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Social and Personality Psychology Compass 10/1 (2016): 11–25, 10.1111/spc3.12229

Exploring the Toolkit of Emotion: What Do Sadness and Anger Do for Us?

Heather C. Lench*, Thomas P. Tibbett and Shane W. Bench Texas A&M University

Abstract What do negative emotions do for people? We present a framework that defines the function of emotions as the degree to which discrete emotions result in better outcomes in particular types of situations. Focus- ing on sadness and anger, we review evidence related to the situations that elicit these emotions; the cog- nitive, physiological, and behavioral changes associated with the emotions; and the extent to which these changes result in demonstrably better outcomes in the type of situation that elicits the emotion. Sadness is elicited by perceived goal loss without possibility of restoration given current abilities and is associated with deliberative reasoning, reduced physiological activity, and behavioral expression. There is prelimi- nary evidence suggesting that sadness can permit coping with loss, and that expression of sadness can re- cruit others to assist in goal attainment. Anger is elicited by perceived goal loss that can be prevented if an obstacle is overcome and is associated with heuristic reasoning, increased physiological activity, and be- havioral expression. There is evidence that expression of anger prompts others to remove themselves as obstacles, and preliminary evidence that anger can promote overcoming obstacles and goal attainment. Like precision tools, specific emotions are best utilized to resolve particular problems.

People often assume that being in a constant state of happiness would be ideal for human func- tioning. In fact, the majority of people consider being happy to be of paramount importance in their lives (Diener, 2000). Yet research findings have revealed that happiness is not the panacea it might appear, and that instead a mixture of positive and negative emotions is related to positive outcomes (Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004). In the present review, we address the question of what negative emotions do for people. We utilize a class of emotion theories – functional ac- counts – to integrate findings related to the consequences of emotions. Broadly speaking, func- tional accounts of emotion posit that emotions are functional in the sense that they do something useful for people. We present a framework that defines the function of emotions as the degree to which the changes associated with discrete emotions result in better outcomes in particular types of situations. To use an analogy, emotions do not function as sledgehammers that can deal with any problem, but rather as a Swiss army knife with a multitude of tools that are best utilized to resolve particular problems.

Functional Accounts of Emotion

The term “emotion” is used in a variety of ways in the research literature and in colloquial speech. Although debate continues, there is an emerging consensus that a primary distinguishing feature of emotions is that they are reactions to events (Eich, Kihlstrom, Bower, Forgas, & Niedenthal, 2000; Kaplan, Levine, Safer, & Lench, 2015; Lench, Bench, Darbor, & Moore, 2015; Verduyn, Van Mechelen, & Tuerlinckx, 2011). Emotions are directed toward or “about” a specific event, such as the sadness experienced after a defeat or the anger felt over an insult. This can be contrasted with moods, which have less identifiable specific causes and are more

generalized, such as feeling down or cheerful (Beedie, Terry, & Lane, 2005; Eich et al., 2000; Kaplan et al., 2015). The present review focuses on the emotions sadness and anger, as illustra- tions of how existing accounts can be integrated to identify the functions of emotion within particular situations. Anger and sadness were selected because they are included on almost all lists of emotions that are universally experienced and have a biological basis (e.g., lists of “basic emo- tions,” and cross-species comparative analyses; Ekman, 1992; Izard, 2007; Panksepp, 2011). They also are both negative in valence and therefore can illustrate the differences between emotions of the same valence that can be predicted from functional accounts. Further, both emotions are frequently regarded as states that should be managed or regulated (Erber & Erber, 2000; Taylor, 1991). This perception likely arises in part because extreme or chronic sadness and anger are symptoms of psychiatric disorders, and in part because they are aversive experiences, so much so that people will pay money to avoid experiencing them (Lau, White, & Schnall, 2013; Tibbett & Lench, 2015). Functional accounts posit emotions are powerful organizing forces of cognition, physiology,

