

Manifest Destiny

On June 3, 1842, J. A. Roebuck, one of the prominent colonial reformers of England, Member of Parliament for Bath, the English health resort which had been frequented by absentee West Indian planters in the eighteenth century, was reported by Hansard as saying in the House of Commons:

'He was prepared to say that if the benefits of the people of England demanded it, he would sacrifice the West-India colonies. Why not? How were those colonies of any benefit to the people of England? A set of barren islands, which were early maintained with the pith and sinews of the people of this country! Jamaica to the bottom of the sea, and all the Antilles after it, rather than the interests of the people should be sacrificed.'

Two years later, on June 30, 1844, he returned to the charge:

'He considered that the West India Islands had been most fatal appendages to this great Empire, they had done us no service—they had been the means of occasioning dreadful wars and fearful commotions—they had put us to immense expense, and had given us nothing in requital. He believed that if, tomorrow, by some accidental visitation, these Islands disappeared from the face of the earth, as far as England was concerned, however much she might mourn the loss human nature would sustain, she would not lose one jot of her strength, not one penny of her wealth, not one instrument of her power.'

In France, also, the political importance of the sugar colonies was regarded as another memory of the past, as Lestiboudois said, in a memorial on behalf of beet sugar presented to the Royal Society of Science, Agriculture and the Arts of Lille in 1839. Britain and France, which had agreed in the eighteenth century on the incalculable importance of the Caribbean territories, agreed in the nineteenth on their indisputable insignificance.

Towards this revolution in colonial affairs, as far as France was concerned, the independence of Haiti was a powerful contributing factor. For a long time France continued to dream of its reconquest, but it was only a dream. Eventually, in 1825, France agreed to give up all claims to Haiti in return for an indemnity of 150 million francs, payable in five annual instalments. Only Martinique, Guadeloupe and Cayenne remained of the once proud empire in the Caribbean, dreamed of by Colbert, Louis XIV and Bonaparte. In 1877 Sweden, reflecting the general European vote-face, restored St. Bartholomew, the inhabitants of which, with one dissenting, voted for the restoration of French sovereignty.

As a result of the war with Bonaparte, Britain emerged in possession of British Guiana and Trinidad, and confirmed in possession of Tobago. St. Lucia and Grenada, which had constantly changed hands in the eighteenth-century see-saw struggle. Britain was on the alert to any French attempt to reconquer Haiti and to extend her power in the Caribbean. When, in 1822, the vagaries of European politics brought French troops temporarily into Spain, the British Prime Minister, George Canning, uttered his famous words: 'We determined that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain with the Indies. We called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old.' The British Government thereby supported the revolutions for independence of the Spanish Colonies in America. But there was little in Canning's words besides rhetoric; there was really not any serious possibility that the French Government would resurrect the western design of Louis XIV.

The United States was the only power interested in the Caribbean in the nineteenth century. In 1811 Jefferson dreamed of an independent federation of all the Caribbean islands, looking upon it as 'an entrapping prospect into futurity'. When that prospect faded, Jefferson turned his eyes to Cuba. He hoped to get

Bonaparte's consent to the admission of Cuba into the Union, stating in 1814 that that would be the *ne plus ultra* of United States expansion in that direction, while Canada could be expected to fall into the lap of the United States during the first war with Britain. The result, said Jefferson, would be 'such an empire for liberty as she has never surveyed since the creation'.

This was too modest for at least one of Jefferson's colleagues, John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, and later President of the United States. To Adams the manifest destiny of the United States was to dominate the Western Hemisphere, and the United States should endeavour to familiarise the world with this idea. With respect to the Spanish possessions to the south and the British to the north, Adams said to the Cabinet in 1819:

'It is impossible that centuries shall elapse without finding them annexed to the United States; not that any spirit of encroachment or ambition on our part renders it necessary, but because it is a physical, moral and political absurdity that such fragments of territory, with sovereigns at fifteen hundred (*sic*) miles beyond the sea, worthless and burdensome to their owners, should exist permanently contiguous to a great powerful and rapidly-growing nation...until Europe shall find it a settled geographical element that the United States and North America are identical, any effort on our part to reason the world out of a belief that we are ambitious will have no other effect than to convince them that we add to our ambition hypocrisy.'

