

ACROSS CULTURAL DIVIDES: THE VALUE OF A SUPERORDINATE IDENTITY

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Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.
—Emma Lazarus

DESPITE this promising invitation, the relations among racial, ethnic, and religious groups in the United States have traditionally been tense and problematic. In a nation founded on principles of justice and equality, prejudice and discrimination pervade intergroup relations and are embedded in official policies (Feagin and Feagin 1996; Feagin and Sikes 1994). This contradiction between principle and practice, recognized over fifty years ago (Myrdal 1944), has been characterized as the "American Dilemma."

The contemporary social attitudes of *individuals*, particularly those in the majority group, reflect an analogous contradiction. Aversive racism [see Dovidio and Gaertner 1991, 1996, 1998; Dovidio, Mann, and Gaertner 1989; Gaertner and Dovidio 1986; Gaertner, Dovidio, and Banker et al. 1997; Kovel 1970], for instance, has been identified as a modern form of prejudice that characterizes the social attitudes of many whites who endorse egalitarian values and regard themselves as nonprejudiced, but harbor, perhaps unconsciously, negative attitudes toward minorities. These negative attitudes are expressed in subtle, rationalizable forms of discrimination. Whereas traditional forms of prejudice are direct and overt, aversive racism is indirect and subtle. Most of the work on aversive racism examines whites' attitudes toward blacks, but similar dynamics are also involved in attitudes toward Latinos (Dovidio et al. 1992) and women (Dovidio and Gaertner 1983; Swim et al. 1995).

Evidence of the American dilemma, at both the national and individual levels, is apparent today. On the one hand, the expressed social attitudes of whites are becoming consistently more positive, tolerant, and accepting. Negative stereotyping of blacks and Latinos has declined (Davis and Smith 1994; Devine and Elliot 1996; Dovidio and Gaertner 1986; Dovidio et al. 1992; Karlins, Coffman, and Walters 1969), and whites' acceptance of minority group members across a range of formal (for example, work) and informal (for example, social) settings is at an unprecedented high (Dovidio et al. 1996; Dovidio et al. 1992; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). For example, in 1958 the majority of whites reported that they would not be willing to vote for a well-qualified black presidential candidate; in 1994 over 90 percent said that they would (Davis and Smith 1994). Social beliefs and attitudes have changed dramatically.

On the other hand, the United States is still "two nations" (Hacker 1995), with gaps between blacks and whites in social, economic, and personal well-being remaining large, and in some areas, growing. Minorities are increasingly underrepresented in industry, government, and the military in positions of higher status, prestige, and control (Dovidio, Gaertner, and Bachman, in press). The majority of blacks in America today have a profound distrust for the police and legal system, and about one-third are overtly distrustful of whites in general (Anderson 1996). Bias in the treatment of both Latinos and blacks in judicial, hiring, and promotion decisions is amply documented (Dovidio, Smith, et al. 1997; Stephan and Stephan 1986). These disparities are rooted in cultural biases—involving language and custom—as well as in individual and institutional biases (Jones 1997; see also Crocker and Lawrence, this volume; Ramirez 1988). Thus, despite the rapid improvement of expressed social attitudes, significant racial and ethnic disparities persist.

The United States is entering the next millennium in the midst of fundamental demographic change. Projections indicate that 50 percent of the children in U.S. schools will soon represent groups of color. These figures promise unprecedented opportunities for intergroup contact, whether out of necessity in a multicultural workforce or by choice. From different sectors, voices have been asking, "Is contact enough to ensure harmonious, equitable relations between members of different groups?" The answer is clearly no. Social psychologists have known for some time that contact between members of different groups is not sufficient to guarantee harmonious, nonbiased intergroup relations (see Allport 1954; Brewer and Miller 1984; Hewstone and Brown 1986). In fact, contact can often exacerbate intergroup bias and increase open conflict (Sherif and Sherif 1969). However, under certain conditions, intergroup contact can be one of the most effective strategies for combating

and eliminating intergroup bias. This chapter explores the psychological processes underlying bias and examines how intergroup contact may be structured to reduce this bias. Specifically, we address three interrelated questions: What are the psychological processes that contribute to the development and maintenance of intergroup bias? Given these processes, how can intergroup contact effectively reduce bias? And how can the benefits of intergroup contact generalize and extend to other group members who are not present?

The purpose of this chapter is to address these questions from the perspective of social psychology and also to provide an overview of our own work on the Common Ingroup Identity Model and to illustrate how this model speaks to these issues (Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner, Rust, et al. 1994, 1996). We begin by considering some basic cognitive and motivational consequences of categorizing people into different groups and the contribution of this awareness to intergroup bias.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BIAS: THE ROLE OF CATEGORIZATION

One universal and essential facet of human thinking is the individual's ability to sort quickly and effectively the many different objects, events, and people he or she encounters into a smaller number of meaningful categories (Hamilton and Troler 1986; Hamilton and Sherman 1994). Categorization enables the individual to make quick decisions about incoming information: the instant an object is categorized, it is assigned the properties shared by other category members. Time-consuming consideration of each new experience is forfeited because it is usually wasteful and unnecessary. Categorization often occurs spontaneously on the basis of physical similarity, proximity, or shared fate (Campbell 1958). In this respect, people may be characterized as "cognitive misers": we compromise total accuracy for efficiency when confronted with the often overwhelming complexity of our social world (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Macrae, Milne, and Bodenhausen 1994).

The process of social categorization, however, is not completely uncontrollable and unalterable. Categories are hierarchically organized, and higher-level categories (such as animals) are more inclusive of lower-level ones (cats and dogs, for example). When a perceiver's goals, motives, past experiences, and expectations are modified, as well as factors within the perceptual field and the situational context more broadly, the level of category inclusiveness that will be primary in a given situation can be altered. Although the easiest and most common way of forming impressions is to perceive people in terms of a social

category, appropriate goals, motivation, and effort can produce more individuated impressions of others (Brewer 1988, Fiske and Neuberg 1990). This malleability of the level at which impressions are formed—from broad to more specific categories to individuated responses—is important because of its implications for altering the way people think about members of other groups, and consequently about the nature of intergroup relations.

When people or objects are categorized into groups, actual differences between members of the same category tend to be perceptually minimized (Tajfel 1969) and often ignored in making decisions or forming impressions. Members of the same category seem to be more similar than they actually are, and more similar than they were before they were categorized together. In addition, although members of a social category may be different in some ways from members of other categories, these differences tend to become exaggerated and overgeneralized. Thus, categorization enhances perceptions of similarities within groups and differences between groups—emphasizing social difference and group distinctiveness. For social categorization, this process becomes more ominous because these within- and between-group distortions have a tendency to generalize to additional dimensions (such as character traits) beyond those that differentiated the categories originally (Allport 1954). Furthermore, as the salience of the categorization increases, the magnitude of these distortions also increases (Abrams 1985; Brewer 1979; Brewer and Miller 1996; Deschamps and Doise 1978; Dion 1974; Doise 1978; Skinner and Stephenson 1981; Turner 1981, 1985).

Moreover, in the process of categorizing people into groups, people typically classify themselves *into* one of the social categories (and *out of* the others). The insertion of the self into the social categorization process increases the emotional significance of group differences and thus leads to further perceptual distortion and to evaluative biases that reflect favorably on the ingroup (Sumner 1906), and consequently on the self (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Perhaps ethnocentrism is so prevalent in part because these biases operate even when the basis for the categorization is quite trivial, as when group identity is assigned randomly (Billig and Tajfel 1973).

