Essays Guru- Wk 5 Case Anylsis

CASE 19-1

Cassandra Jenkins v. American Express Financial Corp.

Supreme Court of Minnesota 721 N.W.2d 286 (2006)

Cassandra Jenkins worked as an insurance specialist for American Express Financial Corporation. After being convicted of assaulting a nurse in 2004, she was sentenced to 30 days in jail, with work-release privileges scheduled to begin on April 18, 2004. Prior to serving her sentence, Jenkins notified her supervisor, Joel Hansen, of her conviction, sentence, and work-release privileges. Hansen said that Jenkins could continue her employment while on work release. When Jenkins reported to the workhouse on April 18, 2004, she discovered that her employer had not verified her employment. She attempted to contact Hansen multiple times, but he never verified her employment and then terminated her employment for absenteeism on April 26. Jenkins filed for unemployment benefits but was denied because the department adjudicator determined that Jenkins had been discharged by her employer for misconduct. Jenkins appealed, but the unemployment law judge (ULJ) upheld the denial of unemployment benefits. Jenkins appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed the department’s decision. Jenkins appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.

Justice Meyer

Whether an employee has engaged in conduct that disqualifies him from unemployment benefits is a mixed question of fact and law. Specifically, the determination of whether an employee was properly disqualified from receipt of unemployment compensation benefits is a question of law on which we are free to exercise our independent judgment.

An otherwise eligible employee will be disqualified from the receipt of unemployment benefits for a variety of reasons, including a discharge for employment misconduct. Employment misconduct is defined as “any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the job or off the job (1) that evinces a serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer has the right to reasonably expect of the employee, or (2) that demonstrates a substantial lack of concern for the employment.”

Absence from work under circumstances within the control of the employee, including incarceration following a conviction for a crime, has been determined to be misconduct sufficient to deny benefits. Importantly, though, we declined to adopt a rule that absenteeism resulting from incarceration was misconduct as a matter of law. Instead, we directed the agency to base its determinations “upon the facts in each particular case, [leaving] the commissioner … with the responsibility of finding the facts as to ‘good cause’ and ‘fault’ within the intent and purpose of the act.”

We turn to the facts of this case to determine whether the employee engaged in misconduct. The first statutory definition of misconduct is conduct “that evinces a serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer has the right to reasonably expect of the employee.” This definition is an objective determination: was the employer’s expectation for the employee reasonable under the circumstances? The court of appeals applied this definition and determined that because the absenteeism resulted from Jenkins’ criminal conviction it was misconduct because American Express was not obligated to verify Jenkins’ employment. The employer in this case does not argue that Jenkins’ off-the-job behavior violated its standard of behavior for its employees. Rather, the employer contends that it was the simple fact of Jenkins’ failure to report to work that violated the employer’s reasonable expectation.

But the facts here lead us to conclude that it was unreasonable for the employer to expect Jenkins to report to work by April 26: the employer allowed Jenkins to continue working between the time of her conviction in March and the time she reported to the workhouse in April; the employer knew in advance of April 18 that Jenkins would be able to participate in a work-release program if the employer verified her employment; the employer told Jenkins that employees in the past had been allowed to participate in work-release programs; the employer told Jenkins that she would be able to continue working while she served her sentence; Jenkins and others provided the employer with the name and phone number of the person to contact to verify Jenkins’ employment; and the employer failed to verify Jenkins’ employment despite good faith efforts on the part of Jenkins and others to obtain the verification.

Jenkins’ case is distinguishable from cases in which absenteeism due to incarceration was found to be misconduct: Grushus v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co.; Smith v. American Indian Chemical Dependency Diversion Project; and Smith v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado. In all three of those cases, the claimant simply failed to show up at work because he had been incarcerated. In both of the Smith cases, the claimant did not contact his employer until after he had missed work because he had been incarcerated. The Grushus case also involved deception to the employer as to the reasons for the claimant’s inability to return to work.

For the above reasons, we conclude that the first statutory definition of misconduct relied on by the court of appeals is not satisfied.

