09A1-00 - Collect stakeholder data that contributes to your implementation strategy and action planning. Construct a policy implementation grid for evaluation. Use Exercise 11.1 on page 327 in Crosby and Bryson Text

Chapter Ten Adopting Policy Proposals

Greater than the tread of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come.

VICTOR HUGO

In the policy-review-and-adoption phase, policy entrepreneurs submit their well-crafted policy proposal (or more likely, proposals) to official policy makers for review and possible adoption in executive, legislative, or administrative arenas. They must prepare for what might be a grueling, even tumultuous process, in which prospects for winning or losing change by the hour, the real decision is often made outside the formal arena, and the constant need to focus on immediate details and stakeholder demands threatens attention to long-term consequences. Policy entrepreneurs may also decide to press their case in formal or informal courts, if arenas are unreceptive to the proposal and if the change residing at the heart of the proposal can be justified by constitutional principles, laws, or norms.

Purpose and Desired Outcomes

The purpose of the proposal-review-and-adoption phase of the policy change cycle is to gain an official decision to adopt and implement the policy proposal that was developed and informally reviewed in the previous phase. This phase is a culmination of the efforts expended in all four of the previous phases of the policy cycle. In other words, the previous phases were designed to permit an authoritative choice among policy options in this, the fifth, phase so that the issue at hand can be addressed effectively during the sixth phase, implementation.

Policy entrepreneurs seek a number of outcomes in this phase:

• Widely shared agreement with their proposal

• A decision in the relevant arena(s) to adopt the proposal and proceed with implementation

• If needed, a decision in relevant courts to require or facilitate proposal adoption

• Provision of necessary guidance and resources for implementation

• Support of those who can strongly affect implementation success

• A widely shared sense of excitement about the new policy and its implementation

• A persistent supportive coalition that will monitor implementation

• Respectful, if not cordial relationships, among participants

Widely Shared Agreement

Ideally, some of the official policy makers are already part of the coalition that has developed the policy proposal. In this phase, policy entrepreneurs work to bring enough additional policy makers on board to obtain formal approval in the relevant arena. They seek to make their idea one whose time has come through astute use of such processes as the bandwagon effect, signing up, and exploiting a window of opportunity. These processes contribute to what John Kingdon ( 1995 ) has called “coupling,” in which a public problem, solutions, and a favorable political climate come together. Kingdon has studied this process in legislative arenas; Carl Van Horn and his colleagues also emphasize the importance of coupling in decision making within corporations, public bureaucracies, and offices of an elected chief executive ( Van Horn , Baumer , and Gormley , 2001). Although much of this chapter focuses on the legislative arena,

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policy entrepreneurs also should attempt to influence relevant executive and administrative policy makers. For example, chief executives may be able to make a significant change on their own, and they also can be powerful allies in persuading a legislative body to act. Additionally, a chief administrator can make some important policy decisions and may have considerable sway with legislators.

The Bandwagon Effect

By playing up the strengths of their proposal, emphasizing the magnitude of support for it, and attracting favorable coverage in relevant media, policy entrepreneurs seek to generate a bandwagon, or multiplier, effect ( Benveniste , 1989; Kingdon , 1995). Nonsupporters may sense that the proposal is a sure winner and decide to hop on the bandwagon so they can be part of a winning coalition.

Perception of the credibility and certainty of adoption is likely to grow as a consequence of threefold knowledge, regarding (1) the technical and administrative feasibility of the proposed change, (2) extensive support for the change among key stakeholders, and (3) the degree to which authoritative decision makers specifically support the change ( Benveniste , 1989). Policy entrepreneurs should strive to increase and publicize all three kinds of knowledge.

A powerful bandwagon effect can make a proposal virtually unstoppable and is particularly important for a major policy change, which is unlikely to happen without strong and widespread support. Although previous phases should be designed to enhance the possibility of a bandwagon effect, policy entrepreneurs want it to peak at the point of a proposal-adoption decision. Once policy entrepreneurs detect this peak, they should quickly press for adoption of their proposal; otherwise crafty opponents may be able to upset the bandwagon. As John Kingdon has noted, “The really big steps are taken quickly or not at all” ( 1995, p. 170).

Signing Up

The softening-up process described in Chapter Nine prepares the way for building a substantial coalition and creating the bandwagon effect. Softening up, however, is different from signing up. In the softening-up process, policy entrepreneurs attempt to persuade stakeholders that policy change is needed. In the signing-up process, entrepreneurs find specific inducements to prompt specific stakeholders to support the proposal. Both the softening-up argument and the signing-up inducements must be geared to the stakeholder's interpretive schemes, values, and interests, because people choose whether or not to support a change in light of how they think it will affect what they care about.

