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chapter

South Africa after Ten Years of Democracy

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► INTRODUCTION

South Africa is both famous and infamous. The infamy stems from the policy of *apartheid*, a state-driven program of separating people on the basis of race, in every conceivable terrain of social interaction, and of enforcing discriminatory rules against those South Africans not classified as “white persons.”

In the second half of the twentieth century opposition to apartheid became a rallying point not only for the many disadvantaged black South Africans but also for the international community. One international political commentator even went so far as to claim (in 1994), “Opposition to apartheid really was the postwar world’s only moral absolute. It ranked higher as an agreed moral reference point than Bosnia today, for all its suffering” (Uys, 1994, p. 4).

South Africa has recently achieved even greater celebrated status through the way it traversed the road from apartheid to democracy. Instead of the widely predicted civil war, a relatively peaceful negotiated transition led to the inauguration of a democratic constitution in 1994. This remarkable transformation, and the way it has been achieved, is nowhere better symbolized than in the person and career of Nelson Mandela, the most famous of South Africans. His own transformation from radical activist to prisoner, to negotiator, and then to president, mirrors the turbulent history of the country.

That history tends to emphasize the unique events and features of the country. However, South Africa also exhibits many features comparable to other states and societies, which can be described with the concepts introduced in this book. It will be shown in this chapter that apartheid can be understood as a state-driven project to entrench the features of a ranked society onto the country. The revolt against apartheid arose from the inability of the state to generate legitimacy. The society itself can be further described as a deeply divided society, with a largely absent national identity, and the economy has the features typical of a developing country. Many of the current policy problems faced by the new post-apartheid rulers are

those typical of a weak state, one in which the consolidation of democracy hinges greatly on good governance.

The challenge to good governance does not only arise from its history of racial conflict but also from its diversity. It is a country about twice the size of Texas, or, just bigger than Germany, France, and Italy combined. Its population of about 45 million people is culturally diverse, with 11 official languages, plus a few lesser ones, is overwhelmingly Christian, but also has significant Hindu, Judaic, and Muslim minorities. The modern economy dwarfs the rest of Africa. South Africa has more cars, phones, automatic teller banks, and industries than the rest of the African continent combined. Add to that its climatic and biological diversity (6000 different spiders, 175 types of scorpions, 100 different varieties of snakes), the result is a dazzling and bewilderingly complex environment, society, and polity (Editors, Inc., 2005, 6–8).

► HISTORY

South Africa's demographic diversity is the result of its early history, which is one of migration, colonization, and dispersal. European settlement started in Cape Town in 1652, when the Dutch East India Company set up a trading post en route to the lucrative markets of the east. Britain took over the colony in 1806 and rapidly expanded its domain into the interior. Disgruntled white settlers, mostly Dutch-speaking, revolted against British rule and resettled themselves beyond the frontier of the Cape Colony, therefore extending the control of European peoples. These Dutch-speaking people called themselves *Afrikaners* and eventually established their own independent republics, namely, the South African Republic in 1852 and the Orange Free State in 1854 (Giliomee, 2003).

These settlers had emerged from the Cape Colony which had by then grown into a very rigidly racially stratified society (Elphick and Giliomee, 1979). Given their sense of racial superiority, these republics were established on the basis of exclusive white citizenship. Furthermore, when these settlers made contact with black Bantu-speaking peoples, the engagements almost invariably became violent.

The Bantu-speaking peoples formed part of a southwestwardly migrating movement of peoples, originating in equatorial Africa and crossing into what is today South African territory around 550 A.D. (Davenport, 1987, pp. 7–12). Their dispersal across southern Africa was caused by an event known by the Xhosa word *Mfecane*, which conveys the notion of “total war” and refers to a process of internal political modernization and warfare. This started with the rise of Shaka Zulu, who established and consolidated the Zulu Kingdom. Warfare and subsequent political consolidation into centralized chieftaincies spread with a domino effect eastward into the Tswana, Sotho, and other linguistic communities (Omer-Cooper, 1966).

By 1870 most of what is today South African territory was under some form of political rule. A number of independent chieftaincies (such as among the Tswana, Xhosa, and Venda) and kingdoms (Southern Sotho, Zulu, and Swazi) among the African peoples existed alongside the autonomous units of the Griqua (racially mixed descendants of white and indigenous Khoikhoi peoples), the independent Afrikaner republics, and the British colonies of Natal and the Cape of Good Hope. During the next thirty years all these political units were placed under British rule, through varying methods of imposition (Thompson, 1975, pp. 245–286). The conquest of the African entities proceeded through a tactical mixture of military subjugation (in the case of the Zulu), diplomatic machinations (as with the Southern Sotho and Swazi), and by what has been described as “psychological conquest” of the Xhosa chieftaincies (Hammond-Tooke, 1975, p. 23). The Afrikaner republics were captured only through conventional warfare. It required an army of 450,000 troops in what is commonly called the Boer War of 1899–1902, but which Afrikaners call the *Tweede Vryheidsoorlog*, or “Second War of Liberation” (Packenham, 1979). By the beginning of this century the republics were annexed as two further colonies.

These four colonies were consolidated into the Union of South Africa in 1910, each reverting to a provincial authority into which all the conquered African political units were incorporated. By agreement the franchise arrangements of the colonies were retained in the union. This meant the retention of a qualified (and very restrictive) franchise for blacks in the Cape and Natal and none in the Free State and the Transvaal (as the former republics were renamed).

The second important feature of the new order was the implementation of the principle of spatial separation between races as a method of social ordering. It was recommended to the British authorities that land ownership be divided by race into exclusive white and black areas; that black dormitory towns be established adjacent to the white towns; that separate educational bodies and curricula for blacks be established; and finally, separate political representation for blacks was also advised. These recommendations were largely implemented in the decades up to World War II, known as the era of “classic segregation” (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). The most important was the 1923 legislation setting up distinct bodies for the administration of the black dormitory towns, as well as 1936 legislation restricting African land ownership to 13 percent of the country, and their final removal from the parliamentary voters’ roll.

The electoral victory of the National Party (NP) in 1948 signaled the triumph of the white Afrikaner nationalists, who thus regained control over their political future which was lost to the British in the Boer War. It also saw the inauguration of the policies of apartheid, which advocated racial separation of a thoroughly different character to that of the preceding era of segregation.

The overall objective of apartheid was to secure white political dominance and white economic privilege. The method was to apply the measures of physical relocation of peoples ever more thoroughly and to institutionalize discriminatory practices. The instrument with which to enact these measures was to be the state.

The basic apartheid laws classified all South Africans into one of the following categories: white, African, colored, or Asian.¹ For the three nonwhite categories of South Africans, nonwhite political institutions were created. Nine ministates (called "homelands") were established, one for each of the African linguistic groups, that is, the North-Sotho, South-Sotho, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Swazi, Ndebele, and Zulu. The exception was the Xhosa speakers, who were assigned to two such units. Despite the homelands' so-called independence, international recognition of such status was consistently withheld. The colored and Asian groups were represented in subordinate nonparliamentary and largely advisory bodies. No ministates were created for them as they were considered permanent residents of the so-called white part of South Africa. In this "white" part of South Africa (consisting of 87 percent of the land), all three nonwhite groups were subjected to discriminatory legislation, forcing them to live in racially demarcated townships, excluding them from certain kinds of employment, prohibiting access to public amenities, and outlawing multiracial social interaction. The ultimate objective of apartheid was to deprive Africans of their citizenship. This became possible in a technical sense as these ministates took "independence," as happened with Transkei in 1976, Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda in 1979, and Ciskei in 1981.

The first formal organization to contest racial discrimination was established in 1912, and in 1923 became the African National Congress (ANC). Its principled strategic position throughout was to oppose apartheid from outside the formal channels of nonwhite representation. This extraparliamentary resistance was led by the ANC, which was later joined by staunch allies, such as the South African Communist Party (SACP). In the 1980s the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) also emerged as pillars of this movement.

Over decades the tactics of the anti-apartheid movement changed from deputations and petitions to organized civil disobedience to armed sabotage and, eventually, to a violent insurrectionary program called the "armed struggle." On every occasion these tactics were met with security action and repression from the apartheid state. Organizations such as the ANC and the

1. These four categories of people were fairly arbitrarily demarcated, as they only partially corresponded to cultural differences. Nonetheless, public goods were distributed on the basis of these assigned identities, which therefore assumed extreme social significance and came to correspond closely with social inequalities and became indispensable to the description of such inequities in South Africa. Therefore, in this chapter these categories are used as essential descriptive categories and not as an implicit endorsement of the ideology which created them. In addition the term "black" will be used as a collective description of the African, colored, and Indian categories.

SACP were declared illegal and banned. Most of the ANC's leaders, including Nelson Mandela, were imprisoned, exiled, or lived as underground fugitives for many years. By the late 1980s a full civil war appeared to be unavoidable.

Yet precisely the opposite occurred. In 1989 the ruling National Party (NP) elected a new leader, F. W. de Klerk, who assumed the office of state president. Within months he unbanned the affected extraparliamentary organizations and in February 1990 released Nelson Mandela from prison. Formal multiparty negotiations for a new post-apartheid democratic constitution started in late 1991. This process ground to a halt in mid-1992 but was successfully relaunched in early 1993. Against most expectations a negotiated constitution was arrived at by the end of 1993, and a new democracy was inaugurated with a founding election in April 1994. Nelson Mandela was duly elected as the new executive president, leading a government of national unity in which the ANC, NP, and the Inkatha Freedom Party share power in a ruling coalition.

This history reads like a fable in which the conflict was between the clearly demarcated forces of good and evil, with the forces of good prevailing in the end, but not before the final reckoning when the forces of evil redeemed themselves and joined hands with their enemies to ensure a happy outcome for all. But fables obscure as much as they reveal. The uniqueness of events is emphasized and magical explanations are offered to account for these events. The South African transition can, however, be explained by much more mundane factors. Some of the more important ones discussed in this chapter are:

- The gradual weakening of the apartheid state through an inability to generate legitimacy.
- The conflict cycle of revolt and repression gradually stabilized into a mutually hurting stalemate.
- The ending of the Cold War was seen by the leadership of the incumbent National Party as presenting a vital opportunity to negotiate with erstwhile enemies and thus to find a tolerable escape from the mutually hurting stalemate. This perception of a need to break out of the cycle of violence was shared by Nelson Mandela, and provided the joint impetus for leadership initiatives.
- Certain crucial features of both Afrikaner and African political culture made it possible for the then State President F. W. de Klerk to make full use of the above opportunity.
- South Africa's growing international isolation. This was evident in a number of fields, including sport (banned from the Olympics), political (barred from taking its seat in the UN), cultural, and above all, economic. Economic sanctions included bans on both trade and investment, such as the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act passed by the United States Congress in 1986.

► POLITICAL CULTURE

Political culture, as outlined in the introductory section, refers to the attitudes and beliefs people hold toward the regime (the system of government, as described in constitutional rules), the government (the people who are the incumbents of these constitutionally defined positions), and the political community (all who qualify as citizens of the state). South Africa under apartheid exhibited the characteristics of a highly fragmented political culture. People held sharply divergent views on each of these political objects: The people in government were either detested as oppressive rulers or loyally supported as representatives of “our people”; the apartheid regime either was rejected as a system of institutionalized exploitation or accepted as the only way to order society; and the political community of South Africans was seen to be either an artificial assembly of many nations, which needed to be unscrambled, or as a single nation, albeit a nation in waiting, which only had to be released from the artificial constraints of apartheid. Survey research conducted during the 1970s, the heyday of apartheid, confirms this fragmentation.

The Apartheid Regime

White rejection of blacks as equals was pervasive. In a 1977 survey of white racial attitudes only 18 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement that “inherently Whites and Africans are equals,” and 88 percent concurred that “it will be many years before the Africans reach the same level of civilization as the white man” (Schlemmer, 1980, p. 249). Africans appear to have reciprocated these sentiments as numerous studies of social distance consistently show that Africans were reluctant to associate with coloreds and white English speakers, even less with Indians, and least of all with white Afrikaners (Edelstein, 1972, pp. 89–94; Horowitz, 1991, pp. 61–71).

A very significant aspect of identity formation during the early 1970s was the sense of powerlessness among the older generation. A survey of an African urban sample of adult men in 1977 showed that more than half the respondents agreed with the statement, “Someone like me can do very little to improve the life of the Africans in South Africa” (Fredman et al., 1983, p. 114). Decades of apartheid had established a very strong sense of quiescence among these Africans, but this was not carried over to the next generation. The class of 1971 Soweto youth virtually all felt proud about being a black person, preferred to be called “Africans,” and resented the inferior position attributed to them by the apartheid system (Edelstein, 1972, pp. 95–96).

The vast social distance between Africans and whites during the 1970s was replicated in their attitudes toward the regime. In 1974 most white voters still held the belief that apartheid was the best solution to the problems of political conflict in the country, with a survey showing that 77 percent supported the notion of homelands for the respective African linguistic groups as the appropriate avenue for the channeling of their political

rights. It is important to note that 90 percent of Afrikaans-speaking whites but only 33 percent of the English-speaking voters thought so. Only a small minority of 15 percent supported the idea of a constitution with a single citizenship and equal political rights (usually encapsulated in the slogan of one person, one vote). Coloreds, who shared most of the cultural attributes of white South Africans, were then already perceived differently. In 1974, 42 percent of this sample of whites were prepared to grant them equal citizenship and by 1977 more than half (55 percent) were prepared to do so.

