a short essay

Will Japan Change? By Peter K. Frost

I s Japan once again changing? Unlike 1868, when the newly empowered

Meiji empe ror moved to Tokyo to preside over a series of dramatic changes that became more generally known as the Meiji Restorat ion. or

194 5, when the Allied O ccupation allied with relatively progressive japanese

to create a new constitution and institute a set of m ajor reforms, Japan has yet to see a truly dram atic leader or many public protests. Yet a less dram atic se- ries o f political, economic, and social developments, combined with the

shocking March 2011 do uble blow of a 9.0 ea rthqu ake and forty-five foot tsunami, raises a question: Is Japan currently in the midst of a third major transformation?

Economic Issu es For some time now, Japanese voters have b een upset by the collapse of what had been c alled Japan's weconomic miracle:· As m ost forcefully-if contro-

versially-explained by Chalmers Johnson and refined a bit by Steven Vogel, Japan's once-praised "developmental state» linked the deeply entrenched, pro-

business Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), an elite bureaucracy a rmed wi th considerable regulatory power, and large banks that gave long- term loans to export o riented companies. These in turn combined close ties with their sub- sidi ary firms and dealers into groups of affilia ted com pan ies kn own as keiretsu, most of which promised permanent employment to an elite male workforce in return for loyal and dedicated work.1 Add to this a "second

budge( of capital from the postal savings system a nd what was know n as amakudari (lite rally "descent from heaven:· or the practice of companies hir-

ing retiring bureaucrats who had o nce supervised them), and you h ave a tight-knit economic syste m.2 Particularly useful when Japan was trying to mode rni ze its economy, all th is encouraged annual GNP growth of 9 to 10 percent p er year up to the oil c risis of 1973 and a relatively respectable 3 to 5 percent growth thereafter. In the process, Japan quickly became the second- largest GNP in the world. It also built highly successful export industries in areas such as electronics and cars that amassed huge trade surpluses.

Under pressure from the US and othe r trading partners to do som ethin g abo ut these hu ge trade surpluses, Japan's Ministry of Finance agreed in the

1985 Plaza Agreement to boost the val ue of the yen , increase the m oney sup- ply, a nd fund substantial public works; these reforms would lessen the trade deficits by increasing both the value of the yen and domestic spending.3 As

prices-including stock shares-rose, banks made risky loans that were only secured by overinflated real estate, and stock prices rose. Perhaps inevitably, shortly after the death of the Showa emperor (mo re informally kn own as Hi- rohito) in 1989, a bubble-popping 1990 stock m arket crash cut the value of stock holdings in half, and many bank loans could not be repaid. Japa n was now in a major recession.

While economists d iffer on whether the government made the right re- sponse, most seem to think that stimulus packages were too small and th at

fman cial regulators were too unwilling to force banks to write off bad loans. Economists also generally agree that the 1997 gove rnment decision to in- crease the con sumption tax to offset a ballooning d ebt was a bad idea. Sim - ilarly, LDP Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryiitaro's 1995 so-called "Big Bang" set offmancial regulatory re forms that have been criticized as too modest. Most of these were n ot put into law until 2001 ; even the n, th ey were so technical that they did not have the explosive impact that their name implied.•

More government reforms were tried during the 200 1- 2006 te nure of

Prime Minister Koizumi Junichi ro. T his cha rismatic LDP leader insisted that Japan needed to adapt to contemoorarv times bv liberalizing its economv. In

1511

HIO

Japan real estate price index, 1985-2011 . Source: Japan Real Estate lnscitute, hnp:llbot.ly/ uYxA<II

Japan Stock Ml!lfl(et

·~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7.7.~~~~~~~~~~~

10000

0

Japan Nikkei 225 Index Performance, 1970-2005. Source: Rnfacts.com. http1/bit.ly/ uWga4e.

2004, Koizumi got the Diet (Parliament) to pass bills breaking up and priva- tizing the pork-laden highway corporation. A year late r, he called a special election designed to defeat the m ost stubborn of his own party's hold outs.

