just way-this grand cultural achievement is the Dao itself, the artful creation of past sages who have properly discerned the best way to order human life. It is no small matter that Augustine thinks the best Christian life is celibate, with very restricted food intake, and this leads him to experience the continu- ing presence of sexual desire and hunger in the way he does. Xunzi never even entertains celibacy as a desirable option, let alone a possibility, and he

-- =~-. "I

284 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

makes lavish feasting a central religious ritual (cf., of course, the Eucharis- tic "meal" of small amounts of bread and wine). As argued previously, Xunzi understands ritual as to some extent a restraint, but just as much it is a vvay of "nourishing" and "adorning" our desires so that they take on the proper forms-forms that lead to social harmony rather than destructive compe- tition and mutual predation. The degree of change to our dispositions that Xunzi aims for is considerably less radical than Augustine's "crucifixion" of our carnal loves, and so his expectation of the possibility of success in this endeavor, at least for some, seems achievable.

Xunzi thus possesses a relatively benign characterization of the nature of spontaneous human desires as blind and ignorantly selfish, not to be trusted to guide the self alone, but still aiming at basic human goods in a way that needs to be reshaped and ordered but not razed and recreated. This concep- tion relates rather directly to his anthropology, which conceives of us as our bodies in their entirety. He thinks the xin Jl,\ "heart/mind," is the ruler of the self and needs to be well trained to fulfill this function properly, but he never imagines that there might be some locus of the self that is separable from the body. In other words, he does not identify with a soul, let alone an immortal soul, that vivifies the body and is categorically superior to it, in the way Augustine does, like almost everyone in the ancient Mediterra- nean world. Not surprisingly, then, the role of embodiment in full ethical personhood for Xunzi is rather different than it is for Augustine. Although Augustine's most considered image of the soul-body relation is of a mar- riage, understood of course in a late antique Roman \vay as a relationship of stark inequality that ought to be characterized by strict obedience of lower to higher, he can also imagine our bodies as an "unruly mount" that is being ridden against its will toward our true goal, beatitude. Augustine's sense of the body as at least partly "other" to ourselves, as something that needs to be ruled because it can never be trusted, is considerably more extreme, and even self-alienating, than Xunzi's views. 46 For Xunzi, the body should be beautifully adorned in appropriate clothing, and it should also be trained to become an expressive medium almost equal to our own voice, through the performative "language" of Confucian ritual, which allows us to express our concern for each other in every daily interaction, no matter how minor. Bodily skill is essential to ethical virtue, for Xunzi.

This may all have a surprising whiff of Apollonian confidence, at least from an Augustinian point of view. Xunzi's account of steady work to reform oneself seems to presume both the desirability and the possibility of achieving transparent self-understanding, so that we can work steadily on our weak points to slowly but surely whittle them av,·ay. In particular, Xun- zi's vocabulary and ethical theory seem relatively limited in their resources

for articulating ongoin; ::-: -: - frustrated first-order de-::-:: ethical categories to gui:: c people""see things onl:· ::~ :c:- be one very common fo:-:~-­ riment of many others tL.: : behavior are not cases c: ::-.: misguided self-formatic1:~. -- _ long-term capacities to :-o:-::-_~

In comparison \\·ith :::-_:'. - and evil, as manifest in v. ~.::.: : and intention, helps hir:~ : something more funda:L::·_:c important, as argued u.:-:: ::- of the mens or mind make- ::. and second-order, a re 1: _::. -_ sonal incoherence as cue::_: or talking past each othe:- ·.;. ·

comparison with Xunz:·-. - divine aid but not finall1 :-_, resurrection. Self-knov, :c- ~.:: and imperfect for hum a:·_ :-- _ always knows us better t~_::.:·_ ·

Because he thinks sc-::--:-:- spawns, remain as actiw :: : inner words that continc-:· __ _ more capable than Xunzi : ::. self-deception. Augmtii:c ·- rebellion against the go:'::: _::.. friend, seeking to go1er:: ··_: - can also serve as project- : - inward confusion about ·.· ~-::.· sin all too effectiwh·.

Augustine thus Yie"'-' :: daunting than even Xur"z:: ::·_ ageable were it not for G : The success of the Yentu:-c- : this life for Augustine: u:~: c ' - end, we will not succcc-c~. ·.;.

ready to pass, on August::-.c:c - all things are possible. In : :-. :

'.' ::.: ~ATIVE PERSPECTIVE

_:· ... Jf course, the Eucharis- .:._ - ::rgued previously, Xunzi

: . :--.:.: just as much it is a way :r.::.: :he;· take on the proper - _- :han destructive compe-

:..r.;e: to our dispositions that ' . ' " 'fi . " f -_ -.·..::;ustme s cruc1 x10n o

: ,,ibilitv of success in this

c:-::..:c:-rization of the nature of r.:::, -dtish, not to be trusted . :-_ . ..::r:1an goods in a way that . ::.:-. :.'. recreated. This concep-

,, :-...::ch conceives of us as our ··:-_::.:.rt mind,'' is the ruler of :.· .. - :··.ir~ction properly, but he

: :ie self that is separable ... :.·,, \\·ith a soul let alone -------. '

· _::. ::: ;orically superior to it, :-. ~ :r: d~e ancient Mediterra- ~ c ::-.':•1:1diment in full ethical

. : ' ::ir :\.ugustine. Although ___ :- -C:, relation is of a mar-

:··_:::-. \Ya:> as a relationship of _- · <r'ct obedience of lower - ..::r.r·..::l:• mount" that is being ··. ::.:'::idc. :\ugustine's sense · . - . as something that needs _ r. <cierably more extreme, := :- :\:·J.nzi, the body should

. :..r. ::_ :: should also be trained ':ir m\·n voice, through

·· :-.:ch allows us to express -· :-.. no matter how minor.

:::an confidence, at least ::. _: ..::.:n of steady work to

:-:..0:::::- and the possibility of :- :.. : ·., c can work steadily on - . r:·, .:.·c:a:·. In particular, Xun- - _- ::::~:ted in their resources

l ,m·

f '!

~: ·.

f ,:~ii:

lf!l::

----= 4

Chastened Intellectualism 285

for articulating ongoing resistance to self-formation as anything other than frustrated first-order desire. At best, Xunzi can speak about using the wrong ethical categories to guide our deliberations, as for instance the way "petty people" "see things only in terms of personal benefit" ( 4I15I14). This would be one verv common form of"obsession" with one consideration to the det-

J

riment of many others that form part of the Way. But these sources of vicious behavior are not cases of internal resistance to self-formation so much as misguided self-formation, which are so dangerous precisely because of our long-term capacities to reshape ourselves.

In comparison with this, Augustine's starkly antagonistic account of good and evil, as manifest in what I called above his "spiritual geography" of desire and intention, helps him to articulate resistance to personal formation as something more fundamental and deep within human beings. Even more important, as argued earlier in this chapter, his structurally unified account of the mens or mind makes the contest between divergent desires, both first- and second-order, a real case of self-division, of vacillation, and even per- sonal incoherence as competing inner discourses swirl within us, debating or talking past each other. What is truly striking in Augustine's account, in comparison ·with Xunzi's, is how this incoherence can be mitigated with divine aid but not finally resohed until the "complete cure" that comes with resurrection. Self-knowledge, like the knowledge of God, remains elusive and imperfect for human beings in this life, according to Augustine; God always knows us better than we know ourselves.

Because he thinks self-preference, and the grasping, covetous desires it spawns, remain as active potentials within our minds, whispering tempting inner words that continence must vigilantly reject, Augustine is also much more capable than Xunzi of articulating a robust account of corruption and self-deception. Augustine's vocabulary makes it easy to speak about how rebellion against the good can start in seemingly innocuous ways. Loving a friend, seeking to govern justly as a public official, even striving for virtue can also serve as projects of human arrogance instead of divine service, and inward confusion about what I really intend can cover these beginnings of sin all too effectively.

Augustine thus views the challenge of personal formation as more daunting than even Xunzi; indeed, Augustine views it as completely unman- ageable were it not for God's merciful love guiding us back to goodness. The success of the venture to live righteously remains unsettled throughout this life for Augustine; unless God grants us the grace to persevere to the end, we will not succeed. We simply do not know what tests we might be ready to pass, on Augustine's account, although we can trust that with God all things are possible. In contrast to this, Xunzi appears to believe that even

286 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

before sagehood, which forms the distant summit of personal formation in any case, noble men can be sure of their own commitment to the Way. Inward struggles of a sort continue for such men, but these are much less grievous than those that can afflict the Augustinian believer, who continues to harbor at least occasional sinful doubts about the entire project of sub- mitting to God.

