

OCCUPIED AMERICA

A HISTORY OF CHICANOS

Seventh Edition



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Goodbye America: The Chicano in the 1960s

1945 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1973

These historical decades are markers within a timeline that help the reader understand how a historical period fits into the development of nations or peoples. More often, however, successive decades merge into each other as major events spill over from one decade into the next. In the above timeline, the year 1945 marks the end of World War II, an event that would have a huge impact on the 1960s, in turn, when trying to understand the "Sixties," it is important to recognize that it too will affect future generations and that the period did not end in 1969. As a marker, some would generalize that this historical period actually ended in 1973 with the end of the Vietnam War. In Chicano history, the Decade of the Sixties is highly important. During this time, the Mexican American identity reached a point where it was integrated into the political life of the nation. The Chicano population reached a critical mass in numbers and because it was concentrated in cities, it could no longer be ignored.

Breaking down the 1960s, one characteristic of the decade was the white baby boomers, the children of people born in the late 1920s. From 1940 to 1964, 76 million babies were born in the United States. The sheer magnitude of this group profoundly affected the economy, politics, fashions, and music of the 1960s, as well as their relations with Chicanos, who as a community were younger than other groups.¹ A significant number of this rock-and-roll generation supported integration and opposed the Vietnam War. Youth played a role in the "leveling" of society. For example, this progressive fringe supported the black Civil Rights movement, spread the antiwar campaign to university campuses, and affected the national conversation.²

The consciousness of a critical mass of the 1960s generation was shaped by World War II, which brought about the breakup of colonial empires built during the previous three centuries. The Third World hoped to decolonize its countries and end their dependency on industrialized nations. The Western powers resisted this transformation of the world order, fearing that many of these new nations would be vulnerable to Communist control, and, hence, opposed the liberation of nonwhite people. One aftermath of this opposition was the Vietnam War, which was a result of failure of the Western nations to live up to the promises of World War II—democracy for all—which made the movement to liberate the Third World inevitable. In turn, these liberation movements affected the black Civil Rights movement as well as liberal minded people in the United States.³

the bilingual education bill should not be included in the poverty bill, they feared that the program would be stigmatized. The bill passed 12 months later, with little support from White House aides. Indeed, much of the funding for the first bilingual program came from the Hearst Corporation.⁴⁴

The Black-White Syndrome

A result of the War on Poverty was that African Americans and other minorities competed for resources. Many Chicanos at the time believed that federal and state bureaucrats played off the two groups against each other—seeing life as black and white. Undoubtedly, the intensity of the African American struggle and the size of its population forced Washington to pay more attention to the demands of blacks. During the mid-1960s, the black community exploded. Urban renewal in the 1950s had reduced the supply of low-rent housing, thus displacing thousands of poor. Northern cities became tinderboxes. The black population of Los Angeles, small before World War II, zoomed in the postwar years. Freeways isolated that community, hiding poverty behind concrete walls. In places like Watts, the infrastructure was grossly inadequate to absorb newcomers. Unemployment hovered around 30 percent. As a consequence of the Civil Rights movement, President Johnson was able to push through the Voting Rights Act of 1965.⁴⁵

In August 1965, the African Americans in Watts rebelled, leaving 35 dead and causing property damage of \$200 million. The governor sent 14,000 members of the National Guard to occupy Watts.⁴⁶ Two years later, another rebellion hit Newark, New Jersey, leaving 26 dead. In 1969, 43 died in a rebellion in Detroit, where 8,000 guardsmen and 4,700 paratroopers occupied the battle zone. Because these incidents heightened middle-class fears, Congress passed legislation to control the political threat by keeping the rebellious African Americans in tow.

Substandard economic and social conditions similar to those of African Americans plagued barrios throughout the United States. The *barrios* did not explode with the same force as the black ghettos did. In the mid-1960s, some Chicanos offered native cultural explanations about why Mexicans did not riot; they pictured themselves as more peaceful than African Americans. According to Lorena Oropeza, the tendency of many established Mexican American leaders was to represent their community as worthy of society's attention "based upon the Mexican Americans' commendable behavior on the battlefield, but also—indicating increasing political participation—at the polls." One explanation for the difference in the responses of the two communities to oppression is that the institutions of social control were stronger in the Mexican *barrios* than in ghettos like Watts. Mexicans had lived in colonias such as San Antonio for generations. In Los Angeles, Chicano communities, despite continuous population turnover, were more stable than the black areas. The Mexican family remained much more intact than families in Watts. A common language and a similar cultural background conveyed at least the facade of a community. Homeownership was also higher in Mexican American areas than in Watts.

The lack of a militant response by the Mexican American community made African Americans think that they were not making the same level of sacrifice as blacks were. Given the overwhelming presence of African Americans, Mexican Americans and other minorities had a difficult time convincing people that they too belonged to the Civil Rights movement. When the United Civil Rights Coalition was formed in Los Angeles in 1963, it refused to admit Mexican Americans. Chicanos had to wait until the *Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District* decision (1970) for the courts to classify Mexican Americans as an "identifiable ethnic minority with a pattern of discrimination."⁴⁷

THE ILLUSION FADES

Almost from the beginning, the War on Poverty ran into difficulties. City bosses saw community action programs, which purportedly organized the poor, as being subversive and, in effect, promoting rebellion. These political machines responded by making the moves to gain local control over federally administered poverty programs and their budgets. The War on Poverty also lacked funds because the Johnson administration had siphoned off money to finance the Vietnam War. Simply, the country could not afford two wars. Space, missile, and armament programs took precedence over people. North American society did not

consider the ending of poverty a worthwhile goal. Euro-Americans increasingly wanted the poor to just go away. According to U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater, "The fact is that most people who have no skill have no education for the same reason—low intelligence or low ambition."⁴⁸

Bureaucratic conflict also weakened the War on Poverty. The Department of Labor refused to cooperate with OEO; social workers perceived it as a threat to the welfare bureaucracy and their hegemony among the poor. Local politicians claimed that OEO programs "fostered class struggle." Meanwhile, as government officials and others quickly gained control of the programs, the participation of the poor declined. By 1966, President Johnson began dismantling the OEO, with Head Start going to Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Job Corps to the Department of Labor. He then substituted the "Model Cities" program for OEO. Johnson, faced with opposition within his own party over the war in Vietnam, announced that he would not seek reelection. The assassination of Robert Kennedy during the California primary also dealt a blow to Mexican American hope. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 put the proverbial final nail in the coffin.

Impact of the War on Poverty

The impact of the War on Poverty on Chicanos was huge. A study of 60 OEO advisory boards in East Los Angeles—Boyle Heights—South Lincoln Heights, for instance—showed that 1,520 individuals, 71 percent of whom lived in these communities, served on the boards; two-thirds were women. Many Chicano activists of the 1960s developed a sense of political consciousness as a result of poverty programs, which advertised the demands and grievances of the poor and created an ideology that legitimized protest. Many minorities came to learn that they had the right to work in government and to petition it. Legal aid programs and Head Start, a public preschool system, also proved invaluable to the poor. The number of poor fell dramatically between 1965 and 1970 as Social Security, health, and welfare payments more than doubled. When the federal government cut the last of the War on Poverty programs in the 1980s, poverty escalated.⁴⁹

MAGNETIZATION OF THE BORDER

A population boom in Mexico tossed millions into Mexico's labor pool, thus intensifying the push factors. In 1950, Mexico had a population of 25.8 million; it jumped to 34.9 million 10 years later and was rushing toward 50 million by the end of the 1960s. Driving this increase was the fertility rate of Mexican women, which increased from an average of 1.75 percent in 1922–1939 to 2.25 percent in 1959–1966 and to 6.9 percent in the late 1950s. Mexico had the fastest-growing gross national product (GNP) in Latin America, but it did not offer this increase in population.

The termination of the *bracero* (guest worker) program in 1964 worsened Mexico's economic plight, drastically cutting remittances sent by the migrant workers to their families at home. Mexico's economy simply could not absorb its increasing population. Matters worsened with a decline of ruralism, caused in part by mechanization and the growing commercialization of Mexican farms, which displaced small farmers. Concurrently, the United States was going through good times, attracting underemployed and unemployed Mexican workers. The wartime economy, the Civil Rights movement, and the youth culture temporarily distracted the common Euro-American citizens so that the heavy migration of undocumented workers went largely unnoticed, and the nation's racist, nativist tendencies remained dormant.

In the United States, growers pressured the border patrol to keep the border porous, ensuring a continual flood of workers. In this context the phenomenon known as the "runaway shop" took form. Simply said, Mexico became the destination for North American multinational businesses to enjoy special privileges and exploit loopholes provided by law in the United States. The Customs Simplification Act of 1956 allowed the processing abroad of metal goods, which would then be returned to the United States for finishing. Congress broadened this provision in 1963 to include items such as apparel and toys. These runaway shops located along the border cut down on transportation and labor costs. Understandably, U.S. labor opposed these loopholes, but it lacked sufficient power to stop the flow of jobs out of the United States.

Mexico agreed to the Border Industrialization Program (BIP), waiving duties and regulations on the import of raw materials and relaxing restrictions on foreign capital within 12.5 miles of the border (this area has

continuously been expanded); 100 percent of the finished products were to be exported out of the country and 90 percent of the labor force was to consist of Mexicans. In 1966, 20 BIP plants operated along the border; this number increased to 120 in 1970 and to 476 in 1976. The so-called *maquiladoras* (assembly plants) did create jobs (20,327 in 1970) but did not relieve Mexico's unemployment problem. Owners paid the BIP workers more than 70 percent of whom were women, minimum Mexican wages. North American employers gave no job security, and the *maquiladoras* could move at the owners' whim. Furthermore, the BIP left relatively little capital in Mexico. Like the *bracero* program, the border program increased Mexican dependence on the United States.⁵⁰

The Immigration Act of 1965

Journalist Theodore White said that the 1965 Amendment to the Immigration Act "was noble, revolutionary—and probably the most thoughtless of the many acts of the Great Society."⁵¹ The act changed immigration policy: basis for admitting immigrants shifted from national origin to family preference; those already having family in the United States would be given higher quota preferences. At the time, legislators expected Europeans to be the main applicants; thus, there was no problem.

The national-origin system of immigration of the 1920s had shielded the United States against the fresh immigration of Poles, Italians, Slavs, and Eastern European Jews. From 1950 to 1960, about 80 percent of U.S. immigrants came from European countries or Canada. The 1965 act opened the country to other races and ethnic peoples, specifically Asians. (Improved conditions in Western Europe had made the United States less of an attraction to European peoples, and few applied.) During the first years of the act, not too many Euro-Americans were concerned, because those applying were highly educated Latin Americans and Asians. Liberals such as Senator Edward Kennedy had sponsored the legislation because they wanted to correct the past injustice of excluding Asians from legal entry. Before the act there had been no quota for Latin Americans; however, the trade-off for taking the exclusion of Asians off the books was the placing of Latin Americans and Canadians on a quota system. The law specified that 170,000 immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere and 120,000 from the Western could enter annually. Until the act, Mexico had been the principal source of Latin American immigration; the new law put a cap of 40,000 from any one nation.⁵²

Mexican American Reaction to Nativism

During the 1950s Mexican American organizations had supported restricting undocumented workers and had encouraged the government to exclude undocumented Mexicans. Organizations such as the American G.I. Forum and LULAC gave the federal government almost unconditional support. Trade unions supporting this restrictionist policy rationalized that the exclusion of the Mexican national was necessary to cut unfair labor competition with Mexican American and other U.S.-based workers. Even so, Mexican American organizations had become distressed about the gross human rights abuses, and pro-foreign-born groups concerned with human rights flourished among Latinos. Immigration, however, was not a priority issue among Mexican Americans in 1965.

Yet, the cumulative experiences of old-time activists made some weary about the renewal of racist nativism. *La Hermandad Mexicana Nacional* (the Mexican National Brotherhood), based out of the San Diego area and established in 1951, reflected the tradition of the Committee for the Protection of the Foreign-Born. During the 1960s, Hermandad joined hands with Bert Corona, then the driving force behind MABA. Corona correctly assumed that, with the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act, there would be a recurrence of the nativism of the 1950s. With Soledad "Colé" Alatorre, an I.A. labor organizer, and Juan Mariscal and Estrella García, among others, Corona opened a Hermandad office in Los Angeles to protect the constitutional rights of workers without papers. Hermandad functioned like a *mutualista* of old, offering self-help services. It then opened additional centers known as *Centro de Acción Social Autónoma* (CASA). At the height of its influence, CASA had 4,000 members. Both Corona and Alatorre were also very active in other aspects of the Chicano political life of the time, and their influence would be felt through the next three decades. In fact, CASA created the progressive template for the protection of the foreign-born.⁵³

The Road to Delano

For many, César Chávez began the Chicano Movement. Chávez and the farmworkers gave Chicanos a cause, for many, a national space to claim their presence in the country's Civil Rights movement.⁵⁴ On September 8, 1965, the Filipinos in the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC) struck the grape growers of the Delano area in the San Joaquin Valley. The Di Giorgio Corporation led the growers. On September 16, the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) voted to join the Filipino. The end of the *bracero* program in late 1964 had significantly strengthened the union's position. The strike itself dragged on for years, during which time its dramatic events and the brutality of many of the growers attracted millions of non-Chicano supporters. Chávez's strategy was to maintain the union's moral authority by employing civil disobedience and fasts to call attention to the cause (cause), following the example of Mohandas Gandhi and the Rev. Martin Luther King. The strategy of civil disobedience was to actively refuse to obey unjust laws and injunctions. César frequently went to jail and would fast in order to rally his supporters.⁵⁵

Born in Yuma, Arizona, in 1927, César Chávez spent his childhood as a migrant worker. In the 1940s, he moved to San José, California, where he married Helen Febela. In San José Chávez met Father Donald McDonnell, who tutored him in *Rerum Novarum*, Pope Leo XIII's encyclical supporting labor unions and social justice. Chávez met Fred Ross of the CSO and became an organizer for the CSO, learning grassroots organizing methods. He went on to become the general director of the national CSO, but in 1962, he resigned and moved to Delano, where he organized the NFWA.⁵⁶

Chávez carefully selected a loyal cadre of proven organizers, such as Dolores Huerta and Gil Padilla, whom he had met in the CSO. Huerta was born Dolores Fernandez in a mining town in New Mexico in 1930. She was a third-generation Mexican American, and her father was a miner and seasonal beet worker. When her parents divorced, Huerta's mother and siblings moved to Stockton, California, where her mother worked night shift in a cannery. Huerta was also a CSO organizer; it was there that she met César Chávez, whom she joined in forming the NFWA.⁵⁷

By the middle of 1964, the NFWA was self-supporting; a year later, the union had some 1,700 members. Volunteers, fresh from civil rights activities in the South, joined the NFWA at Delano. Protestant groups inspired by the Civil Rights movement championed the workers' cause. A minority of Catholic priests, influenced by the second Vatican Council, joined Chávez.⁵⁸ Euro-American labor belatedly joined the cause. In Chávez's favor was the growing number of Chicano workers living in the United States. The changing times allowed Chávez to make the farmworkers' movement a crusade.

