ENF ENF

Effective Emergency Management 131

Collaboration is a necessary foundation for dealing with

both natural and technological hazards and disasters

and the consequences of terrorism. Th is analysis describes

the structure of the American emergency management

system, the charts development of the Federal Emergency

Management Agency, and identifi es confl icts arising from

the creation of the Department of Homeland Security

and the attempt to impose a command and control

system on a very collaborative organizational culture in

a very collaborative sociopolitical and legal context. Th e

importance of collaboration is stressed, and recommen-

dations are off ered on how to improve the amount and

value of collaborative activities. New leadership strategies

are recommended that derive their power from eff ective

strategies and the transformational power of a compel-

ling vision, rather than from hierarchy, rank, or standard

operating procedures.

H urricane Katrina revealed a national emer-

gency management system in disarray, one

that was incapable of responding eff ectively

to the immediate needs of communities along the

Gulf Coast and unprepared to coordinate the massive

relief eff ort required to support recovery. Criticism

focused on the lack of leadership at all levels of gov-

ernment and the inability of the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Depart-

ment of Homeland Security (DHS) to mount a

disaster response and coordinate the relief. Unfortu-

nately, critics have tended to view the emergency

management eff ort as synonymous with emergency

response. Emergency management is a broader set of

functions that go beyond search and rescue, emer-

gency medical services, temporary shelter and feed-

ing, and restoring lifelines. Emergency management

also includes (1) hazard mitigation to prevent or

lessen the impact of disaster, such as building levees

or moving people out of fl oodplains; (2) disaster

preparedness, such as emergency planning and train-

ing; (3) disaster response activities, such as conduct-

ing search and rescue activities; and (4) disaster

recovery, usually meaning the restoration of lifelines

and basic services.

A lack of understanding of emergency management is

likely one reason why offi cials have suggested that the

nation’s response to catastrophic disasters needs a

stronger command and control system that might be

best handled by the military. Th is article explores

whether command and control systems are appropri-

ate in dealing with catastrophic disasters in which

authority is shared, responsibility is dispersed, re-

sources are scattered, and collaborative processes are

essential. Collaborative processes or some combina-

tion of command and control and collaboration

might be more appropriate. It also begins to address

how FEMA and the DHS should structure the

nation’s capabilities to deal with catastrophes of all

sorts, natural and unnatural.

Th e fi eld and profession of emergency management

have been evolving into a more collaborative enter-

prise since the 1940s and 1950s. Th is transformation

has gradually moved beyond the classic top-down

bureaucratic model to become a more dynamic and

fl exible network model that facilitates multiorganiza-

tional, intergovernmental, and intersectoral coopera-

tion. Yet in the aftermath of 9/11 and Hurricane

Katrina, there have been strong pressures to return to

command and control approaches, which are incon-

sistent with the shared responsibility and authority

that characterizes the national emergency manage-

ment system and interfere with the collaboration that

is necessary to address natural and man-made hazards

and manage disaster operations. Why is collaboration

so important in emergency management, and why are

command and control approaches so problematic?

The Evolution of Emergency Management By the 1990s, professional emergency managers had

largely overcome images of the authoritarian air raid

wardens and civil defense directors to develop a lead-

ership model emphasizing open communication and

broad collaboration. Th e transition from the civil

defense focus of the Cold War to the all-hazards focus

of the 1990s involved a fundamental cultural change,

as well as a mission adjustment. Relationships with

William L . Waugh Jr. Gregory Streib Georgia State University

Collaboration and Leadership for Eff ective

Emergency Management

William L. Waugh Jr. is a professor of

public administration, urban studies, and

political science in the Andrew Young

School of Policy Studies at Georgia State

University.

E-mail : [email protected] .

Gregory Streib is a professor and chair of

the Department of Public Administration

and Urban Studies in the Andrew Young

School of Policy Studies at Georgia State

University.

E-mail : [email protected] .

Articles on Collaborative Public Management

132 Public Administration Review • December 2006 • Special Issue

the public changed. Relationships with other govern-

mental and nongovernmental organizations changed.

Th e successful emergency manager came to be defi ned

as one who could interact eff ectively with other gov-

ernment offi cials and with the broader disaster relief

community ( Drabek 1987 ). Hundreds of organiza-

tions have some role in dealing with hazards or disas-

ters, and many are not linked closely with federal,

state, or local emergency management agencies. Mak-

ing and maintaining the necessary linkages is a monu-

mental challenge, and it is a necessary task when

dealing with catastrophic or potentially catastrophic

disasters. In other words, the capacity to collaborate

eff ectively with the nation’s disaster networks is essen-

tial. Frequent interaction, including participation in

planning and training exercises, builds that capacity.