This suggests that, on an Augustinian account, genuine evil remains a "live option" for everyone, eyen the holiest, who retain the possibility of defecting from God throughout earthly existence. Though Xunzi's under- standing of human propensities for thoughtless self-gratification, avaricious personal aggrandizement, and the obsessive pursuit of a merely partial good together proYide an account of how some humans commit truly horrible crimes, Augustine's account goes further, in several insightful ways. It rules out thinking of one's own group or even self as purely good, untainted by sin, and instead instructs us to searchingly question our own motives and plans to test their good faith and loving intentions. Falsely localizing evil in some other social group seems to be a precondition for true atrocities, such as genocide; but Augustine's anthropology and theology stop this move decisively, while giving as well an explanation for why it tempts us (we low to see oursekes in the best possible light, even if this is blatant self-deception). Moreowr, his understanding of the continuing frailty and \".'eakness of the seemingly law- abiding and even the genuinely virtuous suggests that his understanding of sin can account very well for the shocking but "banal" evils of the twentieth century, perpetrated in significant part by bureaucrats and functionaries who loved their families and home communities. Last, Augustine argues powerfully that the human lust for power manifests itself in a perverse imi- tation of divine omnipotence, which drives us to assert ourselves precisely through the manipulation and destruction of other things and people. This incisive charge provides a much stronger account of the sometimes baffling cruelty we routinely visit upon each other than is possible to construct out of Xunzian worries about bad impulses, distracting desire, and misguided self-formation. 4 7

Although in certain respects it might be possible to combine the insights of both these figures while avoiding any respective difficulties-for example, by importing some of Augustine's points about the nature and dangerous- ness of the human will to power into a Xunzian ethical position-in other respects it is not clear how such a synthesis could ever be achieved. Beyond their obvious and fundamental disagreements over metaphysics, sacred his- tory, and sacred texts, one basic problem of ethical theory is that Xunzi's separation of desire from assent proves pmverful when addressing issues of the gradual formation of character through sustained practice but weak

when trying to addff~' :: c ·_ :-- Conversely, Augustine·, ~: _ - disintegrated mens, \\-hie:::_ vides an excellent \\-a\- own highest aspiratio;>. --:-- : that consent cannot O\ c :: _ from God's providentic.: : _ relatively more difficul: :- : - development of virtue: harmonize these tffo t·. :~cc,

A more intriguiw- c.:~ _ an effort to integ;ate ~ .\:·__:_:_ concerning both t:'pica: ·· ~ _ - an expressive mcdiun~ :- : - ity. Could performance: ::: : ::_ _ supplement Augustine-, - :-- exercises? I pursue sue i~ , -- _ the final chapter to the :--:-- -- ::_

evaluation, and cross-t:--c. >:

1. On the ways in,,:--___:,_:-_-__ _

believers, see Clark 200 3 _ -

2. Augustine docs ,,f, _-. celibate, and clerical and :::-

important but nonethck" ::--- -

3. Thc classic studi._> , -: : 1980.

4. The term "mimetic- :

fruitfully to Augustine in:!:, -

5. For an egregious ex:::-:-_ - _

address concerns of some ::: ~ - late an "Augustinian libcrJ::-:-: _--

6. I address some co:-:::::_:.: 7 _ Note also the renc .;_:':-_.::

"models" and "standard,_-- ·-·- :-~- created and "corrected'" h-.- :-__

Dao that lies behind all sue'.:::- sion.

8.Yearley 1990, 13. F :- :: __ tion, seeYearley 1990, 6->_ -~

':_'.,~.'\TIVE PERSPECTIVE

:-.::-:-.:t of personal formation :-_ c<nrnnitment to the Way.

_ ::-.. ~1ut these are much less -__ ::.:-.believer, who continues

..:.: ::-.e entire project of sub-

_:-.:. zenuine evil remains a ::-~tain the possibility of

:-_:::.Though Xunzi's under- - __ :-- zratification, avaricious

- '..:.:: ~~-a merely partial good -:·_::.:-_, commit truly horrible

_ ::-::.: insightful ways. It rules - .:--~::- good, untainted by sin,

..:.:- :-,,-n motives and plans to _::.::zing evil in some other

:.. ~ _ ,ities, such as genocide; - ::-.:" mow decisively, while

_ - -_., c love to see ourselves _:- ~:::-:eption). Moreover, his

:___.::- _ ,, ,_>f the seemingly law-

-:- "__:-_:..:his understanding of ·::..:-.::.:··evils of the twentieth _ - _:..·..:.::-ab and functionaries ·: _ - _ Last, .-\ugustine argues : _->::-elf in a perverse imi-

:..--c::-t ourselves precisely ::-__ ::- :~jngs and people. This

:- :":-ie sometimes baffling _ - :: --ible to construct out

: _ :::-.; .=e~ire, and misguided

___ " : ' combine the insights >~:ulties-for example,

_: ::-. c ::ature and dangerous- - _:~_::al position-in other

:-- c-:- be achieved. Beyond _ :- :-_-.ctaph;·sics, sacred his-

-:~_:_-::: :heon is that Xunzi's

_ :-:..:.: '-'·hen addressing issues - _ -:::.'.ned practice but weak

Notes 287

when trying to address deep self-division of the sort that Augustine charts. Conversely, Augustine's picture of a structurally unified but nevertheless disintegrated mens, which remains to some extent mysterious to itself, pro- vides an excellent way of articulating the self's continuing resistance to its own highest aspirations. (This is only furthered by Augustine's contention that consent cannot overrule our strongest loves, unless we are defecting from God's providential order through sin.) But this same picture makes it relatively more difficult for Augustine than Xunzi to account for the gradual development of virtue over time. It appears that there is no easy way to harmonize these two types of moral psychological pictures. 48

A more intriguing and less clear-cut challenge would be presented by an effort to integrate a Xunzian account of the positive role of embodiment, concerning both typical "desires of the flesh" and embodied ritual action as an expressive medium for human relations, into an Augustinian Christian- ity. Could performance practices as an "outside-in" approach to formation supplement Augustine's more familiar symbolic and discursive spiritual exercises? I pursue such speculations no further here, but instead turn in the final chapter to the broader issues they raise concerning interpretation, enluation, and cross-traditional learning.

NOTES

1 . On the ways in which Augustine does and does not engage in such "leveling" of believers, see Clark 2003.

2. Augustine does of course make such distinctions, e.g., between married and celibate, and clerical and lay Christians. He believes these differences are real and important but nonetheless tempt our tendencies to pride.

3.The classic studies of this theme in Augustine are Burnaby 194 7 and O'Donovan 1980.

4. The term "mimetic desire" comes from Girard 1977, 145-49, and is applied fruitfully to Augustine in the sense I intend by Dodaro 2004, 68-69.

5. For an egregious example, see again Dubs 1956, 218. For a serious attempt to address concerns of some modern despisers of Augustine, and in the process to articu-

late an "Augustinian liberalism,'' see Gregory, n.d. 6. I address some complications to this picture in the final section of this chapter.

7. Note also the revealing discussion of the priority of wise people to good ja {2;, "models" and "standards,'' which cannot implement themselves, and which are both created and "corrected" by those who possess an enlightened understanding of the

Dao that lies behind all such models ( 12 I 5 7 11-7). See Hutton 2001 , 8 2ff., for discus- sion.

8. Yearley 1990, 13. For brief but insightful discussion of this generalized concep- tion, see Yearlcy 1990, 6-23, 9 5--111 .

"I

288 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

9. On this point with regard to Xunzi, see Schafer 2000 [1993]. 10. For discussion of general issues, and of the interrelations of the last three

virtues in particular, sec Hutton 2001.

11. Augustine's On Continence appears to have been written during the Pelagian controversy, sometime around 418-20 CF. Sec Kearney 1999, 189, for discussion.

12. This suggests that although Augustine conceives of continence as a preserva- tive virtue that restrains us from doing evil, in contrast to inclinational virtues like justice that positively move us to good acts (cont. 7. 17), it functions on the basis of a powerful inclination toward goodness implanted within us. For brief discussion of the inclinational/preservative distinction, along with fuller bibliography, see Yearley 1990, 13-14, 16, 207 n. 13.

13. For insightful analysis, see Babcock 1994. The only flaw in Babcock's excel- lent discussion is his apparent reading of continence as in effect infallible, because our greater desire for righteousness overwhelms our lesser desire for sin, so that under grace "our spirits are fixed in the grace and love of God" and we "cease to sin" ( 1994, 18 8). But Augustine explicitly rejects the possibility of sinlessness throughout the Pelagian controversy; even the best Christians continue to sin daily (e.g., cont. 5.12-13, 8.20, 14.31).

14. On this, note especially Schlabach 1998. 15. Translations adapted from Kearney 1999, 215. 16. On Xunzi's epistemology see Hutton 2001. 1 7. Both of these issues are discussed in chapter 6. 18. This leaves to the side the dangers of bi Ntt, "obsession," which as discussed in

chapter 5 can derail even passionate seekers of what is truly good by trapping them within a merely partial awareness of the Way-one that still misguides even though it is partly correct. Obsession docs not really imply conflict within the self, but a lack of conflict where it should be present. One other important counterexample is the case of self-deceived counterfeit "Confucians," whom Xunzi labels su Ru 1ti-1i\¥i, "vulgar Confucians." Such people follow miu f.i'§!, "mistaken" or more likely "fake," techniques and their learning is za *l, "mixed up." Xunzi presents them as thoroughly corrupt and deeply deluded (8/ 32/ 17-21 ). This would seem to be, however, a rather extreme and even simple case of hypocrisy and corruption, rather than a more interesting case of a seemingly earnest misunderstanding of Confucianism leading to gross evil in the name of the good.

19. Babcock 1994, 194. For textual basis see, e.g., conf. 8.11.27. 20. See Babcock 1994, 190, for insightful discussion of this passage. 21 . There are many rich issues regarding Augustine's use of Paul as an exemplar

that I cannot pursue here. Two helpful recent discussions arc Dodaro 2004, 183-95, and Martin 2001.