Tajfel and Turner (1979) proposed that an individual's need for positive self-identity may be satisfied by membership in prestigious social groups. Thus, this need motivates social comparisons that favorably differentiate ingroup from outgroup members. According to this perspective, the individual also defines or categorizes the self along a continuum of social identity that ranges from the self as the embodiment of a social collective or group to the self as a separate individual with personal motives, goals, and achievements. At the latter extreme, the indi-

vidual's personal welfare and goals are most salient and important. At the group level, the goals and achievements of the group are merged with those of the individual (see Brown and Turner 1981), and the group's welfare is paramount. At each extreme, self-interest is represented by the pronouns *I* and *we*, respectively. Intergroup relations begin when people think about themselves as a group member rather than as a distinct individual.

Although the categorization process may place the individual at either extreme of the continuum from social identity to personal identity, Brewer's (1991) Theory of Optimal Distinctiveness suggests that there is a point along the continuum that optimally satisfies the individual's identity needs. At some intermediate point, the individual's need to be different from others and need to belong and share a sense of similarity to others are balanced. Optimally, perceiving one's group as especially positive and distinctive relative to other groups satisfies both needs simultaneously. Unfortunately, one consequence of this process is intergroup bias. Thus, social categorization into ingroups and outgroups lays the foundation upon which intergroup bias or ethnocentrism develops.

Social categorization leads people to favor ingroup members in reward allocations (Tajfel et al. 1971), in esteem (Rabbie 1982), and in the evaluation of the products of their labor (Ferguson and Kelley 1964). Ingroup membership decreases psychological distance and facilitates the arousal of promotive tension or empathy (Hornstein 1976). Relatedly, prosocial behavior is offered more readily to ingroup than to outgroup members (Pillavin et al. 1981). In addition, people are more likely to be cooperative and to exercise more personal restraint when using endangered common resources when these are shared with ingroup members rather than with others (Kramer and Brewer 1984). People retain more information in a more detailed fashion for ingroup members than for outgroup members (Park and Rothbart 1982), have better memory for information about ways in which ingroup members are similar to the self and outgroup members are dissimilar (Wilder 1981), and remember less positive information about outgroup members (Howard and Rothbart 1980). Moreover, people are more generous and forgiving in their explanations for the behaviors of ingroup members relative to outgroup members. Positive behaviors and successful outcomes are more likely to be attributed to the internal, stable characteristics (the personality) of ingroup members, whereas negative outcomes are more likely to be ascribed to the personalities of outgroup members (Hewstone 1990; Pettigrew 1981). Relatedly, observed behaviors of ingroup and outgroup members are encoded in memory at different levels of abstraction (Maass et al. 1989). Undesirable actions of outgroup members are encoded at more abstract levels that presume intentionality and disposi-

tional origin (for example, "she is hostile") than identical behaviors of ingroup members ("she slapped the girl"). Desirable actions of outgroup members, however, are encoded at more concrete levels ("she walked across the street holding the old man's hand") relative to the same behaviors of ingroup members ("she is helpful").

These cognitive biases help to perpetuate social biases and stereotypes even in the face of countervailing evidence. For example, because people encode positive behaviors of outgroup members at relatively concrete levels, they are less likely to generalize their counterstereotypic positive behaviors across situations or other outgroup members (see also Karpinski and Von Hippel 1996). People do not remember the "helpful" nature of an outgroup member, but only his or her concrete descriptive actions. Thus, people are not likely to let their outgroup stereotypes that contain information pertaining to traits, dispositions, or intentions be influenced by their observations of counterstereotypic outgroup behaviors.

Language also plays a role in intergroup bias through associations with collective pronouns. Collective pronouns, such as "we" or "they," that are used to define people's ingroup or outgroup status are frequently paired with stimuli that have strong affective connotations. As a consequence, these pronouns may acquire powerful evaluative properties of their own and can increase the availability of positive or negative associations and thereby influence beliefs about, evaluations of, and behaviors toward other people, often automatically and unconsciously (Perdue et al. 1990).

Whereas social categorization can initiate intergroup biases, the type of bias it initiates represents primarily a pro-ingroup orientation rather than an anti-outgroup orientation, usually associated with hostility or aggression. Nevertheless, disadvantaged status due to preferential treatment of one group over another can be as pernicious as discrimination based on anti-outgroup orientations (Murrell et al. 1994). Pro-ingroup biases can also provide a foundation for generating hostility and conflict that can result from intergroup competition for economic resources and political power.

Because categorization is fundamental to intergroup bias, social psychologists have targeted this basic process as a place to begin to improve intergroup relations. In the next section, we explore how the forces of categorization can be harnessed and redirected toward the elimination of intergroup bias.

REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS

Although it may be impossible to short-circuit the categorization process altogether, the levels of category inclusiveness people use when

categorizing other people, including themselves, may be open to change. It may also be possible to alter whether people identify themselves as distinct individuals or as group members on the continuum proposed by Tajfel and Turner 1979; (see also Brewer 1988; Brewer and Miller 1984; Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Wilder 1978). From these perspectives, it is possible to engineer a *recategorization* or *decategorization* of perceived group boundaries in ways that reduce the original intergroup bias and conflict (see Wilder 1986).

In each case, reducing the salience of the original group boundaries is expected to decrease intergroup bias. With recategorization as proposed by the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner et al. 1993), if members of two different groups are induced to conceive of themselves as a single, more inclusive superordinate group, rather than as two separate groups, attitudes toward former outgroup members should become more positive through processes involving pro-ingroup bias. In terms of decategorization, if these memberships are induced to conceive of themselves and others as separate individuals (Wilder 1981) or to have more personalized interactions with one another, intergroup bias should also be reduced (Brewer and Miller 1984); more personalized contact should degrade pro-ingroup biases and undermine the validity of outgroup stereotypes (Miller, Brewer, and Edwards 1985).

Theoretically, the rationale for these changes in intergroup bias rests on two related conclusions from Brewer's (1979) analysis that fit nicely with social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner 1975) and with self-categorization theory (Turner 1985). First, intergroup bias often takes the form of ingroup enhancement rather than outgroup devaluation. Second, the formation of a group brings ingroup members closer to the self, whereas the distance between the self and non-ingroup members remains relatively unchanged. Thus, when an ingroup forms, or when an individual assumes a group-level identification, the egocentric biases that favor the self are transferred to other ingroup members. Increasing the inclusiveness of group boundaries enables some of the cognitive and motivational processes that contributed initially to intergroup bias to be redirected or transferred to former outgroup members. If ingroup and outgroup members are induced to conceive of themselves as separate individuals rather than as group members, former ingroup members no longer benefit from the egocentric biases transferred to the group when they self-categorized as group members.

The recategorization and decategorization strategies and their respective means of reducing bias were directly examined in a laboratory study (Gaertner et al. 1989). In this experiment, members of two separate, laboratory-formed groups were induced through various structural interventions (for example, the seating arrangement) either to recategorize themselves as one superordinate group or to decategorize themselves

and to conceive of themselves as separate individuals. These changes in the perceptions of intergroup boundaries supported the value of altering the level of category inclusiveness, thus reducing bias. Furthermore, as expected, these strategies reduced bias in different ways. Recategorizing ingroup and outgroup members as members of a more inclusive group reduced bias by increasing the attractiveness of the former outgroup members. Decategorizing members of the two groups by inducing conceptions of themselves as separate individuals decreased bias by decreasing the attractiveness of former ingroup members. Consistent with Turner's (1985) theory of self-categorization, "the attractiveness of an individual is not constant, but varies with the ingroup membership" (60).

These ideas about recategorization and decategorization have also been used to explain how the apparently loosely connected diverse features specified by the contact hypothesis may operate psychologically to reduce bias. Allport's (1954) revised contact hypothesis proposed that for contact between groups to be successful, certain features must be present, including: equal status between the groups; cooperative (rather than competitive) intergroup interaction; opportunities for personal acquaintance between the members, especially with those whose personal characteristics do not support stereotypic expectations; and supportive norms by authorities within and outside of the contact situation. Although this prescription has not been easy to implement, there is evidence to support its efficacy when these conditions are present, particularly for changing attitudes toward the people who happen to be in the contact setting (Cook 1984; Johnson, Johnson, and Maruyama 1983; Pettigrew 1998).

