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P A R T I I I

Theories of

Environmental Ethics

Copyright 201 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. Due to electronic rights, some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s). Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.

Biocentric Ethics and the

Inherent Value of Life

DISCUSSION: Synthetic Biology and the Value of Life

Does life itself have inherent moral value? Several criteria for moral standing were examined in the previous chapter, includ- ing sensation and being conscious. For many observers, such attributes as sensa- tion and consciousness themselves serve a higher end of life, and therefore they conclude that only life itself seems to be plausible candidate for the inherent value that moral standing implies. A “biocen- tric” ethics is an approach that begins with the inherent value of life as its foundational principle of value.

The diversity of life on earth is amaz- ingly complex. Biological science has been categorizing animal and plant species since before Aristotle began his taxonomy of living organisms more than 2,000 years ago. Current estimates suggest that more than 1.4 million different species have been scientifically categorized.1 But, these categorized species represent only a small percentage of the actual number of spe- cies that exist. On the basis of research

conducted in tropical forests, some esti- mates place the number at more than 30 or 40 million species. Biologist E. O. Wilson estimates that invertebrate species alone may number as many as 30 million. Each species contains from a few members (for example, the California condor) to many billions of members (such as bacteria). Each species exists in an ecological niche in which its members interact with their environment to maintain life. Wilson tells of many highly specialized life-forms.

One of my favorite examples of such specialists living in microniches are the mites that live on the bodies of army ants: one kind is found only on the mandibles of the soldier caste, where it sits and feeds from the mouth of its host; another kind is found only on the hind foot of the soldier caste, where it sucks blood for a living, and so on through various bizarre configurations.2

some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s). Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.

Each organism must take in nutrition from its environment to sustain its life and propagate its species. The ability to do this has evolved through millions of years of changing environments via natural selec- tion. This ability, and every other function of living beings, is stored in the genetic code of each organism. Each organism contains 1 million to 10 billion bits of information in its genetic code, repre- senting an enormous genetic library of information developed over billions of years. The diversity of life has inspired scientists, philosophers, and poets for mil- lennia. It is a remarkable phenomenon.

But that diversity is being threatened at astonishing rates. Some scientists, including E. O. Wilson, estimate that over 100 species per day, almost 50,000 species each year, become extinct. Fossil records show that extinction has been a fact of life. But these same fossil records show that the rate of extinctions that are not related to human influence—what scien- tists call the background extinction rate— is significantly smaller than present extinction rates. Mammals, for example, are becoming extinct at 100 times the background rate. The present extinction rates for rain forest species and freshwa- ter species are even higher. Without question, the earth is in the midst of the greatest single extinction episode since the one associated with the extinction of dinosaurs 65 million years ago. The dif- ference, unfortunately, is that this episode is largely due to human factors. Further, estimates suggest that it may take more than 10 million years of life on earth for a natural return to the same number of species as had existed before human- caused extinctions.

But even as many natural life forms are facing extinction, human technology has reached a point where new life forms are being designed and created artificially. In the emerging field of synthetic biology, scientists and engineers are designing biological objects, ranging from small strands of DNA to entire genomes, cells, and organisms. This technology promises to transform medicine, energy, industry, and the environment while it also raises fundamental philosophical and ethical questions.

Broadly understood, synthetic biology is a field in which biology merges with engineering to design biological entities that otherwise do not exist in nature. In more traditional genetic engineering, naturally occurring genes are recombined and manipulated to create a genetically engineered organism, for example by repairing a genetic malfunction or trans- ferring some biological function to another organism. In contrast synthetic biology involves the use of DNA, genes, cells, or organisms that have been syn- thesized by humans.

In May 2010, a team of scientists at the J. Craig Venter Institute announced the following:

the successful construction of the first self-replicating, synthetic bacterial cell. The team synthesized the 1.08 million base pair chromosome of a modified Mycoplasma mycoides genome. The synthetic cell is called Mycoplasma mycoides JCVI-syn1.0 and is the proof of principle that genomes can be designed in the computer, chemically made in the laboratory and trans- planted into a recipient cell to produce a new self-replicating cell controlled only by the synthetic genome.

The Venter Institute goes on to describe that this genome was “constructed from four bottles of chemicals that make up DNA.”3 To many observers, this announcement meant that humans had succeeded in creating life itself from four bottles of chemicals.

Various definitions of synthetic biology have been offered, including: “the design and construction of new biological parts, devices, and systems, and the re-design of existing, natural biological systems for useful purposes. (Synthetic Biology.org)” “Synthetic biology … can broadly be described as the design and construction of novel artificial biological pathways, organisms or devices, or the redesign of existing natural biological systems. (UK Royal Society).” “Synthetic biology is the engineering of biology: the synthesis of complex, biologically based (or inspired) systems which display functions that do not exist in nature. This engineering per- spective may be applied at all levels of the

126 PART III THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

hierarchy of biological structures – from individual molecules to whole cells, tissues and organisms. In essence, synthetic biol- ogy will enable the design of ‘biological systems’ in a rational and systematic way.” (European Commission)4

So, on one hand, life on earth is under- going mass extinctions, most of which are strongly influenced, if not caused, by human activities. On the other hand, humans are on the verge of major break- through in creating life in the laboratory. These two phenomena challenge us to consider the proper stance that humans ought to take towards the natural world, and in specific towards other living beings.

The loss of biological diversity raises a variety of value questions. What does it matter, for example, that a mite living only on the mandible of the soldier caste of army ants becomes extinct? What is the value of life? Traditionally, many instru- mental justifications have been given to support the preservation of this biodiver- sity. Tremendous medicinal, agricultural, economic, and scientific potential lies in the variety and diversity of life. However, such achievements are exactly the primary goal of synthetic biology. Thus, it may well be that we can achieve those goals “in a more rational and systematic” way through synthetic biology than by work- ing with naturally occurring organisms. If such values could be better served by artificial life forms, then this instrumental justification for biological diversity loses much of its force.

But these instrumental values suggest an attitude towards the natural world

that views other living objects as mere tools to be used for our own ends. As we discussed in the previous chapter, how- ever, many have argued that living beings have a value that goes beyond the merely instrumental. Some environmental philo- sophers have argued that life itself pos- sesses inherent value, it is to be valued for its own sake and not simply for how we can use it. But does your attitude towards the natural world and towards life change as a result of synthetic biology’s success in creating life in the laboratory?

DISCUSSION TOPICS: 1. Are naturally occurring life forms more

or less valuable than artificial ones? Is there an important ethical distinction to be made between life that occurs naturally and life that is created artificially?

2. Do you think that every living being possesses some inherent value simply due to the fact that it is alive? Why, or why not?

3. Was the creation of a biological organism from four bottles of chemi- cals more or less wondrous than the species of mite that exists only on the mandibles of ants?

4. Critics of synthetic biology sometimes assert that scientists are “playing God.” What exactly do you think this means? Is it a persuasive criticism?

5. Do artificial organisms have a purpose or good of their own that is indepen- dent of the purposes for them that their designers intend?

6 . 1 I N T R O D U C T I O N

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 showed how standard ethical principles and concepts can be applied to environmental issues. With this chapter, our focus changes to consider more systematic attempts at developing comprehensive environmental philoso- phies. These approaches question the wisdom of simply extending traditional ethics, or what we have called ethical extensionism, in favor of more radical shifts in our ethical perspective. The problems with ethical extensionism revolve around three issues. First, despite the work of such philosophers as Singer and

CHAPTER 6 BIOCENTRIC ETHICS AND THE INHERENT VALUE OF LIFE 127

Regan, the principles and concepts used in their application often remain narrowly focused. The criteria for moral considerability defended by many philosophers are most clearly found in adult human beings. Critics charge that ethical extensionism gives moral standing only to those animals that most closely resemble adult humans. As a result, these extensions remain fundamentally hier- archical and, according to critics, beg the question of the moral status of other living things. For example, both Singer and Regan attribute moral standing only to some animals, leaving out a majority of living species. Other living things remain outside the range of moral consideration. This omission strikes many environmentalists as both an ethical and a logical mistake.

Second, these extensions remain thoroughly individualistic. Individual ani- mals have standing, but plants, species, habitat, and relations among entities have no standing in their own right. Yet so much of the science of ecology stres- ses the interconnectedness of nature. Ecology emphasizes such wholes as species, biotic diversity, ecological communities, ecosystems, and biological, chemical, and geological cycles. Relations, communities, systems, and processes play a major role in the science of ecology. Unfortunately, standard ethical theories have little room for such concerns. Indeed, we need only remember Regan’s dismissal of the ethical focus on communities as “environmental fascism” to see how unreceptive these standard ethical views can be. To some environmentalists, this is the perfect example of a perspective caught in the grasp of a philosophical theory and ignoring the facts of science.

Finally, these extensions are not, nor were they intended as, comprehensive environmental ethics. Philosophers applied ethics to specific problems as the lat- ter arose and as they were perceived, making little or no attempt to build a coherent and comprehensive theory of environmental ethics. This narrow focus has had two unhappy results. First, the extension of ethics to cover, for example, the rights of animals can provide no guidance for many other environmental issues, such as global warming and pollution. Second, extensionism tends to remain critical and negative. It often tells us what is wrong with various policies and actions but seldom offers guidelines about what the alternative “good life” should be.

The chapters that follow present a survey of attempts to develop more sys- tematic environmental ethics. Much of the recent philosophical work on the environment breaks with standard ethical theory and strives to rethink the rela- tionship between humans and nature. Indeed, some of these emerging schools of thought might more appropriately be described as environmental philosophies than as ethics. As philosophers seek a comprehensive account of the place of human beings in their natural environment, they must address more than merely ethical questions. The following topics become important when we begin to rethink ethics in this way: metaphysics (nature and the natural; the ontological status of systems, relations, species, and so forth), epistemology (the logical rela- tion between descriptive and normative claims), aesthetics (beauty and intrinsic value), and political philosophy (civil disobedience and environmental justice).

Let us, then, put aside the role of the philosopher who approaches environ- mental problems armed with a previously articulated ethical theory. Instead, let

128 PART III THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

us adopt the point of view of an environmentalist (or, more simply, of a con- cerned citizen) seeking to articulate, develop, and defend a coherent and com- prehensive environmental philosophy.

No rational person can reflect on such challenges as global climate change and mass extinctions without some concern and distress. But to understand the goals of an environmental philosophy, we need to go beyond the stage of merely reacting. We need to examine the source of our concern. Why exactly are we troubled by these facts? Why should we be troubled by them?

These questions seem to have no single answer. In some cases, our distress grows from our awareness that such environmental destruction poses a clear dan- ger to human beings and thus raises familiar ethical concerns. In other cases, the way we treat the environment offends spiritual, aesthetic, or cultural values. In yet other cases, we seem to be causing direct moral harm to natural objects themselves. The goal of many environmental philosophers is to provide a single systematic principle or theory that can account for these various concerns. Achieving such a goal would require work not only in ethics but also in meta- physics, epistemology, aesthetics, and political philosophy. Still other philoso- phers conclude that no such systematic account is possible and argue instead for a position called moral pluralism.5

6 . 2 I N S T R U M E N T A L V A L U E

A N D I N T R I N S I C V A L U E

One way to understand the philosophical shift that is occurring among envi- ronmental philosophers is to contrast questions of morality with more general questions of value. Morality, narrowly understood, has always taken human well-being and the relationship between humans as its focus. Morality seeks to understand the rights and responsibilities of humans, human well-being, and the good life for human beings. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that philosophers have difficulty granting environmental concerns moral con- sideration. Environmental concerns simply do not fit within the traditional domain of morality.

