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 16. Patricia W. Ingraham and Donald F. Kettl, *Agenda for Excellence: Public Service in America* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993).
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 22. Kaplan, pp. 42–43.
 23. David T. Stanley, *Managing Local Government under Union Pressure* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 136.
 24. Joel M. Douglas, "Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the 1990s," in Frederick S. Lane (ed.), *Current Issues in Public Administration*, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 261.
 25. Frederick C. Mosher, *Democracy and the Public Service* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 178.
 26. PL 95-45, October 13, 1978, Section 7106.
 27. As quoted in Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., *The Union and the Cities* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1971), p. 30.
 28. As Joel M. Douglas concludes, "Bilateralism has replaced unilateralism in the decision-making processes." In Douglas, "Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the 1990s," *op. cit.*, pp. 271–72.

CASE STUDY 7

Introduction

The five critical personnel subsystems discussed in the foregoing essay, those of political appointees, professional careerists, general civil service, unionized workers, and contract employees, are some of the most influential, for the various reasons outlined by the author. Though they do not operate in a vacuum as groups or as individuals, they closely interact with each other and their degree of cooperation or conflict decisively determines the extent of their influence, the sorts of issues they handle, and what they achieve—or fail to achieve—in their work.

Perhaps the following case, "The Decision to Go to War with Iraq" by Professor James Pfiffner of George Mason University, is the most recent illustration of the enormously vital role that political appointees and professionals play within modern American government, both in setting policy and in carrying it out. Here we can vividly see how politically elected and appointed officials, especially so-called neocons (neoconservatives who held top defense policy positions in the Bush Administration), contended with the pros from the military, foreign service, and

intelligence agencies in defining the war policy agenda and its implementation, yet their actions and interrelationships were hardly neat or clear-cut, or at least not as neat and clear-cut as the foregoing conceptual essay outlines. Indeed, the complexities and difficulties of these working relationships—especially under such difficult, high-pressure controversies involving war and peace, life and death—are fraught with fundamental conflicts and ethical dilemmas.

As you read this case, try to reflect on issues raised in the foregoing conceptual reading, such as:

Who were the key political appointees involved? How did their ideas evolve? Why were some involved and others excluded from planning for the Iraq War? Did this affect the choices that were made—namely, by who was included? And by who was excluded?

How did professional careerists and political appointees who opposed the war attempt to exercise influence and try to shape the critical choices about going to war? Who were they? Why did they fail, in your opinion?

Can you generalize from this case study about the role of professionals versus appointees, their power and influence, and their working relationships within American government today? In the modern global context, how do they profoundly shape “public purposes”?

The Decision to Go to War with Iraq

JAMES P. PFIFFNER

To understand how the United States decided to go to war with Iraq, one must go back to the Gulf War of 1991. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, President George H. W. Bush assembled a broad international coalition to confront Saddam and throw his troops out of Kuwait. After a buildup of nearly half a million troops in the area and an extended bombing campaign, U.S. armed forces and their allies were able to defeat the Iraqis within 100 hours.¹ As U.S. troops drove the Iraqis out of Kuwait, Bush made the decision not to slaughter the retreating Iraqi troops on the “highway of death” from Kuwait City back to Basra in Iraq. More important, the president decided not to invade and occupy Iraq. To have done so would have exceeded the U.N. mandate and would have moved well beyond the coalition’s support and the U.S. military mission. Bush

and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Brent Scowcroft, put it this way:

Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in mid-stream, engaging in “mission creep,” . . . We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, there was no viable “exit strategy” we could see. . . . Had we gone the invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land.²

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President George H. W. Bush’s restraint in limiting the coalition’s military victory to driving the Iraqi army out of Kuwait without completely destroying it and invading Iraq was to come under considerable criticism from

a group of public figures and defense intellectuals known as neoconservatives (neocons).³

This loosely connected group of critics of U.S. defense policy believed that the decision not to remove Saddam Hussein was a profound mistake. The neocons organized "The Project for the New American Century" and published a "Statement of Principles" in 1997. The statement noted that the United States was the sole remaining superpower and advocated an assertive U.S. foreign policy and increased defense spending to "accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles."⁴ In 1998 the organization wrote an open letter to President Clinton arguing that Saddam's Iraq was a major threat to the United States as well as a destabilizing force in the Middle East. They stated that U.S. national security strategy "should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power," which "means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing."⁵ The letter was signed by, among others, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle.

When George W. Bush became president in 2001, he appointed Rumsfeld to be Secretary of Defense and Wolfowitz to be his deputy. Other neocons also joined the administration; Perle became Chair of the Defense Policy Board, advisory to the Secretary of Defense; Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; Lewis ("Scooter") Libby, Chief of Staff to Vice President Cheney; Stephen Hadley, Deputy to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice; John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. Vice President Cheney was a strong ally in their hostility toward Iraq and shared their desire to use U.S. military power to topple Saddam.

For the first six months of the Bush administration, however, their arguments did not persuade President Bush. During his presidential campaign, Bush tended to favor disengagement from the rest of the world, compared to the Clinton administration. Bush believed that the U.S. had been too involved in the Middle East peace process, and he thought that the U.S. should reconsider its commitment to peacekeeping in the Balkans. He also rejected the Clinton administration's attempt to foster a reconciliation between North and South Korea. In commenting on foreign relations during the presidential debates, Bush said, "It really depends on how our nation conducts itself in foreign policy. If we're an

arrogant nation, they'll resent us. If we're a humble nation, but strong, they'll welcome us."⁶ With his support of increased military spending and reservations about an active foreign policy, Bush seemed to echo Theodore Roosevelt's advice to "speak softly but carry a big stick." All of this changed, however, after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

The Public Debate over War with Iraq

Although the public campaign for war with Iraq did not begin until 2002, President Bush and part of his administration began considering it immediately after September 11, 2001. At the war cabinet meeting at Camp David on September 15, 2001, the issue of Iraq was raised by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who strongly favored going after Saddam Hussein and argued it might be easier than war in Afghanistan. Secretary of State Colin Powell, however, argued that the coalition backing the United States would not hold if the target was shifted to Iraq. Powell said, "If we go after Saddam Hussein, we lose our rightful place as good guy." CIA Director George Tenet and Chief of Staff Andrew Card agreed with those opposing the attack. The president finally decided not to pursue Iraq at that time and recalled, "If we tried to do too many things . . . the lack of focus would have been a huge risk."⁷

Nevertheless, on September 17, 2001, President Bush signed a top-secret plan for the war in Afghanistan that also directed the Defense Department to plan for a war with Iraq.⁸ White House officials later said that Bush decided soon after the terrorist attacks that Iraq had to be confronted but that he did not make his decision public because "he didn't think the country could handle the shock of 9/11 and a lot of talk about dealing with states that had weapons of mass destruction."⁹

President Bush publicly signaled his decision to pursue war with Iraq in the State of the Union message on January 29, 2002, though his decision was somewhat obscure and stated at a high level of generality by including Iraq, Iran, and North Korea in what he termed an "axis of evil."¹⁰ In the speech, Bush declared that the United States would "prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. . . . The United States of America will not permit the world's most