Koizumi then got another bill passed th at partially p rivatized the postal serv- ices. More importa ntly, the bill changed the postal savings system that the government used to fund its pet projects. Since then , however, vested inter- ests, the bureaucracy's desire to keep its privileges, and the general public's worry about the impact of economic liberalization, particularl y in ru ral ar eas, h ave watered down some of these bills.s

T he private sector has changed faster. Carlos Ghosn, for example, was hired in 1999 by Nissan Moto rs to restore th e companies fortunes: Ghosn is a Brazilian who was born in 1954 to Lebanese parents. After successes with

Michelin tires and the Renault auto company, Nissan made Ghosn their CEO. While his willingness to lay off workers, close plants, and sell off prestigious

assets- things foreigne rs find easier to do than Japanese- was upsetting, Ghosn's ability to turn an ailing car company into a profitable one quickly made h im extremely popular.6

Anoth er milestone came in 2000, when the Japanese gove rnment al- lowed the debt-ridden Long Term Credit Bank to be sold to American in-

vestors. Although the Japanese were hardly eager to sell such an important asse t to a little-known foreign investment fu nd, they recogni zed the need for the bank to get rid of its bad loan s and learn mode rn international banki ng

practices. Workin!! with internationall v-ed ucated Javanese. the new owners

quickly turned th e renamed Shinsei (New Life) Bank into an award-winning

a nd profitable e nterprise.7 Add to this the appo intment of British-ho rn

Howard St ringer to head th e prestigio us Sony e lectronics firm , a nd it was

clear that foreign managers, as well as Japa nese, were being brought in to

bring greate r fl exibility, more creativity, and me rit -based pay system s to

japan's traditio nal business culture.8

Yet japa n's overall economic record remains tepid, d espite numerous

s timulus packages. A predi cted 2011 Gross Domestic Product growth of 1.3

percent. even befo re the March 2011 sto rm damage has been fully calculated,

is disappointing.9 The nati onal debt has risen to more than twice the GN P.

The unemployment rate has bee n rising to a shocking- fo r Japanese-level

of over 5 pe rcent , 1vhile ma ny japanese are employed in "non -regular" jobs

that lack bo th benefits and long- term job security, and even college g raduat es

a re havi ng trouble finding work. 10 Worse yet, th e natio n, which likes to thi nk

of itself as overwhelm ingly middle class, has had to face up to the fac t that one

o ut of eve ry six japanese actu ally lives in poverty. The Ne w York Times re- po rted th at japan ese were particularly upset when th ey realized that this was

close to the poverty rate in th e United States, "whose glaring social inequal-

ities have long been viewed with scorn and pity here:•n

Yet another devastating blow came in March 20 II when the double-bar-

reled ea rthqu ake and tsun ami devastated an impo rtant segm ent of japan's

nuclear po we r-generated facilities, caused a radiation scare, kill ed at least

15,000 japanese, and created well over US $200 billion in damages. Adding

to the traged y was a perhaps inevitably bumbling response by the govern -

m ent and a clear convictio n that safety problems with japan's nuclea r plants

h ad been e ither overloo ked or covered up by the regulators.12 As C hina

m oved p ast japan to become the second-biggest econo my in th e world, and demands for cl1ange accelerated, the o bvious question was, would jap an be

able to respo nd?

Social Issues

A long series of disturbing social events also raised concerns abo ut )a pan's

need to refo rm. In 1995, foll owers of the bizarre Aum Shinrikyo religious cult

released po ison gas during the m orning rush ho ur at a busy subway junc-

tion, killing twelve and injuring pe rh aps as many as 5,000. As bad as this in-

c ident was, japanese were disturbed both by the poo r po li ce work and by the

fact that some Aum Shinrikyo scientists were graduates of elite universities

who sho uld h ave kn own better.