But understood more broadly, philosophical ethics asks more general ques- tions about the good life and about human flourishing. These questions involve wider concerns of value. From this perspective, environmental concerns are more legitimately ethical concerns, because they raise a wide variety of value questions that establish norms for how we ought to live. Not all value questions concern moral value (narrowly understood). We also recognize aesthetic, spiritual, scien- tific, and cultural values as worthy and deserving of respect.6

Thus, central to a comprehensive environmental philosophy is a consider- ation of the nature and scope of value. A full account of value determines the ethical domain by helping to define what objects have moral relevance or what objects deserve consideration. Ethics is concerned with how we should live, how we should act, and the kind of persons we should be. Defining the full scope of

CHAPTER 6 BIOCENTRIC ETHICS AND THE INHERENT VALUE OF LIFE 129

these “shoulds” is to give an account of all that has value or worth. Consider the example described in the preceding discussion case.

Uncounted species of insects are becoming extinct as a result of destruction of the rain forest. Many people find the wanton destruction of diverse life-forms offensive. But what exactly is wrong with causing the extinction of millions of insects? Insects do not feel pain, are not conscious, and are not subjects-of-a-life. They are not, in any obvious way, moral beings. What seems to be wrong is that something of value is lost—indeed perhaps wantonly destroyed—by human activity. Too often these values are lost for the sake of greed or out of sheer ignorance. A similar explanation might be given for the destruction of the rain forest itself, as well as for the loss of wilderness areas, wetlands, trees, lakes, oceans, fish, and plants. Why value insects? Why protect a wilderness area? Why care about plants? As we noted in Chapter 2, some religious traditions are exploring ways to answer these questions from theological starting points, but how are they to be answered philosophically? The shift from an ethics of animal welfare to a more holistic environmental philosophy can perhaps best be under- stood as a shift from a narrow conception of morality and moral value to a broader concern with value itself.

Philosophers often have discussed moral value in terms of interests. Among the philosophers considered in the last chapter, Joel Feinberg, Christopher Stone, Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Kenneth Goodpaster all use the concept of inter- ests to decide what sorts of things deserve moral consideration. To say that an object has interests is to say that it has a “sake of its own” (Feinberg), a “worth” in its own right (Stone), a “welfare” of its own (Bentham and Singer), “inherent value” (Regan), or its own “well-being” (Goodpaster). All this is to say that these objects have a value or worth that is independent of the value and worth ascribed to them by human beings. This implies that we do some- thing wrong when we treat an object that has a value in itself and of its own as though it has value only in relation to us. This difference is typically expressed in the important distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value. Instrumental value is a function of usefulness. An object with instrumental value possesses that value, because it can be used to attain something else of value. A pencil is valuable, because I can write with it. A dollar bill is valuable, because I can use it to buy something. The instrumental value of an object lies not in the object itself but in the uses to which that object can be put. When such an object no longer has use, or when it can be replaced by something of more effective or greater use, it has lost its value and can be ignored or discarded.

Thinking of natural objects in terms of “resources” is to treat them as having instrumental value. For example, Gifford Pinchot’s conservation movement emphasized the instrumental value of forests and wilderness areas. We should protect and conserve the wilderness, because it is the repository of vast resources that humans can use. Pinchot and other progressives argued that the value of national resources was too often unfairly distributed or wasted, which is to say improperly used. Many other environmental concerns rest on the instrumental value of the environment. Clean air and water are valued, because without them human health and well-being are jeopardized. The preservation of plant

130 PART III THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

and animal species is valued by many because of the vast potential therein for medical and agricultural uses. Virtually any utilitarian or economic proposal is based on the instrumental value of nature. The stewardship tradition in religious ethics also has a strong instrumental predisposition. Likewise, synthetic biologists view the life forms that they are creating as valuable in this instrumental sense.

Appealing to the instrumental value of the environment can be an effective political strategy. Public opinion is often most responsive to claims of lost oppor- tunities, wasted resources, and the like. Yet an environmental ethics that is based solely on the instrumental value of the environment may prove unstable. As human interests and needs change, so too will human uses for the environment. The instrumental value of the Colorado River as a water and hydroelectric power source for southern California will quickly override its instrumental value as a scenic wilderness or recreation area. Emphasizing only the instrumental value of nature means, in effect, that the environment is held hostage by the interests and needs of humans, and it immediately evokes the necessity to make trade-offs among competing human interests.

An object has inherent or intrinsic value, on the other hand, when it is valuable in itself and is not valued simply for its uses.7 The value of such objects is intrin- sic to them. To say that an object is intrinsically valuable is to say that it has a good of its own and that what is good for it does not depend on outside factors. Thus its value would be a value found or recognized rather than given. Not all things that we value are valued instrumentally. Some things we value, because we recognize in them a moral, spiritual, symbolic, aesthetic, or cultural impor- tance. We value them for themselves, for what they mean, for what they stand for, and for what they are, not for how they are used.

Some examples can help explain this distinction. Think of friendships. If you value a friend only for her usefulness, you have seriously misunderstood friend- ship, and you would not be a very good friend. Consider also historical monu- ments or cultural and aesthetic objects. The Liberty Bell, the Taj Mahal, and Michelangelo’s David possess value far beyond their usefulness. Clearly, many of our environmental concerns rest on the intrinsic value that we recognize in nature. Life itself, in the view of many, is intrinsically valuable, no matter what form it takes. Wilderness areas, scenic landscapes, and national parks are valued by many people, because, like the Liberty Bell, they are a part of our national heritage and history. (This is essentially the argument Mark Sagoff made, which we examined in Chapter 3.) Grizzly bears may have little instrumental value, but many people value knowing that the bears still exist in Yellowstone National Park. The symbolic value of the bald eagle transcends any instrumental value it might have. Undeveloped and unexplored wilderness areas are highly valued, even by people who will never visit, explore, or use these areas. John Muir’s disagreement with Gifford Pinchot was a disagreement between one who saw an intrinsic value in wilderness (Muir) and one who did not (Pinchot). Muir spoke of the great sequoia groves as a cathedral, suggesting that they possess a spiritual and religious value far above their economic usefulness.

When we say that human activity degrades the environment, we are often referring to the loss of or disrespect for intrinsic value. When sections of the

CHAPTER 6 BIOCENTRIC ETHICS AND THE INHERENT VALUE OF LIFE 131

Grand Canyon are eroded by flooding caused by water released from hydroelec- tric dams upriver, when acid rain eats away at ancient architecture in Greece and Rome, or when shorelines are replaced by boardwalks and casinos, human activ- ity destroys some of the intrinsic goods that we find in nature.

For a number of philosophers working in environmental ethics, the greatest challenge is to develop an account of intrinsic value that can counter arguments based on instrumental values. As we saw in Chapter 5, John Passmore calls for an emphasis on the sensuous to offset the materialism and greed dominant in mod- ern culture. After criticizing the dominant economic model (which recognizes only instrumental value), Mark Sagoff summons philosophers to articulate the cultural, aesthetic, historical, and ethical values that underlie our environmental commitments. These values, Sagoff tells us, determine not just what we want as a people but what we are.

The development of a more systematic environmental philosophy, then, often involves a shift from a narrow focus on moral standing or moral rights and responsibilities to a more general discussion of value, especially intrinsic value. Unfortunately, appeals to intrinsic value often meet with skepticism. We seem to lack the language for expressing intrinsic value. Many people think that such value is merely subjective, a matter of personal opinion: “Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” Thus, when a measurable instrumental value (such as profit) conflicts with intangible and elusive intrinsic value (such as the beauty of a wil- derness), the instrumental value too often wins by default. The remainder of this chapter considers various views that reflect the conviction that life itself possesses intrinsic value and that, accordingly, humans have some responsibilities to it.

6 . 3 B I O C E N T R I C E T H I C S

A N D T H E R E V E R E N C E F O R L I F E

The term biocentric ethics refers to any theory that views all life as possessing intrin- sic value. (The word biocentric means life-centered.) Thus, although someone like Tom Regan is willing to attribute an inherent worth to some animals, his view is not biocentric, because it does not include all living things. Kenneth Goodpa- ster’s focus on life itself as sufficient for moral considerability is biocentric.

An early version of a biocentric ethics is Albert Schweitzer’s “reverence for life” principle. Schweitzer (1875–1965) wrote extensively about religion, music, ethics, history, and philosophy. He also, of course, devoted much of his life to bringing medical care to remote and isolated communities in Africa. His ethics, captured in the phrase reverence for life, is an extremely interesting precursor of contemporary biocentric ethics.

Schweitzer’s was an active and full life committed to caring and concern for others. Yet he was also a prolific writer, who devoted many volumes to diagnos- ing the ethical ills of modern society and seeking a cure for them. Reverence for life was the attitude that he believed offered hope to a world beset with conflict. It is worth our while to examine briefly Schweitzer’s diagnosis and cure.8

132 PART III THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

Modern industrial society had moved away from a worldview that con- nected the goodness of life with the goodness of nature. This belief, which Schweitzer called world-and-life-affirmation, is reminiscent of the natural law tradition in ethics. The rise of science and technology and the industrialized soci- ety that accompanied them severed the connection between ethics and nature by viewing nature as an indifferent, value-free, mechanical force. Modern science often views nature as a machine, governed by physical and mechanical laws. There is no good (nor, for that matter, any evil) intrinsic in nature itself. Set adrift in such a world, human ethics is left without foundation. Ethical value becomes no more than personal opinion or sentiment. Modern industrial society, with its wars, impersonal bureaucracies, meaningless work, and cultural decay, is the result of this separation.

Schweitzer’s ethical thinking sought to re-establish the bond between nature and ethics. Yet, having spent time traveling in the most remote sections of Africa, Schweitzer did not deceive himself that nature is benign and gentle. He had been made more than aware of the destructive and arbitrary power of nature. He was nonetheless convinced that there was good in nature, an intrinsic value that could help provide a basis for human ethics. The idea that Schweitzer developed to solve this issue is captured by his phrase reverence for life.

Schweitzer describes in almost mystical terms the moment that this idea came to him. While riding on a barge traveling upriver in Africa, “at the very moment when, at sunset, we were making our way through a herd of hippopot- amuses, there flashed upon my mind, unforeseen and unsought, the phrase rever- ence for life.”9

What does reverence for life mean? Schweitzer’s original German phrase was ehrfurcht vor dem leben. Ehrfurcht implies an attitude of awe and wonder. Although reverence perhaps connotes a religious tone that is not present in ehrfurcht, it seems clear that Schweitzer had something like this in mind. The etymological roots of ehrfurcht suggest a combined attitude of honor and fear. It would not be mislead- ing to think of the attitude often inspired by majestic vistas from atop high mountains or the attitude inspired by violent storms.

Schweitzer held that the most fundamental fact of human consciousness is the realization that “I am life which wills to live, in the midst of life which wills to live.”10 Ethics begins when we become fully aware and fully in awe of that fact.