Emergency management is also being better inte-

grated into mainstream government operations in

more states and communities, though it is still a pe-

ripheral function in some. Some communities either

lack the resources to invest in hazard management and

disaster response capabilities or simply do not see the

need to do so. However, when there is identifi able and

signifi cant risk to life and property, offi cials may face

political and legal liability for failing to take action.

Th e 9/11 Commission’s recognition of the National

Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 standard

and the emergency management community’s ac-

knowledgment of the Emergency Management Ac-

creditation Program (EMAP) standards have made it

diffi cult for public offi cials to ignore the need to invest

in programs to address hazards ( Bea 2004 ). Th ese

standards have also made it easier to hold public of-

fi cials accountable when they do not address known

risks and prepare for disasters reasonably. It is much

more diffi cult to claim ignorance of risks when the

standards identify potential hazards and provide

assessment procedures.

Th e profession of emergency management has also

changed since 9/11 and the catastrophic hurricanes of

2004 and 2005. Th e task environment has become

even more complex with the increased involvement of

law enforcement and national security agencies and

the addition of terrorist threats. Although there are

many similarities between disasters caused by so-called

weapons of mass destruction and those caused by

natural hazards, unnatural hazards present some spe-

cial problems for emergency responders. Recent cata-

strophic disasters have also changed the way natural

disasters are viewed. For example, long-term disaster

recovery has become a much more central concern,

and pre-disaster recovery planning has become a focus

in emergency planning. Th ere is more pressure to link

disaster recovery to economic development and to

deal with the long-term social and economic problems

exacerbated by disasters. Th e broadened mission of

emergency management requires a much diff erent

skill set than what was once expected of civil defense

offi cials and has been expected of homeland security

offi cials.

At the local level, collaboration has always been a

necessary skill because of the reliance on voluntarism

and community involvement. Volunteer fi re brigades

were organized to protect colonial communities more

than two centuries ago, and most American commu-

nities still rely on volunteer fi re departments. Th e

American Red Cross and the Salvation Army are still

the principal sources of assistance to disaster victims.

Volunteers provide essential surge capacity and links

to community resources.

Clearly, hierarchical bureaucracy can still be found in

the mosaic that is contemporary emergency manage-

ment. In response to the growing number of major

natural disasters that occurred during the 1960s and

1970s, the National Governors Association asked

President Jimmy Carter to consolidate the hundred-

plus federal programs that had some responsibility for

dealing with disasters. When FEMA was created in

1979, the new agency was given responsibility for

programs ranging from the Emergency Alert System

to the U.S. Fire Academy to the National Flood Insur-

ance Program. During this time, FEMA experienced

serious integration problems as diverse organizational

cultures were mingled and national security programs

were given priority. Th e DHS has experienced similar

problems since its creation in 2003. For FEMA, the

failure to respond eff ectively to Hurricanes Hugo,

Andrew, and Iniki led Congress to consider disman-

tling the agency in 1992. However, James Lee Witt

reinvented the agency, and it proved remarkably ca-

pable during the Northridge earthquake in 1994 and

the 9/11 disasters. Problems became evident again,

however, during the response to the 2004 Florida

hurricanes, and they became a national scandal fol-

lowing the poor response to the Hurricane Katrina

disaster in 2005. Th e question now is how to repair

the nation’s capability to deal with disaster. In some

measure, the question has become “FEMA in or

FEMA out” — should FEMA remain within DHS, or

should it be an independent agency that reports di-

rectly to the president, as it was before the DHS was

created? Is it even possible to restore FEMA’s capabili-

ties to deal with natural and technological disasters?

Th e collaborative approach that guided FEMA’s pro-

grams in the 1990s may be lost.

The Essential Roles of Networks Modern emergency management presents a paradox.

On one hand, emergency response requires meticu-

lous organization and planning, but on the other

hand, it is spontaneous. Emergency managers have to

innovate, adapt, and improvise because plans, regard-

less of how well done, seldom fi t circumstances.

Blending these confl icting needs is no easy task.

Effective Emergency Management 133

Government hierarchies play a central role, of course,

but emergency response also necessarily draws on a wide

range of community economic, social-psychological,

and political resources. Th e mobilization of organiza-

tional and individual volunteers also serves a social-

psychological purpose in that it brings communities

together and gives them a sense of effi cacy.

Sociologists have described a process of convergence in

which those wishing to help converge on disaster areas

( Fritz and Mathewson 1956 ). In fact, the state of

California’s manual for anticipating and organizing

volunteers is titled Th ey Will Come (2001). Emergency

response diff ers from many other aspects of modern

life that are dominated by rigid

organizational structures. Th e

involvement of nongovernmental

actors builds the capacity of

communities to deal with future

disasters. Th e disaster experience

can speed recovery and make

communities more resilient when

disaster strikes again. Commu-

nity capacities to respond to and

recover from disasters are not

enhanced when offi cials preempt or exclude commu-

nity involvement ( Comfort 1999 ).

