EXCLUSIVELY FOR MADAM PROFESSOR

MARTIN KLÜNERS

Freud as a Philosopher of History^

/ / • p h i l o s o p h i e de l'histoire," "philosophy of history" is the name Voltaire, L in 1765^ gave to a project, which dominated European—especially German philosophy for the following three generations and was impor- tant until the Fall of Communism at the end of the 20th century. This ideology for decades functioned as a substitute for religion for a quarter of the world's population and also influenced the work of, probably the most influential philosopher of history, Karl Marx. Despite the great diversity of the many different approaches in a period of more than two hundred years, there are five main themes that theories of philosophers of history from different times treat again and again:

(1) Voltaire himself advised what philosophically enlightened historians should do with history: "In all nations," he wrote, history was "distorted by fables, until finally philosophy enlightened Man."^ Historians should therefore untangle the deformed history by using their critical intellect. A hundred years later the protagonists of German historism, Droysen and Dilthey, created the perhaps most important theories of historians' duties: Droysen interpreted Man as a being with two qualities—an acting subject on the one hand, and a subject of historical cognition on the other. Man can understand the reasons why people do or do not do certain things. So for Droysen the duty of the historian is the reconstruction of the intention of human action*. Dilthey advanced Droysen's theory and called his science of "[t]he rule-guided understanding of permanently fixed manifestations of life," of "exegesis or interpretation," hermeneu- tics:^ Historians should, among other things, reproduce coherences of memory.'̂ Still at the end of the 20th century—after the so-called linguis- tic turn—thinkers continue to formulate imperatives for the historian's work from a narrative point of view. Paul Ricoeur wrote an analysis of

The Journal of Psychohistory 42 (1) Summer 2014

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Time and Narrative^ in three volumes that Hayden White called "the most important synthesis of literary and historical theory produced" in the 20th century.^

(2) Voltaire's main aim—as of most philosophers of history in the 18th century—was to show how Man was not the object of God's disposal, but made history himself, that he could understand the sense of history by his intellectual potency and that there had been a continuous progress in the unfolding of intellectual capacities, of "reason" or "enlightenment." This pattern returns, in different forms, in the main works of the philosophy of history, from Voltaire to Condorcet, Schelling and Hegel. Even Weber's analysis of rationalisation is a kind of sociological philosophy of history that examines the progress of enlightenment in occidental history. In its negation the pattern of growing enlightenment leads to the pessimistic Dialectic of enlightenment^ of Horkheimer and Adorno. One could call it the main pattern, the centre of occidental philosophy of history; it is identical with the optimism of the age of enlightenment and, after hav- ing provoked its own negation in failed and bloody revolutions, with the delusion of this optimism (see also 5).

(3) For some of the thinkers the ascent of enlightenment did not take place in a simple and linear development, but in a dialectic process. Fichte and especially Hegel created virtuoso dialectic systems, which influenced Marx.

(4) According to Arnold Gehlen it was also Fichte who invented the motif of Entfremdung, alienation, by defining liberty as regaining control over lost products of one's own acting. i° Especially for Karl Marx Entfremdung became one of the most important concepts of his materialistic theory, as history for him was the history of growing alienation, caused by the contradiction between the means of production and the relations of production.

(5) After revolutions had ended in terror or failure, the ideas of the enlightenment, especially that Man made his own history, lost more and more their persuasive power. Later, Schelling even began to doubt the might of historical reason, which he had himself celebrated in his youth.i^ In the 19th century the conviction prevailed that human reason was unconscious and that one could not predict the aftermath of human acts—history had shown that human acts often resulted in effects totally different from those predicted or projected. This theme—in German often described as "Kontingenz" (contingency)^^—is the reason why philos-

F r e u d as a P h i l o s o p h e r o f H i s t o r y .:.•'.' 5 7

ophy of history, which had been the paradigmatic philosophical disci- pline from the middle of the 18th to the 19th century, generally forfeited its importance and began to be criticized.—even leading, in some cases, to the complete refusal not only of the idea of growing enlightenment, but of any attempt to understand the sense of history. This was true espe- cially after the experience of the two world wars, genocide, and totalitar- ianism in the 20th century. ' .i

Philosophy of history in the late 20th century seemed to exist only in what German philosopher Odo Marquard (Ijorn 1928) called "Schwund- stufen"^^—shrinkage levels.