The man who has become a thinking being feels a compulsion to give to every will-to-live the same reverence for life that he gives to his own. He experiences that other life in his own. He accepts as being good: to preserve life, to promote life, to raise to its highest value of life which is capable of development; and as being evil: to destroy life, to injure life, to repress life which is capable of development. This is the absolute, fundamental principle of the moral.11

In our terms, Schweitzer is claiming that all living things have an intrinsic value, a value that commands our awe and reverence. Life is not a neutral, value-free “fact” of the universe. Life is good in itself. It is inspiring and deserv- ing of respect.

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Critics are quick to caricature the “reverence for life” ethic. Is Schweitzer suggesting that the life of a virus or of bacteria is as worthy as human life? Does he suggest that we treat the life of an ant with as much respect as we treat human life? If not, does he offer any formula for resolving conflicts between human life and the life of, for example, the HIV virus? Would the existence of artificial synthetic life change one’s attitude towards life?

Schweitzer lived his life in a manner that many people would find overly demanding. He would go to great lengths to avoid killing even mosquitoes, going so far as to carry them out of the room rather than swat them. Even when fighting disease-carrying mosquitoes, he was reluctant to kill. He resisted using DDT, for example, because he mistrusted the way it killed indiscriminately. Nev- ertheless, Schweitzer was not naive about the necessity of sometimes taking lives, especially out of reverence for other lives. To maintain life, other life must be sacrificed as food. He was also willing to take an animal’s life to end its suffering.12

But this does not mean that Schweitzer defended some formula or rule to be applied in cases of conflict to establish priorities. Such a hierarchy would under- mine the foundation of the “reverence for life” ethic, by suggesting that some rule or criterion is more fundamental than reverence itself. It would also down- play the serious dilemma that we often face when we must take life. A principle or rule that unequivocally resolves conflict would suggest that any ethical conflict is only apparent and not real.

Schweitzer did not envision reverence for life merely as some rule that we could apply to specific situations and, as it were, simply be read as the recom- mended decision. Reverence for life is more an attitude that determines who we are than a rule for determining what we should do. It describes a character trait or a moral virtue rather than a rule of action. A morally good person stands in awe of the inherent worth of each life.

But what does this say about those circumstances in which the good person must choose to kill? What about the doctor who kills a virus? The butcher who kills a pig? The farmer who cuts down a tree? Schweitzer denies that we can escape responsibility for these decisions. They must be made, but they should be made responsibly and consciously. Reverence for life is that character trait that sensitizes us to our responsibility for these decisions. It is an attitude that makes us aware of the full implications of these decisions. It makes us reluctant to take a life randomly, callously, or without remorse. In doing this, it helps us live an authentic and moral life.

It is an interesting exercise to consider how the creation of life forms in a laboratory might affect our attitude towards life. Natural life was created and evolved over eons, and any number of countless factors could have changed the course of history. Still, against all this, life does exist, life continues to evolve. In the face of such wonder, humans might take a more humble attitude towards their place in the universe. Yet, if these same humans can create life in a lab, perhaps life itself is not so special, not so valuable. And perhaps humans are more unique, and should be more proud, than otherwise thought.

Schweitzer’s ethical views are richly textured and firmly based in the experi- ences of many years in the African wilderness. Yet these views never attained

134 PART III THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

wide popularity among either the public or philosophers. Perhaps the tendency to see such a perspective as overly romantic or naive is too common and too great an obstacle. Schweitzer also never developed the type of scholarly defense of this position that professional philosophers demand. However, recent biocen- tric theories may be more persuasive.

6 . 4 E T H I C S A N D C H A R A C T E R

Before moving to more recent biocentric views, it may be helpful to reflect for a moment on a philosophical issue that underlies this discussion. In the opening sec- tion of this chapter, we suggested that recent environmental philosophies represent a break with many traditional theories. Since that time, we have seen hints of what this might involve, and developing these hints at this point will prove useful.

As we discussed in Chapter 2, many defenders of traditional ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, deontology, and natural law, treat the fundamental question of ethics as “What should I do?” The goal of ethics is to articulate and defend rules or principles that can guide our behavior. The philosopher’s job, then, is to justify those rules by demonstrating why all rational people should act in accordance with them. For most philosophers in these traditions, this task ultimately requires show- ing that obeying them is in a person’s rational self-interest.13

Given this approach to ethics, we can understand why many people would have difficulty accepting Schweitzer’s views on the reverence for life. If we do treat Schweitzer’s view as a rule for guiding our actions, reverence for life might well commit us to the type of counterintuitive positions we mentioned at the end of the previous section. But Schweitzer did not offer reverence for life as an ethical rule. Reverence for life would be a fundamental attitude that we would take toward the world. In this sense, Schweitzer’s ethics focused not on the question of what I should do but on what type of person I should be. His was not an ethics solely of rules as much as it was an ethics of character, seeking first to describe morally good people in terms of their character, dispositions, and values, rather than in terms of their actions.

This shift represents a return to the tradition of virtue ethics described in Chapter 2. An ethics of virtue emphasizes moral character or virtues rather than rules or principles. Ethical systems such as utilitarianism, deontology, and natural law focus on human actions and seek to defend some rule or principle that we use to judge whether those actions are right or wrong. Virtue-based ethics constructs a philosophical account of the morally good person, describing and defending certain character traits of that good person. Like Aristotle’s, most virtue-based theories are teleological. Virtues are distinguished from vices (the opposite of vir- tues) by their connection with attainment of some human telos, or fulfillment. For Aristotle, the virtues were those character traits and dispositions that enable people to live a meaningful and fulfilling human life.

Keep this distinction in mind as we examine more recent environmental philosophies. Many of these emerging philosophies are not simply proposing

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alternatives to the rules or principles advanced by utilitarianism or deontology. Instead, they require us to make a shift in our philosophical perspective—a shift away from a concern with rules of behavior toward a concern with moral character.

These shifts require not only a different view of the environment but, at least as important, a different view of ourselves. Recall that Mark Sagoff tells us that a satisfactory environmental ethics must address not only those values that determine what we want but also those values that determine what we are. Implicit in this distinction is the recognition that our identity as a person is con- stituted in part by our values and attitudes. A person’s character—those disposi- tions, relationships, attitudes, values, and beliefs that popularly might be called a “personality”—is not some feature that remains independent of that person’s identity. Character is not like a suit of clothes that the self steps into and out of at will. Rather, the self is identical to a person’s most fundamental and enduring dispositions, attitudes, values, and beliefs. Thus, when an environmental philoso- phy requires that we change our fundamental attitude toward nature, it is requir- ing quite literally that we change ourselves.

Note how this shift changes the nature of justification in ethics. If, as seems true in many traditional ethical theories, justification of some rule requires that it be tied to self-interest, we should not be surprised to find that this justification often fails. Ethical controversies often involve a conflict between self-interest and ethical values. Consider how we would “justify” the reverence for life. For a self that does not already include a disposition to treat life with reverence, the only avenue open for justification would involve showing how the disposition serves some other interest of the self. Why should I, if I have not already embraced the principle of treating life with reverence, do so now? The only way to answer this question appears to be to show how it is in my self-interest to adopt this attitude. But this means connecting the attitude to, in Sagoff’s terms, those values that determine what we want instead of those that determine what we are. And this is to say that reverence for life must be reducible to some instrumental value. We should adopt the attitude of reverence because it, in some way, serves our purposes or satisfies our wants. Of course, this is exactly what the “reverence for life” ethic denies. Life has intrinsic value. It is much more than merely instrumentally valuable.

On the other hand, for the person already characterized by a reverence for life, the question of justification is less relevant. If one of my fundamental atti- tudes is a reverence for life, the question of why I should revere life ordinarily would not arise.14 Thus, justification for an ethics that requires a fundamental shift in moral attitude involves something other than an appeal to self-interest.

6 . 5 T A Y L O R ’ S B I O C E N T R I C E T H I C S

Paul Taylor’s 1986 book Respect for Nature offered one of the most fully devel- oped and philosophically sophisticated contemporary defenses of a biocentric ethics. Although Schweitzer tried to explain what reverence for life means and

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what practical implications follow from this attitude, he never provided an ade- quate justification for adopting it. Part of the strength of Taylor’s view lies in his careful exposition of why it is reasonable to adopt the attitude of respect for nature. For this reason, we will concentrate on his view as our example of bio- centric ethics.

As a biocentric theorist, Taylor seeks a systematic and comprehensive account of the moral relations that exist between humans and other living things. Taylor sees this relationship as being based on the inherent worth of all life.

The central tenet of the theory of environmental ethics that I am defending is that actions are right and character traits are morally good in virtue of their expressing or embodying a certain ultimate moral attitude, which I call respect for nature.15

Taylor’s explanation and defense of this theory proceed through a number of steps. He first argues that it is meaningful to say that all living things have a good of their own. All living things can be said to have a good of their own because all living things are, in Taylor’s phrase, “teleological centers of life.” Taylor believes that this “good” is a simple fact that follows from living beings having a life. An entity’s having a good of itself is necessary, but not sufficient, for us to conclude that humans have any responsibility to that entity.16 To say that an entity has inherent worth is to go beyond the factual claim that it has a good and to make the normative claim that this entity deserves moral consider- ation and that moral agents have duties toward it. We move from the descriptive claim that a being has a good of its own to the normative claim that it possesses inherent worth when we come to understand and accept what Taylor calls “the biocentric outlook on nature.” To accept this outlook and recognize the inher- ent worth of all living things is to adopt respect for nature as our “ultimate moral attitude.” In turn, adopting this attitude means that we will act in morally responsible ways toward the natural environment.

To understand Taylor’s views, we first need to distinguish things that have a good of their own from things that do not. Taylor cites a child as a being with a good of its own and a pile of sand as something to which it makes no sense to ascribe goodness. Parental decisions aim to promote the child’s good. The child is benefited when that good is furthered and is harmed when that good is frus- trated. On the other hand, it is meaningless to talk of the sand’s own good, as though the sand itself could be harmed or benefited in any way.

Taylor next relies on a traditional philosophical distinction between real and apparent good or between what he calls objective and subjective value concepts. A thing’s good is not always identical with what that being believes is its good. What appears to me (subjectively) to be good for me may not really (objectively) be good for me. This distinction allows Taylor to include in his biocentric ethics any being that has an objective good of its own. Because he ignores the concept of apparent or subjective goods, he need not include only those beings that possess the beliefs, interests, or desires presupposed in any account of subjective good.

What entities have an objective good of their own? Taylor’s answer is to be found in the concept of a teleological center of a life. To understand this, it is

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helpful to draw some parallels with Schweitzer’s “reverence for life” ethics and the natural law tradition of Aristotle. It also is informative to contrast what Taylor says with the concept of a subject-of-a-life as Regan uses it in animal rights ethics.

Let us begin with an example from Taylor.