Decategorization and Personalization

Offering a provocative, conceptually unifying theoretical framework, Brewer and Miller (1984) proposed that the features specified by the contact hypothesis (equal status, cooperative interaction, self-revealing interaction, and supportive norms) share the capacity to *decategorize* group boundaries and to promote more differentiated and personalized conceptions, particularly of outgroup members. When people have a more differentiated representation of outgroup members, they recognize that there are different types of outgroup members (for example, sensitive as well as tough professional hockey players), and thus the effects of categorization, and the tendency to minimize and ignore differences between category members, are weakened. When interactions are personalized, ingroup and outgroup members move toward the individual end of the individual-group social identity continuum. People "attend to information that replaces category identity as the most useful basis for classifying each other" (Brewer and Miller 1984, 288).


During personalized interactions, the individual focuses on information about an outgroup member that is relevant to the self (as an individual rather than as a group member). Repeated personalized interactions with a variety of outgroup members should over time undermine the value of the individual's category stereotype as a source of information about members of that group. Thus, he or she should be able to generalize the effects of personalization to new situations as well as to unfamiliar outgroup members. For the benefits of personalization to be generalized, however, it is, of course, necessary for outgroup members' group identity to be salient, although not primary, during the interaction to enable the group stereotype to be weakened.

A number of experimental studies provide evidence supporting this theoretical perspective (Bettencourt et al. 1992; Marcus-Newhall et al. 1993; Miller et al. 1985). In the study by Miller and his colleagues (1985), for example, contact that permitted more personalized interactions (for example, when interaction was person-focused rather than task-focused) resulted in more positive attitudes not only toward the outgroup members present but toward other outgroup members viewed on video. Thus, these conditions of intergroup contact reduced bias in both an immediate and generalizable fashion (see also Pettigrew 1997).

Although there are similarities between the perception of ingroup and outgroup members as "separate individuals" and "personalized interactions" with outgroup members, these are related but theoretically distinct concepts. Personalization involves receiving self-relevant, more intimate information about outgroup members that enables the individual to differentiate each outgroup member from the others when comparing them with his or her own self. In contrast, structurally perceiving either outgroup members alone (see Wilder 1986) or both ingroup and outgroup members as separate individuals is perceiving them as individuals, not as groups. Doing so is not necessarily based on information exchange. For example, strangers waiting for a bus may regard themselves as separate individuals, not a group. Thus, increasing the perception that outgroup members are separate individuals by revealing the variability in their opinions or having them respond as individuals rather than as a group renders each such member more distinctive and thus potentially blurs the prior categorization scheme (Wilder 1978). Another decategorization strategy is to criss-cross category memberships by repeatedly forming new subgroups, each composed of members from former subgroups; this changes the pattern of who's "in" and who's "out" (Brewer et al. 1987; Commins and Lockwood 1978; Deschamps and Doise 1978; Vanbeselae 1987) and can also render the earlier categorization less salient (Brown and Turner 1981).

In addition to decategorization, we propose that the features specified by the contact hypothesis also reduce bias through recategoriza-

FIGURE 6.1 The Common Ingroup Identity Model



tors (for example, common goals or fate) that are perceived to be shared by the memberships.

Once outgroup members are perceived as ingroup members, they are accorded, we propose, the benefits of ingroup status heuristically and

tion, which increases rather than decreases the level of category inclusiveness (Gaertner et al. 1993, 1994; Gaertner, Rust, et al. 1996). That is, these contact conditions facilitate a reduction in bias in part because they share the capacity to transform members' representations of the memberships from separate groups to a more inclusive social entity. We do not necessarily, however, regard the decategorization and recategorization frameworks as mutually exclusive theoretically; we believe they are capable of working in parallel and complementary ways. Given the complexity of intergroup attitudes, it is plausible that these features of contact operate through several related as well as different pathways. In the next section, we present support for the Common Ingroup Identity Model and the effects of recategorization, and we discuss the value of a "dual identity": original group identities are maintained, but within the context of a superordinate identity.

The Common Ingroup Identity Model

In contrast to decategorization approaches, recategorization is not designed to reduce or eliminate categorization but rather to define groups at a higher level of category inclusiveness so as to reduce intergroup bias and conflict. Specifically, we hypothesize that if members of different groups are induced to conceive of themselves within single groups rather than within completely separate groups, attitudes toward former outgroup members become more positive through processes involving pro-ingroup bias (Gaertner et al. 1993).

This model identifies potential antecedents and outcomes of recategorization, as well as mediating processes. Figure 6.1 summarizes the general framework and specifies the causes and consequences of a common ingroup identity. Specifically, we hypothesize that the different types of intergroup interdependence and cognitive, perceptual, linguistic, affective, and environmental factors can either independently or in concert alter individuals' cognitive representations of the aggregate (for example, Dovidio et al. 1995). The resulting cognitive representations (one group, two subgroups with one group, two groups, or separate individuals) then lead to the specific cognitive, affective, and overt behavioral consequences (listed on the right). Thus, the causal factors (listed on the left, they include features specified by the contact hypothesis) influence people's cognitive representations of the memberships (center) that, in turn, mediate the relationship, at least in part, between the causal factors and cognitive, affective, and behavioral consequences. In addition, we propose that common ingroup identity may be achieved by increasing the salience of existing common superordinate memberships (for example, in a school, a company, or a nation) or by introducing fac-

in stereotyped fashion. Ingroup members are likely to have more positive thoughts and feelings, and to engage in more positive behaviors (listed on the right), toward these former outgroup members after categorizing them as ingroup members. These more favorable impressions of outgroup members are not likely to be finely differentiated, at least initially (see Mullen and Hu 1989). Rather, we propose, more elaborated, personalized impressions can soon develop within the context of a common identity because the newly formed positivity bias is likely to encourage more open communication and greater self-disclosing interaction between former outgroup members. Over time a common identity encourages personalization of outgroup members and thereby initiates a second route to achieving reduced bias.

The development of a common ingroup identity does not necessarily require that each group forsake its less inclusive group identity completely. As Ferdman (1995) notes, every individual belongs to multiple groups. For example, Rodriguez-Scheel (1980) found that Chicanos in Detroit chose nonethnic categories, such as religion, occupation, and family, as often as ethnic labels to describe themselves. As depicted by the "subgroups within one group" (dual-identity) representation, people can conceive of two groups (for example, parents and children) as distinct units within the context of a superordinate (family) identity. When group identities and the associated cultural values are central to members' functioning, or when they are associated with high status or highly visible cues to group membership, it would be undesirable or impossible for members to relinquish their group identities or, as perceivers, to be "color-blind." Indeed, demands to forsake their group identities or to adopt a color-blind ideology would be likely to arouse strong reaction among members, resulting in especially poor intergroup relations (see Schofield 1986). If, however, people were to continue to regard themselves as members of different groups but all playing on the same team, or as part of the same superordinate entity, intergroup relations between these subgroups would be more positive than if people considered themselves members of separate groups only (see Brewer and Schneider 1990).

Tests of the Model Among the antecedent factors proposed by the Common Ingroup Identity Model (listed on the left) are the features of contact situations—such as interdependence between groups, equal status, and egalitarian norms (Allport 1954)—that are necessary for intergroup contact to be successful. From this perspective, cooperative interaction, for example, enhances positive evaluations of outgroup members (an affective consequence listed on the right) at least in part because cooperation transforms members' representations of the memberships from separate groups to one group.