Othe r pro blems have been less violent yet equally troubling. For some

tinle, japanese have been worried by such pheno mena as youngsters whore-

fuse to go to school; increases in school ijime (bullying); "compensated dates" where young schoolgirls went o ut- and often slept with-older m en in re-

turn for expensive material gifts; "parasite singles" - m en and women who

lived with the ir pare nts rather th an having a d edicated career a nd/or mar-

ri age;furita-a mangled English-German loan word given to youth who ei-

the r by d esire o r, in m any cases by necessity, worked o nly periodicall y in

low-payin g jobs; and otaku (often tran slated as "computer nerds") who we re bette r at staying o n the Internet th an in face -to -face social situatio ns. In a

startling and admittedly controversial book, Michael Z ielenziger argues that

there are a large numbe r of hikiko rn ori, basically m en who hide in th eir room s, and th at th is reflects a larger protest against a stifling japanese soci-

ety. "Half th e p eople don't know how bad things are:· he d ainls a japanese

journalist told him. "The rest are in deni al:' 13

Japanese also have to worry a bout their country's rapidly changing po p- ulation . As expla ined in a fas cinatin g book edited by Marcus Reb ick and

Ayu mi Takenaka, three-generati o n families h ave droppe d from 18 pe rcent

of all ho useholds in 19 75 to I 0 percent in 2002, while the ave rage number of

household me mbers has shrunk from five in 1950 to 2.5 in 2004. ~< Partic u-

larly startling in th e allegedly group-orie nted japanese society, the number of

single-member ho useholds has risen to 23 percen t of all households. Since

the average age o f co uples getting married and the numbe rs of wom en who

As China moved past Japan to become the second-biggest economy in the world, and demands for change accelerated, the obvious question was, would Japan be able to respond?

choose not to get m ar ried a rc also r isi ng, th e birth rate has drop p<..·d fro m 4.7

in 1947 to 1.3 percent in 20011. This decline has led to an increase in the per-

centage of th e e lderl y from 5 percent in 1950 to 20 pe rcent in 2005. and . adds

David A rase, a projected 30 pe rcent by 20 30." As the rati o of workers to re -

tirees keeps shrinking. th e Japanese a rt• dee pl y co ncern ed abo ut h ow a slow-

growing econom y with relati vely few worke rs will be able to p rov ide fo r

japan's increasingly agi ng popu lati on. Will old er Japanese who wo rked so

hard to rebuild japan be able to get th e pensio ns and qualit y m edica l care

that they so richl y d ese rve? Concerns of this sort led the japanese to take a

hard look at the ir o nce-admired edu cational system .

Ed ucational Issues

japanese K- 12 edu catio n has lo ng been do minated by th e need to prepare

fo r very factual entrance examinatio ns to hi gh school and college. This led to

stud ents who were fon.:eJ to me morize tri via that, as Tho mas Rohlen's clas

sic wo rk put it, "few Ame rica n high school stud ents would even wan t to at - tempt answering." I• The ge neral public has lo ng complai ned aho ut the strains

caused by th ese e xams, and yet they have also felt that the precise, objectively

graded questio ns might be th e fairest way to judge who was entitled to ente r the m ost elite colleges and hence be assured of a successful ca ree r.17 A tra di -

tio nal stress on effort, as opposed to raw abilit y, m ay also have mad e the tests

seem m ore att racti ve- pa rticula rly to those who passed th em and now staff

th e educati onal bu rea ucracies- tha n th e popular te rm "examina tio n he ll"

might sugges t. 18

As th e economy stagnated, howeve r, educators hegan to worr y tha t the

e mphasis o n rote m emorizati on might kill o ff th e creativity that japan need ed

to compete in a consta nt ly cl1anging and increasingly globali zed economy.