Concerning a butterfly, for example, we may hesitate to speak of its interests or preferences, and we would probably deny outright that it values anything in the sense of considering it good or desirable. But once we come to understand its life cycle and know the environmental conditions it needs to survive in a healthy state, we have no difficulty in speaking about what is beneficial to it and what might be harmful to it… . Even when we consider such simple animal organisms as one-celled protozoa, it makes perfectly good sense to a biologically informed person to speak of what benefits or harms them, what environmental changes are to their advantage or disad- vantage, and what physical circumstances are favorable or unfavorable to them. The more knowledge we gain concerning these organisms, the better are we able to make sound judgments about what is in their interest or contrary to their interest.17

This is something that most of us, at least when we are not caught in the grip of a philosophical theory, would accept. It makes perfect sense to talk about the good of any living thing. This good is objective in the sense that it does not depend on anyone’s beliefs or opinions. It is a claim that biological evi- dence can support. It is something that we can come to know. When we know an entity’s good, we know what would be in that entity’s interests, even if the being itself, such as a plant, has no conscious interests of its own. Thus even the weekend gardener can meaningfully talk about compost being good for toma- toes, pruning being good for an apple tree, drought being bad for vegetables, aphids being bad for beans, and ladybugs being bad for aphids.

All living things have a good, because living beings are teleological centers of life. Remember from the discussion of natural law ethics in Chapter 2 that the Greek word telos is translated as “purpose,” or “goal,” or “end.” Aristotle was led by his biological observations to claim that all living things act toward some dis- tinctive goal, or telos. Like Aristotle, Taylor claims that each species has a distinc- tive nature that determines the specific good for that species. Unlike Aristotle, he believes this nature need not be identified with the organism’s essence or soul. For Taylor, this nature is more like the ecological niche or function fulfilled by that species.

As the aphid and ladybug examples suggest, however, the good of one spe- cies may not be good for another species. Each species has its specific end, but all living things do have ends. In general, that end is growth, development, suste- nance, and propagation. Life itself is directional in the sense that it tends toward this end. Each living thing is the center of this purposive activity. Each living thing is the teleological center of a life.

Schweitzer’s phrase in this context was “I am life which wills to live in the midst of life which wills to live.” So long as we do not assume that all

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things that “will to live” must do so consciously, Schweitzer’s thinking is similar to Taylor’s on this point. Each living thing has its own good because, as a living thing, each life has direction, a goal, a telos. This is true whether or not the being itself is consciously aware of that fact. The will to live is manifested in the biological processes of growth, development, propagation, and sustaining life.

This view can be contrasted with Tom Regan’s defense of animal rights. In Chapter 5, Regan argued that all beings that are subjects-of-a-life have the inherent value that qualifies them for moral standing. (Regan’s use of “inherent value” functions for him as “inherent worth” does in this chapter.) To be a subject-of-a-life involves a complex set of characteristics that go beyond merely being alive and merely being conscious. In this way, Regan defends moral stand- ing only for “mentally normal mammals of a year or more.” Taylor’s concept of a teleological center of a life is more inclusive than Regan’s subject-of-a-life. According to Taylor:

To say it is a teleological center of a life is to say that its internal functioning as well as its external activities are all goal-oriented, having the constant tendency to maintain the organism’s existence through time and to enable it successfully to perform those biological operations whereby it reproduces its kind and continually adapts to changing environmental events and condi- tions. It is the coherence and unity of these functions of an organism, all directed toward the realization of its good, that make it one teleological center of activity.18

Like Regan, and unlike Aristotle and Schweitzer perhaps, Taylor is especially careful in moving from the descriptive claim that some being has a good of its own to the normative claim that we have ethical duties toward that being.19

According to Taylor, it is a matter of biological fact that living things have a good of their own. But it is not an ethical good in the sense that this fact alone does not commit us to any particular ethical stance toward living things. Having a good of its own does not by itself confer moral standing on a being.

Taylor’s perspective explains the normative claims that all living things have moral standing and that we have duties toward them by reference to the concept of inherent worth. As he uses this phrase, inherent worth commits us to making two further normative judgments: Entities with inherent worth deserve moral consideration, and all moral agents have duties to respect that entity’s own good.20 What is the connection between a thing’s having a good of its own and its possessing inherent worth?

Having a good of its own makes it possible for a living thing to be the object of human duties. That is, we can have duties to promote or preserve a being’s good, only if it does, in fact, have a good of its own to be promoted. Having a good of its own is therefore necessary for a being to possess inherent worth. But it is not sufficient. The normative claim that living things have an inherent worth is to be explained and justified by reference to what Taylor calls the biocentric outlook. The biocentric outlook is a system of beliefs that conceptualizes our relationship to other living things. It is a system of beliefs that provides a

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fundamental view of the natural world and our relationship to it. Once we adopt this worldview, we see that treating all living things as possessing inherent worth is the only way of treating them that makes sense. Only this way of understand- ing them is consistent with the biocentric outlook.

The biocentric outlook on nature revolves around four central beliefs. First, humans are seen as members of earth’s community of life in the same sense and on the same terms as all other living things. Second, all species, including humans, are part of a system of interdependence. Third, all living things pursue their own good in their own ways (the “teleological center of life” belief). Finally, humans are understood as not inherently superior to other living things.21

Taylor goes on to explain that the biocentric outlook is a way of conceiving of nature that all rational and factually informed people should adopt. It is an outlook that is firmly based on reasonable scientific evidence. Rejecting this out- look would require us to give up or significantly revise a good deal of what the science of ecology has learned. Once a person adopts this view, she or he will see that recognizing the inherent worth of all living things is the only perspective on life that is consistent with this outlook.

To regard living things as possessing inherent worth is to adopt the attitude of respect for nature. It is to adopt a fundamental attitude toward nature that establishes certain basic motivations and dispositions. To adopt this attitude is to be disposed toward promoting and protecting the good of other living things, simply because it is their good. It is to accept the good of other beings as a reason for one’s own action.

Taylor’s biocentric ethics addresses a number of philosophical issues that were missing in Schweitzer’s “reverence for life” ethics. Taylor’s account of how the biocentric outlook makes the attribution of inherent worth to all living things reasonable offers a rational basis for this belief that is lacking in Schweitzer’s. Likewise, his description of inherent worth and a good of one’s own adds much to the philosophical debate. It remains for Taylor to turn to issues of normative ethics and offer more practical advice.

6 . 6 P R A C T I C A L I M P L I C A T I O N S

Taylor’s normative ethics focuses on two basic issues: the general rules or duties that follow from the attitude of respect for nature, and priority rules for resolving conflicts between the ethical claims of humans and those of other living things. Let us briefly review these normative implications as an example of how more recent ethical thinking might be applied to environmental practice.

Taylor develops four general duties that follow from the attitude of respect for nature. They are the rules of nonmaleficence, noninterference, fidelity, and restitu- tive justice.22 As the term suggests, the duty of nonmaleficence requires that we do no harm to any organism. Taylor understands this as a negative duty. That is, we have the duty to refrain from any act that would harm an organism with a good of its own. We do not, however, have the positive duty to prevent any

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harms that we are not causing. Nor do we have the duty to reduce suffering or aid the organism in attaining its own good. Finally, like all duties, this require- ment applies only to moral agents. For example, except for humans, predatory animals cannot be required to refrain from harming their prey.

The rule of noninterference also establishes negative duties. By this rule, we are required not to interfere with the freedom of individual organisms or, in general, with ecosystems or biotic communities. Because humans can interfere with individual organisms in a variety of ways, a variety of specific duties follow from this general rule. We should neither actively prevent organisms from freely pursuing their good nor act in such a way as to deny them the necessities required to attain that goal. Thus we should not trap or enslave organisms or do anything that would deny them health or nutrition.

The duty of noninterference requires that we “not try to manipulate, con- trol, modify, or ‘manage’ natural ecosystems or otherwise intervene in their nor- mal functioning.”23 Finally, because this is a negative duty, we have no positive obligation to help such organisms fulfill their telos, except where our own actions are the cause of the harm.

Taylor applies the rule of fidelity only to animals that live in the wild. Respect for nature requires that we not deceive or betray wild animals. Most hunting, fishing, and trapping—and much of the enjoyment and challenge of these activities—involve the attempt to deceive and then betray wild animals. As in any case of deception, the deceiver assumes a superiority over the deceived. The deceived, whether an animal or another human, is taken to have a lower worth than the deceiver. Although hunting, fishing, and trapping also typically involve violating the duties of nonmaleficence and noninterfer- ence, breaking the rule of fidelity is yet another way of showing disrespect for nature.

The fourth rule, the duty of restitutive justice, requires that humans who harm other living organisms make restitution to those organisms. Justice demands that when a moral subject has been harmed, the agent responsible for that harm make reparations for the harm. In general, the first three duties establish the basic moral relationship between humans and other living organisms. When any of these rules is violated, the rule of restitutive justice requires that the moral bal- ance between the two be restored. Thus, if we destroy an animal’s habitat, justice demands that we restore it. If we capture or trap an animal or a plant, justice demands that we return it to its natural environment.

Finally, Taylor argues for a priority relation for these four rules. He believes that the duty of nonmaleficence is our “most fundamental duty to nature.” He also believes that with careful attention, we can minimize conflicts involving the other three. However, when conflicts cannot be avoided and when significant good can result without permanent harm, restitutive justice outweighs fidelity, which outweighs noninterference.

Perhaps the greatest challenge to any biocentric ethics arises when human interests conflict with the interests of nonhumans. In many ways, this is the pri- mary test of any environmental philosophy, and it is typically the major motiva- tion behind any attempt to develop an environmental philosophy. What is to be

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done when important human interests come into conflict with the welfare of nonhuman organisms?

We need to recognize that in order to remain consistent with the funda- mental principle of biocentric ethics, any resolution of such conflicts must not privilege human interests. That is, we cannot accept as a solution any decision that grants an in-principle advantage to humans. Any solution to conflict must respect the inherent moral worth of nonhumans.

We thus recognize that many moral conflicts and dilemmas would not arise within an anthropocentric framework. It is only after we acknowledge the inher- ent worth of other living things that a wide variety of conflicts can arise. Taylor mentions several as examples: filling in a wetland to build a marina, bulldozing a meadow of wildflowers to build a shopping mall, plowing a prairie to plant wheat or corn, and strip-mining a mountainside.

These activities raise moral problems only when we acknowledge that they create significant harm to other living organisms. But how do we resolve these conflicts without automatically favoring humans?

Following a long tradition in liberal political philosophy, Taylor argues for several formal or procedural rules to provide fair and impartial resolution of these conflicts. These rules are (1) self-defense, (2) proportionality, (3) mini- mum wrong, (4) distributive justice, and (5) restitutive justice. Self-defense would justify favoring human interests when the conflicting interests of nonhu- man organisms threaten or endanger human health or life. Thus we would be justified in killing an attacking grizzly bear or exterminating an infectious organism or insect. As in the case of human self-defense, this principle holds only as a last resort.

The other four principles come into play when no serious harm to humans is threatened. They all rely on a distinction between basic interests and nonbasic interests. The principles of proportionality and minimum wrong govern those cases in which the basic interests of nonhumans conflict with the nonbasic inter- ests of humans. In this case, if the nonbasic human interest is incompatible with the basic interests of nonhumans, the principle of proportionality prohibits us from satisfying the (nonbasic) human interests at the expense of the (basic) non- human interests. Thus, for example, human interest in killing reptiles to make fashionable shoes and handbags is prohibited, via the principle of proportionality, by the respect for nature.