African discontent with apartheid was enormous. Surveys done in 1977 and 1978 among urban black men showed fewer than one in ten to be very happy with his circumstances; overwhelmingly (94 percent) they were envious of the position in life of white people, and desired the same for themselves. The great majority (83 percent) rejected apartheid entirely. Their rejection of the homelands as a site for political rights was outright, with 82 percent preferring a single, united multiracial South Africa in which equal political rights were exercised by all South Africans. Political deprivation was matched by a sense of economic deprivation, with respondents strongly endorsing statements expressing equal entitlement to the affluence of whites (Schlemmer, 1980, pp. 274–278; Fredman et al., 1983, pp. 12–19).

What Africans desired most, whites feared most. In a 1977 survey of white attitudes the question was posed: “Which two of the following would in your opinion be the most likely changes that would come about if non-whites were to govern South Africa?” Afrikaans-speaking respondents overwhelmingly (80 percent) listed the following item as their first response: “the order and security of our society would be threatened.” A distant second (37 percent) was a perceived threat to their job security (Schlemmer, 1980, pp. 266, 267). This basic fear of social disintegration, of anarchy, and of total disruption and dislocation pervaded white perspectives on political change. Coupled to this was their apparent determination to defend their position. One survey reports that three out of four white voters indicated that they were prepared to “fight” so as to “maintain South Africa as it is” (Fredman et al., 1983, p. 97).

However, the white electorate was not a completely immovable constituency. A large and growing number of whites were prepared to accept constitutional changes, as long as they retained essential political dominance. Support for this form of “sharing power without losing control” grew steadily from 47 percent among Afrikaans-speaking whites and 69 percent among English speakers in 1977 to 56 and 78 percent, respectively, in 1980. Africans meanwhile came out strongly in favor of a unitary state, with majoritarian government, and placed any power-sharing formula as a distant second-best preference (Fredman et al., 1983, pp. 39, 40, 91).

The above outlines of the political culture of South Africa under apartheid allow us to make the following general summary. First, it reflects the fact that South Africa was a strong example of a *ranked society*. In ranked systems “stratification . . . is synonymous with ethnic membership. Mobility

opportunities are restricted by group identity. In such systems political, economic, and social status tend to be cumulative" (Horowitz, 1985, p. 22). The status of whites as superordinate and blacks as subordinate is clearly reflected in South African political culture of the 1970s. (The notable exception occurs among the African youth, who challenged their assigned status of inferiority.) Second, the low level of *legitimacy* generated by the apartheid regime is apparent. Only among whites, and then only within the Afrikaner ranks, was there strong endorsement for apartheid. Third, the conflict in South African politics was clearly about prosperity, identity, power, and status.

The above outline still does not reveal the crucial attitudes which made the breakthrough to democracy possible. Three sets of attitudes are important. First, by the late 1970s most Africans were still opposed to violent means of change. The 1977 survey showed that most urban Africans (61 percent) rejected violence on principle. Only 28 percent believed violence presented the only way to achieve their objectives while close to two-thirds (65 percent) put their faith in negotiation (Fredman et al., 1983, p. 99). Second, surveys from the 1970s as well as the early 1980s consistently showed very strong support for Nelson Mandela as a recognized leader (De Kock et al., 1985, p. 347). Third, Afrikaners tended strongly to endorse the view that group loyalty was more important than individual rights, and National Party supporters expressed confidence in their leaders, *even if they did not understand or approve of their actions* (Fredman et al., 1983, p. 96). Taken together, therefore, these dispositions indicated that should the then ruling National Party leadership and the ANC under a freed Mandela have chosen to negotiate for a democratic constitution, their followers would have supported them. The remaining missing ingredient was the bold, daring leadership required from the incumbent NP to grasp this opportunity. For this South Africa had to wait till 1989.

The Democratic Regime

The negotiated transition that culminated in the inauguration of a democratic parliament in 1994 established an entirely new set of political institutions, which has served as a framework within which a new national identity can be forged. How well have South Africans proceeded with shaping a new political culture, i.e., orientations to the regime, to the government, and to one another in the first decade of democracy? From the outset it was clear that the new ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), and in particular, its leaders, first Mandela as President (1994–1999) and then Mbeki (1999–2009), would play a decisive role in either hollowing out the spirit and letter of the constitution, or by investing greater depth to it.

Attitudes toward the Political Community The 1993 interim constitution put explicit emphasis on the need for national unity and reconciliation. Both the preamble and the closing section address these issues directly, expressing the yearning of the constitutional negotiators to create one political

community from the culturally diverse and politically fragmented society. Mandela, in his term of office, rarely faltered in his role as national reconciliator. He increasingly served as the embodiment of forgiveness, empathy, and goodwill, thus gaining stature as a national figure, who is revered as *the* symbol of national unity.

Even before he took office as president after the 1999 election, Thabo Mbeki took a different line. In his (in)famous “two-nations” speech he presented this view:

We therefore make so bold as to say that South Africa is a country of two nations. One of these nations is white and relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal . . . except for the persistence of gender discrimination against women, all members of this nation have the possibility of exercising their right to equal opportunity. . . . The second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor . . . this nation . . . has virtually no possibility of exercising what in reality amounts to a theoretical right to equal opportunity, that right being equal within this black nation only to the extent that it is equally incapable of its realization. . . . And neither are we becoming one nation. Consequently, also, the objective of national reconciliation is not being realized . . . the longer this situation persists . . . the more entrenched will be the conviction that the concept of nation-building is mere mirage, and that no basis exists, or will ever exist, to enable national reconciliation to take place. (Quoted in Corrigan 1999, pp. 29, 30).

Few would quarrel with Mbeki’s description of the socioeconomic disparities that continued to persist across racial lines in South Africa in 1998. What is open to question is whether these categories constituted distinct “nations.” Public opinion data show that it does not. In a national opinion survey undertaken in the mid-1990s, most South Africans still refrained from identifying themselves as “South Africans,” first and foremost. A variety of racial, linguistic, and religious labels still served as first-order preferences. Yet a huge majority (92 percent) expressed the view that they were “proud” or “very proud” to be called “South African” (Mattes & Thiel 1998, p. 97). A key sense of political community that transcends narrower cultural identities was thus already well established.

The necessary social capital with which to bond this emergent political community into a resilient civil society, let alone nation, however, still needs to be created. Social capital comprises of networks of individuals who collaborate in joint projects on the basis of interpersonal trust, who treat each other as equals, and who extend support to one another with the expectation that it will be reciprocated (Putnam, et al., 1993). Such endeavors thrive when a number of other attitudes are also well established in a society, such as widespread civic engagement and tolerance of others. In societies characterized by a history of deep-rooted conflict, as in South Africa, social capital tends to exist within the ranks of the opposing communities. Very rarely do friendships extend across the communal and political divide. One crucial indicator of the cementing of a new political community in a new democracy is therefore the extent to which new social capital emerges, in the sense that people from across the historical divides can meet and

engage with one another in projects within the civic domain, such as joint business ventures, and participation in cultural, sporting, and educational events.

One early indicator of the conditions conducive to this process is the extent to which the crucial attitudinal indicators of social capital, such as trust and tolerance, are present. South Africa provides an intriguing case (similar to other new democracies such as Poland and Chile). A number of surveys have shown that people tend to trust one another less. The World Values Survey of 1990, for example, records that more than one in every four (28.4 percent) South Africans still agreed with the statement that "Most people can be trusted". By 2001, this figure had declined to about one in every ten (11.0 percent) persons (Kotzé & Du Toit, 2005). Such a decline in generalized interpersonal trust does not bode well for the creation of the kind of social capital a new democracy needs. But, at the same time, surveys indicate that South Africans are becoming more tolerant of one another (again similar to Chile and Poland). In the World Values Surveys, respondents were asked to indicate their tolerance of "outsiders," such as people with a criminal record, homosexuals, people with AIDS, and drug addicts. In addition, "ethical tolerance," i.e., tolerance of people who may differ from mainstream values on issues such as abortion, prostitution, euthanasia, and divorce, was also tested. On both dimensions of tolerance there is a positive shift (Kotzé & Du Toit, 2005). This leads to the intriguing hypothesis that in the long term (probably over a generation or two) such increasing tolerance may create the conditions conducive to the establishment of new networks between people previously assigned to hostile camps on the basis of race, culture, creed, economic need, or political ideology. Securing new political communities takes time.

Attitudes toward the New Regime These are the second component of political culture, again not as straightforward as one would find in established democracies. From the start, South Africans were not prepared to endorse democracy in an unqualified way. A national survey undertaken in 1995 showed that only 47 percent were prepared to agree with the statement that "democracy is always best." By 1997 this had risen to 56.3 percent. Strongest support for this statement came from Africans (61 percent), with significantly lower support from the racial minorities: coloreds (53 percent), whites (39 percent) and Indians (27 percent) (Mattes & Thiel 1998, pp. 100, 101).

According to analysts, this low rating is due to the fact that South Africans, especially blacks, tend to attach a performance-based evaluation to democracy. In another survey undertaken in 1995, 91.3 percent of respondents indicated that they equated democracy with "equal access to houses, jobs and a decent income" (Bratton & Mattes, 2001, p. 454). Regular elections, competitive party systems, minority rights, and likewise procedural criteria received lesser endorsement (except, as can be expected, among

the racial minorities). After decades of material deprivation, new citizens are primarily concerned about escaping from absolute poverty, and in narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor. Legitimacy for the new democratic regime would be about affecting material conditions first and foremost, and about procedures later. For black South Africans, therefore, democracy was going to be about performance in socioeconomic terms, about "equality of results," while whites tended to stress the need for upholding the procedural aspects in providing "equality of opportunity" (Mattes & Thiel 1998, p. 455). How well the new rulers would measure up to this yardstick would be crucial to the consolidation of South Africa's democratic regime.

Attitudes toward the Government These represent the last aspect of political culture to be addressed. Given their materialistic, socioeconomic yardstick of evaluating democratic performance, new citizens were not geared to delayed gratification, but had high expectations of tangible material improvement with the inauguration of the new government. When this was not forthcoming, their performance rating slid. The approval of the national government fell from 57 to 47 percent between 1995 and 1997, and even Nelson Mandela's rating declined from 76 to 65 percent. And, as early as 1995, one in four (25 percent) South Africans were of the opinion that the new government was just as corrupt as the previous one, while another 41 percent were of the view that it was more corrupt than the old one (Mattes & Thiel 1998, p. 106). When Thabo Mbeki took over the presidency from Mandela in 1999, he and his party clearly had a daunting task ahead of them. Unless large-scale service delivery was implemented, the legitimacy of the new regime was going to be eroded. How he measured up to this challenge will be answered in the section *The State and the Economy*, at the end of this chapter.

► BASES OF CONFLICT

The laws of apartheid were enacted by an essentially white Parliament to serve the interests of the electorate and, more specifically, the National Party (NP), which won every election from 1948 to 1989. The state thus constituted was clearly geared to favor those with full citizenship at the expense of those without. And it did so. One of the most striking lines of cleavage and conflict in South African society which emerged during this century was along the lines of race and socioeconomic living standards. Increasingly the poor, who were mostly black, came to confront the wealthy, who were mostly white and had access to the state to ensure that this status quo was entrenched. Governance under the system of apartheid was about the unequal distribution of public goods.

Socioeconomic inequality is not unique to South Africa. It is typical of societies undergoing rapid modernization and industrial urbanization.

However, the effect of apartheid, as Lipton (1986, pp. 37, 38) has argued, "was not to make South Africa a uniquely different society, but to shift the incidence of poverty systematically onto blacks. This exacerbated many of the usual social evils and denied blacks the chance to escape from them, which equality of opportunity, and various stages of the life-cycle, usually allows some of the poor." The dimensions of racial inequality which emerged will be summarized below.

Separation

Forced Removals The Group Areas Act served as the instrument to separate towns and cities racially. The way in which this was done is revealing. Wilson and Ramphele (1989, p. 217) report one set of calculations showing that, for the decades from 1950 to the mid-1980s, up to 80,000 colored families were required to move from their homes to other residential areas, usually built on the outskirts of the established urban landscape. During the same period 38,000 Indian families were also removed, while only 2000 white families had to do the same. Even larger numbers of African people were removed under duress from white-owned farms and towns. The Surplus People Project has calculated that in total, under all removal schemes, up to 3.5 million people were forcibly removed between 1960 and 1983 (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989, pp. 216, 217; Davenport, 1987, pp. 445–449).

Population Resettlement Influx control was intended to prevent Africans from settling in the industrial and urban areas of the country. This was partially successful, and one estimate is that in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s between 1.5 and 3 million Africans were effectively discouraged from urbanizing. Forced removals complemented these control measures by relocating previously urbanized people back into the homelands. Between 1950 and 1990, 1.4 million people were thus "returned" (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989, p. 223). The effect was for the population density of the homelands to rocket. Between 1950 and 1970 the density doubled, and rose again by another 57 percent in the next decade (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, p. 101). The effect of such overcrowding on social life and agricultural productivity was devastating and left the rural economy unable to support the resident population.

Fragmented Cities The ideal apartheid city, according to Western (1981, p. 87–95), would have displayed the characteristics presented in Figure 1. (This model is derived from Western's application of the seven town planning principles submitted by the Durban City Council's Technical Subcommittee to the government in 1951.)

While none of the major cities was fully remodeled to this ideal, most were to some extent reshaped by apartheid-style urban engineering, as shown by studies of the major cities by Western (1981), Maharaj (1992), Scott (1992), as well as by the contributors to the study edited by Lemon (1991).