The signing-up process often involves an interesting twist on the normal notion of costs and benefits. Policy makers may be prone to sign onto a big, pricey proposal because the high costs are actually expected to produce big benefits ( Kingdon , 1995). In voting for the proposal, they position themselves to take credit for distributing those benefits or building a successful program, project, or product. Support for a very expensive proposal is more likely if it is widely perceived to be “good” policy. In 2003, the Bush administration and the U.S. Congress approved billions of dollars for the global battle against HIV/AIDS. Fighting AIDS is now widely seen as a gargantuan public problem and an issue of compassion. Small appropriations are laughable; indeed, the Bush administration was criticized for backing off its initial promise of much more generous funding. The pricey Medicare bill passed in 2003 is a similar example. The new law is a tremendous, costly expansion of Medicare benefits and payments to health care providers. It passed because Medicare is a widely supported program, and because a large number of older adults, pharmaceutical companies, and health maintenance organizations will benefit from the new policies.

Development of policy makers' support for a proposal requires cultivating networks. This is especially true in the legislative arena, but also important in the corporate or nonprofit boardroom, the executive

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cabinet, and administrative offices. The focus here is on the legislative arena because it is crucial in adopting policies that have general application and spur decision making in other arenas.

Policy entrepreneurs should remember that legislators must often make decisions under time pressure and without extensive knowledge. It is wise to assume that legislators know little about any bill other than one they have introduced. Legislators also are unlikely to be interested in a bill that does not relate directly to something they care about (what they likely care about is getting reelected, securing passage of one of their bills, and setting up a useful relationship). Legislative floor debate rarely sways votes. Rather, relationships (especially friendships and political connections) are critical; legislators look to these relationships and the messages conveyed through them for cues about how to vote. Change advocates must find a way to cultivate these friendship and political networks. The networks may include factions within a legislature, but also people outside—other elected officials, civic leaders, party officials, lobbyists, and corporate executives. When a legislature shares power with an elected executive (president, governor, mayor), policy entrepreneurs should seek to win the support of the executive, since he or she has considerable power to activate the network in which legislators participate.

Legislators essentially engage in reciprocity-based decision making, in which they rely on each other and their staff members for information and support. The reciprocity may be tacit; the legislator who agrees to vote a colleague's way today may have the implicit expectation that the colleague will support her bill tomorrow. A more direct exchange is “logrolling,” which James Anderson describes as “a way of gaining support from those who are indifferent or have little interest in a matter, [and which] usually encompasses a straightforward mutual exchange of support on two different topics” ( 1990, p. 128). Pork barrel legislation is the classic example, in which legislators vote for each other's home district projects so that everyone can bring home the bacon.

More explicit reciprocity occurs through compromise, when a legislator at odds with a colleague over the content of a bill agrees to give up something in order to obtain at least part of what he or she wants. A less savory form of explicit reciprocity (usually occurring behind closed doors) is the use of side payments, in which one legislator offers goodies—a desired committee assignment, or office space—in exchange for another's vote.

As a result of vote trading, the press of time, and the numerous details that must be addressed in major legislation, the actual legislation passed might bear little resemblance to wise public policy. As Otto von Bismarck allegedly said, “There are two things one should never see made: sausage and legislation.” Therefore policy entrepreneurs must be attentive to overall legislative strategy and the details of execution; otherwise, the solutions developed in the forums of the previous phases can be lost in the legislative arena. These entrepreneurs also must not forget the desirability of finding an all-gain solution, in which all sides get what they want.

In sum, policy entrepreneurs must be wise and creative in formulating arguments and inducements to give policy makers reasons to say yes. They should cultivate relationships with and among legislators or other key decision makers, and then supply the sympathetic ones with research data, public opinion surveys, and moral and practical arguments through written and oral testimony, conversation, and printed materials. These advocates should be continuously alert to finding, inventing, or trading options for mutual gain. Policy entrepreneurs may also get involved in a campaign that decides who the policy makers will be. In a political election, they may volunteer for a particular candidate or make financial contributions to that campaign.

Similarly, when resort to formal courts is part of the change strategy, advocates should help judges say yes in light of the judges' interpretive schemes, values, and interests. Policy entrepreneurs often seek court decisions that put pressure on arenas to enact the proposals that the entrepreneurs are supporting.

