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Sprint ends its attempt to purchase T-Mobile: Board abandons plans, fearing antitrust concerns would derail any merger MICHAEL J DE LA MERCED. International New York Times; Paris [Paris] 07 Aug 2014: 15.
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Meanwhile, T-Mobile may have to contend with another takeover bid. A French mobile upstart, Iliad, disclosed last week that it had bid $15 billion for a 56.6 percent stake in T-Mobile US.
The end of the talks also leaves open the question of what Deutsche Telekom, T-Mobile's majority owner, will do next. The German telecommunications company had signaled that it would like to eventually sell off its T-Mobile stake, and a deal with Sprint would have been the quickest path to that. Much of the telecom industry has barreled relentlessly toward consolidation, as companies have grasped for bigger scale. Already this year, both Comcast and AT&T have announced huge deals meant to bolster their reach.
A proposed combination of Sprint and T-Mobile, uniting the third- and fourth-biggest carriers in the United States, had been fiercely questioned by officials at both the Federal Communications Commission and the Justice Department. In 2011, AT&T's attempts to buy T-Mobile for $39 billion failed after the [Obama] administration sued to block the deal.
Sprint's board cited concerns that American antitrust regulators would block a deal for T-Mobile, the fourth-largest wireless provider in the United States.
Sprint and its corporate parent, the Japanese telecommunications giant SoftBank, have decided to end their pursuit of T-Mobile USA after conceding that antitrust regulators would block a deal in an industry that is dominated by just a few large players.
The decision was made at a Sprint board meeting on Tuesday afternoon, a person briefed on the matter said. It marks the second failed effort by large American wireless carriers to merge in three years. And it represents a serious blow to SoftBank's efforts to develop a big new challenger to the two giants of the American cellphone industry, Verizon and AT&T.
Meanwhile, T-Mobile may have to contend with another takeover bid. A French mobile upstart, Iliad, disclosed last week that it had bid $15 billion for a 56.6 percent stake in T-Mobile US.
Deutsche Telekom spurned the offer. Iliad is now reportedly seeking additional partners to shore up a revised bid, according to news reports. Still, analysts have questioned whether a merger with T-Mobile would make sense -- and whether Iliad could afford a takeover.
With no deal for now, it remains to be seen what paths Sprint and T-Mobile will take as smaller competitors to the enormous titans of their industry. Combined, the two control less than a third of the wireless market in the United States.
In recent years, T-Mobile has shaken up the industry with an array of novel pricing plans, gaining admirers among both analysts and investors, but Sprint has lost customers for several quarters as it struggles to upgrade its network.
"They have a lot of wood to chop," Craig Moffett, a research analyst at MoffettNathanson, said of Sprint. "They will have to spend a fortune to fix their network, and they will very likely have to cut prices to stay competitive at the same time."
Sprint is making at least one major change in the near term. On Wednesday morning, the company said it would replace its current chief executive, Daniel R. Hesse, with Marcelo Claure.
Mr. Claure is the founder of Brightstar, a wireless services company that sold a majority stake in itself to SoftBank last year. He joined Sprint's board in January.
The end of the talks also leaves open the question of what Deutsche Telekom, T-Mobile's majority owner, will do next. The German telecommunications company had signaled that it would like to eventually sell off its T-Mobile stake, and a deal with Sprint would have been the quickest path to that. Much of the telecom industry has barreled relentlessly toward consolidation, as companies have grasped for bigger scale. Already this year, both Comcast and AT&T have announced huge deals meant to bolster their reach.
But the existence of both transactions -- Comcast's $45 billion takeover of Time Warner Cable and AT&T's $49 billion purchase of DirecTV -- has made the Obama administration wary of concentrating too much power in the hands of too few companies.
A proposed combination of Sprint and T-Mobile, uniting the third- and fourth-biggest carriers in the United States, had been fiercely questioned by officials at both the Federal Communications Commission and the Justice Department. In 2011, AT&T's attempts to buy T-Mobile for $39 billion failed after the Obama administration sued to block the deal.
As recently as last month, T-Mobile and Sprint were speaking on friendly terms. The two sides had discussed a potential transaction worth about $32 billion, people said at the time.
Ever since SoftBank bought a majority stake in Sprint, a deal that closed last summer, the company had its eye on bigger ambitions. The Japanese company's founder, Masayoshi Son,
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Name: Sprint Corp Ticker: FON NAICS: 513310, 514191 DUNS: 00-694-2395;
Name: AT&T Corp Ticker: T NAICS: 513310 SIC: 4822 DUNS: 00-698-0080
Company / organization
Title Sprint ends its attempt to purchase T-Mobile: Board abandons plans, fearing antitrust concerns would derail any merger
Author MICHAEL J DE LA MERCED
Publication title International New York Times; Paris
First page 15
Publication year 2014
Publication date Aug 7, 2014
Year 2014
Publisher International New York Times
Place of publication Paris
Country of publication France
Publication subject General Interest Periodicals--France
ISSN 22699740
Source type Newspapers
Language of publication English
Document type News
ProQuest document ID 1551503418
Document URL https://search.proquest.com/docview/1551503418? accountid=28844
Copyright Copyright International New York Times Aug 07, 2014
Last updated 2016-10-29
Database ProQuest Central
had frequently and publicly derided the state of the American wireless industry as antiquated, falling far behind other nations.
Not known for backing down in the face of long odds -- he once threatened to set himself on fire in a dispute with Japanese regulators -- Mr. Son was forced to concede that a union with T-Mobile would have little chance of gaining regulatory approval, the person briefed on the matter said.
Copyright International New York Times Aug 07, 2014
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Leadership and decision making: A retrospective application and assessment Duncan, W Jack; LaFrance, Kevin G; Ginter, Peter M. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies; Flint 9.4 (Spring 2003): 1.
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Duncan et al examine the applicability of the Vroom-Yetton model of leadership and decision making to the battlefield behavior of ten commanding generals in six major battles of the American Civil War. The findings suggested that when the selected commanders on the field acted consistently with the prescriptions of the Vroom-Yetton model, they were more often successful in accomplishing the foals of the campaign. The findings also suggested that the lack of information sharing and consensus building resulted in serious disadvantages.
Headnote This paper examines the applicability of the Vroom-Yetton model of leadership and decision making to the battlefield behavior of ten commanding generals in six major battles of the American Civil War. The purpose of the paper was twofold. The first objective was to see if it is possible to utilize official war records, autobiographies, biographies of close associates, and scholarly works to reconstruct the thinking of decision makers in the past and frame this thinking within a contemporary theory of leadership and decision making. The second objective was to illustrate the potential value of using prior events as retrospective test cases for a contemporary leadership theory.
Although no attempt was made to suggest that the selection of the appropriate decision making and leadership style was the determining factor in the outcome of major battles of the Civil War, the study provided some interesting findings. The findings suggest that when the selected commanders on the field acted consistently with the prescriptions of the Vroom- Yetton model they were more often successful in accomplishing the goals of the campaign. In addition, the findings suggest that even though the commanders tended to favor autocratic styles, the lack of information sharing and consensus building resulted in serious disadvantages. In the cases examined, the pressure for prompt decision making was not sufficient to justify the loss of information that resulted from the determination to act alone.
Much of leadership theory and practice has been founded on and enhanced by military strategy and tactics. Weber (1947) was fascinated by the precision of military organizations as was Emerson (1908), Mooney and Reiley (1931), Gulick & Urwick (1947), and Urwick (1944). More recently, Krause (1996) used 2,500 year old writings of Sun Tzu to suggest behavioral guidelines for modern business managers such as "superior commanders succeed in situations where ordinary people fail because they obtain more timely information and use it more quickly" (p. 64).
The military maintains a long tradition of developing capable leaders (Bass, 1998; Van Fleet & Yukl, 1986; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1990). This leadership tradition was directed toward, among other things, the early identification of leadership potential and contributed to the development of trait-based identification of leadership potential (Yukl, 1981).
This paper attempts to expand our understanding of leadership and decision-making in military organizations by framing them within the context of contemporary leadership theory using the Vroom-Yetton model (1973). The Vroom-Yetten model provides an appropriate theoretical framework because it allows for leadership and decision making processes that can be applied to routine conditions faced by military leaders and may be appropriately adapted to battlefield environments characterized by chaos, accelerated risk, and increased stress.
Model Selection
The general approach used in this study could have been applied to a variety of leadership theories. Because leadership in military organizations is often stereotyped as autocratic, a styles theory may have been used to test the validity of the stereotype. Contingency theory could have been used to test situational demands and resulting leadership styles. Even transformational theory may have been examined because military leaders are often characterized as charismatic (Northouse, 1997). Our interest, however, related to the battlefield decision making of military commanders. The focus on leadership and decision making, therefore, made Vroom-Yetton the theory of choice.
Vroom-Yetton was selected rather than the Vroom-Jago (1988) model for three reasons. First, the Vroom-Yetton model has been widely validated and its strengths and limitations are well known (Field, 1982; Tjosvold, Wedley, & Field, 1986; Vroom & Jago, 1978). Second, validation studies have provided estimates of the likelihood of decision effectiveness and leader conformity to the normative Vroom-Yetton model (Vroom & Jago, 1988). Estimates provide a useful benchmark when evaluating the results of analysis. Third, the Vroom-Jago model has been used primarily as a guide to applying the basic constructs developed by Vroom and Yetton. The Vroom_yetton model, therefore, provides the most developed theoretical constructs.
Studies by Field and House (1990), Ettling and Jago (1988), Heilman (1984), and Field (1982) provided support for the validity of the model. Vroom (1993) and Vroom and Yetton (1973) reported that attempts to validate their model were generally successful. Utilizing two separate studies, they discovered that most successful decision processes fell within the constructs of their original framework although a number of unsuccessful decisions did not conform to the model (Field, 1982).
In this study, the Vroom-Yetton model was applied to the battlefield behavior of commanders in six battles of the American Civil War (Davis, 1991; Gallaher, 1997). The selected battles presented significant leadership and decision making challenges for the commanders on the field. It should be emphasized that our objective was not to exhaustively describe all the circumstances facing the commanders. Almost any statement made about any military engagement, especially in the Civil War, is subject to debate (Jones, 1992; Wheeler, 1999). In some of the selected battles informed historians continue to debate which side actually won the engagement.
Rather, our goal was to determine if a contemporary leadership model could be applied retrospectively to specific situations and, in the process, increase our understanding of leadership and decision making. We were particularly interested in the usefulness of the model when applied to the high risk and high stress conditions present on battlefields. High risk, as we use the term, relates to the "stakes" involved in the outcome of the decision. The stakes involved in military engagements are great. The fate of an entire army or nation
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Problem Attributes
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Decision Methods and Rules for Group Problems
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Problem Types and the Feasible Set of Decision Styles
may depend on the outcome of decisions made by commanders on the field. The higher the stakes the greater the stress on the decision maker (Festinger, 1957; Hendrick, Mills, & Kiesler, 1968; and Knox & Inkster, 1968).
Implicit in our analysis is a rejection of General Helmuth von Molke's assertion that the American Civil War was nothing more than "two armed mobs chasing each other around the country, from which nothing could be learned." We believe a great deal can be learned from this assessment of leadership and decision making behavior. We also believe that a retrospective "test" of the Vroom-Yetton model can provide important insights into the practicality and validity of the Vroom-Yetton model. It seems useful to us to take contemporary theories and "test" their applicability to past events and, thereby, provide a type of practical validity that is rarely reported in leadership and management studies (Gilderhus, 2000; Wood, 1991).
Concept and Procedure
The early literature on leadership focused on individuals who made decisions in order to bring people together in pursuit of a common goal (Tead, 1935). Fiedler (1966; 1967) and Fiedler and Chemers (1974) described leadership in terms of the leader's style and the situation facing the leader. Vroom and Yetton (1973) built on the research of Fiedler (1967) but added new dimensions to all the previous situational studies. In doing so, they proposed a normative model where the leader adapted to the situation in which decisions were made based on the circumstances and desired outcome
Vroom-Yetton Model
Vroom and Yetton (1973) identified three classes of outcomes that influence the ultimate effectiveness of decisions to include; (1) the quality or rationality of the decision, (2) the acceptance of the decision by subordinates and their commitment to execute it effectively, and (3) the amount of time required to make the decision. These authors, in their normative decision making model, proposed that a leader could arrive at a rational approach. Their model provided the leader with eight problem attributes (Table 1) that could be applied to a given leadership decision making situation. Choices relative to each of these attributes provided the leaders with a path along which to travel, ultimately leading to one or more (feasible set) decision making styles. These possible styles along with the decision rules for their selection are provided in Table 2.
The five decision making styles can be further grouped into three categories based on the degree of subordinate participation. These range from autocratic or low participation (AI, AII), to consultative or moderate participation (CI, CII), to group decision making or high participation (GII) (Field, 1982).
Using the problem attributes and associated diagnostic questions for each, Vroom and Yetton developed a decision tree and as leaders answered "yes" or "no" to successive questions about the situation they progressed sequentially down the branches which lead them eventually to a termination node. The termination node was given a number designation and labeled a problem type. These problem types are then associated with acceptable decision styles as shown in Table 3. The leader subsequently uses this information to determine an approach in a particular decision making situation.
In order to demonstrate how the model may be applied, Vroom and Yetton (1973) used their constructs to analyze a number of different leadership decision-making cases. Their analysis included specification of the problem type, feasible set, and solution indicated by the problem type associated with the model. The methodology used in this study is an adaptation of Vroom and Yetton's previous analysis applied to business situations and modified for actual historical leadership decision making situations on the battlefield (Vroom, 1973; Vroom & Jago, 1978).
Data Collection
To apply the model to battlefield decision making, six engagements of the American Civil War were used as frameworks for analysis. The engagements included Shiloh, Antietam (Sharpsburg), Chancellorsville, Gettsburg, Chickamauga, and Nashville. These six battles were selected because they were representative of many, perhaps most, Civil War engagements. Some of the primary ways in which they were representive are:
1. Both Northern and Southern victories as well as inconclusive engagements are included in the sample. There is general agreement that the North achieved victories at Sharpsburg (Antietam), Gettysburg, and Nashville. The South prevailed at Chancellorsville and perhaps Chickamauga. The outcome of Shiloh is disputed.
2. The battles took place with equal frequency in the Eastern and Western theaters of war. Antietam, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg were in the East while Shiloh, Chickamauga, and Nashville were in the West.
3. The duration of these battles was similar to that of other battles of the Civil War. Although there were exceptions, battles usually lasted one to three days.
4. The battles occurred throughout the War. The first battle in this sample (Shiloh) took place in 1862 and the last (Nashville) occurred in 1864.
Therefore, although all battles are unique, these six battles were representative of Civil War battles, in general, and we believe the inferences drawn from them would apply equally well to other engagements. Table 4 provides a summary of essential information on each battle.
An attempt was made to reconstruct the decision making process and leadership style of the commanding generals in the six selected battles using the best available information. The following process was utilized. The preferred source of information was the official report of the commanding general that was submitted to the respective war departments. The best available source of this information was the War of the rebellion: A compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies (1880, 1884, 1889, 1894). This series of volumes was published by the Government Printing Office and recorded the official report of each battle along with reports of subordinate generals and staff immediately before and after each battle (Howell & Prevenier, 2001). When the commanding general was killed in the battle as was the case of Albert Sidney Johnston at Shiloh the official battle report was filed by the next in command, in this case P.G.T. Beauregard.
If all the information necessary to respond to the diagnostic questions in the Vroom-Yetton Model could not be found in the official records the autobiography of the commanding general was consulted if one existed. A number of these works were available such as Grant's two volume Personal Memoirs (1885, 1886) and McClellan 's Own Story: The war for the Union (1887). When the official report and an autobiography were not sufficient to provide the needed information, autobiographies of subordinate generals were used. For example, since Robert E. Lee did not write an autobiography works by subordinates, such as Alexander's (1907) Military memoirs of a Confederate and Longstreet's (1896) From Manassas to Appomattox were used. In the rare cases where additional information was needed to "get inside the commanding general's head" highly acclaimed historical works on particular battles were employed. The resulting collective judgments are presented in Table 5.
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Summary Characteristics of Selected Battles
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Attributes of Decision Making in Seven Civil War
Battles
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Battle of Shiloh - Federal Commander
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Battle of Shiloh - Confederate Commander
The sources used were read independently by two readers. Consistent with the instructions provided by Vroom and Jago (1978) in their tests of the Vroom-Yetton model, the readers were familiar with the model and understood the types of information needed to make the retrospective collective judgments in Table 5. Both readers held graduate degrees in management and had read research relating to the Vroom-Yetton model. However, by design, the readers were not well-informed about the battles, commanders, and related aspects of the American Civil War. In arriving at the recommended leadership and decision making styles, tables such as those illustrated by Table 6 and Table 7 were constructed for each battle, one for the Northern and one for the Southern Commander. Illustrative tables were constructed for the battle of Shiloh. Identical tables were constructed for the other battles. On the basis of the assessments of all the battles which are summarized in Table 5, we constructed comparable decision trees such as the one presented in Figure 1 that is a graphical depiction of the information contained in the Table 6 and Table 7.
Application
The results are described for each battle situation and the decision-making environment in which the battlefield commanders operated. Each scenario was then documented with an abbreviated analysis constructed in the same manner as the method used by Vroom and Yetton.
Battle of Shiloh
General Albert Sydney Johnston led his Confederate army on a surprise attack against the Northern forces of General Ulysses S. Grant on the morning of April 6, 1862 (Fisk, 1900a, 190Ob). The location of the Union forces at Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee was not a good tactical position because the Northern army which was positioned with a river to its rear and creeks on both flanks. Grant's forces were encamped in a loose battle line and anticipated no attack (Daniel, 1997). The Union General stated confidently "There will be no fighting at Pittsburg Landing. We will have to go to Corinth" (Grant, 1886). This oversight allowed Johnston's army to camp less than two miles away on the night before the attack and still surprise the adversary.
Johnston decided to attack on the morning of April 6th. The attack was completely unanticipated and Grant found himself converting his army from an offensive to a defensive posture. Two events prevented the Union army from being soundly defeated (Force, 1881). Johnston was killed during battle and his death demoralized the Confederates and the Union army was reinforced by troops that were part of a plan to concentrate Federal forces in west Tennessee (Greene, 1882). To illustrate the process used in examining the decision making of each commander at Shiloh Table 6 and Table 7 and Figure 1 were constructed from the information gathered by the readers.