In California and (increasingly) in states with a high

frequency of disaster, emergency management has

become a cottage industry. Professional groups and

consultants address almost every aspect of natural and

technological hazards and disasters. Private companies

are also involved, providing an extensive range of

services from retrofi tting buildings so that they are less

vulnerable to earthquakes to providing psychological

counseling. Th e lines between governmental and

nongovernmental activities are blurring as services are

contracted out and governments encourage prepared-

ness eff orts. Itinerant emergency managers move from

community to community, developing emergency

operations and mitigation plans, coordinating disaster

operations, and facilitating collaboration among com-

munities and state agencies. To be sure, emergency

management is not unlike other government offi ces

and agencies today in terms of the contracting out of

central functions, but a key diff erence is that service

demand escalates tremendously when a major disaster

strikes. Communities become vulnerable when their

internal capacity is permitted to atrophy and outside

resources are unavailable. Hurricane Katrina tested the

limits of governmental and nongovernmental

capacities.

Emergency management capacity is built from the

ground up. Neighborhood and community pro-

grams have to stand on their own because assistance

may not arrive for hours or days. Major incidents are

addressed by mutual assistance arrangements among

community police, fi re, and emergency medical

service providers. Prevention is generally a local

responsibility as well. Local governments have prin-

cipal responsibility for adopting and enforcing

building codes, building standards, and land-use

regulations to mitigate water, wind, seismic, land-

slide, and other hazards. Local emergency managers

are increasingly collaborating with building code,

urban planning, and other offi cials who can help

reduce risks. What we now call the new governance

process forms the core of our national emergency

response. Consensual processes are the rule. State

and federal agencies play important roles by provid-

ing public education, alert and warning systems, and

evacuation plans, but the tools

needed to manage hazards and

reduce risks are most often in

the hands of local offi cials.

Disaster operations, particularly

large operations, frequently in-

volve a great many organizational

and individual participants. For

example, the response to the

bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah

Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 involved

hundreds of public, nonprofi t, and private organiza-

tions, as well as spontaneous volunteers. Th e bombing

was a federal crime involving a federal facility that

resulted in the deaths of federal offi cers, and legal

jurisdiction clearly resided with the Federal Bureau of

Investigation and other federal agencies. However, the

search and rescue operation was managed by the

Oklahoma City Fire Department, and the outer secu-

rity perimeter was managed by Oklahoma City and

Oklahoma State law enforcement offi cers. Th e rescue

operation included federalized Urban Search and

Rescue teams from local agencies across the nation.

Firefi ghters from more than 75 Oklahoma communi-

ties and more than 35 departments from Texas,

Kansas, Arkansas, and other states participated. In all,

FEMA deployed more than 1,000 of its own employ-

ees and hundreds from other federal agencies. Th e

American Red Cross provided food and shelter for

emergency personnel and support for victims and

their families. Private fi rms ranging from building

supply companies to funeral homes to restaurants

supported the responders. Th e scale of the operation

required resources from all levels of government and

a wide variety of nongovernmental organizations.

Th e response to the World Trade Center attack in

2001 was much larger and much more complex than

the response to the Oklahoma City bombing. Th e

operation involved hundreds of organizations and

many thousands of volunteers. Restaurants, catering

fi rms, and disaster relief organizations fed emergency

response and law enforcement personnel for weeks.

Th e American Red Cross coordinated the recruitment

Th e involvement of nongovern- mental actors builds the capac- ity of communities to deal with future disasters. Th e disaster ex- perience can speed recovery and make communities more resil- ient when disaster strikes again.

134 Public Administration Review • December 2006 • Special Issue

and deployment of tens of thousands of volunteers

around Ground Zero. Private fi rms provided material

support ranging from equipment for search and rescue

operations to clean socks and underwear for emer-

gency responders, not to mention big-screen televi-

sions, lounge chairs, and massage therapists for rest

areas. Representatives from the American Society for

the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Pet Rescue, and

other animal welfare organizations located and res-

cued pets left in apartments by owners who had evac-

uated. Relief organizations cleaned apartments and

businesses covered with dust and debris from the

collapsed towers ( Lowe and Fothergill 2003; Sutton

2003 ), and volunteer counselors provided psychologi-

cal counseling for emergency responders, law enforce-

ment personnel, and victims for months afterward

( Seeley 2005 ). Ad hoc relief organizations created in

the neighborhoods surrounding the World Trade

Center site continue to operate today. In fact, approxi-

mately 350 new charities were created after the 9/11

attacks. Similarly, almost 400 new charities were cre-

ated after the Hurricane Katrina disaster ( Strom

2006 ).