Despite this crisis of philosophy of history and the many critiques that occurred since the 19th century, a renaissance of this concept can be observed in an increasingly globalized world, which seeks new kinds sig- nificance. Great works of universal history like those of Weber, Toynbee and others that do not share the classical motifs of philosophy of history, like increasing enlightenment and liberty,̂ "* have shown what a serious, scientific philosophy of history based on empirically gained data might look like. Apart from this, there has been an epistemological debate on formal aspects and, as a result, a slight rehabilitation of philosophy of history since Arthur C. Danto demonstrated the explaining functions of narrating sentences in his Analytical philosophy ofhistory.^^

So many of the questions posed by philosophers of history are still rel- evant today. In particular, the unintentional consequences of human acts are a scientific problem that does not lose its fascination or its interest.

I would like to show why another Schwundstufe of philosophy of his- tory—psychoanalysis^^—has the best answers to nearly all of these ques- tions: Psychoanalysis itself is, in the words of the German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler, a "historical science" as it uses the individual history of the patient as a basis for its diagnoses and therapy, i'' There are some connecting lines between philosophy, philosophers of history, and the science Freud founded.^^

HISTORIANS' DUTIES . , When Voltaire describes history—or better the image of history up to his time—as a biased, warped thing (and one would like to add: biased and warped by memory),"^^ the solution he postulates for this problem mani- fests analogies to the psychoanalytic notion of working-through. The his- torian is, in psychoanalytic terms, a kind of representative of the sec- ondary process. Voltaire can be seen here as a precursor of Paul Ricoeur who in his connection of literary and historical theory compares the com-

58 Martin Klüners

position of the plot to tbe psychoanalytic situation. Ricoeur calls tbe com- position of tbe plot "mimesis" and divides it into préfiguration, configu- ration and refiguration, or mimesis I, II and 111.̂ ° Préfiguration or mimesis I is identical witb tbe reader's ability to recognize acting by its structural cbaracteristics; it is pre-narrative. Tbe configuration (mimesis II) mediates between mimesis I and III, between tbe prior understanding and tbe final understanding of refiguration in wbicb tbe reader compares tbe read story witb bis own life story. Ricoeur defines tbe bistory of tbe individual's life as based on untold stories; in order to get its narrative identity, tbese untold, repressed stories bave to be told, using tbe fragments passed down by memory—similar to what Diltbey, one bundred years before, called tbe reproduction of coberences of memory. Tbis working-tbrougb can be used not only for tbe reconstruction of tbe individual's story, but also for tbat of groups and society.̂ ^ Tbere is a fundamental affinity between tbe work of tbe bistorian and tbat of tbe psycboanalyst.

Nietzscbe, in contrast, saw tbe necessity of a "critical" bistory wbicb should bave tbe force to "break" and to clear away tbe past to make life possible.^^ To tbe suffering individual liberation from bistory could be, according to Nietzscbe, a boon. One could be curious about bow Niet- zscbe would bave argued if be bad gotten to know Freud's theory and tberapy. He migbt bave realized and even appreciated tbat liberation from bistory—is something tbat simply is not possible. A better under- standing and, in tbe best case, a reconciliation witb bistory is tbe aim of psycboanalytic working-tbrougb. Not liberation from bistory, but libera- tion from tbe distortion of bistory, can cure tbe sufferer. Tbe liberation Nietzscbe postulated is more like wbat psychoanalysis calls repression and in fact is tbe opposite of a successful bealing.