Table 5 summarizes the problem types for all six battles General Grant faced; a problem type fourteen (14). The appropriate leadership style for this problem type was a consultative approach (CII) whereby the leaders share the nature of the problem with subordinates, obtains ideas and suggestions, and then makes the decision that may or may not reflect the advice of subordinate officers or GII requiring consultation and consensus. General
Johnston faced a problem type twelve (12) so the appropriate leadership style was GII which required both consultation and consensus building.
Referring to Table 8 one can see that Grant employed an All leadership style and insisted on using only his own understanding of the situation even though he was provided significant amounts of information by his subordinate commanders. His strongly held belief that the Confederates were concentrated at Corinth and were unable to move lulled him into a false sense of security at Pittsburg Landing even though he recognized the danger of his position in spite of all the evidence to the contrary. The failure to detect the presence of such a large force indicated the danger of relying on an absentee leader removed from the proximity of the battlefield.
Johnston also employed an All style of leadership. Although he called frequent councils of war and asked for advice from subordinate officers, in the end, even his most senior commander, General Beauregard, thought the element of surprise was lost and advised against the attack. Johnston, however, decided otherwise and ordered the attack because of his determination to fight. Beauregard later stated that Grant's surprise "was a most surprising surprise."
Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg)
The Southern victory at second Bull Run convinced General Robert E. Lee to alter his stated defensive strategy and invade the North (Ropes, 1881). he knew morale in the North was low and a victory in northern territory might cause the enemy to offer favorable terms for peace (McClellan, 1887). Moreover, Lee thought there were many Confederate sympathizers in Maryland and they might join the southern cause.
George B. McClellan was the new commander of the Union Army and Lee knew he was cautious, perhaps to a fault. Unfortunately, Lee did not know that a Union private had found a copy of his orders and because of this discovery McClellan was aware that the Confederate Army was divided and vulnerable because Jackson had been sent to attack the Union garrison at Harpers Ferry (Palfrey, 1881). In another miscalculation by Lee, McClellan's caution had disappeared and he pursued the Southern Army.
Immediately before the battle, however, McClellan's caution returned and he hesitated giving time for Generals Jackson and A. P. Hill to join Lee in Maryland. In spite of the reinforcements, Maryland did not join the Southern cause and Lee was forced to retreat back to Virginia. Table 8 demonstrates the problem attributes and feasible set of leadership styles facing Generals McClellan and Lee at Antietam. McClellan faced a type five (5) problem while Lee confronted a type nine (9) problem (see Table 5). The only difference in the problem facing the two commanders was that McClellan had information that gave him an edge and Lee was unaware of his competitive disadvantage until much of his plan was placed into action.
Both generals appear to have used an autocratic leadership style in view of the existing situation (see Table 8). Lee was determined to push into Maryland although at least some of his commanders advised against it. The Army was confident, Virginia was about used up agriculturally, and Maryland offered a tempting storehouse for food and supplies as well as possible recruits. Lee was in no mood to argue the merits of an invasion. Moreover, when he discovered through a spy that McClellan had his battle plan his tactical response did not allow time for discussion.
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Battle of Shiloh - Confederate Commander
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Figure 1
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Decision Making Analysis and Outcomes
McClellan had information that made him overly confident. he acted autocratically and boasted openly. However, his eventual lapse into inaction might have been avoided if he had involved more of his experienced commanders. His refusal to pursue the retreating Confederate Army was a decision that all his subordinate commanders and certainly President Lincoln did not support. Both sides claimed victory in this bloodiest one day battle on American soil. In the end, the Union forces achieved their goal of stopping the Southern invasion and Lee was forced to retreat to Virginia.
The Battle of Chancellorsville
Union Major General Joseph Hooker was leading an army of 130,000 men when they approached Chancellorsville to face General Robert E. Lee's army of only about 60,000 seasoned veterans. General Hooker knew the terrain but despite the overwhelming strength of the Union Army he made little progress against the Confederates and was himself wounded early in the battle. The injury left him incapacitated but unwilling to relinquish command. Hooker received continuous reports of the Confederates' activity but appeared to ignore them and made tactical decisions in a virtual vacuum. Lee, knowing that he was greatly outnumbered used every piece of information provided to him by his staff and local citizens to make tactical decisions (Furgurson, 1992).
Lee's decisions were bold and unconventional. Even with the loss of Jackson to friendly fire, Lee was able to outmaneuver the larger Northern Army (Waugh, 1994). With his army's back to the Rappahannock River and in an extremely vulnerable position, Hooker retreated leaving Lee's weakened army the victor (Doubleday, 1881).
The situation was essentially reversed for Lee at Antietam. At Chancellorsville the Southern commander had the critical information and the Union commander was operating on the basis of poor and incomplete intelligence. Lee faced a problem type five (5) and appropriately employed an All style (see Table 8). Once he understood the position of the Union Army and the possibility of using a little known road to move around it, he acted quickly. Virtually no one, save Jackson would have agreed with the recklessness of his battle plan. Who would advise a commander to divide his army not once but twice in the face of a superior enemy?
General Hooker employed the AI style and faced problem attributes (type 14) that made CII or GII more appropriate. he thereby violated the information and unstructured problem rules. Perhaps it was the disorientation caused by his injury but the Union General clearly lacked the information necessary to make the appropriate decision and failed to gather needed
information from his subordinate commanders and spies. The result was one of the most devastating defeats suffered by the North during the entire War.
Battle of Gettsburg
The Army of Northern Virginia and its commander Robert E. Lee were confident after the spectacular victory at Chancellorsville (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Ketes de Veries, 1990; Kroll, Toombs, & Wright, 2000; Roll, 1986). Lee again reasoned that if he could defeat the Union Army in the North, favorable peace, terms would be offered by President Lincoln.
Hooker's defeat at Chancellorsville cost him his command. General George G. Meade was named the new commanding general. The Army of Northern Virginia slipped into Maryland, and attempted to concentrate the army. Immediately before the battle, Lee learned of Meade's appointment and saw an opportunity. He believed Meade would be cautious and take time to ensure the army was ready for another battle (Nolan, 1994).
Things went well for the South on the first and second days of the battle (Foote, 1994). However, indecision, confusion, and the absence of Stuart's cavalry and the valuable intelligence he had always provided cost the Confederates the high ground and eventually the battle. Lee himself confessed the absence of his cavalry left the
army without its "eyes" and made him fight blind in unfamiliar territory.
Against the advice of General James Longstreet the Confederates staged a desperate charge on the third day that could have cost the South the War (Wert, 1993). The South always searched for answers and scapegoats as to why the charge failed along with its last opportunity for victory. General George Pickett, the Confederate commander of the charge, was more philosophical and accurate (Reardon, 1997). Once, when asked why the charge failed, he stated "I think the Union Army had something to do with it."
Meade faced a type four (4) problem and appropriately employed an AI leadership style (see Table 8). He sought information from his field commanders, perhaps hesitated excessively, but eventually made the correct decision to fight from the high ground (Jordan, 1988). Lee suffered from a lack of information and faced a problem type eleven (11). Stuart's absence deprived Lee of vital information about the terrain and size of the enemy force. Lee sought information from his field commanders but seemed determined to press the battle even against the advice of Longstreet. The information rule was violated. Lee's autocratic style and reluctance to employ the CII or styles was an important factor leading to his defeat at Gettysburg.
Battle of Chickamauga
The Battle of Chickamauga was to be General Braxton Bragg's finest moment as a Confederate commander. Unfortunately, his intelligence services failed him and he realized early on that the Federal forces, led by Major General William S. Rosecrans, were substantially larger than he first anticipated (Cozzens, 1992). He prepared to make an attack on what he thought was a two-column enemy force, by attacking from the flanks. What he did not realize was that Rosecrans was leading a three-column force and was actually pursuing him. When Bragg gave the order to attack, his subordinates did not respond and he lost the opportunity to inflict significant damage to Rosecrans' army. The failure to carry out orders by his subordinates was a serious deterrent to his operational capabilities (Cist, 1881).
Meanwhile, Rosecrans was receiving only limited information on the activities of Bragg's forces. He eventually realized that the Confederates were not retreating in disorder but were preparing to fight. On September 20, 1863 Bragg attacked and a fierce battle ended when a tactical error by Rosecrans allowed the Confederates to close in on his army and inflict serious casualties. Rosencrans' second in command, General George Thomas was so dismayed by the tactics that he stated "nothing but stupendous blunders on the part of Bragg can save our army from total defeat." Thinking he was defeated, Rosecrans retreated to Chattanooga. Bragg concluded that no decisive results could be achieved that day and against the insistence of his subordinates, did not pursue the Union Army into Chattanooga.
Both commanders did not have the information needed to make decisions and neither was aware of the extent to which accurate information was lacking. Rosencrans thought Bragg was retreating and Bragg thought the Federal Army was a much smaller force. The two generals faced essentially the same category eleven (11) problem and would have benefited from more information and advice from subordinate generals (see Table 5).
Bragg employed an AI style when CII or GII would have been preferred (see Table 8). He violated the information, unstructured, and acceptance rules which resulted in a failure to capitalize on a victory and some insubordination among his officers and troops. Only major command problems could have turned this major Southern victory into a lost opportunity. Rosencrans autocratic style likewise did not serve him well and perhaps more consultation and consensus building, particularly with General Thomas, could have reversed or minimized
the adverse outcome of the battle. In the end, the Southern general obtained a victory but was unaware of it and lost a great opportunity. The defeated army reassembled at Chattanooga and avoided a more devastating loss. Neither army achieved great advantage by the battle and in spite of its violence, many historians contend Chickamauga was of little consequence to either the North or the South.
Battle of Nashville
The Battle of Nashville was the last stop on the last campaign of the Confederate Army in the West (Cox, 1882). Experts agree that the campaign into Middle Tennessee in 1864 was a fool's game that put the final nails in the coffin of the Southern Army of Tennessee (McDonough & Connelly, 1983). Confederate General John Bell Hood's goal was to invade middle Tennessee, maybe take Kentucky, and eventually join Lee in Virginia (Groom, 1995). The strategy looked as if it had a slim chance of working at Spring Hill but after the South lost three times as many men and six generals at Franklin there was no doubt to anyone but Hood that the grand strategy would fail (Hurst, 1963). Although the Southern defeat culminated at Nashville, the battle was actually the last battle in a series of tactical movements that began a month earlier when the Union Army under General John Schofield withdrew from Pulaski, Tennessee to Columbia to Spring Hill to Franklin and ultimately to Nashville where reinforcements waited.
In spite of the losses at Franklin, Hood had few options so he pursued the Union Army that was falling back to fortifications at Nashville (Schofield, 1897). Although Union General George Thomas delayed in attacking the approaching Southern army, when he did decide to attack the Confederate Army broke all along the front. The Southerners were outflanked and driven back toward Franklin. Almost continuous fighting forced the defeated and decimated Confederate Army to retreat back across the Tennessee River into Alabama with the Union cavalry in pursuit. In the route that characterized the retreat, Private William Mitchell Parker summed up the plight of many Confederate soldiers when he stated: "I don't know if they caught me or I just quit running."
Thomas was unusually cautious and his subordinate generals almost rebelled in order to attack the weak and disorganized Confederates. When he decided to move, Thomas acted on the basis of available information and employed the All autocratic style in a situation that represented a category eleven (11) problem when he would have more appropriately used a CII or GII style (see Table 8). However, the utter desperation of the Rebel situation by the time they reached Nashville made the effects of the decision making process and leadership style inconsequential.
Hood, on the other hand, led a disintegrating army. The number of soldiers absent without leave was high and subordinate generals were advising against virtually every action the commander initiated. Hood would likely have performed much better had he listened to his advice as recommended by a type thirteen (13) problem. If ever a commander needed advice it was Hood. Instead, he acted in an autocratic manner on the basis of inadequate, incomplete, and even imaginary information violating the information, unstructured, and acceptance rules (see Table 5). The result was the destruction of his army and the end of Confederate resistance in the West.
Discussion
Leadership and decision-making style are not irrelevant factors in determining battlefield results but style alone never determined victory or defeat. Table 8 presents our assessment of how the Vroom-Yetton Model suggests commanders should have behaved in particular battles, how they actually behaved, and the ultimate outcome of the battle for both armies.
We are not suggesting, of course, that a commanding general's employment of a leadership and decision making style consistent with the Vroom-Yetton normative model was the factor that determined the outcome of battles. Battlefields, like corporate boardrooms, are complex multidimensional environments where leader behavior is only one of many simultaneously interacting variables. Regardless of the extent of prior planning and analysis, battlefields rapidly become chaotic and unpredictable. Mistakes, luck (good and bad), heroic acts, cowardice, and hundreds (perhaps thousands) of other factors can and do become instrumental in determining who wins and who loses. Sometimes winning and losing is merely a perception and disagreements among combatants and historians are common. Strategic victories may be tactical failures and tactical victories may be strategic failures. However, it seems reasonable to suggest on the basis of this analysis that the more factors a commander can "get right," all other things equal, the better the chance of victory. The style of the commander's decision making is certainly a critically important factor to "get right". This analysis is an attempt to illustrate how applying a theoretical model retrospectively on leader behavior can be used to assist in increasing the odds of getting at least this one thing right.
Although this study provided an application of the Vroom-Yetton model in military decision-making, it did not directly address the issue of decision quality. The military commanders highlighted in this study occasionally selected the same decision-making method suggested by the model but with varying results. This indicates that although the decision method employed by the commander may be effective and efficient it may not always yield the desired outcome.
Summary and Conclusions
This study retrospectively applied the Vroom-Yetton model to leadership and decision making on six Civil War battlefields (Vroom, 1973). Based on the results obtained from analyzing these battles and ten different commanders, there is strong evidence to support the applicability of the Vroom-Yetten model in military decision making. Although the article evaluated only a narrow set of decision making scenarios, the agreement or disagreement between what decision-making method the model suggested, and what approach the leaders used, was significant if not compelling.
This study also evaluated the model using historical battle scenarios that occurred long before the model was developed which, in itself, further supports the applicability of the model and its underlying theory. Past research using the model has dealt primarily with business related decision-making processes while this study sheds some light on the usefulness of Vroom and Yetton's model in a military context. Since the battlefield is characterized by high risk and high stress as noted earlier, the results of this study can only be generalized to the instances in which decisions are being made in similar environments - corporate crises, emergency rooms, hostile takeovers, etc.
The results of this study have a number of implications on how leaders make decisions when confronted with the confusion, chaos, complexity, and uncertainty. Some of the important implications are discussed below.
1. Leadership and Decision Making Styles Do Matter - In Most Cases. At Chancellorsville Lee's aggressive, risky, and unconventional decision making and leadership was probably instrumental in the Confederate victory. Hooker's indecisiveness and uninformed autocratic style contributed to Lee's success. When you are outnumbered two to one and everything is in the opponents favor, victory is possible only through exceptional leadership. At the other extreme, Thomas' leadership and decision making style at Nashville was largely irrelevant. Anything short of total incompetence would have resulted in a Union victory. The Confederate Army was decimated. A Confederate success at Nashville would have required a truly remarkable leader with as much information as possible. Hood was not remarkable except in his ability to persist in a fool's game against all reasonable advice.
2. Conventional Wisdom Regarding Leadership in Military Organizations Requires Reassessment. The epitome of military leadership is the decisive and autocratic commander. It has been said "there is nothing so much like god on earth as the general on the battlefield." Combat is an incredibly complex leadership and decision making environment and certainly requires decisiveness. However, millions of dollars are spent assuring the officers' ranks are full of trained and experienced commanders. To ignore the repository of skills and experience present in a council of war sometimes demands a heavy price. Johnston's decision to attack at Shiloh against the advice of his second in command resulted in limited success only because of an incredible denial of evidence on the part of the enemy. Lee's autocratic behavior at Gettysburg when he should have listened to his second in command helped turn the tide of the War in favor of the Union.
3. Although Leadership is Critical on the Battlefield, Management Is Also Required. In every battle discussed, the time available for decision making was not a major factor. Each of the commanders had considerable time to plan the battle and in some cases the campaign. Both armies had underlying strategies upon which they based their conduct of the war. For the South it was, in most cases, defensive to overcome numbers and take advantage of home territory. For the Union the strategy was offensive in most cases in an attempt to occupy territory and destroy the enemy. In such cases the conventional autocratic style advocated by many ignores the potential advantages of more participatory decision making.
This study questions the appropriateness of the universal application of autocratic decision-making when leaders have the necessary information and good support and morale from the troops. In situations where information is lacking or support is not certain, a more consultative approach is likely to achieve an optimal outcome. As illustrated in our results, a number
of commanders in the Civil War chose autocratic decision-making methods when a consultative approach would have been more appropriate. More often than not, this approach led to unfavorable outcomes.
In conclusion, these results fill an important gap in previous work validating the Vroom-Yetton model. Prior studies have demonstrated the validity of the model by using decision- making scenarios within a business environment. This study successfully extended that approach into a military decision-making environment utilizing as examples battles in a war that predated space age technology. Although we disagree, some suggest that the American Civil War, was the last war where individual leadership really mattered. There appeared to be at least some identifiable relationship between the actions people took and results attained. Consequently, the battlefield was more personal, the numbers, while large, were small in comparison to future world wars and international conflicts, the weapons were crude though cruel but ultimately it was people not technology that determined when to fight, where to fight, how to fight, and when it was not longer advisable to fight.
Future studies will hopefully examine different military conflicts and more dynamic decision making environments. Battlefields of the 20th century and today, unlike those of the 19th century, for example are three dimensional. Speed and stealth are greatly accelerated. Commanders have to consider attacks from above (aircraft) and danger below (submarines and land mines). The addition of a third dimension greatly complicates the leadership and decision making challenges.
