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Victims & Offenders An International Journal of Evidence-based Research, Policy, and Practice

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Emerging Findings from Research on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice

Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg

To cite this article: Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg (2012) Emerging Findings from Research on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, Victims & Offenders, 7:4, 428-449, DOI: 10.1080/15564886.2012.713901

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Victims and Offenders, 7:428–449, 2012 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1556-4886 print/1556-4991 online DOI: 10.1080/15564886.2012.713901

Emerging Findings from Research on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice

Elizabeth Cauffman

University of California–Irvine, Irvine, California, USA

Laurence Steinberg

Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA

Abstract: Three fundamental questions have continued to challenge the juvenile justice system: (1) Should adolescents be held to adult standards of criminal culpabil- ity and, accordingly, be exposed to the same punishment as adults? (2) Do adolescents possess the necessary capabilities to function as competent defendants in an adversar- ial court proceeding? (3) How are juvenile offenders affected by the sorts of punitive sanctions that became increasingly popular during the last several decades? Over the past decade, there has been a remarkable expansion of scientific knowledge relevant to adolescent development and juvenile justice in general, and these specific questions in particular. As such, the goal of this article is to provide a summary of what is known in developmental research and how it has (or has not) influenced juvenile justice practice and policy—specifically in the realms of brain development, cognitive development, and psychosocial/socio-emotional development.

Keywords: juvenile justice, legal policy, juvenile offenders, adolescent development, psychosocial maturity

Few issues challenge a society’s ideas about both the nature of human devel- opment and the nature of justice as much as serious juvenile crime. The unexpected intersection between childhood and criminality creates a dilemma that most people find difficult to resolve. Do we consider young offenders still to be children, despite egregious behavior, or do we declare that such behavior demands we redefine the offenders as adults (Zimring, 1998)?

Address correspondence to Elizabeth Cauffman, Department of Psychology and Social Behavior, School of Social Ecology, University of California–Irvine, 3340 Social Ecology II, Irvine, CA 92687. E-mail: [email protected]

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Historically, American society has most often chosen the first approach, adjudicating most delinquent acts within a separate juvenile justice system designed, in theory, to recognize the special needs and immature status of young people and to emphasize rehabilitation over punishment. For most of the last century, states viewed the juvenile justice system as a vehicle to protect the public by assisting errant children during their maturation to adulthood. Starting in the 1980s, however, a dramatic shift occurred in the way juvenile crime was perceived by policy makers and the general public. Rather than choosing to define offenses committed by youth as delinquent, society increas- ingly opted to deal with young offenders more punitively, either within the juvenile justice system or by redefining them as adults and trying them in adult criminal court. This led to large numbers of juvenile offenses adjudi- cated in adult criminal court, where adolescents are exposed to a far more adversarial proceeding than in juvenile court; increasingly punitive responses to juvenile offenders who are found guilty; and what some call the “criminaliza- tion” of the juvenile justice system itself through increased use of punishment, rather than rehabilitation, as a legitimate juvenile justice goal (Feld, 1993).

This transformation of juvenile justice policy and practice raises important questions for developmental researchers. In particular:

• Should juveniles accused of crimes be held to the same standards of blame- worthiness as adults, and punished in the same ways as adult criminals who have committed similar crimes?

• Do adolescents have the psychological capabilities necessary to function as competent defendants in adult court?

• How does exposing juveniles to especially punitive sanctions affect their behavior, development, and mental health?

The purpose of this article is to provide a summary of what is known in developmental research and how it has (or has not) influenced juvenile jus- tice practice and policy. We begin with an overview of the ways in which developmental science is relevant to decisions made in the juvenile and/or criminal justice systems. We then review relevant scientific knowledge regard- ing adolescent development—specifically in the realms of brain development, cognitive development, and psychosocial or socio-emotional development—as they relate to the questions outlined above. Then we turn our focus to the spe- cific juvenile justice issues where developmental science can provide guidance and insight.

AN OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM

The juvenile justice system was established in 1899 as an alternative to the criminal justice system. Its establishment was based on the premise that

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youths’ characters are not yet fully formed, and that rehabilitation is there- fore more appropriate than retribution. The past 30 years have witnessed an erosion of this philosophy in favor of a more retributive approach. The resul- tant increases in the number of youthful offenders tried as adults and/or placed in secure confinement have led researchers to examine the impli- cations of such policy shifts. Consequently, over the past decade there has been a remarkable expansion of scientific knowledge relevant to adolescent development and juvenile justice. As a young offender moves through the jus- tice system “pipeline,” there are numerous decision points where information about the juvenile’s stage of development is relevant. For example, a juve- nile’s developmental status is relevant with respect to the adjudication process, because a just and fair hearing requires competent participation of the indi- vidual in her defense. Such competence is especially important when facing punitive sanctions in an adversarial court system, rather than rehabilitative proscriptions in a more paternalistic framework. At adjudication and trans- fer hearings, certain competencies are expected to be in place, including those that potentially affect the juvenile’s ability to understand the charges, assist counsel, and enter pleas (Scott & Grisso, 2005). To the extent that such com- petencies develop over the course of childhood and adolescence, an accurate understanding of how and when these capabilities develop is crucial to decid- ing whether an individual possesses the skills necessary to participate in the process.