and behavior that do something for people, in that they function to resolve particular types of problems. There are multiple functional accounts that vary in their particulars (Arnold, 1960; Averill, 1983; Ekman, 1992; Frijda, 1987; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005; Pinker, 1997). Rather than reviewing support for a particular functional account, the present review focuses on evidence related to the core assumption among all of these accounts – that emotions serve a function. There are three key questions that must be addressed in order to identify the potential functions of any emotion: (1) What are the situations that elicit that emotion? (2) What cognitive, physiological, and behavioral changes are associated with that emotion? And (3) to what extent do these changes result in demonstrably better outcomes in the type of situation that elicits the emotion? The challenge of a functional account, then, is to determine the extent to which a given emotion resolves the type of situation that elicited the emotion. In other words, to identify what a particular emo- tional “tool” can do. Figure 1 presents an overview of this approach applied to evidence related to sadness and anger.

Figure 1 Framework for identifying the functions of specific emotions.

12 Functions of Emotion

What Situations Elicit Emotions?

Some functional accounts focus on the objective situations that result in different emotions, such as images of snakes that trigger a fear response (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Although there do appear to be stimuli that elicit particular emotional responses, the vast majority of studies have revealed individual variability in how people respond to objective situations. In one study, in- vestigators videotaped travelers reporting lost luggage at the airport (Scherer & Ceschi, 1997). The emotions that the travelers expressed to this identical objective situation varied quite a bit, with some people expressing anger and others expressing anxiety. Yet this variability in re- sponse was accounted for by differences in how people perceived the situation. Across individuals and cultures, people’s perceptions of situations are stronger and more accurate predictors of their emotional response than the objective situation (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013; Scherer & Meuleman, 2013; Siemer, Mauss, & Gross, 2007; Stein & Hernandez, 2007). So what perceptions of situations matter? This is a matter of some debate among researchers,

and the inferences that can be drawn from the existing empirical literature are often mixed. Conceptualized broadly, emotions result from the perceived discrepancy between the desired and current status of goals and values (Arnold, 1960; Carver, 2004; Frijda, 1986; Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011; Levenson, 2014; Levine, 1996). Negative emotions result when there is a mis- match between what people want and what they have at the moment. Indeed, many theorists regard negative emotions as signals that direct attention to relevant stimuli when there are goals that are in danger of failing (Carver, 2004; Cole et al., 2004). The specific negative emotion ex- perienced results from the specific type of mismatch that is perceived (Arnold, 1960; Campos, Mumme, Kermoian, & Campos, 1994). In a study of people’s daily emotional lives, almost 70% of specific emotional experiences could be predicted from the perceived goal-relevant events that preceded them (Oatley & Duncan, 1994).

Sadness

Sadness is conceptualized as resulting from the perception that a goal has been lost, without the possibility of restoration given one’s current abilities (Carver, 2004; Frijda, 1986, 1987; Gross & Levenson, 1995; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Lench et al., 2011; Levine, 1996; Levine & Pizarro, 2004; Oatley & Jenkens, 1996). Some theories focus specifically on the social situa- tions of relationship loss that predict the emotion of sadness (see Keltner & Kring, 1998, for a review), but sadness has been consistently documented in nonsocial situations involving fail- ure. Images and films depicting relationship losses (e.g., death, illness) effectively elicit sadness, as do imaginative tasks, texts, recall, and real life experiences that involve the experience of goal failure (Lench et al., 2011). In one example, the experience of sadness was effectively manipu- lated by failure to attain an incentive during a game (Carver, 2004 & Scheier, 2001). Similarly, young children predict that a protagonist will experience sadness in situations involving irrevoca- ble goal loss (Levine, 1995) and adults report sadness after loss (Oatley & Duncan, 1994). Concep- tualizing sadness as the result of perceived goal failure beyond one’s ability to repair is also consistent with findings from studies of the specific evaluations (appraisals) of situations that pre- dict emotions. Appraisals that a situation is beyond one’s control (i.e., high situational control, low personal control) reliably predict the experience of sadness across a number of objective situations involving goal failure (Keltner et al., 1993; Siemer et al., 2007; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).

