Qualitative andquantative methods

Article

Social Identity Reduces Depression by Fostering Positive Attributions

Tegan Cruwys1, Erica I. South1, Katharine H. Greenaway1, and S. Alexander Haslam1

Abstract

Social identities are generally associated with better health and in particular lower levels of depression. However, there has been limited investigation of why social identities protect against depression. The current research suggests that social identities reduce depression in part because they attenuate the depressive attribution style (internal, stable, and global; e.g., ‘‘I failed because I’m stupid’’). These relationships are first investigated in a survey (Study 1, N ¼ 139) and then followed up in an experiment that manipulates social identity salience (Study 2, N ¼ 88). In both cases, people with stronger social identities were less likely to attribute negative events to internal, stable, or global causes and subsequently reported lower levels of depression. These studies thus indicate that social identities can protect and enhance mental health by facilitating positive interpretations of stress and failure. Implications for clinical theory and practice are discussed.

Keywords

depression, social identity, multiple group membership, attribution, failure, mental health

We cannot live only for ourselves.

A thousand fibers connect us with our fellow men.

—Herman Melville, Moby Dick

Humans have an innate need for social connections that are vital for

health and happiness in life (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Cohen &

Wills, 1985). When this need is not met—when the ‘‘thousand

fibers’’ in Melville’s (1851) quote are reduced to a few or

none—people are at risk of reduced well-being and even mental ill-

ness. In fact, depression—the leading cause of disability worldwide

(World Health Organization, 2012)—commonly arises when a per-

son lacks social connections (Cacioppo, Hawkley, & Thisted,

2010; Cacioppo, Hughes, Waite, Hawkley, & Thisted, 2006).

Although extensive prior work has documented the fact that

social connectedness and social identities are critical to mental

health and reduced rates of depression, it remains unclear why

this is the case (Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle, Haslam, & Jetten,

2014; Jetten, Haslam, Haslam, Dingle, & Jones, 2014). We

address this research gap in the present work. What exactly do

social identities do, psychologically, that makes them so protec-

tive for mental health? In answering this question, we propose a

novel mechanism through which social identities can protect peo-

ple against depression, that is, reduced depressive attributions.

Social Identity and Depression

A growing body of literature demonstrates that social identities

are a key psychological resource that is protective for health

generally (Haslam, Jetten, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009; Jetten,

Haslam, & Haslam, 2012) and against depression in particular

(Cruwys et al., 2013; Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle, Haslam, et al,

2014; Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle, Jetten, et al., 2014). Social

identity refers to that part of the self-concept that reflects the

internalization of group memberships (Tajfel & Turner,

1979). This means that when the self is defined by a given

social identity (e.g., ‘‘us Catholics,’’ ‘‘us psychologists,’’ and

‘‘us Australians’’), we see other members of that group not as

‘‘other’’ but as part of who and what we are. Moreover, when

groups are internalized in this way, they provide us with a sense

of belonging, purpose, and direction and therefore have the

capacity to enrich our lives—in particular, by providing a basis

for bonding, support, companionship, and security (Haslam

et al., 2009).

The psychological resources that social identity provides

in turn have positive consequences for health and well-being

(Jetten et al., 2012). Indeed, growing evidence suggests that

social identities have an important role in preventing and resol-

ving depression. For example, in a longitudinal study with a

nationally representative sample of over 5,000 older adults,

1 University of Queensland, St Lucia, Queensland, Australia

Erica I. South and Tegan Cruwys are joint first authors.

Corresponding Author:

Tegan Cruwys, School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, St Lucia,

Queensland, 4072, Australia.

Email: [email protected]

Social Psychological and Personality Science 2015, Vol. 6(1) 65-74 ª The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1948550614543309 spps.sagepub.com

Cruwys et al. (2013) found that possessing multiple group

memberships protected against the development of depression,

improved the likelihood of recovering from depression, and

prevented depression relapse. Indeed, evidence suggested that

each new social group an individual joined reduced their risk

of relapse 4 years later by 24%. It is also worth noting that sev- eral studies provide evidence that it is primarily social isolation

that leads to depression, with only limited evidence for the

opposite causal pathway (Cacioppo et al., 2010; Iyer, Jetten,

Tsivrikos, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009).