The most effective strategy was the boycott. The NFWA urged supporters not to buy Schenley products or Di Giorgio grapes. The first breakthrough came in 1966 when the Schenley Corporation signed a contract with the union. The next opponent was the Di Giorgio Corporation, one of the largest grape growers in the central valley. In April 1966, owner Robert Di Giorgio unexpectedly announced that he would allow his workers at Sierra Vista to vote on whether the farmworkers wanted a union. However, Di Giorgio did not act in good faith, and his agents set out to intimidate the workers.

Di Giorgio invited the Teamsters to compete with and thus break the NFWA. Di Giorgio held a series of fraudulent elections certifying the Teamsters as the bargaining agent. The NFWA pressured Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr., to investigate the elections. Brown needed the Chicano vote, as well as that of liberals who were committed to the farmworkers. The governor's investigator recommended a new election, and the date was set for August 30, 1966. Di Giorgio red-baited the union and carried on an active campaign that drained the union's financial resources. This forced Chávez to reluctantly apply for affiliation in the American Federation of Labor and form the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC), which won the election—573 votes to the Teamsters' 425. Field workers voted 530 to 331 in favor of the UFWOC.

In 1967, the UFWOC targeted the Giunarra Vineyards Corporation (the largest producer of table grapes in the United States), boycotting all California table grapes. The result was a significant decline in grape sales. In June 1970, when the strike was approaching its fifth year, a group of Coachella Valley growers agreed to sign contracts. Victories in the San Joaquin Valley and other areas followed.

After the victory in grape industry, the union turned to the lettuce fields of the Salinas Valley; growers of the area were among the most powerful in the state. During July 1970, the Growers-Shippers Association and

29 of the largest growers in the valley entered into negotiations with the Teamsters. Agreements signed with the truckers' union in Salinas were worse than sweetheart contracts. (A sweetheart contract is one made through collusion between management and labor representatives containing terms beneficial to management and detrimental to union workers.) The contracts provided no job security, no seniority rights, no hiring hall, and no protection against pesticides.

By August 1970, many workers refused to abide by the Teamster contracts, and 5,000 workers walked off the lettuce fields. The growers launched a campaign of violence. Thugs beat Jerry Cohen, a farmworker lawyer, into unconsciousness. On December 4, 1970, Judge Gordon Campbell of Monterey County jailed Chávez for refusing to obey an injunction and held him without bail. This arbitrary action gave the boycott the needed publicity; dignitaries visited Chávez in jail. On the face of mounting pressure, authorities released him on Christmas Eve. By the spring of 1971, Chávez and the Teamsters had signed an agreement that gave the UFWOC sole jurisdiction.⁵⁹

La Casita Farms Corporation Strike of 1966 and the Aftershocks

Texas remained a union organizer's nightmare. South Texas's long border ensured growers' access to a constant and abundant supply of cheap labor. The Texas Rangers, the local courts, and right-to-work laws gave growers almost an insurmountable advantage. However, the Chávez movement in California and the growing militancy after the 1963 Crystal City takeover influenced the Texas farmworkers, resulting in the 1966-1967 strikes. Eugene Nelson (who had been with Chávez in California), Margi Sánchez, and Lucio Galván formed the Independent Workers Association (IWA) in May 1966. In June, IWA members voted to affiliate with the NFWA and the UFWOC. More than 400 workers voted to strike the melon growers of Starr County on June 1, 1966. From the beginning, it was a violent strike, with the Texas Rangers under Captain A. Y. Allee Jr. spreading a reign of terror.⁶⁰

In the concluding days of June 1967, strikers took out on a march from Rio Grande City to Austin, which ended on Labor Day. Over 15,000 people joined the march in its final days, with thousands more greeting the marchers as they made their way to Corpus Christi, to San Antonio, and then to Austin, the capitol of Texas. Not wanting to meet the marchers in the state capitol, Governor John Connally, Speaker of the House Ben Barnes, and Attorney General Waggoner Carr had met the marchers in New Braunfels in August. Connally, who favored agribusiness, tried unsuccessfully to dissuade them from entering the capitol. Tens of thousands of supporters converged on the Texas state capitol. César Chávez and U.S. Senator Ralph Yarborough participated.⁶¹

After this action, the marchers wound their way through Starr and Hidalgo Counties. At the Roma Bridge in Starr County, they tried to take control of the bridge to stop the recruitment of undocumented workers to break the strike. Texas Rangers then made mass arrests. On September 30, 1967, a hurricane destroyed the citrus crop, depressing labor conditions and ending all hope of success. Chávez pulled back, saying that the strike had been premature in Texas. Chávez did not have the liberal support that the farmworkers had had in California.⁶² Moreover, Texas growers were not as vulnerable to a secondary boycott. Chávez left Antonio Orendain, 37, in charge of membership and placement services in Texas. The strike was supported by Archbishop Robert Lucy of San Antonio, and the Congressional Hearings drew attention to the Third World-like conditions in the Valley. Throughout the strike, the Rangers and the state bureaucratic establishment favored the growers.

Inspired by the *campesino* (farmworker) movement in California, and more directly by the events in Texas such as the takeover of Crystal City in 1963, Chicano activism increased in the Midwest during the second half of the 1960s. Twenty-two-year-old Jesús Salas, a native of Crystal City, Texas, led Texas-Mexican cucumber workers in Wisconsin. In January 1967, Salas organized an independent farmworkers' union called *Obreros Unidos* (United Workers) of Wisconsin. The organization remained active throughout that year and the next and published *La Voz del Pueblo*. Financial difficulties and the loss of support of the AFL-CIO led to the end of *Obreros Unidos* in 1970.⁶³

Michigan used more migrant workers than any other northern state. Led by Rubén Alfaro—a barber from Lansing—migrants, labor, and students from Michigan State marched on to Governor George Romney, hoping to get a commitment from him to support their crusade and veto any legislation that would "take away

the human dignity of the migrant workers. . . ." Michigan attracted more than 100,000 migrants during the harvest season. Romney refused to take a stand. The migrants were supported by the AFL-CIO "in their crusade for better pay, housing, medical care and education for the migrants' children." Alfaro garnered the support of César Chávez and the United Farm Workers (UFW), and of U.S. Senator Robert F. Kennedy, who sent a telegram that ended with the words "Viva La Causa!" They marched from Seginaw to Lansing, announcing, "Governor, our feet are sore . . . Some of us have walked more than 70 miles to tell you about our problems," and handed the Lt. Governor their petition. A news reporter described the scene:

They held American and Mexican flags, and banners depicting the Virgin of Guadalupe—revered saint of Mexico. Hand-lettered signs carried such slogans as "Viva La Causa," "Human Dignity for Migrant Workers" and "Chicken Coops are for the Birds."⁶⁴

In 1967 in Ohio, Mexican farmworkers demanded better wages and enforcement of health and housing codes. Some 18,000-20,000 Mexicans worked in Wallace County, Ohio, and throughout the tomato belt that extended northwest Ohio, southern Michigan, and northern Indiana. Hunt, Campbell Soup, Libby, McNell, Vasic, and Heinz controlled production. Baldemar Velásquez, 21, and his father organized a march in 1968 from Leipsic, Ohio, to the Libby tomato plant and a later march to the Campbell Soup plant. They established a newspaper, *Maestra Lucha* (Our Struggle), and a weekly radio program. In 1968, the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC) signed 22 contracts with small growers.⁶⁵

Meanwhile, in the Pacific Northwest La Raza was mobilizing against economic injustices. During the peak of the harvesting season, as many as 25,000 migrant Mexicans resided in the state of Washington. Migrant children attended only 21 weeks of school, and the Washington Citizens for Migrant Affairs pointed out that the migrant family had a median of five years of education. The heart of the migrant community was in the agriculturally rich Yakima Valley, where in 1965 the Yakima Valley Council for Community Action (YVCCA) was organized to coordinate War on Poverty programs. The next year, Tomás Villanueva and Guadalupe Gamboa from Yakima Valley College, traveled to California where they met with César Chávez. Subsequently, in 1967 Villanueva helped organize the first Chicano activist organization in Washington. The Mexican American Federation was organized that year in Yakima, to advocate for community development and political empowerment in the Yakima Valley. In May 1967, Big Bend Community College raised expectations by receiving a \$500,000 grant for the basic education of 200 migrants.⁶⁶

The Road to Brown Power

In 1968, 91 percent of the students enrolled in institutions of higher learning in the United States were white, 6 percent were African American, and just less than 2 percent were Latinos, probably less than half that number were of Mexican origin. Chicanos did not begin to enroll in college in significant numbers until after 1968 following the school walkouts in California and Texas. What set them apart from other students was that most, if not all, were from working-class families and first-generation college students. The Chicano student revolt beginning in that year challenged and rattled the tactics of middle-class Mexican American organizations.

The first challenge to the old guard by Chicano students came from Texas, where students organized in Kingsville at Texas A&I University in 1964. José Ángel Gutiérrez, Ambrosio Meléndez, and Gabriel Tafoya, among others, formed the A&I student group, focusing on the usual issues of admission discrimination, segregated dorms, and poor housing. Organizers emphasized forging a Mexican student community in order to develop broader political power among the Mexican student community as a whole. In 1964, A&I Mexican students attended the PASO state convention, where they met Mexican students from Austin who had similar goals. The students successfully lowered the eligibility age for PASO membership from 21 to 18.⁶⁷

Tejano students formed MAYO at St. Mary's College in San Antonio in 1967. They had been energized by PASO's 1963 Crystal City takeover. It was PASO's involvement in La Casita Farms Corporation strike of 1966 in the Rio Grande Valley that Tejano historian David Montelano calls the catalyst for the Chicano Movement in Texas—especially for Mexican American students from Texas A&I and future MAYO leaders throughout the state. It was in the heat of the Casitas strike in the spring of 1967 that MAYO was formed in San Antonio. The

organizers included José Angel Gutiérrez, Nacho Pérez, Mario Compeán, and Willie Velásquez. Most of the founders were graduate students at St. Mary's College; they were well aware of Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), strategies of its leader Stokely Carmichael, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and the Port Huron statement. MAYO played an pivotal role in bringing about civil rights for Mexican Americans and developed a master plan to takeover boards of education and city councils throughout South Texas. Soon after its formation, other university and high school students started MAYO chapters mostly as a result of planned high school walkouts beginning in the spring of 1968 and extending into the 1970s. The strategy was to build a cadre of organizers using charismatic leaders from the various school districts and establish Texas MAYO formed local chapters, which attracted Chicanas such as Choco Meza, Rosie Castro, Juanita Bustamante, Viviana Santiago, and Luz Bazán Gutiérrez who played leadership roles and helped build consensus in MAYO and later in *La Raza Unida* (the United Race) Party.⁶⁵

MAYO differed from Mexican American student organizations in California. For example, in the mid-1960s there were few Chicano college students in California and elsewhere in the Southwest, whereas Texas, comparatively speaking, had a larger number of second-, third- and fourth-generation students attending college. In 1964, there were about 1,030 Chicano students, or 25 percent of the total student body, at Texas A&M—not a significant number, but in relation to California or Colorado, for example, substantial. By contrast, San Fernando Valley State (now California State University at Northridge) had less than a dozen Chicanos. Rampant discrimination and enforced social constraints unified Chicanos at Texas A&M. Though not ideologically united, they socialized together, eventually forming informal networks. This pattern was also evident at other universities, where racism encouraged group organizing. By marked contrast, California institutions favored a dispersion of Mexican students until about 1967.⁶⁶

The next challenge came from California, where Mexican American youth were the most urbanized in the Southwest and thus were subject to fewer institutional and social constraints. When California youth entered the Chicano Movement, they did not have to deal with large entrenched organizations such as the American G.I. Forum or UULAC. However, the black and white radical student movements as well as the farmworkers movements around them politicized California students. They listened to radio broadcasts teeming with music of social protest. By the mid-1960s, youth in California had become more politically aware—partly because of the national youth revolution and partly because the Mexican American movement itself had pushed educational issues to the forefront.