22. Slingerland 2003b, 3-19, 217-64. 23. A modern account of happiness as "flow" that bears intriguing similarities to

this vision is Csikszentmihalyi 1990. Ycarley 1996b gives a helpful general discussion of this sort of skill-mastery.

24. Translation adapted from Slingerland 2003a.

25. As Augustine \Hi:c' < from the vices, not b:· t'.-:t:e ~..,: ought to do, but an enc'. ;, :.-- ~­ when persons do some ac:: :· account of that for \vhich :.--. ·. (c.jul. 4.21).Translatior. 1 .::·:

26. For Xunzi's "'suc::e-- . also his illuminating geneL. priety, and justice in Xun?' term from Invin 1988.

27. Foucault 198). 0. 2 8. I draw these tc:-::> ::· _

who uses them to contra'::.' - and passim) developed c :-. :: c-- nalism." As Slingerland :-:;:-.:. confused with current pl-.:: · - internalism and externali ''.":: -:- - together certain topics the.: _ ::- lacking various internal n: :-::. : _

ing may be required in the ::: : :: Herc I am using the tern:, ··: ...

strategics of personal fo:-:-::c.:: - different sorts of spiritua: e:·:. - _

29. Dodaro 200+, 1.::.:.. :::- . 30. On the backgroc;.:-_:::

3 1. For a thoughtfui c.:-. : ~ to similar issues, framcc'. i:: :_:- Sherman 2 005. It is no ac c: : c :-. : strongly ritualized cultun: :-_ ::.: U.S. Marine Corps boot ,·c.:-::_:- ::· fol transformation of the :-_:: :::: · (for a more objecti,·e, anc.:: :: . : evocative subjective accrm:·.:

32. The distinction be:·.· Macintyre 1984, 187-91.

33. Hutton 2001, .:i.=:. :-.:::· 34. See Xunzi's cont:-:;-::-_:

cal leader and Dao follo"·e:- ·.· expertise (21I104/ 16-.:::

35. Aristotle, l\"icom::.·~: :::: :C: Irwin 1999a, 22, 193, 19)-~~ how one could learn some:;._::-. .:: Slingerland 2003b, 239-tc.:.. __ .:: -

cultivation of virtue bv c>::· .:-.

.' ::.~ATIVE PERSPECTIVE

: _- _'1=11)0 [1993]. :-.:c:-:-clations of the last three

_ :-_ -.-.-ritten during the Pelagian

: ::i::i9, 189, for discussion.

:- : continence as a preserva- -:c-: :•:• inclinational virtues like

- . :: functions on the basis of .::-_::-_ m. For brief discussion of

:..:::er bibliography, see Yearley

---'- Ha\\. in Babcock's excel-

> ::-: effect infallible, because - _: "(T desire for sin, so that

:·Goel" and we "cease to sin"

_:::: of sinlessness throughout :-.:::-_:.:c to sin daily (e.g., cont.

- _ --: •'.1," \\-hich as cliscussecl in

. - ::-..:::;good by trapping them -.:.: -:::: misguides even though it

. _: -.,·ithin the self, but a lack

-· ~ :-:2.:1t counterexample is the .. . . b 1 R 1~1'* " 1 '. _:-.-: .a e s su u 1·"' ·1rnJ, vu gar - -- :-c likely "fake," techniques

- : - ::-_cm as thoroughly corrupt - .. ~o\\·ever, a rather extreme

:- :::r. a more interesting case - -:-:-_ . :: o.ding to gross evil in the

~ ·. -- S.11.27.

_: :his passage. -..:,c of Paul as an exemplar

:-- 2:-c Dodaro 2004, 183-95,

_ :.:-' intriguing similarities to ·_' :. :-_dpful general discussion

Notes 289

25. As Augustine ·writes: "You know, then, that the virtues are to be distinguished from the vices, not by the duties [performed], but by their ends. A duty is what one ought to do, but an end is that on account of which one ought to do it. Therefore,

when persons do some action in which they seem not to sin, if they do not do it on

account of that for which they ought to do it, they are found to be guilty of sinning"

( c.Jul. 4. 21 ). Translation adapted from Teske 1998, 393. 26. For Xunzi's "'success' conception of the virtues" see Hutton 2001, 180. (Note

also his illuminating general discussion of the interrelation of benevolence, ritual pro-

priety, and justice in Xunzi on pp. 168-79, from which I draw here). Hutton takes this

term from Irwin 1988. 27. Foucault 1985, 6. 28. I draw these terms and the general sort of contrast from Kline 1998, 51-52,

who uses them to contrast Mencius and Xunzi. Note also Slingerland's (2003b, 12ff. and passim) de\·eloped contrast between self-cultivation "internalism" and "exter-

nalism." As Slingerland rightly notes (2003b, 291 n. 32), this contrast is not to be

confused with current philosophical debates over motivational and epistemological

internalism and externalism. The danger of such general slogans is that they can run together certain topics that can and should be kept distinct, specifically: ( 1) having or lacking various internal moral resources; (2) whether, when, and why effort or striv-

ing may be required in the moral life; and (3) various approaches to spiritual exercises. Here I am using the terms "inside-out" and "outside-in" only to refer to two differing

strategies of personal formation, exemplified by Augustine and Xunzi, that support different sorts of spiritual exercises, as detailed in the main text .

29. Dodaro 2004, 124, and 115-81 generally. 30. On the background to Augustine's treatment, see Ramsey 1999, 556 .

31 . For a thoughtful and perceptive essay that draws from Stoicism and attends to similar issues, framed in terms of the relation of good manners to good morals, see Sherman 2005. It is no accident that Sherman focuses on the military, one of the few strongly ritualized cultural realms in the United States. For fascinating depictions of U.S. Marine Corps boot camp as a carefully structured setting for the rapid, purpose- ful transformation of the hearts, minds, and bodies of raw recruits, see Ricks 1997

(for a more objective, analytical account) and Schaeffer and Schaeffer 2002 (for an

evocative subjective account). 32. The distinction between goods internal and external to a practice comes from

Macintyre 1984, 187-91. 33. Hutton 2001, 221, makes this point nicely.

34. See Xunzi's contrast between the comprehensive skill of a noble man as politi- cal leader and Dao follower with that of various artisans with more specialized sorts of

expertise ( 21I104/ 16-211105 I 3). On this issue, see Kupperman 1968, 181. 35. Aristotle, J\'icomachean Ethics 1105al 6-1105b20. For insightful discussion, sec

Irwin 1999a, 22, 193, 195-96, who notes the logical parallel to the problem about how one could learn something one did not already know in Plato, Meno 80a-e. Pace

Slingerland 2003b, 259-64, Aristotle thinks he has resolved the issues regarding the

cultivation of virtue by distinguishing between outward form, intention, and stable

-~

290 REFORMATIONS: SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

"state" or virtuous disposition. Xunzi too is much more successful in resolving these

apparent difficulties than Slingerland allows. 36. These ideas arc hardly original; on these issues, I have learned most from con-

versation ·with Jack Kline. For other accounts that make similar points, see, e.g., Lai

2003; Kline 1998; Innhoe 2000a, 6-7, 29-37; and Kupperman 1968, 2002.

37. On the relation of practices and virtue, see Macintyre 1984, 181-203.

38. Counterarguments could certainly be provided to the literacy example, but

note that it would be genuinely hard to imagine someone living without storytelling

or significant shared human culture as living a good human life. 39. I owe this reference to Hutton 2001, 222, and adapt his translation.

40. Although other Confucians, such as Mencius, make relatively more of the

doctrine of Heaven-given ming 1fr1, "fate" or "destiny," it is less significant in Xunzi's thought.

41 . This sketch skips over some very complicated issues in Augustine regarding

the authority of Catholic Church officials over the explication of scripture and articu-

lation of doctrine. Even these knotty topics are but a subset of the larger controversies

over how best to read Augustine's attempts to flesh out the relation between the sov-

ereignty of Goel with various sorts of human authorities. I hope to pursue all of these

issues in future work, but cannot do justice to them here. 42. Later Christian history bears this out, particularly in the development of

pietist and other sorts of"inner light" Protestant sects in the \\·ake of the Reformation.

For a classic survey that treats this theme extensively and well, sec Troeltsch 1992. 43. Wetzel 1992, 222-35; Watson 1975. Note also Frankfurt 1999 for his more

recent work on these issues.

44. Bergner 2005. 45. This is somewhat inexact. For Xunzi, the noble man no longer desires certain

basic goods such as food or social acclaim in a petty way, but only as properly under-

stood parts of the Dao. 46. Of course, Augustine is relatively positive regarding the body when judged in

his own context, as many commentators have remarked, and he is notable in his insis-

tence that the body will be fully redeemed at the resurrection, so that eternal life \vill

be embodied, in some mysterious and flawless way. None of this, however, vitiates the

comparison with Xunzi regarding our experience of the body in this life. 4 7. For a fine recent exploration of these and related themes, see Mathewes 2001 .

For a parallel argument comparing Augustine with the early Confucian Mencius, see

Van Norden 2003a. 48. The challenging test case to this claim would be someone like Aquinas, who

develops a faculty psychology much more complex than Xunzi's separation of assent

from desire, yet still wishes to save central Augustinian insights.

