Assignment Value Theory (two pages single-spaced)
onvab
theory_of_value_1-4.pdf
12/04/17
1
Introduc0on to Philosophy
Theory of Value 1
Theory of Value • Theory of Value is about things which are good or bad, right or wrong,
concerning issues related to how one ought to behave and to what makes life valuable
• Broadly, there are two types of issues we are going to discuss: 1. Are statements of value, like ‘You ought to do this’, because ‘it is good
to do this’ and ‘This person is a good person’ and ‘Pleasure is good’, true/false, or are they not the kind of things which can be true/false? If no, you are subjec,vist. If yes, there is a next ques0on: How are such statements true/false? If because of reality, then you are a realist If because someone determined it so, then you are a conven,onalist > God: Divine Command Theory > Society: Ethical Rela,vism > Individual: cf. Existen,alism
Theory of Value II 2. What makes valuable/good ac0ons good? Ø We are going to discuss three views: a. U,litarianism: an ac0on is good if and only if it
maximizes the amount of pleasure/absence of pain or distress in society.
b. Kan,anism: an ac0on is good if you could turn it into a ra0onal law
c. Aristotelianism: an ac0on is good if it contributes to or flows from your well- func0oning as a human being
Subjec0vism • Statements of value are neither true nor false • Perhaps they are more like expressions of liking/disliking?
(emo0vism) • Some ini,al arguments for subjec0vism: Ø There is a lot of disagreement on value - therefore value is
subjec0ve Ø What is true or false describes what is the case; but a value
statement does not describe what is the case, but what ought to be the case – therefore value is subjec0ve
Only works if one assumes that only what is the case can be true/false – can be a fact Ø What is true or false describes natural proper0es; but according to
the meaning of value statements, they do not describe natural proper0es – therefore value is subjec0ve
Only works if one assumes that only natural (observable) proper0es can be described in true/false statements – only they appear in facts.
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2
Some ‘Stronger’ Arguments for Subjec0vism
1. There is no reasoning in ethics, while there is in science, because there is nothing really to reason about Ø But there is a lot of reasoning in ethics, at least to check consistency 2. There are no observa0ons in ethics, while there are in science, because there is nothing really there to observe Ø But we do make ethical observa0ons, at least of par0cular cases 3. Disagreement in ethics cannot really be solved, for there is no path towards agreement one can agree about, while in science there are ways of ul0mately finding out (and if not, it does not ma_er) Ø Sober’s cri0cism: one can fail to see the truth in ethics because of,
say, self-interest or self-decep0on > so there might be truth, even if there is no path to agreement
Ø But in ethics, failure to see ‘the truth’ can only have consequences if other people disagree, while in science failure to see the truth leads one to expect impossibili0es. So a`er this argument the burden is upon those who want to maintain that there is some truth/falsehood to ethical statements – they have to show how that can be.
The Strongest Argument for Subjec0vism
• In order to explain us having beliefs about ma_ers of science, we need to postulate facts for our beliefs to be about.
Ø Ul0mately, what facts there are determines our beliefs (even if our beliefs are partly mistaken)
• Do we need to postulate facts to explain our beliefs about ma_ers of value, so that our beliefs are about these facts?
Ø It does not seem so: our value beliefs can be explained by appeal to our ‘natural responses’, our upbringing, our experience, but we do not need ethical facts.
[[Sober’s cri0cism: we need to dis0nguish between two types of explana0on for our ethical beliefs: a. Par0cular ethical facts are not needed to explain par0cular ethical beliefs about them. b. General ethical principles do explain the content of our par0cular ethical beliefs, and that theory
of value is true which explains that content best.]]
Evalua0on of Subjec0vism • The arguments in favor of subjec0vism do seem to point to
a real difference between truth/falsity in the case of ‘normal’ knowledge and what holds in the case of ethical beliefs.
