History Questions

IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH

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IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH, by Hin- ton Rowan Helper, was one of the most sensational books ever published in the United States. Appearing in the spring of 1857 as the nation was sliding toward civil war, the book became the centerpiece of an intense debate on the floor of the U.S. Congress. Helper, an obscure yeo- man farmer from North Carolina, claimed that slavery was an economic disaster for the South and an insur- mountable barrier to the economic advancement of the region’s slaveless farmers. There was nothing new about this argument. Political economists had long claimed that slavery inhibited economic development and undermined small farmers, craftsmen, and manufacturers. Much of The Impending Crisis was a tedious recitation of dull sta- tistics designed to prove this familiar argument. But Helper also added a shockingly inflammatory threat: If the southern planters did not voluntarily dismantle the slave system, he warned, the small farmers would launch a sustained class war across the South. Helper even hinted at a slave rebellion, although he himself had racist pro- clivities and little or no sympathy for the plight of the slaves. Coming at such a sensitive moment in national politics, it was no wonder southern leaders denounced Helper’s northern supporters with such vehemence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Helper, Hinton Rowan. The Impending Crisis of the South; How to Meet It. Edited with an introduction by George M. Fred- rickson. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1968.

James Oakes

See also Slavery; and vol. 9: The Impending Crisis of the South: How to Meet It.

IMPERIALISM. Americans have long thought of themselves as an “anti-imperial” people. The nation was, after all, founded in revolt against the British Empire. In the twentieth century, the rhetoric of national “self- determination” pervaded American discussions of foreign affairs. From Thomas Jefferson to Woodrow Wilson, the United States defined itself in opposition to the imperi- alism of other empires.

Imperialism, in this American usage, refers to the domination of another society against the expressed will of its people. Imperialism can be both formal and infor- mal. In the case of formal empire—as in the British rule over the thirteen American colonies during the eigh- teenth century—a powerful foreign state manages the day-to-day political, social, and economic affairs in an- other land. Informal empire, in contrast, refers to a more indirect arrangement, whereby a foreign state works through local intermediaries to manage a distant society. In early nineteenth-century India, for example, British authorities negotiated favorable trade arrangements with native monarchs rather than bear the heavy costs of direct imperial control.

Close attention to these two kinds of imperialism has led many scholars to conclude that, despite popular as- sumptions, imperialism as a general term applies to Amer- ican history. In particular, the years after the Civil War show abundant evidence of Americans expanding their economic, political, military, and cultural control over foreign societies. The post-1865 period is distinguished from previous decades, when the young Republic was both struggling for its survival and expanding over con- tiguous territory that it rapidly incorporated into the con- stitutional structures of the United States. Imperialism implies something different from continental expansion. It refers to the permanent subordination of distant soci- eties, rather than their reorganization as states of equal standing in a single nation. America extended its federalist structure of governance across the North American con- tinent before the Civil War. After that watershed, a pow- erful United States established areas of domination in distant lands, whose people were not allowed equal rep- resentation in governance. By the dawn of the twentieth century, the United States had a large informal empire and a smaller but still significant formal empire as well.

From the Civil War to the Twentieth Century William Henry Seward, secretary of state during and im- mediately after the Civil War, recognized that the United States needed an overseas empire for its future peace and prosperity. The wounds of the bloody North-South con- flict would heal, he believed, only with the promise of overseas benefits for all sections of the country. Informal U.S. expansion into foreign markets—especially in Asia and the Caribbean—provided farmers and industrialists with access to consumers and resources. At a time when the U.S. economy had begun to employ factory manu- facturing, mechanized agriculture, and railroad transpor- tation, large overseas outlets became necessary for pros- perity. Americans were dependent on assured access to international markets, Seward believed, and this required expansion across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Seward began by building a “highway” to Asia. This included annexation of the Brooks Islands in 1867 (re- named the Midway Islands in 1903). The secretary of state also negotiated a treaty guaranteeing Americanbusi- nesses access to the island kingdom of Hawaii. The U.S. Senate eventually approved this treaty in 1875. Seward expected that the Brooks Islands and Hawaii would serve as important stepping-stones for American influence in the lucrative markets of China and Japan.

When the United States encountered resistance to its post–Civil War expansion in Asia, the government em- ployed diplomatic and military pressures. In 1866, after the Japanese government closed itself to foreign trade,the United States joined other imperial powers—the British, the French, and the Dutch—in forcing Western access to the island nation over the objections of native interests. Seward dispatched a warship, the U.S.S. Wyoming, to join in naval exercises off the Japanese coast.