From this recategorization perspective, cooperation among Sherif and Sherif's (1969) groups of summer campers increased positive attitudes toward outgroup members because it changed members' perceptions of one another from "us and them" to a more inclusive "we." To test this hypothesis directly, we conducted a laboratory experiment that brought two three-person laboratory groups together under conditions designed to vary independently the members' representations of the aggregate as one group or two groups (by varying factors such as seating arrangement), as well as the presence or absence of intergroup cooperative interaction. In the absence of cooperative interaction, participants induced to feel like one group relative to those whose separate-group identities were reinforced reported that the aggregate did feel more like one group. They also had lower degrees of intergroup bias in their evaluations (likable, cooperative, honest, trustworthy) of ingroup and outgroup members. We regard this as an important preliminary finding because it helps to establish the causal relation between the induction of a one-group representation and reduced bias, even in the absence of intergroup cooperation.

Supportive of the hypothesis that cooperation reduces bias, the results showed that among participants induced to feel like two groups, the introduction of cooperative interaction increased their perceptions of being one group and also reduced their bias in evaluative ratings relative to the bias of those who did not cooperate during the contact period. As predicted by the Common Ingroup Identity Model, bias was reduced after cooperation was introduced because evaluations of outgroup members became more favorable. Consistent with Brewer's (1979) analysis, cooperation appeared to move the new ingroup members closer to the self.

Consistent with our mediation hypothesis, cooperation induced for- mation among members of the two groups and also reduced bias. In addition, more direct support for the mediation hypothesis was revealed by the multiple regression mediation approach, a form of path analysis (see Baron and Kenny 1986). This analysis indicated that the influence of the introduction of cooperation on more positive evaluations of outgroup members was substantially reduced when the mediating effects of group representations and perceptions of cooperation and competition were considered. Furthermore, consistent with our model, only the one-group representation, among these potential mediators, related independently to evaluations of outgroup members.

The advantage of the experimental design is that we know that cooperation preceded the changes in participants' representations of the aggregate from two groups to one group, as well as the changes in intergroup bias. Also, when we manipulated only the representations of the

FIGURE 6.2 The Contact Hypothesis and the Common Ingroup Identity Model



Notes: Thick bold lines depict reliable ($p < .05$) paths. Thick bold lines that become thinner depict reliable direct paths that become significantly less reliable when the mediators are considered. Thin dash lines indicate that the direct paths are no longer reliable after the mediators are considered.

aggregate (that is, we did not introduce cooperation), we know that the one-group representation preceded changes in intergroup bias. Such certainty regarding the direction of causality is not afforded by our correlational studies of the effects of contact hypothesis variables on intergroup bias that we conducted involving more natural contexts. However, we can rely on the results of the experimental study to at least support the plausibility of the direction of causality proposed by our model as it is applied to the study of the effects of cooperation and the other features specified by the contact hypothesis on intergroup harmony in more natural contexts.

Three survey studies conducted in natural settings across very different intergroup contexts offered converging support for the hypothesis that the features specified by the contact hypothesis increase intergroup harmony in part because they transform members' representations of the memberships from separate groups to one, more inclusive group. Participants in these studies included 1,353 students attending a multi-ethnic high school (Gaertner, Rust, et al. 1994, 1996); 229 banking executives who had experienced a corporate merger involving a wide variety of banks across the United States (Bachman 1993; Bachman and Gaertner 1999), and 86 college students who were members of blended families whose households were composed of two formerly separate families trying to unite into one (Banker 1997; Banker and Gaertner 1998).

To provide a conceptual replication of the laboratory study of cooperation, the surveys included items (specifically designed for each context) to measure participants' perceptions of the conditions of contact (equal status, self-revealing interaction, cooperation, equalitarian norms), their representations of the aggregate (one group, two subgroups within one group, two separate groups, and separate individuals), and a measure of intergroup harmony or bias. For example, contact hypothesis items measuring participants' perceptions of equal status between the groups included items such as "Teachers at this school are fair to all groups of students," "Employees from organization A [participants' company] and organization B are seen as equal members of the merged organization," and "My stepparent treats me, my siblings, and stepsiblings equally." Participants' cognitive representations of the aggregate as one group were measured by the items "Despite the different groups at school, there is frequently a sense that we are just one group," "Within the merged organization, it feels like one group," and "Living in my house, it feels like one family." Also, for each context, items were designed to measure the extent to which participants maintained a dual identity: "Although there are different groups at school, it feels like we are playing on the same team," "Within the merged organization, it

feels like two subgroups within one group," and "Living in my house, it feels like two smaller families within one larger family."

Although the measures of intergroup bias or harmony were different across the three contexts, each study included some measure of affective reactions (such as feeling good, respectful, happy, awkward) to ingroup and outgroup members. For the high school study, the main outcome measure was bias in these affective reactions. For the corporate merger study, the main measure of bias was the extent to which the corporate executives perceived members of organizations A and B to have different work-related characteristics (intelligent, hardworking, organized, skilled, creative). In the stepfamily study, the major dependent measure involved stepfamily harmony (for example, "I would characterize the environment at my house as harmonious"). Within each setting, composite indices were created for each of the major components of our model—that is, the conditions of contact, the representations, and intergroup harmony or bias.

As in our laboratory study, the data from each survey study were examined with the multiple regression mediation analysis described by Baron and Kenny (1986). The results of these analyses support the predictions derived from the Common Ingroup Identity Model. The results depicted in figure 6.2a (high school students), figure 6.2b (bank executives) and figure 6.2c (stepfamilies) reveal that the conditions of contact reliably predict (indicated by thick bold arrows) each of the measures of intergroup harmony and bias before the mediators are considered. Also, the conditions of contact influence each of the participants' representations of the aggregate, as would be expected if one or more of these representations were a mediator. For example, the conditions of contact predict the extent to which participants rate the aggregate as one group ($\beta = .40$ among high school students; $\beta = .53$ among bank executives; and $\beta = .80$ among stepfamilies). In each case, the more favorably the conditions of contact are perceived, the more the aggregate feels like one group.

Moreover, consistent with the hypothesized mediating process, the relationships between the conditions of contact (on the left) and bias in affective reactions (figure 6.2a), intergroup anxiety (figure 6.2b), and stepfamily harmony (figure 6.2c) is substantially weaker after the mediators are considered than before (for example, $-.24$ versus $-.32$ in figure 6.2a). Furthermore, in each case the extent to which the aggregate felt like one group was a primary predictor of affective reactions. As predicted by the model, the more participants felt like one group, the lower the bias in affective reactions in the high school, the less the intergroup anxiety among the bank executives, and the greater the harmony in stepfamilies.

In contrast to the consistent, significant effect for the one-group representation, the role of the dual-identity measure functioned differently across the three intergroup settings. In the high school setting, the better the conditions of contact, the more students regarded the aggregate as "different groups on the same team." In contrast, in the bank executive and stepfamily settings, the more favorable the conditions of contact, the less participants indicated that the aggregate felt like two subgroups or two smaller families within a larger group. Also, in the bank executive context, the more the merged organization felt like two subgroups within one group, the greater the amount of ingroup bias these executives had in their perceptions of the work-related characteristics of the members of the two formerly separate organizations. Thus, in this context, the more strongly salient both subgroup and superordinate group identities were simultaneously, the greater the extent to which ingroup members were regarded as more intelligent, hardworking, skilled, and creative than outgroup members. In the multi-ethnic high school context, however, the more students reported that the aggregate felt like "different groups all playing on the same team" (the dual-identity item), the lower their bias in affective reactions.