Understand;

It should be clear bv n ·· -:_ restraint in these page,;;. of religious studies. 1 B" ~ _: in favor of one or the «: :~. = - cisms and evaluatiw ch and Augustine's ,-ie,,-,

each other and to some =~-­ suggest that despite h ,::-_ ~·­ ethical dangers of hum:::·. :-.:. their deep religious dit:.c:-.'" Christ or the Dao), the:-. c :_ _ are powerful and sugg~-::· strengths. ~-

One rhetorical and:=:~:: sort is to balance corm~c-:::-.. audience and treatmen ~. ::- analysis of our subjecb · :::-_ - of the current studY. Fir,-:. : :. view of human bei~a~ i', --._, -- - - will need for the ±c;-n>c:c ::.-~. ethics and politics. Secor<.:- how the need for a cen:.::·. - does not ultimateh· unc:::-:·:·. ethics. And third, I .outli:~ce ::. lative ideal for eompar2::·

~:..;;:..TIVE PERSPECTIVE

- . -.::cessful in resolving these

: :·.c.·. e learned most from con-

.. -:. <:nilar points, see, e.g., Lai

_ ·· :: crman 1968, 2002. :r.::·re 1984, 181-203.

: : the literacy example, but

:·. c ::·cing \Yithout storytelling

~ :-:·. ::: life.

~ :c.:'t his translation.

:·:c.:.;.,· relatively more of the

.: :' ;,::;,; significant in Xunzi's

.'-..:c' in :\ugustine regarding

. :.:: ·n of scripture and articu-

- - -~: :,f the larger controversies _ ·. ::-.c rdation between the sov-

. · : ::-_ :pe to pursue all of these

. _ :.:-::. in the development of

· ::·.·-'.Yake of the Reformation.

_·: ·.::clL seeTroeltsch 1992. :=:-1:1;;.furt 1999 for his more

:··.:.:: '.'-O longer desires certain

·..:t on!: as properly under-

~~-:::-.;:he body when judged in

. :er.~ he is notable in his insis-

-:: :1 . .;o that eternal life will

: ::1is, however, vitiates the

- J., in this life. . ::: cc:11es, see Mathewes 2001 . . :.-::- Confucian Mencius, see

, :c1eone like Aquinas, who

·. :\·.;::1zi 's separation of assent

::-.':;:1b.

CHAPTER NINE

Understandin9 and Nei9hborliness

It should be clear by now that I am practicing a form of intellectual self- restraint in these pages, one with roots in the phenomenological tradition of religious studies. 1 By deferring global judgments of truth or superiority in favor of one or the other figure (although not eschewing specific criti- cisms and evaluative choices), I have built up detailed accounts of Xunzi's and Augustine's vievvs of personal formation, articulated in relation to each other and to some modern ethical theory. The interpretations offered suggest that despite both their broad apparent similarities regarding the ethical dangers of human nature and the need for spiritual exercises, and their deep religious differences concerning the best way to live (following Christ or the Dao), they each provide accounts of personal formation that are powerful and suggestive, although with notable weaknesses as well as strengths.

One rhetorical and philosophical challenge of comparative works of this sort is to balance competing needs for generality and specificity, in both audience and treatment. In this final chapter, I pull back from the careful analysis of our subjects' prescriptions to address three broader implications of the current study. First, I argue that if any sort of chastened intellectualist view of human beings is correct, then in conditions of religious diversity we will need for the foreseeable future to operate with two-level theories of ethics and politics. Second, regarding "method" in religious ethics, I explore how the need for a certain sort of holism in interpretation complicates but does not ultimately undermine efforts at "retrieval" in studies of ancient ethics. And third, I outline a conception of"global neighborliness" as a regu- lative ideal for comparative studies.

291 •

.. _,

292 UNDERSTANDING AND NEIGHBORLINESS

THE VARIETIES OF MORAL AGENCY

I argued in the last chapter that Augustine and Xunzi both exemplify a laud- able general view of human moral psychology, which I called "chastened intellectualism." Such a view suggests that "human nature,'' in its various reg- isters as a family of related concerns, is sufficiently flawed that we humans are not spontaneously ethical in any full-bodied sense. Furthermore, on this sort of view, personal change is not easy and therefore not trivial. Human beings need significant education and formation to become moral, and they need to willingly assent to such formation if it is to be effective. Such assent is necessary for the requisite level of striving, and it will only be possible in the pursuit of a compelling vision of human existence.

All this implies that most people need the sort of fully worked out pro- grams of character development provided by religious or quasi-religious traditions in order to cultivate dependable virtue, because we cannot sim- ply "identify" with some of our desires or choose some new form of life, without real strain and likely failure. Trusted practices, articulate theories and justifications, socially recognized authorities, aesthetic and literary traditions, and communal and institutional support, especially when inte- grated together, all increase the possibility of successfully practicing spiri- tual exercises.

In contrast, despite the undeniable value of the basic distinctions drawn by Frankfurt and Taylor, their general theories of personhood and agency are so abstract and thin that they are finally inert and unhelpful as actual guides to self-formation. Of course, this '''as hardly their intent in produc- ing such accounts, but it is still worthwhile to reflect on the gap between what can be compellingly argued for on such strictly limited general prem- ises and the richness and complexity in fully realized ways of life.

Chastened intellectualism as I have articulated it here is in the end no different, except that it points beyond itself as a sort of general summary to the necessity of more fully specified versions of the approach (as, to be fair, does Taylor). But Taylor still seeks to provide an overarching synthesis of the "moral horizons" or "sources" of the West, whereas my view does not require the preexistence of any such shared horizon.

It makes a great deal of difference whether one regards oneself as a sick patient being healed of sinfulness by Christ, so that one might love God and neighbor rightly and eventually complete one's journey to beatitude after death, or a person aspiring to nobility by following the sagacious tradition of the Confucian Way, in hopes of properly harmonizing and ordering the human community and taking our appropriate place in the larger ecology of the cosmos. Although I think it is not outlandish to speak of these as vari-

eties of a common sort · :· ·

expectations, practice' . .:.:-. ·~ Several things folli ·.' ::-

generalities of thin 'iev." .:.•r troversial accounts pn•1;= ·.:.:·. tions and contexts. F:rc: . .:._: can conceal disagreemer. :- ~ exercises that are necec-.:.:-· vague if they are to be ( :: : . : or singing the hymm ei: T·. stronger and better ch2r.:..:. to be a chastened inte ::e ::·.:.: well, whether a Chris:i.:.r .. .:. else could include a sv<:e:-:· . .:.: sophical elements; I ;,L :-~·:_

Both Xunzi and A.c,:::·..:, :•r ple's allegiance, a nrie:-,, : ·

that they had found t~e sive path. This chapter i' :·. : the comparative philo,, r :-. · familiar trio of"exclus:,_·:-:-:· .. -

understanding. Probabl:- > :: global hegemony, the m .:=.:: :-: of attentive and empa:}:e::. systems. Studies in the<( ::-.:. that have brought unpre ::. . States, among other place'. : that any particular tradi:' :· .. such goodness relates t: __ religious goals. On the c :-. ::- hard to deny that multiF: ·: :r vating recognizable mor.:.: · :-

It would thus seen: ::-. ·. · future with relati,-eh- me--· : . . the one hand, we all nu~ _:: agree in order to facilit2:::- r - other hand, we also neec: : _ personal development 'r · :- _ conclusions about ultin:c.:c · : phorical, ritual, and art-::. r lar, historically extende . .:=. :r.:.

.:ss

NCY

. ~.:,th exemplify a laud- __ :'.-: I called "chastened o :.·.:::-e ,''in its various reg- :~C. \\·ed that we humans

· _. Furthermore, on this : :-c not trivial. Human :- e: 1me moral, and they - : e:l:(.ctiYe. Such assent : -'. :J only be possible in

: :·:.:.11;· \Yorked out pro- ;: -·.::s or quasi-religious :- .<.:m~e we cannot sim- - ::.:.e new form of life,

:.: : e'. articulate theories ·. ::e,;thetic and literary :-: . c'?ecially when inte-

•-:-·.ill:· practicing spiri-

·::-::distinctions drawn : -::-,onhood and agency :..:· -~ ·J.nhelpful as actual :.::.c::- intent in produc-

- __ :. in the gap between

:::::.ited general prem- - _ : -,. 2ss oflife.

_:. ::.e:-e is in the end no - :-: _!-general summary : :":-_c: 3.pproach (as, to be

' - '· c:rarching synthesis :- _ -c: ::- :11\" Yiew does not

: _ .::::-ci' oneself as a sick - :-.::: ::.1:ght loYe God and

_:-::-c·: to beatitude after - ,; :.::o: -agacious tradition - :·::c:::.,; and ordering the _:.. __ ::1 the larger ecology

-:.:CJ.k of these as vari-

The Varieties of Moral Agency 293

eties of a common sort of view, the differences in specific understandings, expectations, practices, and overall flavor or style are profound .

Several things follow from the distance between the relatively vague generalities of thin views aiming for universality and the precise but con- troversial accounts propounded by individual thinkers in particular tradi- tions and contexts. First, agreement on general ideas shared in common can conceal disagreements just as it reveals similarities. Second, the spiritual exercises that are nec;essary on a chastened intellectualist view cannot be vague if they are to be effective; one will be praying to God for forgiveness or singing the hymns of Zhou, but not merely sitting around wishing for a stronger and better character. This would lead to a third point, that in order to be a chastened intellectualist, one would need to be more than that as well, whether a Christian, a Confucian, or something else. This something else could include a systematic synthesis of different religious and/ or philo- sophical elements; I will return to this point below.