One clue that social identification is at the heart of this pro-

cess is that groups need to be psychologically important to an

individual in order to reduce depression symptoms (Cruwys,

Haslam, Dingle, Haslam, et al, 2014; Wakefield, Bickley, &

Sani, 2013). For instance, high social identification with the

army was associated with lower depression among soldiers

(Sani, Herrera, Wakefield, Boroch, & Gulyas, 2012), and stu-

dents who report high identification with an educational insti-

tution also report lower levels of depression (Bizumic, Reynolds,

Turner, Bromhead, & Subasic, 2009; Brook, Garcia, & Fleming,

2008; Iyer et al., 2009). Similar effects were found in an inter-

vention study that encouraged people with depression to join

social groups: reductions in depression symptoms were most

marked for those individuals with high (rather than low) lev-

els of social identification (Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle, Jetten,

et al., 2014).

Accumulating evidence thus points to the role of social iden-

tity as an active antidote to depression—both that having more

social identities and that identifying more strongly with any

particular social group protect against the condition. Yet while

there is strong evidence for such effects, it nonetheless remains

unclear exactly why joining social groups has this positive pro-

tective effect. Accordingly, there is clearly a need to explore

mechanisms through which social identity might reduce

depression.

Speaking to this issue, previous research has suggested

that the relationship between social identity and depression

might be mediated by social support (Haslam, O’Brien, Jetten,

Vormedal, & Penna, 2005; Jetten et al., 2014; Sani, 2012),

since a sense of shared social identity has been shown to be a

basis for both the provision of help and its positive construal

(e.g., Haslam, Reicher, & Levine, 2012; Levine, Prosser,

Evans, & Reicher, 2005). However, given that just thinking

about one’s social identities has the capacity to improve

well-being and resilience (e.g., Jones & Jetten, 2011), it would

seem likely that candidate mediators will also be psychological

and not (just) material. In this regard too, it is important to note

that both theoretical and empirical works speak to the capacity

for social identity to fundamentally restructure cognition (e.g.,

Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). For example, stud-

ies have found that when individuals define themselves in

terms of shared social identity (rather than as separate individ-

uals; Turner, 1982), they are less paranoid, more empathic, and

more cognitively engaged (Branscombe & Miron, 2004;

Haslam et al., 2014; Reicher & Haslam, 2006). Other research

has shown that social identity has a profound impact on the way

people interpret and explain the social world—as reflected in

stereotypic attributions (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994;

Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991) and in cognitive processing

more generally (e.g., McGarty, Yzerbyt, & Spears, 2002). A

key question, then, is whether such cognitive restructuring

might have implications for depression.

Social Identity and Attribution Style

One hallmark of depression is a negative attribution style

when generating causal explanations for events (Peterson &

Seligman, 1984; Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986; Weiner,

Nierenberg, & Goldstein, 1976). Specifically, individuals with

a depressive attribution style are more likely to attribute nega-

tive events to causes that are internal, stable across time, and

influence many areas of their life (Abramson, Seligman, &

Teasdale, 1978). Positive events are explained in the opposite

way—as externally caused, transient, and situation specific.

This pattern of thinking leads people to blame themselves for

failure while denying credit for success (Sweeney et al., 1986).

A large body of evidence suggests that this depressive attri-

bution style is causally related to depression (Chan, 2012;

Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Sweeney et al., 1986). Therefore,

if a person’s depressive attribution style is altered so as to

become more positive (i.e., external, transient, and specific),

then depression symptoms should be reduced (Seligman

et al., 1988). In line with other work showing that social iden-

tities serve to structure attributions (e.g., Oakes et al., 1991), it

is therefore relevant to ask whether social identity might reduce

depression by attenuating depressive attribution style.