Anger

Anger is also conceptualized as resulting from the perception that a goal has been lost, but, unlike sadness, goal attainment is possible with the removal of an obstacle (Bodenhausen, Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Moreno, 2001; Carver, 2004; Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Frijda, 1986; Gross

Functions of Emotion 13

& Levenson, 1995; Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001; Lench et al., 2011; Levine, 1996; Levine & Pizarro, 2004; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996). As with sadness, some theories focus specifically on social situations that elicit anger, which are often characterized by the perception of injustice committed by another person (Keltner et al., 1993). Consistent with these accounts, anger is effectively elicited by emotion elicitations involving films and pictures that portray social injustice (Lench et al., 2011), and appraisals that someone else is to blame for a negative situation predict the experience of anger (Siemer et al., 2007; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). However, a social context involving injustice does not appear to be a necessary condition for

anger to occur. Anger is also experienced in nonsocial situations involving obstacles to goals (Averill, 1983; Oatley & Duncan, 1994) and effectively elicited by imaginative tasks, texts, recall tasks, and real life experiences that involve obstacles (Lench et al., 2011). For instance, travelers were video recorded reporting their lost luggage at an airport and then asked questions about their perception of the situation, with the result that the perception that goals were obstructed predicted greater anger expression and behavior in the travelers (Scherer & Ceschi, 1997). In studies with infants, anger is frequently elicited by taking away or blocking an attractive toy or video (Buss & Goldsmith, 1998; Stifter & Braungart, 1995). Similarly, young children predict that a protagonist will experience anger in situations involving goal loss when the protagonist can take action to reinstate the goal (Levine, 1995). Anger as the result of perceived obstacles to goal attainment is also consistent with findings from appraisal studies. Appraisals of individual control and certainty predict the experience of anger (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), suggesting that anger is elicited in situations characterized by the possibility of goal attainment with additional effort. Together, the available evidence suggests that anger is elicited in situations that involve obstacles to goals, and that other people can be the obstacle.

What Changes are Associated with Emotions?

Once an emotion is elicited by the perception of a problematic situation, what changes occur? Emotions have been conceptualized as coordinated responses across cognitive, physiological, and behavioral systems to changes in the environment (Ekman, 1992; Levenson, 2014; Mauss et al., 2005; Pinker, 1997; Scherer, 1984). In other words, negative emotions are responses to the percep- tion of problematic situations, described above, that represent a mismatch between what people want and what they have. According to this perspective, emotions represent coordinated changes that draw attention to information relevant to the problem and prepare for action to resolve the problem (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). It is important to note that the changes associated with an emotion are not considered to be deterministic but rather probabilistic, such that individual re- sponses can be affected by a number of moderators (Buck, 2010; Frijda, 1987; Izard, 2007; Lelieveld, van Dijk, van Beest, & van Kleef, 2013; Levenson, 2011; Panksepp, 2007; Weisfeld & Goetz, 2013). For example, people do not reflexively attack every time that they become angry. Rather, the proposition is that anger is associated with an increased likelihood of aggressive behavior, with indi- vidual responses moderated by experience and the situation. This perspective is also consistent with the reasoning based on evolutionary theory that underlies many functional accounts, in that the expression of any evolved feature (the genotype) is altered by individual specific experiences (the phenotype; Cacioppo, Berntson, Sheridan, & McClintock, 2000; Gould & Lewontin, 1979). Across emotions, there is evidence supporting the proposition that emotions represent coordi-

nated changes across systems, although sometimes those relationships are small in size (Lench et al., 2011). Computer algorithms can reliably predict the emotions that people report based on input from behavioral and physiological changes (Bailenson et al., 2008; Kragel & LaBar, 2013). These findings suggest that discrete emotions are associated with unique changes across systems and that changes tend to co-occur. There is also evidence that emotions represent coordinated responses

14 Functions of Emotion

across systems in the sense that changes correlate during emotional episodes (Bonanno & Keltner, 2004; Hsieh et al., 2011; Levenson, 2014; Lewis, 2011; Mauss et al., 2005), although correlations may vary across the life span and in different contexts (Izard & Abe, 2004; Izard, Hembree, & Huebner, 1987; Mauss et al., 2005; Shiller, Izard, & Hembree, 1986). Additionally, discriminant neural pathways have been demonstrated for specific emotions, consistent with the idea that emo- tions represent coordinated responses (Kassam, Markey, Cherkassky, Loewenstein, & Just, 2013).

