The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

Creating the Palestinian State, Revisited Jerome M. Segal Jerome M. Segal is a philosopher at the University o f Maryland and president o f the Jewish Peace Lobby. He is presently writing his next book, The Palestinian Declaration of Independence.

The editors of the Palestine-Israel Journal (PIJ) asked me to look back at the proposals I made in my 1989 book, Creating the Palestinian State: A Strategy fo r Peace, to a) reflect on what has happened in the intervening 26 years, and b) to offer some thoughts about where the “Palestinians and all of us” should go from here. Part a) is published here; a fuller version including part b) is available online at the PIJ website (www.pij.org).

In the spring o f 1988 the first intifada was in its early months and had already achieved two big accomplishments: It had fully mobilized the Palestinian population in a way not seen in prior resistance to the occupation, and, it had won for the Palestinians worldwide attention and considerable sympathy for their plight. There was, however, a gaping hole: the absence of strategy. When you asked Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) about how the intifada was to lead to the independent Palestinian state they said they were seeking, you got one of two answers: Either they said that the issue o f grand strategy was up to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), or they invoked the idea of an international conference in which the Palestinians would be represented by the PLO and at which, somehow, the great powers — primarily the United States — would force upon Israel a Palestinian state and an end to the occupation.

Background In April 1988, I published in the Palestinian newspaper Al Quds an

essay entitled “From Uprising to Independence,” which recommended a unilateral Palestinian Declaration of Independence as the key element in a novel strategy for resolving the conflict. The core idea was that it was unrealistic to imagine that the two-state solution could be achieved either through imposition by the great powers or through negotiations.1 Instead, I

1 At the time not only did Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir oppose Palestinian statehood, but Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres did so as well.

72 PALESTINE-ISRAEL JOURNAL

argued the process should be reversed, with a Palestinian state coming first, to be followed by an end to the occupation and then negotiations to resolve key issues such as Jerusalem and refugees. This possibility o f starting with a Palestinian state, I maintained, was made possible by the intifada and could be imposed unilaterally by the Palestinians.

These ideas were further elaborated in Creating the Palestinian State: A Strategyfor Peace, and in late August, I gave Arafat a copy o f my manuscript when 1 met with him in Tunis. At the time of that meeting, the PLO had already decided to issue a declaration o f independence. This PLO decision had been triggered by Jordanian King Hussein’s July 30, 1988 speech in which Jordan disengaged from the West Bank. In addition, there appeared at this time the so-called “Husseini Document,” a Palestinian text laying out a plan for a declaration o f independence that partially overlapped with the strategy described in my Al Quds piece. Events moved quickly, and on Nov. 15, the PLO, meeting in Algiers, took an historic step: It issued a Declaration o f Independence proclaiming the State o f Palestine.

A Unilateral Strategy for Ending the Conflict The Declaration of Independence/Proclamation of the State was clearly

a unilateral act. But it does not follow that this act was embedded within a unilateral strategy. Indeed, as I will argue below, it can be maintained that the Declaration played a key role, not in advancing a unilateral strategy but in advancing the PLO’s international conference strategy and the subsequent bilateral negotiations strategy.

Within a unilateral strategy, declaring independence and proclaiming the State o f Palestine (SOP) was to be only the first o f many unilateral steps. It would not lead to an end o f the occupation and genuine statehood unless it actually produced a full Israeli withdrawal, and this would not happen unless in addition to being a unilateral strategy fo r statehood, and ending the occupation, it was also a unilateral strategy’fo r peace. Hence, the subtitle o f my book.

Specifically, as a peace strategy, three elements were required: 1) Proclaiming the Palestinian state and bringing it more fu lly into

existence, under conditions o f occupation. This meant going from the rudimentary governance o f the underground command which was already central to the intifada to a provisional government of the State o f Palestine engaged in maximally fea sib le governance. And it meant obtaining widespread international recognition o f the State o f Palestine.

2) Convincing the Israeli public that the proclaimed State of Palestine represented a sea change in traditional Palestinian objectives, that the PLO

20.2&3 73

was now committed to living in peace alongside Israel. Thus, the Declaration would have to be the opening act in a sustained unilateral Palestinian peace offensive, operating on multiple levels.

3) Securing an end to the occupation through internal and external pressure on a future Israeli government, to withdraw from what would come to be seen as another country (Palestine), and which was no threat and committed to lasting peace.

Following the November 15,1988 declaration, the stage was setforthe PLO to follow through with 1) and 2) above. To what extent did it do so?