A new claimant had arisen for Adam's heritage.

The key territory in the Caribbean from the standpoint of the United States was Cuba. Adams wrote to the United States Minister to Spain, on April 28, 1823:

'There are laws of political as well as physical gravitation and if an apple severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its unnatural connection with Spain and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom.'

Adams did not explain why Cuba should have been any more incapable of self-support than Haiti or any of the Spanish mainland colonies which, in that very year, with the benevolent neutrality of the United States, were asserting their claims to independence by force of arms, following the example of the great republic which Adams represented. A powerful school

already existed in Cuba which demanded independence.

But Adams had to reckon with the British and French Governments. His letter continued: 'The transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious to the interests of the Union. The question both of our right and our power to prevent it, if necessary by force, already obtrudes itself upon our councils.' He regarded the Cuban question as of deeper importance and greater magnitude than any other which had occurred since the independence of the United States.

It was with these ideas in mind that President Monroe, in 1823, made his famous speech to Congress which has come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine. Specifically directed towards the Cuban question, but couched in language sufficiently general to exclude any changes of sovereignty whatsoever in the Western Hemisphere—including Russia, as Adams bluntly informed the Russian Minister—Monroe announced to the world firstly that the United States would regard any attempt by the European powers to extend the colonial system in the New World as dangerous to its peace and safety; secondly, pledged itself not to interfere with the existing colonies; thirdly, with respect to the colonies which had declared their independence, 'could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner, their destiny, by any European power, in any other light, than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States'.

On the other hand, Britain would not agree to United States or French annexation of Cuba. 'It may be questioned,' noted George Canning, 'whether any blow, that could be struck by any power in any part of the world, would have a more sensible effect on the interests of this country or the reputation of its government.' The upshot was a sort of gentlemen's agreement between the United States and Britain, to which France subsequently adhered, that the *status quo* should be maintained in Cuba, and the island should remain in Spanish possession. The prestige of the Pope's beneficiary in 1493 had sunk to its nadir.

An uneasy truce was maintained until 1852, with clumsy filibustering attempts from the United States to force the issue. In that year, the British and French Governments, suspicious of United States designs, proposed a convention between the three

governments. The essence of the proposed convention was contained in the following article:

'The high contracting parties hereby severally and collectively disclaim now and for hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba, and they respectively bind themselves to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any power or individuals whatever.'

It fell to the Secretary of State, Edward H. Everett, to reply. He was already familiar with the problem. As United States Minister to Spain in 1825, he had proposed to the President that the United States might peaceably secure the island by offering Spain a considerable loan, with Cuba as security, the United States to obtain complete sovereignty if the loan was not repaid within a stipulated time. Everett's objections to the proposed convention were expressed in a letter of December 1, 1852 to the French Foreign Minister. Reiterating the refusal of his government to see Cuba pass under British or French sovereignty, he compared such a step with French and British reaction to the United States acquiring some important island in the Mediterranean. It was the first official step towards denominating the Caribbean 'the American Mediterranean'.

Everett's objections were as follows. First, the convention would certainly be rejected by the United States Senate. Secondly, the convention would be of no value unless it were lasting; the constitution of the United States did not permit the imposition of a permanent disability on its government. Thirdly, one of the oldest traditions of the United States was an aversion to political alliances with European powers. Fourthly, a more grave objection, the proposed convention, although equal in its terms, would be very unequal in its substance. 'If,' emphasised Everett, 'an island like Cuba, belonging to the Spanish crown, guarded the entrance of the Thames and the Seine, and the United States should propose a convention like this to France and England, those powers would assuredly feel that the disability assumed by ourselves was far less serious than that which we asked them to assume.' Fifthly, the convention could only be transitory, 'sure to be swept away by the irresistible tide of affairs in a new country'. It rested on principles applicable to Europe, where international relations were of great antiquity, but which were not applicable to America,

'which, but lately a waste, is filling up with intense rapidity, and adjusting on natural principles those territorial relations which, on the first discovery of the continent, were in a good degree fortuitous'. Behind the sophistry lay a thinly veiled threat to Europe which went far beyond Cuba. 'It would be as easy,' Everett became more specific, 'to throw a dam from Cape Florida to Cuba, in the hope of stopping the flow of the gulf stream, as to attempt by a compact like this, to fix the fortunes of Cuba "now and for hereafter".'