Figure 1

A typical apartheid city. (Source: John Western, *Outcast Cape Town*, Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1981, p. 91. Reproduced with permission of the author, Human & Rousseau Publishers, and the University of Minnesota Press, Minn.)

Income and Standards of Living

The most immediate impact of apartheid measures on living standards was through the discriminatory measures in the fields of education and employment. The job color bar which was in operation from the early days of segregation effectively restricted the entry of blacks into higher-income

TABLE 1

Racial Shares of Total Personal Income (Percentages)

	1924–1925	1946–1947	1960	1970	1980
Whites	75	71.3	71.2	71.9	59.9
Africans	18	22.2	21.4	19.3	29.1
Coloreds	5	4.5	5.5	6.5	7.6
Indians	2	2	1.9	2.3	3.4

Source: Merle Lipton, *Capitalism and Apartheid, South Africa, 1910–1986*, Cape Town: David Philip, 1986, p. 408. Reproduced with permission of the publishers.

TABLE 2

Population by Racial Groups, 1911–1993 (Percentages)

	1911	1951	1970	1980	1993*
African	67.2	67.6	70.0	70.1	76.3
White	21.3	20.8	17.5	16.6	12.8
Colored	8.7	8.7	9.4	9.5	8.4
Asian	2.5	2.9	2.9	3.0	2.5
Total: percentages	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total: numbers	5,973,394	12,671,452	21,448,169	26,767,278	40,308,000

*Estimate.

Source: Derived from data in T. R. H. Davenport, *South Africa, A Modern History*, 3rd ed., Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1987, p. 408; and C. Cooper et al., *Race Relations Survey 1993/94*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1994, pp. 82–84.

careers. Because of pressure from white unions in the artisan trades of the Cape Province, the Industrial Councils and Apprenticeship Boards registered only 36 coloreds as apprentices from 1932 to 1935 out of a total of 641 (Lipton, 1986, p. 41). Apartheid legislation and practice extended this trend.

As can be expected, racial distribution of occupations results in a corresponding differential racial share of total personal income in the country. Table 1 reveals this outcome quite starkly. This table should be read bearing in mind the relative population sizes of the four racial categories during this era (see Table 2).

By 1950 the white population had already shrunk to about 20 percent of the total, while it was receiving over 70 percent of the national income. These income differentials were closely related to the severity of apartheid measures. In the gold-mining industry, where the color bar was extremely rigid, the black/white income ratio increased from 12.7/1 in 1946 to 20.9/1 by 1971 (Lipton, 1986, p. 43). Such inequalities of income can be expressed in a single measure, the Gini coefficient, ranging from 0 (no inequality) to 1 (highest possible inequality). The Gini coefficient for South Africa for 1975 (by which time the income gap was closing) stood at 0.68. This compares badly with the average for developed western countries, which range from 0.35 to 0.41, and for semi-industrialized countries, which range from 0.5 to 0.6 (McGrath, 1985, p. 225; 1990, p. 94). Comparative statistics show

the South African figure to be, according to McGrath (1985, p. 225), "higher than the Gini coefficient estimated for any economy for which household income data is available."

Apartheid was not only about taking care of white interests. It was also the policy of the NP, which was an explicitly Afrikaner nationalist party, with electoral support drawn primarily from the Afrikaans-speaking sector of the white population, to take care specifically of white Afrikaner interests often to the detriment of white English-speaking South Africans. Giliomee (1979, p. 107) estimates that Afrikaners' per capita income was one-third that of the English in 1910. This can probably be attributed largely to the lingering aftereffects of the scorched earth policies followed by the British in the Boer War. The Afrikaners were not able to hold their own in the rapidly industrializing economy of the union, and by the 1930s the so-called poor white phenomenon was to be found largely among the Afrikaners. After they captured state power in the 1948 election, they put to use their control over public goods and public-sector employment to close this income gap. Through their own endeavors, explicitly employing a strategy of ethnic mobilization, an Afrikaner corporate sector and industrial establishment consolidated themselves within the modern sector of the economy. But even this advance, as Giliomee (1979) has argued, was made possible through the close association of the state and the Afrikaner captains of industry. The outcome was nonetheless strikingly successful. The Afrikaans per capita income ratio which in 1946 stood at 47 percent of English speakers had closed to 64 percent by 1960 and to 71 percent by 1976 (Giliomee, 1979, p. 174).

To retain some perspective it must be pointed out that the deprivation experienced by most blacks during the first half of this century was relative and not absolute. Economic growth in South Africa expanded the net domestic product at current prices from R266 million in 1911–1912 to R5036 million by 1961–1962. Allowing for increases in population growth and in prices, real income per person more than doubled in this period, with an annual rate of increase of 1.8 percent (*Africa South of the Sahara* 1993, 1993, p. 777). Given that the black sector of the population started increasing in size relative to the white sector only from 1970, Bromberger and Hughes (1987, p. 215) have calculated that "the average real black incomes more than doubled over the fifty years from 1920 to 1970 and quadrupled by 1980." The notable exception to this general conclusion may be the resident population of the homelands: Through declining incomes from agriculture coupled to rapid overcrowding and social decay, they probably experienced declining real incomes in this period, though no conclusive evidence on this appears to be available (Lipton, 1986, p. 45).

Public Goods

States justify their existence by, among other things, claiming to be able to deliver public goods more efficiently and effectively than private individuals are able to. This requires that states distribute these goods in a way that

upholds the principle of jointness of supply ("consumption by some individuals does not preclude consumption by others") and nonexcludability ("criteria distinguishing those permitted to consume the good from those prohibited do not exist," Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, p. 84). The distribution of public goods by the South African state under apartheid violated these principles in virtually every domain of public expenditure.

Education provides a telling example. The colonial inheritance was one of a white population with a European cultural disposition toward formal education and an African population for whom this was absent. The economically and politically dominant whites used the state they took control of in 1910 to perpetuate this situation. By 1920 great disparities had already developed, with 78 percent of eligible white children enrolling for school, compared to 14 percent of African children who did so (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989, p. 142). Unequal public spending on education continued into the apartheid era. Then the educational grid of the state became increasingly fragmented, eventually to be administered by fourteen different bureaucracies (Trotter, 1990, p. 244). This exacerbated quantitative inequalities by adding a qualitative dimension comprising differential curricula, administrative methods, social conditions, and political contexts within which education had to proceed. Overall black per capita educational expenditure in 1975 stood at 6.7 percent of that of whites (Trotter, 1990, p. 248).

Teacher/pupil ratios provide a quantitative measure which also points to qualitative differences in educational standards. By 1978 the ratios still stood at 1/20 for whites, 1/29 for coloreds, 1/27 for Indians, and 1/49 for Africans (Gordon, 1980, p. 487). The outcome of decades of unequal public expenditure on education by the state can be easily predicted. Wilson and Ramphele (1989, pp. 138, 139) report an illiteracy rate for whites of about 2 percent, for Indians just under 13 percent, for coloreds about 18 percent, and for Africans almost 30 percent.

A similar distributional pattern is found in the allocation of public funds for housing, and public health and welfare. The overall effects of rapid population growth, poverty, and malnutrition, compounded by the restrictive measures of apartheid with respect to housing, education, and employment, have left the poor in South Africa exceptionally vulnerable to disease. The unequal allocation of public funds for health care has resulted in a far weaker safety net for the black population than for the white sector. Once again, if a single set of statistics can capture this complex, multifaceted, and multicausal cumulative process of inequality built up over time, then it can probably be found in the data on infant mortality. One set of estimates, covering the years from 1981 to 1985, place the national mortality rates for white infants at 12 per 1000 births, for Indians at 18, for coloreds at 52, and for Africans at between 94 and 124 (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989, p. 107).

The provision of housing by the state was shaped by the apartheid notion that Africans were temporary visitors to the urban centers outside the

homelands, and they therefore did not *need* permanent accommodation or any other permanent social or physical infrastructure in the cities. The provision of housing for the urban African poor by the state was therefore given a very low priority, far lower than for coloreds and Indians, who were required to move only within the "white" cities and towns. Given further the size and growth rate of the African population, an enormous backlog in urban housing built up. By the mid-1980s the backlogs for colored housing stood at 52,000 units, for Indians at 44,000 units, and for Africans at 583,000 units, compared to a surplus of 37,000 housing units among the white population (Wilson and Ramphela, 1989, p. 125). Such shortages led to different coping responses, such as illegal squatting and the overcrowding of formal housing. Wilson and Ramphela (1989, p. 125) report a survey which estimates that an average of seventeen people were occupying every house in Soweto during the mid-1980s.

One of the most direct ways in which public goods can be distributed to benefit some people at the expense of others is in the appointment of personnel to public service positions. This also shapes the character of the state and influences the strength of the state as well as its capacity to govern. In this dimension alone, the character of the South African state has undergone dramatic changes during the course of this century. During the decades immediately after the Boer War white Afrikaners did not have the skills required for public service. Black South Africans, given the power equation written into the Act of Union, were hardly considered for such positions, except in the lowest of echelons. Not surprisingly, by 1912 about 85 percent of the public servants in the Union were (white) English-speaking (Giliomee, 1979, p. 146). Under the NP the public sector not only grew rapidly in size but also became increasingly manned by Afrikaners. By 1976, 60 percent of the whites in the public and semipublic sectors were Afrikaans-speaking (Giliomee, 1979, p. 165).

By 1960 whites made up about 47 percent of state personnel and, being in the top positions, received 79 percent of the wages and salaries paid out by the state. Africans made up almost half of the work force of the state but received only 18 percent of the wages and salaries. Ten years later the position was almost unchanged. By 1977, however, the white component of the work force had dropped to 28 percent and their slice of the wages and salaries to 55 percent. By 1985 this trend had reversed somewhat, but a gradual but significant increase in the colored contribution to the work force can be seen. In 1960 it still stood at 5 percent, but by 1985 had risen to 19 percent. Whites at that stage were still firmly entrenched in the top positions, as their 40 percent occupation of positions yielded some 64 percent of the wages and salaries (Natrass, 1988, pp. 147, 248).

Finally, one of the most valuable of public goods is that of citizenship. Not only does it denote formal membership of the state, but it also provides the basis for claiming access to other goods provided by the state. Without citizenship such claims cannot be made. This became the ultimate objective

of apartheid. In 1978 this was made explicit in a classic formulation by an NP cabinet minister:

If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as black people are concerned, there will be not one black (meaning African) man with South African citizenship. . . . Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state in this honourable way and there will no longer be a moral obligation on this Parliament to accommodate these people politically. (Dr. Connie Mulder, MP, quoted in Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, p. 127)

This goal was achieved to quite some extent. When the homelands of Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, and Bophuthatswana became “independent,” the effect was that 9 million Africans forfeited their South African citizenship (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989, p. 212) and with it their claim to the public goods under the control of the South African state.

The above outline allows us to again see the fragile nature of the strength of the apartheid state. It was legitimate only among those who derived direct benefit from it: the white Afrikaner nationalists who perceived the state as a vehicle for achieving the self-determination of the Afrikaner nation and its attendant material benefits. Black South Africans felt otherwise. The apartheid state could not generate *legitimacy by results*, as public goods were distributed so extremely unequally that relative and absolute deprivation among black South Africans became the norm. *Legitimacy by habit* was not forthcoming, as the infinitely more attractive alternative of a democratic, nondiscriminatory state and society was always kept alive by the extraparliamentary as well as parliamentary opposition forces. *Legitimacy by identity* was hardly possible, as the state was very much an *Afrikaner ethnic* state, both in its symbolic trappings and in the way it allocated public goods. Finally, *legitimacy by procedures* could not be generated among black South Africans as the discriminatory practices were enacted through the laws of the state. Discrimination was formal, official, and institutionalized. With this narrow base of legitimacy, the apartheid state was a potentially weak state, unlikely to be able to withstand a concerted challenge from extraparliamentary forces, when it was launched.

Apartheid policies also shaped the character of South African society. First, the structural features of a ranked society, initially established through colonial rule and conquest, were strengthened even further. We have already seen that the political culture of South Africa reflected a hierarchy of status—whites ranked themselves above blacks and denied their claims to equality. Apartheid policies which denied political rights and economic opportunities to blacks acted to reinforce this hierarchy of status and to make the subordinate position of blacks a systemic given. Escape from this condition through individual upward mobility became virtually impossible. Second, apartheid policies deliberately created an increasingly divided society, in which a shared national identity and patriotism were absent. The objective of apartheid policies was to get South Africans to think of themselves as members of different nations, instead of in terms of a shared

identity. This eventually did happen, but not as a function of quiescence. Instead, blacks increasingly used the separate schools, universities, townships, and even homelands as sites of resistance against the apartheid state and created their own identities and political symbols with which to challenge the system of apartheid.

► POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

Parties

The South Africa Act of 1909, in the words of T. R. H. Davenport, "provided a boxing ring in which the contenders for different principles could confront each other until the palm of victory went one day to the stronger" (1987, p. 252). As was described earlier, this electoral boxing ring became increasingly, and after 1956 exclusively, occupied by white political parties. The major contested principle was precisely over who should be allowed to enter *this* ring in the electoral competition and who not.

