ECONOMICS- New Journal

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week_8_winter_2017.pptx

Economics for Decision-Making

Week 8

Winter 2017

Plan

Monopoly

Welfare Effects

Natural Monopoly

Pricing Strategies

The Web’s New Monopolists case discussion

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Market Power

A firm has market power when it can profitably charge a price that exceeds marginal cost

Most firms have some market power

Main determinant

Market definition

Barriers to entry

Monopoly pricing

MR=MC

Shut-down rule

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Monopoly Profit Maximization

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Welfare Effects of Monopoly Power

Surplus analysis

Benchmark

Relative to perfect competition

Price

Quantity

Surplus(welfare) effects

Firm gains

Consumers lose

Deadweight loss!

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Welfare Effects of Monopoly Power

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Other Costs/Benefits from Monopoly Power

How big are real-life deadweight losses?

Recall benchmark

Monopoly power brings

Product diversity/quality

Advertising

Informative

Persuasive

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Other Costs/Benefits from Monopoly Power…

Incentives for…

Investment

Innovation/R&D

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Role of Intellectual Property Rights

Disincentives for R&D can come from:

Strong patents for early generationsless incentives for later generations

Poorly defined boundaries of intellectual propertyrisk of litigationdon’t innovate

Incumbents build “thickets” of strategic patents tha cover little innovation and are just legal weapons to protect incumbents’ profitspatent trollslitigation risk high

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Costs of influencing regulation/restrictions

Lobbying and rent-seeking

What is rent-seeking?

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Regulation of Monopolies

Public Interest Theory: Government actions aimed at making monopoly outcome more competitive by keeping price closer to marginal cost serve public interest

Capture Theory: Regulation creates costs and benefits  Exchange/Capture is possibleserve industry

regulators work for interests of industry rather than public interest

Revolving door between industry and regulatory body

Competition policies can either:

Regulate acquisition of monopoly power (Antitrust legislation),

Regulate exercise of monopoly power (direct price regulations). Mostly confined to utilities in the U.S.

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Why Are Some Monopolies Regulated?

Why regulate?

Political pressure and economic concern about market dominance

If governments create monopolies they may regulate them to protect consumers

Create a monopoly to ensure that goods are produced at least cost  Natural Monopoly

A market is a natural monopoly when a good is produced at least cost by a single firm

Large fixed (sunk) costs

Average cost falls as quantity increases

Second firm may enter but this would cause costs to rise

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Natural Monopoly

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Natural Monopoly Regulation

First-best solution

Price at which P=MC  Aggregate surplus will be maximized

Problem….

Which leads to the Second-best solution

Social loss (DWL) vs. private loss (profit)

Who pays?

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Natural Monopoly Regulation—first best vs. second best, private loss vs DWL

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Sustainability of Natural Monopoly

Do Natural Monopolies last forever?

Electricity?

Demand

Technology

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Price Discrimination

Charge different prices for different units of the same good (possibly to different buyers)

Examples

Some consumers receive more surplus than others

Charge…

Some consumers don’t buy units they value less than the monopoly price but more than MC

Charge…

Ultimate goal is to…

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Capturing Surplus through Price Discrimination

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Price Discrimination…

Conditions for price discrimination

Market power

Item must be difficult to resell

Market segments must be identifiable  Criterion…

Price differences not fundamentally driven by MC differences

Quality discrimination

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First Degree (Perfect) Price Discrimination

Each unit is sold…

To the consumer who values it the most

At a price equal to the consumer’s willingness to pay

Properties of equilibrium

Surplus distribution

Efficiency

How to implement?

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Perfect Price Discrimination

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Price Discrimination – Assessing WTP

Hard to know a given consumer’s WTP

Alternative methods

Based on observable characteristics

Examples

Based on self-selection

Examples

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Third Degree Price Discrimination

Firm sorts consumers into groups based on observable characteristics

Characteristics imply fundamental differences in WTP

Firm likely knows ordinal (not cardinal) WTP

Examples

Charge a higher price to groups with less elastic demand

Intuition

Examples

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Third Degree Discrimination: Profit-Maximizing

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Third Degree Discrimination: Welfare Effects

Firm is better-off

Individual consumer segments may be better or worse-off

Inefficient redistribution

Consumers as a whole may be better or worse-off

If total quantity contracts, consumers are worse-off as a group

If total quantity expands, consumers may be better-off as a group

New markets may be created---more on this later

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Second Degree Price Discrimination

Firm may be unable to distinguish between groups of consumers based on observable characteristics

Price discrimination may still be possible

Solution: Offer a menu of alternatives

If properly designed, customers with different willingness to pay will choose different alternatives

Examples

Airfares

Insurance

Other

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New Market--Damaged Goods

Firm intentionally damages or hobbles a product to create an additional market

Damaging process must be costless

Examples; pro vs student software; disabling features on software or hardware

Pricing must be such that damaged and undamaged versions must appeal to different groups

“Fanning” of price and attributes

--large enough difference to induce market separation

Effects on overall welfare

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Bundling

Bundling is offering or supplying related products or services in a single transaction at one all-inclusive price

Examples

It can be exclusionary, and potentially anticompetitive if compounded with leveraging (placing a less popular product in the same package as a very popular product)

Example: “Browser Wars”

Netscape Navigator initially dominant browser

Microsoft bundled IE with Windows 98, and forced OEM’*s to license and install IE in all PC’s they shipped

Two sides to the story

DOJ: Bundling exclusionary, anti-competitive, and predatory

Microsoft: Combination of IE and Windows offered superior functionality (better “product integration”)

* resell a product under their own name and branding; provide components

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Bundling as a Pricing Strategy…

Conditions purchase of a product on the purchase of a different product

Examples

Charge more to consumers with a low value for one good but high value for the other

Demands must have some negative correlation

Next session

Pay for Performance case discussion

Game Theory and Oligopoly

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