

Chapter One

Russian Soft Power

Hard Power in a Velvet Glove

INTRODUCTION: US SOFT POWER AND THE FATHER OF PERESTROIKA

During Khrushchev's East-West thaw, US President Dwight Eisenhower made a proposal for something unheard of before: an academic exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. The proposal was accepted by the Soviets and started in September 1958. One of the seventeen students sent by the Central Committee was Aleksandr Yakovlev. Yakovlev studied for one academic year at Columbia University. Later he would become Soviet ambassador to Canada and a close friend and source of inspiration of Mikhail Gorbachev, which earned him the nicknames *godfather of glasnost* and *father of perestroika*. According to his biographer, Christopher Shulgan,

Yakovlev sometimes denied the influence of the West on his political thinking. At various times, in various ways, he insisted his time in the West did not change him. "It simply did not," he said on one occasion. This attitude seems like revisionism. Yakovlev acknowledged, in more conciliatory moods, that his time in the West influenced his reformist convictions. He was particularly reluctant to discuss America's influence on him. However, his year at Columbia seems certain to have helped forge the unusually democratic sentiments that defined his 1960's work in Propaganda [Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party].¹

Eisenhower's exchange program was certainly not set up to convert young Soviet academics (which, incidentally, would have proved difficult, since most of Yakovlev's Russian exchange colleagues were KGB spies). Howev-

er, giving young Russians a rare chance of living in the United States for a year exposed them to the “soft power” of American society. In the modern world you don’t need to *live* in another country to become attracted by its soft power. Hollywood movies that were watched in the 1950s in the local cinemas of small towns in Africa, Latin America, and Asia did a lot more to propagate the “American way of life”—including its values and aspirations—than any US government-sponsored initiative could have done. The same is true for music and fashion. In a Russian book with the telling title *Glyadya na Zapad* (*Looking West*), the authors describe the attraction of Western pop music and fashion for Russian youth. “At the end of the 1990s,” they write, “the West continued to be the most important orientation point in the cultural identification of ‘progressive’ [Russian] youth.”²

WHAT IS SOFT POWER?

Soft power is not only an important concept, it is also a rather *new* concept. It was used for the first time by the American political scientist Joseph S. Nye Jr., in his book *Bound to Lead*,³ published in 1990. However, it only became a new catchword in the international political discourse after the publication, in 2004, of Nye’s book *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*.⁴ From that moment, “soft power” began to be used by a broader public. The new concept evoked what Germans call an *Aha Erlebnis*: it seemed to express exactly the meaning of an existing phenomenon for which one had not yet found an adequate description. Nye’s introduction of the concept “soft power” resembled to some extent Freud’s invention of the word “unconscious” in the nineteenth century. This, too, was a phenomenon many already had felt existed but for which they had not yet found an adequate expression. Why did this new concept of “soft power” find a worldwide reception so quickly? A key may well be found in the subtitle Joseph Nye gave his 2004 book: *The Means to Success in World Politics*. He presented soft power as a highly valuable and profitable asset for policy makers because of its purported impact on the success or failure of a country’s foreign policy objectives. In the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, it seemed one of the decisive factors that had contributed to the West’s final prevalence over the Soviet bloc.

But what exactly *is* soft power? According to Nye, it is

the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced. America has long had a great deal of soft power. Think of the impact of Franklin Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms in Europe at the end of World War II; of young people behind the Iron Curtain listening

to American music and news on Radio Free Europe; of Chinese students symbolizing their protests in Tiananmen Square by creating a replica of the Statue of Liberty.⁵

The dynamic force of soft power, explained Nye, is *attraction*. This is, indeed, very different from more classical definitions of power. The sociologist Max Weber, for instance, defined power as “any opportunity to impose one’s own will within a social relationship, even in the face of resistance, no matter what might be the basis of that opportunity.”⁶ For Weber, the essence of power is that one person prevails over the other *even in the face of resistance*. In a more extreme way, the same is expressed in the definition of power given by Mao Zedong, who said that “power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” The characteristic of *soft* power is that there exists no resistance needing to be overcome, and certainly no guns have to be used: others adapt to our objectives because they feel sympathetic towards us and have interiorized our objectives as their own. This interiorization is based on the attraction of our political ideals and actual policies. On a lower level, soft power is based on the attraction of a country’s culture, art, language, music, fashion, landscape, or cuisine.