Under the law, characteristics of the offender and the circumstances of the offense can mitigate criminal responsibility and lessen the punishment that is ordered. A crime committed impulsively, or due to either external coercion or diminished capacity, is punished less severely than one that is premedi- tated and voluntary. Familiarity with the expected developmental timetables of phenomena such as self-control, foresight, and susceptibility to peer pres- sure is therefore important for making determinations of culpability. In theory at least, an offender who—by virtue of developmental immaturity—is impul- sive, short-sighted, and easily influenced by peers should be punished less harshly than one who is better able to control himself, anticipate the long- term consequences of his behavior, and resist the antisocial urgings of others (Steinberg & Scott, 2003).

Finally, decision makers in the justice system often must assess a youth’s potential for change and risk for future offending when making transfer or disposition decisions (Mulvey & Leistico, 2008). Such estimates of developmen- tal plasticity are especially important at transfer hearings, because a young offender who seems “hardened” and unlikely to profit from rehabilitation is more likely to be charged as an adult than one who appears malleable and amenable to intervention. Similarly, a juvenile who is deemed to be at high risk of recidivism, either because of a long prior record of offending or other characteristics associated with continued and/or dangerous criminal behavior (e.g., failure to respond to prior attempts at rehabilitation, a history of repeated

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violence, likelihood of inadequate adult supervision in the community), will be more likely to be sent to institutional placement.

In order to make well-informed decisions about the treatment of juveniles who have entered the justice system pipeline, therefore, policy makers, judges, lawyers, probation officers, and mental health professionals need to be familiar with the developmental changes that occur during childhood and adolescence in the capabilities and characteristics that are relevant to competence, cul- pability, and likely response to treatment. Legislators need this information in order to create statutes that are developmentally appropriate and scientifically reasonable; if, for example, we know that the ability to understand charges or enter pleas does not generally develop until a certain age, it makes little sense to draw age boundaries that would subject developmentally incompetent indi- viduals to court proceedings that necessitate their participation in order to satisfy ordinary due process requirements. Judges need this information in order to make fair and effective decisions in the courtroom; if we know that the capacity to regulate one’s own behavior is unlikely to be present before a cer- tain age, it is important that this information be taken into account at the time of sentencing or disposition. Mental health professionals need this information in order to perform accurate assessments and make appropriate treatment rec- ommendations; individuals at different stages of development may need very different sorts of interventions. And attorneys need this information in order to practice law more effectively; prosecutors may consider a juvenile’s devel- opmental status in deciding when it is appropriate to charge an individual as an adult, and defense attorneys need to know how best to interact with clients who may not fully understand their situation or appreciate the long- term implications of specific defense strategies. Understanding the nature of psychological development during adolescence, therefore, has the potential to improve policy making, judicial decision making, forensic evaluation, and legal practice.

BRAIN, COGNITIVE, AND PSYCHOSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ADOLESCENCE

Recent advances in understanding the changes that occur between adoles- cence and adulthood have highlighted a number of areas in which matu- rational processes continue into early adulthood. Cognitive capabilities and abstract problem-solving competency tend to develop earlier in adolescence than psychosocial markers of maturity such as future orientation, resistance to peer pressure, reduced impulsivity, and (consequently) mature judgment in many “real-world” scenarios. Such observations are bolstered by physiological studies showing continued brain maturation through the end of the adoles- cent period. This work, summarized in the following sections, underscores the

432 E. Cauffman and L. Steinberg

uniqueness of adolescence as a stage of life that is distinct from adulthood with respect to several aspects of brain, cognitive, and psychosocial development.

Adolescent Brain Development Although it has been acknowledged for at least 100 years that adolescents

and adults differ in their behavior and capabilities—after all, this recogni- tion was in part the basis for the development of a separate juvenile justice system—recent work in developmental neuroscience is beginning to shed light on the neural underpinnings of psychological development across adoles- cence and adulthood (Casey, Getz, & Galvan, 2008; Steinberg, 2008). Research linking anatomical and functional markers of brain development with the psy- chological differences identified in behavioral and socio-emotional studies (and known as “common sense” to most teachers and parents of adolescents) has made such differences seem more credible, especially to those skeptical of “soft” psychology.

There are four related changes in the brain systems during adolescence that merit special attention. First, early adolescence (especially the period immediately after puberty) coincides with major changes in brain chem- istry involving neurotransmitters like dopamine, which is a critical biological substrate of the sensation of reward. It has been argued that heightened risk- taking in adolescence, including criminal risk-taking, is presumed to lead to increases in sensation seeking. Second, during childhood and early adoles- cence the brain undergoes substantial synaptic “pruning”—the paring away of unused synapses—leading to more efficient neural connections. This pruning is more characteristic of the prefrontal cortex than other brain regions, consis- tent with the observation that adolescence is a time of marked improvement in executive functions. Third, the adolescent brain undergoes substantial myeli- nation, the process through which neural pathways are insulated with a white fatty tissue called myelin. This insulation improves signal transmission speed and reliability. Such improvements are particularly important for higher-order functions involving multiple areas of the brain, such as response inhibition, planning, weighing costs and benefits, and reconciling multiple information sources. Finally, aided by synaptic pruning and myelination, the neural con- nections between cortical and subcortical regions continue to grow into late adolescence. Such connections lead to improved emotional self-regulation, con- sistent with adults’ superior ability to make mature judgments about risk and reward, and to exercise cognitive control over emotional impulses—especially in socially charged circumstances.