Anotber boundary line between bistorical tbeory and psychoanalysis is related to wbat Droysen considered tbe bistorian's main duty: Tbe reconstruction of tbe intention of buman action is a kind of psychology. But Droysen limits bimself to conscious intention, and can give no real answer to tbe question of wby buman acts so often bave otber conse- quences tban tbose consciously intended. Psycboanalysis is tbe "better" bistorism as it takes account of tbe unconscious.^^ Tbe integration of tbe unconscious also allows us to examine tbe meaning of tbe wisb in bis- tory—botb tbe wisb of tbe acting individuals or groups wbo "make" bis- tory, as well as tbe wisb of tbose wbo write bistory: One of tbe greatest problems of pbilosopbical bistoriograpby is tbe dialectic of (unrealistic) wisb and resulting delusion. Tbe examination of wbat pbilosopbers of bistory wanted to see in bistory and why tbey wanted to see it would be an

Freud as a Philosopher of History 59

illuminating project and might be the basis for the historian's or histori- ographer's own self-reflection.^*

RATIONALISATION Two philosophers writing at the end of the 18th century provide exam- ples of the idea of the continuous progress of human reason: Condorcet, ignoring the contemporary violent and inhuman aspects of the French revolution that will later kill him, is the author of a Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind in which he argues for the neces- sity of the progress of reason. In its untroubled optimism Condorcet's work is considered the classical example of the idea of progress in the age of enlightenment.^^ In Germany, the young Schelling writes at nearly the same time a chronology of the self-fulfilment of reason. In his account the first stage in human history was the direct and unadulterated condi- tion of sense perception—paradise; the second was that of the fall of mankind, in which logos destroyed the unity of life in the sense percep- tion; and in the third stage efforts to undo the fall of mankind and the redemption of the world by the aid of reason lead to a new paradise on a higher level. Human history therefore is a "history of liberating human reason from the limits of sense perception to the existence of the unity of reason."2Ö This is very similar to what Freud nearly 150 years later calls The Progress in Spirituality in his analysis of Moses and Monotheism: One of the, according to Freud, most important "precepts of Mosaic religion," "the prohibition against making an image of God," signified subordinating sense perception to an abstract idea; it was a triumph of spirituality over the senses; more precisely an instinctual renunciation accompanied by its psychologically necessary consequences.^^ Progress in spirituality from the psychoanalytic point of view is instinctual renunciation and its ori- gins are assigned to a certain historic period, the development of Mosaic monotheism, which is not far from Max Weber's definition of the origins of occidental rationalisation: The "disenchantment of the world" which began, according to Weber, with both Hellenistic scientific thought and ancient Jewish prophecy and led finally to the inner worldly asceticism of Protestantism. Inner worldly asceticism itself can be seen as a sort of sublimation and would therefore also be related to the various modalities of instinctual renunciation.^^

The self-fulfilment of reason as described by Schelling is an idea that became very important in the philosophy of another exponent of Ger- man idealism whose work is regarded as the climax of philosophy of his- tory. Hegel interprets world history as the history of reason; reason rules

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the world.^^ But "reason" for Hegel does not necessarily mean conscious- ness. Reason in fact uses human passions for its self-fulfllment: "This maybe called the cunning of reason—that it sets the passions to work for itself, while that which develops its existence through such impulsion pays the penalty, and suffers loss. "3° The optimistic view of a cunning of reason, a heritage of the age of enlightenment, may alienate today's read- ers of Hegel's philosophy as well as all of the optimistic theories of the 18th and early 19th centuries, but the supposition that there has been a historic increase of knowledge and an increase in rationality is still con- sidered to be common sense in the present time.

I would like to connect the idea of increasing rationality or conscious- ness with that of the cultural or historic ego, a term that already appears in Schelling's writings.^' Increasing consciousness was an expression of an extension of the ego.-'̂ The historic ego tends to its own extension, but the ego is not always in control of this process—it not only sets the passions to work for itself, but also is set by the passions to work for them. The idea that the ego and the passions are antagonists that often fight against each other allows us to see the ambivalence of rationality or enlightenment—which was a favourite theme of many 20th century thinkers, as formulated by Horkheimer and Adorno in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. They reversed Hegel's optimistic teleology of the self-fulfil- ment of reason and wrote a negative teleology of reason, a history of the decline of enlightenment from emancipation to governance. But as a negative teleology is not less tendentious than a positive one, there has to be a more realistic and less ideological solution to explain the ambiva- lence of emancipation: emancipation is fundamentally Oedipal. Oedipus aspires to emancipation from parental, or, in the patriarchal society, fatherly dominance. This struggle for independence however is not always successful as patriarchal dominance includes the introjection of dominance structures into the son's psyche. So fatherly dominance in fact does not get abolished, but substituted for by another dominance, the dominance of the son. If the history of the emancipatory process can be interpreted as an Oedipal individuation, the ambivalence of this dynamic psychological process is the cause for the ambivalence of enlightenment. This ambivalence results from the relationship of father and son—the father has the function of a role model for the son, but in truth is seen also as an enemy to fight against. These hostile feelings of the son against the father evoke a deep sense of guilt that has to be ratio- nalised. So "rationalisation" is not only a term for the rational attain- ment of an aim and the increasing assertion of this principle in history,