When nonbasic human interests can be made compatible with the basic interests of nonhumans, even though they threaten or endanger the nonhumans, the principle of minimum wrong sets the conditions for satisfying human inter- ests. Thus the respect for nature might allow damming a river for a hydroelectric power plant even, when this will adversely affect other living things.

The principle of distributive justice sets the conditions for resolving conflicts between the basic interests of humans and nonhumans. In general, fairness demands that burdens be shared equally and that the distribution of benefits and burdens be accomplished impartially. Finally, restitutive justice demands that restitution be made whenever a resolution of conflict fails to meet the con- ditions established by the principles of minimum wrong or distributive justice.

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6 . 7 C H A L L E N G E S A N D D E V E L O P M E N T S

Even Taylor’s careful defense of biocentric ethics faces serious challenges. First, there are several practical challenges to his conclusions. For example, the empha- sis on noninterference as a major normative principle suggests a view of humans and nature that is questionable at best. To say that we ought not to “interfere with” nature implies that humans are somehow outside of or distinct from nature: Humans are separate from nature, so we should leave natural processes alone. Thus the claim is that environmental change—or even environmental destruction—is allowable (good?), if it results from natural processes. Change or destruction is wrong, if it results from human interference. But surely humans are as much a part of natural processes as any other organism. Accordingly, the fact that change is brought about by humans should not in itself have any ethical implications.

Other challenges center on Taylor’s emphasis on individual organisms. Inherent worth resides only in individual organisms. We have no direct duty to ecosystems, nonliving objects, or species, for example. Thus, although Taylor’s biocentrism is nonanthropocentric, it remains individualistic. Several problems follow from this.

First, Taylor’s ethics tends to assume an adversarial relationship between indi- viduals. By focusing on individuals, each pursuing its own telos, Taylor assumes that conflict and competition are the natural state of life. The challenge for bio- centric ethics, in this model, is to find a procedure for resolving these conflicts impartially. We will see other philosophers suggest that a more holistic philoso- phy would emphasize cooperation and mutual dependencies rather than conflict.

Further, the focus on individuals seems to place Taylor in a serious dilemma. Consider one example. I am planning to dig up a small section of my front yard and replace the lawn with a concrete and brick patio. In the process, I will be destroying countless living things, from the individual blades of grass to millions of microbiotic organisms. Does this action raise a serious moral conflict?

As we have seen, Taylor cannot simply grant the human interest priority without abandoning his biocentric egalitarianism. Thus he would rely on the distinction between basic and nonbasic interests and the principles of proportion- ality, minimum wrong, and restitutive justice to resolve this conflict. Ultimately, I will either be allowed to build the patio, or I will not.

If I am not allowed to build the patio, Taylor’s ethics may require too much of us. This is more than simply saying that it is counterintuitive. (Taylor argues that we have no reason to reject a conclusion solely because it is counterintuitive.) Rather, Taylor’s standard would require a level of attention and care far beyond the abilities of most people. (Should I refrain from walking across my lawn, lest I create a path and thereby destroy countless blades of grass? Do I really need to provide an ethical justification for eating vegetables?) It is difficult to see how we could ever be justified in doing much of anything if we treated all nonhuman life-forms as deserving moral consideration.

On the other hand, if I am allowed to build the patio, Taylor must show exactly why such a nonbasic interest as this can override the basic interests of

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the grass and microorganisms. Clearly, we could never allow the mass killing of humans for the sake of a patio, so in order to maintain the nonanthropocentrism, we need strong justification for why patio construction is allowed in the case of plants. Taylor seems to suggest that, finally, the principle of restitutive justice comes into play. I can build the patio so long as I “restore the balance of justice between us and them.” Because I unfortunately cannot restore the balance with those organisms that I have destroyed, this option seems to imply that my duty is to the organism’s species. Perhaps I ought to replant some grass elsewhere in my yard. But this, of course, requires us to abandon the individualism on which Taylor’s ethics rests.

A more general challenge returns to the discussion of teleology and biologi- cal designs and purposes introduced in Chapter 2. Taylor’s view relies on infer- ring, from certain biological facts, the conclusion that teleological centers of a life have a good of their own. The biological sciences do commonly refer to an object’s purpose, goals, or function, and in this sense, they also seem to adopt a teleological framework. But does all goal-directed activity imply that the goal must be understood as a “good.” Such an inference was made in the Aristotelian and natural law traditions, but it is not obviously valid.

Consider the clear example of a human action that aims for some goal. Why do we assume that this goal is a good thing? One explanation is that we assume that any intentional act by conscious and rational agents is undertaken, because that agent believes that the goal is, in some sense, good. Almost by definition, a rational person wouldn’t choose to do something, unless he or she believed that it was the good thing to do. Aristotle himself argued that all acts aim for some good. But if the subject is nonconscious and nonintentional, can we still con- clude that its goal is a good?

In contrast, consider the following examples from Chapter 2: “The purpose of the kidney is to remove waste from the blood,” “The goal of brightly colored plumage on male birds is to attract females,” “The function of a predator species is to control the population of a prey species,” and “Wetlands function as flood control and water-filtration systems.” Assuming that kidneys, bright plumage, species, and wetlands do not consciously and intentionally choose the goals they serve, it is less clear that attaining the goals does accomplish even a per- ceived good. Only if some other value component is elsewhere assumed (for example, that blood free from waste is good, that attracting females birds is good, that controlling the population of a prey species is good, or that floods are bad), can one conclude that attaining the goal is good. The question is whether Taylor slips in such a value assumption with the concept of a biocentric outlook and the attitude of respect for nature.

We can take a broader perspective on these challenges to Taylor by consid- ering the case of synthetic biology that was introduced in this chapter’s discussion topic. For all practical purposes, scientists have created life, self-replicating, bio- logical organisms, in a laboratory. The existence of such artificial, synthetic life raises questions for each of the four principles that Taylor identifies as comprising the biocentric outlook and entailing an ethical respect for nature. First, Taylor claims that this biocentric outlook assumes that humans are mere members, on

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equal terms, of the biotic community. But, this claim loses some credibility, if humans are also creators of other members of the biotic community. Second, Taylor claims that all life forms, having evolved together, are part of a single system of interdependence. Yet, this is not true for synthetic life, which has played no role in an interdependent system. Third, Taylor asserts that all living beings have a good of their own and are “teleological centers of life.” Given that humans have designed and created artificial life, a more plausible claim would be that the good of synthetic life forms is confirmed, when they serve the purposes for which humans have designed them. Finally, Taylor suggests that the biocen- tric outlook asserts that human beings are not inherently superior to other life forms. However, as creators of some life forms, one could argue that humans are, at least for those organisms, inherently superior.

So, major challenge to any biocentric theory remains. Are we justified in attributing a good to all living beings? Clearly, some things (Taylor’s example was a pile of sand) have no good of their own. Clearly, other things do. Auton- omous human beings, who form and pursue their own purposes and goals, surely have independent goods of their own. But do all living things have an indepen- dent good? What distinguishes life from random change, such that interference with one is a harm and with the other is not? It seems that unless we retrieve an Aristotelian teleological biology in which living beings naturally move to fulfill some natural end or adopt a “divine plan” version of natural law in which natu- ral functions are God’s design, it is not obvious that life left alone is good. Nor is it obvious that artificial life has a good of its own. Some life (those beings with their own purposes, for example) qualify, but others may not. The challenge remains for biocentrists to explain and defend the sense that all living things have a good intrinsic to their own life.

6 . 8 S U M M A R Y A N D C O N C L U S I O N S

The biocentric approach pushes the bounds of moral standing about as far as they might ever go. All living beings, simply by virtue of being alive, have moral standing. Biocentrists are surely right to focus attention on the value of all living things. But the question is whether the value of life is moral value in the sense of full moral standing or is a different, perhaps still anthropocentric value. Reflecting on Schweitzer’s reverence for life calls to mind the spiritual, symbolic, and aesthetic values discussed by Mark Sagoff. Perhaps not every object with noninstrumental, intrinsic value should be included in the category of moral standing.

Biocentrists also face the challenge arising from a more ecological point of view. It is not at all clear that species or ecosystems can be incorporated into the biocentric theory, because neither is alive in any straightforward sense. According to many environmentalists, such ecological wholes should be the primary focus of environmental ethics. We turn to these concerns in the fol- lowing chapters.

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N O T E S

1. See, for example, E. O. Wilson, “Threats to Biodiversity,” Scientific American 261 (September 1989): 108– 16; E. O. Wilson, “The Current State of Biological Diversity,” in Biodiver- sity, eds. E. O. Wilson and Frances Peters (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988); and John C. Ryan, “Conserving Biological Diversity,” in State of the World 1992, ed. Lester Brown (New York: Worldwatch Institute, 1992), pp. 9–26. For estimates of extinction rates besides Wilson’s, see Dick Bryany, Daniel Neilsen, and Laura Tangley, The Last Frontier Forests (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 1997), and United Nations Environ- mental Program, Global Biodiversity Assessment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). The state- ment on recovery rates is taken from the work of James Kirchner, Uni- versity of California-Berkeley press release, March 3, 2000, “New Study Suggests Humans Will Not Live Long Enough to See Earth Recover from Mass Extinction.”

2. E. O. Wilson, “The Little Things That Run the World,” address given at the opening of the invertebrate exhibit, National Zoological Park, Washing- ton, D.C., May 7, 1987. Reprinted in The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book, eds. Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1994), p. 84.

3. http://www.jcvi.org/cms/fileadmin/ site/research/projects/first-self- replicating-bact-cell/press-release- final.pdf.

4. All definitions were taken from Synthetic Biology project website, http://www.synbioproject.org/ topics/synbio101/definition/ accessed June 13, 2011. A helpful ethical analysis of synthetic biology is “The Ethics of

Synthetic Biology and Emerging Technologies,” Presidential Commis- sion for the Study of Bioethical Issues, Washington, D.C., December 2010. Available at www.bioethics.gov.

5. See Christopher Stone, Earth and Other Ethics: The Case for Moral Pluralism (New York: Harper & Row, 1987). Moral pluralism is discussed in Chapter 12.

6. Perhaps the best philosophical account of the values that support a comprehensive environmental ethics can be found in the writings of Holmes Rolston. See especially Environmental Ethics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).

7. The philosophical debate over the meaning and legitimacy of instrumental, intrinsic, and inherent value continues. The understanding of instrumental value is relatively trouble-free. In what follows, I adopt Susan Armstrong and Richard Botzler’s suggestion that an “emerging consensus” is settling on the meaning of intrinsic and inherent value. In this view, intrinsic value is indepen- dent of the presence of a valuer. An object has intrinsic value when it has value both in and for itself. Inherent value, on the other hand, requires the presence of a valuer who confers the value on the object. Thus, although it may be valued for its own sake (its value does not come from its usefulness), it does not have value in itself (if there were no one around to value it, it would be without value). For example, children have intrinsic value (they are valued in and for themselves), whereas a family heirloom has inherent value (it is valued for itself and not for its economic worth) but would be valueless, if there were no family around to value it. If we accept this distinction as meaningful, the major question becomes whether natural objects and nonhuman living

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beings have intrinsic value or inherent value. For the emerging consensus claim,see Susan Armstrong and Richard Botzler, Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1993), p. 53. For a defense of intrinsic value, see Holmes Rolston, Environmental Ethics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988). For a defense of inherent value, identified as intrinsic value in a “truncated sense,” see J. Baird Callicott, “The Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species,” in The Preser- vation of Species, ed. Bryan Norton (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), Ch. 6.