In short, the brain systems that govern many aspects of social and emo- tional maturity—such as impulse control, risk avoidance, planning ahead, and coordination of emotion and cognition—continue to mature throughout ado- lescence. Importantly, these changes occur at different times, with the rapid,

Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice 433

pubertal changes in the brain’s incentive and social processing systems out- pacing the slower, steadier, and later-occurring changes in areas related to executive function and self-control.

The implication of this developmental neuroscience for discussions of ado- lescent culpability is that the temporal gap between the increase in sensation- seeking at puberty and the later development of mature self-regulatory competence may make adolescence a time of inherently immature judgment. Thus, despite the fact that in many ways adolescents may appear to be as intelligent as adults (at least as suggested by performance on tests of logi- cal reasoning), their ability to regulate their behavior in accord with these advanced intellectual abilities is more limited.

Adolescent Cognitive Development Findings from research on brain development in adolescence have mapped

nicely onto what psychologists have known about cognitive and psychosocial development for some time, and as such have helped to concretize the dis- cussion of whether and in what ways juveniles and adults are different. The application of information about normative adolescent development to pol- icy and practice in the justice system necessitates differentiating between cognitive and psychosocial development, which appear to follow different developmental trajectories (Steinberg, 2008).

Research on adolescent cognitive development has been important to dis- cussions of both criminal culpability and competence to stand trial, because in each case a central concern is whether adolescents and adults have similar decision-making capabilities. The most important cognitive capacities involved in decision making are understanding (i.e., the ability to comprehend infor- mation relevant to the decision) and reasoning (i.e., the ability to use this information logically to make a choice). These capacities increase through childhood into adolescence. Between late childhood and middle adolescence (roughly between the ages of 11 and 16), individuals show marked improve- ments in deductive reasoning and information processing (Hale, 1990; Kail, 1997; Keating, 2004; Overton, 1990). As a result of these gains, individuals become more capable of abstract, multidimensional, deliberative, and hypo- thetical thinking as they develop from late childhood into middle adolescence (Kuhn, 2009). These abilities generally level off sometime around age 16, so that by this age, individuals’ capacities for understanding and reasoning (at least in controlled, nonemotional scenarios) roughly approximate those of adults. This comparability between middle adolescents and adults is not limited to basic cognitive abilities such as memory or verbal fluency or to per- formance on tasks of logical reasoning. Studies of capacity to grant informed consent to receive medical treatment or participate as a research subject, for example, have also found little improvement beyond age 16 (Belter & Grisso,

434 E. Cauffman and L. Steinberg

1984; Grisso & Vierling, 1978; Gustafson & McNamara, 1987; Weithorn & Campbell, 1982).

The notion that adolescents and adults demonstrate comparable capacities for understanding and reasoning should not be taken to mean that they also demonstrate comparable levels of maturity of judgment, however. Maturity of judgment is affected by cognitive capabilities as well as psychosocial ones, and although the former show adult levels of competency by 16, the latter do not (Steinberg, Cauffman, Woolard, Graham, & Banich, 2008). As a result, despite being cognitively equipped, adolescents may be less able to deploy their cogni- tive capacities as effectively as adults in their everyday lives, when decisions are influenced by emotional and social variables.

Adolescent Psychosocial Development Adolescent thinking in everyday settings is a function of social, emotional,

and cognitive processes; a full account of youthful judgment must examine the interaction of all of these influences (Scott, Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996). While the cognitive capacities of 16-year-olds may approximate those of adults, psychosocial maturation proceeds more slowly than cognitive development, leading to social and emotional differences between adolescents and adults that continue well beyond midadolescence and have profound effects on decision making. Of particular relevance to the present discussion are age differences in susceptibility to peer influence, future orientation, reward sensitivity, and the capacity for self-regulation—all of which are potential considerations in assessments of individuals’ crimi- nal responsibility and competence to stand trial. Available research indicates that adolescents and adults differ significantly with respect to each of these attributes.

Peer Influence

Questions concerning the extent to which adolescents may be more suscep- tible to the influence of others are raised in a variety of different legal contexts, including assessments of whether an individual may have been coerced into committing a crime, confessing to a crime, or waiving an important legal right. In this regard, it is important to note that substantial research evidence sup- ports the conventional wisdom that teens are more oriented toward peers and responsive to peer influence than are adults (Steinberg & Monahan, 2007). Resistance to peer influence increases between adolescence and adulthood as individuals begin to form an independent sense of self and develop greater capacity for autonomous decision making.

Peer influence affects adolescent judgment both directly and indirectly. In some contexts, adolescents might make choices in response to direct peer pressure, as when they are coerced to take risks that they might otherwise

Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice 435

avoid. More indirectly, adolescents’ desire for peer approval—and conse- quent fear of rejection—affects their choices even without direct coercion. The increased salience of peers in adolescence likely makes approval-seeking especially important in group situations. Thus it is not surprising, perhaps, that adolescents are far more likely than adults to commit crimes in groups (Goldweber, Dmitrieva, Cauffman, Piquero, & Steinberg, in press; Zimring, 1998). There is some evidence that during early and middle adolescence, teens who engage in certain types of antisocial behavior—such as fighting or drinking—may enjoy higher status among their peers as a consequence. Accordingly, some adolescents may engage in antisocial conduct to impress their friends or to conform to peer expectations; indeed, in one explanation of so-called “adolescence-limited” offending (in which crimes are committed dur- ing adolescence but not before or after), the imitation of higher-status peers is hypothesized to be a prime motivation (Moffitt, 1993). Research showing that adolescents become more resistant to peer influence as they mature is there- fore also relevant to discussions of factors that lead adolescents to desist from crime since, presumably, crimes committed as a consequence of peer pressure should become less frequent with age.