Nye’s concept has been criticized from many sides. David Marquand, for instance, called it “a slippery concept; and in real life the distinction between it and ‘hard power’ is apt to slither into a bog of semantic confusion.”⁷ Marquand added: “Mahatma Gandhi was perhaps the twentieth century’s supreme exemplar of soft power in action, but as he himself acknowledged, his success in using it depended on British willingness to allow him to do so. He would not have got very far if India had been ruled by the Nazis.”⁸ This last observation may be true; however, it does not invalidate the concept. Its essential characteristic remains: that soft power is based on attraction, on exemplarity, on its model function for others, making it a source of inspiration beyond national borders.

SOFT POWER IS A VARIABLE CURRENCY

Soft power is generally considered a characteristic *par excellence* of Western societies, especially of the United States. We should not forget, however, that the—now defunct—Soviet Union also had, in its time, its own soft-power sources—a fact of which Nye is aware. “In terms of soft power,” he wrote, “following World War II communist ideology was attractive in Europe because of its resistance to fascism and in the Third World because of its identification with the popular movement toward decolonization.”⁹ Successes in space exploration also played a role in boosting Soviet soft power. According to Innokenty Adyasov, a Russian analyst, “Yury Gagarin was the best instrument of Soviet soft power: never, perhaps, in the post-war world

was sympathy towards the USSR so great and here also the personality of the earth's first cosmonaut had an impact."¹⁰ This soft-power reservoir, however, was depleted when the Soviet leadership decided in 1968 to crush the Prague Spring and communism as an ideology gradually lost its appeal throughout the world. Soviet soft power reached its nadir in 1991 when the Soviet Union broke up and communism lost its status as official state ideology.

In 2009 Sergey Karaganov, a Russian analyst, wrote that Russia had to use "hard power, including military force, because it lives in a much more dangerous world and has no one to hide behind from it, and because it has little soft power—that is social, cultural, political and economic attractiveness."¹¹ And Konstantin Kosachev, a Russian Duma member, wrote: "We can say that practically the whole post-war period of our relationship with the U.S. and the West . . . took place under the banner of soft power. And clearly we should admit that, apparently, we were not up to the challenge—however, as concerns hard power, the field of *hard security* [English in the original] we were inferior to no one."¹² This assessment is shared by Joseph Nye in *The Future of Power*. "In terms of soft power," writes Nye, "despite the attractiveness of traditional Russian culture, Russia has little global presence."¹³ Russians envied and resented Western soft power while at the same time criticizing it for its supposed hypocrisy. Yury Kaslev, for instance, in a book on the Helsinki process published in 1980, writes:

In general, the discussion on human rights, artificially imposed by the American delegation during the meeting in Belgrado, showed, in the first place, that this was done for propagandistic reasons in the framework of the well-known policy of the administration in Washington to proclaim the United States "the champion of human rights in the world," secondly, that the United States in practice is not respecting human rights at home . . . , [and] was trying to use the human rights topic as a means to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries.¹⁴

In the 1970s and 1980s Soviet Russia was clearly on the defensive. However, soft power is not an asset that can be taken for granted. After the subprime crisis in 2008, which was followed by a worldwide financial and economic crisis, Western, and especially US, soft-power attractiveness suffered a severe blow. A Japanese commentator wrote: "The Japanese are less and less attracted by American culture. American *soft power* seems to have diminished and according to specialists such a phenomenon has never been known before."¹⁵ American soft power, he continued, "is diminishing progressively in the archipelago, although for the Japanese the United States represented a dream, with its technology, its democracy, its egalitarian relationships between couples. They were not only attracted by the 'city on the hill,' but also by its counter-culture, for instance the protests against the war in Vietnam."¹⁶

This sentiment that US soft power has declined in the past decade was also expressed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, who said that due to the war in Iraq, "I do think that we have unfortunately delegitimized ourselves."¹⁷ He added: "Then, the American dream was widely shared. Today, it isn't."¹⁸