8. The most comprehensive statement of Schweitzer’s ethical views is found in his Civilization and Ethics (London: A. & C. Black, 1946). His autobio- graphical Out of My Life and Thought, trans. A. B. Lemke (New York: Holt, 1990), is also quite helpful. James Brabazon’s biography, Albert Schweit- zer: A Biography (New York: Putnam, 1975) is a good secondary source.

9. Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 130.

10. Ibid., 130.

11. Ibid., 131.

12. Brabazon, Albert Schweitzer: A Biogra- phy, p. 257, reports that Schweitzer was willing to kill his pelican when he recognized that its injuries were untreatable. The other anecdotes reported in this paragraph are also from Brabazon.

13. See Kenneth Goodpaster, “From Egoism to Environmentalism,” in Ethics and Problems of the Twenty-First Century, eds. Kenneth Goodpaster and Kenneth Sayre (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), pp. 21–35.

14. Of course, people do have moments in which their fundamental attitudes are questioned. Such moments of exis- tential crisis, however, tend to rein- force rather than counter the view that no further justification can be given.

15. Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1986), p. 80.

16. Here Taylor uses the phrase inherent worth in roughly the same sense in which I have been using intrinsic value. An object with inherent worth pos- sesses a value that is independent of any (other) valuer. It is to be valued both in and for its own sake.

17. Taylor, Respect for Nature, pp. 66–67.

18. Ibid., 121–22.

19. For Tom Regan’s views on this “naturalistic fallacy,” see The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 247–48.

20. Taylor, Respect for Nature, p. 75.

21. Taylor, Respect for Nature, especially Ch. 3, fully develops the biocentric outlook.

22. Chapter 4 of Taylor, Respect for Nature, fully presents these duties.

23. Ibid., 175.

D I S C U S S I O N Q U E S T I O N S

1. We use the word value both as a noun and as a verb. Certain objects are said to possess value, and humans value numerous objects. If no humans were around to do the valuing, would anything of value remain?

2. Compose a list of things that you value. Distinguish those things that you value instrumentally from those things valued for their own sake. How many dif- ferent types of value can you think of?

CHAPTER 6 BIOCENTRIC ETHICS AND THE INHERENT VALUE OF LIFE 147

3. Like Aristotle, Taylor suggests that each species has a distinctive nature that can best be identified in terms of a characteristic activity. How else might you distinguish between species?

4. Taylor relies on a distinction between basic and nonbasic interests to mediate conflicting interests. Do you find this

distinction helpful? What are some basic human interests? What are some nonbasic human interests? Do basic interests always override nonbasic interests?

5. In Taylor’s account, does it make sense to attribute interests or goods to a wilderness area, to a river, or to other ecosystems? Can such things be teleological centers of life?

G L O B A L E N V I R O N M E N T A L E T H I C S W A T C H

For more information on Biocentric Ethics, please see the Global Environmen- tal Ethics Watch. Updated several times a day, Global Environmental Ethics Watch is a focused portal into GREENR—our Global Reference on the Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources—an ideal one-stop site for current events and research. You will have access to the latest

information from trusted academic jour- nals, news outlets, and magazines as well as access to statistics, primary sources, case studies, videos, podcasts, and much more.

To gain access please use the access code that accompanies your book. If you do not have an access code, visit cengagebrain.com to purchase one.

148 PART III THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

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To meet the learning objectives for this topic, you will complete these activities. Print this page and use it as a checklist.

Review the Introduction and Objectives page. Read the lesson, NonWestern Views on Environmentalism China. Read the lesson, NonWestern Views on Environmentalism Native American. Read the lesson, NonWestern Views on Environmentalism India and Hinduism. Read the lesson, NonWestern Views on Environmentalism Contemporary Egyptian Islamic Views. Participate in the Critical Thinking Discussion 9. Take online Test 9.

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Introduction

In this lesson we will be looking at and discussing Nonwestern concepts and ideologies on Environmental issues, including Taoism, Buddhism, and Native American.

Objectives

After completing the learning activities, you will be able to:

Analyze selected nonwestern concepts. Assess the viability of those concepts for our society.

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Contrary to the attitudes and ideologies of many, the Western or JudaeoChristian view is not the only possible one. This lesson will look at several different Chinese views, both traditional and modern, Native American views, both traditional and modern, Indian/Hindu views and a quick look at modern Egypt's Muslim ideas. Let's start with the traditional Chinese, (keeping in mind that these are very brief summaries, as the focus of this class is environmental ethics, and not philosophy or world religions)...

China

Taoism

For all intensive purposes, we can split the Chinese thought into three main ideologies: Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. Of these, Taoism is arguably the oldest, so let's start there. It is arguable because no one really knows exactly how old Taoism is. We do know when its first text was written, some where near the 4th century BCE. However, it is generally accepted that Taoism is intimately connected to, and probably grew out of ancient Chinese folk wisdom, which is where all the confusion comes from. Its first, and arguably most important proponent is Laotzu, which translates to Old Boy. This is a psuedonym that was used to protect the author, as this book was written during the Warring States Period in China's development. (Some historians think he didn't exist at all, and that his writings are really a compilation from various authors.) His work, the Tao To Ching, is the second most influential book in all of Chinese history. Further, it is second only to the Bible in the number of English translations. Taoism's second main proponent is Chuangtzu, who comes along approximately a hundred years after Laotzu. His book is simply known by his name: The Chuangtzu. Although these two authors have a slightly different approach and focus, their overall philosophy is still the same. Click on the following links to learn more about these ideologies.

Taoism Laotzu Chuangtzu The Chuangtzu

Deep ecology has much in common with China's ancient (perhaps prehistoric) religion, Taoism. The "tao" is the "way, path or road" that one should follow to live in harmony with nature and other people. It is also the "stuff" the universe is made of; it is beyond description or categorization. The opening of the scripture Tao Te Ching is, "The Tao that can be talked about is not the real Tao." Because it all arises from the Tao, the world is an interconnected unity; every action has a ripple effect' that can potentially change the whole universe. Problems (whether psychological, social, medical, ecological) happen when we get out of balance or harmony with the Tao, the natural order of things. Acupuncture, for example, is meant to restore the natural flow of energy through the body when it is disrupted by injury or disease.

A key idea in Taoism is wu wei, which literally means "do nothing" but in practice it means "do nothing that will mess up the natural balance." Of course no one can live if he literally does nothing; but when you must do something, choose the method most in harmony with nature. If you want to build a house, you will probably have to cut down a few trees; it can't be helped; but you can choose whether to do it with an axe or a chain saw. If you have to buy some pickles, you will end up with an empty glass jar; you can throw it away, or you can recycle it. It's very important to note that this balance is not static it is dynamic, changing all the time, following certain natural cycles or patterns (the purpose of the Taoist book I Ching is to describe the patterns).

The essence of Taoism is to attain harmony. Harmony with your fellow man; harmony with Nature; and ultimately, harmony with the universe. And, although what Sheppard Krech II claims about a lack of evidence for any indication of conservationism or an acknowledgement that resources are limited, (which will be talked about in detail below), the reality is that in Taoist thought everything is essentially connected; we are not seperate from Nature. Further, Taoists believe that they have no control or influence over the creator, what it wants it gets, what it wants to do it does and we, as creations, have no room to complain or question. In fact, the focus of Taoism is to attain harmony with Nature, which

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http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/taoism/

http://www.chebucto.ns.ca/Philosophy/Taichi/lao.html

http://www.taopage.org/chuangtzu.html

http://www.terebess.hu/english/chuangtzu.html

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indicates both a reverence for Nature and a realization that our survival, growth and health depends on the continued survival, growth and health of Nature.

Confucianism

Founded by Kung Chui of Lu, aka Kung Futzu, (latinized into Confucius); the primary focus of Confucianism is that of the human world. In fact, one could argue that Confucianism has little concern for Divinity, but this would not be entirely true. It is true, however, that Confucianism was much more concerned about the human world and how to improve it. Click on the following link to learn more about Kung Futzu.

Kung Futzu

Li Tianchen, in his article "Confucian Ethics and the Environment," argues that the distinguishing feature of Confucian ecological ethics is that "it does not give human dominion over nature, nor does it sacrifice human development at the altar of pristine nature." He explains that we should act in accord with preserving and perpetuating nature and to consume resources with a sense of respect and economy.

His thesis is best left in his own words... "Confucianism is distinguished by its concern for the cultivation of human relations towards a harmonious society rather than one's relations with the

supernatural or natural. However, it would be a mistake to regard the civilisational legacy of Confucius as purely humanistic. Confucianism is a philosophy which also contains profound environmental ethics through its inclusiveness of Heaven, Earth and the Human order. These form the traditional Chinese trinity which configure the ultimate harmony. Relations between people and the natural world are therefore of intrinsic interest to those who profess Confucian ethics." To be clear here, the ancient Chinese had a much different view of Heaven than most of the Western world. In the ancient Chinese view Heaven wasn't a place that you visited, or would really want to. Rather, it was viewed as the source of order and the home of the Gods. Earth was considered the best place to be because it represented freedom, variety, etc. The trick, for many of the ancient Chinese belief systems was to harmonize Earth and Heaven.

According to Tianchen, the problem originates from a misunderstanding of the relationship between humanity and nature. Therefore, the solution resides in repairing this misunderstanding: recognizing our place in the natural order and how we should act towards/treat nature. Essentially, Confucians believe that there is a oneness that consists of Heaven, Earth, and Humanity. He offers many quotes from various Confucian texts to support his idea that environemtnal concerns have long been a part of Confucian thought. Let's look at a few...

"All things exist together, and they do not harm each other; all ways exist together, and they do not come into conflict." The Doctrine of the Mean "In all places by which the sage passes, misguided people are helped to change; in places where the sage stays, a mysterious role is played by him; the sage lives on up with Heaven, down with Earth." Mencius "Tradition has it that Heaven gives birth to the myriad things to be nurtured by Earth and brought to completion by sages." Lu Jia "Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I finds an intimate place in their midst. Therefore that which extends throughout the universe I regard as my

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/confucius/

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body and that which directs the universe I consider as my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions." Zhang Zai "Heaven goes with regularity. It does not exist for Emperor Yao, nor does it die for Emperor Jie...""Respond to it with peace and order, and good fortune will result. Respond to it with disorder, and disaster will follow. If the foundations of Living (i.e., agriculture and sericulture) are strengthened and are econmonically used, then Nature cannot bring impoverishment... But if the foundations of living are neglected and used extravagantly, then Nature cannot make a country rich." Xunzi

The core value of Confucianism is ren, which means benevolence, (although it has multiple meanings). Hence, if as is suggested above, that the oneness is real, then "love and filiality towards humans should be extended to the protection of, and the respect for, the natural environment." Ultimately, Tianchen is arguing that Confucianism has an environmental ethic, along with a plan/solution. We have to change how we think about and act towards both the environment by itself and towards our relationship with the environment. We have to move towards a more harmonious and unitary relationship. Afterall, if the ecological crisis "stems from a spiritual crisis in human beings, then the solution to the ecological crisis ultimately rests with the spiritual regeneration of human beings."