Th e large number of nongovernmental organizations

involved in disaster operations has encouraged the

creation of umbrella organizations such as National

Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster and Inter-

Action, a consortium of U.S.-based international

humanitarian and development organizations, as well

as activities such as the Disaster News Network,

which is funded by the American Baptist Churches

USA, Episcopal Relief and Development, the

Mennonite Disaster Service, Presbyterian Disaster

Assistance, the United Methodist Committee on

Relief, and other faith-based groups (see www.

disasternews.net/sponsors/ ). As early as 1992, Monte

Sahlin of Adventist Community Services noted the

development of networks of nongovernmental actors.

In a speech to the National Volunteer Organizations

Active in Disaster, Sahlin judged the Hurricane

Andrew disaster to be a watershed marking a shift

toward network organizations. He described the shift

in these terms:

Increasingly our constituencies all gray together

into a mass of individuals who want to respond

to disasters. And we don’t know anymore

whether they are part of the Adventist constitu-

ency or the Mennonite constituency or the Red

Cross constituency or the Methodist constitu-

ency and they don’t care. Th ey are just indi-

viduals who want to do something and make a

diff erence because people are suff ering. Th ey

tend to operate on the basis of the personal and

want to participate on a personal level. Th ey do

not trust large organizations and they don’t

want to be put into some bureaucratic system.

( Sahlin 1992 )

Sahlin’s comments underscore the complexities of

developing an eff ective emergency response when

organizational cultures vary so greatly. As he notes,

imposing a hierarchy can have a stifl ing eff ect. In fact,

confl icts between the organizational cultures of groups

such as those described by Sahlin and those of hierar-

chical governmental organizations, particularly law

enforcement and the military, are legend in disaster

relief organizations. Cultural interoperability prob-

lems are major impediments to the eff ective coordina-

tion of disaster relief operations (Waugh 2003, 2004).

Eff ective collaboration requires both cultural sensitiv-

ity and a common language. Nonetheless, confl icts are

inevitable, and some organizations simply may be

unable or unwilling to work with others.

Collaborative networks are a fundamental component

of any emergency response. It is a mistake to assume

that a response can be completely scripted or that the

types of resources that are available can be fully cata-

logued. It is also a mistake to assume that any indi-

vidual or organization can manage all the relief and

recovery eff orts during a catastrophic disaster.

The Collaborative Role of Emergency Managers At the professional level, the critical tasks leading up

to, during, and following a disaster involve coordinat-

ing multiorganizational, intergovernmental, and inter-

sectoral response and recovery operations. In the early

1970s, because of coordination problems during large

California wildfi res, the incident command system

was created to integrate and coordinate fi re operations

involving multiple departments. Unity of command

tempered by management by objectives was the solu-

tion for mounting large-scale, disciplined fi re re-

sponses, and incident command became the mantra

of fi re services. When events get larger and involve

more participants, a unifi ed command is created.

Unifi ed command usually means more sharing of

information and coordination of eff ort, but participa-

tion in decision making is limited in large emergency

response operations. Th ere are practical limits to

participation, particularly when quick decisions are

needed, but there are also limits imposed by culture

and convention. Noncollegial professions typically do

not fi nd open communication and participation

comfortable. Public health professionals, for example,

generally expect open discussion of issues before

decisions (Waugh 2002b).

By the 1980s, it was recognized that the eff ectiveness

of emergency management programs rested primarily

on the interpersonal skills of emergency managers

rather than on their technical skills ( Drabek 1987 ).

Th e emergency manager became a coordinator and

facilitator of emergency operations by fi rst and second

responders largely by maintaining a central emergency

operations center, ensuring communications between

Effective Emergency Management 135

and among responders, and providing essential links

to policy makers. Th e coordinative role became crucial

in large intergovernmental, intersectoral, and multior-

ganizational operations ( Waugh 1993 ). In large juris-

dictions, the emergency management director,

working as an agent of the chief executive or chief

administrative offi cer, might also provide strategic

direction when necessary. Distinctions were made

between the coordinative role of the emergency man-

ager and the operational roles of fi rst responders. In

small jurisdictions, however, the roles were often

intertwined with fi re chiefs, police chiefs, or their

subordinates acting as emergency managers as well as

responders. Whether the incident command system

has utility at the emergency operations center level (as

opposed to the fi eld operations level) is an issue that

needs to be examined.

By the mid-1990s, the paradigm shift noted by Sahlin

was also being refl ected in the new FEMA of James

Lee Witt. Th e focus shifted from disaster response to

mitigation. Th e agency’s mantra became “one dollar

spent on mitigation saves two (or several) dollars in

recovery.” Th e federal role changed from being the

proverbial cavalry, rushing in to save people, to being

a supporter of individual and community eff orts to

reduce risks and prepare for and respond to disasters.