By 1967, more students of Mexican origin began filtering into the colleges. That year, students at East Los Angeles Community College formed the Mexican American Student Association (MASA) and on May 13, 1967, Chicano students met at Loyola University (Los Angeles) and founded the United Mexican American Students (UMAS). Most were first-generation college students; most were the children of immigrants.⁶⁷ On December 16–17, 1967, the second general UMAS conference was held at the University of Southern California campus. Majority of Chicano students identified with the UFW's successes and tribulations became their own. On campus, they joined with the black student movement and the SDS. By the spring of 1969, Chicano college student organizations were beginning to spread throughout California. Priority issues included public education, access to universities, Mexican American studies programs, and the Vietnam War. Speakers such as Corky Gonzales⁶⁸ and Reies López Tijerina⁶⁹ added to the momentum.

Almost simultaneously, Chicano student associations formed throughout the country—in places like Tucson, Phoenix, Seattle and the Midwest—in large part motivated by the UFW boycott and the alienation on campus.⁷⁰ In 1968, Alfredo Gutiérrez, who had been with the grape boycott since 1965 and a student at Arizona State University at Tempe, along with graduate student Miguel Montiel, led the Mexican American Student Organization (MASO). Early members included Maria Rose Garrido and Christine Marín. MASO developed strong ties with Gustavo Gutiérrez and the Arizona Farm. In 1967, in Tucson, Arizona, Salomón Baldeagro, a student with a strong sense of justice and identification with the Civil Rights, artwar, and labor movements, organized the Mexican American Liberation Committee at the University of Arizona, where he recruited Raúl Grijalva, Isabel García, and Guadalupe Castillo, who were high school students; the committee advocated bilingual and Mexican culture classes. This organization evolved into the Mexican American Student Association (MASA).⁷⁴

In New Mexico, students at Highlands University organized to demand the end of the suppression of Spanish history classes that reflected the Mexican American experience, more Mexican American teachers, and school counseling programs. By 1966 the protests were taking place against the schools at Albuquerque, Las Vegas, Española, Portales, Roswell, and Santa Fe. That year the Brown Berets and the Black Berets began operating in Albuquerque. The same year in the northern part of the state, *El Grito del Norte* began publication.⁷⁵ Also MAYA (later the Chicano Youth Association) began to appear on campuses. Meanwhile, small numbers of Chicano students began filtering into the colleges of the Pacific Northwest and Midwest.

The Making of a Movement

In California and elsewhere the Educational Opportunity Program (EOP) gave Chicanos and Chicanas a tremendous boost; as mentioned, before 1968 colleges could count the number of Chicano students in the dozens. For the first time, many received financial aid and were recruited to go to college—much the same way as athletes were. The added presence of Chicano youth on campuses nurtured the considerable discontent festering in the *barrios* themselves. On the campuses and in the *barrios*, the injustice of the Vietnam War took on an added air of urgency. As mentioned, many white and black students were from middle-class backgrounds and thus were very much involved with the Civil Rights and antiwar movements. Many of the white student radicals were red diaper babies, that is their parents had been involved in radical politics; many African American students had been involved through their churches. The political involvement of Chicano students was new.

The Vietnam War split many Mexican American organizations with those opposing the war being accused of unpatriotic motives and even cowardices. In California in 1966, largely through the work of peace activists, the MAFPA executive board passed a resolution condemning the war in Vietnam. In Texas, Chicano public leaders such as Commissioner Albert Peña Jr., State Senator Joe Bernal, Representative Henry B. Gonzalez, and Archbishop Robert Lucey opposed the war by 1967, although Hector García of the G.I. Forum continued to support LBJ, sending representatives to the airport to greet the coffins of dead Mexican Americans.

As with the movement as a whole, the 1960s veterans/veteranas worked alongside recent converts and aided the socialization process. Dolores Huerta became vice president of the UFW, while East Los Angeles Chicana activists like Julia Luna Mount and her sister Celia Luna de Rodríguez, active since the 1930s, continued working for social change. Luna de Rodríguez, a key organizer in the Barrio Defense Committee, spoke out against police abuse. Julia Luna Mount, active in the 40th Assembly District chapter of MAFPA, often criticized MAFPA leadership. Julia was a driving force in the antiwar movement even before the mid-1960s. She unsuccessfully ran for the Los Angeles School Board in 1967, and was a founding member of the Peace and Freedom Party. Her daughter Tania was a leader in the 1968 East L.A. school walkouts.⁷⁶

The Formation of Core Groups

Beginning in 1963, the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission—staffed by Richard Villalobos, Mike Durán, and others—sponsored annual Chicano junior high and high school student conferences, which pushed identity politics. The commission conducted seminars and invited speakers to motivate student leaders. At these sessions, students not only discussed identity but also compared the grievances they had against their schools. For example, Chicanos had an over 50 percent high school dropout rate; 53.8 percent of Chicanos dropped out at Garfield and 47.5 at Roosevelt. Many of the seminar participants went on to become leaders in the 1968 student walkouts. High school students such as Vicki Castro, Jorge Licon, John Ortiz, David Sánchez, Racheil Ochoa, and Moctesuma Esparza attended the 1966 conference at Camp Hess Kramer, sponsored by the County Human Relations Commission. These students formed the Young Citizens for Community Action (YCCA) in May 1966. In 1967, the Young Citizens worked for the election of Julian Nava to the Los Angeles School Board.

Student leader David Sánchez was recruited to go to Father John B. Luce's Social Action Training Center at the Church of the Epiphany (Episcopate) in Lincoln Heights. The center was associated with the CSO. Luce introduced Sánchez to Richard Alatorre, a staff member of the Los Angeles Community Services Program, who helped him get an appointment to the Mayor's Youth Council. Moctesuma Esparza, another veteran of the Hess Kramer conference, was also a member. Meanwhile, other members of the Youth Council became more

politicized by the Training Center, and by meeting people like César Chávez. This transition is reflected in the name change of their organization to the Young Chicanos for Community Action.

Also emerging from the Church of the Epiphany's advocacy efforts was the *La Raza* (The Race, or The People) newspaper, founded by Elieazar Risco, a Cuban national. Risco had helped publish *El Mestizo*, the farmworker newspaper. Risco arrived in Los Angeles in 1967 to help organize a grape boycott and soon afterward formed the Barrio Communications Project. Although it had a populist flavor, *La Raza* had a clear focus on barrio issues.⁷⁷ Father Lucé's Social Action Training Center attracted other activists, such as Lincoln Heights Teen Post director Carlos Montes.

The East L.A. Walkouts

By the 1968–1969 academic year, Latino students in East Los Angeles made up 96 percent of Garfield High School, 83 percent of Roosevelt, 89 percent of Lincoln, 76 percent of Wilson, and 59 percent of Belmont. Sal Castro, a teacher at Lincoln High School, was well known among students, helped them articulate their discontent. As early as September 1967, Castro spoke to students at the Piranya Coffee House (which the YCCA had established in October 1967), about the failure of the schools to provide quality education, access to the latest college prep courses, and counseling. By early 1968, the group formed the Brown Berets, led by David Sanchez. Their goal was to put an end to the discrimination and other injustices suffered by Chicano students. Meanwhile, the Los Angeles sheriff's department harassed them; consequently, the Berets led demonstrations against the police. Sanchez was arrested at a February 20, 1968 demonstration, following which he spent 60 days at Wayside Maximum–Security facility.

Meanwhile, high school and college students held strategy sessions and discussions on the blowout (walkout). As a result of Castro's involvement, the students articulated clear demands. Castro, during the planning stages of the blowouts, worked very closely with UMAs students who were a bridge to the high school students. Castro had been in trouble at Belmont High in 1963, when he encouraged Mexican-origin students to form a slate and run for student government. When the slate won, administrators accused Castro of being divisive for telling the students to say a couple of words in Spanish—as John F. Kennedy had done at Overya Street during his presidential campaign. The transfer of Castro from Belmont to Lincoln High had caused community uproar. School officials thought that Castro and not the schools were the problem.

In March 1968, nearly 10,000 Chicano students walked out of five Los Angeles high schools—Lincoln, Roosevelt, Garfield, Wilson, and Belmont—following their example, students at Jefferson, a predominantly black school, also walked out. Although high school students formed the core of the walkouts, Chicana college students like Vicki Castro from California State University, Los Angeles, and Rosalinda Méndez (later González) from Occidental College, as well as the leadership of UMAs chapters also provided leadership. Tanya Luna Mount, a student organizer at Roosevelt High School and a junior, encouraged her fellow students to boycott; she witnessed and wrote about the senseless overreaction of police. Paula Cristóforo, a senior at Lincoln High, who had previously attended the Camp Hess Kramer Youth Conference, and Margarita Mila Curiel, a sophomore at Garfield High School urged students to walk out. Police targeted the Brown Berets, who were present only for security, using them as a pretext to brutally suppress the walkout participants. (One of the leaders, Moctesuma Esparza, produced a film, *Walkout* (2006), memorializing the events).⁷⁸

Prior to the walkout, the school system had pushed out more than 50 percent of the Chicano high school students, through either expulsion or transfers to other schools. Eastside schools were overcrowded and run-down compared with Euro-American and black schools. The students demanded racist teachers to be removed, changing that school authorities had implemented a curriculum that purposely obscured the Chicano culture and programed students to be content with low-skilled jobs. In 1967, only 3 percent of the teachers and 1.3 percent of administrators had Spanish surnames, and many of these were white women married to Latinos. Whites made up 78 percent of the teachers, 91.4 percent of the administrators, and 54 percent of the students—more than 20 percent of the students were Latinos. Chicano community leaders and supporters formed the Educational Issues Coordinating Committee (EICC) to defend the students and to follow up on their demands.

It was clear that sheriff's deputies and police had overreacted and treated the protests as insurrections. Police authorities wanted to make an example of Mexican Americans and control and subjugate them. Many

artists were caught by surprise; however, moderates began to question the fairness of the justice system and were radicalized by the events. They were moved by Sal Castro, who said he had walked out with his students, because in good conscience he could not remain inside the school, because the demands of his students were legitimate.⁷⁹

On June 2, 1968, a Los Angeles grand jury indicted Castro and other activists on charges that included conspiracy to commit misdemeanors. (After two years of appeals, the courts found the counts unconstitutional).⁸⁰ The California Department of Education attempted to revoke Castro's credentials, and he was subject to frequent and arbitrary administrative transfers. Meanwhile, on September 1968, several thousand protesters, led by the EICC, marched in front of Lincoln High School, demanding Castro's reinstatement to Lincoln. During these confrontations, unexpected help came from the presidential campaign of Robert Kennedy, who met with Chicano leaders. Kennedy had enlightened Chicanos such as Lupe Anguiano and Polly Baca on his campaign staff, and he was one of the few politicians of any race to reach out to youth.⁸¹

Chicana/o Student Militancy Spreads

The Los Angeles walkouts, because of the size of the blowouts and the location, called national attention to the Chicanos' plight in education, and encouraged other walkouts throughout the Southwest and the Midwest. On March 20, 1968, students walked out of classes at Denver's West Side High School. They made demands for Mexican teachers, counselors, and courses, as well as for better facilities. Twenty-five people were arrested, including Corky Gonzales.

The perfect storm hit Texas as more than 39 separate walkouts of students hit Texas. As mentioned, MAVO agitated throughout Texas from the spring of 1968 through the early 1970s. The first walkout in Texas occurred at Lanier High School in San Antonio on April 9, 1968. The student council elections triggered the strike when teachers did not approve the nominees and suspended student council member Elida Aguilera for insubordination. Willie Velásquez of MAVO, persuaded the students to form a coordinating committee and to incorporate larger concerns into their demands. Seven hundred students walked out demanding more academic courses, the right to speak Spanish and more democracy. More pungent was the students' demand for Mexican American history and culture classes. The importance of the walkouts was that it generated considerable community support. Among early supporters were the Neighborhood Youth Corp, the Bishops Committee for Spanish Speaking, State Senator Joe Bernal, County Commissioner Alberto Peña, and Councilman Felix Treviño.⁸² Peña received a standing ovation when he said "We're handicapped because we have an educational system that doesn't understand bilingual students."⁸³

On May 16, students rose once again against racist administrators. A young Willie Velásquez—then a graduate student at St. Mary's University, and later an activist who would earn a national reputation—exhorted the students:

*With the education you get at Edgewood, most of you are going to wind up either in Vietnam or as a ditchdigger . . . At Jefferson, Alamo Heights or Lee, there is a chance that you'll go to college. But 85 per cent of you will not go—\$80 a week is the most you will earn the rest of your life . . . Tell Steinhauser this is the problem.*⁸⁴

The walkout was 80 percent effective. The students ended the boycott on Sunday, May 19, to show that they were not walking out on education.⁸⁵ Fundamental to the strike was the district's inability to attract qualified teachers. The all-Mexican Edgewood high spent \$336 per student annually versus \$394 at Alamo Heights which was predominately white. On June 30, Demetrio Rodríguez, Martín Carru, Reynaldo Castañón, and Alberta Smid filed a suit against San Antonio in the Federal District Court citing the inequality in funding.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, MAVO based its campaign on a brand of Tejano nationalism calculated to take political control of South Texas. Tejano nationalism was based on the Texas experience: a blend of Mexican history, family values, Tejano music, and the Spanish language.⁸⁷ The next stepping stone was at Edouard-Elsa High (and middle) school in Hidalgo County. This was the first strike in the rural Rio Grande Valley. Chicano students there suffered numerous indignities. By mid-October 1968, students and parents had begun informal meetings with a few MAVO members, VISTA volunteers, and PASO members in attendance. The chair was Jesús

Ramirez, a MAYO member. It was supported by State Senator Joe Bernal and Dr. Hector Garcia, the founder of the G.I. Forum, was present. On November 13, the students rose from their desks and walked out. The school officials bypassed the local police and reported the walkout to county sheriffs, who arrested the walkout leaders. Meanwhile, the superintendent suspended 168 students for three days.⁸⁸ Here again students objected to the "No Spanish" rule and wanted classes on Mexican American contributions to Texas history. The students demanded courses and counseling that would prepare them for college. They demanded an end to discrimination.⁸⁹ When the students were expelled, the recently organized Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) filed a suit and board policy was ruled unconstitutional.⁹⁰

According to José Angel Gutiérrez, MAYO led or participated in at least 39 walkouts before the December 1969 Crystal City walkout. Beachheads were established at these venues with local MAYO members leading walkouts in communities where they grew up. The walkouts hit a common nerve that many of the adults identified with. They demanded the right to speak Spanish, the right to learn about Mexican American history, the right to get a quality education, and schools that were free of discrimination. The walkouts made them a movement—it had brought to the surface the community's moral outrage.