Sadness

The changes across systems that are associated with sadness have frequently been characterized as “deactivation” or the absence of behavior (Averill, 1968; Cunningham, 1988; Frijda, 1986). This deactivation after a sadness-eliciting goal loss (i.e., a failure) is thought to promote a focus on understanding the causes of goal failure and to reduce goal pursuit and distraction in an en- vironment that is not conducive to success (Andrews & Thomson, 2009; Cunningham, 1988). In a recent meta-analysis that examined the effects of emotions across systems, sadness was asso- ciated with moderate changes ( g=0.41) across all outcomes compared to neutral conditions, in a manner consistent with this deactivation account (Lench et al., 2011). Sadness also differed from other emotion conditions on measures across systems with small effect sizes compared to other negative emotions and large effect sizes compared to happiness. Cognitively, sadness has been demonstrated to change the way that information is processed,

prompting a relatively deliberative, analytic reasoning style that is thought to promote an under- standing of the causes of past failures and to prevent future goal failures (Ambady & Gray, 2002; Andrews & Thomson, 2009; Forgas, 1998; Markman & Weary, 1996). The downstream con- sequences of this more analytic reasoning style include more accurate memories (Bless, Schwarz, & Wieland, 1996; Forgas, Laham, & Vargas, 2005; Park & Banaji, 2000), and less biased judg- ments (Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Forgas, 1998). In addition to more deliberative processing, sadness also directs attention specifically to the outcomes and causes of goal failures. In one study demonstrating this focus, participants who were made sad and then read a narrative about a failure were more likely to recall information about the event outcomes than happy or angry participants (Levine & Burgess, 1997; Levine & Pizarro, 2004). Sadness is also related to more pessimistic thinking, in the form of greater estimates of the likelihood of losses and negative outcomes (DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000). Sadness associated with loss generally results in reduced physiological activity (Ekman,

Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Kreibig, 2010; Levenson, 2011, 2014), and the profile associated with sadness is distinct from other emotional states (Rainville, Bechara, Naqvi, & Damasio, 2006). This decreased physiological arousal is thought to promote reduced psychomotor activ- ity, permitting sad people to concentrate on the source of their failure without becoming dis- tracted (Andrews & Thomson, 2009; Forgas, 1998). In one study, sadness was elicited by having participants pose facial expressions consistent with sadness, resulting in a deactivation in muscle activity (Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). A review of studies that elicited emo- tion to examine physiological consequences found that sadness without crying was associated with decreased heart rate, electrodermal activity, heart rate variability, finger pulse amplitude, and finger temperature, as well as increased respiratory activity (Kreibig, 2010). Although sad- ness is generally associated with decreased physiological activation, sadness that is elicited when there is the possibility of avoiding loss and accompanied by crying behavior is typically associated with increased physiological activity (Kreibig, 2010), suggesting a different physiological pattern when loss might be avoidable with help from others. Behaviorally, emotions can be expressed through facial expressions, posture, and vocaliza-

tions, and any of these expressions can be consistently identified by others as reflecting a

Functions of Emotion 15

particular emotional experience (Buck, 1994; Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1992, 1993; Horstmann, 2003; Tracy & Robins, 2004). The majority of research on behavioral expression has focused on facial expressions, with a particular focus on the subsets of muscle movements associated with different emotions. The characteristic facial expression of sadness includes a frown, eyebrows lifted in the center of the forehead, and relaxed eyes (Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002). Com- puter modeling has revealed that the pattern of facial muscle contractions associated with sadness is distinct from patterns for other emotions, which makes facial expression particularly effective for communicating emotion to others (Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin, & Schyns, 2005).