The pattern of parliamentary party competition can be summarized by briefly surveying the election outcomes. The South African Party (SAP) under the leadership of the former Boer War generals Botha and Smuts won the 1910 election and proceeded to implement the policies of segregation with respect to white-black relations and reconciliation with respect to Afrikaner-English relations. In 1920 the SAP absorbed the Unionist Party but still lost the next election (in 1924) to the Nationalist Party (NP), under the leadership of General Hertzog (another Boer War hero), who with the Labour Party formed the so-called pact government. In 1933 the NP and the SAP merged to form the United Party (UP) and as the "fusion" government stayed in power until 1948 when the *herenigde* (or "reunited") NP won the election. This was the second and last time that the white voters would topple a ruling party. After 1948 the NP steadily increased its electoral majority and reached a peak in 1977 with 123 out of a total of 165 parliamentary seats. (The election returns from 1910 to 1981 are summarized in Davenport, 1987, pp. 586, 587.)

The only other major party to develop within the institutional grid of the apartheid state was Inkatha. Established in 1975 by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the chief minister of the KwaZulu homeland, it operated as a political party in homeland politics, effectively dominating the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly for its entire existence. Buthelezi sought to expand the support base of Inkatha beyond the narrow confines of the Zulu ethnic core the homeland politics provided and campaigned vigorously for membership and support amongst non-Zulu speakers. Although Inkatha was able to claim official membership of over 1 million by 1985 (Kotzé and Greyling, 1991, p. 120), its only proven support outside the KwaZulu-Natal region were among Zulu speakers in hostels in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging industrial heartland.

Under the leadership of Buthelezi, Inkatha participated in apartheid structures without accepting the principles of the system. He argued that this was a strategically sound way of confronting the system from within. A number of other political movements operated outside the formal institutions of apartheid and came to despise Inkatha for its choice of tactics, which, they claimed, amounted to collaboration and not confrontation.

Movements

The evolution of the extra-parliamentary movements that opposed apartheid from docile liberal protest bodies into radical, militant mass organizations, and eventually into negotiators took place over a number of decades. While a rigorous historical account of this evolution is not required here, an appreciation of where these organizations came from and what they went through is essential to the understanding of the makeup of South Africa's current rulers.

The South Africa Act, with its explicit exclusion of African citizens from the rights to which citizens are usually entitled under democratic regimes, drew a response from African leaders despite their almost complete subjugation in all political arenas. This response became the catalyst for the formation of the South African Native National Congress in 1912 (Davenport, 1987, pp. 249, 250; Kotzé & Greyling, 1991, p. 31). The constitution of this body, approved in 1918, stated as its aim the acquisition of a universal franchise for all in a single, undivided South Africa. These goals reflect a yearning to become part of the established political system and mirrors the ambitions of the then leadership core, described by Gerhart as a "black bourgeoisie": "Moral awakening, the dissipation of white 'ignorance' through better education, and confidence in the ability of white liberals to popularize their creed with the rest of South Africa: these were the prescriptions for progress on which the majority of first-generation educated Africans rested their hopes" (Gerhart, 1978, p. 36). In 1923 the name of the organization was changed to the African National Congress (ANC) and for a while it cooperated closely with the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), which was established in 1921. This cooperation continued till 1927, when objections were raised against Communist involvement in what was increasingly seen as an African nationalist cause. (The ANC and the Communist party are referred to as "movements" here rather than "parties" because they operated outside the system of legal electoral competition.)

The Communists purged themselves of many white members during the 1920s and set their sights on establishing a black government in South Africa as the first step toward the eventual creation of a socialist society. In anticipation of its being banned by the NP after the passage of the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950, the party voluntarily disbanded. In 1953 it was reactivated as the South African Communist Party (SACP) and operated illegally inside the country. Close links with the ANC were reestablished.

The next major organizational and ideological benchmark was the establishment of the ANC Youth League in 1944. Its first president was Anton Muziwakhe Lembede, who was a leading thinker in formulating the philosophical and ideological ideas of what he called "Africanism." Departing from the essentially liberal premises of their predecessors, the Africanists introduced a new basic conception into the debate on who owned South Africa. Their premise was to be "that Africans comprised not *a* nation within the boundaries of South Africa, but in fact were, by right of indigenous origins and preponderant numbers, *the* nation, and the only nation, entitled to claim and to rule South Africa" (Gerhart, 1978, p. 67, original emphasis). This fundamental principle of peoplehood not only held further implications for their views on the appropriate nature of statehood but also for democracy and the contest for power: "if Africans were the rightful owners of the country, whites would have to be made to vacate the seats of power and relinquish what they had stolen" (Gerhart, 1978, p. 68). This repositioning also required a complete rethinking of tactics, especially those of collaboration with liberal whites who endorsed their cause. "Liberal whites, they argued, had been responsible for stifling the spirit of self-reliant nationalism among Africans for generations; any concession to or association with liberals was, therefore, a flirtation with the enemy, however well-motivated or 'friendly' that enemy might believe himself to be. After freedom, any whites who accepted an African government could stay in South Africa; those who rejected majority rule could leave" (Gerhart, 1978, p. 71). This Africanist position was to be revised, modified, reformulated, but its essentials have survived and remain a distinct strand in the ideological spectrum of South African politics. It was also to provide an anchoring point in the future leadership contests among anti-apartheid organizations.

The ANC, largely under the leadership of the old guard of first-generation leaders, held onto the ideological position that South Africa was occupied by one nation, albeit a multicultural one, and its agenda was to gain rightful inclusion in this political system as citizens with equal rights. As African nationalists the ANC members strove for inclusion with the dominant whites, whereas the Africanists sought to displace the whites. The organization continued to grow through increasingly assertive tactics such as the 1952 Defiance Campaign. Shortly thereafter an umbrella organization, the Congress Alliance, was formed. The ANC, through the Congress Alliance, sponsored the Congress of the People in 1955 at which the Freedom Charter was accepted. This document—a very generally stated formulation of ideals and principles, open to widely divergent interpretations as to policy, strategy, and tactics—became the rallying point of support for the so-called charterists and a defining position for the mainstream of ANC thinking. It also became a focal point *against* which the Africanists, who occupied the position outlined by Lembede's Youth League, mobilized. Their opposition culminated in a breakaway from the ANC and the formation of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1959 under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe. Both the ANC and the PAC were banned in 1960 when a state of

emergency was declared, and they continued to operate both in exile and underground within the country.

The PAC relocated to headquarters in Maseru, Basutoland (to become independent later as Lesotho). Its military campaign against the state was taken up by *Pogo*, a guerrilla organization operating inside the country. After a clampdown by Basutoland police on the PAC in 1963, Pogo was virtually eliminated from the domestic political arena. The military task of the PAC was taken up by what became known after 1968 as the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA). During the 1970s and 1980s the PAC was riven by internal dissent and leadership struggles, which ended only under the leadership of Johnson Mlambo, who took over in 1985 (Kotzé & Greyling, 1991, pp. 169–180). The changing international context of the late 1980s did move the PAC to search for diplomatic support among the western powers, but this did not dramatically change its stance on policy and strategy.

True to the Africanist tradition, it viewed the question of ownership of “the land” as the essence of the political conflict. While the charterist ANC stood by the principle that the land (as a metaphor for citizenship and political rights in general) should belong to everyone, the PAC through its mouthpiece, *The Africanist*, expressed a far more exclusive notion of ownership: “The African people have an inalienable claim to every inch of the African soil. In the memory of humanity as a whole this continent has been the homeland of the Africans. . . . The non-Africans are guests of the Africans . . . [and] have to adjust themselves to the interests of Africa, their new home” (quoted in Kotzé & Greyling, 1991, p. 174).

The ANC in exile eventually established its headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, and under the leadership of Oliver Tambo started building up an international network of support, initially only among the Communist states of Eastern Europe and later in the west. In December 1961 the ANC established a military wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK), moving into a new era of confronting the state. Under the leadership of Nelson Mandela MK conducted a series of successful bombings (Gerhart, 1978, pp. 251, 252). In 1963 the entire Umkhonto leadership was arrested and convicted at the Rivonia trial, with Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and six other members receiving life sentences. This phase of “limited violence” was seen as a tactical message to the government to heed the calls for the liberation of the disenfranchised.

The next major organizational turning point for the ANC was the 1969 Morogoro conference. At this conference a large measure of ideological convergence between the ANC and the South African Communist Party was achieved and the organizational alliance between the two strengthened (Kotzé, 1989, pp. 58–68). The strategic and tactical objectives of the organization were also refocused on the concept of the *armed struggle*, seen as the appropriate response to the emergence of a revolutionary situation. Its membership was also opened to non-Africans, ending the racial exclusivity which had characterized it since 1912 and making it possible for more Communist party members to gain access to the newly formed Revolutionary Council (Prior, 1983–1984, pp. 181–196).

During the 1980s the ANC initiated the establishment of the United Democratic Front (UDF) inside South Africa (Kotzé & Greyling, 1991, p. 41). Officially launched in August 1993, the UDF rapidly developed into a countrywide mass-opposition movement, inspired and guided by what Lodge and Nasson (1991, p. 45) describe as the “restoration of the ANC’s ideological hegemony.” At its launch 565 organizations representing 1.5 million supporters registered. The community-based character of this federation of resistance can be gauged from the composition of these delegates. The majority (313) were youth organizations, followed by “civic” bodies (82), student (47), women (32), political (24), worker (18), and religious bodies (17) (Lodge & Nasson, 1991, p. 51). At its peak the UDF claimed about 700 such affiliates, diverse in interest but united both in their opposition to apartheid and in their opposition to strategies of confronting apartheid from within the system, such as those employed by Inkatha. These affiliations were organized on a regional basis; prominent leaders included Popo Molefe, Patrick Lekota, Allan Boesak, and Murphy Morobe.

The UDF found a strong ally in the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), established in 1985. This body, with member unions from virtually every major sector of the economy, rapidly grew into the biggest labor federation in the country, with membership peaking at 1,155,000 in 1990, under the astute leadership of its general secretary, Jay Naidoo (Kotzé & Greyling, 1991, p. 203). Strongly sympathetic to the ANC and UDF during the 1980s, COSATU succeeded in being accepted formally as the third party in the existing alliance between the ANC and the South African Communist Party in 1990.

The impact of the rapidly changing domestic and international context within which the ANC-Communist alliance operated toward the late 1980s is further reflected in the 1988 publication of the *Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa*, the first major updating of the core ideas expressed in the Freedom Charter. The Harare Declaration of 1989 provided a further elaboration of their constitutional positioning. With the lifting of the bans on the ANC and a number of other allied organizations on February 2, 1990 by the South African government and the release of their imprisoned leaders—most notably Nelson Mandela shortly thereafter—the breakthrough to the search for a negotiated settlement inside the country between fundamentally opposed antagonists became possible.

Strategy and Tactics

The dignified and measured protest of Africans against the South Africa Act of 1909 took the form of a deputation to London, led by the independent white parliamentarian, W. P. Schreiner. This was followed by a similar deputation to register opposition to the 1913 Land Act and another one in 1919 (Kuper, 1975, p. 439). The 1936 Land Act and Representation Act elicited a similar response in the form of a deputation and petition of protest to the prime minister, General Hertzog. None of these had any measurable effect. The legal status quo by that time conveyed the message to Africans that

"they were not part of the South African community, that European interests were not bound together with African, and that there was no longer any community of interest between Europeans and Africans" (Kuper, 1975, pp. 450, 451). Once the impact of this message became clear, a concomitant shift in strategy and tactics was to be expected.

The Defiance Campaign of 1952 was launched as a program of civil disobedience against laws considered unjust. This involved deliberate breaking of curfew regulations and pass laws,² using public amenities reserved for whites, such as entrances and counters at post offices, and then volunteering to be arrested and to accept prison sentences instead of fines (Lodge, 1983–1984, p. 43). This campaign later extended to strike action and boycotts and, eventually, to violent confrontations with the police. This style of resistance carried through to the end of the decade. By 1959 the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) had emerged as a serious rival to the ANC and its planned 1959 campaign against the pass laws was in part motivated by intense rivalry with the ANC who were planning a similar campaign for 1960 (Gerhart, 1978, pp. 229, 230). The campaign rapidly escalated into violent clashes and culminated in the Sharpeville tragedy. At the township of Sharpeville the police confronted a large crowd of protesters who had presented themselves for arrest on pass law contraventions. Amid rising tensions which built up over a number of hours and in what Gerhart (1978, p. 238) describes as "a moment of panic," the police opened fire on the unarmed crowd, killed 67 people, and injured 186. Sharpeville rapidly came to symbolize authoritarian repression of unarmed civilians engaged in peaceful protest. The immediate repercussion to this event led to the government declaring a state of emergency and the banning of both the ANC and PAC. Yet another shift in strategy and tactics followed this rapid change in the landscape of political conflict.

The military wings of the Pan Africanist Congress and the ANC moved into clandestine actions, mainly in the form of sabotage and similar acts of violence. Their leaders were apprehended and convicted in court on charges of treason. The most notable of these trials was the Rivonia trial which led to the conviction and life imprisonment of Nelson Mandela. Both organizations regrouped in exile and their strategic and tactical options increasingly centered on the concept of armed struggle. Following the 1969 Morogoro conference the ANC defined the so-called four pillars of the struggle as:

- The mobilization of the international community to isolate and delegitimize the South African state and regime in the international economic, political, and cultural arenas

2. The apartheid system issued legal documents to Africans indicating that their permanent residence would be a particular "homeland," unless specific permission was obtained to be inside so-called "white South Africa." This legislation was commonly referred to as the "pass laws," and the documents, which had to be carried on a person (like a driver's license), as "passes." Coloreds and Indians were exempted from this system of social control.