We suspect that contextual differences between these intergroup settings may alter the relative desirability and utility of maintaining a dual identity in lieu of a more inclusive one-group representation (see Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996). For example, maintaining strong identification with the earlier subgroup identities following a corporate merger may threaten the primary goal of the merger. Similarly, in stepfamilies the salience of the former family identities, even with the simultaneous recognition of a more inclusive family identity, may violate members' expectations about what their ideal family should be like. Consequently, the salience of these subgroup identities may be diagnostic of serious problems—reflected, in part, by the fact that these dual identities become stronger in the merger and stepfamily contexts as the conditions of contact become more unfavorable. Of course, the direction of causality could be reversed. That is, it is possible that the stronger the experience of a dual identity, the worse people perceive the contact conditions to be. In either case, the relationship is quite different than it is in the high school context, where the salience of subgroup and superordinate identities would not be incompatible with the goals of the superordinate organization. There the salience of the subgroup identities, within the context of a superordinate entity that provides connection between the subgroups, may signal the prospects for good intergroup relations without undermining the goals of the school or those of the different ethnic or racial groups.

In summary, the findings of our survey studies in natural settings

converge with those of the laboratory study in offering support for the Common Ingroup Identity Model. Perceptions of more favorable conditions of contact predicted less differentiated, more superordinate representations of the memberships that, in part, seemed to contribute to reduced intergroup bias in affective reactions. These studies also offer evidence for the role of a dual identity in intergroup bias. In intergroup contexts in which the formation of a single, more inclusive superordinate group is a desired goal, the continued existence of the earlier subgroup identities (even simultaneously with a superordinate identity) may be perceived as a sign that the amalgamation process is failing. Corporate mergers and the formation of blended families seem, from our preliminary research, to represent such contexts. In contrast, in contexts in which the two subgroups are conceived as working constructively toward a common goal—such as being on the “same team” in the high school study—a dual identity predicts more positive intergroup relations.

These findings reflect upon enduring issues in intergroup relations in the United States. Several structural integration patterns (assimilation, pluralism, and separatism) have characterized American racial and ethnic relations (see Fredrickson, this volume). Assimilation comes closest to the “melting pot” metaphor: achieving homogeneity and integration. This pattern, however, in practice usually requires that minorities forsake their cultural distinctiveness as the price of acceptance into the mainstream or dominant culture. Pluralism’s metaphor is the mosaic: the cultural distinctiveness of all groups is visible and accepted within an integrated society. Separatism is characterized by the mixture of oil and water: each group remains structurally apart (segregated) from the others, and each maintains its cultural distinctiveness.

Which pattern (assimilation, pluralism, or separatism) in any particular situational context would best encourage more positive beliefs, feelings, and behaviors toward members of other groups? To examine the impact of structural integration patterns on expectations regarding the likely contact conditions between two groups and members’ commitment to a superordinate entity, we conducted an experiment involving a corporate merger simulation (Mottola et al. 1997). In this study, we manipulated the merger integration pattern utilized to bring two companies together in terms of whether the culture (policies and norms) of the merged organization reflected just one of the premerger companies (an absorb pattern, a type of assimilation in which one group is expected to forsake its cultural identity), aspects of both companies (a blend pattern, analogous to pluralism), or an entirely new culture (a combine pattern that reflected a more equalitarian form of assimilation). As we would have expected, perceptions of the conditions of contact, organiza-

tional unity, and commitment to the merged organization were most favorable when the combine pattern prevailed, followed in turn by the blend pattern and then the absorb pattern. Another finding in this laboratory study that was conceptually similar to those of our three survey studies in natural settings was that the relation between favorable conditions of contact and increased commitment to the merged organization was mediated by participants’ perceptions of organizational unity (one group).

Beyond generating more positive intergroup attitudes, the degree of organizational unity experienced can have implications for the effectiveness and productivity of a merged organization. For example, in a military context, Manning and Ingraham (1983) obtained a correlation between battalion cohesion and measures of performance effectiveness, including operations readiness. Similarly, we have found that the extent to which members of two groups perceived of themselves as one superordinate group correlated with the actual effectiveness of their task solution ($r = .28, p < .02$). This relationship is also consistent with the meta-analytic conclusions of Mullen and Copper (1994), who found that group cohesiveness significantly predicts group productivity ($r = .246$). Moreover, Mullen and Copper suggest that the relationship between cohesiveness and productivity may be bidirectional and thus iterative: cohesiveness enhances productivity, and successful accomplishment, in turn, further increases cohesiveness. Indeed, the relationship between successful performance and subsequent cohesiveness is even stronger ($r = .505$) than the relationship between initial cohesiveness and productivity. Thus, the development of a common ingroup identity can help form a basis for more harmonious intergroup relations to develop through mutual success and achievement, which reinforce the common bond and identity between the groups.

Group representations also relate to cultural identity and thus can have very important and fundamental psychological consequences for individuals as well as groups. Patterns of integration involving assimilation, pluralism, and separatism represent structural and functional relations between groups that reflect separate-group or superordinate-group representations, or a combination of both (dual identity). Berry (1984), for example, presents four forms of cultural relations in pluralistic societies that represent the intersection of yes-no responses to two relevant questions: Are cultural identity and customs of value to be retained? Are positive relations with the larger society of value, and to be sought? When the answer to both questions is yes, subgroup and superordinate groups are both important. This represents the dual-identity representation within our model. Are the prospects for intergroup relations more positive relative to when a person answers “no” to one of Berry’s ques-

tions—within the context of our model, when only superordinate identity or separate group identities are salient? We consider this issue in the context of the Common Ingroup Identity Model in the next section.

More Evidence on the Role of a Dual Identity

The procedure of the multi-ethnic high school study permitted an additional test of the value of a dual identity in which both superordinate and subgroup identities are salient. When students first identified their group identities on the survey, some minority students checked both "American" (a superordinate identity) and their ethnic group identity (for example, "Vietnamese"), whereas others identified themselves only by their ethnic or racial group. As predicted by our hypothesis about the value of a dual identity, those minority students who used both a superordinate (American) identity and their ethnic or racial group identity had lower bias in affective reactions relative to those who used only their ethnic group identity. Whereas there may be many differences between these two groups of students (such as American citizenship), they did have different cognitive representations of the student body. Minority students who identified themselves as both an American and a member of a minority group endorsed the item "Although there are different groups at school, it feels like we are all playing on the same team" more strongly than did those students who identified themselves using only their minority group identity.

A field experiment (Nier et al. 1999) conducted at the University of Delaware football stadium prior to a game between the University of Delaware and Westchester State University demonstrates how simultaneously salient superordinate and subgroup identities can increase behavioral compliance with a request for assistance from a person of a different race. In this experiment, black and white male and female students approached fans of the same sex as themselves from both universities just before the fans entered the stadium. These fans were asked whether they would be willing to be interviewed about their food preferences. Our student interviewers wore either a University of Delaware or Westchester State University hat. By selecting fans who also wore clothing that identified their university affiliation, we systematically varied whether fans and our interviewers had a common or different university identity in a context in which we expected university identities to be particularly salient. Although we planned to oversample black fans, the sample was still too small to yield any informative findings.

Among white fans, however, sharing superordinate university identity with the black interviewers reliably increased their compliance (59.6 percent) compared to when they did not share a common identity

with the black interviewer (37.8 percent). When the interviewers were white, they gained similar levels of compliance when they shared a common university identity with the fan (43 percent), and these levels were higher than when they appeared to be affiliated with the rival university (40 percent). These fans were not color-blind—only black interviewers who shared a common university affiliation with the fans were accorded especially high levels of compliance. Although there are a number of plausible explanations for this particular pattern of compliance, these findings offer support for the idea that outgroup members can be treated especially favorably when they are perceived to share a more inclusive, superordinate identity.