Elsewhere on May 5, 1970, Chicano students walked out of Delano Joint Union High School in the San Joaquin Valley of California. Protest was centered on the denial of a Chicano speaker at an assembly. On May 7, police encircled the school. The walkout lasted till the end of the school year. Police arrested the strikers when they attempted to enter graduation ceremonies; protesters were beaten up and dragged into padded wagons.⁹¹ The perfect storm, which spread throughout the Southwest, had a tremendous impact on the participants; many of the students remained activists and went on to receive higher education.

The Brown Berets and White Angst

The group causing the maximum overreaction from police authorities was the Brown Berets. Law enforcement authorities actually believed that the Brown Berets were capable of overthrowing the government. The police and sheriff's departments in Los Angeles abandoned reason in harassing, intimidating, and persecuting the Brown Berets, a treatment that few other Chicano organizations have experienced in recent times. Police and sheriff's deputies raided the Berets, infiltrated them, libeled and slandered them, and even encouraged counter-groups to attack members. The objective was to destroy the Berets and to invalidate them in the public eye.

The police and sheriff's departments made the Brown Berets scapegoats, branding members as outside agitators while playing down the legitimate grievances of Chicano students. A grand jury later indicted 13 Chicanos on conspiracy charges stemming from the walkouts;⁹² 7 were Brown Berets. The defendants appealed, and the appellate court ruled the case unconstitutional, but only after years of legal harassment.

Law enforcement agencies infiltrated the Berets with informers and special agents in a bid to entrap the members by encouraging acts of violence. Police purposely subverted the Berets, keeping them in a state of flux and preventing the organization from solidifying. Meanwhile, Berets dealt with the immediate needs of the *barrios*—food, housing, employment, and education. The conflict and the street molded their ideology. On May 23, 1969, the Berets began publishing a monthly newspaper called *La Causa* (The Cause), which became a vehicle to attract new members. Chicanos, such as Gloria Arellanes, the Brown Berets' Minister of Finance and Correspondence, assumed key roles in the establishment and operation of *La Causa*. In addition, Arellanes, along with Andrea Sánchez, organized a free medical clinic, managed by Chicana members of the Berets. (Other Beret chapters also established free clinics and free breakfast programs.) The clinic raised issues of control and strained relations between Sánchez and other women, eventually leading to a schism; these women left the Berets.⁹³

Brown Berets chapters spread through the Mexican *barrios* of San Antonio, Albuquerque, El Paso, Denver, Seattle and San Diego—indeed, no one yet knows how many *barrios* had chapters, only that the chapters were small.⁹⁴ However, to white America they were the symbols of Brown Power and terrorism. It is unimaginable how reasonable people could see young men and women wearing their brown berets and kaki uniforms and be struck with so much terror and exaggerate their numbers. Texas A&M graduate student Jennifer G. Correa obtained 1,200 pages of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Surveillance Files, focusing on East Los Angeles, under the Freedom of Information Act. The documents reveal, among other information, that in 1968 FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had

decided to fully investigate the Brown Berets in order to find out if they were a "threat to national security of the United States," admonishing agents in Sacramento and San Diego for not gathering enough information on the Berets. Agents responded that the Berets were under "continuous and aggressive investigative attention." Considering the small numbers of Berets, the FBI reaction can only be labeled as delusional, and their actions as an abuse of authority since they were directed at spying and controlling a movement.

However, this abuse mirrored the fears of American society. As late as July 1, 1976, the *Syracuse Herald-Journal* in New York carried headlines such as "Brown Beret Alert Cancelled: Police Flaying Down Border Terrorist Warning." The *Herald-Journal* warned its readers about the Brown Berets, a little-known, but according to the newspaper, a heavily armed radical group that reportedly vowed "to kill a cop." Brown Berets were allegedly driving around the East Coast in broad daylight in vans. According to the article, the New York State Troopers were in touch with the FBI concerning the Berets and their possible threat to the Montreal Olympics.⁹⁴

Tlatelolco, Mexico

On October 2, 1968, in the Tlatelolco (once an Aztec stronghold) district of Mexico City—just ten days before the opening of the XIX Olympiad—a massacre occurred, which resulted in a tightening of the Chicanos' emotional bonds with Mexico. Soldiers and riot police opened fire on a demonstration held by thousands of citizens, killing hundreds, if not thousands, of Mexicans, most of them students. The Mexican government tried to play down the slaughter, claiming that "only" a dozen or so were murdered; more conservative estimates put the figure at more than 500 dead or missing.

Student activists exposed the atrocities in documentaries such as *The Frozen Revolution*, which were played in classrooms and halls throughout the United States. *La matanza* (the massacre) led to movements such as that of Rosario Ibarra, who demanded to know the fate of the more than 500 *desaparecidos* (the disappeared), including her son. Chicano youth supported the Mexicans' struggle, and students hung posters reviving memories of Tlatelolco and, even farther back, the Mexican Revolution. Tlatelolco added to the anger and experiences of Chicano youth, who identified with the Mexican youth.⁹⁵

"Wild tribes of . . . the inner mountains of Mexico"

On January 27, 1960, Los Angeles Police Chief William Parker testified before the U.S. Civil Rights Commission: "Some of these people [Mexicans] were here before we were but some are not far removed from the wild tribes of the district of the inner mountains of Mexico." It caused an uproar, but Police Commissioner R. J. Carreon Jr. said that he had heard Parker's story and ordered the Mexican American community to drop the controversy. Local newspapers excused Parker, and they even went as far as to censure Edward R. Roybal for demanding an apology and/or Parker's resignation, accusing Roybal of demagoguery.

Parker's racist attitude was replicated in many instances of police brutality that came about in the succeeding years. In 1966, for example, the L.A. police called for a backup team when an angry crowd gathered as police attempted to make an arrest. Police fired two warning shots into the crowd. In July, the Happy Valley Parents Association organized a monitoring of police. In September of that year, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), in cooperation with the CSO, opened a center in East Los Angeles. (From September 1966 to July 1968, the ACLU had investigated 205 police abuse cases, 157 filed by Chicanos.)⁹⁶

In the summer of 1967 some 300 Chicanos attended a conference on police-community relations at Camp Hess Kramer. Police-community relations in Los Angeles had reached a new low, and the participants asked the federal government to intervene. The failure of the federal government to protect the rights of the community worsened the situation. Meanwhile, the political consciousness increased throughout California. Older activists of MAPA, CSO, IULAC, and the American G.I. Forum, as well as youth, professionals, and poverty workers, criticized the schools and the government's treatment of Mexican Americans. Many new organizations such as the Association of Mexican American Educators (ANMEA, 1965) and UMAS (1967) advertised the community's frustrations. Mexican Americans, concerned about their lack of gains made in comparison with African Americans, insisted that more attention be paid to their needs. Nationalism expressed itself as a pride in identity and a rejection of assimilation as a goal.⁹⁷

Meanwhile, tensions rose even higher as the Vietnam War sabotaged Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" programs. By 1966, the government's commitment to ending poverty was sliding backward; it spent \$22 billion on the war in Southeast Asia compared with about \$1.5 billion to fight poverty. Nevertheless, as late as 1967, Hector P. Garcia assured LBJ that, "As far as I know, the majority, if not the total Mexican American people, approve of your present course of action in Vietnam."⁹⁸

Gringos and Tejanos

On March 30, 1969, some 2,000 Chicanos assembled at San Felipe Del Rio (about 160 miles west of San Antonio) to protest Governor Preston Smith's cancellation of a VISTA program. Smith had canceled the program because VISTA workers participated in a demonstration against the police beatings of Uvalde resident Natividad Fuentes and his wife. The G.I. Forum, LULAC, and other organizations supported the mass rally.

José Angel Gutiérrez, 24, a MAO speaker at Del Rio, demanded reinstatement of the VISTA program and protested inequality, poverty, and police brutality throughout Texas. At the rally Gutiérrez said, "We are fed up. We are going to move to do away with the injustices to the Chicano and if the gringo doesn't get out of our way, we will stampee over him." Gutiérrez gave vent to his anger with the gringo establishment at a press conference and called upon Chicanos to "Kill the gringo," by which he meant that the white rule of Mexicans should end, and not literally killing the white people. Nevertheless, Representative Henry B. Gonzalez from San Antonio, who called for a grand jury investigation of MAO, attacked Gutiérrez.⁹⁹

Gutiérrez was a product of Texas culture—a Confederate state with a tradition of southern racism and historical exclusion of Mexican Americans. Texans had never come to grips with the fact that Mexicans had won at the Alamo. Texas also spawned national leaders of the Ku Klux Klan and the White Citizens Council. In the 1960s, whites could still count on the Texas Rangers to keep Mexicans in their place in South Texas, one of the most deprived regions of the country. Gutiérrez and the "we've had enough" rhetoric appealed to many whom society had marginalized. Ranger Joaquin Jackson, a long-time adversary, says of Gutiérrez, "He radiated cunning, resourcefulness, intelligence, and charisma. A tireless worker and a gifted, passionate speaker, he was further armed with the conviction that he was right." In his book, Jackson also acknowledges the merit of the Chicano grievances against the system.¹⁰⁰

Tex-Mexicans lived in a string of dusty, neglected towns on the "wrong side of the tracks." Mexican Americans resented their status and poverty. The intensity of racism fostered nationalism among them, causing frustration at the moderate way older organizations such as LULAC and the G.I. Forum dealt with the gringo establishment. A nucleus of Chicano students was tired of being docile; they knew what black militancy had achieved, and they were influenced not only by the black literature of the time but also by a handful of progressive white professors. José Angel Gutiérrez was one of the leaders, who expressed the frustrations of the MAO generation. His contribution to the Chicano cause was indispensable; it influenced Chicanos throughout the country.¹⁰¹

On June 20, 1969, Luz Bazán Gutiérrez,¹⁰² José Angel Gutiérrez, and several young volunteers moved to Angel's hometown of Crystal City (population 8,500), Texas, to organize politically and launch the Winter Garden Project (WGP), which was oriented toward community control and committed to the decolonization of South Texas.¹⁰³ Although Chicanos composed more than 85 percent of its Winter Garden area, a white minority, who owned 95 percent of the land, controlled the city's politics. The agribusiness income in Dimmitt, La Salle, and Zavala Counties totaled about \$31 million, yet, in Zavala County, the median family income was \$1,754 a year. The median years of education was 2.3 grades for Chicanos. More than 70 percent of the Chicano students dropped out of Crystal City High School. School authorities vigorously enforced a "no-Spanish" rule. Few Mexicans held offices or were professionals; those who received an education moved away. Euro-Americans considered themselves racially and culturally superior to Chicanos. The Texas Rangers patrolled the area, terrorizing Mexicans. Adding to the plight of the Chicanos, a substantial number of them were migrants who had to follow the crops. Many Mexicans routinely left the Winter Garden area in late spring and did not return until the fall. Small hamlets of the region became ghost towns during this period.

A school crisis at Crystal City in November 1969 gave the young volunteers the ideal issue with which to confront the gringo. Although Chicanos comprised the majority of students in the system,

school policy excluded them from participating in much of the extracurricular activities. When students complained, the school board ignored them, refusing to even discuss the grievances. Left with no other alternative, parents and students organized a school boycott in December. Student leader Severita Lara published and distributed leaflets and agitated the students. Here again, polemics played a role in agitating parents, and MAO and the Gutiérrezes were an indispensable part of this discourse on political vocabulary building. Over 1,700 Chicano students participated in the walkout; the students and their parents formed a citizen's organization and decided that Mexicans would take over the school board in the spring election of 1970.¹⁰⁴

Meanwhile, during the first quarter of 1970, LRUP emerged from the citizen action group. Intensive mobilization took place, and in April 1970, LRUP won four of the seven seats on the Crystal City Board of Education; all of the Chicano candidates for city councils in Carrizo Springs, Cotulla, and Crystal City also won the elections. Cortula also had its first Chicano mayor. The box score for Chicanos in the Winter Garden area was 15 elected with two new mayors, two school board majorities, and two city council majorities. Only one gringo won election. The *Crisol* (Crystal City) victory used the MAO Plan for Aztlan as a template. They intended to use Cristal as theynchpin across the "Accordion Trail"—the migrants' trail from Texas throughout the Midwest and Northwest—to spread their political revolt.¹⁰⁵

The Land Struggle

The history of the land grant is rooted in the past and memorialized by Spanish law, which in New Mexico institutionalized common land usage. In this system, the holding of land and the peasant farmers' place in the society were central to their identification and social status. The *ejido* (communal land) operated alongside private grants to individuals with villages holding common lands such as forests or pastures. The community of peasants collectively owned the common land. The *ejido* has been romanticized in Mexican history on both sides of the border, with historical figures such as Emiliano Zapata immortalized for calling for the redistribution of *latifundio* (a large plantation) lands to the peasants. New Mexicans at the same time idealized the ownership of communal lands and lamented the loss of ancestral acreage.