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In China, the largest and most promising market, Seward used diplomacy instead of explicit force. Accord- ing to the Burlingame Treaty, signed in September 1868, the Chinese government gave the United States trading access to designated coastal areas, with the addi- tional right to build railroads and telegraphs facilitating penetration of the hinterland. In return, the United States allowed thousands of Chinese laborers to migrate across the Pacific. This arrangement helped to relieve China’s overpopulation difficulties, and it provided American com- panies—particularly on the West Coast—with a large pool of low-wage workers. The U.S. government worked with the Chinese emperor to guarantee a market for the export of American products and the import of cheap labor.

Seward’s imperialism set the stage for succeeding secretaries of state, but his policies inspired strong do- mestic resistance. By the time he left office in 1869, Sew- ard had built an American overseas empire that included formal possessions, including the Brooks Islands and Alaska (1867), as well as larger informal areas of influence, which included Hawaii, Japan, and, most important of all, China. Many Americans expressed discomfort with this evidence of imperialism, including Republican Senator Charles Sumner and Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune. Seward’s other ambitious plans—including acquisition of the Danish West Indies (the U.S. Virgin Islands) and the construction of an isthmian canal con- necting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through a sliver of Colombia—died at the hands of anti-imperialists on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

Despite these setbacks, Seward and his successors recognized the overriding imperialist trend in American foreign policy at the time. In addition to the economic advantages derived from overseas expansion, a series of internal social and cultural pressures pushed the United States to become more involved in managing distant so- cieties. Religious belief—in particular a desire to spread Christian “civilization”—had motivated Western settle- ment across the North American continent during the period of manifest destiny, before the Civil War. Now these same urges inspired overseas proselytism. Ministers like Josiah Strong of the Home Missionary Society called upon thousands of their followers to establish churches and schools throughout China and other foreign coun- tries. Christian missionaries would not only save less privileged souls, they would also display the profound righteousness of American society. As was the case with Britain and many other imperial powers in the nineteenth century, the United States defined its national identity by asserting superiority over—and a duty to convert—“Ori- ental” heathens.

American imperialism, in this sense, was part of a much larger international competition. Britain, France, and Russia—and by the last decades of the nineteenth century, Germany and Japan—were all competing for in- fluence in Asia, Africa, and other “open” spaces for ex- pansion. American leaders felt they had to adopt impe-

rialistic policies of their own. Otherwise, the United States risked permanent exclusion from future oppor- tunities abroad. Secretary of State John Hay’s Open Door Notes of 1899 and 1900 codified this argument,proclaim- ing that the United States would assert its presence in China and other countries to make sure that other im- perialist powers did not close off American access. As a self-conscious great power with a civilizing mission and a growing dependence on foreign markets, the United States needed its own empire—preferably informal. The historian Frederick Jackson Turner’s influential 1893 es- say, “The Significance of the Frontier in American His- tory,” captured this sense that the proving ground for American society was no longer on the North American continent, but now overseas.

One could not build an empire—even an informal one—without an adequate military. After an initial decade of demobilization after the Civil War, the United States embarked upon a period of extensive naval construction in the late nineteenth century. Alfred Thayer Mahan, president of the newly created Naval War College, out- lined a new military doctrine for American imperialism in his widely read lectures, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783. First published in 1890, Mahan’s text mined the history of the Roman and British empires to show that a large trading state could ensure its wealth and security by asserting dominance of the sea. A large bat- tleship navy, in control of important strategic waterways and coaling stations across the globe, would guaranteethe flow of commerce. It would also allow for the United States to influence foreign societies, transporting concen- trated forces across great distances.

Largely as a consequence of Mahan’s influence, the U.S. naval fleet grew consistently between 1890 and 1914. More ships created new opportunities for force projec- tion. New overseas naval interests, in turn, justified ever larger estimates of strategic necessities. By 1898, the U.S. Navy had become both an advocate and a tool of Amer- ican imperialism.

The United States used its growing naval power to force the declining Spanish empire out of Cuba and the Philippines. In both areas, America became the new im- perial power. In 1901, the United States—now in formal control of Cuba—forced the native government of the island to include in its constitution a series of stipulations known as the Platt Amendment (named for Senator Or- ville Platt, a Republican from Connecticut). These in- cluded assurances of American political and economic domination. The U.S. Navy acquired possession of a ma- jor facility on the island, Guantánamo Naval Base. Wash- ington also asserted the future right to intervenemilitarily in Cuba if U.S. interests were jeopardized. After granting the island nominal independence in 1902, the United States did indeed send an “army of pacification” to the island in 1906 for the purpose of repressing anti-American groups. The United States practiced a combination of in- formal and formal imperialism in Cuba.