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Exploiting a Window of Opportunity

A window of opportunity is a time span or occasion when conditions are highly propitious for a policy proposal. A window can be opened by a growing public conviction that a problem is significant and urgent, by a political shift, or by a decision point—a time when official bodies are authorized and empowered to act. Some decision points are predictable, while others are not; regardless, policy entrepreneurs should be prepared to take advantage of them. Predictable decision points include those tied to regular reports and addresses, such as the State of the Union or State of the State; a corporation's or nonprofit's annual report; the annual or biennial budget cycle of governments, organizations, and networks; and the scheduled renewal of laws or programs. An unpredictable decision point can arise from a crisis, a sudden change in official leadership or public opinion, or an unexpected opportunity. Policy entrepreneurs make sure that at least the predictable decision points are included in the plan developed in previous phases and that the plan is also flexible enough to take advantage of unpredictable decision points. For example, U.S. advocates of safer beef slaughtering and processing pressed their case through the normal process of congressional hearings in recent years but were defeated by beef industry lobbyists. They also sued in federal court to stop the use of “downer” animals for food, but government lawyers argued against them. A decision to dismiss the suit was under appeal, when a case of mad cow disease was reported in late 2003. The widespread news coverage of the case heightened citizen concern about slaughtering practices, revealed the impact of industry lobbyists, and opened the door for food safety advocates to press their cause in a much more favorable atmosphere.

In two similar instances, advocates of reforming the financing of U.S. election campaigns, and participants in the global anticorruption campaign, were making minor headway in recent years until, in the first case, highly visible scandals involving corporate givers emerged, and in the second case terrorist activity (prominently the September 11 attacks) caused national policy makers to insist on greater openness in financial transactions.

Decision to Adopt and Implement the Proposal

Even if problems, solutions, and politics are coupled, an advocacy coalition may still be defeated during formal adoption sessions by shrewd opponents who find a way to split the coalition or use the formal decision rules of the relevant arena to stop what otherwise would be a sure winner. In these sessions, knowledge of heresthetics—the name William Riker ( 1986 ) gives to the art of political manipulation—is essential. Heresthetics might also be depicted as a political martial art in which advocates and their opponents attempt to parry each other's moves with a variety of weapons (committee rules, voting procedures, calling in debts, releasing or withholding information, negative publicity).

Riker highlights three components of political manipulation: agenda control, strategic voting, and manipulation of the dimensions of an issue. Agenda control is a basic design element of arenas. Exercised mainly by positional leaders such as committee chairs, agenda control involves determining which items, proposals, options, or amendments will come up for consideration by the official decision-making body and at what time. In its most powerful form, agenda control can defeat what is, on paper, a certain winner, purely for procedural reasons.

Strategic voting is a practice in which individual members of a policy-making body use their voting power to accomplish long-term objectives. This practice often takes the form of “voting contrary to one's immediate tastes in order to obtain an advantage in the long run” ( Riker , 1986, p. 78).

Issue dimensions can be expanded or narrowed in order to alter the composition of an advocacy coalition ( Stone , 2002). Issue expansion is often a desirable option for policy entrepreneurs. For example, as the framing of AIDS in the United States expanded from a disease that affected gay men to a disease that could affect children of drug addicts, users of blood transfusions, and finally just about everyone, the

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coalition advocating a massive public prevention and treatment campaign expanded tremendously. Sometimes, however, expanding the dimensions of an issue can cause people to drop out of a coalition. For example, the death penalty, when framed as a deterrent to serious crime, may attract the support of many stakeholder groups that place high value on law and order. When it is reframed as state-sanctioned killing, the issue boundaries overlap with right-to-life concerns. Some of those stakeholders then may rethink their support because they have a religious conviction that life is to be preserved.

Usually, narrowing the dimensions of an issue restricts conflict and favors organized interests. Restricted conflict plays out in political subsystems, where the organized are likely to dominate the unorganized, especially those who are not even aware of the conflict. As Richard Neustadt has observed, “One never should underestimate the public's power to ignore, to acquiesce, and to forget, especially when the proceedings seem incalculable or remote from private life” ( 1990, p. 82). A recent example was how the danger of mad cow disease was handled in the United States before the first documented case was publicized in 2003. Before then, the issue of how to ward off the disease was dealt with largely out of the public eye by the Food and Drug Administration and congressional committees. Republicans and Democrats alike were persuaded by lobbyists for the beef industry that no major changes were needed in monitoring beef slaughter and processing. A number of nonprofit food safety groups lobbied for the changes and some beef processors and retailers altered their practices, but the conflict did not become a widespread public concern. At that juncture, the issue was effectively framed as one of economic security for beef growers and processors and for those they employed. Once the first actual case of mad cow disease emerged, the danger was reframed by press reports and by food safety groups (who suddenly had the ear of the public) as a serious public health threat. This reframing broadened the conflict and also cast the previous inaction of Congress in a new light; the failure to adopt recommended changes was now widely seen as pandering to corporate interests. As illustrated by this example, expanding conflict can improve the prospects of the weak and relatively unorganized, as well as foster greater consideration of the broader public interest, because of increased media attention to the circumstances of the affected parties and their advocates.