The value of a superordinate identity for increasing positive reactions to racial outgroup members was also revealed in a laboratory experiment (Nier et al. 1996). In this study, white subjects participating with a black or white confederate were induced to perceive themselves as separate individuals participating at the same time or as members of the same laboratory team. The results revealed a reliable interaction involving the other participant's race and the team manipulation. Whereas the evaluations of the white partner were virtually equivalent in both the team and individual conditions, the evaluations of the black partner were reliably more positive when they were teammates than when they were just individuals without a common group connection. In fact, for members of the same team, black partners were evaluated more favorably than white partners. Thus, in field and laboratory settings, racial outgroup members were accorded especially positive reactions when they shared common ingroup identity with white subjects compared to when the context did not emphasize their common group membership.

In another laboratory experiment, we obtained support for the prediction (see figure 6.1) that a common ingroup identity reduces intergroup bias in helping and self-disclosure (see Dovidio, Gaertner, et al. 1997). First, members of two three-person laboratory groups ("over- and under-estimators"; see Tajfel 1969) were induced to conceive of themselves as either one group or two groups (as in Gaertner et al. 1989, 1990). Then some participants were given an opportunity to help or to engage in a self-disclosing interaction with an ingroup or outgroup member. For helping, participants listened individually to an audio recording of another student (characterized in a previous session as either an over- or under-estimator) describe how illness had prevented her from completing an important survey of student life for a committee on which she served. Subsequently, participants received a note ostensibly from this person that contained an appeal to help her by placing posters recruiting volunteers to participate in the survey in various locations

across campus. The other participants were engaged in a self-disclosure task in which they were asked to discuss the topic "What do I fear most?" During this task, subjects interacted with either an ingroup or outgroup member who had participated earlier in their session.

The results for the helping and self-disclosure measures converged to support predictions from our model. In each case, the bias favoring ingroup members that was present in the two-groups condition was reduced (and actually reversed) for those induced to regard the aggregate as one group. That is, in the one-group condition, more positive behaviors were directed toward outgroup members than toward ingroup members, albeit by an amount that was not statistically significant. These findings are important for at least two reasons. First, the finding that outgroup members in the one-group condition received especially positive reactions for both self-disclosure and helping parallels the amplified compliance accorded black interviewers who shared a common university affiliation in the football stadium study as well as the more positive evaluations of the black teammates in the laboratory study.

One important aspect of this pattern of change across these different studies is the suggestion that upon recognition of a superordinate group connection, newly regarded ingroup members are initially accorded especially positive reactions compared to when they were regarded only as outgroup members. Also, these reactions to newcomers are even more extreme compared to the reactions accorded original ingroup members. If indeed superordinate connection motivates initially amplified positive reactions to "newcomers," this emotional reaction can perhaps be leveraged to promote more harmonious long-term relationships.

A second important aspect of these findings is the demonstration that common ingroup membership can initiate more personalized interactions between former outgroup members. This consequence can thereby activate an additional, independent pathway for increasing intergroup harmony. Similarly, in another experiment (Gaertner, Rust, and Dovidio 1997), we observed that the capacity of personalized, self-disclosing interactions to bring ingroup and outgroup members psychologically closer also transformed their perceptions of the aggregate from being two groups to being one group. Thus, common ingroup identity and personalized interactions seem to share reciprocally the capacity to facilitate each other, supporting our view that these processes are not necessarily competitive but complementary.

We are encouraged by some recent independent evidence that, in addition to increasing positive evaluations, compliance, helping, self-revealing interactions, and cooperative behavior toward people who would otherwise be regarded as outgroup members, a common superor-

dinate identity can also reduce subtle linguistic biases that serve to perpetuate stereotypes (Maass, Ciccirelli, and Rudin 1996; study 2). In this recent laboratory experiment, northern and southern Italians living in Switzerland received messages that emphasized the differentiation between northern and southern Italians (in a two-groups condition) or between Italians and the Swiss (in a superordinate "Italian" condition). These participants were then shown cartoons depicting northern and southern Italians performing positive and negative behaviors. Participants were asked to choose one of four response alternatives corresponding to the four levels of abstraction (see Semin and Fiedler 1988).

When the distinction between northern and southern Italians was emphasized, the results replicated the linguistic bias effect. Higher levels of abstraction were used to describe positive behaviors of ingroup members (for example, "she is helpful") than for outgroup members ("she walked with the old lady"). Also, higher levels of abstraction were used to describe undesirable behaviors of outgroup members compared to descriptions of the behaviors of ingroup members. This linguistic bias was not evident in the superordinate identity condition. Thus, a superordinate identity fundamentally changed how behavioral information about ingroup and outgroup members was processed, and importantly, in a way that reduced this subtle bias in information processing. In addition, recent research by Karpinski and Von Hippel (1996) reveals that this linguistic bias mediates the extent to which people maintain stereotypic expectancies in the face of disconfirming information. Thus, the development of a common ingroup identity can not only reduce general intergroup prejudice but also, by reducing intergroup linguistic bias, help to change intergroup stereotypes.

Other independent research supports the value of a dual racial or ethnic identity for reducing bias and improving intergroup relations. Earlier we discussed the possibility that acceptance of a superordinate identity does not require that members forsake their ethnic or racial group identity (Gaertner et al. 1989), and our own research on dual identity seems to support this idea. In addition, two recent studies further suggest that the intergroup benefits of a strong superordinate identity remain relatively stable even when the subordinate identity becomes just as strong (Huo et al. 1996; Smith and Tyler 1996). This suggests that social cohesion does not require that individuals deny their ethnic identity.

For example, in a survey study of white adults, Smith and Tyler (1996, study 1) measured the strength of respondents' superordinate identity as an American and also the strength of their identification as white. Following Berry's (1984) strategy of creating four groups on the basis of a median split on each measure, the investigators identified four

groups of respondents who varied in terms of the relative strength of their superordinate and subgroup identities. The results revealed that regardless of whether they strongly identified with being white, respondents with a strong American identity were more likely to base their support for affirmative action policies that would benefit blacks and other minorities on relational concerns about the fairness of congressional representation than on whether these policies would increase or decrease their own well-being. However, members of the group who identified themselves more strongly with being white than with being American based their position on affirmative action more strongly on how they regarded the instrumental value of these policies for themselves.

This pattern of findings suggests that a strong superordinate identity allows individuals to support policies that would benefit members of other racial subgroups without giving primary consideration to their own instrumental needs. Furthermore, once people identify with the superordinate entity, the relative strength of their subgroup identity does not significantly change their bases for supporting policies that benefit other groups within the superordinate collective. This finding also provides evidence that superordinate identity more broadly influences attitudes toward members of other subgroups; it is not limited to the specific subgroup members encountered during intergroup contact. Recall, in our laboratory study (Dovidio, Gaertner, et al. 1997), that the helping measure also provided some evidence of the generalization of positive behaviors beyond those subgroup members actually present during intergroup contact. The person in need was presented as a participant from a previous session. In the next section, we address more directly and fully the issue of how the benefits of intergroup contact can generalize and extend to other group members who are not present.

GENERALIZATION OF THE BENEFITS OF INTERGROUP CONTACT

Although research on the effects of intergroup contact has found support for the contact hypothesis for group members directly involved, these beneficial effects typically do not reliably generalize to the outgroup as a whole or to intergroup attitudes more generally (Stephan and Stephan 1996). Nevertheless, success in promoting harmony among the members of the different groups present in the contact situation is not a trivial accomplishment. In many intergroup contexts, this is precisely the major goal to be achieved.

