Information and Communication Technology Policy and Strategy

profilesml0om7
01wkict17.pptx

The Waves of Change

1

Introducing your Lecturer – Ed Steinmueller

Ed has a PhD in economics from Stanford where he wrote a thesis on the integrated circuit industry. He studies at Stanford and worked in the Palo Alto, California area for 20 years before emigrating to Europe.

His work involved an economic policy research at Stanford (CEPR now called SIEPR) and a partnership providing expert testimony in competition policy legal disputes (involving newspapers and a variety of high technology industries including telecommunications, minicomputers, and nuclear fuels)

He came to Europe in 1994 and worked in Maastricht at MERIT, a sister institution to SPRU where he founded a PhD programme and began work on European information society issues. In 1997 he came to SPRU and has continued his work on social and economic issues surround ICTs.

Most recently, he has been working on issues of social, technical and economic transition to more sustainable societies.

Outline of Lecture

Technological Revolution

Technological Determinism

Innovation Diffusion

The Productivity Paradox

3

Technological Revolution

The modern ICT (information and communication technology) era is marked by four basic trends

The integrated circuit paradigm of Moore’s Law

The application of optoelectronics to communication

High capacity mass storage

Increasing mobility of access to ICT

And two important ‘standards’ innovations

Pack switching giving rise to the Internet Protocol

World Wide Web standards (HTML, URL, etc.)

These trends reflects the power of

a) ‘technological trajectories’ -- the rapid incremental improvement of performance and capacity.

b) ‘standards’ that provide the basis for interconnection and network externalities (which we will discuss in more detail in Week 4)

4

1. The Integrated Circuit Paradigm

Pace of Change (Moore’s Law)

The increase in the number of transistors per device has doubled every 18 months

since 1960. The persistence of this pace is remarkable and has few parallels in

other technologies.

Consequences of Moore’s Law

1. Miniaturisation (not primarily about making things smaller)

Reductions in interconnections

Reductions in power consumption

2. Increases in functionality because

a) integration involves ‘digestion’ of all previous electronic designs into single ICs

b) as well as the capacity to evolve ever more complex and general purpose ‘systems on a chip’

Technological Revolution

5

Moore’s Law Illustrated:

The number of transistors has (more than) doubled every 18 months since 1960

(depicted on a logarithmic scale)

Source: Intel

1. The Integrated Circuit Paradigm

Technological Revolution

6

1 x 1.6 mm Texas Instruments First Integrated Circuit (Jack Kilby)

One transistor, one capacitor and the equivalent of 3 resistors

1958

a. The Integrated Circuit Paradigm

Technological Revolution

Inventors of the IC

Jack Kilby Robert Noyce

7

1965

15 x 15 mm Fairchild Operational Amplifier

14 transistors and fifteen resistors

a. The Integrated Circuit Paradigm

Technological Revolution

8

0.09 x 0.11 mm Section of the AMD 2901 1975 – An Early Microprocessor

c. 5,000 transistors in the entire device

1975

a. The Integrated Circuit Paradigm

Technological Revolution

9

a. The Integrated Circuit Paradigm

2004

This is the Pentium 4 ‘Prescott’ design which has 125 million

transistors.

It is no longer possible to display the detail of a modern IC because the number of pixels on a screen is far fewer than the number of transistors (a computer screen with 1920x1080 resolution only has about 2 million pixels <1% of the number of transistors)

A picture of a modern IC is like a satellite image of London

A nice short (15 minute) lecture on small scale is

https:// nanohub.org/resources/179/watch?resid=20231&tmpl=component&time=00:14:09

Technological Revolution

The Emergence of the Integrated Circuit Paradigm (1)

Why was the military the first user of ICs?

ICs were initially much more expensive than the costs of buying the transistor and assembling them on a printed circuit board.

The cost premium could only be justified in missile and other aerospace applications where higher standards of reliability demanded fewer interconnections.

How did commercial use emerge?