There are several reasons for hypothesizing that this might

be the case. First, a large body of research has shown that cau-

sal explanations can be altered by social factors. In particular,

attribution style has been found to develop in response to social

influences, such as children modeling their parents’ explana-

tory style (Haines, Metalsky, Cardamone, & Joiner, 1999; Lau,

Belli, Gregory, Napolitano, & Eley, 2012; Seligman et al.,

1984). Moreover, once a depressive attribution style develops,

it can still be modified, even in adults (Seligman et al., 1988).

Speaking to this possibility, Klein, Fencil-Morse, and Seligman

(1976) had depressed and nondepressed students complete

unsolvable problems. Attributions for failure were manipulated

by telling participants that most people succeeded on the task

(inducing an internal attribution for personal failure) or that

most people failed on the task (inducing an external attribution

for personal failure). After experiencing failure, depressed indi-

viduals tend to perform poorly on subsequent tasks. However,

inducing an external attribution of failure reduced the number

of depressed individuals who adopted a depressive attribution

style. More importantly, this external attribution eliminated

subsequent poor performance among depressed individuals.

In other words, simply being made aware that personal beha-

vior was similar to that of other group members produced more

positive attributions, reducing symptoms of depression and

associated poor performance.

66 Social Psychological and Personality Science 6(1)

One way in which social identity could change such attribu-

tions is by shifting attentional focus. Depressed individuals

have previously been found to have a self-focusing style such

that they tend to focus internally—that is on their personal

selves—following failure (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Burling,

& Tibbs, 1992). This focus on personal shortcomings leads to

internal attributions for failure, causing depression (Greenberg

et al., 1992; Romens, MacCoon, Abramson, & Pollak, 2011). In

contrast, thinking about one’s social identity shifts attention

away from the self as an individual (Hogg & Williams, 2000;

Turner & Onorato, 1999) and toward (generally positive) group

memberships (Turner, 1982). Thus, when social identity is

made salient, one’s shortcomings as an individual may be less

salient, reducing the chance of internal attributions for failure.

In addition to reducing internal attributions for failure,

social identity may also facilitate internal attributions for suc-

cess. This is important because, as a corollary to the patterns

discussed earlier, depressed individuals have been found to

lack the common (personal) self-serving attribution style in

which credit is taken for personal success and blame is denied

for personal failure (Greenberg et al., 1992; Seidel et al., 2012).

Yet while depressed individuals typically fail to exhibit this

form of self-serving bias, there is some evidence they

still engage in a group-serving attribution bias (Dietz-Uhler

& Murrell, 1998). For example, Schlenker and Britt (1996)

found that depressed individuals had a depressive attribution

style when explaining their own and strangers’ experiences but

that when attributing the same events for their close friends,

they made positive attributions—apportioning credit for their

successes and minimizing blame for their failures. This sug-

gests that depressed individuals are capable of making positive

attributions and that social identities may provide a cognitive

platform for them to do so.

The Present Research

The goal of the present research was to explore the interrela-

tionships between social identity, depressive attributions, and

depression. In line with the above-mentioned reasoning, we

tested the following four core hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: social identity would be associated with

reduced depression,

Hypothesis 2: social identity would be associated with pos-

itive attribution styles,

Hypothesis 3: positive attribution styles would be associated

with reduced depression, and

Hypothesis 4: a decrease in depressive attributions will

mediate the protective effect of social identity on depression.

Importantly, while Hypothesis 1 is supported by previous

social identity research (e.g., Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle, Haslam,

et al., 2014; Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle, Jetten, et al., 2014;

Reicher & Haslam, 2006; Sani et al., 2012) and Hypothesis 3

by a large body of prior work on depression (e.g., Peterson &

Seligman, 1984; Sweeney et al., 1986; Weiner et al., 1976),

to our knowledge this is the first research to propose and test

Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 4 and to explore the cognitive

processes that mediate the relationship between social identity

and mental health more generally.

For this purpose, we conducted two studies. The first was a

survey study designed to explore the various relationships pos-

tulated in the above-mentioned hypotheses. The second was an

experiment in which we manipulated social identity salience

with a view to establishing its causal impact on attribution style

and depression.