- The mass mobilization of “the people” against the state
- The conduct of the armed struggle, through insurgency warfare, sabotage, and guerrilla operations
- The erection of alternative structures to those of the South African state in order to facilitate the armed struggle, to direct mass mobilization, to make the country ungovernable, and eventually to displace the state. (After the overthrow of the state, these structures should provide the basis for the reshaping of both state and society.)

The doctrine of the four pillars as formulated by the ANC must be seen in the context of the strategic perspective of its close ally, the South African Communist Party, which had become committed to the concept of a two-stage revolution in South Africa. This objective remained official policy as late as 1989, and is explained in the official program of the party adopted at its Seventh Congress. The first stage in this process is described as the clinching of “a national democratic revolution which will overthrow the colonial state and establish a united, demo-cra-tic [sic] and non-racial South Africa. The main content of this revolution is the national liberation of the African people in particular, and the black people in general” (South African Communist Party, 1989, p. 102). This was seen as an essential precursor to the second stage, which is a socialist revolution: “Victory in the national democratic revolution is, for our working class, the most direct route to socialism and ultimately communism.” Therefore, “in the period after the seizure of power by the democratic forces the working class will need to continue the struggle against capitalism.” That these two stages are seen as complementary to one another is also made explicit in the document. “The transition to socialism will be neither completely separate from nor contradictory to the tasks of the national democratic revolution. On the one hand, consistent implementation and defense of the national democratic programme constitute a major guarantee for progress toward socialism. On the other hand, many of the major objectives of the national democratic revolution will be fully accomplished in the process of socialist construction” (South African Communist Party, 1989, pp. 107, 108). The SACP appropriated for itself the leadership role (in its own terms, the “vanguard”) in the second stage of the revolution and saw itself as an integral part of the revolutionary alliance directed by the ANC in the first stage of the projected revolutionary transformation.

The extent to which the ANC achieved its stated objectives through the course of the 1970s and 1980s varied considerably. By far the most successful tactic was the isolation of South Africa by the international system of states. This was achieved most dramatically with sporting sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and comprehensive economic sanctions. The armed struggle made the least headway as a program of insurrection. Instead, as a project with political aims, described by Lodge (1983–1984) as “armed propaganda,” it probably achieved far greater though less tangible results.

Mass mobilization was achieved during the 1980s to a far greater extent than was ever possible in the previous decade, primarily through the United Democratic Front and its ally, the Congress of South African Trade Unions. These tactics came to be subsumed under the broad thesis of *ungovernability*. The stated aim was to resist state authority on every level by means of extreme civil disobedience which took the form of school boycotts (inspired by the slogan of "liberation before education"), labor walkouts and strikes, consumer boycotts, and tax boycotts. Coupled to this was a violent revolt against any visible sign of state authority in the townships. In what Lodge and Nasson (1991, p. 65) describe as an "insurrectionary detonation" starting in September 1984, public buildings were burnt to the ground and officials participating in government structures attacked. Officials of the state and individuals considered to be collaborators with the apartheid system became prime targets of violent aggression. The most infamous form of attack was the so-called necklace method of murder, by which a motor vehicle tire was placed around the victim's neck and then set alight. By May 1992 necklace killings had claimed more than 500 victims (Kane-Berman, 1993, p. 39). Police officers were another highly visible target, and in the ten years up to May 1993, 953 officers lost their lives (Kane-Berman, 1993, p. 40). During this upsurge of revolt inside the country in the course of the 1980s a concerted attempt was made to establish alternative structures in "liberated zones" within the urban townships, but without substantial success.

These tactics were met by further repression by the state. Twice during the 1980s (in 1985 and 1987) a state of emergency was declared, giving the security forces extraordinary powers of detention, search and arrest, and other measures, such as control over the press. Coupled to acts legalized through these measures were those described by Migdal (1988, pp. 217–226) as "dirty tricks," involving illegal acts by the state against opponents of the state, thus subverting the very laws of the state itself. Although not easily verifiable, the deaths in detention of political prisoners, most notably that of black consciousness leader Steve Biko in 1977, were among some of these actions.

One of the crucially necessary conditions for negotiating a peaceful settlement to any conflict is the all-around recognition of a condition called the *mutually hurting stalemate*. This entails the mutual recognition "that a stalemate does exist, that there is no way out in the absence of talks, or that things will (or can be made to) get worse as time goes on without a settlement" (Zartman and Berman, 1982, p. 74). By the end of the 1980s this perception among the leaders of both the ANC and National Party moved them to attempt the initiatives which eventually led to a breakthrough. Bold leadership from both sides of the divide provided the final catalyst to the democratic transition.

Arguably the most decisive step in moving toward negotiations for a new constitution was taken by Nelson Mandela in 1988, with his letter (written from Pollsmoor Prison) to the then State President, P. W. Botha. In the letter he expressed the concern that "the deepening political crisis in our

country has been a matter of grave concern to me for quite some time and I now consider it necessary in the national interest for the ANC and the government to meet urgently to negotiate an effective settlement" (*Weekly Mail & Guardian*, January 26 to February 1, 1990). In 1989 Botha retired, and the following year his successor, F. W. de Klerk, was able to share Mandela's concerns. At the opening of Parliament in February 1990, he stated that "only a negotiated understanding among the representative leaders of the entire population is able to ensure lasting peace" and that "the well-being of all in this country is linked inextricably to the ability of the leaders to come to terms with one another on a new dispensation" (*Sunday Times*, February 4, 1990). In the same speech he announced the unbanning of the ANC, the South African Communist Party, and the Pan Africanist Congress and the lifting of restrictions on thirty-three organizations. Nine days later Mandela was released from prison. The decision by the de Klerk government to unban the ANC and to enter into formal negotiations with it was made, according to Giliomee (1992a, pp. 356–364; 1992b), on the basis of a favorable assessment of the power equation as it was perceived to be at the end of the 1980s. This calculation was based on the view that in the long term exclusive Afrikaner control could not be sustained; that the NP had neither the conviction nor the resources to continue with co-option through derivations of the apartheid formula for constitutional rule (such as the 1983 tricameral constitution); that any internal settlement would ultimately require international legitimization and the perception of a new international order emerging from the demise of the U.S.S.R. and of Communist regimes in central Europe. The last factor was of crucial importance as, "in the government's perception, the ANC without Soviet backing was a containable force" (Giliomee, 1992b, p. 113). The strategic objective was therefore geared to the view that the ANC could be deradicalized, and its aims could be moderated and that it could be incorporated into the South African state, which, in turn, would be embedded within a newly reordered system of states in a way favorable to the NP and its supporters. This, in turn, implied its confidence in the inability of the ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance to enact a fundamental reordering and reconstituting of the state (along socialist lines) and a relocation of the state within the global system of states (away from the First World-dominated, capitalist political economy). Rather, "the government moved into the transition firm in its conviction that the outcome of negotiations would strengthen the existing state" (Giliomee, 1992a, p. 359).

► POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESS

Negotiations, 1990–1994

What de Klerk succeeded in doing was to remove the fundamental issue of conflict: whether or not black South Africans should have full civil and political rights. What remained after 1990 was to negotiate the constitutional

order within which this was to be achieved. The NP entered these negotiations in 1990 with an agenda that emphasized the need for minority protection through power-sharing arrangements, the political priority of stability over unrestrained participation, and a socioeconomic priority of growth over redistribution (Gagiano, 1990, pp. 10–35; Van der Merwe, 1989, pp. 41–44). It found a strong ally in Inkatha, which reconstituted itself as a political party in 1991, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Throughout the decades of anti-apartheid action by the ANC and United Democratic Front and their internal allies, Inkatha refused to commit itself to socialism, refused to endorse the international campaign for economic sanctions against South Africa, and campaigned for a liberal constitutional alternative to apartheid. The model of state and regime preferred by the ANC-SACP alliance stressed the populist priorities of equity and unrestrained majoritarian participation over growth and stability, respectively, with the state seen as the appropriate agent of redistribution (Gagiano, 1990, pp. 10–35; Morobe, 1987, pp. 30–38).

Formal constitutional negotiations started when the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), a multiparty forum consisting of nineteen delegations, met on December 20 and 21, 1991. Notable absentees were the Pan Africanist Congress and the white right-wing Conservative Party (CP), both arguing from their respective vantage points (to the left and the right of the political spectrum) that for them to endorse the deliberations, and especially the Declaration of Intent, would amount to “selling out” their constituents to their deadly rivals (Cooper et al., 1992, pp. xlix–li). At CODESA I (as it became known) five working groups, each with specific terms of reference, were established, with a brief to report back at CODESA II to be held on May 15 and 16, 1992. Working Group 2 (assigned to deal with general constitutional principles) became deadlocked on a single item (with the NP and the ANC at opposite ends) and failed to produce a report. Not surprisingly, the issue of deadlock centered on minority protection. The NP insisted on a 75 percent majority vote in Parliament to change the clauses which ensure minority protection in the constitution, while the ANC was only prepared to accept a two-thirds majority. Thereafter the ANC withdrew from formal negotiations and set in motion their mass-action campaign. More than four months later bilateral negotiations between the government and the ANC were resumed, and on September 26, 1992 the so-called record of understanding was concluded (*Sunday Times*, September 27, 1992).

In March 1993 formal negotiations were restarted, this time with twenty-six parties, and by December agreement was reached on a new constitution, with the date of April 27, 1994, being set for the inaugural election. This remarkable progress was due, in part, to the adoption of the rule of “sufficient consensus” during the deliberations. This unique South African decision-making rule held that when the ANC and the NP supported a proposal, other parties’ objections would be noted, and incorporated, but not to the

point where the adoption of the proposal could be thwarted (Atkinson, 1994). Sufficient consensus thus became the rule which embodied the *convergence of interest* (see Sisk, 1995) which gave the negotiation process sufficient momentum to be ultimately successful. The major parties that withheld endorsement of the 1993 constitution were the Inkatha Freedom Party, with its support base among the Zulu speakers of the Natal region, and the white right wing, represented by the Freedom Front. These two parties were eventually drawn into conditional support for the constitution, and participation in the election, only through two amendments to the 1993 constitution. Both these amendments served to strengthen the constitutional protection of minorities, primarily by adding to the semi-federal characteristics of the constitution.

The 1993 Constitution

The 1993 constitution was a reflection of a negotiated settlement and, as such, a product of compromise. Three broad sets of concerns are reflected in this compromise, with none being dominant. The first is the liberal concern for the doctrine of constitutionalism, requiring that everyone, including the incumbent power holders, be subject to law; the second is the radical-populist interest in getting rid of the inequities of the past by using the state as an agent for redistribution; the third is the technocratic set of priorities for economic growth, stability, and minority protection. The major features of the constitution can be summarized briefly.

Parliament The constitution provided for a bicameral legislature, comprising a 400-member lower house (the National Assembly) and a 90-member Senate. These were to be elected on the basis of universal franchise and an electoral system of party-list proportional representation. The executive was vested in the office of the president, who is both head of state and head of the government. The president was assisted by at least two vice presidents (one each to every party that wins at least 20 percent of the vote) and a 27-member cabinet. The president was elected by the National Assembly, through an ordinary majority vote and, therefore, is the choice of the majority party. Upon election the president vacated his (or her) seat in the National Assembly, in contrast to the vice presidents and cabinet ministers who retained their seats. The cabinet was composed of all parties that succeed in capturing at least 5 percent of the national vote in an election and were represented in proportion to their electoral support, thus forming a Government of National Unity. This cabinet was required to "function in a manner which gives consideration to the consensus-seeking spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity."

Interim Status of the Constitution Both houses of Parliament served in joint sittings as a constitutional assembly, which is required to draw up a new constitution (the so-called final one) within two years. This (the 1993) constitution contained thirty-four principles in terms of which this next (final)

constitution had to be drawn up. The 490-member constitutional assembly had to pass this constitution with a two-thirds majority, then the constitutional court had to ratify that it complied with the thirty-four constitutional principles.

Supreme Status of the Constitution The previously existing position of parliamentary sovereignty is reversed, and this constitution is declared as the “supreme law of the Republic,” a status which the constitutional court is assigned to uphold.

Federal Characteristics Nine new provinces are created, namely, Mpumulanga, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern Cape, Northern Province (subsequently renamed as Limpopo), North-West, Free State, Gauteng, and Western Cape. The map on the opening page shows the boundaries of the provinces.

Each province was allowed to exercise legislative and executive powers through bodies set up in terms of their own constitutions. This competence covered a set of functional areas set out in Schedule 6 of the constitution. These are not exclusive functions, as the national government may also make laws applying to these matters, but provincial laws prevail in cases of inconsistency, subject to a number of specified conditions (Erasmus, 1994). In addition, the constitution stipulated that conflicts between national and provincial governments should be dealt with by the constitutional court. Finally, the provinces provided the basis for representation in the Senate, with every province getting ten senators.

A Rigid Constitution The constitution can be considered to be fairly rigid, any amendment requiring a two-thirds majority from the total number of members of both houses of Parliament.

Rights One chapter of the constitution is devoted to the theme of human rights. A number of fully justifiable rights are set out, most of them being “first-generation” rights (placing limits on what the state may do to its citizens) and only a few “second-generation” rights (placing obligations on what the state is compelled to do for its citizens).