The U.S. conquest marked an end to this way of life, as private developers took control of the water, common lands, and finally the villagers' farms. Memories of the past remained strong in the minds of many New Mexicans, who alleged that the gringo had taken the land from them in violation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848). Emotions ran high to this day.

In 1963, local activist Reyes López Tijerina formed *La Alianza Federal de Mercedes* (The Federal Alliance of Land Grants), invoking the Treaty of Guadalupe in the struggle to hold on to common lands. The *Alianza*'s membership jumped from 6,000 in 1964 to 14,000 one year later. A basic premise of the *Alianza*'s demands was that people don't "give away" their lands or rights in treaties. For them, forcing a defeated nation to "sell" territory under duress was intrinsically unjust.

Reyes López Tijerina was born in 1926, in Fall City, Texas, where his family lived a marginal existence. Tijerina became a preacher and wandered into northern New Mexico, where he witnessed the poverty of the people. *El Tigre* (the Tiger), as Tijerina was called, became interested in the land-grant question. He studied the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and became convinced that the national forest in Tierra Amarilla belonged to the Pueblo de San Joaquín de Chama. *Ejido* land belonged to the people in common and could not be sold. Villagers had the right to graze their animals and cut and gather timber in these forestlands.¹⁰⁶

The Forest Service through the early 1960s had ardently restricted the number of cattle permitted to graze in forestlands. For dryland ranchers, having a permit was a matter of life and death. During the first part of the decade, *Alianza* members staged protests, petitioned government, appealed to public opinion, and sought alliances with African Americans and Native Americans among others. The *Alianza* raised the cry of "*Tierra y Libertad*" (Land and Liberty).

On October 15, 1966, Tijerina and 350 *Alianza* members occupied the Echo Amphitheater in the national forest campground, claiming the *ejido* rights of the Pueblo de San Joaquín de Chama. On October 22, *Alianza* members made a citizens' arrest and detained two Rangers for trespassing and being a public nuisance. The "*Alianza* court" found them guilty but suspended the sentence.

After Tijerina was charged with illegal trespassing on national forest land and other crimes, 20 *Altezza* members entered Tierra Amarilla to make a citizen's arrest of District Attorney Alfonso Sanchez. In doing so, the members wounded a jailer. The government sent 200 military vehicles (including tanks), almost 400 soldiers, and scores of police and lawmen to hunt down Tijerina. On November 6, 1967, Tijerina stood trial. A jury convicted him of two counts of assault, and the judge sentenced him to two years in a state penitentiary. Tijerina immediately appealed the verdict.

In May and June of 1968, Tijerina participated in the Poor People's Campaign, threatening to pull the Chicano contingent out if black organizers did not treat them as equals. In the fall, he ran for governor of New Mexico on the People's Constitutional Party ticket. In mid-February 1969, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the Amphitheater conviction. Tijerina's lawyer immediately appealed to the Supreme Court.¹⁰⁷ In June, *El Tigre* again attempted to occupy the Kit Carson National Forest at the Coyote Campsite. Tijerina stood trial in late 1968 for the Tierra Amarilla raid at which Tijerina acted in his own defense. Much of the trial centered on the right to make a citizen's arrest. Tijerina proved his point, and the jury entered a verdict of not guilty.

The higher court denied Tijerina's appeal on the Amphitheater case, and Tijerina went to prison. For seven months, prison authorities kept him in isolation. Tijerina became a symbol, convicted of political crimes rather than crimes against "society." Authorities released him in the summer of 1971.

The Crusade for Justice

Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales symbolized the struggle for control of the urban *barrios*. Born in Denver on June 18, 1928, the son of migrant sugar beet workers, Gonzales grew up the hard way—using his fists. A Golden Gloves champion who turned professional, he was a featherweight contender from 1947 to 1955. He later started a bail bonds business and opened an auto insurance agency. During the 1960s, Gonzales became increasingly critical of the system. In 1963, he organized *Los Voluntarios* (The Volunteers), who protested against police brutality. Two years later he became a director of Denver's War on Poverty youth programs, but he was fired for his involvement in the Albuquerque EEOC walkout. He published his own newspaper, *El Gallo: La Voz de la Justicia* (The Rooster: The Voice of Justice).

Gonzales's epic poem, "I Am Joaquín" was the most influential piece of Chicano Movement literature written in the 1960s.¹⁰⁸ Luis Valdez of the Teatro Campesino made the poem into a film documentary. Conditions differed in *barrios* such as Denver and Los Angeles, where an identity crisis had developed after World War II. Corky Gonzales understood and summed up this identity crisis in his poem.

Gonzales went on to form a new Denver advocacy organization called the Crusade for Justice; it operated a school, a curio shop, a bookstore, and a social center. The Denver school, named *Tlatelolco: La Plaza de las Tres Culturas* (Tlatelolco: The Plaza of the Three Cultures), had about 200 students, from preschool to college age. On June 29, 1968, the Crusade led a march on Denver police headquarters to protest an officer-related killing of 15-year-old Joseph Archuleta. In 1969, the Crusade backed and participated in a walkout at West Side High School, with parents in support. That same year, the Crusade organized the First Annual Chicano Youth Conference at Denver, where participants adopted *El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán*—a revolutionary plan that promulgated the term *Chicano* as a symbol of resistance.¹⁰⁹

Every political movement is driven by moral outrage and symbols that inspire unity. Alurista (Alberto Baltazar Uribe Heredia), a poet and activist, wrote the *Plan* using the symbol of *Aztlán* as confrontational, saying to white America, "we were here first, so if you don't like it go back to where you came from!"¹¹⁰ *Aztlán* (1847), considered the most authoritative map of its time, was used as the official map to designate the boundary between the United States and Mexico; it noted the Antigua Residencia de los Aztecas, which it placed north of the Hopi Indians, so this was hardly Alurista's invention.¹¹¹ (The Chicano Movement was based in Sacramento, California, and called itself the Royal Chicano Air Force [RCAF].) It was comprised of artists and poets, the most prominent of whom was José Montoya, a poet, artist, and musician. Even the name of the group was in society's face,¹¹²

Meanwhile, the Crusade worked with Native American organizations such as the American Indian Movement (AIM), supporting AIM during the Native Warriors' "Era of Indian Power." It maintained close ties with AIM cofounder Dennis Banks and supported AIM in 1972 as it launched its Trail of Broken Treaties caravan, calling attention to the plight of Native Americans. The Crusade perceived Mexicans as native peoples—pointing out that 60 percent of Mexicans were mestizos and another 30 percent were full-blooded Indian. (Less than one percent of Euro-Americans have Native American blood.) The Crusade also strongly supported black activist and scholar Angela Davis. Gonzales and the Crusade assisted in establishing the Colorado branch of LRRP, which ran candidates for state and local offices on November 4, 1970.¹¹³

El Grito del Norte

The Chicano Movement attracted activists such as Elizabeth "Betty" Martinez from the Civil Rights movement. Martinez brought in experiences that helped define oppression in the context of multinational struggle. In the late 1950s, Martinez worked for the United Nations as a researcher on colonialism. In the 1960s, she participated in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in Mississippi and became coordinator of SNCC's New York office. Martinez played a key role in this movement, editing and discussing the works of major Civil Rights activists. She also worked with the Black Panthers. In 1968, she moved to New Mexico, where she cofounded and published *El Grito Del Norte* (The Call of the North) for five years, while working on various *barrio* projects. *El Grito Del Norte* was the first internationalist and nationalist Chicano newspaper published and almost totally staffed and run by women. The newspaper was based in Española, New Mexico, which is significant in view of the historic independence of women in this region. New Mexico was a natural starting place, since it was a classic colony. Among other books, Martinez coauthored *Viva la Raza: The Struggle of the Mexican American People* with Enriqueta Vásquez. A theme in Martinez's work is a critique of capitalism and the effects of exploitation.¹¹⁴

Enriqueta Longeaux y Vásquez was a New Mexican activist, who coedited *El Grito Del Norte*. Vásquez, born in Colorado of farmworker parents, had been involved with Denver activist Corky Gonzales and the Crusade for Justice.¹¹⁵ Her passionate columns denounced capitalism, the military, the Catholic Church, and "gringo" society. Vásquez wrote vigorously about women's issues, highlighting that women's liberation was possible within the Chicano movement. Some Chicanas later criticized her writing on feminist issues as "loyalist," alleging that she was loyal to male networks of power. However, others point out that Vásquez was working within the Chicano movement at the time, attempting to change it, and that she was one of the first Chicanas to publicly take on the issue of Chicana oppression in the mainstream press as well as in the alternative press. In her column "*Despertar Herminas!*" Vásquez encouraged the total liberation of both men and women and drew the connection between racism and capitalism.¹¹⁶

Other Movement Voices

Discussing all the varied voices of the time would be impossible. There were literally scores of newspapers, magazines, and independently published poems and essays. Further, there were *conjuntos* (small musical groups) that played and composed movement songs. Visual artists like Malaguis Montoya produced politically inspired posters that have become classics. One of the best-known cultural artists was Luis Valdez of the *Teatro Campesino*, who contributed greatly to the growth of the new consciousness and to the formation of other *teatros* (theaters). Starting as a farmworker group, the *Teatro Campesino* published in one act plays the struggle of farmworkers and of Chicanos in general. It played *corridos* that popularized the Chicanos' struggle for liberation in the United States.¹¹⁷ Also important was the publication of *El Grito: A Journal of Contemporary Mexican American Thought*, which began in the fall of 1967. It was published by Octavio Romano, a professor at the University of California at Berkeley, who organized *Quinto Sol*, a publishing collective. *El Grito* published, in addition to poetry and art, scholarly articles challenging U.S. scholarship and criticizing its effect on Chicanos. Meanwhile, an active Chicano art movement was formed by the discourse of the times, heightening cultural awareness.¹¹⁸ Finally, there was a plethora of local activist magazines and newspapers. One of them was published by Francisca Flores, an activist for all of her life; she worked on the Sleep Lagoon case, conspired

with Carey McWilliams on *North from Mexico*, and edited *Carra Editorial* in the early and mid-60s. She was a leader in *la Asociación Mexicana Americana* and a critic of Senator Joseph McCarthy. During the 1960s she opposed the Vietnam War and founded *Regeneración*, named after the *Partido Liberal Mexicano's* newspaper. Francisca played an important role in pushing the progressive agenda of Chicanos during the 1960s and into the 1970s. Based on her experience she brought a clear vision of societal problems and what was to be done. She was at the vanguard of feminist expressions of the time.¹¹⁹

Arts flourished during this period. Influenced by the artists of the Mexican Revolution Chicano artists wanted to paint murals with strong political messages; they were also influenced by public murals painted under the auspices of the Works Progress Administration in the 1930s. The art was often raw with strong political messages attached to the UFW and political currents such as the Crusade for Justice and *La Raza Unida*. Frequent themes were *la Virgen de Guadalupe*, Cárdenas, Zapata, *la adelfitas* and *Pancho Villa*. The Mural Movement took off in the early 1970s when it entered a semiprofessional stage. More attention has to be paid to murals painted in the late 1960s like that of Sergio Hernández at San Fernando Valley State, which were painted over. (Sergio also authored a comic strip with *Cor Sefos*, a barrio literary magazine.) Guillermo Bejarano was also an early muralist who worked with the Mexican master Siqueiros. In Texas there were *Festival de Flor y Canto* and *Canto al Pueblo*, as well as many young artists. No one locale had a monopoly on this artistic production that remains one of the most significant footprints of the Chicano Movement.¹²⁰

THE CHICANO YOUTH MOVEMENT GAINS STEAM

In March 1969, Chicano students from throughout the Southwest and Midwest met in Denver and held the First National Chicano Youth Liberation Conference. The conference adopted *El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán*, setting the goals of nationalism and self-determination for the Chicano Youth Movement. At this conference, the students also adopted the label "Chicano" partly in response to the Black Power movement, which had changed its identification from "Negro" to "Black." The adoption of "Chicano" was an attempt to dedicate the movement to the most exploited sector of the U.S. Mexican community, those whom traditional Mexicans and Mexican Americans pejoratively called "Chicanos."

Shortly after the Denver Conference, the newly formed Chicano Council on Higher Education (COCHE), which was mostly based in California, gathered college and university students, faculty, staff, and community activists at the University of California at Santa Barbara to draw up a plan of action for higher education, called *El Plan de Santa Barbara*. At that conference, Mexican American student organizations changed their name to *El Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán* (MECHA: the Chicano Student Movement of Aztlán).¹²¹ The militancy of students reinforced attitudes already expressed in the community, and their mass entry into the movement electrified events. At the 1970 Denver Youth Conference, Gonzales pushed for active antiwar involvement.¹²² MECHA was at the forefront of the establishment of Chicano Studies in California and throughout the nation. Today Chicanos/os owe the entitlements students have to this organization. (See Chapter 14 for Chicano Studies.)¹²³

Where Is God?

In 1969, 65 percent of the Catholics in the Southwest were Mexicans; yet there were fewer than 180 priests of Mexican extraction, and there were no Chicano bishops. In Los Angeles, Cardinal James Francis McIntyre, with support from the diocese's Catholic elites, censured priests who participated in Civil Rights activities. The attitude of the powerful Monsignor Benjamin G. Hawkes was "The rich have souls, too."