In 1979, the Ministry of Ed ucation (afte r 2001 called the Ministry of Educa-

tio n , C ulture, Spo rts, Science and Technology, or MEXT), instituted a so-

called kyotsu ichiji shaken (common test), a screening device that students had to pass before they could take the mo re rigorous n atio nal uni versity

exam s. This policy was designed to eliminate students who had no ch an ce of

passing the mo re rigorous tests given by the unive rsities th em selves, but it in turn was c ritic ized fo r being ove rly p etty and un im agin ative. In response,

new tests in 1990 and 1997 were offered in an increasing number of subjects

so that uni ve rsities might have more choice in what subjects th ey would Like

their applicants to be tested. Private unive rsities were also a ll owed to u se the test.I 9

As this did no t seem to have much effect, M EXT also imple mented other

policies designed to m ake schooling m o re stimulating and less burdensome

in 200 2. Ja pan's half-day schooling on Satu rdays finally e nded, a nd a n ew

c urriculum was designed that allowed high school students greater course choice. A series of inte rdisciplin ary " Integrated Courses" were pro posed that

were designed to e ncourage elem entary and middle school students "to think

about his/he r future plans and to d esign his/her curriculum accordinglY:'

While the rhetoric was no doubt ahead of th e re ality, school stress was no w

being attacked at both the high school c urriculum and college entrance exam

level.20

Atte mpts were eve n made to m ake univers ities better. Regulatio ns e n-

ac ted in 2004 turned the n atio nal universities into "independent agencies"

wh ose staff we re no lo nger civil servants a nd hence no lo nger gua ranteed

permanent employment. Now national unive rsities h ad mo re say over how

they allo tted funds, hired fac ulty, and o rganized courses that would meet new

63

By 2009, voters were so fed up with the govern-

ment's inability to get Japan's economy growing

again that they soundly defeated the LOP and

elected a relatively new party, the Democratic

Party of Japan (DPJ).

2009 ele<tion result headlines. Source: httpi ftiny.cc/um 1 111<.

and mo re d emanding M EXT sta ndards. Law schools were started in hopes

of p rov iding mo re and bett er- tra ined lawyers able to m eet the d em ands fo r

refo rm.21 MEXT hoped this would not o nly help regula r universities gra du -

ate more engaged and bette r students but also create a top t ier of thirty world -

class institutio ns.22 Only the n could japan hope to meet bo th the general chal-

lenges o f globalization and a world in which it would now h ave to think up

its o wn creati ve techn o logical breakthrough s.

Reactions to t hese re form atte mpts have been mixed. Given that th e most prestigio us national unive rsiti es are still the o ldest, cheapest, and most likely to

enable their graduates to ge t good jobs, most families have ge nerally continued

to enroll their children in juku (cram schools) and ask them to study long hours

in tradition al exam -orie nted preparatio n. A few pri vate universities, w hile

more exp ensive, are also prestigious eno ugh to make entrance a diffic ult task

requiring lots of study. The d ecline in th e numbers of young people, o n the

othe r hand, is decreasing the applican t pool to th e poin t where there m ay soon

be a college space for every applicant who wishes a college experience. This

trend has already fo rced relati vely less pres tigious universities, even witho ut

MEXT prodding, to d evelop markedl y simpler entrance examinations, pro-

mote supplementary entrance criteri a, and even constru ct ways of skip ping the mind-numbing entrance exa minatio ns altogether.23 Concerns about youth

problems and education m ay also help explain why some Japanese want to cre-

ate a greater sense of natio nalism. At least since 1982, various conservative ac- ad emics, like- minded Diet m embe rs, and educational officials have waged

what British )a pan specialist Caro line Rose has described as japan's "third text-

book offensive:· Their aim has bee n to revise o r write new textbooks that would

downplay such controversial and Japan -bashing subjec ts as japan's colo nial ex-

pansion, whether the japan ese army invad ed o r "ad vanced into" C hina, th e

Na nj ing Massacre, an d th e fa te of the Worl d War H "Com fo rt Wo men" who

we re forced to hav~ sc:x with Japanese soldiers. Th~s~ efforts ar.: do~cl)' all ied

with the 1999 requirement tha t schools re spec t the nati o nal tbg an d the .m-

