History Questions

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Reversal of Fortune This reversal of the two nations’ positions initially led to a diminishment of the importance of Spanish-American relations. Early in the new century, Americans were fo- cused on events in Asia and the Western Hemisphere, precisely the areas from which Spain had been expelled. When World War I broke out in 1914, both nations de- clared their neutrality. While Spain’s caution led it to maintain that stance throughout the war, in 1917 the ex- panding interests of the United States drew it into the conflictandtentatively intoEuropeanpowerpolitics,thus setting the scene for the next stage in Spanish-American relations.

Just as theAmericanRevolutionposedadilemmafor the Spanish, so too did the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 for the Americans. The rebellion of Fran- cisco Franco and his generals against the Spanish repub- lican government was amicrocosmof the ideological fer- mentof interwarEurope.Francoreceivedassistancefrom Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, and the Republicans re- ceived assistance from the Soviet Union. Most democ- racies, including the United States, observed a formal neutrality thathad theeffectofdoomingtheSpanishgov- ernment to defeat.

Franco remained technically neutral throughout World War II, but he favored the Axis when it seemed in command early on and tipped back toward the Allies as the war drew to a close. American policy during the war was to buy Spain’s neutrality by overpaying the Spanish for goods with military significance (such as tungsten) in order tokeep theSpanishnonbelligerentandthesupplies out of German hands.

U.S. policy toward Spain grew harsher with the suc- cess of D-Day in 1944 and the growing likelihood of a Germandefeat.Citing the roleplayedby theAxispowers inFranco’s rise topower, inearly1945FranklinRoosevelt declared that the United States could not have normal relations with his government. The United States joined its allies in barring Spain from the United Nations and recalled its chiefs of mission from Madrid.

Franco blunted American pressure to yield power to a more democratic regime by appealing to growing con- cern about the Soviet Union. While his quasi-fascist re- gime remained an international pariah, American leaders gradually reached the conclusion that Franco was pref- erable to a potential communist government in Spain. TheUnitedStates didnot includeSpain in either its eco- nomicormilitary plans forwesternEurope (theMarshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), but after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Spain’s potential military value in aEuropeanwar against the Soviets overrode the Truman administration’s ideo- logical aversion to Franco.

The rehabilitation of Franco culminated in the Pact of Madrid, signed in September 1953. While Spain re- mained outside NATO, the agreement (which gave the

United States air and naval bases in Spain) effectively al- lied the two nations during the remainder of the Cold War. The death of Franco in November 1975 and the subsequent return todemocraticgovernment inSpainre- moved whatever residual cloud remained over Spanish- American relations. Spain’s acceptance into NATO in 1982 and the European Community in 1986 further so- lidified the normalization of relations. At the close of the twentieth century, Spanish-Americanrelationsresembled those of the United States with other European nations and had lost the distinctive quality of years past.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beaulac, Willard L. Franco: Silent Ally in World War II. Carbon- dale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986.

Cortada, James. Two Nations Over Time: Spain and the United States, 1775–1977. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978.

Edwards, Jill. Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question 1945–1955. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Hayes, Carleton J. H. The United States and Spain: An Interpre- tation. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1951.

Little, Douglas. Malevolent Neutrality: The United States, Great Britain, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War. Ithaca,N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985.

Rubottom, Richard R., and J. Carter Murphy. Spain and the United States: Since World War II. NewYork:Praeger,1984.

Whitaker, Arthur P. Spain and Defense of the West: Ally and Lia- bility. New York: Harper, 1961. Reprint, Westport,Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980.

———. The Spanish-American Frontier, 1783–1795. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1927. Reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969.

Mark S. Byrnes

See also Spanish-American War.

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. The sinking of the battleship Maine in Havana harbor on 15 February 1898 provided a dramatic casus belli for the Spanish-American War, but underlying causes included U.S. economic in- terests ($50 million invested inCuba; $100million inan- nual trade, mostly sugar) as well as genuinehumanitarian concern over long-continued Spanish misrule. Rebellion in Cuba had erupted violently in 1895, and although by 1897 a more liberal Spanish government had adopted a conciliatory attitude, U.S. public opinion, inflamed by strident “yellow journalism,” would not be placated by anything short of full independence for Cuba.

The Maine had been sent to Havana ostensibly on a courtesy visit but actually as protection for Americancit- izens. A U.S. Navy court of inquiry concluded on 21 March that the ship had been sunk by an external explo- sion.Madrid agreed toarbitrate thematterbutwouldnot promise independence for Cuba. On 11 April, President William McKinley askedCongress for authority to inter-

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Spanish-American War. U.S. troops line up crisply; contrary to this image, thousands of regular soldiers and volunteers found shortages of weapons and supplies, as well as poor food and sanitation, at the camps where they assembled. Getty Images

vene, and, on 25 April, Congress declared that a state of war existed between Spain and the United States.

The North Atlantic Squadron, concentrated at Key West,Florida,wasorderedon22April toblockadeCuba. TheSpanishhomefleetunderAdm.PascualCerverahad sortied from Cadiz on 8 April, and although he had only four cruisers and twodestroyers, theapproachof this “ar- mada” provoked near panic along the U.S. East Coast.