1) more complex devices (hearing aid amplifiers, calculators) became possible as

lithography techniques for scaling to smaller dimensions improved in quality and

became less expensive -- note that there is an element of physical miniaturisation

in these early applications

2) by the late 1960s the ability to ‘integrate’ a larger number of transistors meant that ICs became cheaper than transistors assembled on printed circuit boards

Price dynamics

Early years – yields were low and high prices reflected manufacturing costs

Later – high demand for early applications support high prices (and prevent demand for earlier generation from collapsing)

a. The Integrated Circuit Paradigm

Technological Revolution

11

The Emergence of the Integrated Circuit Paradigm (2)

As the number of circuit elements increased ever more complex systems

could be ‘integrated’ on a single circuit

This process has now accelerated so that modern integrated circuits are constructed from libraries of circuit elements – some of these library elements are much more complex than early integrated circuits

A key feature of the paradigm is the principle of ‘modularity’ – very similar to software modularity in which circuit elements have defined inputs and outputs that facilitate their integration into larger systems

A consequence is that, in principle, any software can be implemented as hardware

An integrated circuit design can be accurately simulated using software so that very complex systems can be tested before manufacture

Moore’s law is not only a prediction, it is a roadmap guiding technological development in the industry

a. The Integrated Circuit Paradigm

Technological Revolution

12

b. The Application of Opto-Electronics

Opto-electronics is the integration of digital electronics and lasers

Lasers can be switched at high rates of speed to produce streams of digital data

Like electricity, light travels at the speed of light – the time to circle the earth at the equator is a bit more than 1/10 of a second

(In practice, signals move slower because they must be ‘switched’ (recognised and then re-sent))

Packet switching over fibre-optic cables allows global data and voice communication at very low (and falling) costs

The essence of the Internet is packet switched data transmission which allows the volume of data traffic (now in millions of terabytes per month)

A technical introduction to Fibre Optics is available at http://fiberu.org/

Technological Revolution

13

c. High capacity mass storage

Magnetic and optical mass storage densities and speeds have increased dramatically since

This is remarkable because such devices have ‘moving parts’ – they only partly benefit from Moore’s law

High capacity mass storage underlies the server technologies responsible for the World Wide Web

In recent years, solid state memories have begun to rival mechanical mass storage for some applications – e.g. the USB ‘key’ and increasingly SSD (solid state disks)

This is an example of how a linear (but rapid) growth (in hard disk capacity) may be displaced by exponential growth (in memory chips)

Technological Revolution

14

"Full History Disk Areal Density Trend" by Barry Whyte. Licensed under CC BY 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Full_History_Disk_Areal_Density_Trend.png#mediaviewer/File:Full_History_Disk_Areal_Density_Trend.png

Hard Disk Capacity Follows (and even exceeds) Moore’s Law

Cellular networks make it possible to use the limited capacity of the radio

Frequency (RF) spectrum to carry data as an RF signal.

Central to the RF technological trajectory is the concept of cellular networks

From a technical perspective the amount of data that can be exchanged in such a network is limited by radio frequency with higher radio frequencies suffering from problems of interference (e.g. rain) and attenuation (e.g. reduction in signal while penetrating solid objects)

These limitations can be addressed by reducing the power and hence shortening the effective range of the signal. It is also helpful to be able to shift the frequency to avoid congestion and improve signal quality.

The use of RF for ICT applications depends upon ‘frequency allocation’ – rules that determine what legal use can be made of the RF spectrum (see next slides) and the limitations in this frequency allocation require inventing techniques to more fully utilise the allocated frequency (e.g. frequency shift)

d. Mobility Using RF Networks

Technological Revolution

Wifi 2.4 & 5 GHz

WiMax 2-66 GHz

(mostly 2.3 & 2.5 GHz)

Mobile

Many frequencies including

925 MHz, 1.8 GHz,

And 1.93 GHz

Technological Revolution

d. Mobility Using RF Networks

Technological Revolution

The RF spectrum is crowded and mobile RF applications (purple) have had

to fit into prior allocation to other uses (e.g. broadcasting and

(not depicted here) military applications

d. Mobility Using RF Networks

Heddy Lamarr

(Hedwig Eva Maria Kiesler)

(1914-2000)

George Antheil

(1900-1959)

Frequency hopping (shifting) was invented by these two individuals as a contribution to the Allies efforts during WW II and is now widely employed to reduce ‘congestion effects’ in RF frequencies. While the most glamourous, these were only two of dozens of important inventors of RF technologies.