them a nd a mo re rece ntl y published guide urging gre at er emphasis on moral

education. They hav.: also inspired perio dic pushes to revise both the allegedly

too individualistic 194 7 f u ndam ental La w o f Educati on a nd the "A rti cle Nine"

clause in the 1947 Japane~e Constit ution that lim its Japa n's m ilitar y to a rda -

tively mod est SclfDefcn s.: Force. Wh ile st rong opposition fro m libe ral edu ca-

tors and sharp criticism fro m Japan's neighbors have so fa r kept advocates of

conservative educatio na l revisio ns prett y much in check, the d ebate over how

vigorou sly Japanese stude nts sho uld be tau ght to love th eir countr y. like the

so-called "Culture Wa rs" in the Uni ted States, rages on.l•

Politics

Traditio nally, Ja pan's post war political syste m was d o minated by a co nserva -

tive coalition kn own as the Libe ral Democratic Party (l .DP). O perating u nder

a parli ame ntar y system first ~stabli shcd in th e Mcij i Constitution of 11:!~0.

but then substan tia ll y ame nd ed in the American -influe nced 1947 Consti tu-

ti on , the LOP combined di spro po rtiona ll y powe rful rural vo tes with a pro-

business, pro-American set of po lic ies heavily seasoned with " po rk'' hando uts

that were politically useful. Commen tators talked o f an "iro n tri ang le" of LDP

po lit ician s who co nt rolled the D ie t, powerful b u reaucrats, and business lead

e rs- ye t th ey also had to admit th at the LD P part y was able to meet vote r

concerns fo r high eco no m ic g rowth , natio nal sec u rit y. and environmental

improvements. Pe ri odi c corruption scandals and cont rove rs ial visits by sev-

eral prime ministers, including Koizumi junichi ro, to th e Yasukuni Shinto

Shrine for the wa r dead we re most ly exc used, as long as it seemed that th e

LOP was at least bette r than th e o pposition.

As concerns m ou nt ed , some p rogress wa s made. In 1994, fo r exa mple,

Japan's electoral syste m was cha nged from multi- member districts electing 500 Diet membe rs- vote rs chose one candidate, but several might get seats in the

Diet- to 300 single-member d istricts and a n addit ionall 80 members elected by

proportional represe ntatio n. The system was not e ntirely fair as some districts

required more than twice as many vo tes to be elected as others. Efforts were

m ade to limit th e practi ce o f amakuda ri- private businesses hiring retiring bu-

reaucrats-and giving the public access to official d ocum en ts. Eve n Japan's o nce

relatively d ocile press began mo re vigo ro us investigati ve report ing.25

Yet by 2009, voters we re so fed up with t he governme nt's inability to ge t

japan's economy growing agai n th at they so undly d efeated the LOP a nd

elected a relatively new party, the Democrati c Party of japan (DPJ) . In con-

trast to the LDP's traditional political gero ntocracy, almost half of the DP)

candidates in th e 2009 elec tions were unde r forty-s ix years of age. The ir slo -

gan, seikatsu daiichi ("Yo u r d ail y life com es first"), reflected what The Econ- omist called the japanese voters' "an :x:iety abo ut the ir o wn living stand ards,

and th eir sense th at things around the m w hich they th ought o f as 'fund a-

m entally japanese' we re fa lling apart:' T he DP)'s ambiti ous political platfo rm

included cutting carbon e missio ns, lo wering gas taxes and high way to lls, up -

ping the minimum wage, reduc ing sm all business tax b u rd ens, h elping to pay subsidies for families with children less th an ftfteen years o f age, provid-

ing both better h ealth care and improved p ensio ns fo r the elderly, a nd mov-

ing unpopular American military bases in O kinawa.26

Voters liked the m essage; in the all-important Lowe r House election, two

thirds of the LOP candidates lost the ir i.e~, and their numbers shrank to 140, whi le the broad coalitio n led by the\D~P rose to 3 18. If calculated in per- centage terms, the LDP's sh are of the )':!6pular vo te dropped roughl y 13 per-

cent to about 38 percent o f th e to tal, wh ile th e D P) coalition went up fro m

over 10 p ercent to over 48 percent of the to taJ.2' Flushed wit h victo ry, DP)

party head Hatoyam a Yuki o fo rmed a new gove rnment.