• S0ll, the sugges0on of subjec0vism is that we may believe anything we like about ma_ers of ethics – that seems false, however:
Ø Despite disagreement, there is also a lot of agreement about value, also between socie0es
Ø Ethical beliefs are crucially shared, and play an important role in our delibera0ons on social ac0on; thus they cannot be merely subjec0ve – they must at least be inter- subjec0ve
4/13/17
1
Introduction to Philosophy
Theory of Value 2
Recapitulation
• Subjectivism is the view that there are no facts of the matter at all to make value statements true or false
• Metaphysical arguments: the only real facts can only be described (is, not ought) or feature only natural properties
Ø But why could there not be other facts, or why could not real facts be described in two ways, as natural and as not-natural?
• Argument from deep disagreement: ethical disagreement cannot be settled in any way, even though one can argue in ethics > is most easily explained if there are no
facts of the matter.
• Best argument: for most beliefs, the fact that we have them is explained best by reference to reality being so-and-so; for beliefs about value, however, that does
not seem to be the case > the easiest explanation there seems that they are the
result of our ‘natural responses’, our experience, our upbringing.
• All these arguments do point to a difference between normal beliefs and beliefs about value, but they are not enough to argue for subjectivism
Ø If subjectivism were correct, there should be deep disagreement about every belief about value > subjectivism cannot explain that there is also deep agreement about some values.
Ø Subjectivism cannot explain that it is crucial for beliefs about value that they are shared by at least some group.
Conventionalism
• The core idea of conventionalism is that there are facts about value, but that they are different from
facts in science, because they are facts made
facts by someone
ØThis can easily explain deep disagreement > not necessary to be subjectivist for that reason
ØThere are different versions of conventionalism, depending on who does the making: God, a
culture/society, or an individual
Divine Command Theory
• Something is good because God/gods make it good
ØBecomes all the more attractive, the more powerful one’s concept of a god is: ancient Greek
goods were not held to be very powerful, but
monotheistic gods, having created the world, can
become very powerful
ØThe more powerful a god is, the more difficult it is to distinguish between the divine command
theory and realism > if a god has created the
whole world, then everything is such that it is so
because the god made it so.
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Criticism of Divine Command Theory
• Criticism of Divine Command Theory assumes that there is a real difference between normal facts and ethical facts
• 1. There are many religions or many gods: are they all creating ethical facts?
• 2. If DCT were true, then the god(s) could have made any value statement true
Ø They would have acted without a reason Ø They must have acted without a reason, because if they
had had a reason, then the ethical fact would have been
there, because of this reason, not because the god(s) would
have made it a fact.
Ø This argument works against any conventionalist theory.
Ethical Relativism
• Ethical relativism says that values are culture-dependent (not merely situation-dependent)
Ø Not in the sense that cultures disagree about values Ø But in the stronger sense that values are there because
they are adopted by a culture
• Problems with Ethical relativism: 1. Same problem as with DCT: cultures could adopt any value
– it is completely arbitrary
2. It leads to conformism: it is impossible to criticize current
values
3. It does not justify the rule that one should not interfere
with the values of another culture > why not just
eradicate that culture?
Mitigated Ethical Relativism
• It seems possible to adopt a mixed account of value, according to which:
- there are facts determining for some things
what is good
- For other things such facts are created by
society/group
Realism
• How could there be ethical facts without them being the same type of facts as normal facts?