Everett's sixth objection showed a lack of knowledge of history. It could not be doubted, he insinuated, that both France and England would prefer any change in the condition of Cuba to that which was most to be apprehended, a repetition of the revolution in Saint-Domingue. This was a bogey which, least of all, would terrify England, who had preferred the revolution to French sovereignty; so, for that matter, had the United States itself. Finally, concluded Everett, the proposed convention would only intensify the filibustering attacks from the United States.

'No administration of this government, however strong in the public confidence in other respects, could stand a day under the odium of having stipulated with the great powers of Europe, that in no future time, under no change of circumstances, by no amicable arrangement with Spain, by no act of lawful war (should that calamity unfortunately occur), by no consent of the inhabitants of the island, should they, like the possessions of Spain on the American continent, succeed in rendering themselves independent; in fine, by no overruling necessity of self-preservation should the United States make the acquisition of Cuba.'

The confusion of Cuban independence with annexation by the United States could not obscure the full import of Everett's manifest destiny.

It was with this background that the United States turned its attention to the possibility of purchasing Cuba. It was the beginning of dollar diplomacy. In 1854 the United States Ministers to Britain, France and Spain assembled in Ostend, Belgium, and issued a manifesto, known as the Ostend Manifesto, recommending an immediate and earnest effort to purchase Cuba for a maximum price of \$120 million. The old-fashioned school of protocol must have been scandalised. In the same year President Pierce authorised the offer of \$100 million for the island, though he

added that he would not have the negotiations fail if an additional 20 or 30 millions were required to effect the sale.

In 1859 the Senate, emphasising that 'the law of our national existence is growth. We cannot, if we would, disobey it,' considered three possible solutions of the difficulty—first, possession by one of the European powers; second, independence; third, annexation by the United States by conquest or negotiation. The Senate rejected the first solution as incompatible with the national safety; it dismissed the second on the ground that independence would be nominal, the precursor to a European protectorate, which could not be tolerated; it recommended the third alternative, annexation by negotiation, as the only practicable course, and as cheaper, in the long run, than conquest.

But Spain obstinately refused to sell, and the Cubans had their own views as to their future status. The United States was not free to intervene directly in the question until 1898.

There were two other parts of Adam's heritage, besides Cuba, which attracted the interest of the United States. The first was the Danish West Indies. Weary of the increasingly heavy burden of these tiny islands in the steadily advancing chaos of the world market, the King of Denmark initiated negotiations for their sale to the United States. He announced the convention to his faithful subjects on October 25, 1867, expressing the hope that 'a mighty impulse, both moral and material, will be given to the happy development of the Islands, under the new sovereignty'.

The King, however, had jumped the gun in an anxiety to abandon islands which was as great as the former anxiety had been to acquire them. The United States Senate refused to ratify the convention. The King of Denmark had to announce the rebuff and inform his subjects that they were still his subjects. In another proclamation on May 7, 1870, he assured them: 'ready as We were to subdue the feelings of our hearts when We thought that duty bade Us so to do, yet We cannot otherwise than feel a satisfaction that circumstances have relieved Us from making a sacrifice which, notwithstanding the advantages held out, would always have been painful to Us.' Denmark had to wait until 1917.

The second area in the Caribbean which seemed manifestly destined to obey Adams' law of political gravitation was the Spanish part of Hispaniola. Declaring itself independent of Spain

in 1821, the territory was annexed by Haiti in the following year, and remained under Haitian rule until 1844, when it once more declared itself independent, as the Dominican Republic. The unceasing struggle in the interior and the constant apprehension of a renewed attack from Haiti led the President of the Republic to make overtures to the United States for annexation. President Grant sent out a one-man commission of inquiry which recommended annexation. But again the United States Senate refused to ratify the treaty.