Anger

The consequences of anger for responses across systems have been characterized as a “readiness for action,” which is thought to facilitate the ability to respond quickly to attain goals or remove obsta- cles to goals (Frijda, 1986; Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001; Kreibig, 2010; Lench et al., 2011). This activation during the blockage of a goal is believed to encourage focus on achieving the goal and decrease the pursuit of alternative goals until the current goal has been achieved, or is lost with- out opportunity to recover (Levine & Pizarro, 2004). In a recent meta-analysis that examined the effects of emotions across systems, anger was associated with moderate changes (g=0.51) across all outcomes compared to neutral conditions, in a manner consistent with this activation account (Lench et al., 2011). Anger also differed from other emotion conditions on measures across systems with small to moderate effect sizes compared to other negative emotions (in some cases the number of available comparisons was small, however), and large effect sizes compared to happiness. Cognitively, anger impacts information processing by encouraging a relatively heuristic rea-

soning style, resulting in more biased and more optimistic judgments (Bodenhausen et al., 2011; DeSteno et al., 2000; Lench & Levine, 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). In addition to more heuristic processing, anger appears to direct attention to goals and the actions of others (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Levine & Burgess, 1997; Levine & Pizarro, 2004) and reduces self-focused attention (Green & Sedikides, 1999). Additionally, anger results in greater estimation of the likelihood of negative outcomes as a result of obstacles to goals (e.g., late due to traffic; DeSteno et al., 2000), suggesting greater attention to goal-relevant information. Physiologically, anger due to a blocked goal results in increased physiological activity (Kreibig,

2010; Levenson, 2014; Levenson et al., 1990), and the profile associated with anger is distinct from other emotional states (Rainville et al., 2006). This increase in physiological activity is pro- posed to prepare people to take action to recover a blocked goal (Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001; Lench et al., 2011; Pinker 1997). Consistent with this proposal, anger has been found to be strongly related to the cardiovascular system (Levenson, 1992; Miller, Patrick, & Levenston, 2002) and to possess a unique physiological profile (Miller et al., 2002). A review of studies that examined the impact of elicited emotion on physiological outcomes found that anger was asso- ciated with increased heart rate, systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure, total peripheral resistance, electrodermal activity, skin conductance level, and respiratory activity (Kreibig, 2010). Behaviorally, the intensity of anger, as well as factors such as trait anger-proneness and gender,

moderate the expression of anger (e.g., verbal, physical aggression, facial expression; Deffenbacher, Oetting, Lynch, & Morris, 1996). As with sadness, the majority of research on be- haviors associated with anger has focused on facial expression and found that anger is associated with lowered brows, glaring eyes, and tightened lips (Ekman et al., 2002). The facial expression of anger has been found to be identifiable in seven-month old infants and to become more pro- nounced with increased intensity (Stenberg, Campos, & Emde, 1983). A meta-analysis of studies examining the recognition of emotion expressions suggested that both the verbal and facial expressions of anger can be recognized across cultures (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002).

16 Functions of Emotion

To What Extent do Emotions Result in Better Outcomes?

The thread tying functional theories together is that emotions serve a purpose, namely, that emo- tions represent coordinated responses that help to resolve particular problems (Ekman, 1992; Lazarus, 1991; Lench et al., 2011; Levenson, 2014; Mauss et al., 2005; Pinker, 1997; Scherer, 1984). Theoretically, the problem that specific emotions serve to resolve should match the situation that elicited that emotion. Therefore, this resolution can be demonstrated in studies that reveal that the cognitive, physiological, and/or behavioral changes associated with an emotion result in better outcomes in situations characterized by the perceived mismatch between goals and the environment that elicits the emotional response. Although many studies demonstrate that emotions change responses in ways that appear functional, as reviewed above, studies have infre- quently assessed whether those responses are functional (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). So, what is the evidence that emotions do something for us, in that they help resolve challenges to goals?