The second statutory definition of misconduct is whether the employee “demonstrate[d] a substantial lack of concern for [her] employment.” Committing a crime that results in a period of incarceration may be evidence that an employee lacked concern for her employment. In this case, however, there is substantial evidence that Jenkins’ inability to report to work was not caused by a substantial lack of concern for her employment. The record establishes that Jenkins made diligent efforts to report to work. She informed her employer of her conviction and the availability of work release to allow her to continue her employment; she obtained a verbal assurance from the employer that the employer would cooperate with the work-release program; as soon as she became aware that she would not be able to report to work because her employment had not been verified, she made every effort to contact the employer; and she provided her employer with the necessary information to permit her release from the workhouse. The evidence as a whole amply demonstrates that she engaged in significant attempts to report for work and continue her employment. Her conduct does not demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for her employment.

We hold that under the facts presented, Jenkins’ absence from work was not misconduct that disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits.

Reversed in favor of the Appellant, Cassandra Jenkins.

Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985

The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) ensures that employees who lose their jobs or have their hours reduced to a level at which they are no longer eligible to receive medical, dental, or optical benefits can continue receiving benefits for themselves and their dependents under the employer’s policy. By paying the premiums for the policy, plus up to a 2 percent administration fee, employees can maintain the coverage for up to 18 months, or 29 months for a disabled worker. Employees have 60 days after their coverage would ordinarily terminate to decide whether to maintain the coverage.

This obligation does not arise if the employee was fired for gross misconduct or if the employer decides to eliminate the benefit for all current employees. Employers who refuse to comply with the law may be required to pay up to 10 percent of the annual cost of the group plan or $500,000, whichever is less.

Workers’ Compensation Laws

Unlike many other laws affecting the employment relationship, workers’ compensation legislation is purely state law. Our coverage of this topic must, therefore, be rather generalized. Prudent businesspeople will familiarize themselves with the workers’ compensation statutes of the states within which their companies operate.

COVERAGE

Workers’ compensation laws provide financial compensation to employees or their dependents when the covered employee of a covered employer is injured on the job. For administrative convenience, most states exclude certain types of businesses and small firms from coverage. A few states also allow employers to “opt out” of the system. These states may likewise give the employee the opportunity to reject coverage.

workers’ compensation laws State laws that provide financial compensation to covered employees or their dependents when employees are injured on the job.

Workers’ compensation is said to be “no fault” because recovery does not depend on showing that the injury was caused by an error of the employer. Think of workers’ compensation as analogous to insurance: The employer pays premiums based on the frequency of accidents in the employer’s business, and the employees receive insurance-like benefits if injured.

To recover workers’ compensation benefits, the injured party must demonstrate that she or he is an employee as opposed to being an independent contractor. This distinction, discussed in Chapter 14, is based on the degree of control the employer can exert over the worker: The greater the degree of control, the more likely it is that the party will be considered an employee. Factors showing employer control include the employer’s dictating how the job is to be done, providing the tools to do the job, and setting the worker’s schedule. In contrast, in employer-independent contractor relationships, the employer generally specifies the task to be accomplished but has no control over how the task is done. A broker hired by a firm to sell a piece of property is an example of an independent contractor.

The employee must also establish that the injury occurred on the job, meaning it must have taken place during the time and within the scope of the claimant’s employment. Once an employee is on company property, the courts generally find that the employee was on the job, a finding based on the application of the so-called premises rule.

More difficult, however, is the situation of the employee who is injured on the way to or from work. If the employee works fixed hours at a fixed location, injuries on the way to or from work are generally noncompensable; but some states establish exceptions to this rule. For example, the special-hazards exception applies when a necessary means of access to the employer’s premises presents a special risk, even if the hazardous area is beyond the control of the employer. For example, if an employee must make a left-hand turn across a busy thoroughfare to enter the company parking lot, this situation has been held to be a risk of employment; therefore, employees involved in accidents while making the left-hand turn into their employer’s parking lot have been allowed compensation under this exception.

Another exception is when an employee is requested to run an errand for the employer on the way to or from work. Compensation is usually allowed for injuries sustained during the course of running the errand.

Sometimes, as a consequence of the job, an employee is forced to temporarily stay away from home. What if the employee is injured while away from home? In some states, reasonable injuries suffered while away from work are covered. In a New York case, a typist was required to travel to Canada to transcribe depositions. While showering in her hotel, she fell and injured herself. She filed a successful workers’ compensation claim.

The elements necessary for recovery under workers’ compensation laws are summarized in Exhibit 19-2.