Homeland Security forum post (303W5)
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303w5l.docxWeek 5 – Critical Infrastructure (Local Level)
In last week’s lesson, we spoke of the nation’s critical infrastructure, concentrating on the various roles and responsibilities of those located at the national level related to these assets. This week, we will direct attention towards the various government entities located at the local level. Rather than repeating any of last week’s lesson here, you are encouraged to review that it as necessary for reference.
When viewing the nation’s critical infrastructure, it is common and understandable for many to view it from solely a national-level perspective. However, much of that infrastructure resides at the state, local, and regional levels, and the risk factors encountered in these geographic regions aid in determining overall national level risk. Therefore, government at these levels cannot be discounted. This is highlighted within NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, where it emphasizes the fact that local governments are instrumental within the overall critical infrastructure partnership. Concerning their specific roles, this document states “they drive emergency preparedness, as well as local participation in critical infrastructure security and resilience across a variety of jurisdictional partners, including government agencies, owners and operators, and private citizens in the communities that they serve” (DHS, 2013, p. 47).
In this lesson, a brief introduction will be offered regarding each of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, the risks that each has identified and serve as areas of concern, as well as the role local level of government might play regarding these risks. Obviously, not all of these sectors will be equally relevant to every local jurisdiction, if considered at all. Simply put, they will vary from one local jurisdiction to another, and the manner in which the risks, threats, and consequences related to each are identified, assessed, and dealt with will vary as well.
Chemical Sector
The chemical sector of our economy converts raw materials into tens of thousands of products that are utilized in all facets of our society. Countless facilities located throughout the U.S. not only utilize these products, but also “manufacture, store, transport, or deliver chemicals along a complex, global supply chain” (DHS, 2015a, p. 2). Although the vast majority of these assets are privately owned, those considered to be of greatest risk are regulated in accordance with various standards, those that include, but not limited to, the DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). Currently, the risks considered to be the most significant include insider threats, cyber threats, natural disasters and extreme weather, deliberate attacks and terrorism, as well as biohazards and pandemics. As part of the Chemical Sector Partnership Structure, state, local, tribal, & territorial forms of government and their representatives are part of what is known as the Government Coordinating Council (GCC). The GCC is something that is common to all sectors, and as it relates to the Chemical Sector, it affords these government entities the opportunity to collaborate with its public and private sector counterparts for a variety of activities. Most notably, these are seen it their ability to address and carry out their responsibilities related to the formulation of chemical security strategies and related sector safety activities.
Commercial Facilities Sector
The commercial facilities sector is an extremely diverse one that includes a host of assets and sites; where a prevalent theme applies throughout. That is, large numbers of people gather at them to do everything from conduct business to enjoy a sporting event. As a whole this sector is made up eight sub-sectors (Entertainment and Media, Gaming, Lodging, Outdoor Events, Public Assembly, Real Estate, Retail, and Sports Leagues), so obviously, a few or many would be located in practically every community across the country. So what does this sector consider to be its greatest areas of risk? A number have been identified, and they range from armed attackers to supply chain disruptions to unmanned aircraft systems, such as drones (DHS, 2015b, p. 11-12). Obviously, coordinated efforts must be carried out by government officials and their private sector counterparts regarding the protection of these facilities, as well as the orderly and speedy restoration of them as part of the community’s overall recovery and resiliency efforts. The Commercial Facilities Sector Partnership provides the structure and assets needed to address these issues in a collaborative manner.
Communications Sector
As would be expected from this sector, it is concerned with all aspects of communications; services that that all aspects of our society (i.e. business community, public safety, government, etc.) depend upon. What was once considered primarily a provider of voice services, it has evolved into a sector that utilizes wireless, wireline, satellite, cable and broadcast communications systems as well. Concerning areas of risk, this sector has identified the following as of greatest concern: natural disasters and related weather events, supply-chain vulnerabilities, global political and social implications, as well as vulnerabilities taking place in the cyber environment (DHS, 2015c). As is the case with the majority of these sectors, most of this one is owned by the private sector, and thus, it (the private sector) is primarily responsible for its protection. However, that does not mean that local government does not have roles and responsibilities related to it. This is because the disruption of this sector directly impacts the ability of local government to conduct business and to ensure the safety and well-being of its citizens. Therefore, communication-related capabilities and their vulnerabilities will certainly factor into local risk assessments insofar as such threats can adversely impact response efforts and subsequent community recovery efforts. We should also keep in mind that from a local perspective, communications includes mass warning notification capabilities, as well non-profit communications efforts such as HAM operators assisting emergency efforts. So it goes without saying that working relationships must be established between these partners before acritical incident takes place.