• It is possible to talk about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in a descriptive way:
Ø ‘This is a bad hammer’ Ø ‘My left eye is my good eye’ Here ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is related to a function > something can be such that it can/cannot perform its function
Ø Artefacts have functions because human beings give them a function > created fact
Ø Natural things have functions because in evolution these things remained there because of providing an advantage >
real fact
19/04/17
1
Introduc0on to Philosophy
Theory of Value 3
Recapitula0on I
• Subjec0vism claims that there are no facts of the maDer in ethics
Ø There is unresolvable disagreement in ethics, and that can best be explained by subjec0vism
Ø To account for the beliefs of people on value maDers, we do not have to appeal to facts about certain ac0on: ‘natural responses’, upbringing, experience will do
• These arguments do show that value facts either do not exist, or are at least different from ‘normal’ facts
• Subjec0vism cannot explain ‘deep agreement’
Recapitula0on II
• Conven0onalism: there are ethical facts, but they are made
Ø By god(s): Divine Command Theory Ø By culture/society: Ethical Rela0vism Ø By individual • Main problem of Conven0onalism: it is arbitrary what kind of values the god(s)/ society/the individual adopt (and if it is not arbitrary, then the facts are not made so)
Realism • In case of an ‘obviously good or bad thing’ many have the intui0on
that it is really obvious that it is good or bad > ‘Don’t you see?!’ > as if there is a fact out there which everybody should see, and as if it is a mistake not to see > Realism
• How could there be ethical facts without them being the same type
of facts as normal facts? • It is possible to talk about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in a descrip0ve way: Ø ‘This is a bad hammer’ Ø ‘My leY eye is my good eye’ Here ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is related to a func)on > something can be such that it can/cannot perform its func0on Ø Artefacts have func0ons because human beings give them a
func0on > created fact Ø Natural things have func0ons because in evolu0on these things
remained there because of providing an advantage > real fact
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Realism II
• Perhaps there are also such facts in the case of ethics > two possibili0es would be:
1. A society can only func0on if there are certain norms > these norms are good, as a fact
2. An individual of a species can only func0on if it engages in certain types of ac0ons > these ac0ons are good, as a fact
> U0litarianism seems to be sympathe0c to such a view: being pleasurable can be seen as involving well-func0oning
Possible Objec0ons
• Do socie0es and individuals have func0ons? Ø Whether a society func0ons well with certain norms also depends on the circumstances, which might change > do the facts change as well?
Ø What would be the func0on of a human being? - Being alive seems not enough for ethics - Being ra+onal seems far too much Ø Should we some0mes not overcome our func0ons? > for example: ea0ng meat may seem to belong to our well-func0oning, but is that good?
4/20/17
1
Introduction to Philosophy
Theory of Value 4
Recapitulation
• Realism tries to combine: - Value beliefs are different from ‘normal’ beliefs (the
subjectivist point - so as to also explain the possibility of deep disagreement)
- there are real facts, not just facts created by someone • by deriving value from real facts about human beings,
either human beings individually or in groups (societies) > on the basis of a function and a criterion for functioning well
• Does this strategy work for all values? It may work for justice, inter-personal relations, but perhaps not for general abstract principles of value or for relations with non- humans.
Theories about what makes actions good
• We will discuss three views: 1. Utilitarianism: good is what leads to the
greatest happiness of the greatest number of
people
2. Kantianism: good is what can be turned into
a rational law
3. Aristotelianism: good is what flows from/contributes to human well-functioning
Utilitarianism
• Utilitarianism: an action is good because it brings about the greatest happiness/well-
being/pleasure for the greatest number
ØOverriding
ØReally universal and equal
ØReason-involving in finding out what does bring this about
4/20/17
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Utilitarianism and Calculating the Greatest Good
• One standard objection against Utilitarianism: How to compare different goods/pleasures? How can we calculate the greatest good?
• John Stuart Mill (1806-73): pleasures are different, but we can still compare them, at least those of us who know the pleasures involved
> They prefer the ‘higher’ kinds of pleasure (of the intellect) > they count for ‘more’
Utilitarianism and Fairness
• Utilitarianism does justice to the idea that in many cases we value an action because of its
consequences
> everybody counts equally > seems fair
• If the suffering of one person leads to a greater overall well-being, utilitarianism prescribes that action
> utilitarianism thus does not seem fair
Rule Utilitarianism
• Utilitarianism tries to circumvent the problem of fairness by introducing rules: > one should introduce rules, including ones for fairness, because they lead to a greater well-being for the greatest number of people > the idea: infringement of the rule may on this occasion lead to more well-being, but not in the long run
Ø Does this solve all the problems? No, rules which discriminate against minorities in support of the happiness of the majority are still possible > one needs a stronger principle to avoid that: John Rawls proposed the ‘veil of ignorance’: rules should be formulated in isolation from knowledge who is going to profit from them and who is at a disadvantage > doing as if you don’t know where in society you will end up.
Utilitarianism and the Evalution of Persons
• One consequence of Utilitarianism is that it is irrelevant who is doing the action and certainly irrelevant who the ones involved in the action are
ØIf, of two people, you can only save one, and one is your child, then you do not have any reason to save your child and not the other.
ØPeter Singer: if you have to choose between a human being and an animal, you do not have a reason to choose either.