Th e cavalry approach is impractical in a large nation

or state because it simply takes too long for the cavalry

to mobilize and ride to the rescue. Proactive activities,

such as pre-positioning material near expected disaster

areas, were adopted to support state and local eff orts

and to prevent the kinds of delays that occurred dur-

ing responses to Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and

Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Th e lessons of Hugo and

Andrew also gave impetus for a

speedier federal response to aid the

most vulnerable populations —

notably the poor, elderly, and ill,

who do not have the resources to

fend for themselves for even a

few days. Th e creation of the

National Pharmaceutical Stock-

pile (now the National Stock-

pile), with medical supplies

dispersed across the nation, was a

part of this response. Th ese

changes also required partnerships with state and local

agencies to facilitate communication and coordination

and to expand the capacities of fi rst and second re-

sponders, particularly at the local level. Increased

partnerships with nongovernmental organizations and

private fi rms (such as Home Depot) were part of the

new FEMA in the Clinton administration.

A 2002 study of FEMA’s involvement in promoting

safe construction methods to reduce vulnerabilities to

fl ood, fi re, wind, and other hazards found the agency

taking a multifaceted approach. It was using its regu-

latory power and economic incentives through the

National Flood Insurance Program to reduce fl ood

losses and employing the Project Impact (Disaster-

Resistant Communities) program to address a variety

of hazards. It was also funding workshops through the

Blue Sky Foundation to help create a market for safe

construction methods and to encourage the building

industry to adopt such methods. Funding was given

to the Institute for Business and Home Safety’s “forti-

fi ed home” program, university agricultural extension

“model home” programs, and other local, state, and

federal programs to educate the public and builders

about construction methods that can reduce vulner-

abilities to wind, fi re, and water hazards. Th e eff orts

included direct regulation, fi nancial and regulatory

incentive programs, direct funding, collaboration with

other agencies, and informal, often personal encour-

agement for the champions of safe construction meth-

ods. In some cases, the same agency personnel were

working formally and informally with very diff erent

kinds of networks to promote the adoption of safe

construction methods (Waugh 2002a).

Developing an Effective Leadership Strategy Leadership problems were cited specifi cally by the

House Select Committee that investigated the poor

response to Hurricane Katrina. Th e committee found

“failures at all levels of government that signifi cantly

undermined and detracted from the heroic eff orts of

fi rst responders, private individuals and organizations,

faith-based groups, and others” (U.S. House 2006, 1).

Th e committee went on to say in its fi nal report,

We refl ect on the 9/11 Commission’s fi nding

that “the most important failure was one of

imagination.” Th e Select

Committee believes that

Katrina was primarily a fail-

ure of initiative. But there is,

of course, a nexus between

the two. Both imagination

and initiative — in other

words, leadership — require

good information. And a

coordinated process for shar-

ing it. And a willingness to

use information — however

imperfect or incomplete — to fuel action. (1)

Likewise, in his testimony before the Senate Commit-

tee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs

in June 2006, Donald Kettl concluded that leadership

was the critical and missing element in the poor

Katrina response. He argued that the committee should

focus on improving FEMA and the DHS leadership

rather than on organizational reform.

How, then, should leaders lead in times of disaster?

Th e fi ndings of the 9/11 Commission and the House

Th e lessons of Hugo and Andrew also gave impetus for a speedier federal response to aid

the most vulnerable popula- tions — notably the poor, elderly, and ill, who do not have the re- sources to fend for themselves

for even a few days.

136 Public Administration Review • December 2006 • Special Issue

Select Committee that offi cials lacked imagination

and initiative, respectively, certainly focus on the

inability of leaders to be proactive. Th e House Select

Committee report also points out that offi cials failed

to adapt existing plans to circumstances as the storm

approached New Orleans and especially when the

levees failed (2006, 4). Ultimately, offi cials had to

respond on an ad hoc basis because plans were not

implemented, were not implemented in time, or were

found to be ineff ective.

Leadership needs vary, and comprehensive emergency

management presents a diff erent set of challenges than

emergency response. Th e task environment is very

diff erent after the storm has passed or the ground

stops shaking or the terrorists have fl ed. Nonetheless,

hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, disaster

response, and disaster recovery are not just closely

linked — they are intertwined. A fl exible leadership

approach is necessary. In fact, Charles Wise (2006)

suggests that although command and control struc-

tures are important, the DHS also needs to have more

fl exible and more nimble processes to ensure that it

can adjust to changing circumstances. Network man-

agement is the missing capability in the DHS organi-

zation, in other words. Wise concludes that more

adaptive management — that is, processes that encour-

age the sharing of information and more collabora-

tion — would foster organizational learning and

facilitate adaptation and improvisation.