Future Orientation

Future orientation, the capacity and inclination to project events into the future, also influences judgment because it affects the extent to which individuals consider the long-term consequences of their actions in making choices—whether these are choices about committing an antisocial act, decid- ing how to behave in the presence of police, or selecting among multiple alternatives when faced with a legal decision (such as responding to a plea bargain proffer). Over the course of adolescence and into young adulthood, individuals become more future-oriented, with increases in their consideration of future consequences, in their concern about the future, and in their abil- ity to plan ahead (Greene, 1986; Nurmi, 1991; Steinberg, Graham, O’Brien, Woolard, Cauffman, & Banich, 2009). This developmental change has implica- tions for our assessments of culpability, competence, and patterns of criminal behavior over time. Future orientation encompasses the ability to plan for one’s future and consider long-range consequences beyond immediate gratifica- tion. It is a capacity that increases across adolescence (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; Greene, 1986; Nurmi, 1991; Steinberg et al., 2009). Furthermore, some evidence suggests that adolescents involved in crime are less future oriented than others who are not (Cauffman, Steinberg, & Piquero, 2005; Monahan, Steinberg, Cauffman, & Mulvey, 2009). For example, Cauffman, Steinberg, and Piquero (2005) found that future orientation was lower among delinquent than among nondelinquent individuals, even after accounting for a wide range of cognitive, familial, and biological factors.

436 E. Cauffman and L. Steinberg

There are several plausible explanations for adolescent shortfalls in future orientation. In part, adolescents’ weaker future orientation may reflect their more limited life experience (Gardner, 1993). To a young person, a short-term consequence may have far greater salience than another five years in the future. The latter may seem very remote simply because five years represents a substantial portion of her life. There is also evidence linking differences in future orientation to age differences in brain structure and function, especially in the prefrontal cortex (Cauffman, Steinberg, & Piquero, 2005).

Reward Sensitivity

Research suggests that, relative to adults, adolescents are more sensi- tive to reward (and, especially, to immediate reward) than to punishment, a difference that may explain age differences in sensation seeking and risk taking (Galvan, Hare, Voss, Glover, & Casey, 2007; Steinberg, Albert, et al., 2008). This heightened sensitivity to reward, relative to punishment, may have important implications for the design of effective interventions, and may explain (as discussed in a later section) why juvenile offenders seem relatively unresponsive to punitive sanctions.

Although it had once been believed that adolescents and adults differ in risk perception, it appears that age differences in risk taking are more likely mediated by differences in reward sensitivity than by age differences in the actual identification of risk (Cauffman et al., 2010; Millstein & Halpern- Felsher, 2002). Adolescents and adults appear to identify risks similarly (both in the lab and in the real world) but weigh rewards differently, especially when comparing costs and benefits (Steinberg, 2004). For example, in deciding whether to speed while driving a car, adolescents and adults may estimate the risks of this behavior (e.g., being ticketed, getting into an accident) similarly, but adolescents may weigh the potential rewards (e.g., the thrill of driving fast, peer approval, getting to one’s destination sooner) more heavily than adults, making them more likely to speed despite understanding the risks.

Self-Regulation

In addition to age differences in susceptibility to peer influence, future ori- entation, and reward sensitivity, adolescents and adults also differ with respect to their ability to control impulsive behavior and choices. Thus, the widely held stereotype that adolescents are more reckless than adults is supported by research on developmental changes in impulsivity and self-management over the course of adolescence (Galvan et al., 2007; Leshem & Glicksohn, 2007). In a study of over 1,000 participants of ages 12–48, adolescents scored lower on measures of self-restraint and were more likely to make socially irresponsi- ble decisions (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000). In general, studies show gradual but steady increases in the capacity for self-direction through adolescence,

Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice 437

with gains continuing through the high school years and into young adulthood. Similarly, impulsivity, as a general trait, declines linearly between adolescence and adulthood (Steinberg, Albert et al., 2008).

Taken together, these findings from self-report and behavioral studies of psychosocial development indicate that individuals become more resistant to peer influence, more oriented to the future, less drawn to immediate rewards, and less impulsive as they mature from adolescence to adulthood. Although the science of adolescent brain development is still in its infancy, much brain maturation continues well beyond the age by which individuals evince adult levels of performance on tests of cognitive capacity. As will be discussed in the following section, the continued maturation of cognitive competence through age 16, and particularly the continued maturation of psychosocial character- istics into young adulthood, have important implications for how we view and respond to the criminal behavior of juveniles.

JUVENILE JUSTICE ISSUES INFORMED BY DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE

Criminal Culpability of Youth The adult justice system presumes that defendants who are found guilty

are responsible for their own actions, should be held accountable, and should be punished accordingly. Because of the relative immaturity of minors, how- ever, it is arguably not justified to hold them as accountable as one might hold adults. If, for example, adolescents below a certain age cannot grasp the long- term consequences of their actions or cannot control their impulses as well as adults, one cannot hold them equally accountable for their actions. We use the term “culpability” as shorthand for several interrelated phenomena, includ- ing responsibility, accountability, blameworthiness, and punishability. These notions are relevant both to the adjudication of an individual’s guilt or inno- cence, and to the determination of a disposition (in juvenile court) or sentence (in criminal court).