Critical Manufacturing Sector
This sector is one that processes raw materials that result in highly specialized parts and equipment that are indispensable to a number of industries within our country, such as transportation, construction, and defense. It is comprised of various subcomponents and assets, those that include the manufacturing of primary metals, machinery, electrical appliances and components, and those related to all aspects of transportation (shipping, aerospace, railways, etc.). Some of the significant risks identified by this sector are similar to some we have touched on before, such as extreme weather conditions, cyber-attacks, and disruptions in supply chains. In addition, the critical manufacturing sector is concerned with deliberate attacks and terrorism, as well as geopolitical unrest, economic conditions, and other such risk factors (DHS, 2015d). These manufacturing facilities may represent a large portion of a community’s employment and commerce; therefore, it is incumbent upon local government to take a proactive stance to work with their private sector counterparts in establishing joint planning initiatives. Some local communities may view manufacturing facilities as threats because they may produce hazardous byproducts from their operations. This serves as yet another reason for government to be diligent and take the initiative to reach out to collaborate in a proactive manner, as the ability of these facilities to prevent, mitigate, or recover from a disaster event will certainly factor into a community’s risk analysis.
Dams Sector
As was mentioned in the introductory remarks, not each sector will be found or apply to any given community or region, and this would certainly applied to the Dams sector. Range of structures classified as dams is more diverse than many think. At present, there are some 87,000 dams located throughout the United States, where some two thirds are by the private sector, where the remainder are operated by state and local entities In addition to dams themselves, this sector is concerned with dam-related projects, plants that provide hydroelectric power, locks that direct navigation, as well as various levees, dikes, and other industrial waste impoundments. Because of these sub-components, a community does not necessarily to have such a structure located within their jurisdiction to be directly impacted; even on a remote basis. Risks related to this sector present themselves in a number of ways; some of which would be expected, such as extreme weather and intentional attacks directed towards these facilities. Yet, other concerns have been raised, such as erosion and structural issues, as well as the aging of both the infrastructure itself and the workforce associated with its operations. Related to the goals that have been established by the Dams Sector, it is obvious that local government has and must play an integral role in their achieving them. Such goals include the identification and assessment of sector specific threats, enhancing security and resilience efforts related to these sites and facilities, as well as promoting ongoing education-based initiatives related to pre-event planning, as well as incorporating post-incident “lessons learned” for the community at large (DHS, 2015e).
Defense Industrial Base Sector
As a whole, the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector encompasses a number of components that collectively meet the requirements set forth by our nation’s military. These various efforts include those related to research and development, design, production, delivery, as well as maintenance associated with military weapons systems and subsystems. On the surface, one would think that local government would have no role related to these efforts that directly support our nation’s armed forces. However, the Defense Industrial Base Sector Specific Plan clearly states that along with the private sector, laboratories, and academia, government agencies at all levels can aid in exploring new concepts related to the protection and resiliency of the facilities in which these operations are carried out, but jointly aid in identifying dependencies that the DIB has upon other infrastructure sector services as well (DHS, 2010). Although this sector is certainly susceptible to direct physical attacks upon its facilities and related locations, the most serious threat identified by the DIB is cyber in nature. Therefore, it is even more imperative that government work with its partners within this sector to collaboratively address this shared threat.