Th ere is evidence that inappropriate leadership strategies

were a factor in the poor response to Hurricane Katrina.

Th e House Select Committee report faulted the com-

mand and control system because it interfered with the

disaster response. Th e implication was that a better

command and control system rather than a decentral-

ized system would have worked better. However, a large

part of the problem with the command and control

system was the lack of situational awareness — that is,

poor communication among offi cials in the disaster area

and decision makers in Baton Rouge, Jackson, and

Washington. Th e leadership strategy required for crises

may well be counterintuitive. Information often fl ows

from the bottom in a traditional hierarchy, to the extent

that it fl ows at all. Such a situation may be better han-

dled by a style that is affi liative, open, and democratic.

An authoritarian response would certainly be faster and

more consistent, but it would require insight and vision

that may not be available to those with actual authority

and media access. As noted previously, fl exibility needs

to be a key requirement for leaders in catastrophic disas-

ters and hierarchical decision processes are neither fl ex-

ible nor speedy in rapidly changing circumstances

( Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, 31 ).

Collaboration and Katrina Following the 9/11 attacks, the nation focused on the

threat of terrorism rather than on more familiar and

probable natural and technological disasters (Waugh

2006). Th e all-hazards Federal Response Plan that

served to coordinate the federal response to the 9/11

attacks was replaced by a more terrorism-centric

National Response Plan. Th e federal government is

assumed to be the lead government for major dis -

asters of all sorts, even though the primary legal and

political responsibility for dealing with most disasters

normally resides with state and local offi cials. Sorting

out responsibilities was one of the major problems in

the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (U.S.

House 2006).

Homeland security – style emergency management has

become more response oriented, less collaborative,

and more centralized. Centralized decision processes

caused delays in approving and dispatching disaster

assistance and greatly complicated communication

between and federal offi cials on the ground in New

Orleans, Mississippi, and Alabama and their bosses in

Washington. Th e infamous e-mail exchange between

FEMA director Michael Brown and Marty Bahamonde,

a FEMA offi cial who rode out the storm in New

Orleans and reported conditions in the Superdome, is

indicative of the disconnect between federal decision

makers and emergency management personnel in the

disaster area ( Lipton 2005 ). After action reports and

studies have noted serious communication problems

between and among local, state, and federal offi cials,

not to mention serious problems communicating with

and among emergency responders (U.S. House 2006;

Waugh 2006).

A major criticism of homeland security offi cials has

been their failure to collaborate extensively with non-

governmental disaster organizations, as FEMA did in

the 1990s. Although FEMA experienced some prob-

lems coordinating with charities following the 9/11

attacks, the problems were largely resolved within a

few weeks (GAO 2002). Th e House Select Committee

report on the Katrina response cites serious coordina-

tion problems among FEMA, the U.S. Department of

Defense, and the state of Louisiana (2006, 3). Th e

report also cites problems coordinating search and

rescue operations among the U.S. Coast Guard, the

National Guard, the regular military, and others (4).

Th e lack of coordination of military and state and local

emergency management eff orts was attributed to the

fact that the Northern Command was not connected

to state emergency management structures prior to the

disaster. As a result, there was a lack of understanding

and trust (4). Th ese problems were not new when

Katrina made landfall. Intergovernmental and interor-

ganizational coordination problems have been noted in

several TOPOFF (Top Offi cials) exercises (DHS 2005;

Inglesby, Grossman, and O’Toole 2001).

Part of the common wisdom of emergency management

is that communication and collaboration are facilitated

Effective Emergency Management 137

by personal familiarity, not just institutional contact.

Th e development of strong working relationships with

state and local counterparts was a central component of

FEMA’s regional programs during the 1990s, and those

relationships have since deteriorated. Building regional

offi ces and roles has been suggested to DHS (Heyman

and Carafano 2004; Meese, Carafano, and Weitz 2005),

but recent reorganizations have centralized rather than

decentralized decision processes.

Terrorist-spawned catastrophes require considerable

collaboration in order to utilize the nation’s capacity

to deal with disaster ( Waugh and Sylves 2002 ). Eff ec-

tive utilization of nongovernmental resources is a

problem following terrorist attacks because the

agencies that are supposed to take the lead role are

often unfamiliar with the networks that respond to

large natural disasters and unused to communicating

openly and collaborating closely with nongovernmen-

tal actors (Waugh 2003). Th is is one of the concerns

with proposals for a larger military role in the nation’s

emergency management system. Greater capacity for

command and control is not synonymous with greater

capacity for collaboration. Th e poor response to

Katrina demonstrated a lack of collaboration and, as the

House Select Committee has pointed out, the Defense

Department does not have continuous working rela-

tionships with state and local emergency management

offi ces. Nor does it have a role in hazard mitigation

(except for the work of the Corps of Engineers), disaster

preparedness, and disaster recovery.