One major reason generalization fails is that the now positively evaluated outgroup members are regarded as exceptions, that is, as not necessarily typical of outgroup members more generally (Allport 1954; Wilder 1984). In this respect, the dual identity (for example, African American) may be a particularly promising mechanism through which generalization may occur. In contrast to a separate-individuals or purely one-group representation, the dual identity maintains the associative link (see Rothbart and John 1985) to additional outgroup members. This dual-identity representation is also compatible with the Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model (Hewstone and Brown 1986; Hewstone 1996), which proposes that introducing a cooperative relationship between groups without degrading the original ingroup-outgroup categorization scheme is an effective way to change intergroup attitudes and to have these attitudes generalize to additional outgroup members. The Trade-off Hypothesis (Gaertner et al. 1993), however, proposes that although attitudes toward outgroup members present during contact would be less favorable with a dual- than with a purely one-group identity, the modest change in attitude could more easily generalize to additional outgroup members.

Hewstone and Brown (1986) argue that generalization to the outgroup as a whole is more likely when group identities are more rather than less salient during intergroup contact. Findings that pleasant contact with more typical rather than less typical outgroup members is associated with more favorable attitudes toward the outgroup more generally supports Hewstone and Brown's position (Hewstone 1996; Wilder 1984; see also Desforges et al. 1991). More specifically, Hewstone and Brown would encourage groups working together to recognize their mutual superiorities and inferiorities and to value equally the dimensions favoring each group. From the perspective of the Common Ingroup Identity Model, the realization of Hewstone and Brown's recommendation would create ideal conditions for keeping earlier group identities salient while simultaneously providing a superordinate connection between the groups.

Although there is some evidence that inducing a superordinate identity without deliberately attempting to emphasize the outgroup members' subgroup identity can yield generalization in terms of the delivery of prosocial behavior (see Dovidio, Gaertner, et al. 1997), there is also reason to believe that a dual identity may have even stronger potential for generalization. This idea was examined directly in an experiment by Hornsey and Hogg (1996). Their instructions emphasized students' individual identities, their separate-group identities (as humanities or math-science students), their superordinate university identity, or both their separate-group identities and their superordinate uni-

versity identities (that is, a dual-identity condition). These students were then asked a number of questions regarding how positive they would feel about working with students in each group (that is, the humanities and math-science subgroups).

Although students felt more positively overall about the prospects of working with students in their own group, the least amount of bias occurred in the dual-identity condition. Contrary to what we would have expected, however, the most bias did not occur in the separate-groups condition, but rather when the superordinate identity alone was emphasized (perhaps as a consequence of arousing needs to establish group distinctiveness). Nevertheless, these results offer support for the value of a dual identity in promoting positive attitudes toward the outgroup more generally. Indeed, with a dual identity, outgroup attitudes were more positive than those associated with a superordinate identity alone.

In addition to a dual identity in which subgroup composition is convergent with original ingroup and outgroup members, as we have been considering thus far, subgroup composition may also cross-cut these original group boundaries. With the convergent composition, the subgroups are composed homogeneously of members from the originally separate groups, but these subgroups are associated with the same superordinate group identity: $[[A][BB]]$. With cross-cut composition, each subgroup is heterogeneously composed of members from different original subgroups, and these subgroups are connected by an overarching superordinate identity: $[[AB][AB]]$.

Building on earlier research by Marcus-Newhall and her colleagues (1993), Rust (1996) varied the presence or absence of a superordinate group identity when freshmen (F) and sophomores (S) were assigned preliminary tasks on the basis of cross-cut $[FS][FS]$ or convergent $[FF][SS]$ patterns. Replicating the findings of Marcus-Newhall and her colleagues, Rust found that bias toward the ingroup and outgroup members present was lower in the cross-cut condition than in the convergent one. Whereas the manipulation of a superordinate identity did not directly influence evaluations of the outgroup members present, nor of outgroup members more generally, the more participants perceived themselves as "crossed subgroups within a superordinate entity" $[FS][FS]$, the more positive were their evaluations of the outgroup members present, and also of outgroup members more generally. The representation involving crossed groups without a superordinate connection $[FS][FS]$ did not relate to outgroup attitudes at all. Although the "convergent subgroups within a superordinate" representation $[FF][SS]$ did not relate directly to more general outgroup attitudes, it did relate marginally ($p < .06$) to the outgroup members who were present. Overall, attitudes toward out-

group members in the contact situation predicted generalized outgroup attitudes. Thus, the "convergent subgroups within a superordinate" representation may lead to more positive generalized outgroup attitudes indirectly through its capacity to influence attitudes toward the outgroup members present. The "convergent" representation without a superordinate boundary $[FF][SS]$, however, did not relate to outgroup attitudes more generally, or to those outgroup members who were present during contact. This finding suggests that a superordinate identity may be compatible with the acceptance of a hierarchical differentiation of the subgroups because members of these groups can see themselves as part of something larger they share in common. This may help explain why in many nonegalitarian societies that deal with ethnic and communal diversity by means of status hierarchies, members of different groups live together in relative peace, each group more or less accepting its assigned societal position. Thus, whether subgroups are constructed with a cross-cut or convergent configuration, the presence of a superordinate group connections seems to facilitate the development of more positive evaluations of outgroup members.

When tasks or roles can be assigned using either cross-cut or convergent subgroup configurations within a superordinate entity, the cross-cut pattern may offer more stable consequences for harmonious intergroup relations and for generalization, assuming original group identities are not completely degraded. The relative salience of the assigned subgroup and superordinate boundaries are likely to vary over time, as does the figure-ground relationship within ambiguous figures, but the variation in the relative strength of the group boundaries may have fewer negative consequences with a cross-cut than with a convergent subgroup configuration; to the extent that original ingroup and outgroup members regard themselves as members of the *same subgroup*, the benefits of a common group identity could be realizable when the subgroups are cross-cut despite changes in the relative salience of the additional superordinate boundary. That is, common subgroup identity may be sufficient to redirect pro-ingroup bias toward former outgroup members even when the superordinate identity is present but relatively weak. When the salience of the superordinate boundary is relatively weak among convergent subgroups, however, the salience of separate-group identities along the original intergroup boundaries may reemerge, reestablishing intergroup bias and conflict.

The value of the cross-cut relative to the convergent configuration within a superordinate entity is particularly evident in our study of stepfamilies (Banker and Gaertner 1998). Specifically, when participants perceived the coalition between themselves and their biological parent (a convergent subgroup within the stepfamily) as strong, their evaluations

of the level of stepfamily harmony were relatively lower. On the other hand, participants who perceived the cross-cutting coalition between themselves and their stepparent as stronger reported greater levels of stepfamily harmony. Although the relationships between these particular coalitions and stepfamily harmony are well documented (Brown, Green, and Druckman 1990; Crosbie-Burnett 1984), our analyses additionally reveal that, consistent with our model, the relation between each coalition and stepfamily harmony is mediated by the extent to which participants perceived their family as being one group.

In summary, the results of a range of empirical studies offer supporting evidence that the benefits of an intergroup contact can, under appropriate conditions, generalize beyond that situation to improve more encompassing intergroup attitudes. Consistent with our model, recognizing both connection (superordinate group identity) and difference (original subgroup identity) facilitates generalization. The superordinate identity activates and redirects pro-ingroup biases to improve attitudes toward the original outgroup members present, whereas the simultaneous salience of original identities provides the associative links for these attitudes to generalize to other members of these groups.

THE COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL IN PERSPECTIVE

We have reviewed some evidence suggesting that a common ingroup identity partially mediates the effects of contact hypothesis variables, increasing positive feelings and behaviors toward specific outgroup members. Also, it seems to have some potential to increase positive attitudes toward outgroup members more generally. Furthermore, we are encouraged by the finding that a superordinate identity can initiate more self-disclosing, personalized interactions as well as more cooperative, prosocial orientations toward outgroup members. Although the cognitive representation of a superordinate identity may itself often be fleeting and unstable, it seems to be capable of initiating behaviors that call forth reciprocity and can thus have more permanent intergroup consequences. Also, some of these behaviors can initiate processes that can reduce bias through additional, independent pathways. Thus, we regard the major strength of inducing a common identity to be its capacity to change temporarily the course of intergroup interactions and to initiate constructive intergroup processes and exchanges that produce longer-lasting positive relations between groups.