Sadness

Given that the changes associated with sadness result from situations involving goal loss that is beyond one’s ability to address, the critical question for functional accounts is the extent to which changes associated with sadness result in better outcomes in situations involving goal loss beyond one’s ability to address.

Interpersonal effects. Better outcomes could result because of interpersonal effects of emotion, in which changes associated with sadness alter the behaviors of others in ways that promote better outcomes related to goal loss. Because interpersonal effects are by definition the result of social exchanges, behavioral expression of emotion is particularly likely to be relevant to interpersonal outcomes (Fridlund, 1991). However, the degree to which expression of emotion results in better outcomes is necessarily dependent on the perception of the other person and their relationship to the expresser. Evidence suggests that the facial or verbal expression of sadness can elicit help from others, at

least under some conditions. In situations that involve goal loss beyond one’s ability to address, recruiting help from others to attain goals results in better outcomes. Indeed, evidence suggests that crying, a behavior typically associated with sadness, can be an effective signal to caregivers to provide help to infants (Bell & Ainsworth, 1972). In investigations with adults, participants were more likely to make concessions to an opponent who displayed a digital facial expression of sadness (Dehghani, Carnevale, & Gratch, 2014). However, participants only made concessions when sadness was displayed over an object of moral significance, suggesting that the expression of sadness elicits helping behavior primarily when there is a rationale for requesting concessions. There is also evidence that verbally conveying that one is experiencing disappointment (similar to sadness, although there is an element of blame to expressing disappointment that is likely absent in sadness) can increase support from others. In one investigation, participants were paired with an ingroup or outgroup member (actually a computer program) and bargained over the distribution of chips with differing payoff structures (Lelieveld et al., 2013). In some condi- tions, the opponent indicated disappointment with an offer made by the participant, and consequently, the participants viewed the opponent as weaker and offered more chips, but only when the opponent was described as a member of their group. This suggests that people were more inclined to support someone in their group who had expressed a sad emotional response. Thus there is evidence that signaling one is experiencing sadness during social exchanges, either verbally or by sending a facial expression, can change others’ behavior in ways that promote one’s goals. However, the impact of expressing sadness on goal protection outcomes is unknown when sadness is expressed in other ways or in other contexts that do not involve direct negotiation.

Functions of Emotion 17

Intrapersonal effects. Better outcomes could also result because of intrapersonal effects of emotion, in which the changes associated with sadness promote better outcomes in situations involving goal loss beyond one’s ability to resolve. In one study, Wrosch and Miller (2009) found that the experience of depressive symptoms (including sad mood) predicted increased goal disengagement capacity over time, and that this disengagement capacity predicted reduced depressive symptoms. This study provides tentative support for the notion that sadness can result in better outcomes in situations involving goal loss and/or failure, although it was unclear in this investigation if goal disengagement was necessary. The only other evidence supportive of this possibility are findings that sadness promotes ways of thinking that seem likely to support goal protection, although that link has not been assessed. For example, sad people meet conversa- tional norms during speech more than happy people (Koch, Forgas, & Matovic, 2013), sad people are better able to detect deception than happy people (Forgas, 2013), and sad people are less optimistic about their futures than happy people (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001). The vast majority of predictions regarding the intrapersonal consequences of sadness that can be derived from a functional account, including that sadness should promote learning from past mistakes and blocking goal disruptions, remain to be tested.

Anger

Given that the changes associated with anger result from situations involving obstacles to goals that are still attainable, functional accounts would predict that anger should result in better outcomes in situations involving obstacles to goals.