Acknowledgements
1 The authors wish to express their appreciation to the following people who read and commented on various drafts of the manuscript. In most cases their suggestions were taken. However, any inaccuracies, historical or otherwise remain the responsibility of the authors. First, we appreciate the advice and personal assistance of Victor H. Vroom in assessing the evidence presented and the selection of the most appropriate version of the Vroom, et al model to apply. Professor Vroom also generously provided his data base of validation studies and offered invaluable advice throughout the project. We also appreciate the advice of David D. Van Fleet, Professor of Management, School of Management, Arizona State University, West; James G. Clawson, D.B.A., The Darden School, University of Virginia; Michael E. Fleenor, M.D., M.P.H., Health Officer, Jefferson County Department of Health; James G. Hunt, Ph.D., Horn Professor of Management, Texas Tech University; and R. Kent Oestenstad, Ph.D., Professor of Environmental Health Sciences, University of Alabama at Birmingham and Civil War historian.
Sidebar The Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies, 2003, Vol. 9, No. 4
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Details
Subject American Civil War; Military officers; Leadership; Decision making models
Title Leadership and decision making: A retrospective application and assessment
Author Duncan, W Jack; LaFrance, Kevin G; Ginter, Peter M
Publication title Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies; Flint
Volume 9
Issue 4
Pages 1
Publication year 2003
Publication date Spring 2003
Publisher Sage Publications Ltd.
Place of publication Flint
Country of publication United Kingdom
Publication subject Business And Economics--Management
ISSN 15480518
Source type Scholarly Journals
Language of publication English
Document type Feature
ProQuest document ID 203134557
War of the rebellion: Official records of the Union and Confederate armies. (1884). Series I, Vol. 10. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office.
War of the rebellion: Official records of the Union and Confederate armies. (1889). Series I, Vol. 27, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office.
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AuthorAffiliation W. Jack Duncan, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL
Kevin G. LaFrance, United States Army - Baylor Graduate Program in Health Administration
Peter M. Ginter, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL
Copyright Baker College Spring 2003
Document URL https://search.proquest.com/docview/203134557? accountid=28844
Copyright Copyright Baker College Spring 2003
Last updated 2016-07-30
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T-Mobile and Sprint Zeroing in on Merger: [Business/Financial Desk] Gelles, David; Michael J. De La Merced. New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast); New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y] 05 June 2014: B.1.
http://YV9QF3BQ4D.search.serialssolution.com?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF- 8&rfr_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Anytimes&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=New+York+Times&rft.atitle=T- Mobile+and+Sprint+Zeroing+in+on+Merger%3A+%5BBusiness%2FFinancial+Desk%5D&rft.au=Gelles%2C+David%3BMichael+J.+De+La+Merced&rft.aulast=Gelles&rft.aufirst=David&rft.date=2014- 06-05&rft.volume=&rft.issue=&rft.spage=B.1&rft.isbn=&rft.btitle=&rft.title=New+York+Times&rft.issn=03624331&rft_id=info:doi/
[...]both sides believe that the only way to remain relevant is to combine.
Updated, 8:51 p.m. |
Responding to a wave of consolidation in the telecommunications industry, the nation's third- and fourth-largest wireless phone operators have agreed on the terms of a deal to join forces.
Sprint and T-Mobile have talked about a combination for years but continued to put it off, each preoccupied with other deals, and concerned about scrutiny from antitrust regulators.
But in recent days, the two sides have settled on the terms of a $32 billion deal that is likely to be announced this summer, people briefed on the matter said on Wednesday.
Under the terms of the deal, which are still preliminary, Sprint would acquire T-Mobile for about $40 a share in cash and stock, a 17 percent premium to Wednesday's price.
Talks are incomplete and could still fall apart. But the agreement on terms represents a turning point in a relationship between two companies that have long contemplated a merger.
Sprint and T-Mobile have decided to press ahead now because their two main rivals, Verizon and AT&T, each with more than 100 million subscribers, continue to grow more formidable.
Verizon's balance sheet is stronger, after agreeing to take full control of Verizon Wireless last year in a $130 billion deal with Vodafone. Verizon is the largest wireless operator in the country and also provides landlines, cable television and business services.
AT&T, the second-largest wireless provider, recently agreed to acquire DirecTV in a $49 billion deal, which would give it control of the country's largest satellite television operator.
Meanwhile, the cable industry is also consolidating. Comcast and Time Warner Cable have agreed on a $45.2 billion deal that would create by far the largest cable television operator. The combined company would also have strong landline, Internet and business services offerings.
Together, these mergers and acquisitions by competitors of Sprint and T-Mobile have created a landscape that has increasingly marginalized the two smaller companies, which each have about 50 million subscribers and only provide wireless service.
Neither Sprint nor T-Mobile, on their own, would have the financial resources to compete against these larger players, nor the suite of offerings to attract customers who can get a whole host of services from other rivals. As a result, both sides believe that the only way to remain relevant is to combine.
Sprint and T-Mobile are both majority-owned by large, international telecommunications groups, which have their own agendas as well. T-Mobile is 67 percent owned by Deutsche Telekom of Germany. Last year, T-Mobile merged with MetroPCS, gaining a publicly traded stock that eased the path for a Sprint deal.
Deutsche Telekom has been looking to get out of its T-Mobile investment for years, and under the proposed deal with Sprint it would own just 20 percent of the combined firm, further reducing its United States exposure.
Sprint, meanwhile, is majority-owned by SoftBank, the Japanese group controlled by the billionaire Masayoshi Son. Mr. Son, known as Masa, an entrepreneur who has already reshaped Japan's wireless industry, has made no secret of his ambitions to do the same thing in the United States. Taking control of Sprint last year was his first step, and at the time that deal was announced, he acknowledged his desire to acquire T-Mobile as well, giving him the scale he thinks he needs to compete with Verizon and AT&T.
"AT&T and Verizon dominate the industry's Ebitda and capital investment," said Walter Piecyk, an analyst at BTIG Research, referring to a common indicator of a company's financial performance. "And Masa is making a credible case that they not only need scale to compete more effectively in the wireless industry but could also offer new and needed competition for wired broadband."
Should it be announced this summer, a deal to combine Sprint and T-Mobile would surely face regulatory scrutiny. Antitrust officials at the Justice Department are already considering the implications of Comcast's proposed acquisition of Time Warner Cable, and AT&T's proposed deal for DirecTV. This would add a third megadeal to the mix, and the regulators could consider the merits of all the deals at once.
Details
Subject Acquisitions & mergers; Telecommunications industry; Competition; Wireless carriers
Name: AT&T Inc NAICS: 517110, 517210;
Name: Comcast Corp NAICS: 517110, 517210, 517919;
Name: MetroPCS Inc NAICS: 517210;
Name: Vodafone Group PLC NAICS: 517210;
Name: Verizon Wireless NAICS: 517210;
Name: Time Warner Cable Inc NAICS: 517110, 517210;
Name: Sprint Nextel Corp NAICS: 517110, 517210
Company / organization
Title T-Mobile and Sprint Zeroing in on Merger: [Business/Financial Desk]
"Regulators have many deals in front of them and need to consider where the market will be five years from now and how to best stimulate competition, which not only means lower prices but also more investment," Mr. Piecyk said.
AT&T tried to buy T-Mobile three years ago in a deal that would also have consolidated the industry. But regulators effectively killed the deal, contending it would have been bad for consumers because it would have reduced their choices.
Accounting for the regulatory uncertainty, the early terms of the deal include a breakup fee of more than $1 billion that Sprint would pay T-Mobile if the deal is not consummated.
Many hurdles to the deal remain, and any announcement is still a ways off. The two sides have not conducted due diligence on one another, drafted a definitive agreement or arranged financing. A deal could be announced in July, according to a person briefed on the process.
Additionally, by expanding so rapidly, Mr. Son of Japan will have created a company with a substantial amount of debt. Together, the two companies carried about $54 billion in long- term debt as of March 31, according to regulatory filings.
There is also the issue of T-Mobile's brash chief executive, John J. Legere. Mr. Legere supports the merger, and could emerge as the leader of a combined company. Dan Hesse, Sprint's chief executive, has previously signaled his willingness to step down.
Despite turning around T-Mobile, Mr. Legere has said publicly that his smaller company lacks the financial firepower to battle Verizon and AT&T over the long term.
"When you play this game over five years or so, there are capital requirements and there are multiple ways to continue to play aggressively and to close the gap on the big guys," he said in a recent earnings call. "We've always said that we think, ultimately in the industry, it's a consolidation game. That's a matter of when and not if."
Bloomberg and The Wall Street Journal earlier reported that the companies had agreed on deal terms.
Craig Moffett, the senior research analyst for MoffettNathanson, said that the timing of the potential takeover stems in part because Mr. Son is eager to use Sprint's stock as deal currency while it remains relatively highly valued.
But Mr. Moffett cited the likelihood of strong opposition by the Justice Department's antitrust division and the Federal Communications Commission in both private and public comments.
"I don't think you can put more than a 10 percent chance of success for this deal," he said.
Among the three proposed deals that the F.C.C. and the Justice Department will weigh, Mr. Moffett considers that the Comcast and AT&T proposals will be the ones to pass, since either approving all three or rejecting them all would be politically untenable. "They will have to find at least one acquisition to be the sacrificial lamb," he said.
This is a more complete version of the story than the one that appeared in print.
Photograph Masayoshi Son of Softbank, Parent of Sprint, Wants to Change the United States Wireless Sector. (Photograph by Kazuhiro Nogi/Agence France-Presse -- Getty Images) (B9)
Copyright New York Times Company Jun 5, 2014
Author Gelles, David; Michael J. De La Merced
Publication title New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast); New York, N.Y.
Pages B.1
Publication year 2014
Publication date Jun 5, 2014
Year 2014
column Dealbook
Section B
Publisher New York Times Company
Place of publication New York, N.Y.
Country of publication United States
Publication subject General Interest Periodicals--United States
ISSN 03624331
CODEN NYTIAO
Source type Newspapers
Language of publication English
Document type News
ProQuest document ID 1532445192
Document URL https://search.proquest.com/docview/1532445192? accountid=28844
Copyright Copyright New York Times Company Jun 5, 2014
Last updated 2014-06-17
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Copyright © 2017 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Terms and Conditions
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Module 4 - Background
Leadership and Decision-Making Styles
Required Reading
The Vroom-Yetton model can be difficult to follow and understand at first, so be sure to go carefully through these three readings to develop a solid understanding of the model before you begin your assignments:
Stanford, N. (2007). Decision making. Guide to Organisation Design: Creating High-Performing and Adaptable Enterprises. Profile Books/The Economist, London, GBR, pp. 225-231. [eBook Business Collection]
Rigolosi, E. (2005). Chapter 6: Diagnosing the task. Management and Leadership in Nursing and Health Care : An Experiential Approach. New York, NY, USA: Springer Publishing Company, 2005. [eBook Academic Collection.]
Vroom, V. (1976). Can leaders learn to lead? Organizational Dynamics, 4(3), 17-28. [ProQuest]
Case Assignment Reading
Gelles, D., & Michael J De La, M. (2014, Jun 05). T-Mobile and Sprint zeroing in on merger. New York Times [ProQuest]
Yao, D. (2014). Moody's: Sprint/T-Mobile merger faces negative free cash flow until at least 2018. SNL Kagan Media & Communications Report [ProQuest]
De La Merced, M. (2014, Aug 07). Sprint ends its attempt to purchase T-Mobile. International New York Times [ProQuest]
Optional Reading
For an example of how the Vroom-Yetton model has been applied to a military setting see this following paper:
Duncan, W. J., LaFrance, K. G., & Ginter, P. M. (2003). Leadership and decision making: A retrospective application and assessment. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 9(4), 1 [ProQuest]
Muczyk, J. P., & Steel, R. P. (1998). Leadership style and the turnaround executive. Business horizons, 41(2), 39-46. [Science Direct]
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Module 4 - Case
Leadership and Decision-Making Styles
Case Assignment
Since 2013 there has been on-and-off talk of Sprint purchasing T-Mobile. (They are the third- and fourth-largest mobile phone carriers in the United States.) This move is led by Masayoshi Son, the chair of Japanese conglomerate SoftBank, which owns Sprint. Mr. Son is a bold entrepreneur who is known for his penchant for risk taking and desire to be a global leader in the telecommunications industry. If the merger ever goes through it would result in a merger of the third and fourth largest mobile phone carriers in the United States.
Most recently, it appears that the merger will not go through. But the fact that talk of this merger has been rumored for quite a long time suggests it must have been a very difficult decision for Masayoshi Son. Such a large-scale merger brings great benefits in allowing a combined Sprint/T-Mobile to compete with industry leaders AT&T and Verizon. But mergers are always very risky and require a huge amount of debt to finance, not to mention overcoming numerous regulatory hurdles.
For this assignment, thoroughly review the background materials on the Vroom-Yetton decision-making style model. This involves answering seven questions relating to a decision and using the results from the model to determine your decision-making style. Make sure you understand the model, including the seven questions and the path diagram that you follow in order to find the preferred leadership style. The Vroom-Yetton model allows you to choose between different levels of autocratic, consulting, or group decision-making styles.
After you have reviewed the required background materials including Stanford(2007), Vroom (1976), and Rigolosi (2005), do some research on Sprint’s decision whether or not to purchase T-Mobile and think about what kind of answers you would give to the seven questions involved in the Vroom-Yetton model. Here are some articles on the rumored Sprint/T-Mobile merger to get you started:
Gelles, D., & De La Merced, M. J. (2014, Jun 05). T-Mobile and Sprint zeroing in on merger. New York Times [ProQuest]
Yao, D. (2014). Moody's: Sprint/T-Mobile merger faces negative free cash flow until at least 2018. SNL Kagan Media & Communications Report [ProQuest]
De La Merced, M. (2014, Aug 07). Sprint ends its attempt to purchase T-Mobile. International New York Times [ProQuest]
Once you have finished your research on the Vroom-Yetton model and on the merger, write a 4- to 5-page paper addressing the following issues:
- Imagine you are Masayoshi Son and have to decide on which decision-making style to use. Go through the seven questions from the Vroom-Yetton model and give your answers based on what you think the main issues are in the decision of whether or not to purchase T-Mobile. Explain your reasoning behind each answer
- Go through the diagram in the Vroom-Yetton model and, based on your answers to the seven questions from Question 1, see what kind of decision-making style is recommended for Masayoshi Son. Use the diagram (Figure 6.2) on page 118 of Rigolosi (2005). Are you surprised by this answer? Is it the kind of decision-making style you would personally recommend based on your own research?
- Conclude your paper with a discussion of your own opinion as to the usefulness of the Vroom-Yetton model for choosing your decision-making style. Would you recommend that corporate executives receive training in this model? Is there any ways in which you think the model could be improved? Explain your reasoning.
Assignment Expectations
- Follow the assignment instructions closely and follow all steps listed in the instructions.
- Stay focused on the precise assignment questions; don’t go off on tangents or devote a lot of space to summarizing general background materials.
- Make sure to cite readings from the background materials page. Rely primarily on the required background readings as your sources of information.
- Include both a bibliography and in-text citations. See the Student Guide to Writing a High-Quality Academic Paper, including pages 13 and 14 on in-text citations.
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Module 4 - SLP
Leadership and Decision-Making Styles
For this assignment think about a specific decision that was made by your supervisor in the organization you currently work for or have worked for in the past. Review the background materials carefully on the Vroom-Yetton model and think about how this model applies to this decision that you experienced. Then write a 2- to 3-page paper applying the Vroom-Yetton model to this decision:
- Describe the decision that management had to make, and also whether their decision-making style was autocratic, consultative, or group-based. Explain your reasoning.
- Go through Vroom-Yetton’s seven questions and apply these questions to their diagram to see what decision-making style their model suggests. Briefly explain the reasoning behind your answers to the seven questions.
- Conclude your paper with a discussion of whether or not you would recommend this model to your supervisor and whether or not you were surprised by the recommendation given by this model regarding decision-making style.
SLP Assignment Expectations
- Follow the assignment instructions closely and follow all steps listed in the instructions.
- Stay focused on the precise assignment questions; don’t go off on tangents or devote a lot of space to summarizing general background materials.
- Make sure to cite readings from the background materials page. Rely primarily on the required background readings as your sources of information.
- Include both a bibliography and in-text citations. See the Student Guide to Writing a High-Quality Academic Paper, including pages 13 and 14 on in-text citations.
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6 Diagnosing the Task
OUTLINE
THE VROOM, YETTON, AND JAGO MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING MODEL APPLICATION OF THE DECISION-MAKING MODEL DISCUSSION OF THE DECISION-MAKING MODEL A FINAL NOTE SUMMARY REVIEW CONCEPTS AND QUESTIONS SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENTS REFERENCES
EXPECTED LEARNING OUTCOMES
To gain knowledge of a decision-making theory that can be used to diagnose the task To understand six major types of decision-making styles To blend the diagnosis of followers and selection of appropriate beginning leader behavior with diagnosis
of the task
Part II of this book is devoted to identifying the appropriate leader behavior to use in beginning the process of motivating and educating people in a system to accomplish an identified goal. This process involves diagnosing the environment—self, system, and task—and then applying leader behavior theory, as presented in Chapter 5.
Diagnosing self, presented in , is necessary in identifying the leader’s personal point of view onChapter 3 the problem or goal and on the environment. Further, diagnosing one’s personal leader behavior style is helpful to fit behavioral intent with what is generally automatic behavior that stems from one’s own personality. Diagnosing self is a consciousness-raising experience with an intent of reducing leader bias and matching needed leader behavior with what is actually given to and perceived by followers.
Chapter 4 contains a discussion of theories that can be used to diagnose a system. Once a diagnosis is made, leader behavior theory is applied to determine the leader behavior style that has the highest probability for motivating and educating people to accomplish a task. This leader behavior style is the umbrella or pivot upon which problem solutions and actions should be based.
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Chapter 5 contains a discussion about matching a system’s diagnosis to a leader behavior theory of choice to know the theoretically best leader behavior style that should be used to begin the process of goal accomplishment. The reader should be aware that leader behavior preferably should always be on target with what followers need. There is, however, another variable that adds to the overall diagnosis, as shown in the following equation, which was presented earlier and is worthy of reinforcement:
Manager Behavior = Diagnosing the Organizational Environment
— Self
— Task — Situational Variables — Material Resources
Plus Applying Leader Behavior Theory
Diagnosis of the task is the last segment of leader responsibilities that will be discussed in of thisPart II book. It completed the equation that forms the basis for the core of how managers work. Remember, as stated previously in situational variables and material resources are considered in the overall developingChapter 4, action plan and are thought of as an awareness of what a leader has in an environment—they are what has been given and what must be worked with at a particular point in time. Situational variables and material resources do not require a diagnosis as do self, human resources, and the task.