Emergency Services Sector
The Emergency Services Sector (ESS) is of the utmost importance to local communities. The vast majority of this sector is owned and operated by local government and includes fire and emergency services, law enforcement, public works, emergency management, emergency medical services, and a host of other specialized response capabilities. It must also be understood that this sector incorporates the resources found in three different realms; human (the personnel who carry out these activities), physical (the facilities, equipment, and vehicles used by these personnel), and cyber (the supporting environment where communications, information databases, and information networks reside). Considering the various environments in which this sector must operate within, risks associated with it are varied as well. These include attacks or disruptions upon cyber infrastructure, extreme weather-related events that require a surge of ESS-related resources, attacks carried out by violent extremists and terrorists, as well as incidents utilizing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials and agents (DHS, 2015f). Obviously, the ESS resources available and quality of services provided are integral components of a community’s risk analysis. Capabilities related to disaster response factor heavily into risk rankings as greater capabilities will decrease the consequences of disaster events.
Energy Sector
Without question, the Energy Sector is an enabling one as it relates to each of the other 15 critical infrastructure sectors. It is divided up into three interconnected, yet independent segments; electricity, oil, and natural gas. Within each, numerous activities relate to production, refinement of resources, storage, distribution, as well as oversight and maintenance of various facilities, substations, power lines, pipelines, etc. As far risks and threats are concerned, it is interesting to note that these subsectors have developed their own list to focus their attention upon. For instance, the electricity subsector is concerned with equipment failure and its aging infrastructure, changes in both the technical and operational environments, involving regulatory requirements related to the environment and the economy, as well as other issues. Regarding the oil and natural gas subsector, it is concerned with unpredictable oil and gas prices and demands, operational hazards such as spills and ruptures, and constraints that might impact the movement of their resources, which of course is directly dependent upon the Transportation Services Sector (DHS, 2015g). Since local government and the services in which provides is dependent upon the Energy Sector, it would behoove it to reach out to its private sector counterparts (which owns the vast majority of these utilities) to work in a coordinated manner regarding the uninterrupted flow of this sector’s services. As stated in the Energy Sector Specific Plan, local government agencies play a vital part in the emergency planning and response process, assisting in the development of policies and practices related to energy security and reliability, and facilitating protection activities related to this sector. So as it relates to local government, there is no doubt that that “In times of crisis, citizens turn to these organizations, which play a significant role in preparing for and responding to energy supply events and mitigating the impacts of emergencies that do arise” (DHS, 2015g, p.11).
Financial Services Sector
This Financial Services Sector is obviously extremely important to our country as a whole; it’s standing within the global market related to the economy and commerce, the effectiveness and survival of many private sector organizations, and the livelihood of private citizens as well. It is made up of various institutions where funds are deposited, those that provide a variety of investment products, insurance companies, organizations dealing with credit and financing and a host of related services that support these activities. Considering the fact that many of this sector’s key resources are either provided through or carried out on various platforms related to communication and information technology, it would come as no surprise that cyber-attacks would be a chief concern, as well as risks associates with physical attacks both facilities employees, as well as the impact that natural disasters might have upon associated operations. To address these and related issues, local government, along with its private sector counterparts, must seek to enhance information sharing initiatives in order to “improve the timeliness, quality, in reach of threats entering information shared within the sector, across sectors, and between the sector and government (DHS, 2015h, p. 14). In addition, encouraging the formulation and use of best practices, as well as conducting joint response efforts are instrumental related to this joint endeavor.
Food and Agriculture Sector
Considering the journey that takes place from “farm to fork,” and the various components that make it up (the nation’s farms, manufacturing and storage facilities, points of distribution, warehouses, restaurants, grocery stores, etc.), it should come as no surprise that it is predominantly found within the private sector. As it relates to this sector as a whole, the risks that have been identified include both accidental and intentional actions related to the contamination of food contamination or its disruption, various diseases and pests, as well as severe weather, which has a direct and Germanic impact upon this sector. States and communities can vary significantly in how they look at this sector in terms of threat and hazard analyses. Restaurants will not factor into these analyses. Food manufacturing and storage facilities can be factors at the local level to the degree to which a specific facility may pose a danger of explosion. Farms are considered more heavily in states with large agricultural economies. Naturally occurring or terrorist related biological threats to livestock and crops, and environmental threats (such as drought) to livestock and crops will normally be factors on state threat and hazard analyses. Vulnerabilities to livestock and crops and the economic damage (consequences) of possible disaster events will be considered by state governments, and to a lesser degree, local governments. Therefore, in order to achieve proper levels of both security and resilience, a close working relationship between both government and industry is required. In many locales, government representatives are responsible for inspection of Food and Agriculture Sector facilities and establishments. Also, many government representatives can play a vital role in prevention, protection, and response practices related to the diseases and pests that might affect both animals and plants (DHS, 2015i).
