

Exhibit B: (continued)

2:15	Rooftop sniper radios SWAT leader Williams about "1 bleeding to death" sign in window.
2:17	SWAT leader Williams splits his team, putting one half under Deputy A.J. DeAndrea.
2:24	Deputy DeAndrea and his team locate and evacuate some 60 students. Soon after, they evacuate an additional 60 students.
2:42	SWAT leader Williams and his team reach Dave Sanders and 60 students and call for medical help.
3:07–3:17	A Denver paramedic declares Dave Sanders dead.
3:22	Williams's SWAT team enters the library and finds twelve students dead, including Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold. SWAT members call paramedics to rescue one injured student.
4:45	SWAT teams complete a second search of the school and bomb technicians begin their search.
10:30	New SWAT teams launch a third sweep of the high school as bomb technicians continue their search.
11:30	Parents of missing children are told to go home for the night after bomb experts suspend search until morning.
<i>April 21</i>	
7:30 a.m.	Investigators return to Columbine and identify the victims.

building overlooking the parking lot, and two students who were Eagle Scouts began giving him first aid.

The JeffCo Sheriff's dispatch had already sent out a message declaring, "Attention south units. Possible shots fired at Columbine High School." At 11:26, Gardner called for reinforcements. Panic-stricken students were running from different sides of the building, and two JeffCo deputies, Scott Taborsky and Paul Smoker, arriving from the northwest discovered a student who had been shot in the first phase of the attack lying behind an athletic shed on the west side of the school. Another badly wounded student lay nearby. As the two deputies went to help the second student, Gardner, who was just down the hill from them, spotted a gunman inside the west doors and shouted, "There he is!" The gunman, Harris again, shot through the opening of a broken window at Gardner as first Gardner, and then Deputy Smoker, returned fire. As the gunman retreated, and Gardner radioed in a "Code 33" for emergency assistance, the deputies heard more gunfire from within the school.

Over the next few minutes, the already desperate scene degenerated. Teacher Patti Nielson, who was

under a counter just inside the library, reported over her cell phone that there was smoke drifting in and shots right outside the door. Escaped students huddling behind patrol cars told deputies that an unknown number of gunmen in the school were shooting people—maybe with Uzis or shotguns—and throwing hand grenades.⁶ None of the students could identify Harris or Klebold as the perpetrators, nor did they know if the shooters were high-school age or older. Gardner, who could see four victims lying injured, including the girl originally reported as "down" in the parking lot, radioed for emergency medical assistance. Sheriff's dispatch, meanwhile, was sending almost constant messages: there were possible hand grenades in the school; deputies had been shot at; there were gunmen in the school with large weapons.

At about 11:30, the gunmen shot out some of the west windows of the library, aiming at escaping students and the handful of deputies who had arrived. Although teacher Patti Nielson had stopped talking on her cell phone when the gunmen entered the library, over the next several minutes, the dispatcher could hear numerous gunshots, and a person shouting,

"Yahoo!" Investigators would later discover that Harris and Klebold had killed ten people and wounded 12 in the seven-and-a-half minutes they spent in the library.⁷

Outside, meanwhile, a deputy began loading students hiding behind a patrol car into a separate sheriff's car and driving them to safety, three or four at a time. The dispatch center called in off-duty dispatchers, and switched to 12-hour shifts to increase available personnel. At the same time, the media, which had heard of a shooting incident at Columbine, began calling the JeffCo Sheriff's Office for information. Less than ten minutes had passed since the first dispatch alert about an injured student in the parking lot of Columbine High School. At 11:32, Deputy Paul Magor, who was guarding the entrance to the south parking lot, radioed for mutual aid.

The Growing Response: Reinforcements Arrive

Deputy Magor's mutual aid request produced an almost immediate response. In fact, since agencies in the area had been monitoring the JeffCo dispatches, dozens of responders were already on the way, and would soon transform Columbine into a major multi-jurisdictional response. This kind of "self-dispatching" to a large incident was not uncommon. Moreover, because Columbine lay near several law enforcement jurisdictions, a number of responders had personal reasons for wanting to arrive quickly. . . . A student hiding in the school kitchen with 17 others had already called the Denver Police Department, hoping to speak with his police officer father, and several of the first Denver and Littleton police officers to arrive had children in the school.

When Lieutenant Terry Manwaring, JeffCo's SWAT commander, arrived at 11:36, law enforcement representatives had already begun to congregate a couple of blocks north of the school on Pierce Street, the north-south access road that ran along Columbine's east side Manwaring had already paged JeffCo's SWAT team and its command staff on the way over. Now, as JeffCo's first command level representative present, Manwaring told dispatch that the command post and SWAT staging area would be placed at the point where officers were already gathering, the intersection of Pierce and Leawood.

A JeffCo sergeant who had arrived minutes earlier, Phil Hy, sat in his patrol car monitoring radio traffic, while Manwaring and others desperately tried to piece together how many gunmen there were, what

they looked like, and where they all were located. The information coming over the radio was sketchy and often inconsistent. Dispatch had reported a possible suspect on the football field, as many as six to eight gunmen in the school, shooters in paramilitary garb, and the possibility of hostages being held inside. Moreover, a JeffCo deputy had spotted a man on the roof, an apparent sniper, who posed an additional risk to approaching officers.⁸

Most of this information, though, was dead wrong. As Manwaring arrived, Harris and Klebold—still in the library—had just shot the last person they would kill other than themselves. The two gunmen would spend the next half hour, investigators later concluded, wandering through the school, firing at random targets, and throwing bombs. The two returned to the cafeteria, at one point, and shot at two large bombs in duffel bags they had placed there earlier that had failed to explode, hoping—but failing—to trigger an explosion. They wandered back upstairs to the main office area and fired shots into ceilings and walls. Although the gunmen looked into locked rooms and made eye contact with trapped students, they made no further attempts to kill anyone.

Outside, though, none of this was clear. At 11:38, a pipe bomb thrown by the shooters blew out windows near the cafeteria, and students hidden inside ran to a nearby deputy in the parking lot, and ducked behind cars. The student holed up in the kitchen with a cell phone told the Denver police officer on the line that he could hear a gunman nearby with school keys and a walkie talkie.⁹ At 11:40, four minutes after Harris and Klebold left the library, some 30 students ran out from the school's west side, including many who had survived the shooting spree in the library. Based on student accounts, a deputy reported that one of the gunmen might be a student named "Ned Harris," and that he might be wearing bulletproof armor.¹⁰

Meanwhile, law enforcement personnel continued to arrive. According to Captain Mark Campbell, commander of the patrol division of the Arapahoe Sheriff's Office, the corner of Pierce and Leawood was already congested with patrol cars and emergency response vehicles by the time he got to Columbine at 11:45. "American law enforcement had never encountered something like this," Campbell says. "I'd seen a lot of stuff, and when I turned the corner, I was flabbergasted. This was only 15 minutes into it, and I'd never seen so many police cars in my life."

Amidst growing fears that the gunmen might take advantage of the confusion to sneak out of the school,