The task is an addition to a leader’s diagnosis. The nature of tasks may require different leader behavior styles to have the most effective outcomes. Ideally, the suggested best leader behavior style of a task should match the selected best beginning leader behavior style for the followers who will be doing the task. So, please place aside what has presented so far and continue to hold it as your theoretically bestPart II suggestions for how managers work. Then study the contents in this chapter and blend everything when you understand what is presented. Diagnosing the task is another important piece of information that can be placed in the leader’s picture of information—it purports to increase your batting average for success in leading others to accomplish goals.
THE VROOM, YETTON, AND JAGO MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING MODEL
The conceptual framework for diagnosing the task is the Vroom, Yetton, and Jago (VYJ) managerial decision-making model ( ; ; ). ThisVroom, 1973 Vroom & Jago, 1978, 1988 Vroom & Yetton, 1973 decision-making model is another theory destroying the myth that managers who use democratic styles are “good” and those who do not are “bad.” The decision process used by a manager in a situation should depend on the nature of the unique situation—the diagnosis of the environment (Donnelly, Gibson, & Ivancevich,
; ; ).1998 Gatewood, Taylor, & Ferrell, 1995 Kreitner & Kinicki, 2010 The VYJ model provides a means to diagnose tasks in determining the most appropriate leader behavior
style for the manager to use in getting something accomplished. Although diagnosing the nature of the task should be only one of three determinants of leader behavior, the VYJ decision-making model is a powerful one that reports validity for its purpose ( ; ; ) and hasField, 1982 Jago & Vroom, 1978 Vroom & Jago, 1978 been widely evident in the literature ( ; ; Hersey, Blanchard, & Johnson, 2008 Lord, Hanges, & Godfrey, 2003
; ; ).Marquis & Huston, 2012 Newstrom, 2011 Vroom, 2000, 2001, 2002
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ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .
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A general guide for diagnosing the task can be depicted by the following equation (La Monica & Finch, ):1977
Effective decisions = a function of (quality + acceptance + time)
Quality refers to whether there are a number of possible solutions to the problem and some alternatives could result in better outcomes than others—a qualitative judgment on the best solution must be made. Acceptance is concerned with whether staff members must accept the problem’s solution to eliminate the problem or achieve the goal—must the staff do anything? relates to how much time is available to work on theTime problem or accomplish the goal. The VYJ managerial decision-making model integrates answers to these three variables and suggests a decision-making style that has the highest probability for effectiveness. These results will be combined with other diagnoses from previous chapters in determining leader behavior.
Table 6.1 contains six different managerial decision styles. Read each one and then study the case in Box . Select the decision-making style that you would use if you were the manager in the case. Write your6.1
response in the space provided after the case.
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ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .
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ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .
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BOX 6.1
Case Example
You are an assistant director of nursing in a large city hospital. The management has recently put into effect, at your request and consultation, the [newly organized and computerized] unit manager system on two floors. This was expected to relieve the nurses of administrative responsibility, increase their abilities to provide quality care to clients, ensure that health assessments and care plans could be accomplished for every client, and lower the nursing budget. Quality health care and nursing care plans reflected the suggestions made by the hospital accreditors. To the surprise of everyone, yourself included, little of the plan has been realized. In fact, nurses are sitting in the conference room more, quality has maintained a status quo, and employees and patients are complaining more than ever.
You do not believe that there is anything wrong with the new system. You have had reports from other hospitals using it and they confirm this opinion. You . . . [also have] had representatives from institutions using the system talk with your nursing personnel, and the representatives report that your nurses have full knowledge of the system and their altered responsibilities.
You suspect that a few people may be responsible for the situation, but this view is not widely shared among your two supervisors and four head nurses. The failure has been variously attributed to poor training of the unit managers, lack of financial incentives, and poor morale. Clearly, this is an issue about which there is considerable depth of feeling within individuals and potential disagreement among your subordinates.
This morning you received a phone call from the nursing director. She had just talked with the hospital administrator and was calling to express her deep concern. She indicated that the problem was yours to solve in any way you think best, but she would like to know within a week what steps you plan to take.
You share your director’s concern and know that the personnel involved are equally concerned. The problem is to decide what steps to take to rectify the situation.
Decision style you would use:_______________________________________________
Note. The source of the case is La Monica, E., & Finch, F. ( ). Managerial decision-making. 1977 Journal of Nursing , (5), 21. Reproduced with permission. This case was originally adapted into nursing from a businessAdministration 7
example. The original material was presented by Vroom, V. ( ). A new look at managerial decision-making. 1973 , (4), 66–80.Organizational Dynamics 1
As you have probably noted, the six managerial decision styles can be considered as a continuum. AI and AII are autocratic styles, CI and CII are consultative styles, and GII is a group decision-making style. Delegation (DI) has been discussed by Vroom and Yetton ( ) and Vroom and Jago ( ) as a style for1973 1988 use in a two-person superior or follower relationship; delegation is at the opposite end of the continuum from AI. These decision styles are paralleled with the Ohio State Model of Leadership, as shown in . OfFigure 6.1 course, they similarly would apply in the other leader behavior models that are presented in ItChapter 5. must be noted that as a manager moves from AI to GII, the amount of time involved in solving the problem or in achieving the goal increases. This effect is because group interactions take more time than autocratic behavior.
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ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .
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APPLICATION OF THE DECISION-MAKING MODEL
Now that your decision-making style has been selected for the case example from ., the VYJ (Box 6.1 Vroom, ; ; ) model should be applied in diagnosing the task.1973 Vroom & Jago, 1978, 1988 Vroom & Yetton, 1973
Vroom ( ) and Vroom and Yetton ( ) developed the decision model using a tree format; it is1973 1973 commonly referred to as the , shown in . This tree can be described as a seriesdecision-making tree Figure 6.2 of questions that move through the situational parameters of the model ( ).Chemers, 2000
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ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .
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ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .
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Notice that there are seven questions across the top of . Questions A, B, and C refer to theFigure 6.2 variable of quality, and questions D through G refer to the variable of acceptance. Referring to the case in Box 6.1, it is necessary to start at the left of the model, Question A, and answer the question in a yes or no format. If the answer to Question A is “no,” then follow the “no” line to the next node and answer the question on top of that node. Follow this format until the tree ends with a decision-making style. It should be noted that each successive question in the quality and acceptance sets of variables asks more specific information concerning the variable. This process is similar to programmed history taking when an answer of yes to “history of familial diabetes,” for example, results in more specific questions concerning this matter being asked.
The decision model conceptually is communicating the following:
1. If acceptance of decision by followers is crucial, then get the group involved in solving the problem. 2. If quality is important, with expertise being a requirement, then find people who have the expertise
and solve the problem with their input. 3. When both quality and acceptance are required, then bring the experts and the group together for
problem solving.
The purpose of the decision-making tree, however, is to integrate the variables of quality and acceptance and to suggest a decision-making style that will take the shortest amount of time, considering the requirements of the task. Time increases as one moves down is styles from AI to GII. Hence, if style CII is suggested at the end of the decision-making tree, quality and acceptance are important so one should not use styles AI, AII, or CI because the group would not be involved to the degree required in these styles. But one could use GII if the leader thought that the group was mature enough to solve the problem using that style
had the time available. The problem would be solved more quickly in style CII than in style GII.and Concluding simply, any decision-making style at or below the one indicated by the decision model in
is fine to use. More time, however, would be needed to solve the problem as the styles moveTable 6.1 downward. Decision-making styles above the one indicated by the decision model should not be used because the nature of the task requires more group interaction.
Let us walk through the case example from using the decision-making tree from . toBox 6.1 Figure 6.2 see if Vroom ( ) and Vroom and Yetton ( ) agree with your choice for the best style to use given the1973 1973 nature of the task. Begin by starting at the left and answering Question A.
Question A: Quality—Yes
There is quality requirement in this case. A number of possible solutions to the problem exist, and one could be better than another. There are several ways to solve this problem, and one way could result in more effective outcomes than another.
Follow the “yes” line on the tree to the next node; look above it. Question B must be answered.
Question B: Manager’s Information —No
The assistant director obviously has neither the information nor the expertise to make a high-quality decision and to solve the problem.
Follow the “no” line to the next node and answer the above further question on quality.
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ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .
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This question requires explanation. A structured problem is one in which the decision is based on quantitative (objective) data, the location of those data is known, and the data can be obtained and retrieved. An unstructured problem has a subjective element. The decision is a qualitative assessment—a value judgment—and/or the location of the information is unknown or cannot be obtained. In the case example, information that is required for solving the problem is qualitative and its specific location is unknown.
Follow the “no” line to the next node, look above the node, and answer Question D.
Question D: Acceptance—Yes
Another way of asking Question D is: Do followers have to do anything in order for the problem to be solved? In this case, acceptance is critical. The followers must implement the new unit management system in order for the goal to be reached. One possible reason for why the system is failing may be that personnel were not involved in the initial planning.
Follow the “yes” line to the next node and answer Question E.
Question E: Prior Probability of Acceptance—No
An autocratic decision in this case probably would not be tolerated.
Follow the “no” line to the next node and answer Question F located above the node.
Question F: Goal Congruence—Yes
Another way of asking this question is: If the problem is solved, will it benefit the people working in the environment? Obviously, the people will benefit in this case if the unit manager system works. The resulting style that is suggested by the model is GII. Bring the two supervisors together with the four head nurses and proceed in solving the problem as a group.
Did the style you chose match the style that you ended with on the decision-making tree? If so, your intuition was on target. Intuition, however, is as fluid as air—it comes and goes. Theory should be used first, and then intuition. Even if you were correct, diagnose every task and check on what your intuition tells you. You can raise your batting average continuously by using the theory. If your intuition does not match the decision-making tree ( ; ), it generally would be advisable to follow theVroom, 1973 Vroom & Yetton, 1973 suggestion from the decision-making tree over your own. Vroom and Jago ( ) reported on an1978 experimental study suggesting that managers who apply the decision model have significantly more effective outcomes—more technical quality and more follower acceptance—than do managers who do not apply the model. Experiential Learning Activity, Exercise 7 at the conclusion of of this book contains additionalPart II cases that can be used for practice.
DISCUSSION OF THE DECISION-MAKING MODEL
The decision model just discussed is used to diagnose the task; this is just one part of the environmental diagnosis. As noted earlier in this chapter, diagnosis of the system and self-diagnosis must be considered in determining leader behavior.
Suppose that you went back to the case example in and applied the maturity or performanceBox 6.1 readiness theories from and then the leader behavior theories from . You decided that theChapter 4 Chapter 5 followers in the case example were at the M1 level of readiness, thereby requiring high structure and low
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ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .
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consideration leader behavior. The diagnosis of the task in the case suggested that group decision making is indicated—that is, high consideration and low structure leader behavior style (see ). What shouldFigure 6.1 the manager do?
The best course for the leader to follow in the previous scenario is to bid for more time by presenting evidence to your superior, the nursing director. Advise your director that the nature of the task demands that the group become involved in solving this problem to have the best probability for an effective outcome. Further, the group is not mature or ready enough to handle a group problem-solving activity. More time is needed to help the group mature to the level required for solving the problem. The manager’s best bet, therefore, is to try to get the task tabled until the group is mature enough to handle it—get more time. Then use other tasks that do not require group problem-solving experiences and have your followers practice and experience the group processes in a lower risk scenario so that they learn to communicate effectively while working together. Coach them in the learning process when the stakes are not too high.
The manager should try, to the degree possible, to match the decision-making style required by the task with the leader behavior suggested by the group maturity or readiness level—this is ideal. It is also a way to determine the problems or goals that should be the focus of group work at any given point. Tasks should be given to groups according to the group’s ability to accomplish them effectively. Decision styles (AI through DI presented in ) can be used by the manager to help followers progressively mature in groupTable 6.1 problem solving. Decision styles are a ladder to how a leader may bring followers to maturity in organizational group activities.
Going back to the case example, if the director of nursing says, “the task must be done even though the group is not ready to handle it,” even though a case against this has been made repeatedly and with assertiveness, then the manager must act accordingly. Given that the situation is far from ideal, every effort must be taken to ensure the highest probability for success. The group must be involved even though the experts must maintain control of the group’s process because quality and acceptance are both critical. The manager’s best bet in this instance is to move into a leader behavior style that falls between what the system requires and what the task requires—high structure and high consideration—CI or CII. This would be the leader behavior style applied for beginning the process of goal accomplishment. This style would be a compromise between the group involvement indicated by the task diagnosis (LBS3—GII) and the leader control indicated by the modal performance readiness level diagnosis of the followers (LBS1).
It must be noted that group decision making in the case example, indicated as best by the decision tree, means that the manager presents the problem for the group members to solve. The problem or goal is to determine how to make the unit manager system work effectively, producing the anticipated outcomes. The problem or goal must be presented with clarity. Group members should not be given the opportunity to say that they do not want the new unit management system. The system exists, and now it must be made effective. This principle applies in all group decision-making processes. Group decision making should begin with the manager’s statement of the problem or goal and the factors that have to be considered in the situation—those that must continue and those that may be changed.
Imagine that the task diagnosis required AI decision style and the follower diagnosis for performance readiness was M3. This is a reverse of the case example previously discussed and is for explanation purposes only. Just follow this thinking conceptually. According to VYJ’s theory ( ; Vroom, 1973 Vroom & Yetton,
), you can use any decision style under the one produced on the decision tree (refer to ).1973 Table 6.1 Therefore, you can use GII (LBS3) and match the follower’s performance readiness, and you can move quickly into DI to help your followers to continually grow in performance readiness. You can be reasonably
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sure that the diagnoses of followers and the task with the matching leader behavior style result in the best choice to begin the journey toward goal accomplishment. The Experiential Learning Activity, Exercise 7, contains one example of this example.
A FINAL NOTE
Foresight in management is always better than hindsight. The manager should always try to prevent the situation just discussed by a complete and accurate diagnosis of essential elements in the environment. However, when prevention has not worked (and prevention does not always work), then the manager must do what is best in the given situation, after considering the best leader behavior style based on diagnosis of followers and diagnosis of the task.
Self-diagnosis must also be studied because a manager who has a personality that matches the requirements of the system and task probably will have the smoothest journey through solving the problem. Should the leader’s personal style not match, however, two alternatives are possible, given that the task must be accomplished by the system: (a) delegate leadership for solving the problem to an assistant whose personal leadership style matches the requirements or (b) provide the leader behavior style that is required by the system and task by being conscious that one’s behavior must follow the style needed. If possible and comfortable, validate with someone if your intended behavior matches their perceptions. In the second alternative, the manager must be diligent in thinking about the leader behavior that must be provided for the system because one’s personal inclination may be different from the desired behavior.
SUMMARY
The task is the third aspect of the environment that must be diagnosed to determine leader behavior. VYJ’s ( ; , ; ) managerial decision-making model wasVroom, 1973 Vroom & Jago, 1978 1988 Vroom & Yetton, 1973
discussed for this purpose. The variables of quality, acceptance, and time are considered important in specifying the task’s requirements. A decision tree or model can be used to integrate elements of quality and acceptance for a given situation and to suggest a decision style that requires the least amount of time and has the highest probability for effective outcome as one begins the journey toward goal accomplishment.
One case was followed and discussed applying the decision model. An Experiential Learning Activity in of this book contains three additional cases for practice using the model. The manager should try toPart II
match the decision-making style required by the task with the leader behavior suggested by the system’s maturity or readiness level. The manager can use the model to decide on task priorities for a given group.
Chapter 7 contains a case application of the management process and problem-solving method. This chapter will put the content from , , , and into action.Chapters 3 4 5 6
REVIEW CONCEPTS AND QUESTIONS
1. Describe and explain the variables of acceptance, quality, and time, according to the Vroom, Yetton, and Jago (VYJ) decision-making model.
2. Explain how to apply VYJ’s decision-making model with the leader’s behavior decision process that was explained in Chapter 5.
3. Discuss how the managerial decision styles can be applied to the leader’s behavior pathway from LBS1 through LBS2, LBS3, and LBS4.
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EBSCO Publishing : eBook Academic Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 3/1/2017 2:31 PM via TRIDENT UNIVERSITY AN: 477403 ; Rigolosi, Elaine La Monica.; Management and Leadership in Nursing and Health Care : An Experiential Approach, Third Edition Account: s3642728
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8 Culture and group processes
organization doesn’t really accomplish anything. Plans don’t accomplish anything, either. Theories of management don’t much matter. Endeavors succeed or fail because of the people involved. only by attracting the best people will you accomplish great deeds.
Colin Powell, former us secretary of state
In most cases a “visioning” process kicks off an organisation design project. in these sessions executives and others gather to “blue-sky” the
new organisation design, describe the ideal future state, and lay plans for becoming the “best we can be”.
in these and subsequent sessions the cultural and group processes – typically the hidden dangers that block the route – are not discussed. because they are caught up in the mindset of the “infinite possibility”, participants choose not to acknowledge that the path between the current state and their desired future state is perilous and that they are often ill- equipped to take it. Unless design leaders ask and answer the sorts of questions listed below, they will be exposed like those scott Fitzgerald describes in The Great Gatsby as careless, smashing up things and then retreating to “let other people clean up the mess they had made”:
? how much is organisational design success dependent on factors such as local culture (both national and organisational) and human factors such as personalities?
? What specific aspects of an organisation’s culture get in the way of a change process? how are these tackled?
? Are group processes – decision-taking, making sound judgments and managing consequences – effective?