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In the case of the Philippines, the United States ini- tially went to war with Spain in 1898 for the purpose of acquiring an informal naval coaling station. Native resis- tance to U.S. interests and a growing recognition in Washington that the archipelago would serve as an ideal point of embarkation for trade with the Chinese mainland led President William McKinley to declare the Philip- pines a permanent U.S. colony on 21 December 1898. America fought a bloody forty-one-month war to secure possession of the entire archipelago. During this Philip- pine Insurrection, the United States created an occu- pation army that waged total war on local resistance. Forty-two hundred Americans died in battle for posses- sion of this colony. As many as twenty thousand Filipino insurgents also died. As never before, the United States had established direct control over a foreign society— seven thousand miles from North America—throughbrute force. At the dawn of the twentieth century, the evidence of American imperialism was unmistakable.

Liberal Imperialism During the first half of the twentieth century, the United States was both an advocate of democracy and a practi- tioner of imperialism. The two are not necessarily con- tradictory. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson both believed they had an obligation to spread American ideas and interests across the globe. As a new world power, the United States had an apparent oppor- tunity to remake the international system in a way that would eliminate the old ravages of war and corrupt alli- ances. Roosevelt and Wilson sought to replace militaristic aristocracies with governments that promised economic development and, eventually, democracy. International change of this variety would, they assumed, best serve America’s long-term interests.

In the short run, however, the “new diplomacy” of Roosevelt and Wilson required more extensive American imperialism. When societies refused to follow the alleged tide of “modern” economic development and democracy symbolized by the United States, Washington felt an urge to intervene. On a number of occasions, U.S. leaders went so far as to force societies to be “free” on American terms. This was the rationale behind a series of early twentieth- century U.S. interventions in the Western Hemisphere that included, among others, Cuba, the Dominican Re- public, Nicaragua, and Mexico. In each case, the United States asserted strategic and economic interests, and a long-term commitment to the betterment of the society under Washington’s control. When U.S. military forces left their foreign areas of occupation, the threat of their redeployment served to intimidate those who wished to challenge U.S. influence.

In Europe and Asia, the United States pursued a con- sistent policy of informal imperialism during the first de- cades of the twentieth century. Contrary to the image of American diplomatic isolation before and after World War I, U.S. businesses worked with Washington’s ex-

plicit—though often “unofficial”—support to build new overseas markets during this period. Investment firms like J. P. Morgan and Company lent large sums to countries such as Great Britain and France, forcing them to allow more American influence in the daily workings of their economies. Industrial concerns like Standard Oil, Singer Sewing Company, and International Harvester became more active in controlling natural resources overseas and marketing their products to foreign consumers. Perhaps most significant of all, intellectual and charitable groups like the Carnegie Council and the Rockefeller Founda- tion began to advise leaders in Europe, Asia, and Latin America on how they could make their societies and econ- omies look more like that of the United States. Their seemingly “objective” counsels encouraged private prop- erty concentration, natural resource extraction, and in- creased trade—all factors that served to increase the in- fluence of American firms.

The worldwide economic depression of the 1930s and the rise of fascism restricted much of the international commerce and communication that had flourished in the first decades of the century. These conditions, however, only heightened the pressures for informal American im- perialism. Fearful that economic and political forces—es- pecially in Germany—were moving against trade, eco- nomic development, and democracy, the U.S. government continued to encourage the activities of American com- panies and advisory groups abroad.

The administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, in par- ticular, sponsored the overseas marketing of Hollywood- produced films. Movies helped to proselytize theindividual freedoms and personal prosperity that Americans believed were essential for a peaceful, liberal world. Hollywood helped nurture foreign consumers who would soon want to purchase the American-made automobiles and other products glorified on the silver screen. Most significant of all, policymakers like Roosevelt believed that movie exports would help inspire positive views of the United States in foreign societies. The president even thought this might work with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin—an avid consumer of American movies. Roosevelt hoped that Hollywood depictions of Soviet-American friend- ship would help solidify the two nations in their fight against Nazi fascism.