In November 1969, Ricardo Cruz, a young law student from Loyola University (Los Angeles) formed *Cadillos Por La Raza* (CPLR).¹²⁴ Its members became infuriated over the closing of Our Lady Queen of Angels High School, a predominantly Mexican school, allegedly owing to lack of funds. Cardinal McIntyre had just spent \$4 million to build St. Basil's Church in the exclusive Wilshire district of Los Angeles. On Christmas Eve 1969, members of CPLR protested in front of St. Basil's Church. The picketing was peaceful and orderly. When the mass began, demonstrators attempted to enter the church, but sheriffs

deputies posing as ushers locked them out. When a few did gain entry, armed deputies expelled them. Police units arrested 21 demonstrators, 20 of whom stood trial for disturbing the peace and assaulting police officers. The so-called "people" convicted Ricardo Cruz of misdemeanor, and on May 8, 1972, he began serving a 120-day sentence for his conviction.¹²⁵

Simultaneously, changes were taking place within the Chicano clergy itself. Because of the heated discourse surrounding the unequal treatment of Mexicans by the Catholic Church, Mexican American priests in San Antonio formed the group PADRES (*Padres Asociados para los Derechos Religiosos, Educativos, y Sociales*), and in October 1969, 50 Spanish-speaking clergy developed the agenda for a national meeting. Diocesan priests Ralph Ruiz and Henry Casco, Francisco Manuel Martinez, and Jesuit Edmundo Rodríguez were among the leaders. PADRES held its first convention on February 2-5, 1970, in Tucson, Arizona. It successfully lobbied the Church for the appointment of Father Patrick Fernández Flores as the first Chicano bishop in the United States. The group also played a role in resolving labor disputes, establishing various grassroots organizations—among them the Mexican American Cultural Center in San Antonio, founded by Father Virgilio Elizondo, who was a major influence in PADRES.¹²⁶

Las Hermanas was founded in 1970 in Houston by Gloria Gallardo, SHG, and Gregoria Ortega, OLMV. Both sisters had been heavily involved in community work. In the spring of 1971 they sent out a call to other nuns to join them in Houston for their first organizational meeting. Their primary objective was to raise awareness of the needs of the community and to work for social change. Its first national meeting was held in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in November of that year. *Hermanas* were influenced by Liberation Theology and the Vatican Reform. They were committed to the *comunidades de base* concept of empowering the people; and worked closely with the UFW.¹²⁷

The nuns, while recognizing that racism existed in their orders, were more concerned with service to the poor. The *Hermanas* organization furnished them with a network to expand their world vision; some sisters studied liberation theology in Quito, Ecuador, where they forged religious and intellectual bonds with Latin American nuns and clergy. The new awareness led to even more involvement with the poor, and many nuns became advocates for the people. *Las Hermanas* were among the founders of the Mexican American Cultural Center in San Antonio in 1972, which sensitized priests and nuns throughout the country to the needs of Mexican Americans. Many members of *Las Hermanas* became involved in the Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS) in San Antonio, established in 1974 by Ernesto Cortés, a native of San Antonio, and others. The nuns' involvement in social issues represented a new sense of identity among Chicanas/os, which fueled activism. However, the nuns in the Church were especially vulnerable since at that time the Church did not pay into social security; many were expelled from their respective orders because of their activism and had to live out old age in poverty.

Violence at Home

Judge Gerald S. Chargin of Santa Clara County (California) Juvenile Court on September 2, 1969, called a 17-year-old Chicano—who had allegedly committed incest—an animal and ordered that he should be sent back to Mexico. The judge concluded: "Maybe Hitler was right. The animals in our society probably ought to be destroyed because they have no right to live among human beings."¹²⁸ Throughout the Southwest Mexicans were deprived of defense counsels and representation on juries. In the County of Los Angeles, where the Chicano population numbered about 1 million, only four Mexicans served on a grand jury in 12 years (grand juries were nominated by judges). In adjacent Orange County, which had more than 44,000 Mexicans, there had been only one Chicano on the grand jury panel in 12 years. No Chicano had served on the grand jury of Monterey County from 1938 through 1968.

The Mexican American community lacked a legal infrastructure to take on these issues. Tejanos had just formed the MALDEF in 1968. In the late 1960s, the federal government funded a program called California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA). Although the CRLA did not handle criminal cases, it represented the poor in various other matters. In Kings County, for example, growers received \$10,179,917 from the government in the form of farm subsidies not to grow certain crops, but Kings County spent less than \$6,000 on food for the poor. The CRLA sued the county on behalf of the poor, charging that it was violating

federal statutes. As complaints mounted against the CRLA by reactionary elements such as the California growers, Governor Ronald Reagan became more incensed about the federal government's support of an agency that sued private enterprise. In December 1970, Reagan vetoed the federal appropriation to CRLA and the work of the agency was curtailed.¹²⁹

Chicanos/los Under Siege

The universities played a major role in spreading the antiwar message and transforming public opinion about the Vietnam War. Lea Ybarra, later a professor of Chicano Studies at Fresno State and Johns Hopkins, was active on the Berkeley campus with her friends Nina Genera and Maria Elena Ramirez, performing *actos* (one-act plays) that criticized the war. The women offered Chicanos draft help through the American Friends Committee, and published an antidraft pamphlet. Bettia Martinez was another early voice in comparing the plight of the Vietnamese people to the Chicano experience. Ideas spread like wildfire. Moral outrage against the war in Southeast Asia spread among Chicanos, propelling militancy in the Chicano *barrios*. The anti-Vietnam War movement united Mexicans and moved even the middle-class and flag-waving groups like the Forum to the left. In Los Angeles, the Congress of Mexican American Unity (COMAU), consisting of some 300 Los Angeles organizations, supported the antiwar effort.

Chicano activists began organizing protests against the war. Rosalio Muñoz, a former student body president at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA); Sal Baldeagro of the University of Arizona; Ernesto Vigil of the Crusade for Justice in Denver; and Manuel Gómez, a former member of MASA at Hayward State College, refused military induction. Muñoz had initially set out to organize protests against the draft, not the war. Ramsés Noriega, a fellow student at UCLA and an artist, accompanied Muñoz. The Brown Berets formed the National Chicano Moratorium Committee, holding its first demonstration on December 20, 1969. Rosalio Muñoz joined as cochairperson with David Sánchez. On February 28, 1970, the group staged another protest, in which 6,000 Chicanos participated braving the pouring rain.

Simultaneously, mobilizations were taking place outside Los Angeles. In March, the Second Annual Chicano Youth Conference was held in Denver. A series of Chicano moratoria, climaxing with a national moratorium in Los Angeles on August 29, were planned. Meanwhile, police-community tension increased. On July 4, 1970, a demonstration held at the East Los Angeles sheriff's substation, protesting the death of six Mexican American inmates in the preceding five months, clashed with police. Windows of buildings along Whittier Boulevard were broken; a youth was shot by the police. Twenty-two arrests were made before the rebellion was quelled by 250 deputies and members of the California Highway Patrol. Tension increased as August 29 approached.

Organizational work gathered momentum during the days preceding the August 29 moratorium. According to Rosalio Muñoz, the women of the Brown Berets were especially dedicated. In different locations, mini-moratorium groups were formed to organize the bases; campuses became centers of activity. Chicanas like Irene Tovar, who ran San Fernando Valley College's Community Center, worked relentlessly. Irene had been active in community organization since her teen years. She was a cofounder of the Latin American Civic Association in 1961 and was part of a vast personal network of friends and leaders of organizations. A long-time advocate for quality education for Mexican American children, she testified on behalf of bilingual education throughout the 1960s. It was this credibility of the leaders that drew many from the San Fernando Valley to the protest—this scenario was replicated up and down the state of California.

On the morning of the August 29, contingents from all over the United States started arriving in East Los Angeles. By noon, participants' number swelled to just below 30,000. *Conjuntos* blared out *corridos*. *Vivas* and other shouts filled the air; placards read: "*Raza sí, guerra no*" and "*¡Aztlán! Love it or Leave it!*" The march ended peacefully as the parade turned into Laguna Park. A minor incident at a liquor store—a block away from Laguna Park—where teenagers pilfered some soft drinks, sparked a major confrontation. The police, instead of isolating this incident, rushed squad cars to the park, and armed officers prepared to enter the park area. Their hostile behavior caused a reaction, and a few marchers angrily threw objects at the police. Authorities said that conference monitors had restrained the few protesters. However, police had found a pretext to break up the demonstration.¹³⁰

Deputies rushed into the arena, trapping men, women, and children, and causing considerable panic. Wielding clubs, they trampled spectators, hitting those who did not move fast enough. In the main section of the park, the crowd was caught unaware. Numbering more than 500, the deputies moved in military formation, sweeping the park. Wreckage could be seen everywhere: the stampede trampled baby strollers into the ground; four deputies beat up a man in his sixties; tear gas filled the air. The number of police escalated to more than 1,200. Mass arrests followed and sheriffs kept prisoners, chained together in fours, in two buses at the East Los Angeles substation. Sheriffs' deputies did not allow them to drink water or go to the bathroom for about four hours. Deputies killed a 15-year-old boy at Laguna Park.

Late in the afternoon Ruben Salazar and two coworkers from KMEX-TV, the Spanish-language television station, stopped at the nearby Silver Dollar Bar for a beer. Problems for television journalist Ruben Salazar had begun on July 16, 1970, when five Los Angeles detectives and two San Leandro police officers burst into a hotel room in downtown Los Angeles, shooting and killing two Mexican nationals—Guillermo Sánchez, 22, and Baldán Sánchez, 23, who came to be known as the Sánchez cousins. Police claimed it was a case of "mistaken identity." In the weeks to follow, Ruben Salazar exposed the inconsistencies in police reports. Law enforcement officials called on Salazar and ordered him to tone down his television coverage, alleging that he was inciting the people to violence. A federal grand jury issued an indictment against the officers involved in the Sánchez shootings for violating the civil rights of the two men. When the city of Los Angeles paid for the defense of three of the police officers, a storm of protest arose. A federal court later acquitted the officers.

Now, a month after his expose of the police brutality issue, Salazar again inadvertently found himself caught in the crossfire, this time literally. Deputies surrounded the bar, allegedly looking for a man with a rifle. When some occupants of the Silver Dollar attempted to leave, police forced them back into the premises. Police claimed that deputies broadcast warnings for all occupants to come out; witnesses testified that they heard no such warning. Sheriffs shot a 10-inch tear-gas projectile into the bar. The missile could pierce 7-inch-thick plywood at 100 yards, and it struck Salazar in the head. Another shot filled the bar with gas. Customers made their way out of the establishment. About 5:30 p.m., two reporters frantically informed deputies that Salazar was still in the bar. Deputies refused to listen, and it was not until two hours later that Salazar's body was discovered.

On September 10, 1970, a coroner's inquest probed the circumstances surrounding Ruben Salazar's death. Officers testified as to the Chicano community's notorious nature. Testimony showing the malfeasance of the deputies was restrained. *La Raza* magazine reporters, eyewitnesses to the events at the Silver Dollar Bar, contradicted the deputies' testimony. For example, deputies claimed that they did not force the customers of the Silver Dollar to return to the bar. *La Raza* produced a photo showing that they had. Shortly afterward, *La Raza* published a special issue featuring the photos taken on August 29. The *Los Angeles Times* obtained permission from the *barrio* publication to reprint many of the photos.¹³¹

Four inquest jurors found "death at the hands of another"; the three remaining jurors decided "death by accident." After their verdicts, the jurors questioned the officers' recklessness and wondered if they would have acted in the same manner in Beverly Hills. Los Angeles District Attorney Evelyn J. Younger announced on October 14, 1970, that he would not prosecute, and there was clearly a cover-up. Many Chicanos posited that Younger had decided not to try the officers responsible for Salazar's death out of political opportunism. A candidate for California state attorney general (he was elected), Younger knew the law-and-order mentality of Californians who demanded this response. As usual, the *Los Angeles Times* supported Younger.

On September 16, 1970, a peaceful Mexican Independence Day parade ended in violence when police attacked the crowd as marchers reached the end of the parade route. TV newscasters Baxter Ward and George Putnam informed public rage against the demonstrators. Then, on January 9, 1971, Chicanos protested against police brutality, marching to the Parker Center, the LAPD Headquarters. Police incited a riot and arrested 32 people. Chief Davis blamed "swimming pool Communists" and the Brown Berets for the riot.

Numerous minor incidents followed: the last major confrontation took place on January 31, 1971. Contingents arrived at Belvedere Park in East Los Angeles from the four major *barrios* in the Los Angeles. The demonstration was peaceful, and as the rally ended, Rosalio Muñoz told supporters, numbering around 5,000, to disperse. Some, however, marched to the sheriff's substation on Third Street and staged a rally. A confrontation ensued, which left one man dead and 19 people wounded by buckshot, two with stab wounds, and numerous with broken bones. Property damage was estimated at more than \$200,000.¹³²

THE PROVOCATEURS

In October 1971 Louis Tackwood, a black informer, stunned the Los Angeles public by testifying that the Criminal Conspiracy Section (CCS) of the Los Angeles Police Department paid him to spy on militants. The LADP assigned Tackwood to a group of officers who, in cooperation with the FBI, planned to provoke a disruption of the 1972 Republican convention in San Diego by militants; they planned to kill minor officials to force President Richard Nixon to use his powers to break the militant movement. Tackwood named Dan Mahoney (CCS) and Ed Birch (FBI) as the supervisors of the operation. In private conversations he also described how the police used drug pushers as informers in return for protection from prosecution.