Similar observations were made in the French daily *Le Monde*, but this time on the declining soft power of Europe. Under the title "Europe No Longer Makes Asians Dream,"¹⁹ the story explains that Asian countries—due to the never-ending euro crisis—began to question Europe's proud soft-power model: European integration. The fact that the EU received the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize probably did little to compensate for this loss of soft power. Even if the combined soft-power potential of the United States and Europe still remains considerable, one has to admit that it is a far cry from its strength at the beginning of the 1990s. In this period the Soviet empire crumbled, the United States organized a broad international coalition under the aegis of the UN against Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, and in Maastricht the European Community transformed itself into a "European Union"—ready to expand with fourteen new countries and to make an important next step towards integration with the introduction of a single currency. "The end of history," announced in 1989 by Francis Fukuyama in an article in *The National Interest* and further elaborated by him in a book in 1992,²⁰ was in fact nothing else than a celebration of the West's soft-power dominance at that specific historical moment. Fukuyama could not imagine that any other political and economic system could, in the future, compete with the West. He was wrong. Now, in the present day, we are witnessing the emergence of competing political models, of which Putinism is a leading example. These models, although superficially resembling the Western model and presenting themselves as democratic market economies, are, in fact, authoritarian semi-state economies. Competition from these alternative models is taking place at a historical moment when the West's soft-power dominance is no longer self-evident. According to Moisés Naím, "Soft power is, at the very least, a volatile concept, highly vulnerable to short-term twists in world affairs, in an environment where news travels more rapidly than ever."²¹ We should, indeed, not forget that soft power is a currency that—as any currency—has no constant and stable value but undergoes important variations.

HOW TO MEASURE SOFT POWER?

One of the problems with Nye's concept of soft power was that it remained, indeed, a rather vague concept. Jeanne Wilson spoke about "the amorphous nature of soft power as a concept, the absence of a set methodology for measurement, a lack of comparable data, and the inherently subjective nature

of constructing indicators.”²² What also did not help was that Nye broadened his concept over the years. In his book *The Future of Power* (2008) he added economic resources and even military power as possible soft-power assets (the latter in the form of offering training facilities and disaster relief). The method most frequently used to measure soft power was through opinion polls. This was how Anholt-GfK Roper, for instance, composed its annual *Overall Nation Brands Index*. In the index for 2010, the United States ranked number one, followed by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom in second, third, and fourth places, respectively. Russia came in at twenty-first place, just before Luxembourg and China.

A more elaborate and objective method to measure soft power was developed by the London-based Institute for Government. In its 2010 report it weighed a number of objective criteria concerning culture, government, diplomacy, education, and business/innovation.²³ The outcomes of these objective criteria were complemented by a subjective evaluation by an experts’ panel. In the resulting *Soft Power Index Results*, twenty-six countries were analyzed. The same four countries came on top as in the Overall Nations Brands Index, but in a different order: France was number one, the United Kingdom second, the United States third, and Germany fourth. Russia came in at the twenty-sixth and last place.²⁴ In the 2011 report the method was further fine-tuned and improved. Now the United States came in at number one, followed respectively by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Russia went down to the twenty-eighth place (of a total of thirty countries).²⁵ However, the author of the report warned against too much optimism. He wrote that

Observed in isolation, the results of the index might produce a false sense of security for the world’s developed countries. But comparing the recent approaches to soft power taken by the established and emerging powers throws up some interesting questions, namely how long can the West’s soft-power hegemony last? In the current context of sustained fiscal austerity for the West, soft-power assets have been among the most tempting budget lines for governments to cut. [At the same time,] emerging powers have been investing in their capacity to generate and project soft power.²⁶

“MYAGKAYA SILA”: THE HISTORY OF THE SOFT-POWER DEBATE IN RUSSIA

In Russia the concept “soft power” attracted only little attention at first. Unlike in China, Nye’s book *Bound to Lead*, in which the concept made its first appearance, was not translated. According to Jeanne Wilson, “The East-view Universal Database, the largest repository of journals and newspapers available in the Russian language does not indicate a reference to soft power

until 2000.”²⁷ In the period 2000–2012, this database listed 334 articles that referred to “soft power” in the text and 32 articles that contained “soft power” in the title.²⁸ Neither Putin during his first two presidencies nor Medvedev during his presidency seemed to have used the concept.

Several factors point to why in Russia the debate on “soft power”—in Russian, *myagkaya sila*—started rather late. First was the fact that a concept such as “soft power” was completely at odds with the Russian tradition and the Russian way of thinking. In tsarist Russia as well as in the Soviet Union, power tended to be unilaterally defined as *zhestkaya sila*, or “hard power.” The foreign policy of both regimes was characterized by their emphasis on military power while internally the authorities often resorted to brutal violence and police repression. To understand the new concept of “soft power,” a complete reversal of these traditional ways of thinking was necessary.