The concept of culpability allows that two people who engage in the same wrongful conduct may differ in their blameworthiness. One may be less cul- pable than another (or not culpable at all) because he inadvertently (rather than purposely) caused harm, because he is subject to some endogenous defi- ciency or incapacity that impairs his decision making (such as mental illness or immaturity), or because he acts in response to an extraordinary external pressure—a gun to the head being the classic example. Less blameworthy offenders deserve less punishment, and some persons who cause criminal harm deserve no punishment at all (Scott & Steinberg, 2008). What makes the con- duct of one person less blameworthy than that of another person who causes

438 E. Cauffman and L. Steinberg

the same harm? Generally speaking, a person who causes criminal harm is a fully responsible moral agent (and deserves full punishment) if, in choosing to engage in the wrongful conduct, he has the capacity to make a rational deci- sion and a “fair opportunity” to choose not to engage in the harmful conduct. Under this view, the actor whose thinking is substantially impaired or whose freedom is significantly constrained is less culpable than the typical offender and deserves less punishment (how much less depends on the extent of the impairment or coercion).

Adolescents, in a real sense, suffer from endogenous traits or conditions that undermine their decision-making capacity, impairing their ability to assess the long-term consequences of their wrongful acts or to control their conduct in the face of external pressures. Teenagers are more susceptible to peer influence than are adults and tend to focus more on rewards and less on risks in making choices. They tend to focus on short-term rather than long-term consequences and are less capable of anticipating future conse- quences. They are more impulsive and volatile in their emotional responses. When we consider these characteristics within the conventional criminal law framework for assessing blameworthiness, the unsurprising conclusion is that adolescent offenders are less culpable than adults. The mitigating conditions generally recognized in the criminal law—diminished capacity and coercive circumstances—often characterize the actions of juvenile offenders. This does not excuse adolescents from criminal responsibility, but it renders them less blameworthy and less deserving of adult punishment.

Some legislatures and courts have recognized that immature judgment reduces culpability. Most notably, in its consideration of the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty, the Supreme Court has focused on this rationale for mitigation. In Roper v. Simmons, the 2005 case that abolished the juvenile death penalty, the court adopted the developmental argument for mitigation that follows from the research reviewed earlier. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, described three features of adolescence that distinguish young offenders from their adult counterparts in ways that mitigate culpability— features that are familiar to the reader at this point. The first is the diminished decision-making capacity of youths, which implies that their behavior is “not as morally reprehensible as that of adults.” Second, the court pointed to the increased vulnerability of youths to external coercion, including peer pressure. Finally, the court emphasized that the unformed nature of adolescent identity made it “less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime was evidence of irretrievably depraved character.” Adolescents are less blameworthy than adults, the court suggested, because the traits that contribute to criminal con- duct are transient, and because most adolescents will outgrow such behavior as they mature. Although the court did not elaborate, each of these attributes of adolescence corresponds to a conventional source of mitigation in criminal law (Roper v. Simmons 2005).

Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice 439

Competence of Adolescents to Stand Trial In contrast to culpability, which focuses on an individual’s blameworthi-

ness in engaging in criminal conduct, competence to stand trial refers to an individual’s ability to function effectively as a defendant in a criminal or delinquency proceeding. Although many of the same incapacities that excuse or mitigate criminal responsibility may also render a defendant incompetent, the two issues are analytically distinct and separate legal inquiries, which focus on the defendant’s mental state at two different points in time (the time of the crime and the time of the court proceeding).

In 1960 the Supreme Court announced a legal standard for trial compe- tence in Dusky v. United States that has since been adopted uniformly by American courts. According to Dusky, when the issue of a defendant’s com- petence is raised in a criminal trial, the court’s determination should focus on “whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him.” Thus, there are three broad types of abilities implicated under the Dusky standard for competence to stand trial: (1) a factual understanding of the pro- ceedings, (2) a rational understanding of the proceedings, and (3) the ability to assist counsel (Scott & Grisso, 2005).

The requirement that criminal defendants be competent to stand trial had little relevance to delinquency proceedings in the traditional juvenile court. In a system in which the government’s announced purpose was to rehabil- itate and not to punish errant youths, the procedural protections accorded adult defendants—including the requirement of adjudicative competence— were thought to be unnecessary. This changed with In re Gault (1967), which led to an extensive restructuring of delinquency proceedings to conform to the requirements of constitutional due process. Today, it is generally accepted that requirements of due process and fundamental fairness are satisfied only if youths facing charges in juvenile court are competent to stand trial.

As juveniles’ competence to stand trial began to emerge as an important issue in the mid-1990s, the need for a comprehensive study comparing the abil- ities of adolescents and adults in this realm became apparent. Before this time, a few small studies had looked at particular capacities in juveniles that were important at different stages in the justice process. However, no comprehen- sive research had compared the specific capacities of juveniles and adults that are directly implicated in assessments of adjudicative competence. In response to that need, the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice sponsored a large-scale study of individu- als between the ages of 11 and 24—half of whom were in the custody of the justice system and half of whom had never been detained—designed to exam- ine empirically the relationship between developmental immaturity and the abilities of young defendants to participate in their trials (Grisso et al., 2003).