Minority Protection Minorities were granted protection in a number of ways. The semi-federal characteristics of the constitution provided one set of mechanisms to protect geographically concentrated minorities. The provision for a Volkstaat Council, a body which has to deliberate on the demand for self-determination put by the white right wing, served to represent their specific interests. By allowing for a House of Traditional Leaders to be established within any province containing such recognized persons, traditional African communities also gained protection. The application of the principle of proportionality in the system of representation specifically protected smaller parties. The rigid constitution again produced a limited veto

for a minority of parliamentarians. Finally, dispersed cultural communities gained some form of protection as eleven languages are recognized as official languages at the national level, entitled to equal treatment by the state.

Mechanisms for Dealing with Inequities The majority of South Africans experienced discrimination and a denial of rights under apartheid. The 1993 constitution created a number of institutions to deal with specific aspects of redressing these inequities. A Human Rights Commission was provided for, which had to ensure that the rights written into the formal constitution become part of the political practice of the state. A Commission on Gender Equality could be established to promote equality and to make policy recommendations in this regard. The constitution also allowed for the establishment of a Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, to deal with matters arising from claims to land which was expropriated under apartheid.

National Unity Finally, the constitution emphasized the need to achieve national unity and reconciliation. The preamble expressed the need “to create a new order in which all South Africans will be entitled to a common South African citizenship in a sovereign and democratic constitutional state,” and the closing section declared that this constitution “provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence.” These are noble sentiments, and should be taken as an expression of belief rather than fact. The concluding statement can rather be read as the very test which lay ahead for this constitution: If it served its purpose well, then it would serve as an instrument with which the divisions in South African society could be bridged. Looking back, one can ask why both black and white South Africans accepted this constitution. From the earlier discussion in this chapter we can conclude that for whites, the notion of a government of national unity met their minimum requirement of “sharing power without losing control.” For blacks, it delivered formal equality of citizenship, thus securing the first vital step in escaping subordination within a highly ranked society. Whether the constitution would deliver actual power sharing and in what proportions were matters to be determined by elections. Whether historical inequities can be removed is being determined by the new rulers’ economic policies. These issues are taken up in the remaining sections of this chapter.

The 1996 Constitution

The first elected Parliament duly assembled to negotiate the “final” constitution, which was endorsed by the constitutional court in 1996, and came into force in 1997. This constitution differed from the earlier transition constitution of 1993 in a number of important ways. Firstly, the vice presidency is reduced to one position, elected by Parliament through an ordinary majority vote. Secondly, the mandatory Government of National Unity is done

away with. Cabinet would henceforth be comprised of members of the majority party in Parliament, unless the president by his own choice selects someone from the smaller parties. Thirdly, the semi-federal characteristics, represented by the autonomy of the provinces, were considerably diluted, putting pay to any hopes that the new regime would evolve further into a fully fledged federation. Finally, the Bill of Rights underwent significant changes. Specifically, the mechanisms with which the state could promote equality were strengthened, and those that entrenched freedoms were circumscribed. Freedom of speech, for example, was curtailed by a clause prohibiting so-called "hate-speech." The equality clause (section 9) prohibited any "unfair" discrimination on a large number of grounds, including race and gender, but allowed the state to institute policies of redress that do discriminate on these bases, which then would constitute "fair" discrimination. Finally, redress would be guided by the norm that the entire public service had to be composed of personnel that had to be "... broadly representative of the South African people" (section 195). The equality clause and this demographic norm would become the constitutional basis of the new government's policies of Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment.

The 1994 Election

South Africa's first democratic election reflected the dynamics of the negotiation process which preceded it more than it did the dynamics of ballot-box competition. According to Friedman and Stack (1994, p. 301), this election "horrified purists, for it carried the spirit and style of the negotiations into most aspects of election management and the campaign itself. . . . It may have been the first ever election which was negotiated at every crucial stage."

The first unique aspect of the election is that it was administered not by the South African state (rejected by the ANC as partisan) or by an agency of the international community (rejected by the NP as undermining the sovereignty of the state) but by an internal agency, negotiated by the parties as an attempt to set up a neutral domestic agency, to level the playing fields of electoral competition. This body, the Transitional Executive Council, set up the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to run the election. Its task was immense. The IEC was appointed only in December 1993, the Electoral Act was passed only in mid-January 1994, and the election was to be held about three months later. In less than four months an entirely new institution had to be created, comprising 300,000 employees, which then had to function with the utmost impartiality and efficiency. In this it duly failed.

The campaign itself exhibited some remarkable features. The first was the problem of violence and intimidation. The IEC received 3594 complaints to this effect. All the major parties as well as hundreds of individuals lodged objections, and all the major parties were accused of being the transgressors (Friedman & Stack, 1994, pp. 308, 309). A second, closely related feature was the extent to which parties were denied access to voters in previously hostile territory. The IEC identified no less than 165 no-go areas in

the country, of which 62 were considered to be “hard” no-go areas, where rivals were completely denied access. According to their sources the ANC controlled 39 percent of these areas, the Inkatha Freedom Party 27 percent, tribal authorities 15 percent, and the white right wing about 12 percent. All these areas could be expected to deliver a block vote on election days and to cut down the number of potential floating voters to a bare minimum. What is remarkable is that none of the parties raised this fundamental restriction on political liberty as a reason to question the validity of the election. Friedman and Stack (1994, p. 311) offer the explanation that the parties accepted this as a given, unalterable fact of South African political life: “This reflected the spirit of the South African compromise, which was built less on principle than on a willingness to recognize unpalatable realities.” Another remarkable fact of the election is that the IFP, the third major party in the election, formally entered only a week before polling day, long after the ballot papers had been printed. This required yet more innovative thinking, with the result that an IFP sticker was to be added to the bottom of every ballot paper. Given these indicators of a highly polarized and antagonistic electorate, the all-around expectation was that on the polling days every one of the 9000 polling stations was a potentially lethal flash point for civil conflict. The very opposite occurred. Voters acted with restraint, dignity, and enormous endurance while waiting for hours in queues to cast their votes—the great majority for the first time ever. Throughout the country violence dropped sharply and remained at low levels, with the exception of KwaZulu-Natal, where conflict levels again rose rapidly.

The administration of the election stretched the IEC beyond the limits of its untested capacities. Its first failure was with regard to logistics. The necessary ballot papers were not delivered to all the stations when polling started. Some ballots did not have the IFP sticker. In all, 35 percent of polling stations experienced logistical problems. To compensate for this, a fourth voting day was set aside. The counting produced another inept performance with inadequate procedures delivering questionable totals. The counting process did reveal evidence of substantial tampering with the ballots—some boxes (supposedly sealed) were returned full of grass but no ballots, others with neatly stacked rows of ballots!

The cumulative evidence pointed to an election result that was, in terms of technical requirements, patently unfree and unfair. To declare it so would have been correct in principle, but it would have been politically disastrous. So when the IEC declared the result free and fair, no objections were raised. The parties chose to avoid the disaster and negotiated to accept the result. Friedman and Stack (1994, p. 325) explain the dynamics of this uniquely negotiated election: “the IEC probably knew a deal had been done—not necessarily by politicians huddling with commissioners, but by the simple fact that parties had withdrawn complaints. This was not the result of spontaneous self-renunciation—one IFP leader has described privately in detail the meeting between it and the ANC where the two agreed

TABLE 3

Results of the South African National Assembly Elections, April 1994

Party	Votes	National %	National Assembly seats
African National Congress	12,237,655	62.65	252
National Party	3,983,690	20.39	82
Inkatha Freedom Party	2,058,294	10.54	43
Freedom Front	424,555	2.17	9
Democratic Party	338,426	1.73	7
Pan Africanist Congress	243,478	1.25	5
African Christian Democratic Party	88,104	0.45	2
Other	159,296	0.81	0
Total	19,533,498	100.00	400

Source: Adapted from A. Reynolds (ed.), *Election '94 South Africa: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*, Cape Town: David Philip, 1994; and *Die Burger*, May 7, 1994.

TABLE 4

Votes by Race (Percentage of Party's Total Vote)

Racial category	ANC	NP	IFP
African	94.0	14	85
Colored	4.0	30	*
Indian	1.5	7	*
White	0.5	49	10

*Coloreds and Indians shared 5 percentage points.

Source: Adapted from A. Reynolds (ed.), *Election '94 South Africa—The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*, Cape Town: David Philip, 1994.

to drop complaints against each other.” Part of the reason for accepting the result was that it met the minimum requirements of all the major parties (see Table 3).

The ANC won its overall majority but, to the relief of all the other parties, was well short of the two-thirds majority which would have given it sole control of the constitutional assembly. The NP managed to secure the 20 percent of the vote which gave its leader, F. W. de Klerk, one of the vice presidencies, and it also secured the provincial base of the Western Cape. The IFP confirmed its status as one of the big three, easily crossing the 5 percent threshold needed to join the ANC and NP in the government of national unity, as well as capturing the provincial base of KwaZulu-Natal.

The election closely resembles a racial census. As Table 4 shows, the ANC drew overwhelming support from the African voters, with only .5 percent of its support coming from the white electorate. The IFP also relied on the African vote, almost entirely Zulu-speaking, but managed to get sizable support from mostly conservative white voters as well. One of the most ironic aspects of the election result was the fact that the NP, the creator of apartheid, was the only party with a truly cross-racial support base and less than half of its voters came from the white electorate. It received substantial support from colored and Indian voters, both susceptible to perceiving themselves to be (potentially) threatened minorities and both

aspiring middle-class communities. The NP skillfully secured their support by playing on their fear of being overwhelmed by a culturally different African majority.

The 1999 and 2004 Elections

With the 1994 elections South Africa had finally crossed a major watershed in its domestic politics. The contest for power would become less violent, and more focused on parliamentary politics. After 1994 the number of fatalities due to political violence declined rapidly (see Figure 2), and Parliament quickly asserted itself as the legitimate source of political authority. By 2003 the numbers were so low that the South African Police Service had ceased listing political fatalities as a separate category.

The ANC managed steadily to increase its share of the vote in the next two elections, while the opposition vote not only declined in percentages, but also shifted significantly. As can be seen from Table 5, the ANC had breached the two-thirds majority in 2004, making it technically possible for it to change the constitution without the support of any other party in a parliamentary vote. This electoral dominance is slightly deceptive as the resounding win in 2004 was achieved with a voting turnout that had declined substantially, from 89 percent in 1999 to 77 percent in 2004.




Figure 2

Political Fatalities 1984–2002 (Source: Kane-Berman, J. (ed.), *South Africa Survey 2002/2003*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 2003, pp. 439, 440).

TABLE 5

Percentage of Votes, by Party

	1994	1999	2004
ANC	62.65	66.35	69.68
DA	1.73	9.56	12.37
NNP	20.39	6.87	1.65
IFP	10.54	8.58	6.97

Source: Editors, Inc., *South Africa at a Glance, 2004–2005*, Greenside: Editors, Inc., 2005, p. 53.

It nonetheless confirmed the establishment of the *dominant-party system* in South African politics (Giliomee & Simkins, 1999). The fortunes of the opposition parties fluctuated wildly. The National Party, even with a re-branding of its name to the New National Party (NNP) crumbled, having lost its white electoral support base, especially as these voters became more and more disillusioned with the style and content of the policies of the new rulers. The Democratic Alliance (DA) steadily picked up these voters, and became the official opposition in 1999. Even the IFP, with its core of Zulu-speaking supporters, suffered steady erosion at the polls, declining in both national support, and also in its home base of the Kwa-Zulu Natal province. The ANC wrested this site of power from the IFP in 2004, as well as the Western Cape from the DA.

In both these elections the ANC campaigned with the same slogan as in the first election: "A Better Life for All." This amounts to an unqualified promise to every poor voter in the country that his or her direct needs would be addressed. On a rhetorical level, no one expressed this promise more eloquently than Nelson Mandela. On May 10, 1994, he was inaugurated as president. On May 24 he delivered his opening address to Parliament. In his speech he movingly restated this promise as "the fundamental objective to restore the human dignity of each and every South African. This requires that we speak not only of political freedoms. My government's commitment to create a people-centered society of liberty binds us to the pursuit of the goals of freedom from want, freedom from hunger, freedom from deprivation, freedom from ignorance, freedom from suppression and freedom from fear." In every election this slogan has (thus far) delivered handsome dividends to the ANC, primarily because it could tap into the political capital in the form of widespread optimism (then) prevailing among the black electorate (Bratton & Mattes 2001, p. 464). In the long term, however, tangible results alone would sustain the momentum. The way the ANC managed the economy in the first ten years of democracy would be crucial to meeting these expectations, and is taken up in the next section.

► THE STATE AND THE ECONOMY

Some of the highly visible features of the economy and of the relationship between the state and the economy have already been discussed in this chapter. These are the enormous inequalities in income distribution, the racially skewed allocation of public funds, and the scale of state intervention in the labor market, in the movement of people, and in the regulation of the physical and social dimensions of entrepreneurial activity.

In this section some of the basic structural features of the economy are touched upon briefly. The modern economy of South Africa is very closely tied to the discovery of diamonds (in 1866) and of gold (in 1886). These mining activities provided the basis for the development of a modern diversified economy. The mining sector dominated the economy in the early

part of the century and in 1911–1912 contributed 27.1 percent of the net domestic product, compared to 17.4 percent of the agricultural sector and 6.7 percent of manufacturing. By 1990 manufacturing was the biggest sector, producing 25.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) with mining in the second place at 10.7 percent and agriculture down at 5 percent (*Africa South of the Sahara* 1993, 1993, p. 777).

