



Critic of Nietzsche's Philosophy

Nietzsche argues that people we should follow our conscience and not what people say you should be. He says your conscious says, "You should become who you are." He also argues that there is a sort of a value system put in place such that to take control of their superiors, members of the group creates mortality. This is mostly guilt, fear, and a destruction of the will to power in which the things which are of inferior type are praised as virtues, while those of the superior type are condemned as arrogance. The idea is that the belief in the Christian supernatural being has become the unpopular belief. Nietzsche tries to propagate the idea that the old beliefs and value system are no longer impressive. Rather than a gloomy and depressing crumbling of religion and the old value system, there is a new indescribable variety of value system build on reason. **People can open their eyes and see a new horizon.**

Nietzsche's ethical reasoning is basically basic in introduction. He assaults profound quality, both for its dedication to untenable spellbinding (powerful and observational) asserts about human office, and additionally for the malicious effect of its particular standards and values on the thriving of the most elevated sorts of people (Nietzsche's "higher men"). His positive moral perspectives are best comprehended as joining a sort of consequentialist hairsplitting as Nietzsche's understood hypothesis of the good, with an origination of human flawlessness including both formal and substantive components. Nietzsche, nonetheless, is a hostile to realist about value, he takes neither

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his positive vision, nor those parts of his scrutinize that rely on it, to have any uncommon epistemic status, a reality which clarifies his talk and the prudent character of his "recondite" admonishing. **In spite of the fact that Nietzsche's illiberal mentalities** (for instance, about human fairness) **are evident, there are no justification for crediting to him a political theory,** since he has no efficient (or even halfway deliberate) sees about the way of state and society. As an elusive moralist, Nietzsche goes for liberating ^{REWORD} higher individuals from their false awareness about profound quality (their false conviction that this ethical quality is beneficial for them), not at a change of society on the loose.

Indent > While Nietzsche obviously has seen about the condition of issues to which positive inherent esteem appends (specifically, the thriving of higher men), there is greater contradiction among mediators about what sort of morals emerges from the last valuation so fundamental to his scrutinize of profound quality. The two driving candidates are that Nietzsche grasps ~~a sort of~~ goodness morals (e.g., Hunt 478; Solomon 86) and that he is a sort of fussbudget (Hurka 193, Hurka 277). These records end up overlapping — the splendors of the last record are regularly the temperances of the previous — however the fussbudget record will demonstrate to have certain different focal points, examined underneath.

OVERUSE
of
"sort of"

Indent > Any record of Nietzsche's "sure morals" stands up to an edge stress, in particular, that Nietzsche's naturalistic origination of people and office — and, specifically, his origination of people as constituted by non-cognizant sort actualities that decide their activities — makes it vague how Nietzsche could have a philosophical morals in any customary sense. In the event that, as Nietzsche, says, **we confront "a baldfaced mass of destiny, we are in jail, we can just dream ourselves free, not make ourselves free";** if "the single person is a bit of fatum from the front and from the back, one law more, one need


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(Nietzsche
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more for all that is yet to come and to be"; if (as he says all the more hyperbolically in Nachlass material) "the deliberate is totally missing... everything has been coordinated along specific lines from the earliest starting point"; if (again hyperbolically) "one will turn out to be just that which one is (despite every one of: that implies training, guideline, milieu, possibility, and mishap)"; then it is not really astonishing that Nietzsche ought to likewise say, "A man as he should be: that sounds to us as dull as 'a tree as he should be'"

However a rationalist hesitant to discuss "man as he should be" is clearly ill-suited to the errand of building up a regularizing morals, comprehended as methodical and hypothetical direction for how to live, regardless of whether that direction comes as principles for conduct or airs of character to be developed. (There is an extra, and extraordinary trouble, for the individuals who think Nietzsche is an uprightness ethicist, to be specific, that he likewise thinks bona fide excellencies are particular to people, implying that there will be nothing broad for the scholar to say in regards to them. This implies we should approach the topic of Nietzsche's "sure" morals as far as explaining (1) what it is Nietzsche values, (2) what his criteria of assessment are, and (3) what evaluative structure, assuming any, is displayed by the responses to (1) and (2). We turn out badly toward the ~~begin~~, **beginning**, be that as it may, on the off chance that we anticipate that Nietzsche will deliver a standardizing hypothesis of any natural kind, regardless of whether a prudence morals or something else.