Technological Revolution

d. Mobility Using RF Networks

Unifying Principle – Technological Trajectories

A technological trajectory is a projection or forecast of performance and capacity

As is the case with Moore’s law the forecast provides a means of organising and directing technological research

None of the three fundamental technologies responsible for the ICT revolution have encountered fundamental roadblocks – this is unusual

They are all related to a single body of scientific knowledge – materials science

The same area of science which is now opening up nanotechnology for development

There are also important connections between materials science and biotechnology

Technological Revolution

20

Technological Determinism (1)

What I have just presented is a version of ‘technological determinism’

I have suggested that forecasts of improvement guide efforts to make improvement, creating a virtuous cycle whose consequences are the ICT revolution

This view is contested by social scientists who observe that technological efforts are planned, directed, and carried out by people who influence the rate and direction of technological improvement – they are ‘socially constructed’

There is certainly some truth in this argument and some relevance for our purposes

In a competitive market economy, technological opportunities not exploited by one group of people will be exploited by others

A consequence of the absence of roadblocks to technological advance in the three central technologies is that a global technological race has been underway for several decades – it shows no signs of decline

This race has more to do with ‘raw’ technological capacity than it does with the use of the technology because production improvements are an easier target than use improvements (for reasons we will examine further in this and the next classes)

21

Technological Determinism (2)

It is true, however, that the ways in which technology is employed are influenced by social groups such as the technical staff of ICT producers and the users of ICT

An important part of the discussion of this course is considering who gets included and excluded in these processes of ‘social construction’ of technology

For example, one of the key features of ICT developments is that races to exploit technological opportunity often produce dominant companies

WINTEL -- Microsoft and Intel

CISCO

SAP and Oracle

Nokia and Motorola and now Samsung and Apple

22

Technological Determinism (3)

Information and communication technologies (hereafter ICTs) are subject to several types of economies of scale:

Many ICTs have important elements of fixed costs – e.g. the software example.

The ‘economy of integration’ from the IC industry makes it possible to produce ever more complex devices at similar costs – thus, over time the ‘real’ (quality adjusted) price of electronics falls which increases demand

Investments in design capabilities can be applied to a number of different areas (economies of scope)

Many ICTs are mass produced (e.g. optical disk drives) and there are classical mass production economies of scale available.

In addition, they are affected by:

1) Adoption Externalities – what others do influences your choice

2) Technological Standards (week 4) in augmenting or strengthening economies of scale.

23

Innovation Diffusion (1)

24

The ‘Stylised Facts’ of the Diffusion Curve

I. Early Adoption

II. Take Off

III. Rapid Growth

IV. Maturity

V. Obsolescence

Innovation

I

II

III

IV

V

Share

of Total

Available

Market

Time

Innovation Diffusion (2)

25

Innovation Diffusion (3)

Consequences of Diffusion

The diffusion curve continues the ‘technological determinist’ perspective

It suggests that new technologies are necessarily taken up according to the ‘stylised facts’ based upon experience

The rapid rate of the ‘take up’ phase in combination with economies of scale are responsible for the ‘winner takes all’ nature of technological races

But are ‘diffusion models’ very good at prediction?

26

Innovation Diffusion (4)

Predicting Diffusion (a)

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Innovation Diffusion (5)

Predicting Diffusion (b)

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Another Prediction

From about 1960, social commentators have been talking about ‘automation’ as a potential threat to jobs and as a remarkable new source of productivity that might enable changes in the service industry comparable to those achieved through electrical power in manufacturing

With some conspicuous exceptions (e.g. telephone operators) automation has not produced the extent of job losses or the productivity improvements predicted.

Why not?