Both Xunzi and Augustine recognized a variety of competitors for peo- ple's allegiance, a variety of ways to be human, but they were each confident that they had found the one uniquely correct synthetic and comprehen- sive path. This chapter is not the place to rehearse current debates within the comparative philosophy of religions, nor to provide my views on the familiar trio of "exclusivism," "inclusivism," and "pluralism" in interreligious understanding. Probably in part because of its colonialist past and current global hegemony, the modern West has simultaneously developed traditions of attentive and empathetic attention to other religions and philosophical systems. Studies in these traditions, as well as recent immigration policies that have brought unprecedented religious heterogeneity to the United States, among other places, have made it much more difficult to conclude that any particular tradition is the unique path to virtue, leaving aside how such goodness relates to salvation, enlightenment, or other supranormal religious goals. On the contrary, pace both Augustine and Xunzi, it seems hard to deny that multiple traditions provide sufficient resources for culti- vating recognizable moral virtue. 2

It would thus seem inevitable that we are stuck for the foreseeable future with relatively messy two-level approaches to ethics and politics: On the one hand, we all need general but vague views upon which most can agree in order to facilitate political and diplomatic relationships. But on the other hand, we also need to nurture and follow more specific traditions of personal development in order to (1) follow with integrity our considered conclusions a.bout ultimate value; and (2) have the rich philosophical, meta- phorical, ritual, and artistic resources for personal formation that particu- lar, historically extended traditions provide (even as this subjects us to the

1,·

~

294 UNDERSTANDING AND NEIGHBORLINESS

weaknesses, failings, and internal struggles of such traditions as they try to survive and improve).

Even restricting ourselves to the two cases studied here, simply because of the obvious disagreements between Xunzi and Augustine over metaphys- ics, history, and the character of the ultimate authorities they recognize, it would be impossible to create a supenocabulary of moral agency that would somehow harmonize their disparate ·ways of life. A fortiori, no one could create a "moral Esperanto" that could successfully articulate every- thing of moral (and cultural?) significance in one all-purpose vocabulary, and thereby supercede various religious and quasi-religious vocabularies for human life. 3

What can be created arc generalized vocabularies that address problems of coexistence amid social diversity. For example, the vocabulary of "human rights" has considerable utility in the contemporary world, because it makes it possible to articulate basic claims for justice to people around the world, despite our divergent specific moral vocabularies. Such claims are certainly not the whole of ethics, but thev are still valuable. To live well as a human , being requires being a citizen of a particular commonwealth, a rationally committed adherent of particular complex and conflicted traditions. Today, however, it also requires a tolerance for coalitions built around practical goals of justice that cannot be justified in the same way to everyone who values such goals. Even the most abstract lists of general goods in life will be hard to nail down to everyone's satisfaction, but this can no longer be surprising or even upsetting. 4

"SPOILING THE EGYPTIANS": HOLISM, INTERPRETATION, AND THEFT

According to Augustine, all truth belongs to the Lord, wherever it is found, even in "pagan" traditions such as Stoicism and Platonism. Thus Christians should not hesitate to "spoil the Egyptians" as they leave the pagan world behind, taking whatever is good for Christian use, but being sure to "cease- lessly ponder" Paul's dictum that "knowledge puffs up, but love builds up" (doc. Clir. 2.18.28, 2.40.60-2.41.61). 5 Xunzi, too, did not hesitate to take good ideas from a variety of sources as he developed his understanding of Confucianism, as I have argued elsewhere. 6

Contemporary debates about this sort of "borruwing" or "stealing" from sources outside one's primary tradition are usually cast in terms of "bricolage."7 Though this word may unfortunately connote a haphazard, unsystematic, and merely pragmatic process of borrowing, the basic issues involved are both deep and old, as Augustine's statements above attest. Put

"Spoiling the ::5_. ::

simply, how might "e ~c': _ and how might we be5t :c::..:-:- I obviously cannot ht:'rc: ::· theory of theory crea6 :~ · worse attempts. InsteaC:. : claim in one of the mo< -.: __ Yearley's Mencius and_L::::-.:.

In this book,Yearle;. ::..:-,:_ the work of the anthro~ _ - .:: secondary theory. On Ye::..:-: · empirical and technical :-:-. ::.. :- ondary theory concerr.' ::- : _. unobservable entities. a:~~ _ theory concerns hm, :1 cultures. He suggests th: ::- :.. cially promising object' :· ·.:. _

to explain why he find' "':-:::.. : and Aquinas's conceptic•:> "thin resemblances" and -:::..:-,

Although this contc:_: some degree in the currc::-_: . of time to compare eleff-c-:-_:- my accounts of Xunzi aL~ .~. _ ferent "levels" of theon :--. with difficulty, became·::: :-:-.

d " d " an secon ary concen> ::..:-. whole. 9 One cannot tak ::.:- talking about their vie''' : :- of these areas bleed acre " ::-_

More specificalh-. I ,~:-::... analysis of human flo~ri<::::.:: - as Xunzi and Augustint- ::. ' -: · such theories are essenti::..: ::..:-. the present studv, I arc•..:-:: : : laries" as generally int~;:-::..: forms of social and indi'>: ·: .:.::... Augustine, their religiou, · _ conceptions of metaph:·< _ .. general moral theor:. r : · tion. Attempting to isc:::..: - ations from the first three ·.·

::;_ \ESS

_:_'.-_ :raditions as they try to

-:·_:~:c-d here, simply because _ : _-",-.l{Ustine over metaphys- :c-.::iurities they recognize,

- _::::::-:: of moral agency that :- life. A fortiori, no one

__ _:;:-,,-fully articulate every- :~ -:c all-purpose vocabulary,

- -'-i-rdiCJious vocabularies -_ -- b

_ ::::-:;:-'that address problems __ . ::-.c- \·ocabulary of "human :-::::-: '-rnrld, because it makes : :- c:-<:;ple around the ·world, _ -. ':.ich claims are certainly

c :- _ ::c _ TiJ liw well as a human :-:~:~10m\·ealth, a rationally

_ _ =~~;icted traditions. Today, :: :-_, built around practical -:c:~---. \va:· to everyone who

: ;~:1eral goods in life will :-__ -:--_:t this can no longer be

·: HOLISM, THEFT

:_ :- :. "-herever it is found, ~ :::: 1nism. Thus Christians

::-.::: :eave the pagan world - l . " _ - _. :··.lt oemg sure to cease-

_:::' -..::). but love builds up" . ~:d not hesitate to take

:: c : hi, understanding of

.. - . " " l" " :· ,:_--rmnng or stea mg ~=-c ·.:-ualh- cast in terms of

-~:~::. connote a haphazard, : _- :-:-o,,·ing, the basic issues -::c:e:nents above attest. Put

--~--- -- ==---__:___~

"Spoiling the Egyptians": Ho I ism, Interpretation, and Theft 295

simply, how might we best understand some unfamiliar ethical vocabulary, and how might we best learn something genuinely helpful from such study? I obviously cannot here give a full account of hermeneutics, nor a general theory of theory creation with a set of criteria to distinguish better from worse attempts. Instead, I address a particularly relevant and interesting claim in one of the most successful recent works of comparative ethics, Lee Yearley's Mencius and Aquinas.

In this book, Yearley argues for distinctions among what he (building on the work of the anthropologist Robin Horton) calls primary, practical, and secondary theory. On Yearley's account, primary theory concerns everyday empirical and technical matters and is widely shared across cultures; sec- ondary theory concerns peculiar and distressing events, makes recourse to unobservable entities, and diYerges strongly across cultures; and practical theory concerns how to live and what to do, and is partially shared across cultures. He suggests that partially oYerlapping practical theories are espe- cially promising objects for comparison, and he uses this tripartite division to explain why he finds "real and textured resemblances" between Mencius's and Aquinas's conceptions of virtue, especially courage, while noting only "thin resemblances" and stark differences in other areas of their thought. 8

Although this contention about fruitful comparison is borne out to some degree in the current study, I hope I have shown that it is not a waste of time to compare elements of "secondary theory." More important, I think my accounts of Xunzi and Augustine shmv that the strategy of isolating dif- ferent "levels" of theory in order to compare only one of them is fraught with difficulty, because in most sophisticated thinkers "primary," "practical," and "secondary" concerns and ideas mix together into a generally coherent whole. 9 One cannot talk about their views of spiritual exercises without talking about their views of human nature and cosmology. Indeed, all three of these areas bleed across the boundaries of Yearley's schema.

More specifically, I disagree that secondary theory "may hinder" the analysis of human flourishing offered by sophisticated religious thinkers such as Xunzi and Augustine (as well as Mencius and Aquinas); on the contrary, such theories are essential and constitutive of that analysis. IO In chapter 2 of the present study, I argued for a "weak holism" that views ethical "vocabu- laries" as generally integrated human constructions that enable particular forms of social and individual life. As we have seen in the cases of Xunzi and Augustine, their religious vocabularies as presented here reveal interrelated conceptions of metaphysics, history, recognized authorities, anthropology, general moral theory, and both theory and practices of personal reforma- tion. Attempting to isolate the last three apparently "practical" consider- ations from the first three would eviscerate both figures' accounts of human

296 UNDERSTANDING AND NEIGHBORLINESS

life, robbing them in particular of those considerations that justify the char- acter of the spiritual exercises they recommend.