Interpersonal effects. If anger promotes overcoming obstacles to goals, then expression of anger should elicit responses in others that make goal accomplishment more likely, potentially through removing themselves as obstacles or supporting one’s position. As with sadness, these interpersonal effects are necessarily dependent on the perception of the other person and their relationship to the person ex- pressing anger. Expressing anger has been described as a signal to others that one is serious and might lose control or take aggressive action (Pinker, 1997), and people experiencing anger versus other emotions are more likely to act aggressively toward others after an insult (Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001; Lieberman, Solomon, Greenberg, & McGregor, 1999). People seem to be intui- tively aware of this connection, as supervisors report strategically using the expression of anger to resolve issues with employees (Lindebaum & Fielden, 2011). In one investigation, participants were paired with another player (actually a computer program) who stated in writing that they were an- gry or happy about an offer made by the participant during a negotiation (or wrote nothing; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Participants facing an angry opponent were more likely to concede to the demands of the opponent, suggesting that verbally expressing anger can result in people capitulating to one’s desires. Similarly, participants indicated that they would be more likely to comply with the demands of an angry person who left a message for them (Tamir & Ford, 2012). There is evidence, however, that capitulation to the desires of a person who expresses anger in a ne-

gotiation is dependent on a number of moderators. In one investigation, participants conceded more to an angry person,but only if they wantedto maintain acontinuedrelationshipwiththe person(Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Similarly, participants conceded more to an angry person if that person had relatively high power, in the sense that their satisfaction would have an impact on the participant (Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). The expression of anger can also result in rejection during nego- tiations that involve multiple parties who form coalitions to promote better negotiating power (Van Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008). Together, these findings suggest that the expression of anger can result in better outcomes in negotiations with others, but that it is only effective to the extent that the expresser has the ability to carry through on the implied threat associated with anger expression.

18 Functions of Emotion

The facial expression of anger might also convey cues that compel others to comply. Partic- ipants who viewed faces posing the different components of an anger expression (i.e., browridge lower, brow lower, cheekbones higher, nose wider, mouth raised, lips thinner, chin raised) at- tributed significantly greater strength to the person than when the person had a neutral expres- sion (Sell, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2014; see also Hess, Helfrecth, Hagen, Sell, & Hewlett, 2010). Thus, expressing anger might convey strength to others, making it more likely that they would remove themselves as obstacles to one’s goals. There is evidence, however, that only expressing anger facially is insufficient to motivate others to capitulate. Participants engaged in a negotia- tion with a confederate (a professional actor) who was instructed to display fake anger (only modifying facial expression, but not internal experience or tone) or intense anger (modifying experience; C té, Hideg, & van Kleef, 2013). Participants were more likely to give into the de- mands of an opponent expressing anger, but not if that anger was only expressed facially, and this difference was the result of a decreased sense of trust when the opponent appeared to be faking anger. There is some evidence that expressing anger increases others’ support for one’s position. In

one investigation, participants watched a video of a politician expressing anger or sadness (Tiedens, 2001). Those who viewed the angry versus sad politician had more positive attitudes toward the politician, indicated that they were more likely to vote for the politician, and viewed the politician as a better leader. Similarly, people report that they experience anger most often in their close relationships and that one consequence of expressing anger within those relationships is that the target gained respect for the angry person (Averill, 1983). Thus there is evidence that expressing anger verbally or facially can change others’ behavior

in ways that promote overcoming obstacles to goals, although the impact of expressing anger in other ways is unknown and the impact on achieving better outcomes outside of a negotiation context, which is inherently contentious, is unclear.

Intrapersonal effects. Intrapersonally, anger should be characterized by responses across systems that enable overcoming obstacles and goal attainment. In one study, participants who had been in- duced to be angry kicked with more force on a physical task than happy or neutral participants, which might be effective in removing obstacles to goals in physical encounters (Woodman et al., 2009). Similarly, Darwin (1872) suggested that the baring of teeth common during angry expressions might ready the expresser to bite if necessary, which might help people overcome obstacles in physical fights. Frijda (1986) argued that the lowered brow and frown that are common in angry expressions reflect expressions that promote focused visual attention and might help angry people focus on a particular problem or target. As with sadness, however, the evidence that anger and responses that characterize anger actually result in overcoming obstacles and goal attainment is meager. There is correlational evidence that people experiencing anger persist longer on difficult tasks and consequently are more successful on cognitive tasks that re- quire persistence (Lench & Levine, 2008; Mikulincer, 1988). However, because of the nature of correlational research designs, it is also possible that persisting longer elicits greater anger. In one investigation, participants were induced to feel emotions and then played a game that in- volved confrontation (shooting enemies) or a non-confrontational game (Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008). Angry participants performed better during the confrontational game than the other game, and better than participants induced to feel excitement or in a neutral condition. If the enemies in the game can be conceptualized as obstacles, then these findings would support the notion that anger facilitates overcoming obstacles. Again, the vast majority of predictions that can be derived from a functional account remain to be tested, including that anger should promote better outcomes related to focused attention on goal pursuits and concerns, reduced moral restrictions, and greater physical responsiveness.