A second reason for the late reception of the “soft-power” concept was the fact that Russians considered “soft power” a typical *American* concept. From Russia’s perspective, it looked like a new fad, invented by American political scientists, which had, maybe, relevance for the United States but no direct implications for Russia’s situation. A real interest in the new concept arose only after the “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet space: the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine—popular movements which swept away corrupt and undemocratic regimes. At this point, the Kremlin woke up to the new reality that soft power could, eventually, be used as a very effective weapon.

HOW DID RUSSIA ASSESS ITS OWN SOFT-POWER POTENTIAL?

The color revolutions were a watershed moment in the Kremlin’s thinking on soft power. Russian politicians and political analysts suddenly recognized that in the modern, globalized, and interconnected world of the twenty-first century, characterized by a growing role for the internet and social media, soft power had become an important strategic asset. For the Kremlin it was a rude awakening. Observations about the dire state of Russian soft power, made earlier in the West, now also began to surface in the Russian media. Alexander Lukin, director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), for instance, wrote:

The Soviet Union offered an alternative to bourgeois civilization and quite a number of people would long view it as a rising ideal society, for which they were ready to sacrifice their lives. Today’s Russia does not offer anything—apart from its mineral resources—that would deserve at least some interest, to say nothing of sacrificing one’s life. Its soft power, nonaggressive attraction, and moral and ideological influence have dropped to zero. It does not promote either a democratic ideal (similar to the United States) or a fundamentalist

ideal (similar to some Islamic countries and movements). It does not serve as a model of successful integration on the basis of democracy (like the EU) or a pattern of speedy development (like China that has aroused global interest with the so-called “Beijing Consensus” as an alternative to the “Washington Consensus”). Russia is not a crucial and useful ally for anyone (the way Japan is for the U.S.) or anyone’s bitter enemy (like Iran is for the U.S.). Naturally, someone can say that the world has a large number of countries that do not offer anything special to mankind (e.g. the small states of Europe). But they do not claim the role of independent centers of power, to say nothing of being separate civilizations, since they are part of the European one. In the meantime, an attempt to integrate Russia into Europe flopped, and that is why Russia must look for ways to consolidate its own soft power and seek things that it could offer to the rest of the world, albeit not on the Soviet scale of the past.²⁹

Lukin’s gloomy but realistic assessment was that Russia’s soft power had “dropped to zero.” While Lukin still stuck to Nye’s definition that soft power is the power of attraction, this was no longer the case for two other Russian authors, Latukhina and Glikin, who defined soft power as

the ability to influence the development of a political situation abroad with the help of specially deployed experts and polit-technologists—sort of agents of influence. Russian political scientists like to give the example of the local branches of the Soros Foundation and the Carnegie Center, which are in an effective way active throughout the world, “spreading democracy.” We don’t have such agents of influence in whom we can put our hope and whom we could finance. Russian soft power is completely powerless, we might even say that such a power, in general, does not exist.³⁰

While these authors shared Lukin’s observation that Russian soft power “dropped to zero,” writing that it simply “does not exist,” something else here catches the eye. It is the explicit redefinition of soft power, which is reduced to a simple tool of manipulation in the hands of hostile governments. American NGOs are considered to be “agents of influence” sent abroad by “polit-technologists.” An “agent of influence” is defined by *Wikipedia* as “an agent of some stature who uses his or her position to influence public opinion or decision making to produce results beneficial to the country whose intelligence service operates the agent.” Soft power here is put into a conspiratorial context and becomes an instrument in the hands of hostile secret services. Also the use of the word “polit-technologists” is telling. In Putin’s Russia, “polit-technologists” are those experts who, like Vladislav Surkov, the former deputy head of the presidential administration, manipulate the political system, including the elections, in the Kremlin’s favor.

THE TRIPLE REDUCTION: HOW THE “SOFT-POWER” CONCEPT WAS REDEFINED IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

This trend of changing the content and meaning of Nye’s soft-power concept has become mainstream in contemporary Russia. The concept underwent, in fact, a *triple* reduction. The first step was to reduce the broad concept of soft power to one of its constituent parts: public diplomacy. This means that soft power—which in Nye’s definition is a power emanating from *both* civil society and the state—was reduced to an instrument used by the state to influence foreign governments and manipulate foreign public opinion. The fact that it is a country’s civil society in particular that produces soft power was lost out of sight. By reducing soft power exclusively to a policy of the state, conducted with the aim to enhance its hard power, the *focus* of soft power also was changed.