In 1871, pursuant to a resolution of Congress, another commission of inquiry was appointed to report on the desire in the Dominican Republic for annexation. The assistant secretary to this commission, which consisted of three men, was the distinguished Negro abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, who later became United States Minister to Haiti. The Commission reported as follows: 'There is but one chance for that Republic ever to recover its independence—to become, after a proper period of probation, one of a union of states, the freedom and substantial independence of each being guaranteed by the strength of all.' The Commission warned that, if the republic were not annexed, 'it is to lie exhausted and helpless until some strong nation shall seize it and hold it in colonial subjection'. In the very next paragraph the commission stressed that the tobacco trade of the republic was rapidly becoming a German monopoly, and that the number of Germans on the north side of the island exceeded those of any foreign power. But the Senate would not budge, and the United States had to wait until World War I before it could get a foothold.

The commission of inquiry, feeling 'a deep interest in the experiment of self-government which the blacks are trying in Haiti', which it wished all success, made efforts to go beyond its terms of reference, and tried to study Haiti also, desiring to give government and important citizens an opportunity of stating their views, both as to their claims on the Dominican Republic and as to their wishes with respect to any changes that might be brought about in the neighbouring republic. They received no encouragement to pursue these inquiries, and the Haitian Government refused to permit them to explore the interior. The Commission, however, expressed the view that the establishment of a well-regulated, orderly and prosperous state in the Dominican Republic

would be hardly less beneficial to Haiti than to its neighbour, would set an example to Haiti, would put an end to the exhausting border warfare between the two countries, and would enable both to devote their energies to the education of their people and the development of their resources. Here, also, the United States had to wait for World War I before it could obtain an opportunity to secure a footing.

Then a new star had been added to the Caribbean firmament was strikingly and dramatically brought out in 1895, when a fifty-year-old boundary dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela came to a head. The United States, to whom Venezuela had repeatedly appealed, took the view that the dispute fell within the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, which it interpreted to read that, when a European power had a difference with a South American community, the European power shall consent to refer that controversy to arbitration. The doctrine of manifest destiny was never more sharply stated than it was by Secretary of State Olney:

'Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subject to which it confines its interposition... Being entitled to resent and resist any sequestration of Venezuelan soil by Great Britain, it is necessarily entitled to know whether such sequestration has occurred or is now going on.'

Olney added that the three thousand miles of ocean geography had improved since Adams' time—separating Europe and America was a physical fact which made any permanent political union between a European and an American state unnatural and expedient. President Cleveland proposed to Congress the appointment of a United States commission to investigate the facts, after which it would be the duty of the United States 'to resist by every means in its power as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which, upon investigation, we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela'.

The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, dealt incisively with the United States claims. He emphasised, in the first place, that the Monroe Doctrine, whatever the respect felt for it, had no place in international law, which was founded on the general



48. '1959-1969: Tenth Anniversary of the triumph of the Cuban rebellion'

consent of nations: 'no statesman, however eminent, and no nation, however powerful, are competent to insert into the code of international law a novel principle which was never recognised before, and which has not since been accepted by the Government of any other country.'

In the second place, Salisbury rejected Olney's implications that the union between Great Britain and Canada, between Great Britain and Jamaica and Trinidad, between Great Britain and British Honduras and British Guiana was unnatural and inexpedient, and he emphatically denied the opinion on behalf of the British Government and its American subjects:

'They are not prepared to admit that the interests of the United States are necessarily concerned in every frontier dispute which may arise between any two of the states who possess dominion in the Western Hemisphere; and still less can they accept the doctrine that the United States are entitled to claim that the process of arbitration shall be applied to any demand for the surrender of territory which one of these States may make against another.'

President Cleveland breathed defiance. War between the two nations loomed on the horizon. But in January, 1896, the German Kaiser sent his telegram to President Kruger of the Transvaal congratulating him on the frustration of the Jameson raid. With the Boer War on its hands, and with Joseph Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary flirting with his dream of an alliance of the three great Anglo-Saxon powers, Britain, Germany and the United States, Britain adopted a conciliatory attitude and agreed to arbitration. The decision of the tribunal followed, in the main, the British claim.

The controversy over the Venezuela boundary had a profound psychological effect on the people of the United States and prepared them for new adventures based on a wholly untenable interpretation of a unilateral doctrine which its greatest students in the country could not endorse. The publication of Mahan's history of sea power had helped to give the United States public that taste of empire which, according to the *Washington Post* in 1899, was in the mouth of the people even as the taste of blood in the jungle. The hour was approaching; only the man was needed.