Study 1

Study 1 surveyed final-year university students in the process of

completing a major research thesis in psychology. This sample is

at high risk of depression (Murphy, Gray, Sterling, Reeves, &

DuCette, 2009; Stallman, 2010) and therefore particularly appro-

priate for investigating our hypotheses. Furthermore, question-

naires were completed during the week that students were

submitting their research thesis, and for this reason the sample

was expected to be under considerable acute stress. Social iden-

tity was operationalized in this study as multiple group member-

ships, in line with previous research suggesting that these act as a

psychological resource that protects against depression (Cruwys

et al., 2013; Iyer et al., 2009).

Method

Participants and Design. An online questionnaire was adminis- tered to 139 final-year psychology students (Mage ¼ 23.93, SD ¼ 5.07; 115 female) from four universities. The question- naire included measures of multiple group memberships,

depressive attribution style, and depression symptoms. A range

of other variables related to personality and mental health were

also measured but do not relate to our hypothesis and will not

be discussed further.

Materials Multiple group memberships. The Exeter Identity Transition

Scale (Haslam et al., 2008) was used to gauge participants’

involvement in multiple groups. The scale comprised 7 items

(e.g., ‘‘I am active in lots of different groups’’). Participants

rated their agreement with each item on a scale from 1 (not

at all) to 7 (completely), a ¼ .95. Depressive attribution style. The Depressive Attributions

Questionnaire (DAQ; Kleim, Gonzalo, & Ehlers, 2011) was

used to measure depressive attribution style. This scale com-

prised 16 items across four related attribution areas (internal,

stable, global, and perceived helplessness) such as ‘‘when bad

things happen, I think it is my fault’’ on a 4-point scale from 0

(not at all) to 4 (very strongly), a ¼ .91. Depression symptoms. The Centre for Epidemiological Stud-

ies Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977) was used to assess current

levels of depression. Participants responded to 20 statements

that asked how often they had experienced symptoms of

Cruwys et al. 67

depression over the last week. Response options varied from

1 (rarely or none of the time) to 4 (most or all of the time),

a ¼ .93.

Results

Descriptives Statistics and Analytic Strategy. The average level of depression was high (M ¼ 18.43; SD ¼ 12.31), exceeding the diagnostic cutoff of 16. Average depressive attribution style

was also higher than previously reported norms (M ¼ 31.01; SD ¼ 8.58, compared to M ¼ 20.52 in three studies by Kleim et al., 2011). Students reported a moderate level of involvement

in groups (M ¼ 4.02; SD ¼ 1.60). This is similar to previous research with students transitioning to university (Iyer et al.,

2009). Regression analyses were conducted to assess Hypoth-

eses 1, 2, and 3.

Hypothesis 1: Multiple group memberships protect against depression. Results supported Hypothesis 1, with multiple group memberships significantly predicting depression

scores, R 2 ¼ .07, F(1, 137) ¼ 11.66, b ¼�.28, p ¼ .001. Par-

ticipants who reported having more group memberships

tended to have lower levels of depression symptoms. Among

those with an above average number of group memberships,

38% were above the cutoff for depression; however, among those with a below average number of groups, 65% met cri- teria for depression.

Hypothesis 2: Multiple group memberships promote positive attributions. Analyses also supported Hypothesis 2, R2 ¼ .05, F(1, 137) ¼ 6.47, b¼�.21, p ¼ .012. Participants with multiple group memberships had a more positive attribution style. Those

with higher levels of multiple group memberships (1 SD above

the mean) scored 4 points lower on the DAQ than those with

fewer group memberships (1 SD below the mean).

Hypotheses 3 and 4: Positive attributions mediate the protective effect of group memberships. Regression analysis also supported Hypothesis 3. When entered in a second block following mul-

tiple group memberships, depressive attribution style signifi-

cantly predicted depression symptoms, R 2 D ¼ .24, F(1, 137)

¼ 48.23, b ¼ .50, p < .001. Among respondents who had a more positive attribution style (i.e., below the sample mean),

32% exceeded the cutoff score for depression, whereas among those with a more negative attribution style (above the mean),

70% met this cutoff. The impact of multiple group member- ships also became less pronounced when depressive attribution

style was entered in the model, b ¼ �.17, p ¼ .018. In order to test Hypothesis 4, a mediation analysis with