The rate of growth of this economy has varied considerably. In the decade from 1960 to 1970 it averaged an annual rate of 8.9 percent. This exceptionally high rate was beaten only by Japan. Such growth could not be maintained, however, and in the decade up to 1980 it stood at an annual rate of 3.9 percent. The next decade saw the economy slow down even further, to an average yearly growth rate of only 1.4 percent, dipping below the population growth rate of 2.3 percent per annum (*Africa South of the Sahara* 1993, 1993, p. 777). By the early 1990s real economic growth had become negative and stood at .6 percent for 1991 (Cooper et al., 1993, p. 525). Given the rate of population growth, which also increased during the course of the century, rates of per capita growth also fluctuated with the overall economic trends. During the first fifty years from 1911–1912 to 1961–1962 real income per person increased at an annual rate of 1.8 percent. As the economy slowed, the impact on real incomes was directly visible. In both 1990 and 1991 annual real GDP per capita declined by 2.7 percent (Cooper et al., 1993, p. 525).

The South African economy has from the start of the diamond and gold mining industries been very open to the global economy. From 1911 until 1984 imports rarely dropped below 22 percent of GDP and exports ranged from 20 to 36 percent of GDP (Nattrass, 1988, p. 270). The United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, and Japan are the major trading partners. The economy has served as a source of foreign investment since the start of the mining industry, but political turmoil after 1984 led to more or less constant annual outflows of capital.

The extent of government involvement in the economy through apartheid legislation has been noted in earlier sections of the chapter. Yet this is but the tip of the iceberg. Giliomee (1979, p. 222) reports total figures of 4000 laws and 6000 regulations that extended state control over the private sector of the economy in the late 1970s. The role of the state as an active participant also steadily increased. Total state economic activity as a percentage of GDP rose from 23.3 percent in 1946 to 41 percent in 1985 (Nattrass, 1988, p. 234, table 10.1).

Not only apartheid had an impact on the economy of the country; the fight against the apartheid state had an impact as well. The most direct intervention was in the form of international economic sanctions. Two kinds of strategies formed the anti-apartheid, pro-sanctions stance. The first was that sanctions should be deployed as a threat, so as to send a message to the government to enter into negotiations with the then banned anti-apartheid movements, and not as a punitive measure. The second, advanced by Orkin (1989), was that sanctions should rather be used as a directly punitive

measure, damaging the economy, and in this way getting the same result. According to this view, written in the late 1980s, "they are only starting to come to their senses now that they are being brought to their knees" (Orkin, 1989, p. 22).

The actual impact of sanctions on the politics of transition remains a debated issue (Bell 1993). On the economic impact there is more clarity: it moved South Africa even further down on the list of attractive investment sites for international venture capital. The new rulers would have to work hard to restore the country's investment profile, amid a globalizing world economy.

The debate on the economy for South Africa after apartheid centers quite understandably on the issue of inequality. As could be expected, the anti-apartheid movements have taken up strong positions on how these inequalities should be redressed. Within the overall populist set of priorities in which the goal of equity takes precedence over the goal of growth, a number of different means for achieving this have been advanced. The Freedom Charter mentions the strategy of nationalization of industries as a possible way of doing so. The 1989 South African Communist Party program insists that ending apartheid is about ending capitalism, and a fundamental rewriting of the economic rules of the country is therefore required. The NP, with its technocratic preferences, listed growth as a higher priority than redistribution. For it, the appropriate way of achieving this would be in the form of capitalist enterprise.

As the negotiating process gained momentum, the convergence of positions on economic priorities and strategies tended to be closer to the NP than the ANC-SACP-COSATU opening positions. The latter had to concede that nationalization was an obsolete notion, that the key to greater wealth lay in the re-creation of domestic as well as foreign investor confidence, and that redistribution could only follow from the proceeds of increased growth. The NP in turn had to accept that political stability in the end could not be found in liberty that coexisted with poverty. Growth could only be justified as a means to achieving the overall goal of greater equity.

Whatever the exact substance of the negotiated settlement on matters of economics turned out to be, the post-apartheid rulers had to confront the legacy of past actions. The openness of the South African economy does reveal its dependence on global forces for investment, technology, imports, and exports. This dependence is a source of vulnerability, which was exploited to the full by the policies of international economic sanctions. It also foreshadows the paradoxical loss of power for those who probably gained most power through the use of this tactic. Consider the following prediction by Nattrass:

If sanctions result in a severe shortage of financial and physical capital and of technical know-how, as well as a loss of export markets, causing economic stagnation and serious difficulties on the balance of payments, then any Black government that comes to power will inherit this situation, and will find it as difficult as, if not more difficult than, the present government does to correct the problems. The future

prosperity of the country will also be threatened by the almost certain reluctance of foreign investors to re-invest capital in a country from which it has previously been withdrawn, particularly if that country is suffering structural economic damage and political instability. (1988, p. 278)

The overall decline of the country's economy from the 1980s undoubtedly adversely affected the capacity of the state to generate and distribute public goods. The challenges confronting the first post-apartheid government was daunting and presented formidable challenges for effective governance. The new ANC-led government of national unity was required to keep the voters happy and at the same time keep the state solvent. This entailed attending to the basic needs of the millions of previously deprived black South Africans without putting the government into unredeemable debt. The backlogs that have built up throughout this century were staggering. Consider the following items:

- The official figure for unemployment released in 1995 was 32.6 percent. By comparison, the highest unemployment in Europe then was that of Spain at 23.9 percent. In France and Italy it stood at 10 percent, and the 1994 figure for the United States was 6.6 percent. South Africa's unemployment statistics still revealed the legacy of the apartheid decades: Unemployment among Africans was 41.1 percent, among coloreds 23.3 percent, among Indians down to 17.1 percent, and for whites 6.4 percent. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that almost 87 percent of the unemployed were not trained in any specific skill and that the job market had shrunk by 9.2 percent since 1989 (*Finansies en Tegniek*, April 14, 1995).
- Living conditions of many South Africans remained desperate. By 1992 the estimated housing backlog already ranged between 1.4 and 3 million units. Those without houses lived in shacks—estimates range from 5 to 7.7 million. Close to half of the population (16 out of 40 million people) lacked adequate water supplies, and more than half (22 million) did not have adequate sanitation (Cooper et al., 1994, p. 319). Eighty percent of the households in the former homelands had no electricity, while 2.3 million South Africans were suffering from malnutrition. Almost one-third of the population was illiterate, and more than half were dropping out of school at primary school level. Racial differences still persisted: eight out of ten white pupils reached matriculation, while only two out of ten Africans succeeded in doing so (*Weekly Mail and Guardian*, March 17–23, 1995). The percentage of people living below the absolute minimum living standard has increased from 14.7 million in 1980 to 17.1 million in 1990 (*HSRC/RGN in Focus*, 1995, p. 38).

The new government had to address these backlogs with a tax base which is also distorted by the decades of inequality created by apartheid. A highly skewed distribution of wealth also yields a very narrow tax base. The

South African state (in the early 1990s) got its tax revenue from three major sources: personal income tax (41.1 percent), value-added tax (26.5 percent), and company tax (10.6 percent). Personal income tax, the biggest source of income, was paid by only 2 million South Africans, roughly 5 percent of the population (*Die Burger*, April 17, 1994). These taxpayers form the backbone of middle class society and are already heavily taxed. In comparative terms, a South African earning R50,000 per annum in 1994 paid tax at the marginal rate of 41 percent. It has been calculated that the same earnings (at the then operative exchange rates) in Britain would have been taxed at the marginal rate of 25 percent, in Germany at 30 percent, and in the United States at 15 percent. At the other end of the spectrum is South Africa's neighbor, Zimbabwe, where the rate was 55 percent (*Die Burger*, November 19, 1994). The expansion of the tax base was hindered by the lingering tax boycotts which formed an integral part of the resistance against apartheid. It was reported that by late 1993 only 15 percent of payment for services was received from Soweto and the West Rand and only 27 percent from the East Rand townships (Cooper et al., 1994, p. 626).

Higher expenditure on public goods, so as to improve the living conditions of the poor and to deliver the promised better life for all, must therefore be financed from a growing tax base. This, in turn, can be acquired only from a growing economy. This growth had to be achieved in the competitive markets of the international economy. But recent studies have shown some crucial elements of a lack of competitiveness in the economy. For example, the domestic sugar price in 1995 was almost double the world price, textile costs were almost double those of Brazil and four times those of India, and the average number of quality defects per motor vehicle produced and assembled in South Africa stood at 350 per 100 vehicles. In the United States and Japan it was below 50 (*Sunday Times, Business Times*, March 19, 1995).

At the same time expectations among the African electorate appeared to be high. A December 1992 survey of urban Africans showed that 58 percent indicated that they would demand and expect from a new government an enforced minimum wage, 71 percent would require the government to provide work for the unemployed, and 58 percent would demand and expect ready-built houses from the government (Schlemmer and Hirschfield, 1994, p. 49).

The way the ANC would respond to these enormous challenges would be a function of its history, internal power dynamics, personalities, and the constraints of the global economy. The ANC, in 1994, was comprised of a number of subgroups that, as function of its history as a banned liberation movement, had little contact with one another, and very different life experiences. At the center were the Robben Islanders. These were Nelson Mandela and his peers who were convicted of high treason, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Individuals like Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki (the father of the later president, Thabo Mbeki) were prominent in this group, were virtually untouchable within the movement, and served as the symbolic

“elders” of organization. The second most influential grouping were the exiles, who ran the headquarters of the organization for decades. Oliver Tambo, for many years the president of the organization, dominated this grouping, and it is within the fold of the exiles that Thabo Mbeki spent his formative years. The soldiers of *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, the military wing of the ANC, represented a powerful section within this grouping. Then came the so-called “inziles,” those who held leadership positions within the UDF, such as Mosiuoa Lekota and Murphy Morobe. Additional complexities were added to the diversity of leadership by the presence of the Communists, the SACP, and the trade unionists (COSATU), each with their tradition, ideology, and strategic repertoire. Each of these groupings was molded by the politics of resistance and revolt, and each in its own way developed a corporate culture appropriate to the exigencies at the time: centralized decision making, a premium on leadership and internal discipline. When the movement had to convert to parliamentary politics, it had to reinvent itself, as a political party. This process is still underway, and some of the inconsistencies in its policies can be understood as being a reflection of the countervailing forces imposed by the tradition of liberation politics, and the need for a modern democratic corporate culture (Gumede, 2005, pp. 31–52).

From this complex organizational environment Mandela emerged as the first president. After the death of Oliver Tambo, he had no rival at the top. His successor, Thabo Mbeki, very skillfully extended his power base from the ranks of the exiles, and eliminated all other contenders such as Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale, and Mathews Phosa, to succeed Mandela in 1999. His aims were fourfold: first, to establish a prosperous and stable black middle class and elite; second, to modernize the ANC, and to secure its position within South Africa as a moderate centrist political party; third, to raise the issue of Africa’s underdevelopment on the global agenda; and finally, to restructure global sites of power, such as the UN Security Council, in a way more favorable to the countries in the global periphery.

At the start of its first five years in office, the ANC under Mandela still carried much of its Liberationist ideology. In measuring up to the economic challenge of delivering the promised better life for all, the ANC published a comprehensive policy document, *The Reconstruction and Development Programme*, or RDP (African National Congress, 1994). The document revealed a sensitivity to the fact that under conditions of economic decline the goals of growth and redistribution may become virtually incompatible. It proposed to stimulate *growth through redistribution*. The proposals therefore point to a major shift in public expenditure toward basic needs and changes in the access of previously disadvantaged communities to opportunities for advancement. Some specific targets include:

- The provision of more than 300,000 housing units every year by the end of the program’s five-year term
- Clean running water to 12 million people and sanitation to all urban households then without it

- Access to electricity for an additional 2.5 million households
- Free health care for all children under the age of 6, and also for all homeless children, and by the end of the five-year term, free care for 90 percent of childbirth cases, in addition to free immunization for 90 percent of children within three years
- The overall management of the economy so as to lead to the creation of 300,000 to 500,000 jobs in the nonagricultural sectors of the economy within five years (ANC, 1994, pp. 22, 28, 33, 46, 87)

This policy boldly presumed that direct foreign and global investment from private corporations would be forthcoming, and would finance this developmental drive. Very little of this materialized, as investors remained skeptical and risk-averse, and at the end of its first parliamentary tenure the voters were already becoming agitated (as was noted in the section on political culture).

When Thabo Mbeki succeeded Mandela in 1999, a new policy direction was taken. Mbeki, freed from the Cold War ideologies of the previous generation of leaders, started to deliberately court the global markets. Fiscal and monetary restraint was tightened, inflation brought down, corporate taxes and interest rates lowered, and budget deficits contained, and then reduced. A policy named GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) i.e., *growth followed by redistribution*, replaced the RDP. What has this yielded thus far? In general terms, sustained, if modest economic growth was achieved. The hoped-for high level of 6 percent growth in GDP per year has, however, eluded the country thus far. A more detailed scorecard of who were the direct beneficiaries of ten years of economic growth is instructive.