U nfo rtunately, the D PJ got into trouble almost immedi ately. Prime MiJl -

ister Hatoyam a was quickly weake ned b y his poo r leadership skills, h is

64 EDUCATION ABOlJf ASIA Volume 16, Nu mber 3 Winter20 11

[page 65 of the original article with a 2014 in sert]

association with Ozawa lchiro, a long time w heeler-dealer, and by his own money-raising scandals. In May 2010, he had to apologize to Okinawa residents and then resign for not living up to his promise to move the noisy and unpopular American marine ba se at Futenma . No sooner had he resigned, than hi s successor, Naoto Kan, had to beat back a seriou s challenge from Ozawa: shortly after, in July, the DPJ did badly in th e upper house election and could no longer be sure that its bills would pass. Then came strong doubts that the DPJ was competent enough to fix the appalling damage from the March 2011 earthquake and t sunami. By August 30, 2011, Noda Yoshihiko had replaced Naoto Kan as the sixth Prime Minister in five years. Noda promptly had to fire his trade minister for allegedly joking with reporters about the nuclear radiation tragedy.

[2014 insert] Sure enough, the 2012 lower house elections turned out to be a disaster for the Democratic Party of Japan. Their seats dropped from 308 to a mere 57, while the once trounced Liberal Democratic Party's number of seat s increased from 119 to 294. Th e LDP promptly elected Abe Shinzo as their leader -- and hence Prime Minister. Domestically, Abe announced the "three arrow" reforms of monetary and fisca l stimulu s plus attempts to continue efforts to loosen Japan's rather inflexible business organization. While the restructuring proceeded way too slowly, the monetary and fiscal stimulu s, plu s the improved economic situation in the United States and elsewhere, did lead to a modest , but encouraging 1.9% GDP growth in 2013. As in the United States, the stimulus rai sed stock market prices higher-- in Japan's case by an astounding 50%-- yet unlike the US, stock market prices were still not yet back to 2007 levels .

Meanwhile Abe, lon g known as a staunch nat ionalist , react ed vigorou sly to a dispute with China over a set of islands known to the Japanese as th e Senkaku Island s and th e Chinese as the Diaoyu. While basica lly a set of uninhabited rocks, whoever owned the islands could lay claim to rich oil and fish resources in the neighboring waters, and, of course, to national pride. In the fall of 2013, China announced that the islands were part of th eir air defense zone, while Japan responded by an upgraded defense plan and a controve rsial visit by Abe to the Yasukuni Shrine to the war dead . It seems fair to say that both sides undoubtedly found not backing down and, indeed, posing as nationalists helped maintain their popularity at home. Thi s in turn alarmed the Obama administration, which reaffirmed its defense treaty with Japa n but urged caution and negotiation on both sides. Th e ways in whi ch all this will affect the direction of change in Japan will be fascinating to watch.

Conclusion So will the Japanese be able to respond to these significant changes? Even as- suming stable political leadership, slow growth in other industrial nations, combined with Japan's quite large national debt and the expenses of rebuilding the nation after the March storm, will hurt the economy and thus limit the na- tion's ability to fund domestic reforms without some sort of unpopular tax in- crease.19 Si milarly. the rise of a more aggressive China, combined with North Korea's erratic behavior, will also make it hard for Japan to move too far away from the traditional American alliance. More abstractly, while most Japanese arc worried about their future, they are also conscious that Japan is much bet- ter off now than it was in the immediate postwar years. The older generations, in particular, are proud of what the nation has accomplished and seem hesitant to support too radical a set of reforms. A 5 percent unemployment rate is up- setting, they admit, but it is less than that of the US. Why institute a lot of po- tentially dangerous changes, they say, when life is not too bad as it is?