Getting the cultural and process aspects of an organisation design journey right is challenging. ernest shackleton’s apocryphal adver- tisement for men to accompany him to the south Pole in 1914 on the Endurance was rather different from the vision statement of most organi- sation design projects:1
Men Wanted for Hazardous Journey, small Wages, Bitter Cold, Long
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Months of Complete Darkness, Constant Danger, safe return Doubtful. Honour and recognition in Case of success.
in mid-trip the Endurance was crushed by ice. circumstances necessi- tated a complete new organisation design, including a change of purpose. (some would say at this point that their project had failed because it did not achieve the intended mission. however, it illustrates the point that failure is relative and must adapt to circumstances.) in the event and after months of enduring staggeringly harsh conditions, the 28-man team under shackleton’s direct command returned safely.
to achieve this took strong group processes and a robust, well-func- tioning organisation culture. indeed, shackleton’s report of the trip tends to mention only the positive aspects of these – friendly football games on the ice, and so on.2 however, a recent perspective by kelly tyler-Lewis, writing about the expedition’s base-camp party (members of whom did not accompany shackleton’s team), suggests a less rosy picture:3
shackleton’s lack of clarity about the chain of command pitted Mackintosh against his subordinate, Ernest Joyce. “I have never in my experience come across such an idiot in charge of men!” Joyce wrote, while refraining from outright mutiny.
both perspectives are probably right. however, imagine the likelihood of expedition success if group members had started with less of an idea of what they were letting themselves in for and then:
? blamed someone else for the situation they were in (a blame culture); ? wanted to hear only good news (a good-news culture); ? refused to discuss aspects of the expedition (the shadow side of
the organisation); ? were unable to make quick decisions; ? failed to solve the problems they faced; ? escalated rather than managed conflicts.
one or more of these six factors commonly blocks an organisation design implementation. (note that the first three relate to the culture of the organisation and the second three to group processes.) clearly, there are other blockers and some are discussed in previous chapters – for example, leadership issues or stakeholder concerns – but realistic appraisal of aspects of culture and group process followed by effective management
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of them goes some way towards achieving either the desired outcome of an organisation design or being successful in its failure.
shackleton acknowledges as much in the closing section of South:4
That we failed in accomplishing the objective we set out for was due, I venture to assert, not to any neglect or lack of organization, but to the overwhelming natural obstacles … To the credit side of the Expedition one can safely say that the comradeship and resource of the members of the Expedition was worthy of the highest traditions of Polar service; and it was a privilege to me to have had under my command men who, through dark days and the stress and strain of continuous danger, kept up their spirits and carried out their work regardless of themselves and heedless of the limelight.
this chapter looks at three aspects of organisation culture – blame culture, good-news culture and the shadow-side culture – and then at three group processes – making decisions, solving problems and dealing with conflict.
Organisational culture
it is surprising how few of the organisation design models shown in chapter 2 specifically mention culture. they focus on aspects of organisation design that are explicit, whereas much about culture is implicit and difficult to describe because it is socially construed and manifested in norms, behav- iours, expectations and “the way we do things round here”. nevertheless, as edgar schein says in The Corporate Culture Survival Guide:5
Culture matters. It matters because decisions made without awareness of the operative cultural forces may have unanticipated and undesirable consequences.
thinking about organisational culture at three distinct levels as shown in table 8.1 makes it easier to gain awareness of the operative cultural forces that affect new organisation design implementation.
organisation design work has a good chance of success when cultures are aligned, collaborative and open at all three levels. take the example of microstrategy, a builder of business intelligence software, which was forced into design change following an investigation by the Us securities and exchange commission.
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Microstrategy: a forced design change
nearly every element of Microstrategy’s business model has been subjected to scrutiny and forced to change. But amidst these deep-seated strategic reforms, one element of the organization has remained intact so far: its equally deep-seated culture and values.
The fact that most employees were able to keep their heads, even as some heads were rolling, confirmed for saylor [founder and CEo] that for all of his mistakes, he and his senior colleagues had done one important thing right. Their obsession with building a sense of shared purpose, their commitment to schooling all of their people in the big-picture vision behind the company’s business, and their willingness to spend millions of dollars and hundreds of hours of CEo time to create a sense of shared responsibility, had become the glue that held things together.
“The past �� months have really shown that culture is by far the most important thing in a company,” saylor says. “If we had constructed a culture that was based solely on stock price or on prestige, there wouldn’t be a reason to be here now. At the end of the day, the thing that drives people through all of this pain and turmoil is the belief that the world is a better place because of what they do.”
source: salter, C., “updating the Agenda: Microstrategy Inc.”, Fast Company, May �00�
Table �.� three levels of culture
Artefacts and behaviours
This is the observable level of culture, which consists of behaviour patterns and outward manifestations of culture: perks provided to executives; dress codes; who gets the latest technology device; and the physical layout of work spaces. All may be visible indicators of culture but difficult to interpret.
Espoused values Values underlie and to a large extent determine behaviour, but they are not as directly observable as behaviours are. There may be a difference between value statements that organisations make and the values people use from day to day. People attribute their behaviour to underpinning values.
Assumptions Assumptions derive from values, which are difficult to identify as they are taken for granted and drop out of awareness. People may be unaware of or unable to articulate the beliefs and assumptions forming their deepest level of culture.
source: schein, E.H., Organizational Culture and Leadership, �rd edn, Jossey-Bass, �00�
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cultures that are misaligned – for example, where there is a statement of values but these are not seen in practice, or are not open, for example where there is finger-pointing and back-biting – must be changed as part of the organisation design process if there is to be any chance of success.
culture change is easy to effect at one level, for example changing the dress-code, or giving everyone the same size of office or workspace. changing behaviour is harder and takes time, patience and resilience – as anyone with children (or dogs) knows. A tv series, Super Nanny, provides a model for behaviour change that organisation designers could well learn from:6
Her simple methods stress consistency, communication and reasonable consequences for poor behaviour, all delivered with loving firmness. she emphasizes the importance of spelling out the new rules of the household to children in advance, as well as explaining the consequences for infractions. she also candidly points out to parents where they need to be more decisive, more flexible or even how they may need to adjust their expectations of a child’s readiness for certain behaviours.
however, as with individuals so with organisations: it gets progres- sively more difficult to change espoused values and assumptions and it is at these levels that culture change is either not addressed in organisation design projects and/or fails to take root. three types of culture which are particularly hostile to new organisation design and thus are essential to change are the blame culture, the good-news culture and the shadow-side culture.
The blame culture briefly, a blame culture is one where there is a search for someone or something to attribute lapses, mistakes or misdeeds to. in other words, people in a blame culture seek to pin responsibility, usually for a wrong action, on someone or something other than themselves.
the example of the response to an internet virus, discussed in relation to a generalised “software culture” similar to that found in many organ- isation’s it departments, illustrates the fact that blame cultures cost money, cut productivity, hinder innovation and learning, build dysfunctional rela- tionships and stem the flow of good information.
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Blame culture: response to an internet virus
This winter [�00�], a worm known as slammer rattled the internet violently enough to become what you might call a “Cnn-level virus” – that is, it burrowed its way into the national consciousness.
The old game was to blame Microsoft. “Microsoft did not protect its customers”, read a letter to the New York Times after the Melissa virus hit in �999. A year later, after the I Love You virus infected Microsoft outlook, a Washington Post editorial stated: “This is a software development problem.”
slammer, though, hasn’t followed the old pattern. A developing consensual wisdom suggests that as woeful as Microsoft’s products may be, CIos have been equally sloppy. A February poll of more than �00 IT professionals, by antivirus company sophos, showed that 6�% of respondents blamed their peers’ lax security practices for slammer. only ��% blamed Microsoft.
What frustrates … security experts is the fact that this seemingly intractable problem is actually quite tractable. The tools and strategies to prevent another slammer are just waiting to be used. In fact, the number of tools and strategies available – and available at a reasonable cost – makes it inexcusable for any CIo to fiddle while the software burns.
There is, after all, $60 billion on the table. A �00� study by the national Institute of standards and Technology (nIsT) developed that number to describe buggy software’s cost to the national economy. Improved software testing alone, nIsT suggests, could shave $�� billion off that.
Why can’t the software community motivate itself to grab all that cash? The answer lies in software culture.
source: Berinato, s., “The Bug stops Here”, CIO Magazine, May �00�
the three levels of a blame culture typically appear as listed in table 8.2. organisation design projects do not succeed in blame cultures because,
inevitably, the project implementation process hits snags, bottlenecks and unforeseen circumstances. Although shackleton’s expedition hit all of these the prevailing culture was not one of blame, illustrating the point that in difficult conditions success relies on a culture of being accountable and taking responsibility. People know that “the buck stops here” and are able and confident to admit to errors, work with the situation as it is and learn from it, not waste time and energy casting around to find someone to scapegoat.
An example of successful culture change is motorola, where ceo
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ed Zander turned around a blame culture. the organisation has seen a number of changes since he joined in 2004, one of which is the way that teams have learned to co-operate to develop new handsets:7
Co-operation improved … because each group became willing to try something difficult that might help the others – without worrying too much about who would get blamed if they failed.
this sort of atmosphere is hard to achieve unless the boss takes it seriously, and unless everyone in the company knows that the rules really have changed. by encouraging motorola’s people to push themselves in this way, mr Zander has changed the company’s frame of mind.
The good-news culture similar to a blame culture is the good-news culture. here people refuse to listen to the operational realities of a situation that is not going as planned. the three levels of a good-news culture are illustrated in table 8.3.
Good-news cultures often reflect the need of leaders to have their image of themselves as successful leaders bolstered. consequently, people in these cultures are not valued for their success in their jobs but for their ability to provide evidence that things are going well, do deals and make their superiors look good. typically, senior executives are unwilling to hear anything which suggests that there are problems.
bob Woodward in his book State of Denial illustrates the good-news culture in action in his description of Jay Garner, head of the iraq Postwar Planning office, meeting President bush:8
of course with all the stories, jocularity, buddy-buddy talk, bluster and confidence in the oval office, garner had left out the headline. He had
Table �.� three levels of blame culture
Artefacts and behaviours
CYA (cover your arse) behaviour “If at first you don’t succeed, remove all evidence you ever tried”
Espoused values “Eagles may soar high, but weasels don’t get sucked into jet engines” The secret of success is knowing whom to blame for your failures no single raindrop believes it is to blame for the flood
Assumptions People are out to get you someone will stab you in the back if you’re not careful The harder you try the dumber you look
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not mentioned the problems he saw, or even hinted at them. He did not tell Bush about the three tragic mistakes. once again the aura of the presidency had shut out the most important news – the bad news.
It was only one example of a visitor to the oval office not telling the president the whole story or the truth. Likewise, in these moments where Bush had someone from the field there in the chair beside him, he did not press, did not try to open the door himself and ask what the visitor had seen and thought. The whole atmosphere too often resembled a royal court, with Cheney and rice in attendance, some upbeat stories, exaggerated good news, and a good time had by all.
in another example, the good-news culture prevailing at the national Australia bank led to massive foreign-currency losses:9
A key finding of both the Australian Prudential regulation Authority report and a controversial PricewaterhouseCoopers investigation into the currency losses was the need for sweeping changes to the bank’s culture.
It was described as being too bureaucratic and focused on process and documentation, rather than understanding the substance of issues, “taking responsibility and resolving matters”.
All levels of management were criticised for encouraging a “good news culture” that cocooned top decision makers from information that might have enabled the bank to avoid a string of corporate mishaps, ranging from the $�.� billion Homeside losses to the currency scandal.
the issue for people introducing new organisation designs into a good news culture is that they feel pressured to cover up aspects of the project
Table �.� three levels of good-news culture
Artefacts and behaviours
Present data selectively to show only the good news Push bad news under the carpet Dismiss negative findings or make them more palatable
Espoused values You aren’t being paid to do what you believe is right Avoid candour remain cocooned
Assumptions You’ll be punished for being the bearer of bad news It is a career limiter to discuss difficulties openly There’s no support for admitting errors or mistakes
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implementation that would be better exposed and dealt with before it gets too late or spins out of control. helen Fraser, formerly managing director of Penguin books, makes the point:10
You have to make it easy for someone to be able to tell you the bad news. We all like hearing good news, but they have to be able to tell you that they have made the most terrible mistake and know that you won’t completely lose it. The mistakes may not always be redeemable, but you hope you have learned for next time.
The shadow-side culture in his book Working the Shadow Side, Gerard egan defines the shadow- side culture as:11
All the important activities and arrangements that do not get identified, discussed, and managed in decision-making forums that can made a difference. The shadow side deals with the covert, the undiscussed, the undiscussable, and the unmentionable. It includes arrangements not found in organisational manuals and company documents or on organisational charts.
Although it appears from this definition that there is something wrong about the shadow side, this is not necessarily the case. And characterising the shadow side in terms of three levels of culture is not helpful as it does not exhibit in that way. A better way is to think of the organisation’s culture as being a brain with a left and right hemisphere: the left being the rational, logical side and the right being the intuitive, and creative. Using this analogy the two sides manifest as shown in table 8.4.
taking this brain analogy, it is clear that having a shadow side is normal and that organisations are likely to survive best by working with both parts of the “brain”, in exactly the same way that human potential is realised through the whole brain and not through only one hemisphere. Unfortu- nately, organisation design projects are often initiated and planned using predominantly the rational (left side) of the cultural brain which means that the mess, unpredictability and chaos of day-to-day implementation creates anxiety and lack of confidence in project leaders. those that have the skills to engage openly in the right side of the cultural brain as well as the left are more likely to adapt, innovate and find creative solutions as they work on their design.
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Group processes
organisation design work depends on groups of people being able to work effectively together to meet the project’s goals. this is easier said than done. Although group members may know what they have to achieve – the outcomes or objectives – they may lack skills to do it. conse- quently, groups commonly stall on things like making decisions, problem- solving, handling conflicts, communication and boundary management (which includes obtaining resources, sharing information, admitting people into the group, and relationships between the group and the wider organisation/environment). A meeting at marks & spencer when sir richard Greenbury was running the company illustrates difficulties on almost all these counts:12
one of greenbury’s former aides said: “The thing about rick is he never understood the impact he had on people – people were just too scared to say what they thought. I remember one meeting we had to discuss a new policy and two or three directors got me on one side beforehand and said they were really unhappy about it. Then rick made his presentation and asked for views. There was total silence until one said, ‘Chairman we are all �00% behind you on this one.’ And that was the end of the meeting.”
Group process knowledge and skill in handling interpersonal dynamics are critical competences for organisation designers because they work with a range of groups including project teams, advisory committees, task- forces, steering boards and stakeholder constituencies. Without the process skills to build confidence, bring people along, generate commitment and
Table �.� rational and shadow sides of an organisation
Rational elements (left hemisphere) Non-rational shadow-side elements (right hemisphere)
Directives strategic plans organisation charts Job titles Policies Training courses Budgets
Trust Friendships Jealousy Fear and insecurity Power struggles Ambition grapevine
source: “An Introduction to the shadow side”, www.organisational-leadership.com/intro_shadowside.cfm
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help people listen to each other, designers will struggle to make their projects successful.
reporting annually on what makes it projects work – and large scale it implementations are a common driver of a new organisation design – the standish Group has noted that lack of user group involvement tradition- ally has been the principal reason for failure. recognising this, the group developed a one-day workshop called the six senses (sight, hearing, touch, smell, taste, instinct), all of which are related to developing group process skills in it project managers. this is an interesting, touchy-feely foray into a world traditionally associated with geeks and techies (see Glossary) not known for their people skills.
First Workshop: sense of sight
What is the necessary expertise a project manager needs in development to be able to fully use the sense of sight to improve project management success? Can a project manager see the future and move people and the process in ways without criticizing, condemning or complaining to keep the project moving in the right direction? In this workshop we will work together on this sense to improve the sense of sight and eliminate blind spots.
source: “The six senses of Project Leadership”, www.standishgroup.com/events/chaos.php
As well as being skilled in group processes, designers and managers who develop and use the mindset of a critical practitioner as they work will fare better than those who do not. this means: 13
? being constructively not negatively critical; ? coping with uncertainty and change; ? using knowledge with awareness of personal biases; ? adopting no moral direction, apart from the fundamental
professional commitment to social justice for others and empowering, anti-oppressive work.
Developing these skills in critical practice involves five interlocking and overlapping domains. the international masters Programme in Practising management (impm), a radically different alternative to a traditional mba, co-founded by henry mintzberg, cleghorn Professor of management
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studies at mcGill University and author of Managers Not MBAs, aims to develop managers able to manage:14
? themselves (the reflective mindset); ? organisations (the analytical mindset); ? context (the worldly mindset); ? relationships (the collaborative mindset); ? change (the action mindset).
the critical practitioner mindset that this type of study develops should be a mandatory mindset for managers in group situations where people have a tendency to do extraordinary things for good or bad. in most cases the good things go largely unrecognised – no news is good news – while the bad things surface, wreaking all kinds of damage. this is cleverly documented in “the human behaviour experiments”, produced by Alex Gibney, in which past social psychology experiments are re-enacted and discussed in order to answer questions about why human beings commit unethical acts under particular social conditions:15
Why would four young men watch their friend die, when they could have intervened to save him? Why would a woman obey phone commands from a stranger to strip-search an innocent employee? What makes ordinary people perpetrate extraordinary abuses, like the events at Abu ghraib? … [There is] a fierce debate about just how much the situation – or the system – determines our actions, and how much individual personalities are to blame.
three situations particularly relevant to management practice in organ- isation design work are the group processes involved in decision-making, problem-solving and managing conflict, where an experienced critical practitioner can help head off disaster and navigate towards success.
Decision-making Decisions are the essence of management. They’re what managers do – sit around all day making (or avoiding) decisions. Managers are judged on the outcomes, and most of them – most of us – have only the foggiest idea how we do what we do … decision making is a kind of fortune-telling, a bet on the future.
Thomas stewart�6
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making this kind of bet on the future is risky. take the case of hewlett Packard, a large computer and printer company, whose ceo mark V. hurd made the decision to approve an elaborate “sting” operation on a reporter in February 2005 in an attempt to plug leaks of competitive and sensitive information to the media. According to the Washington Post:17
Internal e-mails show senior HP employees who were given the task of identifying anonymous news sources concocted a fictitious, high-level HP tipster who sent bogus information to a san Francisco reporter in an attempt to trick her into revealing her sources.
in this instance what started off as an apparently good decision to find out how the leaks occurred resulted in an internal investigation into the sting operation that then led to criminal probes and became the subject of a congressional hearing. hurd explains in his congressional Written testimony on september 26th 2006:18
What began as a proper and serious inquiry of leaks to the press of sensitive company information from within the HP board became a rogue investigation that violated HP’s own principles and values. There is no excuse for this. …
How did such an abuse of privacy occur in a company renowned for its commitment to privacy? The end came to justify the means. The investigation team became so focused on finding the source of the leaks that they lost sight of the privacy of reporters and others. They lost sight of values that HP has always represented.
the result of this kind of reputational disaster, which has wide-ranging repercussions in respect of share price, employee trust in management, and so on, inevitably leads to organisation design work as roles and processes are realigned to keep the business stable. hurd, continuing his testimony, explains the measures taken:
We have appointed Bart schwartz, the former head of the criminal division of the us Attorney’s office under rudy giuliani, to do an assessment of current practices and develop future best practices so that our processes will always be legal, ethical, appropriate and without peer.