Another way of manipulating the dimensions of an issue is through what Deborah Stone ( 2002 ) calls strategic release of information: announcing research findings, issuing a report, or making a decision under conditions that bolster one's favorite policies or render it hard for opponents to respond. For example, President Bush gave the green light to the highly disputed construction of more roads in the Tongas wilderness area of Alaska during the holiday rush two days before Christmas 2003, when a majority of citizens could be counted on to be preoccupied with other matters.

In sum, policy entrepreneurs must be attentive to opportunities for agenda control, strategic voting, and manipulation of issue dimensions and information. They have to be on guard and maintain the “ability to shift from moment to moment, poking and pushing the world until it favors [their] cause” ( Riker , 1986, p. 51).

Policy entrepreneurs should also remember that one arena might be overruled by another higher in the government hierarchy, or by popular referenda. Thus, if change advocates lose in a local arena, they may try again at a higher level.

Decision in Court to Require or Facilitate Adoption

Action by an arena can be shaped or overruled by a court. Throughout this phase, as in the previous phase, policy entrepreneurs make sure that changes in their proposal will stand up under scrutiny in the relevant courts. In some cases, administrative courts are extremely important, since they oversee development and application of rules and regulations designed to implement the proposed policy. Additionally, policy entrepreneurs may ask a formal court to overturn a law previously enacted by an arena, or they may seek a court decision that reshapes the way an arena functions—for example, by mandating the redrawing of

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electoral district boundaries or nullifying an election. Moreover policy entrepreneurs may seek to reshape the courts, as in trying to affect the appointment or election of judges.

Courts, however, face limits in making policy changes. Usually they do not attempt to implement the changes they mandate. Policy entrepreneurs should as well remember that formal court systems are often hierarchical. Change advocates who win at one level can lose on appeal to a higher court; conversely, they can lose in a lower court and win on appeal.

Provision of Guidance and Resources for Implementation

Implementers and judges look to the adopted proposal as well as to the record of policy makers' discussion of the proposal to discern the policy makers' intention for how the policy should be carried out. If guidance is inadequate, implementers can be expected to use methods with which they are familiar or spend considerable time trying to figure out what to do. Inadequate guidance also opens the door for opponents to step in with their own ideas for how the proposal should be implemented. Without thorough guidance, evaluators of policy impact might also have difficulty knowing exactly what they should evaluate.

Sometimes, the political climate is such that the only way policy entrepreneurs can win passage of their favored proposal is to keep the implementation plan ambiguous. Or the issue at the heart of the proposal might be so complex that the proposal mainly seeks authorization and funding for helping many stakeholder groups develop implementation strategies, as in the case of the African American Men Project. Here a helpful tactic is to create a commission or other group assigned to work out the implementation plan.

Meanwhile, policies that are adopted in the absence of adequate resources are little more than symbolic window dressing. Symbolic policies may be important in paving the way for future, adequately funded policies; nevertheless, to have real impact, a policy ultimately must be accompanied by needed resources for implementation.

Support of Those Who Can Affect Implementation Success

Wise policy entrepreneurs involve likely implementers of their proposal in shaping it in the first place. The concerns and capabilities of implementers still need to be considered as the proposal is modified in this phase, so that implementers remain supportive. For example, if sustainable development advocates seek to convince policy makers to pass tax incentives for reducing manufacturers' waste products, they may need to keep information flowing from people in affected businesses (especially the designers of manufacturing processes), as the policy makers debate waste reduction requirements and implementation schedules. During implementation, the policy makers themselves are likely to stay involved, either as overseers or interveners; as a result policy entrepreneurs seek to win the support of as many of the policy makers as possible, not just enough to pass the proposal.