10,000 bootstrap samples was conducted (Hayes, 2013, model

4). Multiple group memberships were included as the predictor,

with depression symptoms as the outcome variable. Depressive

attribution style was entered as the mediator. The indirect

effect (IE) of multiple group memberships was significant

(IE ¼ �.11, standard error [SE] ¼ .04, 95% confidence inter- val, CI [�.20, �.02]). In line with Hypothesis 4, a decrease

in depressive attribution style partially mediated the effect of

multiple group memberships on lower levels of depression

symptoms. The model is displayed in Figure 1.

We also tested the most plausible alternative mediation

model, in which depressive attributions predicted reduced mul-

tiple group memberships via increased depression symptoms.

This model did not provide a good fit to the data, as it explained

only 8% of the variance (compared to 32% of the variance in the hypothesized model) and attribution style was not a signif-

icant direct predictor of multiple group memberships (b ¼ �.09, p ¼ .377). However, the IE of attribution style on multi- ple group memberships was significant (IE ¼�.13, SE ¼ .06, 95% CI [�.25, �.02]).

Discussion

As hypothesized, participants with more group memberships

had lower levels of depression (Hypothesis 1) and were less

likely to make depressive attributions (Hypothesis 2). More-

over, depressive attributions were associated with higher

depressive symptoms (Hypothesis 3) and partially mediated the

relationship between multiple group membership and depres-

sion (Hypothesis 4). This study provides preliminary support

for the proposition that social identity can reduce depression

by attenuating depressive attribution style. In a sample of

highly stressed students, the availability of multiple social

identities protected against depression by encouraging a more

positive attribution style.

Although an alternative model predicting lower group mem-

berships through depression was also significant, this model

was less powerful than our hypothesized model. Of course,

with correlational data it is impossible to definitively determine

causal ordering of variables. To address this limitation, we

therefore conducted an experiment in which we manipulated

social identity salience.

Study 2

Study 2 investigated whether an experimental manipulation of

social identity salience could reduce depressive attributions

and negative mood following failure on a task. This design

would allow us to more confidently infer the causal role of

social identity in shaping depressive attributions. Negative

Multiple Group Memberships

Depressive Attribution Style

Depression Symptoms

-.21*

-.28** (-.17*)

.50**

Figure 1. Depressive attribution style partially mediates the relationship between multiple group memberships and depression symptoms. All numbers are standardized coefficients. Note. N ¼ 139. *p < .05. **p < .001.

68 Social Psychological and Personality Science 6(1)

mood was used as an analogue of depression because it was not

feasible to alter an individual’s depression symptoms in an

experimental context (for similar logic, see Klein et al.,

1976; Spielberger, Ritterband, Reheiser, & Brunner, 2003).

Social identities were made salient by asking participants in

three independent conditions to reflect on no groups (control),

one group, or three groups that they belong to. Rather than

investigating attributions during a period of high stress (as in

Study 1), all participants in Study 2 experienced failure on a

problem-solving task—a context in which, theoretically,

depressive attributions are most problematic.

The study tested the same four hypotheses as in the previous

study. More specifically, we anticipated that participants in the

social identity conditions (one group or three groups) would

have reduced negative mood (Hypothesis 1) and make more

positive attributions (Hypothesis 2) than those in the control

condition and that positive attributions would reduce negative

mood (Hypothesis 3) and mediate the relationship between

social identity salience and negative mood (Hypothesis 4).

Method

Participants and Design. Participants were 88 undergraduate psy- chology students (Mage ¼ 19.72, SD ¼ 3.86; 55 females) who received partial course credit for their participation. Partici-

pants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions

(none vs. one vs. three groups) and identity salience was

manipulated between subjects. After the manipulation, all par-

ticipants completed a problem-solving task and received failure

feedback before completing the dependent measures.