This was the second reduction: from a non-zero-sum game, soft power became a zero-sum game with winners and losers. In Nye’s definition, the soft power of one country does not hinder or diminish the soft power of another country. The four countries that are the world’s soft-power champions, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, do not fight a “soft-power war,” nor do they “attack” the soft power of their “rivals” (assuming for a moment that this would be possible). The only way to become number one in the league of “soft-power champions” is to become more attractive. In this beauty contest, you don’t become more beautiful by denigrating or attacking the other participants. You win because you have the best qualifications.

The reduction of soft power to political diplomacy, conducted by the state, led to an additional—third—reduction of Nye’s original concept. Because the Kremlin regarded soft power exclusively as a constituent part of an overall hard-power game, the meaning of soft power became totally inverted, and even illegal activities, such as bribery and espionage abroad, could be presented as useful instruments of a country’s “soft-power arsenal.”

VLADIMIR PUTIN’S CONCEPT OF “SOFT POWER”: HARD POWER IN A VELVET GLOVE

These three reductions of Nye’s soft-power concept can clearly be observed in the way in which Vladimir Putin describes “soft power” in a manifesto for his third presidency published in the *Moskovskie Novosti* in February 2012:

There is a concept, such as soft power, a complex of instruments and methods to achieve foreign policy objectives without the use of weapons, which include the use of information and other means. Unfortunately, these methods are often used to cultivate and provoke extremism, separatism, nationalism, ma-

nipulation of public opinion, [and] direct intervention in the internal politics of sovereign governments. The distinction must be made clearly between where there is freedom of expression and normal political activity, and where illegal instruments of “soft power” are used. . . . However, the activity of “pseudo-NGOs” [and] other structures which, with outside support, have the aim to destabilize the situation in this or that country, is unacceptable.³¹

Putin spoke here about the soft power of the West and the activities of what he called “pseudo-NGOs” working within Russia and receiving financial support from the West. He could not believe that the activities of these NGOs could be inspired by a genuine desire to promote the cause of democracy, to protect human rights, or to work for an independent judiciary. For him, these NGOs were all “foreign agents.”³²

All the elements of the redefined, reduced version of Nye’s soft-power concept are present in Putin’s text. Soft power is defined as “a complex of instruments and methods to achieve foreign policy objectives.” Soft power is conceived, therefore, as an exclusively *state* affair. Soft power is for him also an integral part of a *hard*-power game. The message is that Russia should develop its own soft-power arsenal in order to prevail in this zero-sum power game. The weapons in this soft-power game include “the use of information and other means.” For Putin, the former spy master, “information” has a broad meaning, and it includes, undoubtedly, the intelligence of the secret services. This vision is shared by a Russian analyst, who wrote: “Putin emphasizes that his understanding of ‘soft power’ includes, quite precisely, the use of illegal instruments, ‘undercover work’ (*rabotu pod prikrytiem*).”³³ On September 3, 2012, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev reiterated in a speech at the Russian Foreign Ministry the need for Russia to further develop its soft-power tools. This “may look to an outside observer like an optimistic signal and a long-awaited change in Russia’s foreign policy,” wrote Dumitru Minzarari. “This benign view, however, could not be more wrong. Rather, the Kremlin is seeking to exploit the Western concept of ‘soft power’ . . . and reframing it as a euphemism for coercive policy and economic arm-twisting.”³⁴

We find this reframing of the Western “soft-power” concept already in the “Basic Guidelines Concerning the Policy of the Russian Federation in the Sphere of International Cultural-Humanitarian Cooperation,” an official document published in 2010 as a complement to the Foreign Policy Concept of 2008. These “Basic Guidelines” begin with the observation that “culture, in the realization of Russia’s foreign policy strategy, plays a special role.”³⁵ “It is increasingly evident,” the text continues, “that the global competition takes on a cultural dimension. Among the fundamental games in the international arena the struggle for cultural influence is becoming more intense.”³⁶ There-

fore, write the authors, the government should not only “actively support the competitiveness of the [different] branches of the national culture” but also take care that an “objective and favorable image of our country” will be formed, that “the number of Russia’s friends grows,” and that “anti-Russian political and ideological attitudes are neutralized.”³⁷ According to the guidelines, “Cultural diplomacy becomes [also] increasingly important in efforts with the aim of actively counteracting the propaganda campaign [conducted] under the banner ‘containment’ of Russia.”³⁸