Officer Fernando Sumaya also worked as an undercover agent for the LADP. In the fall semester of 1968 he attempted to infiltrate the UMAs chapter at San Fernando Valley State College (now California State University at Northridge) during campus protests there. He was ousted from the group because he was unknown and because he came on too strong. Sumaya then moved to East Los Angeles, where he infiltrated the Brown Berets. In the spring of 1969 he was involved in the Biltmore Hotel affair, where Chicanos were accused of disrupting a speech by Governor Ronald Reagan at a Nueva Vistas Education Conference, sponsored by the California Department of Education and archreactionary California Superintendent of Schools Max Rafferty. Thirteen Chicanos were arrested on the charge of disrupting the peace; 10 of the 13 were charged with conspiracy to commit arson. After two years of appeals the defendants were tried. The key witness for the prosecution was Sumaya. The defendants all denied any involvement with the fires. Some charged that Sumaya set the fires. The jury found the defendants not guilty. Meanwhile, Carlos Montes, a Brown Beret, and his wife, Olivia Montes, had left the area and he was not tried. The Montes remained at large until the mid-1970s. The LADP destroyed records documenting Sumaya's role in the Biltmore fires. After relentless hounding, the Montes family was caught, and Carlos was tried. In November 1979, a jury found Montes not guilty—evidently the jury questioned Sumaya's and the LADP's suspect role. Also questioned by the Berets' *La Causa* was the suspect role of Sergeant Abel Armas in the Special Operation Conspiracy of the LADP. Freedom of information documents obtained by Professor Ernesto Chávez reveal that the FBI was extremely active in investigating the Berets.¹³³

In a press conference on January 31, 1972, Bustacio (Frank) Martinez, 23, revealed that since July 1969 he had infiltrated Chicano groups. A federal agent for the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division (ATF) of the Internal Revenue Service recruited Martinez, who, in return for not being prosecuted for a federal firearms violation, agreed to work as an informant and agent provocateur. He infiltrated the MAYO and the Brown Berets in Houston and Kingsville, Texas. He admitted that he committed acts of violence to provoke others. From September 1969 to October 1970 he participated in many protest marches and during the one in Alice, Texas, tried to provoke trouble "by jumping on a car and trying to cave its top in." He attempted to entice militants to buy guns and to provoke police. He was rebuked by the MAYO members.¹³⁴

In October 1970 ATF agents sent Martinez to Los Angeles, where he worked for agents Fernando Ramos and Jim Riggs. Martinez began spreading rumors against Rosalio Muñoz, accusing him of being too soft, and in November 1970 Martinez ousted Muñoz and became chair of the Chicano Moratorium Committee. Martinez later named officers Valencia, Armas, Savillo, and Dominguez of the CCS as contacts. In other words, when Martinez took part in the Los Angeles rebellions on January 9 and 31, 1971, the Los Angeles police knew of his involvement. He continued in this capacity until March 1971, when he returned to Texas. There Martinez became a member of the Brown Berets and, according to informants, went around waving a carbine and advocating violent tactics.

Upon his return from Texas he was instructed by Ramos and Riggs to infiltrate *La Casa de Carrizismo* to establish links between *Carrizismo* and the Chicano Liberation Front (CLF), which had been involved in numerous bombings. Martinez reported that the main functions of *Carrizismo* were to eliminate narcotics, to sponsor English classes, and to dispense food to the needy; he could find no links with CLF. The officers told him that his "information was a bunch of bullshit." He was to find evidence by any means necessary. They then instructed him to use his influence to get a heroin addict by the name of "Nacho" to infiltrate *Carrizismo*. Martinez refused to take part in the frame-up. He finally became disillusioned when, on the first anniversary of the Chicano National Moratorium, agents told him to plead guilty to charges of inciting a riot. He had been promised protection from prosecution.¹³⁵

Although some reporters questioned the reliability of Martinez's disclosures, they did not call for congressional investigations into the provocateur activities of federal and local agencies. Louis Tackwood and Frank Martinez were admitted provocateurs. The latter's revelations cast a shadow on the actions of the police in the Los Angeles Chicano rebellions.

Whatever were their roles, they lie buried in the secret files of the different branches of the federal and local police agencies. Such aspects of history remain closed to historians. The ACLU, in a suit settled in the early 1980s, uncovered extensive police-spying on progressive white, black, and Chicano communities.

Conclusion

The 1960s had reached the perfect storm in the mobilization of youth organizations that attempted to transform their constituencies. The relatively small number of Chicano youth succeeded in mobilizing the largest proportion of the community thus far in the history of Mexican Americans in the United States. In part, the success of this mobilization was due to the large number of young people in the Chicano community who listened and nurtured a hope to change society. They integrated with other youth through music; listening to rock 'n' roll bound many together. The Vietnam War tapped an energy that generated anger—anger at the war, anger at society, anger at seeing the disparate treatment of people at home and abroad.

The Chicano Movement left legacies not least of which was a community much more aware of its constitutional rights. Many more persons of Mexican extraction got involved in trying to ensure civil rights guarantees for Chicanos and the Spanish-speaking people in the United States. A larger sector joined student organizations such as MECHA and MAYO and mobilized community groups to fight for their rights. Youth activists furthered the Mexican American civil rights tradition of the past, and every subsequent generation of immigrants coming into the country would benefit from this legacy.¹³⁶

Notes

1. Baby Boomers, Ohio History Central, <http://www.ohiohistorycentral.com/entry.php?ref=1699> (accessed November 8, 2009).
2. Civil Rights Struggle of the 1960's, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eljg5iZNY4gI> (accessed November 8, 2009).
3. Civil Rights: The Music and the Movement, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QDbskHHPGs> (November 8, 2009). Today, for example, youth are less homophobic than were the older generation; more youth than those over 55 voted for a black president.
4. "Hearts and Minds," Top Documentary Films, <http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/hearts-and-minds/> (accessed November 8, 2009).
5. America in Ferment: The Tumultuous 1960s, Vira I. Razal 1960s, Digital History, http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/database/article_display.cfm?HID=366 (accessed November 8, 2009).
6. Among Mexican Americans, crossover singers began to appear in greater numbers, who changed their last names to appeal to white audiences. In the San Fernando Valley, mostly centered in the Pacoima area, Ritchie Valens (Richard Valenzuela) was a sensation before he was killed in 1959. He continues to live in the memory of many people in the Valley. Ritchie Valens, http://www.history-of-rock.com/ritchie_valens.htm (accessed November 8, 2009).
7. Traditional Mexican music remained very popular across generations during the decade and, as in the case of boogie, was blended in—often expressing the Mexicans' sense of community. Jorge Negrete - El hijo del pueblo, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2QAwN8n7w> (accessed November 8, 2009). The author finds Negrete's song especially prophetic of the Chicano Movement.
8. November 8, 2009). La Bamba - Ritchie Valens, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=74C_gVCT2wU (November 8, 2009). Out of Texas came Freddie Fender (Baldemar Figueroa). Freddy Fender, "Wasted Days and Wasted Nights," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qw8RPhR-U> (accessed November 8, 2009).
9. Freddy Fender - Crazy Baby, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w-OE3GAH9K> (accessed November 8, 2009). She was born in El Paso, Texas as Florendia Bisenta de Castillas Martinez. Vikki Carr - He's a Rebel, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CQsm0i9qWE> (accessed November 8, 2009).
10. Paul Friedlander, *Rock and Roll* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) 267. Barbara Ehrenreich, "The Rock Rebellion," <http://spiritlink.com/rock-rebellion.html> (accessed November 8, 2009).