Whereas the development of a common ingroup identity does not necessarily require that each group forsake its earlier identity, we

could anticipate that groups of higher status are more resistant to joining forces with lower-status groups in order to maintain their positive distinctiveness (Ellemers et al. 1992). Lower-status groups, however, may relish the idea of improving their standing by developing super-ordinate connections with higher-status groups. Rust's (1996) study of college freshmen and sophomores, for example, quite clearly revealed the greater reluctance of the sophomores, compared to the freshmen, to conceive of themselves as members of the same superordinate group.

A critical element in this process involves one of the fundamental functions of group identity—to maintain and enhance "positive distinctiveness" and esteem (Tajfel and Turner 1979). One of the conditions for successful intergroup contact, identified by the contact hypothesis, is that the groups must be of equal status in that context. As our earlier work on the conditions specified by the contact hypothesis suggests, equal status would be expected to facilitate the development of a common ingroup identity. However, bringing different groups together, particularly when they are similar on an important dimension (such as task-relevant status), might arouse motivations to achieve "positive distinctiveness," which could exacerbate rather than alleviate intergroup bias (Brown and Wade 1987). In this respect, establishing a common superordinate identity while simultaneously maintaining the salience of subgroup identities (that is, developing a dual identity as two subgroups within one group) would be particularly effective because it permits the benefits of a common ingroup identity to operate without arousing countervailing motivations to achieve positive distinctiveness. We conducted two experiments investigating this hypothesis.

In one study (Dovidio, Gaertner, and Validic 1998), groups of three students were given feedback indicating that, based on their performance on an earlier task, their group was higher, lower, or equal in status than another group with which they were about to cooperate. This status manipulation was crossed factorially with whether the groups were assigned identical or different task perspectives in preparation for their cooperative interaction. The discussions involved the Winter Survival Problem (Johnson and Johnson 1975) and groups with different task perspectives: the members of one group were told to assume that they would hike to safety, while the members of the other group were asked to assume that they would stay put to await search parties. As predicted, the analyses revealed that when the groups were of equal status and task perspectives were different, intergroup bias was lower and the representation of the aggregate as one group was higher than in each of the other three conditions (equal status-same task, unequal status-different task, and equal status-same task). In addition, the one-group

representation mediated the relation between the experimental manipulations of status and task perspective on intergroup bias. These findings are consistent with the proposed value of equal status—primarily, as Hewstone and Brown (1986) propose, when the distinctiveness between groups is maintained.

In another study, we varied relative group status among actual employees of many different companies by asking them to imagine that their current organization was about to merge with another (Mottola 1996). In one condition, their present company was described as higher in status than the other in terms of generating greater sales and greater profits. In another condition, their company was lower in status on both dimensions. In a third condition, both companies were described as having equal status in terms of both sales and profit. In a fourth condition, their company was described as higher in status on one dimension, but the other company was higher on the other dimension. Consistent with Hewstone and Brown's (1986) ideas about the benefits of maintaining the mutual distinctiveness of groups working together, participants in the fourth condition—one company had higher profits and the other higher sales—anticipated that they would more strongly identify with the merged organization than did participants in each of the other three conditions (which did not differ from one another). Thus, when each group can maintain positive distinctiveness, we can anticipate greater acceptance of a superordinate identity from the members of both groups. This would be particularly important in organizational settings when subgroups must be formed and only the convergent pattern is realistically possible. Furthermore, when the basis of group differentiation facilitates the merged group's effectiveness, the development of "unity" can be enhanced. For example, as in the study by Mottola (1996), when each subgroup contributes a different, but necessary component to the merged organization's effectiveness, group differentiation can enhance the acceptance of organizational identification.

The benefits of the development of a common ingroup identity are also consistent with the models of second-culture acquisition. For example, the assimilation model (Gordon 1978) describes how a member of a minority group is absorbed into the dominant culture. In general, research shows that minorities who are more assimilated experience less stress and anxiety and have lower levels of failure in school and of substance abuse (Burnam et al. 1987; Pasquali 1985). However, there may also be psychological costs associated with assimilation. For instance, academically successful African Americans may feel that they have to reject the values of the African American community to succeed (Fordham 1988). Thus, when the development of a common identity involves abandoning important racial or ethnic identities, the potential

benefits may be compromised by other personal and psychological considerations.

Nevertheless, as we have proposed, the development of a common ingroup identity does not necessarily require that people forsake their separate-group identities. The consideration of a dual identity within the Common Ingroup Identity Model is, in fact, consistent with other models of cultural identity and well-being. For instance, the alternation model of second-culture acquisition (LaFromboise, Coleman, and Ger-ton 1993) suggests that it is possible for an individual to know two cultures, identify with both, and draw on both identities at different times. The multicultural model suggests that an individual can maintain a positive identity while simultaneously participating in and identifying with a larger entity composed of many other racial and ethnic groups (Berry 1986). Indeed, the development of a bicultural or multicultural identity not only is possible but can contribute to the social adjustment, psychological adaptation, and overall well-being of minority group members (LaFromboise et al. 1993; Ogbu and Matute-Bianchi 1986) in ways superior to full assimilation or acculturation.

Unlike strategies that seek to reduce bias by focusing primarily on the perpetrators rather than on their victims, the development of a common ingroup identity requires the participation of both memberships. Victims may assume, however, that only those responsible for bias and discrimination should actively participate in the necessary therapy. Also, victims may be so distrustful of their persecutors that they strongly resist the prospects of common ingroup membership. Unfortunately, when overtures to join together are resisted by one group, the prospects for developing more harmonious relations may become more tenuous than before. Also, majority group members, whose traditions usually dominate the cultural landscape, may resent minority group members' allegiance to their original heritage, even in the context of a dual identity. In particular, the loyalty or patriotism of these minorities may be suspect. Whites in the United States, for example, may assume that for African Americans their African identity is always stronger than their American identity, and consequently weaker than whites' own American identity. Although the utilization of the dual identity may reduce intergroup bias among minorities, the use of the dual identity by minorities may exacerbate intergroup tensions among majorities. For the dual identity to provide positive intergroup consequences for both groups, it may be critical therefore for minorities to demonstrate clearly their allegiance to the inclusive superordinate entity.

Although we are encouraged by the demonstrated value of inducing a common ingroup identity, its capacity to reduce bias has been examined only among groups that were not engaged in severe or mortal inter-

group conflicts—that is, where bias usually takes a more pro-ingroup than anti-outgroup form. If the rash of recent armed conflicts among the various ethnic groups in Eastern Europe following the decentralization of the Warsaw Pact is to be any guide, it would appear that appeals to the national identities of these combatants would not be likely to decrease the ferocity of their fighting. At the same time, the perception of a common identity, albeit cemented by a totalitarian central regime, may have been the glue that kept these groups together before decentralization.

In terms of our future work, the capacity of a common identity to change the tone and direction of more hostile intergroup relations needs to be addressed. In addition, the correlational approach of our survey work in natural group settings, such as corporate mergers and stepfamilies, would benefit from a longitudinal approach that enables more careful assessment of the directions of causality between the constructs proposed in the model. In closing, we remind the reader that we do not regard a common ingroup identity as a panacea for the problematic relations between groups. Instead, it seems to have the capacity to activate cognitive and motivational processes that change the tone and direction of immediate intergroup relations, changes that can, in turn, initiate other, more stable processes and pathways toward the achievement of more productive, harmonious relations between groups.

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