What immediately catches the eye here is the martial, almost warlike terminology that is used. One speaks about a “struggle” that is “becoming more intense,” about “anti-Russian attitudes” that should be “neutralized,” about a Western “propaganda campaign” that should be “counteracted.” Apparently, the authors of this paper have sought their inspiration in Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” rather than in Joseph Nye’s soft-power concept. The authors claim to promote an “objective and favorable image” of Russia. A few lines further, they make this “objective image” more explicit, writing: “Making use of specific forms and methods of influencing public opinion, cultural diplomacy, as no other instrument of ‘soft power,’ convincingly expresses the rebirth of the Russian Federation as a free and democratic society.”³⁹ The problem, however, is that neither foreigners, nor many Russians, consider today’s Russian Federation “a free and democratic society.” And only a few will agree with the statement that “Russia’s dynamic cultural life [takes place] in conditions of pluralism and free creativity, pluralism of opinions, and absence of censorship.”⁴⁰

Putin, however, considers the negative image of Russia in the West not as a consequence of the immanent flaws of the Russian political system but rather as a result of actions of Western governments and the Western media to blacken Russia’s reputation. In a speech to the ambassadors in July 2012, he said that

Russia’s image abroad is formed not by us and as a result it is often distorted and does not reflect the real situation in our country or Russia’s contribution to global civilisation, science and culture. Our country’s policies often suffer from a one-sided portrayal these days. Those who fire guns and launch air strikes here or there are the good guys, while those who warn of the need for restraint and dialogue are for some reason at fault. But our fault lies in our failure to adequately explain our position. This is where we have gone wrong.⁴¹

In the same vein, he stated in his concluding speech at the 2014 Valdai Club conference: “Total control of the global mass media has made it possible when desired to portray white as black and black as white.”⁴²

For the Kremlin, the solution seemed simple: Russian state agencies should get the task to debunk Western misinformation and to provide “real,”

"truthful" information. Giving truthful information on Russia is certainly desirable. As Greg Simons remarked, "Truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive, we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that."⁴³ He added: "One of the problems encountered by Russian public diplomacy relates to the credibility, and therefore to the believability of the messenger. This is especially the case if the messenger is tied to the Russian authorities, owing in no small part to the strong anti-democratic reputation that has been gained in the post-Yeltsin era (from the year 2000)."⁴⁴