Collaboration is an expectation in emergency manage-

ment. Th e NFPA 1600, the international standard for

emergency management programs, and the EMAP

standard, which was adapted from the NFPA 1600 for

public emergency management programs, defi ne

programs as “a jurisdiction-wide system that provides

for management and coordination of prevention,

mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery activi-

ties for all hazards. Th e system encompasses all organi-

zations, agencies, departments, entities, and

individuals responsible for emergency management

and homeland security” (EMAP Standard 3.3.3).

Th e standard goes on to require an advisory commit-

tee to ensure input by program stakeholders (Standard

4.3.1) and to “ensure that the program is developed

and maintained in collaboration with program stake-

holders, both from policy and

operational levels” (Standard

4.3.2). Organizations are not

accredited, but programs are.

An analysis of the baseline

assessments, conducted as part

of FEMA’s National Emergency

Management Baseline Capabil-

ity Assurance Program to help

programs improve their capa-

bilities, found that about one-half of the states evalu-

ated had committees of stakeholders or similar

mechanisms to ensure meaningful involvement in

program policy and operational decision making

( Lucas 2005 ). Accreditation is contingent on develop-

ing mechanisms for cooperation and collaboration,

even when it requires a change in state law or local

ordinance to permit participation by nongovernmen-

tal organizations.

Th e focus on collaboration and cooperation is also

evident in FEMA’s training programs. FEMA encour-

ages communities to send their elected and appointed

offi cials, along with their emergency managers, to the

National Emergency Training Center for four-and-a-

half-day Integrated Emergency Management courses

that use simulations and classroom instruction to

develop collaborative skills, as well as an understand-

ing of technical issues such as recovery and mitigation

following hurricanes (FEMA 2004). Some jurisdic-

tions send dozens of offi cials, including elected leaders,

to ensure that they develop the skills to handle com-

plex emergencies. Th e point is that the interpersonal

contact — the working relationships — are critical.

Intellectually, the emergency management profession

has moved beyond a focus on emergency response to a

focus on all hazards and comprehensive emergency

management. Indeed, to receive the highest credential

in the fi eld, the Certifi ed Emergency Manager desig-

nation, emergency managers have to have education,

training, and experience in all four functions (mitiga-

tion, preparedness, response, and recovery). It is not

enough to be an experienced fi refi ghter or an emer-

gency medical technician or a military logistician. A

working knowledge of the four functions and an un-

derstanding of the social, political, and legal contexts

of emergency management are required. Th ese devel-

opments certainly illustrate the value placed on leaders

able to understand the big picture, but these actors are

seldom the ones designing the major organizational

infrastructure that governs national action. Th ey must

also manage the “rowers,” who may not have a clear

conception of the diff erent roles in the system.

Conclusions Disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and re-

covery are the end products of complex political and

administrative interactions, and the results cannot be

easily controlled or anticipated.

Analyzing the best way to ap-

proach these tasks is valuable, as

improved performance in emer-

gency management depends to a

great extent on the ability of pub-

lic offi cials to fully comprehend

the complexities of the policy

networks operating in the areas in

which they work and to think

Disaster mitigation, prepared- ness, response, and recovery are

the end products of complex political and administrative in- teractions, and the results can-

not be easily controlled or anticipated.

138 Public Administration Review • December 2006 • Special Issue

strategically about how to use or alter them. Th ey also

need subject-matter knowledge of diverse topics —

such as land-use regulation, zoning, and building

codes — in order to properly understand and explain

community vulnerabilities.

Understanding the implications of disaster response

decisions on a community’s ability to recover quickly

is also essential. It is not just a case of “putting the

white on the red,” as fi refi ghters describe putting out

fi res. Th e need for a broad perspective and eff ective

leadership skills is not radically diff erent from other

public administration activities, but the hazards faced

are often far more dire and consequential. Sorting out

these complex issues is more than any single person

can do, and this is certainly one reason emergency

managers were quick to understand and embrace

collaborative activities. Collaboration is the way pro-

fessional emergency managers get the job done. Th at

said, disasters and fear of disasters also generate a

strong desire for hierarchy — somebody to take charge,

or possibly someone to be held accountable. Such

thinking is inconsistent with the tenets of the fi eld

and displays blindness to what collaborative action has

accomplished. Th ere are pressures in emergency man-

agement that help drive collaboration, but there is also

pressure for the kind of security promised by a com-

manding leader.