More deeply, several of these interrelated realms seem to resist classi- fication into primary, practical, and secondary. Xunzi and especially Augus- tine think that history, which would seem to be an example of primary theory, cannot be comprehended without reference to proper conceptions of metaphysics, anthropology, and what is truly authoritative. Holy texts, institutions, traditions, and people-about which our figures would dis- agree so absolutely-are certainly a$ present and obvious as the objects of primary theory, shape human life in a practical vny, and yet are decisively shaped by secondary theory. Perhaps most important, both their anthro- pologies rely very strongly on secondary theory. This is particularly obvious with Augustine, who refers constantly in his analysis of human beings to grace, imaging God, and the difference betvveen various positions in the divine metaphysical hierarchy, among other "secondary" topics. Even the metaphysically more austere Xunzi relies on notions of qi *1:, Ji ll, ("pat- tern"), and the distinction between the "heavenly" and the "human" to expli- cate his anthropology. All this suggests that merely talking about the "ethics" of ancient thinkers is descriptively misleading if done in abstraction from the rest of their views. It also suggests that it may be impossible to engage some important aspects of practical theory, such as spiritual exercises, without simultaneously addressing "secondary" theoretical conceptions of various sorts.

We cannot then hope to understand or adequately represent Xunzi's or Augustine's "practical" theories in isolation from their "secondary" theories. This stance complicates efforts to "retrieve" past practices, ideas, and theo- ries, by showing how they interrelate with numerous elements of their lived context. Shorn of these mutual supports and dependencies, particular bits and pieces may be unpersuasive and apparently useless. However, a broadly based and subtle reading that does not slight the connections between dif- ferent aspects of a thinker's views may also show which parts of a broader "system" of living do and do not depend on others, and in what ways. This charting of logical dependencies gives an opening, at least, to borrowing- and in any case, creatiYe recasting is always possible in principle, even if one cannot imagine exactly how it might be done in advance. 11

This holistic approach to ethico-religious vocabularies even helps explain why such transplantation works so frequently in practice: Intercul- tural borrowing is often successful because bringing practices and theories into "reflectiYe equilibrium" is always a creative production, requiring seri- ous work and rigorous discipline, whether one is following ancient prac- tices from precursors of one's own group or taking "spoils" from someone

"Spoiling the =~-· :: ; else. 12 Successful borr 1 1\'.::-_ _:: the disciplined work rec:::-:-: practices themselws. "~,: _ :-- - - tion and justification. c.:--_ ~ ::: and strengthen practit: :1:-_:::-- of religious histor:, pr::.~:: __ - of old justifications anc : • ::-_' - presents itself, if the:- c.rc : c :- and "subjection" often 'cc:-_-_ -_ haps even these could be ~ :-:- tiYeness is articulated ir--_ :-:: : :__:

Of course, both :\_:.:.:-_=: :__: beginners attempting :1: :-:_ -:-_ techniques or ideas the. :-- .:: debilities of human nae-:-;:_ -:-_~ onlv to the extent tha: ::--_:e-, clements, and a good l-1:: to be superior to all ofre:- : engaged in the systemJ.t:, _ - were already well in haL1~. :_ lar difficulties. TheY en.::c..::ec _ sis. The extent to ,~-hicf -:-__ - whom, will hinge largc'.:- personal formation.

More generally spec..~=--; tradition Yia conwrsion. large ways in response t 1 ::--__ to be scrupulously faithL: : _:_ ous evaluative choices ir--_ :-::--_ _:_ :: confidence. This sort of e:_:_~ ments as they continue : learning that chastened i:--_ >: Whatever the "sources",,:-.-~::-_

possibilities or promise re' from making use of th er:-_: -:-:-_ lar details of various issue-. :- all architecture and app:- _ _:_ _ :- to be limited necessarih- :

although he is surcl: rii'.--_: : as human beings recur i:--_ :--_ __:_:-:· least, for engagement.

::: ;; _ \JESS

_:-2::,:1m that justify the char-

:-:: 2::J1s seem to resist classi- :< ..:.:~zi and especially Augus- = :: J.n example of primary

:-::-_cc to proper conceptions _- 2·..:.thoritative. Holy texts, :-_: _ ":--_ our figures would dis- ,:-_~ :1bYious as the objects of

-, 2:·. and yet are decisively --= :-:J.nt, both their anthro-

-:-:--_:s is particularly obvious ::.:-_2>.<is of human beings to

-- -, arious positions in the - : .: -:1dan-" topics. Even the

: i=o}IRi" :: :> o± qi~' i .c_:r:, (pat- - - 2:1d the ''human" to expli- - "ki b h " h" ,, -: -: :11 - ng a out t e et ics

_: : ·ne in abstraction from --2: :,c impossible to engage

-- ls spiritual exercises, -- :~~,,:,retical conceptions of

= _c_:c-::- represent Xunzi's or --- ::-_.:i:- ··secondary" theories. ,,: -:::-1ctices, ideas, and theo- - _ - _:, clements of their lived _ -:: :::~dencies, particular bits

_-c-:css. However, a broadly _ ,:mections between dif- -'~ich parts of a broader

::- . :-< and in what ways. This :·;- 1:: least, to borrowing-

.-:::-:::- ::J principle, even if one :-_ c..:-.J.nce. 11

_:_' -. 1::-icabularies even helps ~_.::::~ti: in practice: Intercul- :.;::-1g practices and theories _ -:: :- :1duction, requiring seri-

:- _ :' follmving ancient prac- . .. ·1 ,, f

:::.~=--g sp01 s rom someone

"Spoiling the Egyptians": Holism, Interpretation, and Theft

,., ,, Jr

e1:1•, 51iii

I "E::::

297

else. 12 Successful borrowing can happen, even in unlikely places, because the disciplined work required is at least partially motivated by the formative practices themselves, which precisely in their difficulty call out for explana- tion and justification, and in their experienced effectiveness both inspire and strengthen practitioners to pursue such accounts. Simply as a matter of religious history, practices in particular seem able at times to float free of old justifications and to inspire new justifications in whatever vocabulary presents itself, if they are perceived to be effective. Models of personhood and "subjection" often seem to guide the incorporation of details, but per- haps even these could be borrowed or at least amended, once their distinc- tiveness is articulated in relation to other possibilities.

Of course, both Xunzi and Augustine would be deeply suspicious of beginners attempting to fashion their own religious way out of whatever techniques or ideas they might come across, given their analyses of the debilities of human nature. They felt licensed to engage in such borrowing only to the extent that they were confident they had grasped the essential elements, and a good bit of the details, of preexisting paths they judged to be superior to all other possibilities. They understood themselves to be engaged in the systematic elaboration of the truth, the outlines of which were already vvell in hand, allowing modest corrections to resolve particu- lar difficulties. They engaged, in other words, in careful, systematic synthe- sis. The extent to which one sanctions this sort of experimentation, and by whom, will hinge largely on one's sense of the requirements of sufficient personal formation.

More generally speaking, even if one cannot honestly embrace an alien tradition via conversion, one can amend one's own tradition in small or large ways in response to the other tradition's strengths. Even the attempt to be scrupulously faithful to a complex historical tradition involves numer- ous evaluative choices in matters that are frequently difficult to grasp with confidence. This sort of elaboration and adjustment of one's own commit- ments as they continue to deepen seems to be essential to the process of learning that chastened intellectualists like Xunzi and Augustine advocate. Whatever the "sources" one might come across, if they suggest valuable new possibilities or promise resolutions to old difficulties, how could one refrain, from making use of them? The borrowing involved might concern particu- lar details of various issues, or it might even concern broader issues of over- all architecture and approach-exactly what will prove helpful seems not to be limited necessarily to the realm of the "practical," in Yearley's sense, although he is surely right to suggest that concerns with how to live well as human beings recur in numerous cultures, promising ample material, at least, for engagement.

-~

298 UNDERSTANDING AND NEIGHBORLINESS

The process of comparison itself, as Yearley suggests, can also be helpful in this regard, by showing the distinctiveness and complexity of previously assumed ideas such as "human nature" and "the will," and also expanding the scope of other subjects, such as "spiritual exercises,'' by examining pre- viously ignored conceptions and adjusting general accounts accordingly. Sorting the different and indeed competing strands in various accounts of "human nature" provides a new metric for analyzing the seemingly familiar accounts of both Augustine and Xunzi, as well as contemporary accounts that advocate or denounce versions of such an idea. Working out which aspects of the complex family of concerns amalgamated in the idea of the "will" arc unique to the post-Augustinian West, and which are treated, in varying degrees of depth, in an unrelated tradition like classical Confucian- ism, helps us to understand the distinctiveness of each tradition without succumbing to simplistic "East versus West" dichotomies.