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The study also probed age differences in psychosocial influences on decision making in the criminal process.

Based on participants’ responses to a structured interview that had been used in previous studies of competence to stand trial among mentally-ill adults, and for which norms had been established to define clinically significant “impairment,” the researchers found that competence-related abilities improve significantly between the ages of 11 and 16. On average, youths aged 11 to 13 demonstrated significantly poorer understanding of trial matters, as well as poorer reasoning and recognition of the relevance of information for a legal defense, than did 14- and 15-year-olds—who in turn performed significantly more poorly than individuals aged 16 and older. There were no differences between the 16- and 17-year-olds and the young adults. The study produced similar results when adolescents and adults were categorized according to their scores above and below the cutoff scores indicating impairment in adults. Nearly one-third of 11- to 13-year-olds and about one-fifth of 14- and 15-year- olds—but only 12% of individuals 16 and older—evidenced impairment at a level comparable to mentally ill adults who had been found incompetent to stand trial with respect to either their ability to reason with facts or under- stand the trial process. Individual performance did not differ significantly by gender, ethnicity, or (in the detained groups) as a function of the extent of indi- viduals’ prior justice system experience. This last finding is important because it indicates that there are components of immaturity that extend beyond a lack of relevant experience that may contribute to elevated rates of incompetence among juveniles.

A different structured interview was used to probe how psychosocial influ- ences affect legal decision making by assessing participants’ choices in three hypothetical legal situations involving a police interrogation, consultation with a defense attorney, and the evaluation of a proffered plea agreement. Significant age differences were found in responses to police interrogation and to the plea agreement. First, youths (including 16- to 17-year-olds) were much more likely to recommend waiving constitutional rights during an inter- rogation than were adults—with 55% of 11- to 13-year-olds, 40% of 14- to 15-year-olds, and 30% of 16- to 17-year-olds choosing to “talk and admit” involvement in an alleged offense (rather than “remaining silent”), but with only 15% of young adults making this choice. There were also significant age differences in response to plea offers. This vignette was styled so as not to clearly favor accepting or rejecting the state’s offer, which probably accounted for the fact that young adults were evenly divided in their responses. In con- trast, 75% of the 11- to 13-year-olds, 65% of the 14- to 15-year-olds, and 60% of the 16- to 17-year-olds recommended accepting the plea offer. Together, these results suggest a much stronger tendency for adolescents than for young adults to make choices in compliance with the perceived desires of authority figures (Grisso et al., 2003).

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Analysis of participants’ responses to the vignettes also indicated differ- ences between the youngest age group and older subjects in risk perception and future orientation. Participants were asked to explain their choices, includ- ing their perceptions about positive and negative consequences of various options; questions probed the subjects’ assessment of the seriousness of risks (the perceived negative consequences) and the likelihood of risks materializing. Analyses indicated age differences for all of these dimensions of “risk percep- tion,” with the 11- to 13-year-olds less able to see risks than 16- to 17-year-olds and young adults. Similarly, fewer 11- to 13-year-olds mentioned the long- range consequences of their decisions than did older adolescents, suggesting differences in future orientation consistent with those described earlier.

The study’s findings are consistent with those of earlier studies that exam- ined various dimensions of youths’ functioning in the justice system. For example, an important study of youths’ and adults’ capacities to understand Miranda rights in the early 1980s found that, compared with adults in the criminal justice system, 14-year-olds in juvenile detention were less able to understand the meaning and importance of Miranda warnings (Grisso, 1981). Other studies using smaller samples also have found age differences across the adolescent years with regard to knowledge of legal terms and the legal process in delinquency and criminal proceedings (e.g., Cooper, 1997). Finally, a series of studies found significant age differences across the adolescent years in “strate- gic thinking” about pleas; older adolescents were more likely than younger subjects to make choices that reflected calculations of probabilities and costs based on information provided (e.g., Peterson-Badali & Abramovitch, 1993).

In light of what is known about psychological maturation in early and midadolescence, these findings are not surprising. Indeed, given the abil- ities required of defendants in criminal proceedings, it would be puzzling if youths and adults performed similarly on competence-related measures. This research provides powerful and tangible evidence that some youths fac- ing criminal charges may function less capably as criminal defendants than do their adult counterparts. This does not mean, of course, that all youths should be automatically deemed incompetent to stand trial any more than would a psychiatric diagnosis or low IQ score. It does mean, however, that the risk of incompetence is substantially elevated in early and midadolescence; it also means that policy makers and practitioners must address developmental incompetence as it affects the treatment of juveniles in court (Scott & Grisso, 2005).

It is important to emphasize that the pattern of age differences in studies of legal decision making more closely resembles that seen in studies of cognitive development (where few age differences are apparent after 16) than in studies of psychosocial development (where age differences are observed in late adoles- cence and sometimes in young adulthood). This suggests that determinations

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of where to draw a legal boundary between adolescence and adulthood must be domain-specific. In matters in which cognitive abilities predominate, and where psychosocial factors are of minimal importance (that is, in situations where the influence of adolescents’ impulsivity, susceptibility to peer pres- sure, reward sensitivity, and relatively weaker future orientation is mitigated), adolescents older than 15 can probably be treated like adults. In situations in which psychosocial factors are substantially more important, drawing the boundary at an older age is more appropriate.