World War II and the Cold War U.S. participation in World War II formalized America’s liberal imperialism of the prior decades. As part of the Atlantic Charter—negotiated when Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met in secret between 9 and 12 August 1941—the United States proclaimed that the war against fascism would end with a “permanent sys- tem of general security” that would embrace national self- determination, free trade, and disarmament. Citizens of foreign countries would benefit from “improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security” when they restructured their societies to look like the

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United States. The Atlantic Charter laid out an agenda for total war against the large standing armies, state-run economies, and dictatorial governments that character- ized fascist regimes. This is what one scholar calls the “American way of war.” Between 1941 and 1945, the United States deployed unprecedented military force— including two atomic bombs—to annihilate its most direct challengers in Asia and Europe. American commitments to free trade, economic development, and democracy re- quired the unconditional surrender of Japanese, German, and Italian fascists. U.S. leaders and citizens not only as- serted that their nation was the necessary “arsenal of de- mocracy,” they also proclaimed that they would remake the world after the horrors of war and genocide. The de- feat of fascism would christen the “American Century,” when the United States would play the unabashed role of liberal imperialist, planting the seeds of American-style economic growth and democracy across the globe.

The United States undertook this task with extraor- dinary resolve as soon as World War II came to a close in 1945. In the western half of Germany and the Euro- pean continent, American policymakers rebuilt war- devastated societies. The Economic Recovery Program of 1947 (also known as the Marshall Plan, after Secretary of State George Marshall) provided a staggering $13 bil- lion of U.S. aid to feed starving people, reorganize in- dustry, and jump-start economic production. Instead of the reparations and loans that weighed down European economies after World War I, the United States used the Marshall Plan to foster postwar stability, prosperity, and integration in Europe. With their economies organized along liberal capitalist lines, the west European countries developed favorable markets for American exports only a few years after the end of World War II.

In Japan and the western half of Germany, America’s liberal imperialism was formal and incredibly successful. In both societies, U.S. officials helped to write new con- stitutions. The Japanese national charter of 1946 pro- hibited militarism and state control over the economy. It gave Japanese women the right to vote for the first time, promoted noncommunist labor unions, encouraged free public expression, and created new opportunities for American-style schooling. The new German “Basic Law,” promulgated in 1949, similarly outlawed fascism and en- sured individual rights, personal property ownership, and free elections. In both societies, the United States worked with a series of local politicians to uproot authoritarian traditions and impose liberal democracy. American offi- cials sought to prevent future war, improve the lives of foreign citizens, and ensure U.S. strategic and economic interests. These goals were not incompatible; in fact, they reflected a formalization of American assumptions dating back to 1865.

The Soviet Union objected to America’s liberal im- perialism for obvious reasons. Joseph Stalin and his suc- cessors recognized that U.S. expansion in Europe and Asia prohibited the spread of communist ideals. Instead

of the worker rights and economic equality championed by the Soviet Union—in words, if not in practice—Amer- ican influence privileged personal liberties and individual wealth accumulation. The conflict between America’s lib- eral democratic vision and the Soviet Union’s communist alternative created an environment of competing impe- rialisms, which contemporaries called the “Cold War.”

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet criticisms of U.S. imperialism gained some popular support in Asian, African, and Latin American societies struggling for independence against inherited European and Amer- ican domination. This was most evident in Indochina. Despite its anticolonial inclinations, U.S. leaders sup- ported French colonialism in this region of Southeast Asia after World War II. In the eyes of U.S. policymakers, national independence for Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cam- bodian citizens threatened to undermine the stability and security of the region. Nationalist governments would al- legedly threaten trade and economic development. Most significantly, American leaders feared that newly inde- pendent governments would fall under the influence of Soviet and, after 1949, Chinese communism. Liberal imperialism appeared necessary to contain communist expansion and prepare “underdeveloped” societies for eventual independence.

When Vietnamese nationalists—aided, as Washing- ton predicted, by China and the Soviet Union—forced the French out of Indochina in 1954, the United States took over as a formal imperialist in the region. By the end of 1965, U.S. soldiers were fighting an extensive ground, sea, and air war against Vietnamese nationalists. Before the last U.S. troops withdrew from the region in 1975, hundreds of thousands—perhaps millions—of peasants had died or suffered dislocation as a consequence of American military activities. In addition, 58,193 U.S. sol- diers perished in this war.

The Vietnam War illustrated the extended brutality of American imperialism during the Cold War. Long- standing economic and political impulses had combined with militant anticommunism to devastate much of South- east Asia. Observers in countries around the world—in- cluding the United States—condemned Americanforeign policy for undermining the liberal purposes that it claimed to serve. The global revolt witnessed in 1968 on city streets across the United States, Europe, Asia, and Latin America was an international reaction against American imperialism.