Regarding spiritual exercises, rather than dismissing non-western exer- cises as insufficiently cognitive, 13 attending carefully to Xunzi has helped expand the range of the idea beyond previous discussions focused on the Hellenistic world. For example, Hadot's classification of spiritual exercises into four types (disciplines of attention, meditations, other intellectual exercises, and active exercises intended to create habits) seems to presume a split between intellectual contemplation, to be governed by the first three, clearly superior sorts of exercises, and practical action, where habits of activity would be valuable as a sort of supplement. Xunzi recognizes no such distinction, and his exercises are tuned directly to his anthropological analysis of human beings as bodies ruled internally by the xin Jl,\ or "heart/ mind." His emphasis on practices of communal performance such as ritual and music is far from the typical range of discussions in the ancient Medi- terranean world.

Augustine's emphasis on inward self-scrutiny, combined with his strong interest in discursive and symbolic practices designed to reshape our "inner discourse" of ongoing interpretation and deliberation, seems to put him squarely within the predominantly cognitive therapeutic traditions of the West, which stretch from the ancient philosophical schools and early Chris- tian monastic movements to the various forms of "talking cure" practiced in contemporary psychotherapy. And yet his distinctive psychology, proposing a structurally unified mind involving memory, understanding, and voluntas, which is nevertheless divided in its ongoing stream of inner "words," along with his overarching account of the Christian life, changes the context and import of many of the exercises he adopted from extant traditions.

Moreover, both Augustine and Xunzi make study and learning founda- tional and central. In itself, this is hardly unique. But what I have called their

"chastened intellectua:i.-::·. ·· _ tions of the subtle intcr::<::- moral, and even ph;·siL a: :: :- : at least when comparcc -- _ :_ between intellectual ,-;:-::·..:.:: ~:-

Which of these p 1 ::-_:-. tices discussed in this ,oL ~- . depend on the com mi c:-_ ·: :·.: - comparative religious c-:::-_: _ - : antagonistic toward n:1 :-c . self-consciously Chri-t':::·_ exploratory and experi::· __ :·_:: of continuing attempts :: personal formation that :.....:.:·- tion would be self-cont:·::~---: of chastened intellectua:: ':-:·

GLOB

To increase the possibil:::: resident aliens, I propc1'c ·· _ comparative studies of re:::~ ers" generally. 14 This i:L? ::-. - teachers, not merel_,, pc:::·_:. refuses to fear the neis::'.:- - otherwise-some a pp a-re-::: :- f erence and disagreemec :::- _ proselytizing all have the::- : : before neighborliness. le-:::-: __ accident, rather than sor:::: ::· __

This ideal has scwra: ::: __ ity about the ideas, prac::>. the appropriate degree a:: ~ _ -._ her of factors related tc1 , :· __ -

a blanket policy of aftirn::::: it suggests alert opcnne-- :::-_

Second, global nei;'.::· - lauded goal of charital<:: ::· - one's interlocutors are ::·. ::::· becomes inescapable. T::: - or evasion of it. Charir. -

-:::~LINESS

,-.lggests, can also be helpful - .:.:-: :: complexity of previously --:::-_c: will," and also expanding

. "b .. ::(cc:-c1ses, y exammmg pre- ;- :·_c·:-al accounts accordingly. --:-.:.:-1ds in various accounts of

:- ::.: : z:ng the seemingly familiar - ___ ::_..c contemporary accounts - ::.:-_ :dea. vVorking out which :.:·:-_::.:.::amated in the idea of the , _ --: . .:.:~d \vhich are treated, in · · -- -=~ like classical Confucian -

~- <:'ach tradition without - -:un1ies.

- _ -:-:-::,--ing non-western exer- -::_-_ :-..::!: to Xunzi has helped _ - ~:-~-ussions focused on the

-- : :--. _::.-::·Jn of spiritual exercises - _>::.-:ions, other intellectual - _::.-: c ':-.a bits) seems to presume

:- c gowrned by the first --:-::.,-::cal action, where habits

· - _ ::-:-:c:-.t. Xunzi recognizes no _ :- , -:::. to his anthropological

- - h ' "h I --- ::_ __ :, :-:. t e xin ;[),or eart ___ -: :.:-:-,:::rmance such as ritual

:> in the ancient Medi-

- -- - -:nbined \Yith his strong - h "' -:;:-.c 2 to re~ ape our mner

- . :-::.::: n. seems to put him -::· __ :-::_::i(".ltic traditions of the

_ - _ ::.: - ,-'.1uols and early Chris- -- - : ··-: ::.:~:1g: cure" practiced in

_-: - c :·-:-cholog;-, proposing _:-: .::.:-<1nding, and rnluntas,

~ --:-, ::.:·:-_ ,:· :nner '\vords," along : _. _ '.-:::.:'-.::t> the context and

-- :·:-: :.:(:J.L~ traditions. --:-_ ~:, :ind learning founda- ~ ..:.: -,_'.::it I haw called their

::1:1: . ·t,l'

:1:;

'if §i!!.

' ,Sii:: ------- _!ij'--~~~ Global Neighborliness 299

"chastened intellectualism" leads them each to give distinctive interpreta- tions of the subtle interplay between intellectual progress and emotional, moral, and even physical progress within the ongoing process of education, at least when compared ·with views that presuppose a strong distinction between intellectual virtue and character virtue, for instance.

Which of these points, or the many other specific ideas and prac- tices discussed in this study, vvill be most striking or useful will of course depend on the commitments and views of particular readers. The sort of comparative religious ethics I have been practicing in this work is thus not antagonistic toward more confessional approaches, including varieties of self-consciously Christian ethics, but complementary to them. It is more exploratory and experimental, but this should not be read as a rejection of continuing attempts to articulate the kind of comprehensive visions of personal formation that Augustine and Xunzi created. Indeed, such a rejec- tion would be self-contradictory, given my arguments about the character of chastened intellectualism.

GLOBAL NEIGHBORLINESS

To increase the possibility of learning from others, from both distant and resident aliens, I propose "global neighborliness" as a regulative ideal for comparative studies of religious thought and for relating to religious "oth- ers" generally. 14 This implies a conception of such neighbors as potential teachers, not merely potential converts. It also implies an openness that refuses to fear the neighbor as a potential or likely threat, unless proven otherwise-some apparent neighbors really are threatening, but mere dif- ference and disagreement are not. Testifying, apologetics, debate, and even proselytizing all have their times and places, but if any of these comes first, before neighborliness, learning something new will be a surprise and an accident, rather than something sought.

This ideal has several facets. First, it implies attentiveness to and curios- ity about the ideas, practices, and general mode oflife of others. Obviously, the appropriate degree and extent of such an attitude will depend on a num- ber of factors related to one's social position and responsibilities. This is not a blanket policy of affirmation or even toleration of all ways of life. Instead, it suggests alert openness and an eagerness to learn.

Second, global neighborliness implies a commitment to the widely lauded goal of charitable interpretation: the sustained presumption that one's interlocutors are neither fools nor villains, unless such a conclusion becomes inescapable. This implies real evaluative concern, not the lack or evasion of it. Charity requires postulating the strongest, most sensible

300 UNDERSTANDING AND NEIGHBORLINESS

interpretation of seemingly strange ideas or behavior, as a way of reaching deeper insight; and an interpreter cannot arrive at such judgments without attempting to see how someone else's views make sense, or occasionally fail to. By refraining from rushing to negative judgments about one's neigh- bor, charity requires patience, along with both moral and epistemological humility. The first sort of humility is justified by an awareness of our own faults, and the second by an awareness of the relation of sustained practice to real understanding-and both suggest the inherent difficulties in coming to grasp an alien tradition or person. 15

A closely related third point is that neighborliness requires taking oth- ers' commitments seriously. This sort of maneuver is sometimes confused with an apparently nonjudgmental respect or admiration for any system of values (an ideal that seems self-contradictory). To the contrary, I would argue that serious consideration of others' views implies real critical engage- ment with them, as a corollary to charitable interpretation itself. Even if final judgments are def erred for some time, especially if they are strongly negative, working hypotheses about insight and confusion are essential to the process of gaining understanding. This process is ongoing, hovvever, and needs to be sustained over time so that nuances and interconnections can be fully absorbed, precisely through the testing and revision of interpretive hypotheses, vvhich cannot avoid being at least implicitly evaluative.

This critical engagement requires awareness of and attention to both differences and similarities between familiar theories or ideas and new, apparently strange ones. A rush to assimilate the nevi/ to the familiar is one of the easiest ways to miss any chance at learning something-indeed, it risks deceptively confirming the apparently impressive magnitude of our current wisdom. Yearley's insistence on sifting through "similarities within differences" and "differences within similarities" by dravving complex analo- gies and disanalogies between positions is particularly helpful here. 16

This degree of careful engagement leads to the fifth characteristic of global neighborliness, which is alertness to complexity. Such alert- ness refuses to overgeneralize about whole "religions" or "traditions," and it recognizes that the range of views and practices in most social groups is large-not to mention in vast, historically extended traditions such as Christianity and Confucianism, let alone the cultural complexes associated with whole regions like East Asia or Europe. Any broad generalizations that comparative ethics might justifiably produce should not be about "men- talities" or "deep assumptions" of whole civilizations and/ or eras but about the shaping of debates within and between religious traditions. This guards historical particularity, complexity, and conflict, while leaving room for comparing and contrasting different narratives of change over time. So, for

instance, we can recoz::-_::-·: - formulation of the id~ c. ·: subsequent debate in tL: -,. ·

the carefully synthetic. ::-- ::-. from his numerous soi..;:-:·: - . least as much from tht:" ::~:- _ - freedom and determi:1:-:-:-.. ous, powerful desire. '--: · ~: :-. such tensions is simp::. :·. : tual history, we could i:·_ ·. -: < compare them \vith n~ - what is in question.