Widely Shared Excitement About the Policy and Implementation

Once a proposal is adopted, celebratory events and messages can help sustain the momentum of change and build a bridge to the implementation phase. If a new law is passed, a president or governor may hold a signing ceremony with great fanfare. The winning advocacy coalition may hold a celebratory rally and communicate messages of triumph and great expectation through the press. They may call on citizens or organizations to join in implementing the new policy. Opponents find themselves fighting a rearguard action as the burden of proof shifts from the initiators to the opposers of the change ( Wilson , 1967). Thus, the supporters of the AAMP organized major community events to announce the Hennepin County board's approval of the 2002 report and appointment of the African American Men Commission. County commissioners, other officials, and community leaders were highly visible participants. Videotapes of

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these events and follow-up activities were used at subsequent community gatherings to demonstrate the project's momentum and support from top officials, community leaders, and citizens.

Ideally, a renorming process begins. Assuming the new policy addresses a real public problem and is technically, administratively, politically, legally, and ethically acceptable, more and more people begin “owning” the problem and solution and expecting new behavior from themselves and others. Such ownership is extremely important if people are to commit to changes and follow through on them ( Eden and Ackermann , 1998). Once the renorming is widespread, the court of public opinion will help enforce the norms.

A Persistent, Supportive Coalition to Monitor Implementation

Members of a victorious coalition are likely to feel a surge of self-confidence and self-esteem that is based on hope, faith, hard work, and task accomplishment at the end of this phase. They are also likely to feel a strong sense of connection to those who have labored alongside them in the coalition. Policy entrepreneurs should build on these good feelings to sustain the coalition for the long-term work of ensuring that adopted policies are implemented well. Members of the coalition may be understandably fatigued after a long fight and ready to declare victory and take a break. It's important, though, to remind them that their hard-won victory may be for naught if they decamp.

Respectful, Even Cordial, Participant Relationships

In the policy-review-and-adoption phase, policy entrepreneurs should strive to conduct their campaign in a way that allows their supporters and opponents alike to shake hands at the end and prepare to work together in the future. Attacking the opponents or making an effort to embarrass them in a formal review or adoption session obviously undermines this desired outcome. Maintaining civil relationships is especially important when policy entrepreneurs initially fail to win adoption of their proposal but decide to try again. They will hope to turn some opposing policy makers into supporters, a task made easier in the absence of leftover animosity ( Patterson , Grenny , McMillan , and Switzler , 2002; Kegan and Lahey , 2001).

Leadership Guidelines

Success in this phase depends as much on policy entrepreneurs' ability to negotiate the intricacies of formal arenas (and in some cases courts) as on the value of the ideas contained in the proposal they are promoting. If the preceding phase has gone well, they begin this one with a well-crafted policy proposal supported by a broad coalition and attractive to relevant policy makers. They need an array of political leadership skills in order to press their proposal at the right time, guide it past procedural barriers, win over or thwart opponents, and sustain and further expand their coalition.

We group guidelines for this phase in three categories:

1. Building support

2. Providing implementation guidance and support

3. Gleaning success from failure

Building Support

Keep track of key stakeholders, especially the policy makers, throughout this phase. Organize an effective lobbying and media campaign. Use tactics such as agenda control, strategic voting, and bargaining as needed. Seek a powerful bandwagon effect.

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Policy Makers Deserve Attention

Continue to pay attention to the goals, concerns, interests, beliefs, and egos of all key stakeholders, but especially of the policy makers themselves. In a government arena, party affiliation and past political alignment are important stakeholder characteristics. In government arenas, key stakeholders are likely to include top-level elected or appointed executives; legislators; directors, managers, and frontline employees and volunteers in important implementing organizations (whether government agency, business, or nonprofit); technical, professional, and interest-group opinion leaders; representatives of key constituent groups; and funding sources. In this phase, it is especially important to understand the policy makers well enough to know what type of inducement will prompt them to vote in favor of the proposal.

Assess Support and Opposition

Use the stakeholder-support-versus-opposition grid ( Exercise 9 . 2) to assess changes in the proposal as it goes through the formal review and adoption process.

Identify Sponsors and Champions

Identify one or more policy sponsors and policy champions to gain passage in legislative and administrative arenas. In a legislature, one or more members must officially sponsor proposed legislation. In addition to formal sponsorship, someone (preferably a legislator) must champion the proposal and do the educating, networking, bargaining, and negotiating that are undoubtedly necessary to win passage of legislation. Key decision makers and opinion leaders must play similar roles in an administrative arena. Gathering more information about key stakeholders and using stakeholder support-and-opposition grids can help policy entrepreneurs identify sponsors and champions. (Sometimes policy entrepreneurs themselves are able to play these roles; Gary Cunningham was the key champion of the AAMP within Hennepin County government.)