After Vietnam and to the Twenty-First Century American foreign policy was never the same after the Vietnam War. Aware of the resistance that the formal ele- ments of American imperialism had inspired, policymak- ers returned to more informal mechanisms for asserting influence abroad. Economic globalization and human rights advocacy took center stage, along with continued anticommunism. The promise of American-style pros- perity and individual rights—championed by politicians,

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businesspeople, and Hollywood writers—triumphed over the gray authoritarianism of communist regimes. By 1991, societies across the globe rushed to attract American in- vestment and aid. Citizens sought out American cultural exports—including McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, and Michael Jordan.

America’s informal imperialism in the late twentieth century was remarkably effective. It did, however, inspire serious resistance. Instead of adopting communist slo- gans, as they had in the 1950s and 1960s, opponents of U.S. influence after 1991 turned largely to religion. Fun- damentalisms of many varieties—Christian, Jewish, and Islamic—arose to challenge the decadence and hypocrisy of American liberal democracy. They condemned the United States for undermining traditional sources of au- thority and morality in foreign societies. They recognized that the free trade, economic development, and popular elections advocated by the United States would destroy many local hierarchies.

International terrorism—symbolized most frighten- ingly by the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon—emerged, in part, as a reaction to a long history of formal and informal Ameri- can imperialism. This observation does not, in any way, justify the abhorrent terrorist activities. American impe- rialism has produced both positive and negative out- comes, as the contrast between post–World War II Japan and Vietnam makes clear. Nonetheless, the extraordinary overseas influence of the United States, dating back to 1865, has inspired violent resistance. Americans probably will not abandon their liberal imperialist assumptions in the twenty-first century, but they will surely develop new strategies for isolating and defeating foreign challengers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cooper, John Milton, Jr. The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985. A superb comparative study that analyzes the politics and foreign policy of early twentieth- century America.

Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies ofContainment:ACriticalAppraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Ox- ford University Press, 1982. The best analysis of the sources and implications of America’s anticommunist con- tainment policy during the Cold War.

Gardner, Lloyd C. Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam. Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1997. A pro- vocative analysis of how American liberal imperialism con- tributed to the Vietnam War.

Hahn, Peter L., and Mary Ann Heiss, eds. EmpireandRevolution: The United States and the Third World since 1945. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2001. A useful survey of American imperialism in the “third world” during the Cold War.

Hogan, Michael J. The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. A penetrating account

of how the Marshall Plan reconstructed Western Europe on America’s model.

Hunt, Michael H. Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987. A stimulating account of how ideas about liberty, race, and revolution shaped American imperialism.

Iriye, Akira, ed. The Cambridge History of American Foreign Re- lations: The Globalizing of America, 1913–1945. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. A compelling discus- sion of Americanization in the first half of the twentieth century.

Knock, Thomas J. To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and theQuest for a New World Order. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1995. An excellent account of Wilson’s liberal approach to foreign policy.

LaFeber, Walter. The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998. A classic history of American imperialism be- tween the Civil War and the War of 1898.

Leffler, Melvyn P. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992. A rich account of how American values and fears of Soviet power drove foreign policy in the early Cold War.

McCormick, Thomas J. China Market: America’s Quest for Infor- mal Empire, 1893–1901. Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1990. A pro- vocative account of American imperialism in Asia at the end of the nineteenth century.

Ninkovich, Frank. The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. A compelling account of Wilson’s influence on American im- perialism in the twentieth century.

Rosenberg, Emily S. Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982. A thoughtful account of America’s cultural and economic imperialism between the two world wars.

Smith, Tony. America’s Mission: The United States and the World- wide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. Prince- ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994. A provocative analysis of American liberal imperialism.

Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. A compelling analysis of America’s imperialistic approach to war.

Williams, William Appleman. The Tragedy of American Diplo- macy. New York: Norton, 1988. Originally published in 1959 and one of the most important works on the history of American foreign relations—a penetrating discussion of economics, ideas, and imperialism.

Jeremi Suri

See also Anti-Imperialists; China, Relations with; Cuba, Re- lations with; Hawaii; Intervention; Japan, Relations with; Philippines; Spanish-American War; Vietnam War; and vol. 9: Anti-Imperialist League Platform.

IMPLIED POWERS. At the end of Section 8 of Ar- ticle I of the U.S. Constitution, which enumerates the