Materials and Measures Identity manipulation. In the control condition, participants

did not complete a written reflection task. In the two other con-

ditions, participants first read a short paragraph explaining

what constitutes a social identity (adapted from Haslam, Oakes,

Reynolds, & Turner, 1999). Participants in the one-group con-

dition then listed one group they belonged to and wrote about

‘‘why this group is an important part of who you are.’’ Partici-

pants in the three-group condition completed the same exer-

cise, listing three groups (Jones & Jetten, 2011). Most

participants took less than 5 min to complete the task.

Failure paradigm. The failure paradigm was presented to par- ticipants as a four-question problem-solving task (following

Carver & Scheier, 1982; Klein et al., 1976; Welch & Huston,

1982). The task involved four unsolvable questions developed in

accordance with previous attribution research (e.g., Mikulincer,

1989; Koole, Smeets, vanKnippenberg, & Dijksterhuis,

1999). The test was collected from participants after 5 minutes.

All participants received a score of 0 out of 4, provided in writ-

ing after a brief delay ostensibly to allow time for marking.

Failure manipulation check. Participants were asked to rate their performance on the problem-solving task, on a scale rang-

ing from 1 (very poor) to 7 (excellent).

Current mood. The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Wat- son, Clark, & Tellegen, 1998) was used to measure current

mood. Participants were given a list of emotions and asked to

rate ‘‘the extent to which you feel this way right now, that is,

at the present moment’’ on scales ranging from 1 (very slightly

or not at all) to 5 (extremely), a ¼ .88. The 10-item negative subscale was of central interest.

History of depression. Individuals with a history of depression are more likely to display depressive attributions (Garber &

Flynn, 1998; Giles, Etzel, & Biggs, 1989). To explore whether

this moderated the hypothesized model, participants’ history of

depression was measured by asking them to respond ‘‘yes’’ or

‘‘no’’ to the item ‘‘Have you ever been bothered for most of two

weeks either by feeling down, depressed or hopeless, or by lit-

tle interest or pleasure in doing things?’’ (Wulsin, 2012).

Depressive attribution style. As in Study 1, this was measured by means of the DAQ (Kleim et al., 2011, a ¼ .93).

Identity manipulation check. The item ‘‘I see myself in terms of my group memberships’’ was used to assess the impact of

the identity manipulation. Response options ranged from 1

(do not agree at all) to 7 (agree completely). Participants in the

social identity conditions (one group and three groups) were

expected to give higher responses than those in the control

condition.

A final open-ended question asked what participants

thought the experiment was about. This question was included

as a potential exclusion criterion.

Results

Four participants were excluded because they indicated strong

suspicion regarding the veracity of their failure feedback. The

final sample included 88 participants (control, n ¼ 31; one group, n ¼ 29; and three groups, n ¼ 28). A high number of participants (59.1%) responded ‘‘yes’’ to the question assessing previous depression history.

As can be seen in Figure 2, for all variables of interest the

one- and three-group conditions together differed significantly

from the control but were statistically no different from one

another. As mediation requires that categorical predictor vari-

ables have no more than two levels in each analysis (Hayes,

2013), we therefore collapsed the two social identity conditions

in the analyses that follow.

Manipulation Checks. On average, participants rated their perfor- mance on the problem-solving task as 1.27 (SD ¼ 0.81) on a 7- point scale, suggesting that the failure paradigm was successful.

The social identity manipulation check was also successful. Par-

ticipants in the combined social conditions reported thinking

about themselves in terms of group memberships (M1 group ¼ 3.48; M3 groups ¼ 3.64) more than participants in the control condition (Mcontrol ¼ 2.81), t(86) ¼�2.09, p ¼ .039. The social identity conditions did not differ from one another, t(55) ¼�0.36, p ¼ .723.

Cruwys et al. 69

Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2: Social Identity and Positive Attributions Protect Against Depression. Supporting Hypothesis 1, negative mood was significantly lower in the combined social

identity conditions (M1 group ¼ 15.73; M3 groups ¼ 16.36) than in the control condition (Mcontrol ¼ 19.35), t(86) ¼ 2.13, p ¼ .036. The social identity conditions did not differ from one another,

t(55) ¼�.36, p ¼ .722. Supporting Hypothesis 2, depressive attributions were sig-

nificantly lower in the combined social identity conditions

(M1 group ¼ 20.00; M3 groups ¼ 21.79) than in the control con- dition (Mcontrol ¼ 26.77), t(86) ¼ 2.14, p ¼ .036. Depressive attributions were no different across the two social identity

conditions, t(55) ¼�.54, p ¼ .592.

Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4: Positive Attributions Mediate the Protective Effect of Social Identities. Confirming Hypothesis 3, depressive attributions significantly predicted negative mood

when controlling for social identity salience, b ¼ .45, p < .001. The collapsed social identity conditions no longer signif-

icantly predicted negative mood with attributions in the model,

b ¼ �.12, p ¼ .206. A mediation analysis with 10,000 boot- strap samples was conducted to test Hypothesis 4 (Hayes,

2013, model 4), as presented in Figure 3. Supporting Hypoth-

esis 4, the IE was significant (IE ¼ �.11, SE ¼ .06, 95% CI [�.25, �.02]), indicating that depressive attribution style fully mediated the effect of social identity on negative mood.

To investigate whether history of depression moderated the

effect of social identity on depressive attribution style, a sensi-

tivity analysis was conducted in which history of depression

was included as a moderator (Hayes, 2013, model 7). The

moderation path was nonsignificant (b ¼�.12, p ¼ .246), sug- gesting that social identity salience was protective against

depressive attributions both for participants with and without

a history of depression.

Discussion

As hypothesized, an experimental manipulation of social iden-

tity salience reduced negative mood (Hypothesis 1) and depres-

sive attributions (Hypothesis 2). Depressive attribution style

predicted negative mood (Hypothesis 3), and this fully

mediated the protective benefits of social identity salience

(Hypothesis 4). These findings point to the causal role of social

identity in promoting a more positive attribution style and thus

protecting mental health.

Interestingly, there was no difference between the one-

group and three-group salience conditions in terms of their

capacity to buffer depressive attributions in the face of failure.

It is also worth noting that the effect sizes in the meditational

models are highly similar to those found in Study 1, despite the

different measures and methodology used in the two studies.

Finally, having a history of depression did not moderate the

effect of social identity on depressive attributions. This sug-

gests that social identification reduces depressive attributions

regardless of whether or not an individual has experienced

depression in the past.

General Discussion

Previous research has established a reliable link between social

identity and reduced depression, yet up to this point there has

been no clear evidence of the process by which this effect

might occur. To address this, we explored the possibility that

a novel mechanism is implicated in this so-called ‘‘social cure’’

effect—testing the idea that social identity acts to reduce

depression by promoting a more positive attribution style in

which blame for failure is minimized.

Correlational and experimental studies provided support for

our hypotheses. In Study 1, having multiple group member-

ships was associated with reduced depression. In Study 2, the

manipulated salience of social identity (one or three groups

vs. a control) served to reduce negative mood. In both cases, the

effects of social identity were mediated by reduced depressive

attributions. Although Study 1 showed multiple group member-

ships were associated with reduced depression, Study 2 showed

a

a

a

b

b

b

b

b

b

15

17

19

21

23

25

27

“I see myself in terms of

my group memberships”

Depressive attributions Negative mood

Social identity salience condition:

Control

1 group

3 group

Figure 2. Mean effects of social identity salience condition on the social identity manipulation check, depressive attributions, and negative mood. Note. Columns with ‘‘a’’ are significantly different from combined ‘‘b’’ within each variable at p < .05. Responses to ‘‘I see myself in terms of my group memberships’’ were scaled (multiplied by 7) so that all three variables could be presented in the same graph.

Social Identity Conditions

(vs. Control)

Depressive Attribution Style

Negative Mood

-.23*

-.24* (-.13)

.47**

Figure 3. Depressive attribution style mediates the relationship between social identity salience and negative mood. All numbers are standardized coefficients. Note. N ¼ 88. *p < .05. **p < .01.

70 Social Psychological and Personality Science 6(1)

that the salience of even one social identity was enough to have

this effect.