Use Lobbying and Persuasion

Implement a lobbying strategy and persuasion campaign. Important tactics include:

• Reducing decision-maker uncertainty about the policy proposal. Decision makers may not be knowledgeable about the policy area connected to the proposal. Help them view your proposal positively by emphasizing compatibility with their goals, furnishing evidence of the technical quality of the proposal, and giving reassurance that it comes from competent sources. Activate members of the coalition to do behind-the-scenes work as well as public presentation. These people are often prominent, influential, and obviously connected to extensive networks that can be marshaled in support of the proposal. As an example, to obtain foundation support for the 2002 Vital Aging Summit in Minnesota, members of the summit planning committee used their personal connections and credibility with foundation directors to win donations.

• Developing arguments and counterarguments in support of the proposal prior to formal review sessions. Bargaining and negotiation may predominate in this phase, but persuasion still matters. You cannot be a successful bargainer or negotiator without the ability to develop a persuasive argument. Strive to articulate the logic of the proposal in a way that is convincing to key decision makers and stakeholders—or at least buys their neutrality—else the decision will go nowhere ( Forester , 1999; Simons , 2001). Remember to pay attention to the egos, ideologies, and political allegiances of the policy makers ( Sabatier and Jenkins - Smith , 1993). Be sure to outline the benefits of proposal adoption to various stakeholder groups and to constituencies that are important to the official decision makers, and indicate that attendant costs are reasonable. As mentioned earlier, you should be able to argue

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against the opponents' effort to change the dimensions of an issue. In court, arguments must show how the proposed change accords with, or indeed is required by, judicial principles and previous court decisions.

• Organizing a well-timed demonstration of constituent support. Demonstrations are especially important in any politically difficult situation. You can call on one or more seasoned pressure groups that are part of your coalition to begin activating members to send e-mails, write letters, show up at policy makers' offices, join rallies, and attract media coverage. Make certain, however, that pressure does not backfire. If lobbying is so intense that policy makers feel they are being browbeaten or that some key stakeholders are offended, it may actually reduce support for your proposal. For example, in March 1983, the New York AIDS Network timed its demands for well-funded city AIDS services to coincide with an explosive column by Larry Kramer in the New York Native. The Native also published a call for volunteers to be trained for civil disobedience aimed at bringing attention to the failure of city officials to take any significant action against AIDS. Kramer's column increased the polarization within the gay community—between those who denounced Kramer as an alarmist and those who sided with his claim that AIDS was now a “public health emergency” ( Shilts , 1988, p. 245). New York Mayor Ed Koch responded to the calls for city-sponsored AIDS services with a new office and minor gestures of support—a minimal approach that went largely unchallenged by gay community leaders.

Use Agenda Control and Strategic Voting

Seek agenda control and strategic voting that favor the proposal. Agenda control is mainly the province of an arena's positional leaders, so they must be on board and give the proposal priority. In 1983, as chair of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources Orrin Hatch used his prerogative at a crucial point in the efforts to pass a bill boosting anti-AIDS funding to send the bill directly to the Senate floor for debate. He decided against the normal practice of holding a committee hearing, because some committee members could be counted on to use the hearing to push their antigay rights agenda ( Shilts , 1988). It may also be possible to end-run the agenda-control system. For example, Congressmen Henry Waxman and Phil Burton and their staffers Bill Kraus and Tim Westmoreland worked successfully in the early 1980s to secure substantial federal funding for AIDS prevention and treatment by using congressional supplemental appropriations process to counter the president's budget recommendations.

In addition to working with policy makers who can shape the decision-making agenda, pay attention to how strategic voting may affect your proposal. For example, the timing of a vote on the proposal may greatly enhance or diminish chances of the proposal's benefiting from strategic voting.

Get the Timing Right

In general, be sure that bills are introduced when competition from other pressing matters is low. This tactic helps policy makers and the press give your proposal their full attention. (In some situations, however, you may be wise to introduce a bill quietly so that it does not attract much attention.) Lobbying pressure should be exerted at the right time and in the right way; information should be circulated at the most propitious time and in the right format.

Engage Reviewers

Engage formal review bodies in a structured review session focusing on strengths, weaknesses, and modifications of the process. This is much the same as what we described in Chapter Nine. Again, be prepared to accept all modifications that actually improve the technical, administrative, political, legal, and ethical acceptability of the proposal. Remember, elected politicians favor proposals that help their constituents, avoid highly controversial issues, enhance their reputation and prospects for reelection,

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and achieve their concept of good public policy. Further, politicians are likely to vote in a direction consistent with the balance of opinion among their key constituents ( Kingdon , 1995).