We are putting into place new measures to maintain the highest levels of information privacy. Let me elaborate on those internal policies.
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in an attempt to minimise the risks inherent in group decision- making in organisations, various tools and techniques are brought into play. simplifying considerably, these come from two schools of thought: first, teaching that good decisions come from a structured, analytical and rational approach; second, teaching that decisions are made in a natur- alistic way involving experience, intuition, sense-making, and so on. Generally, managers are taught to make organisational decisions using the first – a structured way of getting to a situational decision. A common method is the Vroom-Yetton-Jago model of decision-making, which has two steps:19
Step 1: Answer seven questions in order. each question has only a yes or no answer. Follow the tree diagram shown (Figure 8.1) from left to right. the questions are indicated on the top row by a letter of the alphabet and the boxes in the column under each letter indicate the point to ask each question.
A. is the quality of the decision important? b. is there sufficient information to make a high-quality decision right
now? c. is the problem structured? D. is acceptance of the decision by subordinates important for
effective implementation? e. if the leader was to make the decision by him or herself, is it
reasonably certain that is would be accepted by subordinates? F. Are subordinates motivated to attain organizational goals? G. Are subordinates likely to disagree with proposed solutions?
Step 2: Apply one of the decision processes that is shown at the end of the path through the tree. there are five possible processes.
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Table �.� decision processes
Autocratic decision- making
AI: Leader makes decision with current information. AII: Leader obtains needed information from subordinates, then makes the decision him or herself.
Consulting decision- making
CI: Leader shares the problem with subordinates individually and gathers their input. Leader makes the decision that may or may not reflect their input. CII: The same as CI but the leader gathers input from subordinates in a group.
group decision-making gII: The leader shares the problem with subordinates as a group. Collectively, group members generate and evaluate alternatives. They choose a solution that has group consensus.
For example, in the case where the quality requirement is low (for example, the nature of the solution is not critical), choose the “no” branch at point A. if in reference to question D acceptance of this decision by subordinates is also not critical, choose method Ai. Alternatively at point D, if acceptance is critical, ask question e regarding certainty of acceptance if the decision is made without reference to others. if people are likely to accept the decision, again choose method Ai. if, however, acceptance of the decision is not reasonably certain, opt for a consensual group method (Gii) to help overcome this.
the naturalistic method suggests that decisions are made in a much
�: gII
source: World Economic Forum
sources: Vroom, V.H. and Jago, A.g., The New Leadership: Managing Participation in Organisations, Prentice Hall, �9��; Vroom, V.H. and Yetton, P.W., Leadership and Decision Making, university of Pittsburgh Press, �9��
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
YesYes
Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
no
no
no no
no
no
no
no
no no no
no
no
no
no
no
no
state the
problem
a B C d e F g �: ALAI, CL, CI, gII
�:AI, AE, CI, CII, gII
�: AI, AL, CI, CII �: gII
6: CII
�: AII, CI, CII
�: AII, CI, CII, gII
9: CII
�0: CII, gII
��: gII
��: CII
6b: CI CII
2.18.1Vroom-yetton-Jago model for decision-making
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less analytical way drawing on a range of sources. Gary klein presents a model (Figure 8.2) for assessing whether a team is likely to have good decision-making processes.20 the answers to the questions in each of the four areas give an indication of the soundness of a team’s decision- making process.
in this naturalistic model a team with a sound process usually has:
? high skill levels, and shared practices and routines (team competencies); ? a good sense of what they collectively, rather than individually,
own and control (team identity); ? a shared understanding of the situation they are in with methods
of communicating changes and preparing for them (team cognition);
? an ability “to create new and unexpected solutions, options, and interpretations, drawing on the experience of all team members
source: World Economic Forum
source: Klein, g., Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, MIT Press, �999
team competencies team identity
team metacognition
team cognition
How good are the team members?
Are they still struggling with basic procedures?
Does everyone know who does what?
Do people help each other out?
Is anyone “out of it”?
Is anyone micro- managing?
Who’s taking responsibility?
Do they get crunched for time?
Do they spot and correct problems?
Are they headed for the same goals?
Does everyone have the same picture?
Are they behind the power curve?
Do they get paralysed by uncertainty?
2.18.2advanced team decision-making model
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to generate products that are beyond the capabilities of any of the individuals”21 (team metacognition).
researching the characteristics of team decision-making, klein describes a team of newly organised wildland firefighters with good processes:22
Marvin Thordsen was on location during a forest fire in Idaho, a large one that covered six mountains. He watched the command staff assemble a team of �,000 firefighters, drawing them from all over the country. They put together a working organisation in only a few days and sent them out to fight the fire. It is hard to manage an intact organisation of �,000 people, to give directions and make policies, even in stable and safe bureaucratic settings. Here, in less than a week, they were building that organisation and trusting it enough to risk lives. Why are they so good? …
The command staff met twice a day to make difficult decisions. After years of working together, the team members knew how to plan together. They did not waste time on politeness, and their egos were strong enough to take criticism without bristling. They were also sensitive to issues of morale. someone who disagreed with the commander’s action would confront the commander in the meeting only if it was necessary. otherwise, the disagreement would be expressed in private. They did not want to waste staff time on lower-priority fights or create a feeling of divisiveness.
in reality teams use a blend of the two approaches, sometimes helped by technology tools like Decision Lens or cognexus, both allowing groups to participate in a range of decision-making situations by identi- fying decision options and enabling electronic voting.
because organisation design work is complex and involves decisions being made across a range of objectives, processes, policies, systems, tech- nologies, skills, incentives, and so on (see Figure 1.2 on page 5), making design decisions usually requires trade-offs whatever the method used. John mackey, ceo of Whole Foods, a Us natural and organic food retailer, is designing an expansion to his organisation. his answer to the question “Are there sustainable measures that you wish you could implement, but can’t because of practical bottom-line concerns?” illustrates this:23
If you speak to the totally pure, you will cease to exist as a business. I made these decisions �� years ago. My first store was a little tiny store
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called safer Way. I opened it in �9��. It was a vegetarian store. We did $�00,000 in sales the first year. And when we made the decision to open a bigger store, we made a decision to sell products that I didn’t think were healthy for people – meat, seafood, beer, wine, coffee. We didn’t think they were particularly healthy products, but we were a whole food store, not a “holy food” store. We’re in business not to fulfil some type of ideology, but to service our customers.
Going through a process gives a group the opportunity to look at a decision from various angles and consider the consequences of different courses of action. but even a good process is no guarantee of a good outcome. the value of the process lies in “checking the results of a decision against its expectations, showing executives what their strengths are, where they need to improve, and where they lack knowledge or information”.24
Problem-solving some problems are so complex that you have to be highly intelligent and well informed just to be undecided about them.
Laurence J. Peter, the Peter Principle2�
From the moment the design work is conceived, organisation design teams are faced with problems that may be latent, showing signs of becoming problems, or already evident (see Figure 8.3 overleaf).
At whatever stage they are, the problems may have existed before the project was conceived or they may arise at any stage during the progress of the project. this means that organisation design teams need the skill to:
? anticipate problems before they emerge – this is linked to risk assessment;
? identify the symptoms of a problem early enough so it can be managed before it gets bigger – an analogy here is containing a grievance before it develops into a strike;
? take action on an evident problem – often design work focuses on one aspect while ignoring others.
the bp example illustrates an organisation that had problems at each of the stages shown above.
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BP: problems at every stage
An interim report into a fatal oil refinery explosion accuses BP of ignoring “catastrophic safety risks” and of knowing about “significant safety problems” at another �� facilities around the world.
The us Chemical safety Board (CsB), which publishes the damning findings today, believes that BP may have been aware for years of major problems at its Texas City refinery, which exploded in March last year killing �� workers and injuring ��0.
Carolyn Merritt, the CsB chairman, said: “The CsB’s investigation shows that BP’s global management was aware of problems with maintenance, spending and infrastructure well before March �00�. BP did respond with a variety of measures aimed at improving safety. However, the focus of many of these initiatives was on improving procedural compliance and reducing occupational injury rates, while catastrophic safety risks remained.”
source: Hotten, r., “BP ‘ignored safety risks over refinery disaster’”,
Daily Telegraph, october ��st �006
in this case the recognised problem was ignored and people focused instead on improving compliance and reducing injury rates. they failed to identify the symptoms of disaster at that particular plant with the result that there was a catastrophic explosion, and they did not anticipate the problem (reputational and otherwise) that an explosion would cause. in other words, they did not manage the risks of this. the result of the explosion is an investment of an estimated $1 billion of organisation design work aimed at improving and maintaining the site.
source: World Economic Forum
Latent no symptoms of problems are evident but that does not mean they might not arise
sHoWing signs symptoms of problems are evident
eVident There is a clear problem
2.18.3stages in problem life cycle
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BP: repairing the damage
“The report clearly describes the underlying causes and management system failures which contributed to the worst tragedy in BP’s recent history,” said ross Pillari, president of BP Products north America Inc. “We accept the findings, and we are working to make Texas City a complex that attains the highest levels of safety, reliability and environmental performance.”
some of the actions recommended by the investigation team have been completed. Many are underway. Texas City site manager Colin Maclean has established a special project team to plan and drive execution of the improvement program.
The company will install modern process control systems on major units, transition to a more powerful maintenance management system, improve worker training, remove blow down stacks and implement the other recommendations contained in the final report. The project team will also develop plans for reconfiguring and simplifying the operation of the Texas City refinery. source: BP press release, December 9th �00�, www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=�0�
�96�&contentId=�0��96�
Problem-solving, like decision-making, is best approached in a disci- plined way, selecting tools and approaches appropriate for each stage in the life cycle (see table 8.6).
note that table 8.6 shows both rational and naturalistic tools. blend these as the situation demands and also realise that although the tools are associated with a particular stage, this does not preclude using them in other stages. remember, too, that no method can predict all possible problems as michael saylor, founder and ceo of microstrategy, ruefully acknowledges:26
What a difference a year makes. saylor is still young, but it seems as though he’s aged �0 years in �� months. His dark hair has started to turn gray. He says that he’s much more cautious as a result of Microstrategy’s meteoric rise and fall – and more humble. While he still answers questions in long, eloquent passages, they sound less like a lecture and more like a confession. “If I was a better manager, if I had had more experience, if I was more careful, if I was more competent, maybe this wouldn’t have happened,” he concedes. “It’s like being a parent whose children were playing in the front yard, and one of
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the kids got struck by lightning, and now he’s dead. You didn’t have a lightning rod on your roof, because you were planning to take care of doing that next year. now people walk by your house, point, and say, ‘Look, that’s where the kid got struck by lightning.’ It’s an awful feeling.”
Table �.6 examples of tools for each stage of a problem life cycle
Problem life cycle Group process tools for each stage
Anticipate problems before they emerge
use tools and approaches associated with risk assessment: ? Brainstorming ? Questionnaires ? Business studies which look at each business process and describe both
the internal processes and external factors which can influence those processes
? Industry benchmarking ? scenario analysis ? simulation exercises ? risk assessment workshops ? Incident investigation ? Auditing and inspection ? HAZoP (Hazard and operability studies)a
Identify the symptoms of a problem early
? spotting anomalies ? Pattern recognition ? “Connecting the dots” ? using intuition – “something doesn’t smell right here” ? Tracking trends ? seeking confirmatory or disconfirmatory information ? Comparison of past and current experience ? seeing the invisible ? Filtering out noise
Take action on a recognised problem
use tools and approaches associated with six sigma DMAIC (define, measure, analyse, improve, control) methodology, eg: Kaizen sIPoC Work-out Pareto Chart regression Analysis Cause and Effect/Fishbone Diagram � Whys
a The Institute of risk Managers, The Risk Management Standard, �00�, available to download from www.theirm.org
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Managing conflict those involved in organisation design projects frequently find themselves in conflict with others. recognising that conflict is inevitable and learning to manage it constructively rather than trying to avoid it is critical. richard Duran, senior director of human resources at ben & Jerry’s homemade (bought by Unilever in April 2000), makes the point:
I have come to expect it [conflict] as a part of my everyday routine in dealing with business issues. If we walk away from conflict and don’t understand it, we are doomed to repeat and recreate the conflict. not working through problems just slows down the process of understanding. Avoiding conflict creates tension and frustration. on the other hand, if I work through the conflict, I can both understand the other person’s point of view and express my perspective. The process then begins to build trust and understanding. I would not be successful, or a survivor, if I did not deal with conflict openly. It would eat me up inside or cause me political problems within the organization.
People’s attitudes to conflict depend on a range of variables – what will inflame one person may not even be noticed by another. conflicts are most likely to occur when a person or a group feels that their social, psychological, emotional, physical or other space is threatened, and only some form of dialogue will resolve the conflict. there are six steps in a conflict cycle (see Figure 8.4).
conflict is often thought to be a negative group dynamic, but if managed effectively at steps four and five (interpretation of situation and response to situation), it can be positive (see table 8.7).
individual conflict style and the process a group uses for managing conflict have the greatest impact on the outcome of a potential conflict situation. it is therefore helpful to know what individual and team role styles are and how conflict styles can be assessed. there are several tools and models available for individual conflict style assessment, most based on a five-mode response model with two dimensions (see Figure 8.5). A popular one is the thomas-kilmann conflict mode instrument.27
in this model the “concern for self” axis is the degree to which a person aims to satisfy his or her personal concerns or needs, and the “concern for others” axis reflects how much someone is concerned with meeting others’ needs or concerns:
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? the competing or dominating style emphasises winning at the expense of other people – it is highly assertive and unco-operative.
? the collaborating or integrating style involves high concern for self and high concern for others – it is both assertive and co-operative.
? the avoiding or neglecting style shows low concern for self
source: World Economic Forum
1. Individual or group’s attitude to “space”
2. Trigger to perception that space is being invaded
3. Frustration with situation
4. Interpretation of situation
5. response to situation
6. outcome of situation (decisions, actions, feelings, etc.)
2.18.4steps in a conflict cycle
Table �.� Positive and negative outcomes of group conflict
Positive effects of conflict Negative effects of conflict
Causes problems to surface and be dealt with Clarifies points of view stimulates and energises individuals Motivates the search for creative alternatives Provides vivid feedback Creates increased understanding of individual
conflict styles Tests and extends capacities of group members Provides a mechanism for adjusting relationships
Frustrates individuals reduces cooperation Destroys trust Diminishes performance and motivation Causes lasting damage Communication breakdown Builds stress Breaks up relationships
source: Mitchell, r.C., “Constructive Management of Conflict in groups”, �00�, www.csun.edu/~hfmgt00�/ cm_gp.htm
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and low concern for others evidenced by withdrawal, denial or sidestepping confrontations.
? the accommodating or appeasing style reflects low concern for self and high concern for others, akin to self-sacrificing and acquiescing.
? the sharing or compromising style shows moderate concern for self and for others. it takes a middle ground that involves trading concessions, splitting the difference, and so on.
A tool such as belbin’s team-roles, which is an inventory designed around nine clusters (team-roles) of behaviour, each having a combin- ation of strengths and areas for development, can be used to assess the part individuals play in groups.28 Using this form of assessment in combi- nation with an assessment of team-member conflict style is a powerful way of thinking about managing conflicts that may arise. some interesting research by Aitor Aritzeta, sabino Ayestaran and stephen swailes, who used the belbin team-role tool, suggests that:29
Creating a high performing work team is not just about putting well- trained individuals together and giving them the autonomy to take decisions. such teams also need to be built in a complementary way where different team role preferences are present and individuals have
source: World Economic Forum
source: Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument
Competing (dominating)
Avoiding (neglecting)
Collaborating (integrating)
Accommodating (appeasing)
sharing (compromising)
Cooperativeuncooperative
u na
ss er
ti ve
As se
rt iv
e
Concern for others
Co nc
er n
fo r s
el f
2.18.5Conflict style model
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the abilities to manage conflict. Knowing how team role preferences are related to conflict management styles will help practitioners to build balanced teams.
other ways of managing conflict focus on the processes and strat- egies used by participants either at the point of conflict or as the conflict escalates up the management ladder.30 strategies for managing at the point of conflict include:
? devising and implementing a common method for resolving conflict (for example, collaboration, mediation, team counselling);
? providing people with criteria for making trade-offs (for example, between speed in getting a new process up and running and ensuring its seamless integration with existing ones);
? halting the escalation of conflict, rather than accepting it, and coaching people to manage it at their level. ibm, for example, runs training programmes with back-up resources for staff. one of these lists the types of conversations that might occur and suggests some methods of managing these.
strategies for managing conflict as they start to escalate include:
? establishing and enforcing a requirement of joint escalation (that is, people present a disagreement jointly to their manager or managers);
? requiring managers to resolve escalated conflicts directly with their peers;
? making the process for escalated conflict resolution transparent.
Jamie Dimon, ceo of JPmorgan chase, notes his way of stopping the escalation of conflicts as he designs the company to be less bureaucratic:31
You have all these meetings, and people come and see you privately afterward and say, “Well, I know what we said there, but here’s what I really think about it.” And my reaction is, “Hey, am I your messenger? You couldn’t say it in the meeting?” The response is, “Well, I thought so-and-so would get upset.” And I say, “I don’t care whether he or she gets upset. say it next time.” I have no problem with someone coming in and saying, “Hey, we met. We don’t agree. Here are the facts on
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which we agree; here are the things we disagree on. Can we talk about this now?” That’s what mature management does.
Case study: management of roles and conflicts
Enterpriseaccess.org is the official business link to a major western country’s government, and is managed by the Department of Enterprise in a partnership with more than �0 other government departments. This partnership, known as Enterprise Access, is an initiative that provides a single access point to government services and information to help the country’s businesses with their operations.