Government Facilities Sector
As the name implies, this sector includes a wide variety of buildings and related facilities that are located in both the United States and overseas, those that are owned or leased by various levels of government. Many are open to the public, while others maintain a high level of security. Therefore, local government would be responsible for all activities related to the protection and security of those under its oversight. The ability of a community to maintain government services to its citizens in light of critical incident is of paramount concern; therefore, all steps must be taken to fulfill associated responsibilities and expectations. Joint planning efforts must be initiated and carried out related to proposed threats and hazards. Mitigation measures related to both physical and cyber protection must be considered. Also, attention must be directed towards the resources and expertise needed to effectively respond and recover from any disaster event. In addition, regarding federal and state facilities that might be located within a certain community (such as federal court houses), representatives from all levels of government must embrace a proactive stance in addressing and carrying out these same responsibilities in a collaborative manner.
Healthcare and Public Health Sector
The Healthcare and Public Health Sector is one that is broad and varied in nature; where its services incorporate both the public and private sectors. It is made up of a number of subsectors, those that include facilities that offer direct patient care, health-related insurance companies, mass fatality management services, as well as numerous laboratories and pharmaceutical manufacturers. Emerging sector threats and hazards include pandemics and related health crises, malicious human acts, supply chain disruption and corruption, as well as its dependency upon other critical infrastructure sectors (DHS, 2016a). The presence of hospitals and their own internal resiliency practices are key to overall community capabilities and must be considered in relation to government-led threat and hazards analyses. Therefore, relationships and resources must be leveraged to adequately assess and manage risk.
Information Technology Sector
Considering our technologically dependent culture in which we now live, the products and services provided by the IT Sector not only support the proficient operation of our society, but are crucial to the many processes carried out by all other critical infrastructure sectors. Man-made incidents, either related to a deliberate or unintentional act, are of great concern to this sector; those that could result in the distribution of untrustworthy information, as well as the loss of e-commerce or routing capabilities (DHS, 2016b). Since local government is dependent upon the services provided by the IT Sector to carry out its own functions, the ability of local government agencies to continue operating when primary IT capabilities are lost is paramount. Therefore, local government must make a determination related to risk in terms of its vulnerability to loss and disruption due to industrial accidents, natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other such incidents. Cyber terrorism must be considered at the local level as well, but for many communities, IT related security measures may not be as robust as needed. There may be some exceptions. Cities that are greater targets of terrorist activities due to economic, social or political reasons will often possess greater mitigating and protection capabilities regarding this threat. For any identified vulnerabilities or shortfall, government must take the initiative to address them in a proactive fashion.
Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste Sector
Similar to the Dams Sector, this is one in which every local community will not be directly impacted; but may be remotely affected nonetheless. That is because nuclear power reactors produce some 20 percent of our nation’s electricity, while countless medical procedures and efforts related to science and biomedical research are directly dependent upon the Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste Sector. It is made up of a number of nuclear power plants, research, training, and test reactors, fuel cycle facilities, waste management operations, and a host of other related facilities. Risks related to this sector include structural issues, aging infrastructure workforce, deliberate attacks and terrorism, as well as source diversion or mishandled and “orphan” radioactive sealed material (DHS, 2015j). Communities within a hundred miles of a nuclear facility will consider the facility as a technological hazard. How great a risk a nuclear facility poses to a given community will be determined by that community’s ability to respond to an accident at the facility, the community’s perception of how vulnerable the nuclear facility is to identified threats, as well as the working relationship developed between applicable government and facility representatives. It is through such relationships that joint planning, training, and related efforts can be carried out.