But the man, too, was available—Theodore Roosevelt, Governor

of New York, soon to be President of the United States. Cowardice in a race, as in an individual, said Roosevelt at the opening of the Naval War College in Newport in 1897, was the unpardonable sin, and no nation could hold its place in the world unless it stood ready to guard its rights with an armed hand. On February 9, 1898, Roosevelt wrote to a friend:

'I should myself like to shape our foreign policy with a purpose ultimately of driving off this continent every European power. I would begin with Spain, and in the end would take all other European nations, including England.'

With the second war of independence in Cuba; with Olney's curious fears that Cuban independence might lead to a division of the island into two republics, the one white, the other black; with the sugar of Cuba, as the United States Minister to Spain stated to the British Minister in 1897, as vital to the United States as the wheat and cotton of India and Egypt to Great Britain; with all these factors simultaneously bearing upon the problem, the United States followed Roosevelt's prescription and began with the colonies of Spain on April 21, 1898.

The American Mediterranean

A new and more bitter revolution for independence began in Cuba in 1895. Spain was unable to restore order, the non-combatant population was caught between the depredations on both sides, and American commerce and interests suffered heavily. The United States urged Spain to terminate the revolt, but the revolutionaries refused to be satisfied with anything short of independence. The continuing disorders led the United States Government to send the battleship *Maine* to Havana in January, 1898. It exploded shortly after with the loss of two officers and 258 men. The United States, blaming a submarine mine or some external cause, demanded reparation and presented a virtual ultimatum to Spain on March 29, 1898 calling for an immediate armistice. The Spanish Government, blaming an internal explosion, refused. On April 11, 1898, President McKinley, unimpressed by a joint note of the European Great Powers urging further negotiations with Spain, approached the Congress, which passed a joint resolution reading as follows:

'First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

'Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the

Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

'Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces in the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several states, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

'Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said Island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the Island to its people.'

After three months of war Spain sued for peace, preferring annexation of Cuba by the United States in order to guarantee Spanish life and property and Cuba's external debts to Spain. The United States refused, and the Treaty of Paris, signed on December 10, 1898, provided for the relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba, as well as Puerto Rico which was annexed outright by the United States. Thus ended the Papal Donation of 1493 and Spanish power was removed from the Caribbean.

The Military Government established by the United States concentrated on the relief of the starving population, the disarmament of the Cuban revolutionaries and loyalists, the control of yellow fever, and the promulgation of an electoral law as the basis of the election of a convention to frame a constitution. The convention, summoned in 1900, resisted American claims which were clearly and precisely set out in a proviso attached to the Military Appropriation Bill on March 2, 1901, which has come to be known as the Platt Amendment. The Platt Amendment, which was to govern American relations with Cuba down to the advent of Fidel Castro, read as follows:

'I. That the Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorise or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonisation or for military or naval purposes or otherwise lodgement in or control over any portion of said island.

'II. That said Government shall not assume or contract any public

debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking-fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of Government, shall be inadequate.

'III. That the Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.

'IV. That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.

'V. That the Government of Cuba will execute, and, as far as necessary, extend, the plans already devised, or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as the commerce of the Southern ports of the United States and the people residing therein.

'VI. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty.

'VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defence, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States land necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

'VIII. That by way of further assurance the Government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States.'

The convention was disinclined to accept the Platt Amendment, taking the view that such demands would deprive the Government of Cuba of all real independence and would pave the way for constant American interference in its internal affairs. The United States made it clear that it would not withdraw from Cuba until the Platt Amendment was accepted, and so the convention backed down. The permanent treaty was signed on May 22, 1903. The United States received in 1903 bases at Guantanamo and Bahia Honda, agreeing to pay an annual rent of \$2,000; in 1912 the United States surrendered its right at Bahia Honda in return for an enlarged area at Guantanamo, agreeing to raise the annual rent

to \$5,000. Ultimately in 1925 the United States abandoned all claims to the Isle of Pines which remained under Cuban jurisdiction. The American Government intervened in 1906 when law and order in Cuba totally broke down, and an American Provisional Government, under Taft, and later Magoon, was installed from 1906 to 1909.