Enterprise Access initially focused on starting, growing and financing small businesses. More recently users said they needed help in complying with government regulations, a need that was not being met by any other government programme. To meet that need Enterprise Access was relaunched to provide a one-stop compliance assistance shop for businesses. It held over �0,000 compliance-related documents from 9� government websites and for the first time businesses were able to go to a single website for all their compliance assistance resources. one business owner reported:
It’s a real breakthrough. I’ve browsed the site and already I can see it’s going to save me hours of time and a lot of money. The maze of stuff I have to submit to comply is a nightmare and I was never sure if I got it right. The burden has almost put me out of business, but with this resource and the way it’s organised I don’t have to know which of the 90 or more departments to contact, or navigate millions of documents returned from general web directories and search engines.
The team behind the portal’s new look comprised Enterprise Agency staff and external consultants and the project had not gone smoothly. Malcolm silcock, the programme manager, said:
Quite honestly this has been a difficult project. on the client side, we’ve had five changes in the client we reported to, the government stakeholders have been inconsistent and unreliable, we’ve had to handle a lot of budget unknowns because the funding comes from the �0 partnering departments which all have the option to withdraw funding. on our side, our company was acquired which has led to team turnover with all that entails, and we weren’t sure for almost a year precisely what the project aimed to achieve which caused a lot of tension and in-fighting.
I clearly remember the day when we had everyone together and finally
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nailed the direction. It was a real turning point. People stopped blaming each other for hold-ups and there was a reduction in gossip and emotional responses. other issues remained unresolved but once we had a common goal we became motivated. We started to say “let’s do this together”, instead of “this is never going to work”. I’m really proud that we’ve achieved the first goal of getting the site renewed and relaunched. now our task is to drive traffic to the site and give the users good reasons for returning. In a year from now I’d like to be seeing an extended user base and hearing success stories that they put down to the site’s content and ease of use.
To recalibrate the project (starting again but from where the company was then) and set the tone for the next phase, silcock decided to run a one-day workshop:
What I’d like to come out of it is that we have a common view of what the current situation is, and what we would like to achieve in the coming year. To do this we need to agree why we should bother working towards this – what’s in it for all the players? of course it can’t be just a talking shop, we also need to draft a high-level plan of what work has to be done together with a timeline and critical milestones so we’re in a better position to respond as the situation changes.
silcock and the facilitator he brought in to orchestrate the day carefully designed it in the spirit of appreciative inquiry (see Chapter �). The opening session included questions like: What do you most enjoy about your work? What works well in the team you currently work with? What surprised participants was their realisation that they had successfully met their target because, for the most part, once they had an agreed direction they had managed to achieve an open team culture where they shared information, sought creative solutions to issues and valued the diversity in the team.
The morning progressed in a similar vein, and the client manager reported:
My eyes were really opened when we did that transferable skills exercise [see Tools for this case below] where we all identified the three or four things we were most competent at and I saw how much capability we had available to us. It made me see more clearly that people are wired differently and that we could use this diversity more effectively. In the discussion we had about some of the conflicts we’d had I could see that a lot of it was probably due to people trying to place their standards on others. Also we’d been under very tight time pressures to get the software right and didn’t take time to have face-to-face discussions. Had we done that we probably would have identified the root problems and solved these rather than arguing about the symptoms we had to deal with.
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The exercise on capturing achievements to date led to other insights. The software architect said:
What I enjoyed hearing was not just the range and level of achievements we’d had but the discussion around what made these possible. It pulled out the reasons why we were successful in some aspects and suggested that if we applied similar approaches in those cases where we’d had difficulties things might have worked out differently. For example, I remember a tremendous blow-up in the early stages when the technical solution failed on all counts – I don’t think we realised that some of what happened was due to our not defining our terms properly. There was frustration because some of our partners felt their territory was being encroached on, and we worried too much about trying to hide our problems from the client rather than sharing openly and honestly what was going. The client, who was our point of contact at that stage, was very difficult too. To protect ourselves we felt obliged to hide all the issues from him as he couldn’t cope with anything but good news. This led to all kinds of complications which, with the current client manager, we simply don’t have. Her view is that an unhealthy culture develops if people can’t express openly what’s going on.
The afternoon session focused on the practicalities of drafting a high-level plan, and again to the surprise of some of the participants the session ran smoothly. It began with the facilitator reminding people of some of the attributes for group success that participants had identified in the morning: listening carefully before responding, sticking to the issues in hand, keeping the behaviour and vocabulary level, not overreacting, and calling truces for rethinking, cooling off, or recovering.
six months after the event the programme manager commented:
I had in mind what the streams of work should be but as the discussion progressed I started to change my mind, and in fact, stopped even thinking about my solution and went with the flow of the group. It made a lot of sense because I was new to the project and they’d all been working on it for various lengths of time. What we came up with was radically different from what I planned to propose but I could see how it made sense to start from a clean slate. What was more important was that we arrived at a jointly agreed solution that everyone subscribed to. I must admit that I’m rather impatient and over the course of the three hours or so that it took I wondered if we were ever going to get to closure but I’m glad that I stuck with it. The thing that catalysed it for me was that graphic that the facilitator showed (Figure �.6).
My approach was going to be that of the common design scenario building
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on what already existed, and what we’ve got now is the more successful design scenario reflecting a whole view of the project in the system and not a piecemeal view. By celebrating their success and acknowledging the different strengths people bring to the table, the team has been able to find a creative solution to recalibrating the project. What’s striking is that we’re getting a lot of kudos for the way things are going. For example, we’ve now got trade associations’ support and other government departments are using us as a model of success for one-stop information and are seeking our input on how to apply our learning to their projects. of course it hasn’t all been easy. We’ve had to put a lot of effort into defining our own operating processes – decision-making, problem-solving and managing the inevitable conflicts. But it seems that this investment is paying off and we are almost able to say that the Enterprise Access project is running like a well-oiled machine.
Reflections on this case
having to redesign project organisations when they have reached specific milestones (in this case the website launch) or when some other event occurs (such as a significant change in stakeholder support) is extremely common.
Perfo rm
ance m
etri cs
Communica tio
n plan
Initiative
source: World Economic Forum
source: www.touchstone.com
Performance metrics
Communication plan
Initiative
Performance metrics
Communication plan
Initiative
CoMMon design sCenario
Perfo rm
ance metric sCommunicatio
n plan
Initia tiv
e
Initia tiv
e
Initia tiv
e
? Fragmented views of the As Is and Vision ? Many initiatives managed independently to solve
problems ? Each individual accountable for their initiative
? Cohesive views of the As Is and Vision ? Fewest initiatives managed as portfolio to drive
Vision ? Team accountable for portfolio of initiatives
More suCCessFuL design sCenario As is As isVision Vision
2.18.6aligning project initiatives with the vision
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this case is interesting because on the face of it the project had achieved success in that it was on schedule, within budget and well received. Probing more deeply using appreciative inquiry revealed a number of aspects where participants agreed that they could do things differently and much better. it also revealed how they had been able to be successful in the first phase. crucial to their success was agreeing the vision and mission of the project and thus having a common direction for their work. With this and the constraints of time and budget they had tight boundaries to work within, and were able to move from a culture of blame towards a more participative “one for all and all for one” approach. With the appointment of the new client contact they were able to move away from a good-news culture. both these events meant a shift in the shadow side of the project organisation towards a healthier, more trusting working environment. the shifting context had clear impacts on the project.
team members handled decision-making less well than they felt they should. For example, they knew they had to make a decision on data harmonisation as they were getting information in different formats from the various departments, but they had procrastinated on this which led to upstream difficulties.
they all felt pretty good about problem-solving. but looking again at how they did it, they understood that they were not using the diversity of the team to come up with innovative solutions. they had a tendency to limit discussion to people in their work streams which they felt could lead to missed opportunities.
managing conflict was an aspect that they felt they could improve on. team members recognised that negative conflicts arose over things like adminis- trative procedures, resource issues, deadlines, overruns and not prioritising carefully enough. however, team members also saw that there were some positive conflicts that they found energising and capacity building provided that they followed the “rules”: listening effectively, acknowledging people’s positions, responding without defensiveness and looking for the causes of issues rather than trying to deal with the symptoms.
Tools for this case
Transferable skills cards these cards, available from Lifeskills Publishing,32 are used to help individ- uals and groups identify and apply their skills and values to work choices. Users identify their transferable skills and then classify their level of ability in applying them, choosing one of four levels (very competent, competent, adequate for task, undeveloped) for each skill. skills cards are classified
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under data, ideas, people and things. Work values are identified by levels of importance and considered with respect to paid and unpaid work. Guide- lines and support materials are available in Build Your Own Rainbow.33
The prisoner’s dilemma the prisoner’s dilemma shows that, in certain circumstances, if the members of a group trust each other, they can choose a course of action that will lead to the best possible outcome for the group as a whole. Without trust, each individual will aim for his or her best personal outcome, which can lead to the worst possible outcome for all.
in the prisoner’s dilemma, two players act as prisoners who have been jointly charged with a crime (which they did commit) but they are ques- tioned separately. the police have enough evidence to secure a conviction for a minor offence but not enough for the more serious crime.
the prisoners made a pact that if they were caught, they would not confess or give evidence against each other. if both prisoners keep their word, they will only be convicted of the lesser offence. the dilemma occurs when the police offer each prisoner a reduced prison term if they confess to the serious offence and give evidence against the other prisoner.
this is a good exercise in group dynamics when played with a pack of playing cards (instructions are available at www.indiana.edu/~econed/ issues/v31_3/3.htm). individuals can also play the open University’s inter- active prisoner’s dilemma (www.open2.net/trust/dilemma/dilemma_ game.htm).
Summary
this chapter discusses aspects of group culture and dynamics, putting the view that successful organisation design work is characterised by a no-blame culture, telling it like it is and reducing the negative power of the shadow side. team members working on organisation design projects must be able to work effectively with group processes and dynamics, specifically methods of decision-making, problem-solving and conflict management.
even so, success is not guaranteed. returning to shackleton’s expedition:
Whether there is one book or �0, the fate of the ross sea Party deserves to be told and retold. “There are,” wrote the Edinburgh Evening Dispatch, “some failures as glorious as successes. sir Ernest shackleton’s is one of them”. no less important, no less memorable, is the story of The Lost Men.��
__MACOSX/422 mod 4/._Standford 422.pdf
422 mod 4/Vroom 422.pdf
Vroom's contingency model shows that the appropriate leadership style varies with the situation. Moreover, he demonstrates how the leader can learn (1) how to recognize the requirements of a situation and (2) how to tailor his style to meet these requirements.
Uan l^eaoers
J^earn io J^ecwv
Victor H. Vroom
ike my fellow authors, I start with certain preconceptions. These preconceptions—some may call them biases—influence the way in which I view issues of leadership, particularly leadership training. I have tried to depict these preconceptions in Figure 1.
The central variable in this figure is the behavior of the leader, which I believe is determined by two classes of variables, attri- butes of the leader himself and attributes of the situation he encounters. Furthermore, I as- sume that many of the differences in the be- havior of leaders can be explained only by examining their joint effects, including inter- actions between these two classes of variables.
The left-hand portion of the diagram is the descriptive .side of the leader behavior equation. Much of my research has focused on these relationships in an attempt to un- derstand the ways in which managers actually respond to situations that vary in a number of dimensions. If you examine the right-hand side of Figure 1, however, you encounter is- sues that are potentially normative or pre- scriptive in character. They deal with the consequences of leader behavior for the organi-
zation and here I share with Fiedler (and probably disagree with Argyris) a conviction that a contingency model is required. I do not see any form of leader behavior as optimal for all situations. The contribution of a leader's actions to the effectiveness of his organization cannot be determined without considering the nature of the situation in which that be- havior is displayed.
WORKING WITH THE CONTINGENCY MODEL
I am going to assume that most of you arc familiar with the model that Phil Yetton and I developed and have described in detail in our recent book. As a normative model, it deals with the right-hand side of Figure 1, but it is a limited model because it deals with only one facet of leadership behavior—the extent to which the leader shares his decision- making power with his subordinates.
Figure 2 shows the latest version of our model. For purposes of simplicity, the presentation here is restricted to the model for group problems, that is, problems or deci-
This article is based on a paper delivered at the 1975 annual meeting oj the American Psychological Association.
Figure 7
SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF VARIABLES USED IN LEADERSHIP RESEARCH
1
Situational Variables.
Personal Attributes
Organizational Effectiveness
Leader Behavior
1a
Situational Variables
18
sions that affect all or a substantial portion of the manager's subordinates. At the top of the figure are problem attributes—that is, situ- ational variables that ought to influence the decision process used by the leader—specifi- cally, the amount of opportunity that the leader gives his subordinates to participate in the making o£ a decision. To use the model, one first selects an organization problem to be solved or decision to be made. Starting at the left-hand side of the diagram, one asks oneself the question pertaining to each attri- bute that is encountered, follows the path de- veloped, and finally determines the problem type (numbered 1 through 12). This problem type specifies one or more decision processes that are deemed appropriate to that problem. These decision processes are called the "feasi- ble set" and represent the methods that remain
after a set of seven rules has been applied. The first three of these rules eliminate methods that threaten the quality of the deci.sions, while the last four rules eliminate methods that are likely to jeopardize acceptance of the decision by subordinates.
For those who are unfamiliar with the Vroom-Yetton model, let me point out that the decision processes arc described here in a kind of code. AI and All are variants of an autocratic process. In AI the manager solves the problem by himself using whatever information is available to him at that time; in All he obtains any necessary information of a specific nature from his subordinates be- fore making the decision himself. CI and CII are variants of a consultative process. In CI he shares the problem with relevant subordi- nates individually, getting their ideas and
Figure 2
DECISION PROCESS FLOWCHART (FEASIBLE SET)
A. Does the problem possess a quality requirement?
B. Do I have sufficient ir)formation to make a high-quality decision? C. Is the problem structured? D. Is acceptance of the decision by subordinates important (or effective implementation? E. If I were to make the decision by myself, am t reasonably certain that it would be accepted by
my subordinates? F. Do subordinates share the organizational goals to be attained in solving this problem? G. Is conflict among subordinates likely in preferred solutions?
suggestions before making the decision; CII is similar, but the consultation takes place within the context of a group meeting. Fi- nally, CII corresponds with Norman Maier's concept of group decision in which the man- ager's role is that of chairperson of a group meeting aimed at reaching consensus on the action to betaken.
The part of the model described so far specifies bow decisions should not be made, not how they should be made. For most problem types, there exist more than one decision process consistent with the rules and therefore contained in the feasible set. We have also been concerned with the con- sequences of various ways of choosing from
these alternatives. There is considerable evi- dence that the time required to make the decision (defined either as the elapsed time or the number of man-hours needed to make the decision) increases with the intensity of involvement or participation of subordinates. Thus a time-efficient model (which we term Model A) would select the most autocratic alternative within the feasible set, a choice that would be clearly indicated in crisis or emergency situations and in situations in which one seeks to minimize the number of man-hours that enter into making the deci- sion.
Of course, time is not the only di- mension to include in deciding the degree to 19
which the leader should encourage the par- ticipation of his subordinates in decision mak- ing. In addition to the possibilities that par- ticipation may increase decision quality or its acceptance (considerations that are incor- porated into the rules referred to previously), there are also grounds for believing that par- ticipation contributes to individual and team development and is likely to result in more informed and responsible behavior by subor- dinates in the future. Hence Model B, which could be thought of as a time-investment or developmental model, dictates the choice of the most participative process within the feas- ible set. It is important to note that Models A and B are consistent with the same rules (to protect decision quality and acceptance) but represent extremely different ways of operating within these rules. Model A maxi- mizes a short-run value—time; Model B maximizes a long-run value—development.
What is the image of the effective leader portrayed by this normative model .̂ He is neither universally autocratic nor univer- sally participative but utilizes either approach in response to the demands of a situation as he perceives them. Above all, he is a flexible leader who has thought through his values and who has a repertoire of skills necessary to execute effectively each of the decision processes.
VALIDATING THE MODEL
When Philip Yetton and I wrote our book, we had no evidence validating the model other than the consistency of our rules with existing empirical evidence concerning the consequences of alternative approaches. Dur- ing the past six months. Art Jago and I have been working to remedy this deficiency. We have asked managers, all of whom were un-
20 familiar with the model, to select two deci-
sions that they had made—one that proved to be successful and one that proved to be unsuccessful. Each manager wrote up each decision situation as a case and specified the decision process he used in solving the prob- lem. Later these managers were trained in the problem attributes and went back over each of these two cases, coding each in a manner that would permit the researcher to determine the problem type and the feasible set of meth- ods for that problem type.
The data for this study are still com- ing in. To date, we have written accounts of 46 successful decisions and 42 unsuccessful ones. (It seems that some managers have dif- ficulty in recalling the decisions they made that did not turn out too well!) Figure 3 shows the results available so far. These re- sults clearly support the validity of the model. If the manager's method of dealing with the case corresponded with the model, the proba- bility of the decision's being deemed successful was 65 percent; if the method disagreed with the model, the probability of it's being deemed successful was only 29 percent.
It is important to note, however, that behavior that corresponds with the model is no guarantee that the decision will ultimately turn out to be successful—nor is behavior out- side the feasible set inevitably associated with ail unsuccessful decision.
To create a model of decision pro- cesses that completely predicts decision out- comes (that is, which generates 100 percent ob- servations in upper left and lower right cells) is an impossibility. Any fantasies that we may have entertained about having created a model of process that would completely determine decision outcomes have been permanently dashed against the rocks of reality! Insofar as organizations are open systems and deci- sions within them are made under conditions of risk and uncertainty, it will be impossible to generate complete predictability for a model
Figure 3
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MODEL ACREEMENT
AND DECISION OUTCOME
Percent Percent Sue- Unsuc-
cessful cessful Total Method used agrees with feasible set 65
Method used disagrees with feasible set 29
35
71
100%
100%
such as ours. To be sure, we may be able to use the data from the study I have described to improve the "batting average" of the model, but the limit of success must be less than perfection.