Impact of Punitive Sanctions on Adolescent Development and Behavior The increasingly punitive orientation of the justice system toward juve-

nile offenders has resulted in both growing numbers of juveniles tried and sanctioned as adults and the use of harsher sanctions in response to the delin- quent behavior of juveniles retained in the juvenile justice system. Research on the impact of adult prosecution and punishment, and on the use of punitive sanctions more generally, suggests that these trends may actually increase recidivism and jeopardize the development and mental health of juveniles (McGowan et al., 2007). There is a growing consensus among social scientists that policies and practices such as setting the minimum age of criminal court jurisdiction below 18 (as about one-third of all states currently do); automat- ically transferring juveniles to the adult system for a wide range of crimes, including nonviolent crimes; relying on incarceration as a primary means of crime control; and exposing juvenile offenders to punitive programs such as “boot camps” likely do more harm than good, cost taxpayers much more than they need spend on crime prevention, and ultimately pose a threat to public safety (Greenwood, 2006).

In order to understand why this is the case it is important to begin by distinguishing between “adolescence-limited” and “life-course persistent” offenders (Moffitt, 1993). Dozens of longitudinal studies have shown that the vast majority of adolescents who commit antisocial acts desist from such activ- ity as they mature into adulthood and that only a small percentage—5–10%, according to most studies—become chronic offenders. Thus, nearly all juvenile offenders are “adolescent limited.” This observation is borne out in inspec- tion of what criminologists refer to as the “age-crime curve,” which shows that the incidence of criminal activity increases after preadolescence, peaks at about age 17 (slightly younger for nonviolent crimes and slightly older for vio- lent ones), and declines thereafter. These findings, at both the individual and aggregate level, have emerged from many studies that have been conducted in different historical epochs and around the world (Piquero, Farrington, & Blumstein, 2003).

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Within the juvenile system, of course, there is wide variation in the types and severity of sanctions to which offenders are exposed. Some youths are incarcerated in prisonlike training schools, while others receive loosely supervised community probation—neither of which is effective at changing antisocial behavior. An important question therefore is, what can the juvenile system offer young offenders that will be effective at reducing recidivism? A detailed discussion of the enormous literature evaluating the effects of various sanctions and interventions is beyond the scope of this article, and this litera- ture has been summarized many times (Greenwood, 2006; Lipsey, 1999). Here we highlight a few main points.

Until the 1990s, the dominant view held by social scientists was that “nothing works” to reduce recidivism with young offenders. Today the picture is considerably brighter, in large part due to a substantial body of research produced over the past 15 years showing that many juvenile programs, in both community and institutional settings, have a substantial crime-reduction effect; for the most promising programs, that effect is in the range of 20–30%. In general, successful programs are those that attend to the lessons of develop- mental psychology, seeking to provide young offenders with supportive social contexts and to assist them in acquiring the skills necessary to change prob- lem behavior and to attain psychosocial maturity. For example, recent research has shown that even in incarceration settings, adolescents use social sup- port as their dominant coping mechanism (Shulman & Cauffman, in press) and that youth who receive visits from parents report more rapid declines in depressive symptoms over time compared to youth who do not receive parental visits. Moreover, these effects are cumulative, such that the greater num- ber of visits from parents, the greater the decrease in depressive symptoms (Monahan, Goldweber, & Cauffman, in press). In his comprehensive meta- analysis of four hundred juvenile programs, Lipsey (1995) found that among the most effective programs in both community and institutional settings were those that focused on improving social development skills in the areas of interpersonal relations, self-control, academic performance, and job skills. Some effective programs focus directly on developing skills to avoid antisocial behavior, often through cognitive behavioral therapies (CBT). Other interven- tions that have been shown to have a positive effect on crime reduction focus on strengthening family support—including multisystemic therapy, functional family therapy, and multidimensional treatment foster care, all of which are both effective and cost-effective (Greenwood, 2006). It is also clear from these reviews that punitive sanctions administered within the juvenile system have similarly iatrogenic effects to those seen in studies of juveniles tried as adults. Punishment-oriented approaches, such as “scared straight” or military-style boot camps, do not deter future crime and may even inadvertently promote reoffending. Nor do such programs appear to deter other adolescents from offending (Greenwood, 2006).

444 E. Cauffman and L. Steinberg

In addition, adolescence is a formative period of development. In midado- lescence and late adolescence, individuals normally make substantial progress in acquiring and coordinating skills that are essential to filling the conven- tional roles of adulthood. First, they begin to develop basic educational and vocational skills to enable them to function in the workplace as productive members of society. Second, they also acquire the social skills necessary to establish stable intimate relationships and to cooperate in groups. Finally they must begin to learn to behave responsibly without external supervision and to set meaningful personal goals for themselves. For most individuals, the pro- cess of completing these developmental tasks extends into early adulthood, but making substantial progress during the formative stage of adolescence is important. This process of development toward psychosocial maturity is one of reciprocal interaction between the individual and his social context. Several environmental conditions are particularly important, such as the presence of an authoritative parent or guardian; association with prosocial peers; and participation in educational, extracurricular, or employment activities that facilitate the development of autonomous decision making and critical think- ing. For the youth in the justice system, the correctional setting becomes the environment for social development and may affect whether he acquires the skills necessary to function successfully in conventional adult roles (Steinberg, Chung, & Little, 2004).