The principal reason is that ICTs support the creation of variety (product differentiation) as effectively as they improve the control of mass production and consumption -- The new opportunities for growth obscure the ‘disruption’ and ‘displacement’ effects enabled by ICTs

A secondary reason is that the expectations that the ‘conversion’ process represented by automation would be smooth or automatic are consistently frustrated – organisational change is difficult – i.e. it is costly and time-consuming

The Productivity Paradox

29

Management Challenges

Managing the ‘disruptive’ elements of change requires a better understanding of how and why disruption occurs in the process of adopting ICT solutions

There is no smooth path between how a system may be designed according to the ideas of the technologist designing it and and how it operates in practice as part of a social system

Central to this better understanding is an appreciation of how ICTs enter into the social systems in which they are expected to have a role

These issues are dealt with in this course by considering engagement, co-ordination and integration issues (statements of ideas that link technological and social science ways of thinking)

At both the level of the firm and in society as whole – ICTs are seen as a progressive force

There are limits and problems with this viewpoint and understanding what these are provides better insight into how ICT take up and use can be managed

The Productivity Paradox

30

Technological Determinism (Soft and Hard) vs. Social Constructivism

When we talk about the ICT revolution, who or what are the revolutionaries?

‘Hard’ technological determinism is the view that technology is autonomous of direct human control and dictates changes in society

Social constructivism rejects technological determinism because it

conceals power relationships

ignores the human instrumentality in creating technology and human choices made in implementing technology, and

provides little basis for understanding why technologies fail to deliver the promises of their supporters

Summary (1)

Social constructivism has its own risks, however. It is too easy to see everything as contingent on (depending on) power relationships and ignore the influence of technological opportunities on choices.

Soft technological determinism recognises that human agency plays a major role in technological outcomes, but maintains that technological opportunities are not solely socially constructed and that the variety of initiatives by actors produces ‘emergent outcomes’ whose path is not controlled by any actor or group of actors

31

Relevant Sociological and Political Ideas

The social constructivist debate described earlier indicates the importance of examining who makes the decisions regarding the design of ICT systems

-- Often this is characterised as the contest between ‘supply push’ and ‘demand pull’ types of explanations, but this obscures the point as much as it illuminates it

-- Defining what social interests there are in ICTs is an important subject

At the level of the individual user, issues of ‘resistance’ and ‘accommodation’ are important

-- ICTs make existing skills obsolete and demand new skills

ICTs are also a new method for achieving ‘co-ordination’ between individuals in an organisation – co-ordination occurs when we must take account of others actions.

-- For example, express parcel delivery

-- The larger implications of these new means of ‘co-ordination’ are only beginning to be recognised (e.g. open source software movement).

Summary (2)

32

Looking Forward

Some key questions for the module:

How are people either left behind or excluded by ICT developments – do digital divides exist? If yes, what are their consequences.

Why is technological change faster than organisational change?

3. Is improvement possible or is this another instance of ‘determinism’

Beginning with the technological opportunity reveals my own bias toward a soft technological determinism approach. For me, it all begins with the remarkable potential of the technology.

The ‘bridge’ or ‘road’ to the Information Society is not, however, likely to be smooth due to both economic and sociological/political considerations.

The next lecture continues the use of the economic dimension by looking at the role of the Internet in markets which is followed by the guest lecture of Dr. Puay

Tang who will look at a key rule (institution) – intellectual property rights. In week 4 we will examine another institution (rule) – standards and how they influence ‘connectivity’ (the formation of networks) and then discuss the implications of networks in the following lectures

33

(c) Frank M. Bass (1999)

Projection of World

-

Wide PC Demand, 1999

-

2010

-

Data From Bill Gates,

Newsweek

Actual Worldwide PC Shipments, 1981-1999 and Fitted and Projected

Shipments, 1981-2010, m=3.384 Billion, p= .001, q= .195

0

20

40

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180

81

83

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87

89

91

93

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97

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101

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105

107

109

Year

Millions of Units

World Wide PC Shipments

Fitted World Wide PC Shipments

Peak

2008

697 Million Units

Shipments through

1999

Shipments Includes Replacements

(Upgrades)

5

-

31

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99

Projection of World-Wide PC Demand, 1999-2010-Data From Bill Gates, Newsweek

5-31-99

(c) Frank M. Bass (1999)