Use the formal review process to gain additional endorsement of the proposed change prior to the formal adoption process. This evidence of support can assure policy makers that they are on safe ground if they vote for the proposed change.

A review body might be a subcommittee, whose recommendations carry considerable weight with the full policy-making body. The ideal review body consists of five to nine members and has a history of constructive interaction and open communication. Lacking such a history, it may require training in effective group communication, problem solving, and conflict management.

Keep a Watchful Eye on Opponents

Much of the policy adoption process involves individuals and interest groups who want the proposed policy to fail. These opponents often hammer on the details of the proposed change, especially if passage appears likely. They know that policy intentions can be made to fail during implementation through tampering with the details during adoption. Be aware that even small changes can have a big impact, and be prepared to counter selective information, distortion, and even lies.

Try to avoid unwelcome surprises. The work in previous phases should construct an effective early warning system that eliminates unwelcome news during this phase. The systematic review process in the proposal-formulation phase and in this phase is especially helpful in uncovering troublesome concerns in advance.

Bargain and Negotiate for Support

Be prepared to bargain and negotiate over proposal features, or other issues, in exchange for political support. Bargaining and negotiation are the modus operandi in legislative bodies. The bargaining is intended to win over or placate opponents and those who are indifferent. Even a proposal that seems to have no opposition (say, one aimed at eliminating child abuse) may provoke argument over methodology, resources, and the locus of responsibility for implementation.

Finding or inventing options and inducements that can promote agreement, without sacrificing key proposal components, is a prime political leadership activity ( Susskind , McKearnan , and Thomas - Larmer , 1999; Thompson , 2001). The price of the last vote necessary for proposal adoption may be the highest, since the voter may know that without his or her support the entire proposal will be defeated ( Riker , 1962). On the other hand, if a bandwagon effect occurs, relatively cost-free support may be gained as latecomers seek to avoid exclusion from the benefits of proposal adoption. No matter what, do not bargain away essentials in order to win support.

Create a Powerful Bandwagon Effect

As bargaining and negotiation continue, participants may realize that enough agreement is emerging to ensure ultimate passage. More and more of them may become convinced of the proposal's feasibility and aware of widespread stakeholder support and key decision makers' favorable attitude toward the proposal. At this point, a future different from the present gains credibility and certainty, and the bandwagon effect takes hold. Participants often “alter their behavior and responses. They will either pick preferences that have a higher probability of happening or fashion new preferences that fit their image of the future” ( Benveniste , 1989, p. 130).

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Announce the Proposal Publicly

Make a public announcement of the reworked proposal, at least within the affected system. The announcement may occur before or after formal adoption of the proposal. A public announcement prior to adoption may be a trial balloon to determine whether a sufficiently large supportive coalition has been formed. Or it may be designed to soften up decision makers at the same time that it solidifies or expands the coalition, perhaps triggering a powerful bandwagon effect. A preadoption announcement, however, could also allow an opposing coalition to form. A postadoption announcement informs stakeholders how things have changed and prepares them for implementation.

Use a Two-Pronged Media Strategy

First, keep the issue alive in the pertinent media so as to demonstrate to policy makers that the public is paying attention. Some of the policy makers themselves may make this task easier as they begin making newsworthy statements about the proposal. Other tactics include public rallies and press conferences to attract media attention to subcommittee hearings, procedural votes, threatened vetoes, and the final vote.

Second, communicate what is happening to your proposal as it advances through the legislative meat grinder. Maintain good press contacts so you can immediately let the public know when your proposal is being advanced, or gutted, in the legislative process.

Strike While the Iron Is Hot

When the time is right, press for formal adoption of the proposal. The time is right when the coalition is as large as it can be; the proposal is politically acceptable, technically and administratively workable, and ethically and legally defensible; and a decision point is at hand.

Decide Whether to Ask the Courts to Intervene

If your proposal is faring badly because the arena's structure or process violates laws or constitutional principles, consider asking the appropriate court to force needed change in the offending rule and methods. You may also decide to test your proposal in court if the constitution or judicial precedents offer grounds for doing so.

Providing Implementation Guidance and Support

Be sure enough resources are committed, incentives are right, and the process is well designed. Keep in mind that your ultimate goal is construction of a new policy regime.