All this was in accordance with the new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine enunciated by Theodore Roosevelt. In its classic form, the Roosevelt Corollary, as it has come to be known, was thus stated by Roosevelt in 1904:

'Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilised society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilised nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.'

The international policeman carried a big stick. His was the duty, as President Taft wrote to Secretary Knox in 1909, 'to have the right to knock their heads together until they should maintain peace between them'. As stated frankly by Roosevelt himself in 1908 with reference to Venezuela, America had to 'show these Dagoes that they will have to behave decently'. So Roosevelt just 'took' the Panama Canal while Congress and the South Americans debated the issue. As Roosevelt himself wrote to Cecil Spring-Rice of the British Foreign Office in 1904:

'It was a good thing for Egypt and the Sudan, and for the world, when England took Egypt and the Sudan. It is a good thing for India that England should control it. And so it is a good thing, a very good thing, for Cuba and for Panama and for the world that the United States has acted as it has actually done during the last six years. The people of the United States and the people of the Isthmus and the rest of mankind will all be the better because we dig the Panama Canal and keep order in its neighbourhood. And the politicians and revolutionists at Bogota are entitled to precisely the amount of sympathy we extend to other inefficient bandits.'

The Caribbean itself was to become America's closed sea, the American Mediterranean. As Assistant Secretary of State Loomis stated in 1904:

'...no picture of our future is complete which does not contemplate and comprehend the United States as the dominant power in the Caribbean Sea.'

The need to control the approaches to the Panama Canal did the rest. The new policy was adumbrated by President Taft in his Annual Message to Congress in 1912, as follows:

'The diplomacy of the present administration has sought to respond to the modern idea of commercial intercourse. This policy has been characterised as substituting dollars for bullets.'

The United States was faced with new large British investments in Cuba which from 1909 to 1913 totalled \$60 million (French and German about \$17 million) as against \$35 million from the United States, and with German interests in Haiti and the Dominican Republic related to naval bases and coaling stations. President Wilson was obsessed with his determination 'to teach the South American Republics to elect good men' and Secretary of State Bryan with the opportunities in the Dominican Republic for jobs for 'good deserving Democrats'. The stage was set for American intervention in the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

On February 8, 1907, there was signed at Santo Domingo a convention respecting assistance of the United States in the collection and application of the customs revenues of the Dominican Republic. The pertinent sections of this convention read as follows:

'I. That the President of the United States shall appoint a General Receiver of Dominican Customs, who, with such Assistant Receivers and other employees of the Receivership as shall be appointed by the President of the United States in his discretion, shall collect all the customs duties accruing at the several customs houses of the Dominican Republic until the payment or retirement of any and all bonds issued by the Dominican Government in accordance with the plan and under the limitations as to terms and amounts hereinbefore recited; and said General Receiver shall apply the sums so collected, as follows:

'First, to paying the expenses of the receivership; second, to the payment of interest upon said bonds; third, to the payment of the annual sums provided for amortisation of said bonds including interest upon all bonds in sinking fund; fourth, to the purchase and cancellation or retirement of said bonds as may be directed by the Dominican Government; fifth, the remainder to be paid to the Dominican Government...

'II. The Dominican Government will provide by law for the payment of all customs duties to the General Receiver and his assistants, and will give to them all needful aid and assistance and full protection to the extent of its powers. The Government of the United States will give to the General Receiver and his assistants such protection as it may find to be requisite for the performance of their duties.

'III. Until the Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the bonds of the debt its public debt shall not be increased except by previous agreement between the Dominican Government and the United States. A like agreement shall be necessary to modify the import duties, it being an indispensable condition for the modification of such duties that the Dominican Executive demonstrate and that the President of the United States recognise that, on the basis of exportations and importations to the like amount and the like character during the two years preceding that in which it is desired to make such modification, the total net customs receipts would at such altered rate of duties have been for each of such two years in excess of the sum of \$2,000,000 United States gold...'