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING
I would now like to turn to the central issue of this symposium, the use of the model in leadership training. Over the past few years, several thousand managers have received train- ing in the concepts underlying the model. The workshops have ranged from two to over five days in length, and the participants have in- cluded admirals, corporation presidents, school superintendents, and senior government offi- cials. I have been personally involved in enough of this training to have learned some important things about what to do and what not to do. And because I believe that there are substantial but understandable misconceptions about how training based on the Vroom and Yetton model works, I would like to describe the things I have learned.
It would have been possible to build a training program around the model that was completely cognitive and mechanistic. Partici- pants would be sold on the model and then
trained in its use through intensive practice— first on standardized cases and later on real problems drawn from their own experiences. Such an approach would represent a new domain for Taylorism and could even be ac- complished through Skinnerian programmed learning. I believe that, at best, this behavioral approach would influence what Argyris calls espoused theories and would not have any long-lasting behavioral effects.
Our methods have been much more influenced by Carl Rogers than by B. F. Skin- ner. We have assumed that behavioral changes require a process of self-discovery and insight by each individual manager.
One method of stimulating this pro- cess is to provide the participant with a picture of his own leadership style. This picture in- cludes a comparison of his style with that of others, the situational factors that influence his willingness to share his power with others, and similarities and differences between his own "model" and the normative models.
In advance of the training program, each participant sits down with a set of cases, each of which depicts a leader confronted with an actual organizational problem. We call these cases "problem sets," and the num- ber of cases in different problem sets ranges from 30 to 54. The common feature in each of the eight or nine problem sets that have been developed is that the cases vary along each of the situational dimensions used in the construction of the normative model. The set is designed so that the variation is system- atic and that the effects of each situational attribute on a given manager's choice of deci- sion process can be readily determined. This feature permits the assessment of each of the problem attributes in the decision processes used by a given manager.
The manager's task is to select the decision process that comes closest to depicting what he would do in each situation. His re- 21
Victor H. Vroom is fohn G. Searle Professor oj Administrative Sciences and professor of psychology at Yale University. Since 1974, he has been involved in plans jor Yale's new School oj Organization and Management and has served as chairman oj the interim board oj governors of that school. He received his bachelor's and master's degrees jrom McGill University and his Ph.D. degree jrom The University oj Michigan. He was the winner oj the Pord Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Competition at Michigan and held the Ford Foundation's Faculty Fellowship at the Uni- versity oj Pennsylvania. He has also won the McKinsey Foundation Research Design Competition (1967), been appointed Fulbright Lecturer in the United Kingdom, and received the fames McKeen Cattell Award oj the American Psychological Association (1970),
Dr. Vroom is a director of the Connecticut Savings Ban}{^ and of the Connecticut Mental Health Center. He has been active as a con- sultant to over 30 major corporations, includ- ing General Electric, Bell Telephone Labora- tories, and Chemical Bank^. He is a jellow oj the American Psychological Association and has served on its council oj representatives.
For the past 20 years. Dr. Vroom has been involved in research and teaching on the psychological analysis oj behavior in organi- zations. His book^ Work and Motivation is regarded as a landmark in the field. He has also authored six other boof(s, most recently Leadership and Decision Making with Philip Yetton.
22
sponses are recorded on a standardized form and processed by computer along with other participants' responses in the same program.
Instead of writing about informa- tion contained on a printout, I thought that it might be more efficient to let you see what it looks like. The next figure reproduces three of the seven pages of feedback that a manager recently received. Examine the first page o£ the printout shown in Figure 4. Consider A first in that figure. The first row opposite "your frequency" shows the proportion of cases in which the manager indicated he would use each of the five decision processes. The next row (opposite "peer frequency") shows the average use of these processes by the 41 managers constituting his training group. A comparison of these two rows in- dicates the methods he used more and less fre- quently than average.
The third row shows the distribution of decision processes that would be used by a manager using Model A, the time-efficient model in the 30 cases. The final row shows a distribution for Model B, the developmental or time-investment model.
To obtain an overall picture of how participative this manager's responses are in relation to other members of his training group and to Models A and B, it is necessary to assign scale values to each of the five deci- sion processes. The actual numbers used for this purpose are based on research on the rela- tive amounts of participation perceived to result from each process. AI is given a value of 0; All a value of 1; CI a value of 5; CII a value of 8; and Gil a value of 10.
With the aid of these scale values a mean score can be computed for the manager, his peers, and both models. These are obtained by multiplying the percentage of times each process is used by its scale value and dividing by 100, These mean scores are shown in B along with the standard deviation (SD), a
Figure 4. Page 1 of Printout
LEADERSHIP STYLE ANALYSE
NAME OR I .D.-- JOHN DOE
A - - PROPORTrON OF CASES tN WHICH EACH DECISION PROCESS IS USED
YOUR FREOUENCY
PEER FREOUENCY
MODEL A (MINIMIZE PARTICIPATION)
MODEL B (MAXIMIZE PARTICIPATION)
B-SCALED PARTICIPATION SCORES
AI
43%
25%
40%
0%
A l t
3%
14%
13%
0%
01
23%
19%
3%
0%
CI I
30%
27%
23%
40%
GM
0%
15%
20%
60%
YOUR RESPONSES
PEER AVERAGE
MODEL A
MODEL B
MEAN
3.60*
4.73
4.17
9.20
SD
3.48
3.66
4.31
0.96
* - YOUR SCORE IN FIGURE 1
C--FREOUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SCALE SCORES (MEAN LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION)
YOUR PEER MEAN MEAN
LOW PARTICIPATION HIGH PARTICIPATION
P A R T t C I P A T I V E N E S S
measure of dispersion around the mean—that is, an indicator of how much behavior is varied over situations.
These mean scores are shown graphi- cally in the figure at the bottom. Each asterisk is the mean score of one of the group mem- bers. The symbol X is printed underneath this manager's mean score, the symbol P un- der the group average, and the symbols A and B show the location on the scale of Models A and B respectively.
D through F in Figure 4 are on the second page of the printout. As we pre- viously mentioned, the normative model iden- tifies 12 problem types corresponding to the terminal nodes of the decision tree shown in Figure 2. There is at least one case within the set of 30 problems that has been designated by the authors and most managers as repre- sentative of each type. The problem types and
corresponding problem numbers are shown In the two left-hand columns of D, In the third and fourth columns, the prescriptions of Mod- els A and B arc given, and the fifth column shows the feasible set for that problem type. The last column, marked "your behavior," indicates the manager's responses to each of the cases of the indicated problem type. If there is more than one case of that type, the methods used are shown in the same order as the problem numbers at the left-hand side.
E reports the frequency with which the manager's behavior agreed with the feasi- ble set, with Model A, and with Model B. For comparison purposes, the average rates of agreement for members of the manager's training group arc also presented.
Each time our manager chose a deci- sion process that was outside the feasible set, he violated at least one of the seven rules un- 23
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derlying the model. F in Figure 4 reports the frequencies with which each rule was violated both by this manager and by his peer group. The right-hand column shows the specific cases in which the rule violations occurred. It should be noted that each manager under- stands the seven rules by the time he receives the feedback, and it is possible for him to re- examine the problems with the appropriate rule in mind.
We have previously noted that the cases included in a problem set are selected in accordance with a multifactorial experimen- tal design. Each of the problem attributes is varied in a manner that will permit the man- ager to examine its role in his leadership style. Figure 4 (page 3 of printout) depicts these results. Consider problem attribute A—the importance of the quality of the final solution. The problem set contains cases that have a high quality requirement and those without a quality requirement (the identifying num- bers of these cases are shown at the right-hand side of this table).
The mean scores for the manager's behavior on these two sets of cases are speci- fied at the left-hand side of each row and arc designated by the symbol X. They are also designated by the symbol X on each of the scales, and the slope of the line made by con- necting the two letters (X) provides a visual representation of that difference.
If the score opposite "high" is greater (that is, more toward the right-hand side of the scale), it means that the manager encour- ages more participation from his subordinates on important decisions than on so-called "trivial" ones. However, if the score opposite "high" is lower, it means that the manager is willing to use more participative methods on problems for which the course of action adopted makes little difference and is more autocratic on "important" decisions.
The letter P shown on both scales
designates the average effects of this attribute on the manager's peer group, and the letters A and B designate the effects on Models A and B respectively.
A similar logic can be used in inter- preting the effects of each of the other attri- butes in the model. At the bottom of the page, the computer prints out the three attributes that have the greatest effect on the manager's behavior—magnitude of effect referring to the amount of difference the attribute makes in his willingness to share his decision-making power with subordinates.
The results shown in Figure 4 per- tain to only one manager and to his peer group. Similar data have been obtained from several thousand managers, a sufficient num- ber to provide the basis for some tentative generalizations about leadership patterns. One of our conclusions is that differences among managers in what might be termed a general trait of participativeness or authoritarianism are small in comparison with differences within managers. On the standardized cases in the problem sets, no manager has indicated that he would use the same decision process on all problems or decisions—and most use all methods under some circumstances.
It is clear that no one score computed for a manager and displayed on his printout adequately represents his leadership style. To begin to understand his style, the entire print- out must be considered. For example, two managers may appear to be equally participa- tive or autocratic on the surface, but a close look at the third page of the printout (Figure 4) may reveal crucial differences. One man- ager may limit participation by his subordi- nates to decisions where the quality element is unimportant, such as the time and place of the company picnic, while the other man- ager may limit participation by his subordi- nates to those decisions with a demonstrable impact on important organizational goals. 25
In about two-thirds of the cases we have examined—both those used in the prob- lem sets and those reported to us by managers from their experiences—the manager's be- havior was consistent with the feasible set of methods given by the model. Rules that helped ensure the acceptance of or commit- ment to a decision tend to be violated much more frequently than rules that protect the quality of the decision. Our findings suggest strongly that decisions made by typical man- agers arc more likely to prove ineffective be- cause subordinates don't fully accept decisions than because decision quality is deficient.
Let me now turn to another thing that we have learned in the design of this training—the usefulness of the small, informal group as a vehicle in the change process. The first four or five hours in the training process are spent in creating six- to eight-person teams operating under conditions of openness and trust. Each participant spends more than 50 percent of the training time with his small group before receiving feedback. Group ac- tivities include discussing cases in the problem set and trying to reach agreement on their mode of resolution, practicing participative leadership styles within their own groups, analyzing videotapes of group problem-solv- ing activities; then group members give one another feedback on the basis of predictions of one another's leadership styles.
After feedback, group members com- pare results with one another and with their prior predictions and share with one another what they have learned as well as their plans to change. The use of small, autonomous groups greatly decreases the dependence of participants on the instructor for their learn- ing and increases the number of people who can undergo the training at the same time. I have personally worked with as many as MO managers at the same time (22 groups), and
26 "̂ 0 to 50 is commonplace.
One criticism that has been correctly leveled at the Vroom and Yetton work stems from the fact that the data on which the feed- back is based are, at best, reports of intended actions rather than observations of actual be- havior. While we have evidence that most managers honestly try to portray what they think they would do in a particular situation rather than what they think they should do, I am persuaded by Argyris's evidence that many people are unaware of discrepancies be- tween their espoused theories and their ac- tions. Small groups can be helpful in pointing out these discrepancies. I have seen managers who were universally predicted by other group members to have a highly autocratic style, who were provided with very specific evidence of the ground for this assumption by other group members, but who later received a printout reflecting a much more participative style. I am less concerned about the relative validity of these discrepant pieces of data than I am about the fact that they are frequently confronted and discussed in the course of the training experience.
In fact, we have begun using a dif- ferent source of potential inconsistencies, and it is logical to assume that this source will have more information about a manager's be- havior than do the other members of his small group. I am referring to the manager's subor- dinates.
In a recent variant of tbe training program, subordinates were asked to predict their managers' behavior on each of the cases in the problem set. These predictions were made individually and processed by computer, which generated for each manager a detailed comparison of his perceptions of his leadership style with the mean perception of his subordi- nates. Not surprisingly, these two sources of information are not always in perfect agree- ment. Most managers, as seen by their subor- dinates, are substantially more autocratic
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(about one point on the lO-point scale) and in substantially less agreement with the model. Once again, I am less concerned with which is the correct description of the leader's behavior than I am with the fact that discrepancies gen- erate a dialogue between the manager and his subordinates that can be the source of mutual learning.
We are still experimenting with meth- ods of using the Vroom-Yetton model in leadership training and, I believe, still learn- ing from the results of this experimentation. How effective is the training in its present form ? Does it produce long-lasting behavioral changes? I must confess that I do not know. Art Jago and I are in the first stages of design- ing an extensive follow-up study of almost 200 managers in 20 different countries who have been through .n four- or five-day version of the training within the past two and one-half years. If we ca i solve the incredible logistical and methodol gical problems in a study of this kind, we should have results within a year.
On the basis of the evidence, I am optimistic on two counts: first, as to the lead- er's potmtial to vary his style to meet the re- quirements of a situation; second, as to the leader's ability, through training and develop- ment, to enlai^e the repertoire of his styles. In short, like Argyris and unlike Fiedler, I believe that n anagers can learn to become more efiective leaders. But like Fiedler (and unlike /vrgyri^), I believe that such effective- ness ret uires :: matching of one's leadership style to the demands of the situation. I also am confident that 5i) years from now both contingrncy nujdels will be found wanting in deta [ if n -t in substance. If we are re- membered at tiiat time, it will be for the kinds
of questions we posed rather than the specific answers we provided.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Victor Vroom and Philip Ycnons'Leadership and Decision Maying (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973) presents a comprehensive description of their normative model, its research underpin- nings, and its use in leadership training. Vroom's "A New Look at Managerial Decision Making" (Organizational Dynamics, Spring 1973) gives a brief description of the model and a summary of early research results. Victor Vroom and Arthur Jago's "Decision Making as a Social Process: Normative and Descriptive Models of Leader Behavior" (Decision Sciences, Vol. 5, 1974) extends the model to individual problems (affecting only a single subordinate) and incor- porates delegation as a process. It compares and contrasts behavior on group and individual prob- lems.
Norman Maier's Problem Solving Dis- cussions and Conferences (McGraw-Hill, 1963) contains the most useful account of the confer- ence leadership skills necessary to execute a par- ticipative approach to decision making.
Robert Tannenbaum and Warren Schmidt's "How to Choose a Leadership Pat- tern" (Harvard Business Revietv, March-April 1958) presents another perspective on the norma- tive issues surrounding participation in decision making.
Any reader interested in further explor- ing the approach to leadership training described in this article should write to Kepner-Tregoe, Inc.; P.O. Box 704; Research Road; Princeton, New Jersey 08540.
28
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Moody's: Sprint/T-Mobile merger faces negative free cash flow until at least 2018 Yao, Deborah. SNL Kagan Media & Communications Report; Charlottesville (Jun 18, 2014).
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In a June 16 research note, Moody's said the combined leverage of Sprint and T-Mobile could come to 5x to 5.5x debt/EBITDA after closing and the merged company could post negative free cash flow for years. [...]the credit rating agency warned that the carriers would face a "complex and costly" integration. "For several years, [Sprint and T-Mobile] will have an inferior infrastructure, weak cost structure and (arguably) an unsustainable capital structure," the analyst wrote. [...]the two carriers will have a tough time raising margins if Sprint Chairman Masayoshi Son makes good on his promise of a price war, among other regulatory concessions.
A potential merger between Sprint Corp. and T-Mobile US Inc. would create a company with as much as $75 billion in debt that could bleed cash until at least 2018, according to Moody's.
In a June 16 research note, Moody's said the combined leverage of Sprint and T-Mobile could come to 5x to 5.5x debt/EBITDA after closing and the merged company could post negative free cash flow for years. Moreover, the credit rating agency warned that the carriers would face a "complex and costly" integration.
Sprint is rumored to be interested in acquiring T-Mobile, despite steep regulatory odds of the transaction getting approval. The two reportedly set a break-up fee of $2 billion.
Moody's said the merger's risks would start as soon as the deal is announced. "The two companies could lose momentum and market share during what is likely to be a long and difficult regulatory approval process," analyst Mark Stodden said in the note. "A deal could lead to distracted managers and employees, similar to what happened when T-Mobile and AT&T announced and then abandoned their combination in 2011."
Stodden noted that AT&T Inc. and T-Mobile lost market position while Verizon Communications Inc. continued to execute well during that year.
While Sprint and T-Mobile combined would be comparable in scale to AT&T, the similarity ends there.
"For several years, [Sprint and T-Mobile] will have an inferior infrastructure, weak cost structure and (arguably) an unsustainable capital structure," the analyst wrote.
Moreover, the two carriers will have a tough time raising margins if Sprint Chairman Masayoshi Son makes good on his promise of a price war, among other regulatory concessions.
Sprint and T-Mobile's combined $75 billion debt could outweigh that of majority owner SoftBank Corp., limiting the level of potential credit support.
Stodden does see Sprint and T-Mobile potentially cutting $3 billion in costs from operations and increasing its EBITDA. However, to achieve those milestones in five years would take "nearly flawless" execution of the merger, he said.
Stodden assumed a deal value for T-Mobile of $32 billion, paid in equal parts stock and cash. Sprint and SoftBank would also issue $16 billion of debt in this assumption. The analyst further assumed that T-Mobile's $23 billion of debt would stay in place, adding to Sprint's current $33 billion of borrowings plus new debt.
If the Sprint-T-Mobile deal falls through, Sprint would likely suffer more than T-Mobile, Stodden said.
Sprint also would be aiding a fellow rival with the hefty break-up fee. AT&T paid T-Mobile billions of dollars in fees and also contributed spectrum, helping fuel T-Mobile's revival, he said.
Copyright SNL Financial LC Jun 18, 2014
NAICS: 517110, 517210;
Name: Moodys Investors Service Inc NAICS: 522110, 523930, 561450
Title Moody's: Sprint/T-Mobile merger faces negative free cash flow until at least 2018
Author Yao, Deborah
Publication title SNL Kagan Media & Communications Report; Charlottesville
Publication year 2014
Publication date Jun 18, 2014
Section SNL Extra; Rumored Transaction
Publisher SNL Financial LC
Place of publication Charlottesville
Country of publication United Kingdom
Publication subject Communications
Source type Trade Journals
Language of publication English
Document type News
ProQuest document ID 1539342269
Document URL https://search.proquest.com/docview/1539342269? accountid=28844
Copyright Copyright SNL Financial LC Jun 18, 2014
Last updated 2014-06-24
Database ProQuest Central
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