Buddhism

Buddhism started in India with Sidhartha Guatama. It is a religion based not on a diety, but rather, on the perfection of the individual, especially in a spiritual sense. The ultimate goal of Buddhism is to attain enlightenment and transecend to Nirvana.Two big and overlapping issues with Buddhism are the notions of karma and reincarnation. Karma can be considered the weight of existence with good deeds lightening your soul and bad deeds weighing it down. Reincarnation, then, is based on the weight of one's soul, and it involves the near perpetual returning of the soul to Earth to be born again and again. One can easily see how these issues overlap: one

effects the other. Now, for Buddhists, Nirvana is the end goal, but it is not like a Christian heaven. Nirvana is not only an escape from being reborn again, but it is also a state of nonbeing best described as the dissolution of the personal ego into the cosmic consciousness. Click on the following link to learn more about Sidhartha Guatama.

Sidhartha Guatama

So, Buddhist environmental ethics... essentially, they fall into the same category as the Taoists; yes, Krech's argument (again, in detail a little lower). However, where the Taoists are able to use harmony as a pary around Krech, to some degree; the Buddhists can go one step further. Not only do Buddhists believe that everything is one, but also that all life is precious. Therefore, harming the environment would go against their core beliefs. So, although they may have no formal, advanced notion of environmental ethic, they most definitely cared about Nature and all things living in it. There is a true story about a Westerner who befriended the Dalai Lama when he was young, and helped the Tibetan people build a movie theatre. In the process, they had to move/save all the worms while digging the foundation for the building.

Contemporary

According to Peter Ho (much of this section is based on his article, Greening Without Conflict), "much like the Enlightenment ideas, MarxistLeninist ideas are also based on economic growth, technological innovation and rapid industrialization." Ho claims that there are two mains reason for this: 1) "the Soviet state needed an industrial base to support war against potential aggressors," and 2) "industrialization created the power base of the statethe industrial working class." To be fair, there is some argument about what Marxist actually means. So, in this case, let it be clear that we are talking about the bastardization of Marxist ideas and not what Marx himself believed.

http://webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/siddhartha.html

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In the 1950's we heard claims from the Chinese government about finally subduing nature and about reclaiming grasslands that had alledgedly been desolate for a thousand years and turning them into fertile farmlands. Then, in 1966 we heard chairman Mao decclare that "if people living in nature want to be free, they will have to use natural science to understand nature, to overcome nature and to change nature; only then will they be free from nature." And yes, everyone will have to understand and use natural science for various reasons, but the obvious philosophical questions here are: who wants to be free from nature? and more importantly, why do we have to change it? It is at least possible here, that these sentiments more accurately represent an aversion by Mao and his policymakers to the old Chinese folk religions and beliefs than it does an actual policy or belief of theirs. However, this is purely speculation.

Although China did demonstrate an "embryonic awareness of environmental problems as early as the 1950's." it would be wrong to assume that there was a "socialist environmental policy." In fact, according to Blaike and Brookfield, 'there will be a great variety of policies and outcomes of landuse management in socialist countries...and in all societies there will be problemsolving attempts to cope with the opportunities and constraints which natural conditions place on those who manage land." In other words, different areas and different industries, combined with different ideologies and different needs and wants will produce a variety of problems and solutions. (duh, right.) The trick is to try to make sure that these problems are not only minimized and dealt with immediately, but also, that they are done so with the utmost concern for individuals and the environment.

Ho then goes on to explain that the Chinese government is likely to, and adept at silencing dissention, however, they should not be considered authoritarian because "such a label would overlook the many strategies that citizens can employ to escape from the government's control, and would fail to uncover the complex patterns of interaction between state and society that shape environmental movements." (do you by that explanation?) Further, that massive, nationwide protests are unheard of in China because "there is no green movement capable of organizing national demonstrations; rather, environmentalism is fragmented and highly localized." Since Mao, environmentalism in China has been predominatly regional. It is local issues and concerns that have driven various communities to social resistance and civil disobendience. One of the responses has been to start creating social organizations known as NonGovernmental Organizations (NGO's).

For instance, in the 1980's there were some local protests about water polution caused by a factory's waste discharge into the local river. More importantly, in the Fangshan Prefecture in the suburbs outside of Beijing, there was some steady, regualr and increasingly more violent interactions between locals and the coalprocessing plant. A study that was conducted by the Centre for Legal Assistance of Pollution Victims (CLAPV), revealed that 70% of the local population "suffer from eye and respiratory diseases as a direct result of coalprocessing." According to Ho, the NGO's grew due to a "common sense of civic responsibility towards the environment and an urge to act in areas where the government was falling short." Eventually, we begin see a shift of priority from economic development to sustainable development.

However, not before the state attempts to maintain control and influence. Essentialy, the Chinese government wanted to appear open to these NGO's while at the same time limiting both their numbers and their scope. What they did was set up four rather strict regulations that had to be met for a group to become a legal NGO.

1. Prior to registering, the group needed to get a local sponsor from local business. 2. They were limited to a maximum membership of 50 people. 3. The group must have a fixed address with specialized staff corresponding to its scope of activities. And, they must have legal financial resources.

4. There can be no other social organization applying in the same administrative area...

Further, there is no way to appeal a decision if an application gets rejected. Although some of these make sense, some of them are clearly aimed at control. Eventually, the government began to set up there own NGO's, refered to as GONGO's or Government Organized Nongovernmental Organizations?

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This, of course, rose some serious concern and debate among both scholars and policymakers. Let's now discuss some of the organiations.

This brings us to Wang Canfa who founded CLAPV. One of the first cases that he took on was that of Zhang Jinhu, a duck farmer who discovered one morning that hundreds of his ducks had died over night due to water pollution from a pig farm's waste polluting the water upstream. Wang, realizing that the government was typically hesitant to punish business due to taxes, high employment etc, decided to go against the grain of typical Chinese action and attempted to sue the pig farm for damages on behalf of Zhang. This was the first such case in Chinese history. Click on the following links to learn more.

Wang Canfa CLAPV

The Global Village, founded by Liao Xiaoyi, stresses the relationship between women and the environment while promoting environmentalism through several media, but primarily through their weekly TV show: Environmental Protection Hour. Two years after they started promoting a policy toward garbage sorting and a green lifestyle the district they hail from started the countries first sorted garbage and recycling system. Click on the following links to learn more.

Global Village Liao Xiaoyi

Another new development that we are witnessing in China is the hybridization of NGO's and GONGO's. Basically, what we have is that some of the people involved in GONGO's are using their political and financial influence to help organize and help get various NGO's conference rooms etc. Jiang Xiaoke, one of the aforementioned, has also proposed tradeable waste permits, pollution taxes, and other economic incentives.

So what then are the real goals and policies for China when it comes to environmentalism. "On the one hand, the central government is under increasing pressure to devolve certain state functions back to society. More importantly, awareness of its own limitations has also led the central state to tolerate and even cautiously encourage citizens' voluntary actions. In this sense, environmentalism is linked to broader issues of political reform, civil society and human rights. On the other hand, the state fears the loss of control over society and is seking ways to allow the growth of a sector deemed legitimate, but without the prospect of one day having to face another nationwide social movement such as the Falun Gong. The Chinese state is itself unclear about the exact path of development for the environmentalist sector. The autonomy of green social organizations is a space of continuous negotiation and wavering between official control and informal toleration."

The green activists in China tend towards a "female mildness." That is, they attmept to accomplish their goals with as little conflict as possible: "a greening without conflit." They believe in guiding instead of blaming and helping instead of complaining. And this is a powerful image for the green movement.

http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1663317_1663320_1669921,00.html

http://www.clapv.org/english_lvshi/

http://www.c-can.cn/en/node/652

http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/cgw2006/198224.htm

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According to Gillian Rose in her article, Proenvironmental Behavior in Egypt: Is there a Role for Islamic Environmental Ethics?, the environmental movements in Egypt, much as in other less affluent countries. were propagated by governments and NGO's, and, primarily because of foreign donors. However, much as in China, there were some local issues that drove small groups. In her article, where the research focused more on behavior than ideology, she focused on social demographic factors, selfsufficiency, and values.

First, with demographic variables, she discovered that although the affluence of a country affects how it comes to recognize environmental issues, it is not a barrier, nor is it the only factor. One's marital status, family size and occupation contribute to the likelihood to exercise proenvironmental behaviors. Further, the more education one has, the more one exhibits such behavior. Age did not seem to play much of a role.

Second, as some would expect, optimism regarding the environment was significantly and positively correlated with all three types of behavior. Conversely, a sense of helplessness about environmental issues is negatively correlative. Also, the more helpless one felt the more likely one was to believe that their neighbors were less willing to make sacrifices.

Some other interesting aspects include the notion of motivation. Where environmentallyinclined Westerners are concerned, it is about preserving nature. However, in Egypt the motivating metaphor was "health and cleanliness." Further, religion plays a large role. Hence the health and cleanliness focus in an Islamic nation. "Muslims believe that humans are merely part of the holistic system of life created by God and while humans have the right to survive, they have [also] been given the role of responsible leadership on Earth." AlBiruni, who was a 10thcentury Muslim scholar, wrote that "man does not have a right to exploit other kingdoms for his own desires, which are insatiable, but may use them only in conformity with the law of God and in His way."

Let's look at some quotes from the Qur'an and Muslim scholars...

On stewardship: "And we have given you mastery over the Earth and appointed for you therein a livelyhood..." Q 7:10. On preservation and protection of creation: "The reason for conserving the environment is that the environment is God's creation. The creation of this earth and all its natural resources is a sign of His wisdom, mercy, power, and His other attributes and therefore serves to develop human awareness and understanding of the Creator. Muslims should protect and preserve the environment because by doing so they protect God's creatures, which pray to Him and praise Him." (Izzi Dien 2003)

"The seven heavens and the earth, and all beings therein, declare His Glory. There is not a thing but celebrates His praise, and yet you understand not how they declare His Glory." (Q 17:44)

Respect for the privleges of other species: "There is not an animal in the earth, nor a flying creature, flying on two wings, but they are communities like you." (Q 6:38)

"...there is no Muslim who plants a tree or sows a field from which a human, bird, or animal eats, but it shall be reckoned as charity." (saying of the Prophet Muhammad quoted by Izzi Dien 2000)

Using no more than you need: Prophet Muhammad instructed one of his companions not to waste water, even when performing religiously mandated ablutions. He said: "Even if you take the ablutions in a fastflowing river, do not waste the water."

"...and do not waste in excess, for God loves not those who waste." (Q 6:141)

Finally, Rice concludes that there is a strong proenvironmental ideology within Islam, which is supported by Hopkins' research showing that approximately 95% of Cairoarea respondents felt that the teaching of religion had some relevance to environmental issues. Unfortunately, these ideas within Islam are rarely promoted in Egypt today.

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Click on the links below to visit various websites.