Critically, the previous focuses ought not to be perused as denying that Nietzsche thinks values and evaluative judgments can causally affect activities and how lives are lived. All things considered, there would be no reason for undertaking a "reevaluation of qualities" if such a reevaluation would not have outcomes for, e.g., the prospering of higher men, or if MPS values did not have injurious causal results for those same

individuals. Values have a causal effect, at the same time, given Nietzsche's epiphenomenalism about cognizance, they don't have this effect as a result of free, cognizant decisions people make to receive certain ethical standards or develop certain attitudes of character.

We can better value Nietzsche's surprising perspectives on this score by looking all the more carefully at the well known, however mixed up, **thought that Nietzsche approaches individuals to "make themselves"**. Alexander Nehamas, for instance, peruses Nietzsche as embracing a morals of self-creation. For Nietzsche, Nehamas says, "The general population who 'need to wind up noticeably those they are' are absolutely 'individuals who are new, one of a kind, exceptional, who give themselves laws, who make themselves' " (1985, 174). Sadly, Nehamas truncates the quote from *The Gay Science* at a deceptive point. For Nietzsche, in the full section, proceeds as takes after: 

Great example

To that end [of making ourselves] we should turn into the best learners and pioneers of everything that is legal and essential on the planet: we should move toward becoming physicists keeping in mind the end goal to be makers in this sense [wir müssen Physiker sein, um, in jenem Sinne, Schöpfer sein zu können] — while until now all valuations and standards have been founded on obliviousness of material science

what does this mean

Along these lines: long live material science!

Creation "in this sense" is, then, an extremely exceptional sense in fact: for it presupposes the revelation of what is "legitimate and important" as uncovered by physical science! The entry starts to bode well in setting. For in this same area, Nietzsche asserts that "each activity is mysterious," however he includes:

... our conclusions, valuations, and tables of what is great unquestionably have a place among the most intense levers in the included instrument of our activities, however... in a specific case the law of their component is indemonstrable.

This perception drives Nietzsche instantly to the recommendation that we ought to make "our own new tables of what is great," probably with an eye to affecting the causal assurance of our activities in new ways. In any case, we require assistance from science to recognize the legitimate examples into which values and activities fall; regardless of the possibility that the components are indemonstrable, science may at any rate uncover the examples of significant worth information sources and activity yields. So to make one's self, "in this sense," is to acknowledge Nietzsche's fundamentally deterministic picture of activity — as controlled by sub-cognizant causes (sort actualities) that are difficult to recognize — however to utilize science to help distinguish those "values" which figure in the causal assurance of activity in new, yet unsurprising, ways.

Values, then, have a causal effect upon how individuals act and in this way likewise on their life directions; yet we can't anticipate that these effects will spill out of free, cognizant decisions that people make. This would clarify, obviously, why we discover so little in Nietzsche by method for factious or digressive support for his evaluative judgments: such learned gadgets are exactly the ones that would speak to our cognizant resources, and along these lines would be sit without moving as for the coveted results. Nietzsche's regularly rough logical style, by complexity, may be normal (or so Nietzsche apparently considers) to have the essential non-objective impact on his coveted perusers — those "whose ears are identified with our own"

In the event that Nietzsche does not have a common standardizing morals, he unquestionably has no lack of perspectives about evaluative inquiries. For instance, it is

clear from the prior discourse of Nietzsche's investigate of ethical quality that he doles out **awesome natural incentive to the thriving of higher men**. In any case, who are these "higher men" and why does Nietzsche allocate an incentive to them? (Take note of that while Nietzsche talks in Thus Spoke Zarathustra of the "superman" as a sort of perfect higher sort, this idea essentially drops out of his develop work (with the exception of a short say in EH with regards to examining Zarathustra). "Higher men" is an essential idea in Nietzsche; the "superman" is simply an expository figure of speech in the profoundly adapted Zarathustra.)