At a theoretical level, these findings confirm the capacity for

social identity to structure both cognition and perception

(Turner et al., 1994). The social identity approach, and in par-

ticular self-categorization theory, is a cognitive model that

posits that as individuals’ sense of self shifts to the collective

level, their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are filtered

through this collective lens (Turner & Oakes, 1997). However,

the focus of past research has predominantly been on the affec-

tive and behavioral consequences of social identity, rather than

on the cognitive and perceptual consequences (with some nota-

ble exceptions, e.g., Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, &

Turner, 1990; Haslam et al., 1999; Oakes et al., 1994). There-

fore, the present research is important not only because it elu-

cidates a mechanism for the protective benefits of social

identity but also because it provides evidence for the impact

of social identity on the way people perceive and understand

the world. Specifically, when individuals self-define in terms

of their social identity (or identities), they are more robust in

the face of stress (Study 1) and failure (Study 2), partly because

they are less likely to believe that the cause of this negative

event is something internal, stable, and global (e.g., ‘‘I’m just

not good enough’’). This research adds to the growing body

of work elucidating the positive benefits of social identity, par-

ticularly for mental health, which acts as a counterpoint to the

traditional focus of social identity research on negative conse-

quences such as discrimination and prejudice.

In addition, these findings have implications for clinical

psychology. Although attributions are a central concept in our

understanding of the development of depression (Gladstone &

Kaslow, 1995; Sweeney et al., 1986), very few studies have

investigated the origins and development of attribution styles.

Our findings demonstrate that attribution styles are not a ‘‘set

in stone’’ individual difference but are responsive to even quite

subtle experimental manipulations. This dovetails with other

findings that simple interventions, such as affirmations, can

modify attributions and subsequent mental health outcomes

(Peden, Rayens, Hall, & Beebe, 2001). This was true not only

for low-risk participants but also for those who reported a his-

tory of depression. As the success of many therapeutic

approaches hinges on the malleability of attributions (e.g.,

cognitive-behavior therapy; Beck, 2011; Kovacs & Beck,

1978), our findings are thus encoukraging for psychotherapists.

Conclusion

The present studies suggest that social identity ameliorates

depression not only because belonging to groups makes people

feel good. Instead they support the claim that social identity has

this impact because it restructures the way people understand

the world and, in particular, the way they interpret failure. This

has important implications for clinical practice, as it suggests

not only that attribution styles can be changed, but also that

they can be modified through social, not just clinical, means.

Indeed, rather than focusing clinical energies on trying to

alter depressive attributions in the abstract, these findings sug-

gest that fostering meaningful social connections may instead

be a more fruitful means of improving a person’s explanatory

style and mental health. A growing body of research

supports such an approach (Cruwys et al., 2013; Cruwys,

Haslam, Dingle, Jetten, et al., 2014), and it is also apparent that

efforts to boost the availability of social identities could prove

less expensive and time consuming than traditional forms of

psychotherapy. In short, as observed by Captain Ahab in Moby

Dick, it appears there is much to be gained from focusing less

on living life ‘‘only for ourselves,’’ and more on strengthening

the social fibers that serve to make that life meaningful and

purposive.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to

the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

This research was partially funded by an Australian Research Council

Laureate Grant no. FL110100199 (see http://www.arc.gov.au/). The

funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, deci-

sion to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

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Author Biographies

Tegan Cruwys, PhD, Australian National University, is a lecturer and

clinical psychologist at the University of Queensland. Her research is

at the intersection of social and clinical psychology, with a focus on

social identity processes in mental health.

Erica I. South graduated with first class honors in psychology in 2013

from the University of Queensland.

Katharine H. Greenaway, PhD, University of Queensland, is a glo-

bal scholar with the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, based

at the University of Queensland, Australia. Her research centres on

issues of control, including perceived life control and the exertion of

self-control.

S. Alexander Haslam, PhD, Macquarie University, is a professor of

psychology and Australian Research Council Laureate Fellow at the

University of Queensland, Australia. His research interests are in the

social psychology of health and well-being, stereotyping and preju-

dice, and organizational behavior.

74 Social Psychological and Personality Science 6(1)