In 1915 the American government occupied the Dominican Republic for fear that the ordinary process of Dominican elections would produce a government not regarded with favour in the United States. The decree of the American Command stated:

'All revenues accruing to the Dominican Government, including revenues hitherto accrued and unpaid—whether from customs duties under the terms of the Treaty concluded on February 8, 1907, the Receivership established by which remains in effect, or from internal revenue—shall be paid to the Military Government herein established which will, in trust for the Republic of Santo Domingo, hold such revenue and will make all the proper legal disbursements therefrom necessary for the administration of the Dominican Government, and for the purposes of the Occupation...'

The Military Government came to an end in 1924.

The Dominican pattern was followed in the case of Haiti with which a treaty was signed by the United States on September 6, 1915, respecting finances, economic development and tranquillity. The Treaty set up a general receivership, associated with a Financial Adviser nominated by the President of the United States. Customs receipts were to be applied to the costs of the Receivership, the salaries and expenses of the Financial Adviser, the interest and sinking fund of the Haitian public debt, and to the maintenance of a constabulary. The Treaty continued:

'Article VIII. The Republic of Haiti shall not increase its public debt except by previous agreement with the President of the United States, and shall not contract any debt or assume any financial obligation unless the ordinary revenues of the Republic available for that purpose, after defraying the expenses of the Government, shall be adequate to pay the interest and provide a sinking fund for the final discharge of such debt.

'Article IX. The Republic of Haiti will not, without a previous agreement with the President of the United States, modify the customs duties in a manner to reduce the revenues therefrom...

'Article X. The Haitian Government obligates itself, for the preservation of domestic peace, the security of individual rights and full observance of the provisions of this treaty, to create without delay an efficient constabulary, urban and rural, composed of native Haitians. This constabulary shall be organised and officered by Americans, appointed by the President of Haiti, upon nomination by the President of the United States...

'Article XI. The Government of Haiti agrees not to surrender any of the territory of the Republic of Haiti by sale, lease, or otherwise, or jurisdiction over such territory, to any foreign government or power, nor to enter into any treaty or contract with any foreign power or powers that will impair or tend to impair the independence of Haiti.'

The American officers of the Haitian constabulary were withdrawn by agreement on August 7, 1933, which provided for the Haitianisation of the constabulary, and the withdrawal of the American marines was to commence on October 1, 1934 and be completed within 30 days. A financial arrangement adjusting the financial guarantees stipulated in 1919 and 1922 limited the number of Americans employed by the Fiscal Representative to 18, and provided further:

'Article XIII. Each year, by January 31st at the latest, the Fiscal Representative shall present a detailed estimate of receipts for the following fiscal year. Except by special agreement, the budget of the Republic shall not exceed the amount of probable ways and means which the Secretary of State for Finance and the Fiscal Representative shall have agreed upon...

'Article XVII. Without the accord of the Fiscal Representative no new financial obligation will be assumed unless the ordinary revenues of the Republic, after defraying the expenses of the Government, shall be adequate to assure the final discharge of such obligations...

'Article XX. The Government of Haiti agrees not to reduce the tariff nor to modify the taxes and internal revenues in such a way as to

reduce the total amount thereof without the accord of the Fiscal Representative...'

United States supremacy in the Caribbean was further underlined when, in 1917, the United States purchased the Virgin Islands from Denmark for the sum of \$25 million, in order to get possession of the harbour of St. Thomas.

World War II provided the setting for yet a further advance, this time in the British West Indies. In 1940 the United States received from Britain 99-year leases of naval bases in Trinidad, Guyana, Antigua, St. Lucia, Jamaica, the Bahamas—as well as in Newfoundland and in Bermuda. The difference was that no dollars were involved—only fifty over-age destroyers for Britain, with its back to the wall against submarines. How the deal appeared in United States eyes is brought out in the opinion of Robert Jackson, the Attorney General, to President Roosevelt on August 27, 1940:

'(b) In consideration it is proposed to transfer to Great Britain the title and possession of certain over-age ships and obsolescent military materials now the property of the United States and certain other small patrol boats which, though nearly completed, are already obsolescent.