Nietzsche has three most loved cases of "higher" people: Goethe, Beethoven, and Nietzsche himself! What makes these figures ideal models of the "higher" sort for Nietzsche, past their **incredible innovativeness** (as he says, "the men of awesome inventiveness" are "the truly extraordinary men as indicated by my comprehension"? Taking after Leiter (2002: 116–122), we can recognize five attributes that Nietzsche distinguishes as particular of "higher men": the higher sort is lone, seeks after a "bringing together venture," is solid, is invigorating, and rehearses self-respect. Taken together, they are evidently adequate to make somebody a higher sort in Nietzsche's view, however it is not clear that any of these is fundamental, and different blends frequently appear to be adequate for clarifying how Nietzsche talks about higher people.

To begin with, higher sorts are singular and manage others just instrumentally. "Each decision person," says Nietzsche, "endeavors intuitively for a fortress and a mystery where he is spared from the group, the numerous, the immense larger part... "[T]he idea of significance," he says in a similar work, "involves being honorable, needing to be without anyone else's input, having the capacity to appear as something else, remaining solitary and living freely [auf-eigne-Faust-leben-müssen]" To be sure, the

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higher sort seeks after isolation with something of a retaliation, for he "knows how to make foes all over,... He continually negates the immense lion's share not through words but rather through deeds" Obviously, then, the considerable or higher man does not have the "congeniality" and "great naturedness" so frequently celebrated in contemporary world.

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Reading Response
By: Kymberli Nielsen

Student: Dung Quang Tran

1. Read the introduction. Based on what you have you read so far, what is the main focus and what do you think the rest of the essay be about?
 - Critiquing Nietzsche's philosophy in which we went over in the class. Reviewing Nietzsche's ideals and counterarguing them as well.
2. About halfway through, describe in as much detail as possible what is going on in your mind as you read.
 - This essay is very technical, and strong in many aspects. Reading it is not necessarily easy, but the writer is very clear when discussing what they want to say regarding Nietzsche. There were a few grammatical errors that made it difficult to read, yet the information was very strong. I think it would be very interesting to see what the writer discusses about Nietzsche in today's world.
3. What is your emotional response to the essay: Interest? Sympathy? Frustration? Confusion? Boredom? Why? Think about tone, topic, organization, and evidence as you answer this.
 - My emotional response is overall interest. The tone is very wise, and throughout the essay there is plenty of evidence. Just a little reminder, do not forget to cite wherever you are getting your information. It is always interesting understanding how strongly someone can disagree with a philosopher's ideology. Organization was great as well, but some paragraphs didn't have indents. Overall, the essay was very well-written.
4. Is the argument and focus you wrote in answer number one carried throughout the paper? How does the writer do this?
 - Yes, the writer is very strong at maintaining the argument throughout the paper. With the amount of evidence, in-text citations, and the writer's opinion there is a lot of information provided in the paper. If the writer maintains a strong voice and uses plenty of evidence within each paragraph, the essay will be very strong.
5. Are the examples clear, detailed, and persuasive for each supporting point?
 - The examples are detailed and persuasive for each supporting point. I do believe that the examples could be clearer because some examples sounded a little confusing. If the writer maintains a clear tone and argument in each paragraph then the essay will be great!
6. Does the paper flow well together and feel well organized? How does the writer achieve this?
 - Yes, the paper flows very well. I do think that the paper could be a little more organized, easier for the reader to comprehend. However, the writer knows what

he is talking about and has a very strong argument. The writer has achieved a very strong paper.

7. Imagine you are telling a friend what you just read and briefly summarize it.
 - The writer's critic of Nietzsche's philosophy, and discusses each of his opinions and argues them among his own. By arguing his opinion against Nietzsche's, readers are able to recognize the differences among the two. The essay is very technical, but brings to light several pieces of information.
8. When looking at the "Thesis Statements and Essay Writing" and "Essay Writing Checklist" pages in this handout, are there any aspects that the writer has missed?
 - Fixing the work-cited page, and indenting paragraphs
9. Do you have any questions to the writer? What are your suggestions for revision?
 - To the writer, I would suggest rereading throughout your essay and checking for any grammatical errors. Make sure to cite any of your quotes that you took from Nietzsche's original work. Your tone and voice is very good in the essay, so as long as you focus on cleaning up the essay, it'll definitely be a good one. Your topic is not an easy one, yet this essay is very well written.