- and also to attract money by way of grants. Ernesto Calzara, "La Mala Noche Arcaica," *Center Diary* (September–October 1966): 26–32, reprinted in Acuña and Compagn, *Voices of the U.S. Latino*, 813–18.
- Graciela Gil Olvera [sic], Arizona Women's Heritage Trail, <http://www.womenheritagetrail.org/women/GracielaGILOlvera.php> (accessed November 8, 2009). Mowry and Brownell, *Urbán Nation*, 221–22. William O'Neil, *An Informal History of America in the 1960s: Coming Apart* (New York: Quadrangle, 1980), 130–31. For general background on the War on Poverty, see Bliana Maria Ambrecht, "Politicalization as a Legacy of the War on Poverty: A Study of Advisory Council Members in a Mexican American Community" (PhD dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1973). V. Kartz, "Politics, Ethnicity, Integration: Mexican Americans in the War on Poverty" (PhD dissertation, University of California, Davis, 1970). This section draws specifically from Greg Coronado, "Spanish-Speaking Organizations in Utah," in Paul Morgan and Vince Mayer, eds., *Working Papers Toward a History of the Spanish Speaking in Utah* (Salt Lake City: American West Center, Mexican American Documentation Project, University of Utah, 1973), 121. Vernon M. Briggs Jr., Walter Fogel, and Fred H. Schmidt, *The Chicano Worker* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977), 38. *Forerunner* (March 1967) states that the Forum almost dropped sponsorship of SER because LBJ was heading on the White House conference. Pryctor, *LBJ*, 152–53, 159, 161.
- Peyton, *LBJ*, 164, 170, 178–82. Carey McWilliams, *North from Mexico* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 17. *Forerunner* (October 1967). The Forum supported the conference and said nothing about the demonstrations. See also John Hart Lane Jr., "Voluntary Associations Among Mexican Americans in San Antonio, Texas: Organization and Leadership Characteristics" (PhD dissertation, University of Texas, 1968), 2. Richard Gardens, *Gringo Rules: Tijuana and the New Mexico Land Grant War of 1967* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 231–32. Craig A. Kaplowitz, *LULAC, Mexican Americans, and National Policy* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005), 98–104.
- David Nieto, "A Brief History of Bilingual Education in the United States," *Perspectives on Urban Education* (Spring 2009): 61–72.
- Anguliano was a former nun who had been a national organizer for the United Farm Workers. She later founded, along with Gloria Stein and Bala Abrego, the National Women's Political Caucus (1971). Jasmina K. Williams, "Jupe Anguliano—A Tireless Warrior Woman," *New York Post* (March 12, 2007). Jupe Anguliano Archive Event, UCLA Chicano Research Center, <http://www.chicano.ucla.edu/center/events/Anguliano.htm> (accessed November 8, 2009).
- Pryctor, *LBJ*, 183–87.
- Voting Rights Act, 1965. United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/info/intro_b.htm (accessed November 8, 2009). Mexican Americans were not initially entitled under the Act.
- Watts Riots Project, <http://www.youthbe.com/watch?v=UJS9a0Yms&feature=related> (accessed November 8, 2009).
47. Davis, *City of Quartz*, 101–06. Gerald Horne, *Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1997), an excellent presentation of the causes of the uprisings. Oropesa, "La Baralla," 95, 100–01. Meyer Weinberg, *A Chance to Learn: A History of Race and Education in the United States* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 174.
48. Quoted in James T. Patterson, *America's Struggle Against Poverty, 1900–1980* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 145–46. Kaplowitz, *LULAC*, 98, 108, 123, 220.
49. Acuña, *Community Under Siege*, 145. Patterson, *America's Struggle*, 148.
50. Morris Singer, *Growth, Equality and the Mexican Experience* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), 31. María Fernández-Kelly, *For We Are Sold, I and My People: Women and Industry in Mexico's Frontier* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 24, 123, 134. Lamar Babin, *Anglo Jones*, "Mexican American Labor Problems in Texas" (PhD dissertation, University of Texas, 1965), 33. Devon G. Peña, *The Terror of the Machine: Technology, Work, Gender & Ecology on the U.S.–Mexico Border* (Austin: Center for Mexican American Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1997). "Mexican American Labor," 35–37 Avery Wear, "Class & Poverty in the Maguila Zone," *International Socialist Review* (May–June 2002), http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Mexico/Class-Poverty_MaguilaZone.html (accessed November 8, 2009).
51. Theodore White, *America in Search of Itself* (New York: Harper Collins, 1984), 365.
52. "The Immigration Act of 1965: Intended and Unintended Consequences of the 20th Century" (April 3, 2008), http://www.america.gov/st/educ-english/2008/April/20080423214236_eid805637982.html (accessed November 8, 2009). Basically, this Act got rid of the racist restrictions on Asian immigration imposed by the 1952 Immigration Act, which also imposed national origins quotas favoring white western Europeans. The 1965 Act gave family preferences, that is, priorities to those who have close family members in the United States. James Fallows, "Immigration: How It's Affecting Us," *The Atlantic*, 252, no. 5 (November 1983): 45–68. Acuña, *Anything but Mexican*, 114. Mario T. García, *Memories of Chicano History: The Life and Narrative of Bert Corona* (Berkeley: University of California, 1994), 290–300. David G. Gutiérrez, "Sin Fronteras? Chicanos, Mexican Americans, and the Emergence of the Contemporary Immigration Debate, 1968–1978," in David Gutiérrez, ed., *Between Two Worlds: Mexican Immigrants in the United States* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1996), 175–209. Miriam I. Wells, *Strawberry Fields: Politics, Class, and Work in California Agriculture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 63; the success of the Civil Rights Movement and antipoverty programs enhanced the vulnerability of noncitizens and their utility to employers. "Obituaries: Funeral Services for Labor Activist Bert Corona," *Los Angeles Times* (January 19, 2001). Corona passed away in January 2001.
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55. National Farm Workers Association Collection, Records, 1960–1967, Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs, http://www.reuther.wayne.edu/collections/hae_221-ufw.htm (accessed November 8, 2009). Cesar Chavez NFWA, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KlnVXMA50Epc> (accessed November 8, 2009). Farm Worker Poverty 1962, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZUJ150TWA&feature=related> (accessed November 8, 2009). Cesar Chavez—Facts, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EnDfjgKk> (November 8, 2009).
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70. United Mexican-American Students Symposium—UCLA February 1968, Pacifica Radio Archive, <http://www.archive.org/details/UnitedMexicanStudentsSymposium-UCLAFebruary1968> (accessed November 8, 2009).
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74. Rosales, Chicano!, 211-13. In the Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Maricopa, Adolfo Bono, Plaintiff vs. William E. Laird, J.H. Daniel and JJ Wachhouse as members of and constituting the Board of Trustees of Tempe School District NO.3 and G.W. Persons, Superintendent of Tempe School District NO.3, Defendants, No. 21617, Judgment and Findings of Fact and Order, October 5, 1975. Francisco A. Rosales, ed., *Testimonio: A Documentary History of the Mexican American Struggle for Civil Rights* (Houston, Texas: Arte Publico Press, 2000), 126-27. Dan Pavillard, "Minorities Like Tale of Honey—Huerta Says," *Tucson Daily Citizen* (October 20, 1967). Programs such as Tucson Neighborhood Youth Corps also created a climate for activism. Its director John L. Huerta told a group of mental health advisors, "Minorities are through with being spoon-fed by smug American middle class with a guilty conscience, through with inferior education, through with lack of . . . opportunities for employment, promotion and the lack of adequate housing." Maritza De La Trinidad, "Collective Outrage: Mexican American Activism and the Quest for Educational Equality and Reform: 1950-1997," (PhD Dissertation, University of Arizona, 2008), 150, 162, 183, reviews the history of the fight for bilingual education in which Tucson was a leader. She concentrates on María Urigües, a teacher who had graduated in 1928 from Arizona State Teachers College and who beginning in 1955 led the fight against the "no Spanish" rule. Urigües worked closely with the NEA. She campaigned for the Bilingual Education Act.
75. Enriqueta Vásquez (Author), Dionne Espinoza (Editor), Lorena Oropeza (Editor), *Enriqueta Vásquez and the Chicano Movement: Writings from El Grito Del Norte* (Houston, TX: Arte Público Press, 2006).
76. Navarro, *Mexican American Youth*, 55-66. Juan Gamza-Quinones, *Mexican Students por La Raza: The Chicano Student Movement in Southern California 1967-1977* (Santa Barbara, CA: Editorial La Causa, 1978), 17-18, 22-23. Gerald Paul Rosen, "Political Ideology and the Chicano Movement: A Study of the Political Ideology of Activists in the Chicano Movement" (PhD dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1972), 248. Also in Los Angeles, Francis Flores, a veteran activist, and Ramona Morin (women's auxiliary of the Forum) cofounded the California League of Mexican American Women. Flores published and edited *La Carta Editorial*, which reported on political activism in the mid-1960s. In the late 1960s, Flores published *Regeneración*, an activist magazine focusing on women's issues.
77. H. Gutiérrez, "Chicano Education Rights," 53. Gamza-Quinones, *Mexican Students por La Raza*, 17. Rosales, *Chicano!*, 186-88.
78. "Walkouts," HBO Films, <http://www.hbo.com/films/walkout/> (accessed November 8, 2009).
79. Blowout Panel 3, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXt8j1Z1M14> (accessed November 8, 2009).
80. *San Antonio Light*, 1968. *The Superior Court of Los Angeles County*, 9 Cal. App. 3d 675; 88 Cal. Rptr. 500; 1970 Cal. App. LEIS 1985, July 17, 1970.
81. Dolores Delgado Bermea, "Chicana School Resistance and Grassroots Leadership: Providing an Alternative History of the 1968 San Antonio Blowouts" (PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1997), 84-85. Ernesto Chávez, "Creating Aztlan: The Chicano movement in Los Angeles, 1968-1978" (PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1994), 65, 73. Carlos Muñoz, Jr., *Youth, Identity, Power: The Chicano Movement* (London: Verso, 1989), 64, 68, 123. Rosales, *Chicano!*, 190, 191, 192-94. Sánchez was Prime Minister Carlos Montes, Minister of Information, and Cruz Olmeda, Minister of Discipline. They had approximately 30 members by mid-1968. H. Gutiérrez, "Chicano Education," 4-5, 56. Gutiérrez observes that one of the strategies was the formation of the Mexican American Education Commission within the L.A. schools. According to Gutiérrez, the effect was to transfer a significant portion of the leadership of the EICC to the commission, which was an appendage of the school district bureaucracy. G. Rosen, "Political Ideology," 143-45. Avelard Véldez, "Selective Determinants in Maintaining Social Movement Organizations: The Case Studies from the Chicano Community" in F. C. Garcia, *Latinos and the Political System*, 236-54. Along with Castro, Eleazar Riso, editor of *La Raza* newspaper; Joe Razo, co-editor; Patricio Sáenz, community activist; Mostertuma Espanza of UCLA UMAS; David Sánchez, prime minister of the Brown Berets; Carlos Montes, minister of communications for the Berets; Ralph Ramirez, minister of defense; Fred Lopez of the Berets; and Richard Vigil, Gilberto C. Olmeda, and Henry Gómez were indicted. The latter three were activists in War on Poverty program. *Pyron, LBJ*, 220-21. Oropeza, "La Batalla," 94.
82. Juan A. Sepúlveda, *Life and Times of Willie Valdez*; *San Yoyo Es Vos* (Houston, TX: Arte Público Press, 2005), 69-72. Doris Wright, "Lanier High Students Get Civic Leader Support," *San Antonio Express* (April 11, 1968).
83. Fern Chik, "Miller Seeks to Calm Lanier Revolt," *San Antonio Light* (April 16, 1968). "Miller Replies to student Demands," *The San Antonio Light* (April 17, 1968). Fern Chik, "Lanier Group Plans to Press Protest," *The San Antonio Light* (April 18, 1968).
84. Ron White, "3,000 Ask Reforms in Walkout," *San Antonio Light* (May 16, 1968). "School Chief insists it's Classes as Usual," *San Antonio Light* (May 17, 1968).
85. Ron White, "Edgewood Rally Held," *San Antonio Light* (May 21, 1968). "Edgewood Hearing in Recess," *The San Antonio Light* (May 24, 1968), to get the restraining order on two teachers lifted. Frank Trejo, "Board Promises Solution to Ciferances," *The San Antonio Light* (May 24, 1968). Frank Trejo, "School to Act on Grievances," *San Antonio Light* (May 28, 1968).
86. Baldemar James Bartera, "We Want Better Education! The Chicano Student Movement for Educational Reform in South Texas, 1968-1970" (PhD dissertation, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 2007), 102. Richard R. Valencia, *Chicano Students and the Courts: The Mexican American Legal Struggle for Educational Equality* (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 92-103.
87. Elaine Ayala, "The Year Latino Students Stood up, Walked out," *San Antonio Express News* (May 07, 2008), <http://archives.digitargh.com/2008/may/07/news/ci-latino-011-0507may07> (accessed November 8, 2009). On March 21, 1973, the Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision ruled against Rodriguez, stating that the system of school finance did not violate the federal constitution. Texas should resolve the issue.
88. "Valley School Hit By Boycott," *The Dallas American* (November 14, 1968), blames the MAYO movement. "Five Arrested in School Boycott," *Gadsden Daily News* (November 16, 1968) reported as arrested Mirale Villarreal, Homer Trevino, Freddie Sainz, Arnulfo Susana, and Xavier Ramirez. Nolete Hodges, "Edcouch-Elsa Students in Class Revolt," *Brownsville Herald* (November 14, 1968). Norma R. Cuellar, "The Edcouch-Elsa Walkout," *Mexican-American History* 23.63, Dr. Rodolfo Rocha (June 29, 1984), 1. <http://www.aparcales.com/school/files/walkout/edcouchwalkout.doc> (accessed November 8, 2009).
89. Cuellar, "The Edcouch-Elsa Walkout," 3.
90. "Refuses Boycoting Pupils," *Big Spring Herald* (Texas, November 19, 1968). Edcouch-Elsa High School had about 820 students. Principal J. L. Pipkin estimated 90 per cent of the student body and about 70 per cent of the faculty as Mexican American. Gary Garrison, "Return to School Sought," *Corpus Christi Times* (November 19, 1968). "Edcouch-Elsa Board Hears Each Student," *Brownsville Herald* (November 20, 1968). "Edcouch Student Hearings Scheduled for Wednesday," *Brownsville Herald* (November 26, 1968). "Valley Students Stage Walkout," *Big Spring Herald* (Texas, November 14, 1968). Xavier Ramirez identified as the leader of the walkout. Group guided by MAYO. Kenneth Clark, "VISTA's Tied to Boycott," *Brownsville Herald* (November 25, 1968). Cuellar, "The Edcouch-Elsa Walkout," 6-8.
91. Oscar Acosta, "The East L.A. 13 vs. the Superior Court," *El Grito* 3, no. 2 (Winter 1970): 14. London and Anderson, *So Shall Ye Reap*, 25. William Parker Frisbie, "Military Among Mexican Americans: A Study of High School Students" (PhD dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1972), 4, 143. *Forerunner* (October, December 1968). Eugene Acosta Marin, "The Mexican American Community and Leadership of the Dominant Society in Arizona: A Study of Their Mutual Attitudes and Perceptions" (PhD dissertation, U.S. International University, 1973), 12. Ian F. Haney-López, *Racism on Trial: The Chicano Fight for Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004).

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2. There have been few studies on the berets; most of them have been on berets in Los Angeles. University of California Berkeley scholar David Montemagno has a book on the berets in San Antonio, which is about to go to press, and UCLA doctoral student in history Milio Avarez is doing his dissertation on the berets nationally.
3. Jennifer G. Correa, "Chicano Nationalism: The Brown Berets and Legal Social Control." Master's Thesis, Texas A&M University, Kingsville, Texas 2006. 79–97, quoted FBI File # 105-178715. March 27, 1968. FBI File # 157-2165: March 7, 1968 reported on the ELA Walkouts. Correa also quoted FBI File # 105-178715: February 25, 1969.
4. Patrick J. McDonnell, "1968 Massacre in Mexico Still Echoes Across Nation: Activism: Killing of Students Just Before Olympics Radically Changed Country and Questions Continue." *Los Angeles Times* (October 2, 1993). Kate Doyle, "The Tlatelolco Massacre U.S. Documents on Mexico and the Events of 1968." Posted October 10, 2003. National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB399/> (accessed November 8, 2009). Mexico City (accessed November 8, 2009). 2 de Octubre Fotos Inéditas México: Tlatelolco, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hmtZK6714&feature=related> (accessed November 8, 2009).
5. Armando Morales, "A Study of Mexican American Perceptions of Law Enforcement Policies and Practices in East Los Angeles" (DSW dissertation, University of Southern California, 1972), 87, 88, 90. *New York Times* (October 25, 1971). Christopher Rand, *Los Angeles: The Ultimate City* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 131. Joan W. Moore, *Mexican Americans*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 93. *GL Forum News Bulletin* (March–April 1960). *Eastside Sun* (Los Angeles, February 4, 1960). *Eastside Sun* (February 4 and 11, 1960), see Martin J. Steel, "Behind the Badges: The Police and Social Discontent in Los Angeles Since 1950," in Norman M. Klein and Martin J. Steel, *20th Century Los Angeles: Power, Promotion and Social Conflict* (Claremont, CA: Regatta Books, 1990), 153–94. *Eastside Sun* (February 11, 1960). "Rybal Comments on Crime Reports of East Los Angeles," *Eastside Sun* (March 10, 1960). "Police Misconduct Subject at Conference at Biltmore Hotel," *Eastside Sun* (June 16, 1960).
97. Morales, "Mexican American Perceptions," 89, 90. *New York Times* (October 25, 1971).
98. Oropeza, "La Batalla," 109, 113.
99. Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez's Congressional Speech of April 22, 1969, *Congressional Record*, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (April 22, 1969). Josh Gottheimer, ed., *Ripples of Hope: Great American Civil Rights Speeches* (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 2003), 331–39.
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132. *La Raza*, 3 (Special Issue 1970) features a photo essay of the monatorium, documenting police repression. Armando Morales, *Ando Sangrando! I Am Bleeding* (Los Angeles: Congress of Mexican American Unity 1971), 105, 117. Chavez, "Aztlán," 118-19, 124. Putnam's transcript on file, "Police Chief Davis Claims Latin Youth Being Used by Reds," *Belvedere Citizen* (January 21, 1971). *Eastside Sun* (February 4, 1971). An important work that attempts to synthesize the ideology of the 1960s is Ignacio M. García, *Chicanismo: The Forging of a Militant Ethos among Mexican Americans* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997). Rosales, *Chicanos*, 198-207.

133. Chavez, "Aztlán," 82-91; those arrested were Chris Augustino, Luis Arroyo, Jaime Cervantes, Adalberto R. Del Castillo, Ernest Eichwald, Montesuma Esparza, Reynaldo Macías, Francisco

Martinez, Rene Nuñez, Frank Sándorval Victor Resendez, James Vigil, Thomas Varela, and Petra Valdez. The ten indicted were Anthony Salamanca, Esmeralda Barral, Carlos Montes, Ralph Ramirez, Thomas Varela, Rene Nuñez, Ernest Eichwald, Keith, Juan Robles, Moctezuma Esparza, and Willie Méndez. Aside from Sumayr, Abel Armas and Robert Avila were listed as infiltrators. Others were Sergio Robledo and Frank Martinez. *Carlos Montes et al. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County*, 10 Cal. App. 3d 343, 88 Cal. Rptr. 736, 1970 Cal. App. LEVIS 1845 August 7, 1970.

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