Chart1

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84
85
86
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90
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92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
World Wide PC Shipments
Year
Millions of Units
World Wide PC Shipments, 1981-1999
2.75
5.49
6.53
12.5
10.91
13.73
16.47
19.22
21.96
24.705
27.45
30.195
46.47
51.96
57.45
65.49
87.45
95.49
100.98

Chart2

81 81
82 82
83 83
84 84
85 85
86 86
87 87
88 88
89 89
90 90
91 91
92 92
93 93
94 94
95 95
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98 98
99 99
World Wide PC Shipments
Fitted World Wide PC Shipments
Year
Millions of Units
Actual and Fitted Worldwide PC Shipments, 1981-1999
2.75
3.384
5.49
4.1076463616
6.53
4.9836726758
12.5
6.0430441788
10.91
7.3224876365
13.73
8.865309973
16.47
10.722206607
19.22
12.9519810364
21.96
15.6220536671
24.705
18.8085791372
27.45
22.5959157478
30.195
27.0750992052
46.47
32.3408724454
51.96
38.4867305399
57.45
45.5973867868
65.49
53.7381064892
87.45
62.9405660702
95.49
73.1853723349
100.98
84.3822087031

Chart3

81 81
82 82
83 83
84 84
85 85
86 86
87 87
88 88
89 89
90 90
91 91
92 92
93 93
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109 109
110 110
Peak 2008
697 Million Units Shipments through 1999
Shipments Includes Replacements (Upgrades)
World Wide PC Shipments
Fitted World Wide PC Shipments
Year
Millions of Units
Actual Worldwide PC Shipments, 1981-1999 and Fitted and Projected Shipments, 1981-2010, m=3.384 Billion, p= .001, q= .195
2.75
3.384
5.49
4.1076463616
6.53
4.9836726758
12.5
6.0430441788
10.91
7.3224876365
13.73
8.865309973
16.47
10.722206607
19.22
12.9519810364
21.96
15.6220536671
24.705
18.8085791372
27.45
22.5959157478
30.195
27.0750992052
46.47
32.3408724454
51.96
38.4867305399
57.45
45.5973867868
65.49
53.7381064892
87.45
62.9405660702
95.49
73.1853723349
100.98
84.3822087031
96.3497923986
108.7993185126
121.3264896586
133.4179599354
144.4772493566
153.8722322115
161.0011415572
165.3677583496
166.6512970306
164.7550347272
159.8214777875

Sheet1

Year World Wide PC Shipments Time World Wide PC Shipments Fitted World Wide PC Shipments
81 2.75 0 2.75 3.384
82 5.49 1 5.49 4.1076463616
83 6.53 2 6.53 4.9836726758
84 12.5 3 12.5 6.0430441788
85 10.91 4 10.91 7.3224876365
86 13.73 5 13.73 8.865309973
87 16.47 6 16.47 10.722206607
88 19.22 7 19.22 12.9519810364
89 21.96 8 21.96 15.6220536671
90 24.705 9 24.705 18.8085791372
91 27.45 10 27.45 22.5959157478
92 30.195 11 30.195 27.0750992052
93 46.47 12 46.47 32.3408724454
94 51.96 13 51.96 38.4867305399
95 57.45 14 57.45 45.5973867868
96 65.49 15 65.49 53.7381064892
97 87.45 16 87.45 62.9405660702
98 95.49 17 95.49 73.1853723349
99 100.98 18 100.98 84.3822087031
100 19 96.3497923986
101 20 108.7993185126 Raw R-square (1-Residual/Total) = 0.996
102 21 121.3264896586 Mean corrected R-square (1-Residual/Corrected) = 0.990
103 22 133.4179599354 R(observed vs predicted) square = 0.990
104 23 144.4772493566 Bass Model Estimates
105 24 153.8722322115 Wald Confidence Interval
106 25 161.0011415572 Parameter Estimate A.S.E. Param/ASE Lower < 95%> Upper
107 26 165.3677583496 M 3384.069 1303.840 2.595 620.052 6148.086
108 27 166.6512970306 P 0.001 0.000 3.795 0.001 0.002
109 28 164.7550347272 Q 0.195 0.017 11.353 0.158 0.231
110 29 159.8214777875
697.2