Emergency management theory and practice has

certainly been infl uenced by the revolution that is

changing all aspects of public administration here and

abroad. Th e National Performance Review called for

delegating authority, replacing rules and regulations

with incentives, developing budgets based on results,

exposing government operations to competition,

searching for market rather than administrative solu-

tions, and, whenever possible, measuring the success

of government in terms of customer satisfaction ( Gore

1993, 7 ). FEMA has been transformed by the

National Performance Review, the Government

Performance and Results Act, and the New Public

Management. In the 1980s, FEMA offi cials measured

outputs — for example, the number of training pro-

grams and the amount (in dollars) of assistance deliv-

ered. In the 1990s, saving lives and reducing property

losses, as well as customer satisfaction, were the results

that FEMA pursued. Th e achievement of those results

necessitated partnerships and broader collaboration

because FEMA had neither the authority nor the

resources to achieve the desired results on its own (see

Waugh 1999). Little has changed since the 1990s.

FEMA, as well as the DHS, lack the authority and the

resources to protect life and property without

collaboration.

Better understanding of the nature of collaboration

can also produce benefi ts. It is easy to confuse respon-

siveness with collaboration, for example. Th is kind of

confusion could also help to fuel the desire for greater

hierarchical control. Disasters will inevitably produce

calls for responsiveness, but an eff ective response is

unlikely to happen without collaboration. Vigoda

(2002) helped to clarify this issue when he argued that

New Public Management notions of responsiveness

have also been accompanied by “a lower willingness to

share, participate, elaborate, and partner with citi-

zens.” Responders can be blinded by their own good

intentions.

Likewise, public offi cials need to know that network

management and intergovernmental management

may not be related activities ( Agranoff and McGuire

2003 ). Despite arguments about the disarticulated

state, the basic legal and normative structure remains

intact. Th is makes collaboration much more challeng-

ing in emergency management than in other public

arenas. Th e federal government is always the elephant

in the room, possibly facilitating or inhibiting the

actions of others. And, we saw during the Katrina

response, it can be frustrating for federal offi cials

when they lack the authority to deal with the catastro-

phe they see developing. Th ough they could have

supplanted state authority and taken over the re-

sponse, the political repercussions would have been

severe. Th e temptation is to change the rules rather

than to collaborate closely. By the same token, it can

be frustrating for state offi cials when federal offi cials

want to assume control over state resources, such as

the National Guard.

Th e response to natural disasters is, in large measure,

an ad hoc aff air involving organized nongovernmental

actors, governmental actors, and emergent groups that

often become well organized and long lived. No one

can ever have complete control; it is not possible to

fully command attention or to compel compliance.

Nongovernmental organizations will respond with or

without government approval. Volunteers will arrive

with or without an invitation. First responders will

self-deploy. Th is type of convergence behavior is inevi-

table. Better integration of nongovernmental organi-

zations into federal, state, and local disaster relief

operations is the best approach, as recommended by

the White House’s review of the Katrina response

( Townsend 2006 ), but this will not be easy to achieve.

An enhanced military role in disaster response is likely

to occur, but unless the Defense Department develops

long-term and close working relationships with state

and local emergency management offi ces, a broader

role is not realistic. Some (perhaps many) nongovern-

mental organizations would choose not to work with

military units as well.

Although integration might facilitate the co-optation

of nongovernmental organizations ( O’Toole and

Meier 2004 ), it is likely that some diff erences cannot

be smoothed over. Goal confl icts are common, as is

Effective Emergency Management 139

distrust. Th e controversy over rebuilding neighbor-

hoods in New Orleans’s Ninth Ward is a good illustra-

tion. Nongovernmental organizations and volunteers

are helping to rebuild homes as city and state offi cials

consider redevelopment plans, including plans not to

rebuild in some areas, and as federal offi cials deter-

mine what restrictions should be in place to prevent

future fl ooding. Governors, mayors, sheriff s, and

other public offi cials, including presidents and mem-

bers of Congress, have heavy political stakes in the

management of hazards and disasters. Th eir goals

frequently confl ict, and fi nding common ground is

challenging.

As Donald Kettl (2006) noted in his congressional

testimony, leadership has been a serious problem for

FEMA and the DHS. Th e skills and experience that

should be required for new appointees has been a

subject of debate following recent resignations. Th e

type of leadership credibility discussed by Gabris

(2004) is certainly needed. Th e choice should derive

from vision and strategic thinking rather than from a

predisposition to hierarchy or management control.

Th ough political savvy will also help, developing an

appropriate agenda can only come from mastering

the fundamentals of emergency management and

related disciplines. To be sure, James Lee Witt was

the transformational leader who reinvented FEMA

in 1993, beginning his fi rst day at work as he shook

hands with employees as they arrived for work at the

front door of the headquarters building in Washing-

ton. Defi ning the core values of the agency and

building morale and competence was his approach

to transforming the agency into what was once one

of the best-functioning agencies in the federal gov-

ernment. Although the values may have changed

somewhat since 9/11, the imperative to collaborate

has not.

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