Seek Adequate Resources

Obtain necessary resource commitments, if at all possible, prior to the formal adoption session. Gain commitment from formal decision makers and key implementers for key personnel, additional staff, training costs, conversion costs, stipends, technical assistance, contingency funds, and the like.

Align Incentives

Remember that incentives must run in the proper direction for implementation. If implementers see that they can benefit from implementation, they are more likely to facilitate it than if they see it as a kind of punishment ( Weimer and Vining , 1999). Placing potential implementers in their historical context and noting important trajectories, details, and change points can help you choose preferred implementers and fashion incentives that are positive motivators rather than a punishment ( Neustadt and May , 1986).

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Support Movement Away from the Status Quo

Meet the conditions for effective implementation of a policy that departs substantially from the status quo. Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier ( 1983 ) argue that major policy changes are likely to be achieved if:

• The enabling legislation or other directive outlines clear and consistent policy objectives or criteria for resolving goal conflicts.

• The legislation incorporates a sound theory of what is needed to achieve the policy objective and gives implementers sufficient authority. Constructing and critiquing a logic model that captures the essence of the theory linking inputs, process, outputs, and outcomes is one way to make sure the theory is sound (Millar, Simeone, and Carnevale, 1999; Poister , 2003). Forward and backward mapping, to be discussed in the next chapter, may be helpful.

• The legislation structures the implementation process to favor success—for example, by assigning the change to a supportive and capable agency, establishing supportive decision rules, and making adequate resources available.

• Key implementers possess the necessary leadership and management skills and are committed to achieving the goals.

• A coalition of key supporters, including important legislators or chief executives, actively supports the implementation process, and the courts are supportive or neutral.

• New priorities or conflicting policies do not emerge, and underlying social conditions do not change so as to weaken the policy's political support or underlying causal theory.

Bear these conditions in mind throughout the proposal-review-and-adoption phase and carry them with you into the implementation process. If the conditions are not in place at the conclusion of this phase, you will need to strategize accordingly.

Focus on Regime Building

View the policy-adoption process as an exercise in potential regime building. Ultimately you are seeking a strong, self-sustaining regime of principles, laws, norms, expectations, and decision-making procedures that will institutionalize the policy changes during the implementation phase. This regime is more likely to emerge if your advocacy coalition is large, the interpretive schemes that support the new policy are widely shared, and the implementation incentives are effective.

Gleaning Success from Failure

If the outcome of this phase is disappointing, reflect on the reasons and decide whether to try again.

First, remember that some proposals must fail at least once before they succeed. In a politically difficult situation, initial failure is especially likely, and it may even be a necessary part of the social learning that paves the way for ultimate change. Failure can be an occasion to expand and educate key constituencies about the importance and magnitude of the public problem being addressed.

Second, it is possible to establish a valuable principle, even though the proposal itself is defeated. New principles may lead to standard operating procedures in the future that outweigh present losses. They may also break up an existing coalition and be the basis for new ones. A principle established in one field may spill over to others.

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Third, if adoption fails even though the policy change process has been well designed and pursued, consider these possibilities:

• The time is not yet right.

• The draft policies, plans, or programs are inadequate or inappropriate.

• The problem or needs that the proposal purports to address simply are not important or urgent enough.

• The system cannot handle the magnitude of the proposed change, and the design has to be scaled back.

• The proposal must be taken to another arena or court.

Fourth, rally the spirits of coalition members by highlighting what they have accomplished. Additionally, if the coalition is willing to move on to another arena or court, or cycle back through previous phases, emphasize the importance of continuing to fight for change.

Summary

Formal proposal review and adoption moves the policy change process from forums to arenas and sometimes to courts. Even when the focus is on an arena, the courts must be kept in mind, because adopted changes are often challenged in the courts.

In this phase, policy entrepreneurs help official decision makers say yes to the proposed change as comfortably as possible. They use their political leadership skills as they seek to make their proposal unstoppable. To bring policy makers on board, they use such processes as the bandwagon effect, signing up, and exploiting a window of opportunity. They use their understanding of agenda control, strategic voting, issue dimensions, and information control to win passage of their proposal. They bargain and negotiate over details, while attempting to protect key provisions. They compete fiercely with opponents but hold open the possibility of working together in the future. They sustain and expand their coalition and activate coalition members to directly and indirectly lobby the policy makers. They ensure that adopted policies include adequate guidance and resources for implementation in the next phase.

If the proposal fails in an arena, policy entrepreneurs have the option of trying another arena, or pursuing change in the courts. They may also need to circle back to earlier policy change phases.

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