NOTES

1. Christopher Shulgan, *The Soviet Ambassador: The Making of the Radical behind Perestroika* (Toronto, Ontario: McClelland & Stewart, 2008), 291.
2. Hilari Pilkington, "Pereosmyslenie 'Zapada': Stil i Muzyka v Kulturnoy Praktike Rossiyskoy Molodezhi," in Hilari Pilkington, Elena Omelchenko, Moya Flynn, Uliana Bludina, and Elena Starkova, *Glyadya na Zapad: Kulturnaya Globalizatsiya i Rossiyskie Molodezhnye Kultury* (Saint Petersburg: Aleteiya, 2004), 186.
3. Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
4. Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
5. Nye, *Soft Power*, x. In *Bound to Lead*, Nye spoke also about "co-optive power": "Co-optive power is the ability of a nation to structure a situation so that other nations develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with one's own nation. This type of power tends to arise from resources as cultural and ideological attraction as well as the rules and institutions of international regimes" (191).
6. Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie*, Erster Halbband, herausgegeben von Johannes Winckelmann (Cologne and Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1964), 38 (my translation).
7. David Marquand, *The End of the West: The Once and Future Europe* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011), 154.
8. Marquand, *The End of the West*, 155.
9. Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 168–169. Cf. Nye, *Bound to Lead*, 188–189: "In the early postwar period, the Soviet Union profited greatly from such strategic software as Communist ideology, the myth of inevitability, and transnational Communist institutions."
10. Innokenty Adyašov, "Vozmozhnaya li rossiyskaya 'myagkaya sila'?" *Regnum* (May 7, 2012).
11. Sergei Karaganov, "Russia in Euro-Atlantic Region," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (November 24, 2009). English version available at <http://karaganov.ru/en/news/98>.
12. Konstantin Kosachev, "Myagkaya Sila' kak faktor sblizheniya?" (May 18, 2012), <http://baltija.eu/news/read/24577>.
13. Nye, *The Future of Power*, 170, 209. In this book Nye introduces the new concept of "smart power," which combines hard- and soft-power strategies.
14. Y. B. Kashlev, *Razryadka v Evrope: Ot Helsinki k Madridu* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1980), 78.
15. "L'Amérique ne fait plus rêver" (originally published in *Tokyo Shimbun*), translated in *Courrier International* no. 1129 (June 21–27, 2012).
16. "L'Amérique ne fait plus rêver."
17. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "U.S. Fate Is in U.S. Hands," *TNI Interview, The National Interest* no. 121 (September/October 2012), 12.
18. Brzezinski, "U.S. Fate Is in U.S. Hands," 14.
19. François Bougon, "L'Europe ne fait plus rêver les Asiatiques," *Le Monde* (July 1–2, 2012).
20. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London and New York: Penguin, 1992).
21. Moisés Naim, *The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn't What It Used to Be* (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 148.
22. Jeanne L. Wilson, "Soft Power: A Comparison of Discourse and Practice in Russia and China," *Social Science Research Network* (August 2012), 3, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2134457>.
23. Jonathan McClory, *The New Persuaders: An International Ranking of Soft Power* (London: Institute for Government, 2010). The culture subindex includes measures such as the annual number of incoming tourists, the global reach of the country's language, and Olympic sporting successes. The government subindex gives measures for the quality and effectiveness of the system of governance as well as for individual liberty and political freedom. The diplomatic subindex includes measures for the global perception of a country and its ability to shape a positive national narrative abroad. The education subindex gives measures for a country's ability to attract foreign students and the quality of its universities. The business/innovation subindex includes figures for openness and innovation, competitiveness, and corruption.
24. McClory, *The New Persuaders*, 5.
25. Jonathan McClory, *The New Persuaders II: A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power* (London: Institute for Government, 2011), 15.
26. McClory, *The New Persuaders II*, 20.
27. Jeanne L. Wilson, "Soft Power," 5–6.
28. Jeanne L. Wilson, "Soft Power," 6.
29. Alexander Lukin, "From a Post-Soviet to a Russian Foreign Policy," *Russia in Global Affairs*, no. 4 (October–December 2008), available at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/print/number/n_11886.
30. Kira Latukhina and Maksim Glikin, "Politicheskie Zhivotnye," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (April 1, 2005).
31. Vladimir Putin, "Rossiya i menyayushchiysya mir" (Russia and the Changing World), *Moskovskie Novosti* (February 27, 2012).
32. It is interesting to compare Putin's attitude towards foreign-government-funded agencies with that of the Indian leader Nehru. John Kenneth Galbraith, who was US ambassador to India at the beginning of the 1960s, told how Sargent Shriver, the founding head of the US Peace Corps, came to visit Nehru. "I warned him," wrote Galbraith, "that in the Indian mood of the time, and that of Jawaharlal Nehru in particular, the Peace Corps would be regarded as a rather obvious example of the American search for influence." Shriver presented to Nehru a project which would "help the most needy of the Indian needy" in Punjab. "When he [Nehru] eventually replied, it was to ask why the enterprise had to be so small, why it had to be limited to only one Indian state. He thought the idea excellent, regretted only the evident limitations." John Kenneth Galbraith, *Name-Dropping: From F.D.R. On* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 123–124.
33. Mikhail Moskvina-Tarkhanov, "Vladimir Putin i 'myagkaya sila,'" *Svobodnyy Mir* (February 27, 2012).
34. Dumitru Minzarari, "Soft Power with an Iron Fist: Putin Administration to Change the Face of Russia's Foreign Policy toward Its Neighbors," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 9, no. 163 (September 10, 2012). We should emphasize, however, that this interpretation of soft power is that of the dominant *siloviki* faction of the political elite. Igor Yurgens, for example, the chairman of the board of the Institute of Contemporary Development, a liberal pro-business think tank, wrote: "Even if we . . . can tell the world about our culture, [and] historical heritage, we will not be attractive in Europe and North America if we have not completed the development of our democratic institutions and structures of civil society. Only these can become true ambassadors of Russian culture in the world." (Cf. Igor Yurgens, "Zhestkiy vyzov 'myagkoy sily,'" *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (September 16, 2011).)