Normative teenagers who get involved in crime do so, in part, because their choices are driven by developmental influences typical of adolescence. In most cases, even in the absence of severe punitive sanctions, they desist from crim- inal behavior and mature into reasonably responsible adults as they attain psychosocial maturity—particularly as they encounter adult work and fam- ily responsibilities. Correctional environments can influence such trajectories among normative adolescents in important ways. Factors such as the availabil- ity (or lack) of good educational, skill-building, and rehabilitative programs; the attitudes and roles of adult supervisors; and the identity and behavior of other offenders shape the social context of youths in both the adult and the juvenile systems. These factors may affect the inclination of young offenders to desist or persist in their criminal activities, and may facilitate or impede their successful development into adulthood.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

The overarching goal of this paper was to examine how research informs debate about three fundamental questions that continue to challenge the justice system: (1) Should adolescents be held to adult standards of crimi- nal culpability and, accordingly, exposed to the same punishment as adults? (2) Do adolescents possess the necessary capabilities to function as competent

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defendants in an adversarial court proceeding? (3) How are juvenile offenders affected by the sorts of punitive sanctions that became increasingly popular during the last several decades?

It is now incontrovertible that psychological development continues throughout adolescence and into young adulthood in ways that are relevant to all three questions. Although basic cognitive competence matures by the time individuals reach age 16, many of the social and emotional capacities that influence adolescents’ judgment and decision making, especially outside the psychologist’s laboratory, continue to mature into late adolescence and beyond. Compared to individuals in their mid- to late-twenties, adolescents even as old as 18 are more impulsive, less oriented to the future, and more susceptible to the influence of their peers. In addition, because adolescence is also period dur- ing which individuals are still acquiring the psychological capacities they will need to successfully transition into adult work and family roles, it is impor- tant that the sanctions to which juvenile offenders are exposed not adversely affect their development. Recent research on the neural underpinnings of these developments does not change the portrait of adolescent immaturity painted by behavioral research, but it does add detail and support to the argument that makes the story more compelling. It is one thing to say that adolescents don’t control their impulses, stand up to peer pressure, or think through the conse- quences of their actions as well as adults; it is quite another to say that they don’t because their brains are not yet wired to support such mature decision making.

Because American criminal law clearly provides that diminished judgment mitigates criminal responsibility, it is reasonable to argue that adolescents are inherently less blameworthy than their elders in ways that should affect deci- sions about criminal punishment; as a class, adolescents are inherently less blameworthy than adults. Taken to its logical conclusion, the science of adoles- cent development (especially as it applies to criminal culpability) reaffirms the need to maintain a separate juvenile justice system; to set the minimum age for criminal court jurisdiction at 18; and to limit the criminal prosecution of juveniles younger than in the adult system to older, repeat offenders who have demonstrated that they are both dangerous to the community and unlikely, on the basis of previous experiences in the juvenile system, to benefit from the services and interventions that the juvenile system has to offer.

The picture that emerges from an analysis of the capacities necessary for competence to stand trial is different. Here the relevant research indicates that some adolescents (generally, those 16 and older) have adultlike capabil- ities but that others (generally those 15 and younger) may not. Because a very large proportion of individuals younger than 14 are likely to be incom- petent to stand trial as adults, it therefore does not make sense to allow for the transfer of these adolescents to the adult system. For individuals who are 14 or 15, their elevated risk for developmental incompetence calls for

446 E. Cauffman and L. Steinberg

special protections, such as requiring competence evaluations before transfer decisions are made.

Research on the impact of punitive sanctions on adolescent development and behavior, while not explicitly developmental in nature, indicates that trying adolescents as adults or exposing them to especially harsh sanctions (including incarceration) does little to deter offending and may actually have iatrogenic effects on adolescents’ mental health, psychosocial development, and antisocial behavior. In contrast, recent evaluations of community-based treatment programs indicate that many such interventions, especially those that are family-based, are both effective and cost-effective. Policy makers and practitioners should therefore attempt to limit the use of institutional place- ment to adolescents who represent a genuine threat to public safety and, even then, should limit offenders’ length of stay to terms that are less likely to dis- rupt adolescents’ prospects for education and for the successful transition into productive adulthood.

Although justice system policy and practice should not be dictated solely by studies of adolescent development, the ways in which we respond to juvenile offending should at the very least be informed by the lessons of developmen- tal science. Taken together, the lessons of developmental science offer strong support for the maintenance of a separate juvenile justice system in which adolescents are judged, tried, and sanctioned in developmentally appropriate ways. However, using developmental science to inform juvenile justice policy is not a panacea that will “solve” the problem of youth crime. Adolescents will always get in trouble, sometimes very serious trouble, and some will continue to offend—despite the state’s best efforts to respond to their crimes in ways that will deter future offending. At the same time, the future prospects of many youthful offenders will be harmed by a system that holds them to adult levels of accountability for behavior that is often a consequence of transitory devel- opmental changes. No one policy regime will yield good outcomes for all young offenders, but looking to developmental research to guide our decision mak- ing provides a solid framework for policies and practices that will enhance public safety in the long run by promoting effective treatments and healthy adolescent development.

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