Cairo's Black Cloud BBC Black Cloud video Japan's Whaling Practices China's Weather before Olympics

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96875260

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8324024.stm

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2010/02/201022294755935286.html

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GzYm4q76xY

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In her article, "The Limitations of Religious Environmentalism for India," Emma Tomalin attempts to argue that there is a difference between a nature religion and a religious environmentalism. She ultimately concludes both that we cannot call older nature religions environmental because they existed before there was an environmental crisis and its response, and further, that just because someone worships a particular tree or grove that doesn't prove that they have an environmental agenda; and further, that religious environmentalism is "limited precisely because it is a product of Western ideas about nature, in particular a 'romantic' vision of nature as a realm of purity and aesthetic value." Let's see how she does...

Tomalin admits from the beginning that both Buddhism and Hinduism have held an ancient attitude towards caring for nature by offering the following quotes...

"Buddhism is a religion of love, understanding and compassion, and committed towards the ideal of nonviolence. As such, it also attaches great importance to wild life and the protection of the environment on which every being in this world depends for survival...From existing sources there is evidence to suggest that for all their limitations, people in the past were aware of this need for harmony between human beings and nature. They loved the environment. they revered it as a source of life and wellbeing in the world (WWF 1986: 6)."

and...

"In the ancient sprirtual tradidtions, man was looked upon as a part of nature, linked by indissoluble spiritual and psychological bonds with the elements around him. This is very much marked in the Hindu tradition, probably the oldest living religious tradition in the world...the natural environment also received the close attention of the ancient Hindu scriptures. Forests and groves were considered as sacred, and flowering trees received spiritual reverence...The Hindu tradition of reverence for nature and all forms of life, vegetable or animal, represents a powerful tradition which needs to be renurtured and reapplied in our contemporary context (WWF 1986: 1719)."

However, Tomalin sees these quotes along with the attendant implications as nothing more than a romanticising that assumes there was an "ecogolden age," a conclusion which leads people to believe that these "tribal" or peasant people were environmentalists. She continues her argument by discussing the Chipko "treehuggers" of Northern India whose politicalaction principles are rooted in Gandhi's philosophy and traditional Hinduism. Tomalin questions the "extent to which the Chipko movement is an expression of ideology, political or religous." And then she suggests that "values and ideologies are being imposed upon the movement post hoc." (This is a term in logic that means 'after the fact.' However, she offers little or no evidence for this assertion. Later, Tomalin argues that Hinduism is used not in religious ways, but rather, in pragmatic ways. However, she fails to realize that one can't use a religous belief in a pragmatic way unless that religion holds those values. In other words, how can one use Hinduism in a pragamatic way to move people towards environmentalism, if Hinduism did not already hold some notion of environemntalism in it basic beliefs?

Ultimately, though acknowledging that Hinduism does in fact worship and protect trees, groves, and rivers, the "contention that religious traditions are environmentally friendly is an interpretation of tradition rather than a traditional interpretation." This idea is rooted in her argument that they might see the river as sacred, but also believe that they, as humans can't hurt its purity through their various rituals. However, they do seem to be aware when industrial waste threatens their survival (which she seems to argue is their only possible understanding of evironmentalism). It should be obvious to any

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rational person that not only is she committing the fallacy of anachronism, but she is also struggling poorly to rationalize out their reverence for nature.

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2017620 NonWestern Views on Environmentalism Native American 17.SU.HUM.1135.501 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

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Most of us have the notion of the 'Noble Savage' in our minds an idea formed in Europe when the explorers first began to interact with American Indians. Regardless of whether we agree with it or not, it is still there. It is essentially the idea that the original Americans (or Africans, or Australian aborigines, or whoever) had a certain reverence for nature. They believed that they belonged to the world, not vice versa like us Westerners. Further, we have all heard stories about them not wasting any part of the buffalo that they kill, or asking pardon oif the animals they hunted. And, certainly, they had nowhere near our modern capablilities for polluting the environment. Take only what you

can use, and use all of what you take. You are a part of this Earth, put here by the Creator or Great Spirit, and the land is actually his.

Since deep ecology has attracted so many followers in the American West, and because it blames the JudaeoChristian tradition for our attitude toward nature, it is not surprising that it would look to American Indian spirituality for better answers. There is of course no "Indian religion"; every tribe had its own traditions, and those which survive have been much altered and diluted by nonIndian influences. But these traditions have a few things in common:

• no distinction between religion and everyday life: everything is sacred'

• everything is interconnected by a spiritual force (what anthropologists call mana')

• there may be many gods or spirits, but almost always an earth mother' who is the source of life often she is a 'corn mother'

• people or families or tribes have guardian spirits, usually personified as animals ( totemism')

• religious ceremonies are not worship' in the Western sense, but rather an active ritual participation in the processes of nature (a rain dance does not cause' rain; it is just the human part in a much larger operation of forces that bring rain)

• death is not bad' or the opposite of life, but just the next stage in a cycle or process. (Many Indian legends show that they feared ghosts, but not death itself.)

• as an extension of the last point: things that we regard as opposites' are to native Americans complements,' two sides of the same coin: life and death, good and evil; you should not embrace one and avoid the other, because both are necessary. This is often expressed in "twin myths," where one brother is good' and the other evil' but these are usually misinterpreted by nonIndians, who assume that 'good' must stamp out 'evil.'

As long as we're talking about Indians, there are some presentday issues that many activists (not just deep ecologists) are concerned about. Of course "we" stole their continent, and reduced them to poverty and marginality. Now, some of them charge, we are also stealing and cheapening their religions and cultures. Some environmentalists (and lots of other people as well) have certainly taken bits and pieces of Indian culture out of context to use them for their own purposes. Worse, our legal system usually gives them the short end of the stick.

Consider these two recent Supreme Court cases:

(1) in the socalled "Lyng case," two California Indian tribes sued the federal government (Lyng was Reagan's secretary of the interior) to stop construction of a logging road through a national forest (leased to lumber companies). The tribes have for many centuries conducted a "World Renewal" ceremony in a spot that the road would destroy. The ritual is an essential part of their religion; it is the part humans play in keeping the cycle of the seasons turning. The Indians lost the case, Sandra Day O'Connor opining that the building of the road would not prevent the tribes from practicing their religion elsewhere.

(2) at about the same time, the same justices ruled on the case of Smith v. Oregon. Smith was a state employee fired for possession of peyote, a hallucinogenic used in religious rituals. Since the 1920s Indians have been allowed to use peyote under certain purely religious conditions. But Smith worked at

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a juvenile detention center, and had peyote with him on the job (though he never used it there). He sued the state of Oregon to get his job back and won the case.

Both cases were argued from the First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom, and had many other points of similarity. It doesn't take much thought to figure out why the results were different.

Contemporary

Shepard Krech II in his article, Reflections on Conservation, Sustainability, and Environmentalism in Indigenous North America, argues that the notion of the Noble Savage is misleading, if not outright false. He rests his argument on two primary questions: (1) "were American Indians ecologists i.e., did they think about the environment and its components in interrelating, and systemic ways?" and (2) "were the American Indians conservationistsi.e., did they intentionally use wisely to maintain future availability of resources, avoid waste or despoilation, and the like?" He concludes with a third and what he calls a "collateral interest" question: "were the American Indians environmentalisti.e., did they show concern for the state of the environment and perhaps act on that concern?"

He begins with acknowledging that the American Indians can indeed be called ecologists. However, in the same paragraph he dismisses this same claim as ironic on the grounds that some of their beliefs were rooted in myths and beliefs that we have shown to be false. For instance, where the buffalo spend the winters: the American Indians knew that it was away from them, and believed it to be in lake bottom prairies, which we know don't exist. But does a belief/action rooted in a myth mean that the action isn't real?

Next he tackles the question of conservation, drawing two conclusions. First, he argues that the Native American Indians believed that their prey would be reincarnated. And, the "belief in reincarnation interferes with or even precludes conservation." Second, that there is no definite historical evidence for native conservation. However, he does acknowledge that once trade started with the Westerners, the American Indians did seem to come to understand that natural resources are limited, and realized it before we did. Finally, although they do have extensive "cultural" knowledge of the land that they live on, according to Krech, we must not assume too much validity in that, not only is this rooted in the past, but it is also rooted in oral tradition which is easily maleable. In fact, it is regularly changed by succeeding generations, or when forgotten." Again, this seems a bit dismissive.

Further, he argues that the term conservation is in dispute. He argues not only that the term is unclear, but also 1) that conservation is focused on belief and not action, and 2) "when focus is on past behavior, the data are often limited or projected from the present, and finally, "even those who agree that conservation is about behavior and not values or attitude, nevertheless debate how to define conservation and disentangle it from sustainability." What? Although those two terms are not exactly synonymous, they are most inextricably linked.

Finally, it seems as if Krech is committing the fallacy of anachronism. This means that he is using modern standards to judge older, if not ancient, cultures. So let's analyze this notion of his. He is arguing that native people clearly had some reverence for nature, and clearly attempted, at least in some cases, to use their resources completely (as with the buffalo). Although their religion clearly shows/dictates that they belong to the Earth and not vice

versa, these people simply do not measure up to the current definitions of these terms and therefore are not conservationists, ecologists, or environmentalists.

Is it actually fair to take an older culture that lived in a time when the world's population was a fraction of what it is now, and judge them for not learning/realizing something that a lot of us still haven't realized: that natural resources are in fact very limited and that our consumption of these resources must be moderated? Let alone ignore the reality that, for these people in those times and environments, the resources were arguably unlimited, at least as far as their survival was concerned? I don't think so. Further, Krech even acknowledged that when things started to change with the

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introduction of Western trade, the American Indians realized its effects first. Not only this, they also incorporated and acted upon this knowledge something that we haven't done as a nation yet.

Finally, does not having a modern sense of the need for conservation indicate a lack of respect or reverence for nature? I don't think so. It seems illogical to expect a people to produce an answer to a question or problem that has not yet reared its ugly head. However, it also seems illogical to try to ignore it once it has.

week6/requirement.docx

Answer the following question:

· Which mindset, Western or Non-Western, has a better environmental ideology? Why? Give specific examples. Remember to reply to a few classmates.

Required: Quote only one applicable sentence from your textbook environmental ethics, by Joseph R. DesJardins. Provide the page number where the sentence is located in the textbook. The sentence does NOT count as one of the required sentences in each of the sections (Introduction, Body, Conclusion). Do NOT use the same quote in any of the remaining discussions –you will lose points if you repeat the quote.

· The format of this paper:

· Introduction (3 complete sentences –minimum) Body (10 complete sentences –minimum) Conclusion (5 complete sentences –minimum)

· Instructions:

· 1. When you write your posts, clearly identify each section of the post. Above the sections/paragraphs write INTRODUCTION, BODY or CONCLUSION (all capital letters).

· 2. Your sections/paragraphs must have the minimum number of complete sentences indicated above.

· 3. If you’re required to use or include a website, include it and provide a complete cite (any citing style).

· 4. Write in complete sentences.

· 5. Use correct grammar and spelling.

· 6. In your INTRODUCTION, introduce your topic or theme. DO NOT REPEAT THE ASSIGNMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS.

· 7. In your BODY, write about your topic or theme. Present your analysis in this section. DO NOT REPEAT THE ASSIGNMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS.

· 8. In your CONCLUSION, share your conclusions, reactions, and final comments on the theme or topic. DO NOT REPEAT THE ASSIGNMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS.

· 10. In the INTRODUCTION, do NOT repeat the assignment's instructions. Introduce your theme or topic.