Peace Offensive Here, the PLO deserves high marks. It made major steps towards

peace and did so unilaterally, without any quid pro quo from Israel. Most fundamental was the Declaration itself. It could have just declared the State o f Palestine. But it went well beyond that. It explicitly based that proclamation on the continuing legitimacy o f the Partition Resolution of 1947. In doing so, it redefined a central tenet of the Palestinian national movement, as found in the PLO Covenant which stated that “ [t]he partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment o f the state o f Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage o f time.” Moreover, in characterizing the (now legitimate) Partition Resolution, the Declaration specifically stated that it called for two states, “one Arab and one Jewish.” To this day, this remarkable step o f linking the legitimacy o f the State o f Palestine to the international legitimacy o f the creation of Israel, and noting that this extends to its Jewish character, remains largely unknown.

Further, within 30 days o f the Declaration, the PLO, through Arafat’s statements in Geneva, and to the satisfaction o f the Reagan administration, met the three U.S. conditions: it recognized Israel’s right to exist; it accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242; and it renounced terrorism.

These were major steps, though as part o f a peace strategy the PLO could have done even more. Specifically, I had suggested further unilateral steps, including:

* Announcing that the State o f Palestine was at peace with Israel, followed by naming and sending an ambassador to Israel.

* Enacting a constitution like that o f Costa Rica, committing Palestine to demilitarization.

* Enacting as law #1 o f the new state an anti-terrorism statute, which would be fully enforced.

N onetheless, with acceptance o f the Partition Resolution, the

74 PALESTINE-ISRAEL JOURNAL

renunciation o f terrorism and the recognition of Israel’s right to exist, the PLO had launched a unilateral peace offensive.

In the months to come, however, these messages were not regularly repeated and were not reinforced by steps on the ground. Ideally, the intifada should have ended all violence and moved to massive nonviolent protest. And more importantly, the PLO should have acted vigorously against terrorist attacks, regardless o f whatever Palestinian faction was involved.2 Overall, however, it was an impressive start.

Bringing the State of Palestine More Fully into Existence Where the PLO really faltered was in not taking further steps to bring

the state into existence. Specifically, it failed to establish a provisional government and, consequently, it failed to maximize the extent to which self-governance could have been actualized in the West Bank and Gaza.

The Husseini Document, which in a somewhat muddled way was suspended between a unilateral strategy and the international conference/ negotiations strategy, was very explicit in its call for a provisional government once the state had been proclaimed. Specifically, it called for a national parliament that would include personalities from the OPT whose names would appear in the Declaration itself. It even provided a list o f 150 people, and it spoke o f an interim administrative body to be established in the occupied territories, one that would deal with “health, education, welfare, law, police, agriculture, industry, commerce, construction, electricity, water, municipalities, press and media.”

Moreover, the 19th PNC which proclaimed the Declaration that November, also passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a provisional Government “as soon as possible,” and it entrusted the Executive Committee of the PLO with the powers and responsibilities of the provisional government until such time as it was established. This resolution stated that the provisional government “shall be composed of Palestinian leaders, notables and skilled human resources within the occupied homeland and outside.” Yet, other than Arafat being named president o f Palestine and Farouk Kadoumi being named foreign minister, no government was ever established. Inside the “occupied homeland,” where the intifada has initiated a state-building process, no leaders were given governmental authority.

In my writings, I had gone a good deal further. Specifically, I had called fo r the PLO to go out o f existence, to be replaced by the State o f Palestine.

2 In June 1990, in the absence o f a strong PLO response, the George H.W. Bush administration broke off dialogue with the PLO following an attack on Tel Aviv beaches by the Palestine Liberation Front.

20. 2&3 75

Thus, the entire international apparatus o f the PLO would now function as the representative o f the new state, and a new constitution would replace the PLO Covenant, which would become an historic artifact with the PLO no longer in existence. This, I argued, more than any other step, would signify a new beginning.

Once established, the new government would:

* Organize elections in the OPT, possibly secret elections, or possibly as public events that dared the Israeli government to suppress them.

* Re-open public schools, again challenging Israel to close them. * Issue a currency, ideally a coin with intrinsic value to ensure its

circulation. * Issue passports to Palestinian both inside and outside the territories.

Most fundamentally, I urged that the provisional government start functioning as a government. It could legislate in all areas o f the law. It could establish a police force and a court system. If necessary, the courts could function outside the territories. None o f this occurred. The state had been proclaimed, but it did not govern, which is to say, it did not exist.

The Declaration, Resolution 242 and the Negotiations Strategy The failure o f the PLO to establish a government o f Palestine, and

the failure of the Executive Committee which had temporary governmental

PLO Chariman Yasser Arafat proclaiming the Palestinian declaration o f Independence in Tunisia on November 15, 1988.