Functions of Emotion 19

Functional Accounts in Context

Propositions that emotions are functional is often interpreted within a broader evolutionary account, with the assumption made that emotions resulted from natural selection because they provided a benefit in terms of survival or reproduction (Ekman, 1992; Lench, Bench, & Flores, 2013; Lench et al., 2011; Mauss et al., 2005; Pinker, 1997). However, evidence that emotions are functional, in the sense that they result in better outcomes in particular situations, is only one piece of evidence that is necessary to claim that emotions are adaptations from natural selection (Lench et al., 2015). Emotions can also be functional and result in better outcomes because people have learned that expressing or experiencing specific emotions is useful in particular situations (Averill, 1983; Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley, & Barrett, 2013). Arguments that emotions are adaptations in an evolutionary sense must draw on multiple lines of evidence, and function- ality is only one piece of supporting evidence (see Lench et al., 2015, for a review of this evidence). From an evolutionary perspective, however, evidence of functionality is considered particularly important for evaluating if a feature is an adaptation. Such evidence is equivalent to a “performance check,” to evaluate the likelihood that a feature conveyed a benefit that could have been selected for through evolutionary processes. The purpose of this review was to illustrate how a functional account of emotions can be

implemented to organize predictions related to the causes and consequences of emotion, and to examine the evidence that two negative emotions – sadness and anger – are functional. Evidence suggests that sadness results in situations that involve goal loss beyond one’s ability to resolve and that sadness is associated with cognitive, physiological, and behavioral changes. Limited evidence further demonstrates that the changes associated with sadness can result in better outcomes in situations involving goal loss, either by recruiting others to assist or by promoting changes conducive to resolving goal loss such as disengagement. Available evidence reveals that anger results in situations that involve potential goal loss than can be resolved by overcoming obstacles to goals, and that anger is associated with cognitive, physiological, and behavioral changes. Evidence further suggests that the changes associated with anger can result in better outcomes in situations involving obstacles, either by intimidating or impressing others, or by promoting changes conducive to overcoming obstacles such as physical force. Obviously more work is needed that examines whether changes associated with these emotions actually result in better outcomes in particular situations. In other words, research has defined the scope of the tools, but it is not yet clear if or when the emotional tools of sadness and anger are actually effective in resolving problems.

Acknowledgement

The first author was supported during preparation of this article by the National Science Foun- dation (award #1451297).

Short Biographies

Heather Lench is an associate professor at Texas A&M University. She conducts research on the impact of emotions on thoughts and behavior. She received an APA New Investigator Award for work on affective reactions and optimism. She teaches graduate seminars in Affective Sci- ence and an undergraduate statistics course. She earned her BA from Florida State University and PhD from the University of California, Irvine. Tom Tibbett is a graduate student at Texas A&M University. His research interests include

decision-making, the function of emotion, and ostracism. He earned his BA at the College of

20 Functions of Emotion

William and Mary; he is currently completing his doctorate in College Station. He has com- pleted a graduate-level certification in Applied Statistics in conjunction with his degree. Shane W. Bench is a post-doctoral research associate at Texas A&M University. His research

interests include the functions of emotions and social cognition, with specific areas of interest including boredom as a functional emotion, predictions of the future, perceptions of the self and others, and altruistic behavior. He has taught undergraduate courses in social psychology, prosocial behavior, and introductory psychology. He earned his BS from Weber State University and PhD from Texas A&M University.

Note

* Correspondence: Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4235, USA. Email: [email protected]

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