Spanish troop strength in Cuba totaled 150,000 reg- ulars and forty thousand irregulars and volunteers. The Cuban insurgents numbered perhaps fifty thousand. At the war’s beginning, the strength of the U.S. Regular ArmyunderMaj.Gen.NelsonA.Mileswasonly twenty- six thousand. The legality of using the National Guard, numbering something more than 100,000, for expedi- tionary service was questionable. Therefore, authorities resorted to the volunteer system used in the Mexican- American War and CivilWar. Themobilization act of22 April provided for a wartime army of 125,000 volunteers (later raised to 200,000) and an increase in the regular army to sixty-five thousand.Thousandsof volunteersand recruits converged on ill-prepared southerncampswhere they found a shortage of weapons, equipment, and sup- plies, and scandalous sanitary conditions and food.

In the Western Pacific, Commo. GeorgeDeweyhad been alerted by Acting Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt to prepare his Asiatic Squadron for operations in thePhilippines.On27April,Dewey sailed fromHong Kong with four light cruisers, two gunboats, and a reve-

nue cutter—and, as apassenger,EmilioAguinaldo, anex- iled Filipino insurrectionist. Dewey entered Manila Bay in the early morning hours on 1 May and destroyed the Spanish squadron,buthehad insufficient strengthto land and capture Manila itself. Until U.S. Army forces could arrive, the Spanish garrison had to be kept occupied by Aguinaldo’s guerrilla operations.

In the Atlantic, Cervera slipped into Santiago on Cuba’s southeast coast. Commo. Winfield Schley took station off Santiago on 28 May and was joined four days laterbyRearAdm.WilliamT.Sampson.Tosupportthese operations, a marine battalion on 10 June seized nearby Guantánamo to serve as an advance base. Sampson, re- luctant to enter the harbor because of mines and land batteries, asked for U.S. Army help. Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter, at Tampa, Florida, received orders on31May to embark his V Corps. Despite poor facilities, he had seventeen thousandmen,mostly regulars, ready to sailby 14 June and by 20 June was standing outside Santiago. On 22 June, after a heavy shelling of the beach area, the V Corps began going ashore. It was a confused and vul- nerable landing, but theSpanishdidnothing to interfere.

Between Daiquiri and Santiago were the San Juan heights. Shafter’s plan was to send Brig. Gen. Henry W. Lawton’s division north to seize the village of El Caney and then to attack frontallywithBrig.Gen. JacobF.Kent’s division on the left and Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler’s dis- mounted cavalry on the right. The attack began at dawn on 1 July. Wheeler, one-time Confederate cavalryman, sent his dismounted troopers, including the black Ninth andTenthcavalries and thevolunteer Rough Riders,un- der command of Lt. Col. Theodore Roosevelt, against Kettle Hill. The Spanish withdrew to an inner defense line, and, as theday ended, theAmericanshad their ridge line but at a cost of seventeen hundred casualties.

Shafter, not anxious togoagainst theSpanishsecond line, askedSampsontocomeintoSantiagoBayandattack the city, but for Sampson there was still the matter of the harbor defenses. He took his flagship eastward on 3 July to meet with Shafter, and while they argued, Cervera in- advertently resolved the impasse by coming out of the port onorders of theSpanish captaingeneral.Hisgreatly inferior squadron was annihilated by Schley, and on 16 July the Spaniards signed terms of unconditional surren- der for the 23,500 troops in and around the city.

At the endof July theVIIICorps, somefifteen thou- sand men (mostly volunteers) under Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, had reached thePhilippines.Enroute, theescort cruiser Charleston had stopped at Guam and accepted the surrender of the island from the Spanish governor, who had not heard of the war. Because of anunrepairedcable, Dewey and Merritt themselves did not hear immediately of thepeaceprotocol, andon13August anassault against Manila was made. The Spanish surrendered after token resistance.

The peace treaty, signed in Paris on 10 December 1898, established Cuba as an independent state, ceded

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Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States, and provided for the payment of $20 million to Spain for the Philip- pines. Almost overnight the United States had acquired an overseas empire and, in the eyes of Europe, had be- come a world power. The immediate cost of the war was $250 million and about three thousand American lives, of which only about three hundred were battle deaths. A disgruntled Aguinaldo, expecting independence for the Philippines, declared a provisional republic, which led to the Philippine Insurrection that lasted until 1902.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cosmas, Graham A. An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Publishing, 1994.

Hoganson, Kristin L. Fighting for American Manhood: How Gen- der Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine- American Wars. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998.

Linderman, Gerald F. The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War. Ann Arbor: University of Michi- gan Press, 1974.

Musicant, Ivan. Empire by Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century. New York: Holt, 1998.

Traxel, David. 1898: The Birth of the American Century. New York: Knopf, 1998.

Edwin H. Simmons / a. g.

See also Jingoism; Maine, Sinking of the; Paris, Treaty of (1898); Teller Amendment; Territories of the United States; Yellow Journalism; and vol. 9: Anti-Imperialist League Platform; A Soldier’s Account of the Spanish- American War.

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, NAVY IN. Shortly before the Spanish-American War, growing American interest in a modern, powerful navy had resulted in in- creased appropriations and a vigorous program of ship construction, especially of battleships and cruisers. The Spanish-American War (1898) lasted only about ninety days, yet it marked the generally successful combat trial of the then new American navy. Following by eight years the appearance of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, the conflict illustrated principles and techniques of war that were sometimes adhered to, sometimes violated.

The main combat areas of the war were Spanish pos- sessions in the Philippines and the Caribbean. In both theaters, American naval ascendancy was first established, although by different means, to assure sea control before undertaking amphibious and military operations. On 1 May 1898, in the Battle of Manila Bay, which involved secondary cruiser forces in a secondary area, Commodore George Dewey easily defeated an antiquated Spanish