Yet change appears likely. No longer are Japan's bureaucrats so powerful; in the wake of well-publicized bureaucratic mistakes and, in some cases, cor- ruption, politicians arc asserting control of policy formation. The legal sys- tem is changing. Citizen groups are being formed to lobby politicians, government officials, and businesses on the important issues of the day. The media is demanding more information on controversial issues, and as a re- sult, is becoming more confrontational. The unusually startling demographic developments, new educational developments, and an increasingly innova- tive business culture are taking hold, and there is some evidence that young Japanese have been inspired to help rebuild their ravished nation.30

Even though Japan's leaders face difficulties and have made mistakes, ar- gues Temple University historian Jeff Kingston, Japanese have not only the de- sire but also the ability to change. Fortunately, Japan is a highly educated country with a trained workforce and a good health care system. Unlike the US, its national debt is largely held by domestic institutions. It has first-class com- panies poised to profit from the rise of Indian and Chinese markets. The March tragedy has galvanized the nation to rebuild. Most of all, Japan has a history of changing when it needs to. While the changes most probably will not appear be as dramatic as those of the Meiji Restoration or the Allied Occupation, "In a messy, incremental and fitful manner," Kingston states, "Japan will somehow manage to muddle through" what he calls "Japan's Quiet Transformation:· How this turns out will greatly affect both Japan and the world. 31 •

NOTES

I. Chalmers johnson, MIT! mrd the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy. 1925- 1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); Steven K. Vogel, Japan Remodeled: How Government and Industry are Reforming Japanese Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Cornell University Press, 2006); see also Gary Kikuchi, "What Are Keiretsu and Why Do Some U.S. Compani es Dislike Them ?" in Japan - Why it Works, Why it Doesn't: Economics in Everyday Life, James Mak, Shyam Sunder Shigeyuki, Abe and Kazuhiro lgawa, eds. (Hon- olulu: University of Hawai · i Press. 1998). For a more complex view, see Thomas E. Oirgill and Takayuki Sakamoto, Iapan Si11ce 1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

2. for a stud cnl ·oriclllcd d ,•scription of the Postal Sa,~ngs Bank system . sec lames Mak, lapa11: Wiry ir 1\'orh 1\'lry It Dm·s,·r.

3. Steven K. Vogel. Japan llm wdelcd: How Govcrumctlf arrd Industry nrr Refo rmms /11(11111 · esc Capitali.<m (Prinn·Ion , NJ: Cornell Univcr.;ity Press, 2006). Much oftiH· in forma t.lon in the fnllowi ng parogra phs also com es from this source; see also Zhiqun /.h u. Urrtlrr· sta11ding East A.<ia:< f:r .. nnmit "Miracles," KLAS Series (Associat ion fo r Asinn Studies. 2009).

4. See EdwMd j. Lincul n. "The Japanese Government and the Economy;· Edu oll iorr AIJout Asia 12 no. 3 (200 7): .l l - 38.

5. For further commentar y. sec " ltichard Katz on the Japanese Economy;· Ed<Jmtinll Al1011t Asia 15 no. I (20 I 0 ): .1~ J 7.

6. David Magee, 'limrar01mtl: How Carlos Glrom Rescued Nissan (New York : I la rpcrCo ll ins Publishers, 2003 ).

7. Gillian Tett . Saving tlrr Srm: A Wall Street Gamble to Save /apm1 f rom It s Trillio11 Dolla r Gamble (New York: I tarpcrCollin s Publishers. 2003); a paperback edition hy I larpcr· Collins is ti tled S.wirrg tir e Sun: How Wall Street Mavericks Slrook Up /apmrs Fit~~rrr cial World and Made /Jilli<>>rs.

8. Daniel Schorn, "Sir I toward Stringer: Sony's Savior?" 60 Minutes, C BS News, january 8, 2006; sec al so John Nathan, Sony (N ew York: Marine( Books, Houghto n Mifllin. 1999).