76 PALESTINE-ISRAEL JOURNAL

authority to begin functioning as a government, may suggest that the PLO was never really serious about bringing the State o f Palestine into existence under conditions of occupation. One might be tempted to conclude that though the Declaration of Independence was a unilateral act, and while it was part o f a peace offensive, there really never was a unilateral strategy.

Along these lines, it can be pointed out that the Declaration played a critical role within a different strategy — in advancing the PLO towards an international conference and negotiations. Arafat was sharply focused on being viewed as a legitimate player by the United States. The key to official contact with the U.S. was the requirement that the PLO meet the three conditions, o f which the most problematic was acceptance o f UNSC Resolution 242, not for what 242 said, but because o f what it didn’t say. It never mentioned the Palestinians. In the elaborate and extended dance between the PLO and the U.S. over 242, the Palestinian position was always that they would affirm 242 coupled with an affirmation of the Palestinian right to self-determination. And the U.S., for its part, remained unmoved in its insistence that 242 be accepted without any linkage to Palestinian self- determination. When in December 1988 the PLO found a way to accept 242 without mentioning self-determination, it was able to do this because in unilaterally proclaiming the Palestinian state the Palestinian people had already exercised their right to self-determination. This was both a logical point and an essential fact o f political psychology — the self-assertion o f the unilateral declaration in November made unilateral concessions possible in December.

The Quest for Recognition of the State of Palestine: 1988-90 Despite all this, it goes too far to say there was no unilateral strategy at

all, to characterize the Declaration o f Independence as an isolated unilateral act that served to advance the preexisting strategy of seeking an international conference and negotiations. It was more than that, as can be seen in what followed the Declaration: a prolonged struggle between the U.S. and the PLO as the PLO sought to obtain international recognition o f the State of Palestine and its admission to the UN and an array of other organizations. Starting immediately after the Declaration and lasting a year and a half, the PLO pushed ahead, and the U.S. countered with an enormous effort to thwart international recognition o f Palestine.

On the country level, Palestine was recognized by around 100 states, but the U.S. was able to hold the line with the European democracies. Organizationally there were showdowns in the UN General Assembly, UNESCO, the World Health Organization and other organizations, as well

20.2&3 77

as a fight over the accession o f Palestine to the Geneva Protocols. In the main, by threatening to cut off funds for the UN and UN-affiliated agencies, the U.S. was able to block admission of Palestine to international bodies. The PLO pursued this diplomatic struggle to advance its unilateral assertion o f statehood with great determination and vigor, despite the fact that it severely strained U.S.-PLO relations, just when the U.S. was viewed as the key to PLO achieving international legitimacy and participation in both an international conference and subsequent negotiations.

Oslo and the End of Unilateralism

The year and a half following the Declaration is thus best viewed as a period o f dual strategies, a period in which, in some dimensions, the unilateral strategy was vigorously pursued, and in other dimensions it withered. Gradually, however, it was largely abandoned. At Madrid, the long-sought international conference occurred, but it was hardly the empowered conference the PLO had wished for. Mostly it was a gateway to bilateral negotiations, and the PLO was focused on ensuring that it, not Jordan, and not an independent delegation o f West Bank notables, would represent the Palestinians. In this struggle over representation, the PLO was ultimately successful, the culminating act being the 1993 exchange o f letters in which the PLO straightforwardly recognized Israel’s right to exist, and Israel recognized the PLO as representing the Palestinian people.

In all o f this, there was no mention at all o f the State o f Palestine. The Olso agreement o f 1993 read as though the Declaration o f Independence of 1988 had never happened. And two years later, with the signing o f the Oslo II agreement, the PLO formally abandoned unilateralism. The PA had been created, not unilaterally but through negotiations, and it was made explicit that it was not a state and possessed no sovereign powers. Moreover, in the Oslo II agreement the PLO agreed that “[njeither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome o f the permanent status negotiations.” This was a pledge to not return to the already abandoned unilateral strategy.

It is now 22 years since the first o f the Oslo Accords was signed, committing Israel and the PLO to bilateral negotiations to end the conflict. For all its early promise, this process has failed to bring a Palestinian state into existence, failed to end the occupation and failed to end the conflict. Looking back, it is hard not to believe that things would have gone far better had the PLO fully committed to a unilateral peace strategy in 1988 and stayed the course.

78 PALESTINE-ISRAEL JOURNAL

Copyright of Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture is the property of Palestine-Israel Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.