Sheet2

Sheet3

Actual Worldwide PC Shipments, 1981-1999 and Fitted and Projected

Shipments, 1981-2010, m=3.384 Billion, p= .001, q= .195

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

81838587899193959799

101103105107109

Year

Millions of Units

World Wide PC ShipmentsFitted World Wide PC Shipments

Peak

2008

697 Million Units

Shipments through

1999

Shipments Includes Replacements

(Upgrades)

Actual vs. Bass Predicted PC Shipments

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

19751980198519901995200020052010

Year

Millions Shipped

Chart1

1981 1981
1982 1982
1983 1983
1984 1984
1985 1985
1986 1986
1987 1987
1988 1988
1989 1989
1990 1990
1991 1991
1992 1992
1993 1993
1994 1994
1995 1995
1996 1996
1997 1997
1998 1998
1999 1999
2000 2000
2001 2001
2002 2002
2003 2003
2004 2004
2005 2005
2006 2006
2007 2007
2008 2008
Year
Millions Shipped
Actual vs. Bass Predicted PC Shipments
2.75
3.384
5.49
4.1076463616
6.53
4.9836726758
12.5
6.0430441788
10.91
7.3224876365
13.73
8.865309973
16.47
10.722206607
19.22
12.9519810364
21.96
15.6220536671
24.705
18.8085791372
27.45
22.5959157478
30.195
27.0750992052
46.47
32.3408724454
51.96
38.4867305399
57.45
45.5973867868
65.49
53.7381064892
87.45
62.9405660702
95.49
73.1853723349
100.98
84.3822087031
134.7
96.3497923986
128.9191820837
108.7993185126
132.4
121.3264896586
169
133.4179599354
189
144.4772493566
207.8
153.8722322115
229.7
161.0011415572
257.4
165.3677583496
287.8
166.6512970306

Sheet1

Year World Wide PC Shipments Time World Wide PC Shipments Fitted World Wide PC Shipments
81 2.75 1981 2.75 3.384
82 5.49 1982 5.49 4.1076463616
83 6.53 1983 6.53 4.9836726758
84 12.5 1984 12.5 6.0430441788
85 10.91 1985 10.91 7.3224876365
86 13.73 1986 13.73 8.865309973
87 16.47 1987 16.47 10.722206607
88 19.22 1988 19.22 12.9519810364
89 21.96 1989 21.96 15.6220536671
90 24.705 1990 24.705 18.8085791372
91 27.45 1991 27.45 22.5959157478
92 30.195 1992 30.195 27.0750992052
93 46.47 1993 46.47 32.3408724454
94 51.96 1994 51.96 38.4867305399
95 57.45 1995 57.45 45.5973867868
96 65.49 1996 65.49 53.7381064892
97 87.45 1997 87.45 62.9405660702
98 95.49 1998 95.49 73.1853723349
99 100.98 1999 100.98 84.3822087031
100 134.7 2000 134.7 96.3497923986
101 128.9191820837 2001 128.9191820837 108.7993185126 Raw R-square (1-Residual/Total) = 0.996
102 132.4 2002 132.4 121.3264896586 Mean corrected R-square (1-Residual/Corrected) = 0.990
103 169 2003 169 133.4179599354 R(observed vs predicted) square = 0.990
104 189 2004 189 144.4772493566 Bass Model Estimates
105 207.8 2005 207.8 153.8722322115 Wald Confidence Interval
106 229.7 2006 229.7 161.0011415572 Parameter Estimate A.S.E. Param/ASE Lower < 95%> Upper
107 257.4 2007 257.4 165.3677583496 M 3384.069 1303.840 2.595 620.052 6148.086
108 287.8 2008 287.8 166.6512970306 P 0.001 0.000 3.795 0.001 0.002
109 28 164.7550347272 Q 0.195 0.017 11.353 0.158 0.231
110 29 159.8214777875
697.2

Sheet2

Sheet3