Service Delivery and Living Conditions

Access to education was increased dramatically, but full equity as to high quality education remains to be achieved. Some indicators are:

- The number of graduates from universities and technikons increased by 29 percent between 1992 and 1996 from 66,506 to 85,989, only to decrease again by 5 percent between 1996 and 1998. By 2002 it had again risen to 101,544.
- Between 1994 and 1998 the proportion of African graduates at universities and technikons increased from 30 to 49 percent, and the proportion of whites declined from 56 to 40 percent.
- Adult literacy continued to rise steadily. In 1980 it was at 74.4 percent, by 1991 it had increased to 82.2 percent, by 1996 it was 85.9 percent, and in 2003 it reached 89.25 percent. However, racial disparities persist. Whites and Indians are close to full literacy, while coloreds and Africans lag behind.
- Money still buys better education. In 2000 the pupil/teacher ratio in public schools funded by the state stood at 33:1, in sharp contrast to private schools where the ratio was a much more favorable 16:1. (Kane-Berman, 2003, pp. 239–242).

Far more clear-cut successes were recorded by the new government in the field of social delivery and in the improvement of the living conditions of the poor. Some highlights are:

- An increase in the number of households living in formal dwellings, from 66 percent in 1995 to 74 percent in 2003, with a concomitant decline in the number of households living in traditional housing in the rural areas from 15 percent in 1995 to 11.1 percent in 2003.
- Massive rapid urbanization continues to take place, as can be expected in any process of industrial modernization, and authorities have still to meet the demand for urban housing. State-subsidized housing projects have delivered more than 1.6 million dwellings in the cities between March 1994 and March 2004. Yet the proportion of households living in shacks in squatter camps still rose from 8 percent in 1995 to 12.5 percent in 2003.
- Access to electricity has increased dramatically. Households without electricity declined from 79 percent in 1995 to 49.7 percent in 2002. Households that use this electricity for lighting went up from 64 percent in 1995 to 78.7 percent in 2003, and for cooking, up from 47 percent in 1995 to 59 percent in 2003.
- Water delivery was extended to 9 million more people since 1994.
- Social grants to the poor and destitute have increased by more than threefold, reaching 6.8 million people in 2003, as opposed to the 2.6 million ten years ago (Editors, Inc, 2005; p. 14; Kane-Berman, 2004, pp. 329–356).


Income

Dramatic changes have occurred in the distribution of income among South Africans in the first ten years of democracy. These are, firstly, the deracialization of affluence with a rapid and significant increase in the number of blacks who have joined the elite and middle class categories; secondly, an equally significant descent into absolute poverty by large numbers of South Africans from all races; and thirdly, following from the above, an increase in the overall inequality between rich and poor South Africans.


The rapid rise of the black elite and middle class can be counted as one of Thabo Mbeki's most resounding policy successes. The following pie chart shows how the racial composition of the middle class has shifted between 1994 and 2000 (Figure 3).

A comparison of Figures 3 and 4 shows how the African proportion of the middle class rapidly expanded from 29 to 49 percent, while white South Africans declined from 53 to 34 percent of the middle class in the same period. It must be noted that middle class South Africans remain a small part of society. In 1994 this category comprised only 10.1 percent of the population, increasing in 2000 to 12.2 percent.

The data in Table 6 show the percentages of current and projected future increases in income patterns between the racial categories. The trend

**Figure 3**

Middle Class in 1994, by Race (Source: C. Garcia-Rivero, P. Du Toit, and H. Kotzé, "Tracking the Development of the Middle Class in Democratic South Africa," *Politeia*, vol. 22, no. 3, 2003, p. 20)

**Figure 4**

Middle Class in 2000, by Race (Source: C. Garcia-Rivero, P. Du Toit, and H. Kotzé, "Tracking the Development of the Middle Class in Democratic South Africa," *Politeia*, vol. 22, no. 3, 2003, p. 21.)

TABLE 6

Increase in Real Personal Disposable Income by Race, 1960–2005
(in percent)

Race	1960–2001 (actual)	1960–2005 (forecast)
African	176	208
Colored	151	177
Indian	339	384
White	56	66


Source: Kane-Berman, J. (ed.), *South Africa Survey 2003/2004*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations 2004, p. 179.

is clear. Africans, coloreds, and especially Indians are set to increase their standards of living at a far greater pace than white South Africans are currently doing, and are expected to do.

While Table 6 shows relative rates of change, it still does not accurately display the changes in actual levels of income. This is presented in Figure 5. Whites are still the most prosperous group in the country.

The most striking trend, however, evident from both Table 6 and Figure 5, is the strong upward mobility of the Indian population group. It is already the case that in five out of the nine provinces, the annual household income of Indians exceeds that of white households, even if only marginally so (Kane-Berman, 2004, p. 179).

At the elite level (individuals earning more than R2 million per year), there were, in 2005, about 12,000 Africans, Indians, and coloreds as opposed to 11,000 whites (*Die Burger*, February 1, 2005). This staggering rise in wealth among those previously disadvantaged by the policies of apartheid has been the result of a host of deliberate government policies of affirmative action, largely referred to under the general rubric of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). The beneficiaries of such policies are often scorned by their not-so-fortunate fellow citizens, and are at times mockingly referred to as the "BEEple," having displaced the "people" as the appropriate target of redress. (See the cartoon at the end of this chapter.)

**Figure 5**

Real Disposable Income per capita by Race, 1960–2005

(Source: Kane-Berman, J. (ed.), *South Africa Survey 2003/2004*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations 2004, p. 181).

TABLE 7

Poverty Trends: Proportion of Households by Race with Incomes Below the Minimum Living Level, 1989–2001 (in percent)

	African	Colored	Indian	White
1989	51	24	6	3
1993	50	26	8	3
1996	57	22	9	3
1997	55	21	6	4
2001	62	29	11	4

Source: Kane-Berman, J. (ed.), *South Africa Survey 2003/2004*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations 2004, p. 181.

At the other end of the spectrum are the poor, who constitute 46.2 percent of the population, about 21.5 million people. About 20.5 million of them are Africans, 780,000 coloreds, 83,000 Indians, and 189,000 whites. And the data in Table 7 show that, within every racial category, there are more people sinking into this socioeconomic class every year.

Unemployment

This widening gap between the rich and the poor, amid a general trend of sustained economic growth, has many causal factors, none of which can be dealt with here. One salient factor present in the economy that has an impact on poverty, is the rising level of unemployment, and the inability of the new government to contain—let alone reverse—this trend. Technological innovation that displaces human labor with machines is part of a global trend that gives rise to so-called “jobless growth,” and this impacted employment levels. South Africa’s opening up to the global economy after 1994 required higher levels of competitiveness, thus also motivating employers to cut employment as a means of cost-saving. Finally strict legislation by the new government made dismissals very difficult (creating a so-called

rigid labor market) and inhibited employers from taking on new employees. With the advent of democracy, unemployment stood at 32.6 percent. Ten years later (in 2003), according to the same definition, it stood at 41.8 percent. (The government has adopted a new, narrower definition of unemployment, which defines an unemployed person as one who had not worked during the seven days prior to being interviewed, who wanted to work and was available to start working within a week, and who had taken active steps to try to find gainful employment in the four weeks prior to the interview. The data cited above take the wider definition, that excludes the last criterion.) According to the narrow definition, unemployment in 2003 stood at only 28.2 percent.

A persistent level of poverty, according to either definition, holds grave long-term consequences for the consolidation of democracy. If not broken, it can lock the poor into a syndrome of poverty, where poor health, crime, lack of education, and a defeatist frame of mind disempowers people, and thwarts outside efforts at development. Addressing this challenge remains the biggest challenge facing the new government.

Crime

In the decade culminating in the inauguration of South Africa's democracy (1984-1994) 21,561 people lost their lives in political violence (Du Toit, 2001, p. 34). After 1994, political violence declined dramatically (see Figure 2), but the country remains a very violent place. In the first decade of democracy close to a quarter of a million (235,069) people were murdered. Another 293,485 survived as victims of attempted murder. There were 122,203 reported cases of culpable homicide, and more than half a million (512,851) rapes were reported. More than 2.3 million cases of common assault were reported, and more than 900,000 cases of robbery with aggravating circumstances (South African Institute of Race Relations, 2004, pp. 2, 3).

Some headway has been made in the government's campaign against crime. The murder rate has at least declined from 66.9 per 100,000 people in 1995 to 47.5 in 2001. The rate of robbery with aggravating circumstances has also declined significantly. But in comparative terms, the levels remain intolerably high. South Africa's murder rate (47.5 per 100,000 people in 2001) compares badly with that of the United States (5.6), France (1.8), and Ghana (2.1) for the same year. South Africa's rate of rapes (104.6 per 100,000) is appallingly high compared to the United States (28.6), Japan (1.4), France (16.4), and Zimbabwe (35.7). Only when it comes to motor vehicle theft does the comparison become less invidious. The rate of 221 cases per 100,000 people compares better with the rate for Canada (547.6), France (537.7), and the United States (430.6) (Kane-Berman, 2004, pp. 401-403).

The impact on public perceptions of such pervasive levels of violent crime is predictable. A national opinion survey undertaken in 2003 showed that fewer than one in every four South Africans (23 percent) feel that it is

safe to walk alone after dark in the area where they reside (Burton et al., 2004, p. 53). The failure to deal with violent crime is a signal indicator of state weakness, and a threat to the consolidation of democracy.


AIDS

Africa south of the Sahara is, at the time of writing, generally accepted as the area in the world that is worst hit by the HIV/AIDS disease. For a number of years, South Africa was the country with the largest number of HIV/AIDS infected people in the world (only overtaken by India in 2005). In 2002 South Africa had 6.46 million people living with HIV, or with full-blown AIDS, an infection rate of 14.2 percent (Kane-Berman, 2004, pp. 295, 296). The latest calculation, at the time of writing in 2005, was that people were dying from AIDS-related disease at the rate of 800 per day (Bourne & Geffen, 2005, p. 18).

Projections of the future impact of AIDS differ widely and wildly, but some estimates are worth considering. One of the most important side effects of the disease is the large number of orphans (ages 0–14) left by deceased parents. The low estimate is that South Africa will have to deal with about 1.95 million such orphans by 2010, while the high estimate puts it at 7 million (Kane-Berman, ed., 2004, p. 294). How society deals with this challenge is of singular importance for democratic consolidation. If not integrated into mainstream society, these orphans may be recruited by the many criminal gangs and syndicates, which could escalate the problems of violent crime mentioned above.

The most troubling aspect of the entire AIDS issue has been the reluctance of the ANC government to implement an anti-AIDS policy at all. At first, President Mbeki questioned the link between HIV and AIDS, claiming that material deprivation was the more likely cause. The government only started introducing anti-retroviral medication to pregnant mothers after losing a court case against the Treatment Action Campaign interest group in 2000.

The overall impact of the disease on the population can best be assessed through its impact on life expectancy. Life expectancy at birth is in the decline. In 1980 it stood at 58.8 years, rising to 62.8 years in 1991. Then it declined to 57 in 1996, and further down to 50.9 years in 2001 (Kane-Berman, 2004, pp. 20, 21). A large part of this decline is considered to be AIDS-related, especially as it tends to associate with tuberculosis, an otherwise highly curable disease. One projection, presented in Figure 6, is that the overall population growth of the country will stall below 48 million for many years. According to this analysis, the life expectancy of the population is expected to decline to 41 years by 2010. Whatever the unknown long-term effects of AIDS may be, one effect is incontestable: it saps the wealth from society. Families lose breadwinners, and ill people, who may linger for many years, have to be taken care of by others who end up depleting their life savings in this way. AIDS is, therefore, one of the potent factors in the underdevelopment syndrome in contemporary South Africa.



Source: Actuarial Society of South Africa

Note: The fact that the “no change” and “change” lines are almost identical indicates that intervention at this stage will have a negligible effect on population growth.

Figure 6

Population Size and Impact of HIV/AIDS, 2000–2010 (in millions)

(Source: Kane-Berman, J. (ed.), *South Africa Survey 2003/2004*, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations 2004, p. 21)

► CONCLUSION

South Africa's democracy is delicately poised. The direct beneficiaries of democracy experience a “peace dividend” in a tangible way. These include the multiracial business sector, the upwardly mobile black middle class, the new black multi-millionaires, and the various individuals who benefited from preferential treatment in appointments through affirmative action policies. Also on this list would be individuals and communities that now have access to water, electricity, clinics, and schools, as well as those who had land restored to them after being expropriated by the apartheid government. Ranging up against them are an increasingly disgruntled multiracial mix of citizens, who sense that the peace dividend has passed them by, and that the benefits are accruing disproportionately to the powerholders themselves. This group can be recruited from the 8.1 million people without jobs (according to the wide definition of unemployment), the 21.5 million still living in poverty, the many victims of violent crime, those suffering directly or indirectly from the impact of AIDS, those who lost jobs through affirmative action, and those who are still without housing, sanitation, electricity, water, and access to clinics. Many of them have become cynical about the slogan of “A better life for all,” and about the ideological roots of this slogan, the Freedom Charter, which was drawn up in 1955. This sentiment is well represented in the cartoon (Figure 7) that appeared in the *Sunday Times* on June 26, 2005, the year in which the fiftieth anniversary of the Freedom Charter is celebrated.

Could any other president have done better than Mbeki? The cornerstone of his policies was to play by the rules of the neoliberal paradigm for managing the economy through fiscal and monetary restraint, good governance, and growth-oriented initiatives. Comparative political economy tells




Figure 7

The Freedom Charter (Source: *Sunday Times*, June 26, 2005. Used by permission of the author.)

us that states that do otherwise (such as Zimbabwe from 2000 onward), are heavily punished by hegemonic global markets, and are prone to collapse into a downward spiral of bankruptcy, repression, poverty for all, and a destruction of the rule of law. The consolidation of democracy in South Africa hinges on the all-round acceptance of this fact.

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