9. GDP estimates vary wid ely. Th ese were taken from 71Ie Ecomrmist special edition, Tire World ill 201l, 11 9.

10. A New l'ork limes article re ports that 45 perce nt of workers fifteen to thirty · lo ur ho ld " incgular" jobs. and only 56.7 percent of graduating college seniors had seem ed jobs. Janu ary 28. 20 II. ·

II. New York 1imcs. Ap ril 22,2010, 6; sec also Tire Economisr, September 5, 2009,29 - 3 1 and David A rase, "Japan in 2008: A Prclud~ to Change?" As,ia11 Survey 49. no. I (2009 ).

12. Sec, for exa mple. Onishi Norimitsu and Martin Fackler, "Japan Ignored or Long Hid Nuclear Risks," New l'ork Times. May 17, 2011. I.

13. Michael Zielenziger. Slr utti11g Out tir e Su11: How Iapan Created Its Ow11 Losr Gerru ation. (Hopkinton. Ma ssachu setts: Vintage Books, 2006).

14. Marcus Rebid: and Ayumi Takcnaka, "The Changing japanese Family;· in Marcus Rr· bick and Ayumi Takcna ka, eds .. The Cha11ging fapanesc Family (New Yo rk: Routledge Publishers, 2006). 3ff.

15. Sec Arase, Japan in 2008 . 16. l11omas Rohlen, /apmrs Higlr Schools (Berkeley: University of Ca lifornia Press. 1983). 9 7. 17. For an elaboration of this idea. see Ronald Dore, The Diploma Disease (Berkele y: Uni·

versity of California Press, 1976). 18. The virtues of effort are discussed in lbomas Rohlcn and Gerald LeTendre, Teaching and

Learning i11 japa n (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996). 19. For Engli sh la nguage references. see http://www.m ext.go.jp/englishnews/2000/

10/00 I 00 l.htm. 20.lbid. 21. See "A Brieflntcrvie w with Frank Upham; Educatio11 About Asia 16 no. 1 (2011 ):54-5 5_ 22. Ibid, 199ff; see also "W(h)ilher the japanese University? An In troduction to the 2004

Higher Education Reforms in Japan," The "Big Bang" in Japanese Education, j.S. Eades, Roger Goodman and Yumiko Hada, cds., (Victoria: Trans Pacific Press, 2005),1 ff.

23. Earl H. Kin month, "From Selection to Seduction: The Impact of Demographic Chan ge on Private Higher Education: in The "Big nang.·

24. Caroline Rose, "Patriotic Ed\lcation in Japan; in Nationalisms in Japan, Naoko Shimazu (New York: Routledge. 2006), 131 - 154; see also J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Sa.;,uels, Nine Uves? The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Iapan (Washington: The J;ast West Center, 2005).

25. See Upham and Takahashi Kazuyuki. "Ongoing Changes in the Infrastructure of a Con- stitutional System; from 'Bureaut racy to Qemocracy7' in Law in Japan: A Turning Point, Daniel H. Foote, ed. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 329ff.

26. "New Bosses; The Economist, September 3, 2009, 69. 27. Ibid. .

28. 11re Economist, May 8- 14, 2010, 42; see also Blaine Harden, "Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama Resigns; Washington Post Online, june 2, 2010.

29. Jeff Kingston, Japans Quiet Transformati.on: Social Change and Civil Sodety in the Twenty· first Century (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2~4); Kingston, Contemporary Iapan: His- tory, Politics and Social Change Since tire 198o s (Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley Blackwell, . 201 I). The quotation is from Contemporary Japan, 255.

30. The Economist, September 3-9. 2011, 39; ~ee also New York Times, September 13, .2011, A6.

31. See Kingston,Japans Quiet TransfomJation.

PETER K. FROST is the Frederick L Schuman Professor of International Relations Emer- itus. Williams College and Visiting Professor of International Studies at the Croft Institute. The University of Mississippi.

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