'(c) Upon such transfer all obligation of the United States is discharged. The acquisition consists only of rights, which the United States may exercise or not at its option; and if exercised, may abandon without consent. The privilege of maintaining such bases is subject only to limitations necessary to reconcile United States use with the sovereignty retained by Great Britain. Our Government assumes no responsibility for civil administration of any territory. It makes no promise to erect structures, or maintain forces at any point. It undertakes no defence of the possessions of any country. In short, it acquires optional bases which may be developed as Congress appropriates funds therefor, but the United States does not assume any continuing or future obligation, commitment, or alliance... The executive agreement obtains an opportunity to establish naval and air bases for the protection of our coastline but it imposes no obligation upon the Congress to appropriate money to improve the opportunity...

'I am informed that the destroyers involved here are the survivors of a fleet of over 100 built at about the same time and under the same design. During the year 1930, 58 of these were decommissioned with a view toward scrapping and a corresponding number was recommissioned as replacements. Usable material and equipment from the 58 vessels removed from the service were transferred to the recommissioned vessels to recondition and modernise them, and other usable material and equip-

ment were removed and the vessels stripped. They were then stricken from the Naval register, and 50 of them were sold as scrap for prices ranging from \$5,260 to \$6,800 per vessel, and the remaining 8 were used for such purposes as target vessels, experimental construction tests, and temporary barracks. The surviving destroyers now under consideration have been reconditioned and are in service, but all of them are over-age, most of them by several years.'

Grade 12 Lent Term Project

Study the **FIVE** sources below which relate to the United States' influence in the Caribbean, and then answer **ALL** the questions that follow.

SOURCE I

I should myself like to shape our foreign policy with a purpose ultimately of driving off this continent every European power. I should begin with Spain, and in the end, would take all other European nations including England.

Theodore Roosevelt, soon to be president of the United States, explaining his foreign policy, Letter to a friend, February 9 1898, in Eric Williams. From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean. 1492-1969 London: Andre Deutsch Ltd. 1970. P.418.

SOURCE II

....That the Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty and for discharging the obligation with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris (December 10, 1898) on the United States now to be assumed by the government of Cuba.

Proviso to Military Appropriation Bill (Platt Amendment) on March 2, 1901 signed 22 May 1900. In Eric Williams. From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean. 1492-1969 London Andre Deutsch Ltd. 1970, p. 420

SOURCE III

That said government shall not assume or contract any public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of government, shall be inadequate.

Proviso to Economic reformation (Platt Amendment) on March 2, 1901 signed 22 May 1900. In Eric Williams. From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean. 1492-1969 London Andre Deutsch Ltd. 1970, p. 421

SOURCE IV

That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.

Proviso to Military Appropriation Bill (Platt Amendment) on March 2, 1901 signed 22 May 1900. In Eric Williams. From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean. 1492-1969 London Andre Deutsch Ltd. 1970, p. 421

SOURCE V

That the government of Cuba will execute and as far as necessary, extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as the commerce of the Southern ports of the United States and the people residing therein.

In Eric Williams. From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean. 1492-1969 London Andre Deutsch Ltd. 1970, p. 421

1. Identify and outline the US policy which is reflected in the statements made in source 1. (3pts)
2. To which dispute is source 1 referring? (2pts)
3. For what reason was the United States eager to use the Roosevelt prescription in Cuba, and what was used to trigger it? (6pts)
4. Identify the legislation used to fulfill the oath stated in source II. (2pts)
5. Give TWO reasons why this legislation in source II in Cuba's constitution was opposed by so many Cubans. (4pts)
6. In source III why was it necessary for the Cuban government not to assume any debts without the United States knowledge? (3pts)
7. In reference to source III, for what reason did the US limited Cuba's financial power? (4pts)
8. From source IV, outline the benefits of the United States with the Treaty of Paris being imposed. (4pts)
9. In source IV, why did the US carry a 'big stick'? (2pts)
10. What was happening in the Caribbean at the time of the 'big stick' policy? (3pts)
11. What consequence did South Americans suffered as a result of their ongoing disputes among themselves by the US? (2pts)
12. Based on source V, in what ways did Cuba benefitted from the US in terms of social reform? (6pts)
13. How did the US benefitted in return for the initiatives put in place? (4pts)
14. What far reaching benefits did the US gained for their effective recovery policies in Cuba? (3pts)
15. Read the articles on page 425 and summarize your findings. (15pts)