Last, the most ob,,-: be the need for tact. pr::::-. care essential to neie:h~,.: :-_::- when and how to ask c~-:<: differing convictions .. :

even improvements in ' : =-=~: Confucians teach us. s·J,.:-_ · ..

if it might seem to exccc : · because of the respon~>:::::, - spect, and in part bcca:.:-·: :· ..

This sort of atten::·.c. _- neighborliness facilitate':,~=-: accompanies such lear::.::· . ..:: -:- tures and traditions su:::...::c--> - either biologically or l~,;: _ c. is at least roughly on tn,:..:.. · become ethical beine:s. t. · - ·. tanced consideratio~ of:~: better than to investi:zatc _ - to develop and refine-oc

1. For a helpful OYu<: 2. I think this as pee:

of his theory's failings.

3. Actually, in tern> theories such as utilitari2.:~<:-:· ~ - this sort of"moral Espera.:-.: -

3:::(LINESS

::-'.-:.1,ior, as a way of reaching :: :.t such judgments without ::'.ake sense, or occasionally ·.:..:'.;ments about one's neigh-

.::-_ ::10ral and epistemological :::··: an awareness of our own

:-:::ation of sustained practice :-_:-_::rent difficulties in coming

:-liness requires taking oth- .:.. ·.:.·.-er is sometimes confused - :.dmiration for any system ::-: . To the contrary, I would

- - :::1plies real critical engage- _:-_ :erpretation itself. Even if

_ -:::e:cially if they are strongly ,:-_ : :onfusion are essential to _ c'' is ongoing, however, and

__ : , :.nd interconnections can ·; :.::-. .:'.revision of interpretive · :·:~ :::•:i:ith- evaluative. :-. _ ,, ,,f and attention to both :- ~:-_::-.xies or ideas and new,

~--- _ :~c::\Y to the familiar is one :.::-:· __ :~; -omething-indeed, it _:·:·::-c:,,iw magnitude of our

·; ~---=-· 1.:;?:h "similarities within _ -- -: :'.:rrn·ing complex analo- -- _ .:.::.::-:; helpful here. 16

:he fifth characteristic : :•mplexity. Such alert- . .. " d". " d . :;: _ :> or tra it10ns, an

-:. _ ~: _:, i:1 most social groups _ :(~::-:-.ded traditions such as

_--~.:.::-:..:complexes associated -_:·· :-:-.,ad generalizations that

- -·.:.:d not be about "men-

'.1' and/ or eras but about ·;. ·.:-o traditions. This guards

-- - : :: . ,,,-hile leaving room for

: :!~ange over time. So, for

Notes 301

instance, we can recognize the immense influence of Augustine's particular formulation of the idea of voluntas, which has guided so much inquiry and subsequent debate in the West. And although in the section above I stressed the carefully synthetic, even systematic character of Augustine's borrowing from his numerous sources, the influence of his ideas about the will stems at least as much from the inherent tensions in the idea-for example, between freedom and determinism, and between responsible choice and spontane- ous, powerful desire. Noting that the problematique for inquiry created by such tensions is simply not present in the same way in Chinese intellec- tual history, we could investigate what problematiques have been present, and compare them with more familiar ones, if broad civilizational contrast is what is in question.

Last, the most obviously Confucian element of this conception would be the need for tact, precisely as an expression of, and guide to, the serious care essential to neighborliness. This sort of diplomatic discretion concerns when and how to ask questions and listen, to forthrightly report one's own differing convictions, to criticize, and to suggest possible alternatives or even improvements in someone else's conceptions. As Xunzi and the other Confucians teach us, such benevolent politesse is required at all times, even if it might seem to exceed what an interlocutor appears to deserve, in part because of the responsiveness of human beings to signs of respect and disre- spect, and in part because neighborliness as an ideal simply demands it.

This sort of attentive, charitable yet critical, patient, subtle, and tactful neighborliness facilitates learning from others, as well as the self-scrutiny that accompanies such learning. Though the remarkable diversity of human cul- tures and traditions suggests that no particular mode of personal formation is either biologically or logically necessary, if a chastened intcllectualist account is at least roughly on track, we each need some version of such formation to become ethical beings. If we truly aspire to goodness, and not merely to a dis- tanced consideration of models of human goodness, than we could hardly do better than to im·estigate conceptions of personal formation, aiming thereby to develop and refine our own convictions-by practicing them .

NOTES

1. For a helpful ovenicw, see T·wiss and Conser 1992.

2. I think this aspect of John Hick's work (1985, 1989) is inescapable, regardless of his theory's failings.

3. Actually, in terms of this study's lingo, one could argue that modern moral theories such as utilitarianism and Kantian constructivism are attempts to create just

this sort of"moral Esperanto" and are notably more influential than the actual language

. --::::1 ==""

302 UNDERSTANDING AND NEIGHBORLINESS

of Esperanto. Many have learned to speak and even live these moral yocabularies, but I would wager that their numbers are still dwarfed by those who adhere to some form of religion, and those who have absorbed elements of such accounts into comprehen- sive religious visions.

4. My position on human rights has been influenced most by the works of Sum- ner Twiss, as developed, e.g., in Twiss 1998b.

5. On the Israelites stealing from the Egyptians as they left, see Ex. 3:21-22, 12:35-6. On knowledge and loYe according to Paul, see 1 Cor. 8: 1.

6. Stalnaker 2003. 7. On "bricolage," see Stout 1988, 74-77; and Stalnaker 2005, 215-19. Contrast

this with the common habit of treating the parallel issue addressed within one's tradition, considered sometimes very broadly, as the "retrieval" of one's own "moral sources."

8.Yearley 1990, 175-82, 169-75. 9.Yearley now seems to see the force of this sort of objection, and to be moving

in a similar direction. See Yearley 1998, 124. And even in Mencius and Aquinas (1990), Yearley's methodological conclusions about comparison and types of theory do not seem to have precluded him from offering detailed descriptions of the views of his two subjects, which draw on ideas from their "secondary" theories such as grace and qi, for example, in the body of the work itself.

10.Yearley 1990, 180. ButYearley's contention does have real bite: One could cer- tainly argue thatAugustine's understanding of sin is radicalized by his theological commit- ments, e.g., regarding atonement and the proper reading of the Letter to the Romans, in a way that is ultimately unconvincing. But this position is so essential to his overall under- standing of life that to reject it is tantamount to rejecting his broader religious vision, in favor of something more like that of his late antagonist Julian of Eclanum.

11. Indeed, one of the other purposes for which Yearley deploys the distinctions between levels of theory is to authorize and guide his constructive efforts in contem- porary virtue ethics, which draw on both Aquinas and Mencius to develop general accounts of dispositions, virtues, and the virtue of courage.

12. The phrase "reflective equilibrium" comes from Rawls 1971, 20ff. 13. Compare Hadot 1995, 116 n. 79. 14. Although the rhetorical allusion to the Christian love command is intended,

that is hardly this ideal's only source. Global neighborliness is not meant to be restricted to Christians or automatically governed by Christian norms, but is proposed for oth- ers as well. The particular elements of the conception owe much to reflecting on the comparative procedures of Frank Clooncy and Lee Yearley, among others.

15. A critic might question whether such counsels of charity are compatible ,,.,·ith skeptical accounts of human nature such as Augustine's or Xunzi's, which might instead suggest that we should be dubious about the professed intentions and aspira- tions of our interlocutors. But as long as one is equally skeptical of both the familiar and the strange, then this criticism has a hard time getting off the ground: If one refuses to presume one's own superiority, then there are no grounds for high-handed,

insensitive interrogations to begin. 16.Yearley 1990, 4-6, 170-75.

Allen, Douglas, ed. 190-. __ West. Boulder, Co'.·:.:·.'.

Ames, RogerT., \.\'imal [•:--::: Asian Theory anJ Pr..::::._ -_

---. 1996. Self a<:::::· Universitv of:\e,,-y ~ ..

0

Antonaccio, Maria. 1 q.:.' _ < Exercises. Annuaj _-":.": _

Augustine. 1844-6+a. D,- _c ..::: ----. 1844-64b. D.- . ..:: __ -

48. ---. 1844-6+c. D,- _

Bcttcnson 198+.] ---. 1844-64d. c_-::. -_-

Chadwick 1991 . ] ----. 1844-64e. D.-

Kearney 1999.] ---. 1844-64f. C::.::..: __ _

549-638. [Trans. Tc,,:_ ---. 1844-64g. C::.::..:

[Trans. Teske 199S. :: '-'' - - ---. 1844--64h. C-::·..: -_

1049-1608. [Tran'.-:-~---- 1844-64i. C::.:-..:

388. 1844-64j. D,- ..::

40, col. 11-100. - -. 1844-64k. D,- ..: [Trans. Green 199).-

---. 1844-641. D,- ..::.:..:· __

Paris. ---. 1844-64m. £::..->: _

64, vol. 40, col. 2 3: - .:. ---. 1844-64n. fr::...::-..:: -

37,col.1966. ---. 1844-640. E::: ::.: ..:_

Teske 2003.J ---. 1844-64p. f-r, ::

35,col.1977-2062.