Transportation Systems Sector
The nation’s transportation system consists of a number of sub-sectors that include aviation, maritime, freight rail, highway and motor carrier, pipeline, postal & shipping, and mass transit. Local communities may be responsible for significant aspects of many of these sub-sectors; most notably those related to mass transit and various roadways, bridges, etc. Public and private companies alike operate this sector’s infrastructure, and therefore must assume responsibility for its security and resilience. Terrorism, aging infrastructure, and issues related to natural disasters, global climate change, and extreme weather events serve as the primary risks identified by this sector (DHS, 2015k). In any community with mass transit systems, these will be considered in light of vulnerabilities related to technological accidents and terrorist attacks. Supporting infrastructure such as roadways and bridges must receive appropriate attention. Likewise, pipeline systems must be analyzed by local communities based upon the type of “traffic” (such as natural gas) for possibilities of rupture and resulting consequences to the community. Also, all components related to this sector must be analyzed by local communities for the possibility of the accidental or purposeful release from vehicles of hazardous material into the air, ground or waterways.
Water and Wastewater Systems Sector
As was the case with the Food and Agriculture Sector, communities are heavily reliant upon water and wastewater systems as well. Safe drinking water is essential to basic public health and survival, and human activity as a whole. This sector is made up of a variety of physical elements which include sources of water, storage of water and treatment of it, as well as distribution and monitoring systems. Likewise, as it relates to wastewater, factors related to collection, discharge, and monitoring are noted as well. There are also various cyber elements that make up this sector, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Risks include natural disasters, cyber events, intentionally malicious acts, as well as a lack of needed mutual aid agreements and effective education and outreach to emergency management personnel (DHS, 2015l). The possibility of contamination of water systems should be a major consideration in each community’s threat and hazard analysis. The restoration of this system following a disruption due to any disaster event should be deemed a high priority in any community’s recovery planning. Contamination will often be considered as a cascading event of any given disaster. Also, local government services such as those related to fire suppression and sanitation depend greatly upon this sector as well.
Conclusion
In summary we can recall the six strategic challenges from the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security review:
· Terrorism
· Cyber terrorism
· Nuclear terrorism
· Biological concerns
· Transnational criminal organizations
· Natural hazards
From this recollection, we can relate these challenges directly to the 16 critical infrastructures from the perspective of local government. When we do this, we should begin to realize that priorities differ significantly at the local level from one jurisdiction to another; and that whatever the jurisdiction, its priorities are likely to differ from those of the federal government. This is largely because of differences in perception of risk, threat and consequences. Priorities at the local level are based upon:
· Which pieces of this infrastructure pose a threat to the community
· Which pieces of the infrastructure can aid the community in building disaster resilience
· The risks facing the community and the vulnerabilities of local infrastructure related to these associated threats and hazards
· The community’s ability to carry out expected activities (prevention, protection, mitigation, response, recovery) related to these threats and hazards and their relationship to critical infrastructure
The protection of critical infrastructure is seldom the primary concern of local communities and government. Instead, the primary concern is the preservation of life and property, and the restoring of a community to normalcy following a disaster event. Therefore, infrastructure must be considered within this paradigm.
References
Department of Homeland Security (2010) Defense industrial base sector specific plan: An annex to the NIPP 2010. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security. (2013). NIPP 2013: Partnering for critical infrastructure security and resilience. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security. (2015a). Chemical sector specific plan: An annex to the NIPP 2013. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security. (2015b). Commercial facilities sector specific plan: An annex to the NIPP 2013. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security. (2015c). Communications sector specific plan: An annex to the NIPP 2013. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security. (2015d). Critical manufacturing sector specific plan: An annex to the NIPP 2013. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security. (2015e). Dams sector specific plan: An annex to the NIPP 2013. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security (2015f) Emergency services sector specific plan: An annex to the NIPP 2013. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security. (2015g). Energy sector specific plan: An annex to the NIPP 2013. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security. (2015h). Finance services sector specific plan. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security. (2015i). Food and agricultural sector specific plan. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security. (2015j). Nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector specific plan: An annex to the NIPP 2013. Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security. (2015k). Transportation systems sector specific plan. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security. (2015l). Water sector specific plan. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security. (2016a). Healthcare and public health sector specific plan. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