Freud as a Philosopher of History 61

but also has an important psychopathological aspect as the psychoana- lytic use of this term already suggests: Introduced in 1908 by Ernest Jones into the psychoanalytic vocabulary, rationalisation describes the ambi- tion to find coherent, "rational" reasons for non-identified real motives of acting, sentiments, thoughts etc. which is supported by ideologies, morality, religion, or political convictions—what Weber called ideas—as the activity of the superego reinforces the ego's mechanisms of defence.̂ ^ The assumption that ideologies, morality, religion, and political convic- tions could influence thinking would offer the possibility of using psy- choanalysis to help understand historically powerful ideas and to finally find an answer to the question of why history so often yields other devel- opments than those consciously intended.

DIALECTIC •- fi For the thinkers of German idealism rationalisation was a dialectic process. I would like to focus on the parallels between Hegel's and Freud's dialectic as Paul Ricoeur analysed them in his Essay on Interpretation.-^^ Ricoeur seeks "to find in Freud an inverted image of Hegel"^^ by comparing their respective dialectics: Freud links, in the words of Ricoeur, "a thema- tized archaeology of the unconscious to an unthematized teleology of the process of becoming conscious," while "Hegel links an explicit teleology of mind or spirit to an implicit archaeology of life and desire. " '̂' Hegel does not develop a phenomenology of the consciousness, but of spirit, so spirit is more than consciousness. Between "the Hegelian dialectic of redu- plicated consciousness" and "the process of consciousness that develops in the analytic relation there is a remarkable structural homology," "[t]he entire analytic relation can be reinterpreted as a dialectic of consciousness, rising from life to self-consciousness, from the satisfaction of desire to the recognition of the other consciousness."^^ According to Ricoeur, the rela- tion between the analyst and the patient is similar to, the Hegelian rela- tion between master and slave. The Hegelian terms of "satisfaction" and "recognition" are of such great importance for psychoanalysis that "we can say that all the dramas psychoanalysis discovers are located on the path that leads from 'satisfaction' to 'recognition.'"^^ Freud's thought is, like that of Hegel, fundamentally dialectical, especially in the second topography: "The second topography is the dialectic properly so-called in and through which arise the various instinctual dichotomies and the opposed pairs of instinctual vicissitudes [...]. The question of the superego lies at the origin of the dialectical situation [...]. Furthermore, the series of pairs, ego-id, ego-superego, ego-world, which constitute these dependent

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relations, are all presented, as in the Hegelian dialectic, as master-slave relationships that must be overcome."^' For Freud world history, the rela- fionship of human nature, cultural development and religion—are seen as the mirroring of the dynamic conflicts between ego, id and superego*"— this dialectic is the base of a potential synthesis of Hegelian philosophy of history and psychoanalytic cultural theory.

ALIENATION Karl Marx upended the Hegelian idealistic dialectic and interpreted the idea mentioned above, tracing it originally back to Fichte, that alienation is losing control over the products of one's own acting, in a materialist way: Labour is not only the quality that distinguishes man from animal, it is also the reason for the transformation of human nature and for human Entfremdung (alienation), the central term of Marxist theory. The dual char- acter of labour—as it involves the human relationship to nature as well as being a social phenomenon—causes the alienation not only of the individ- ual, but also of his social situation. History is the story of increasing alien- ation and will end in the self-destruction of capitalism. Control over his- tory will finally be regained by means of the revolution of the proletariat.*^

There have been many attempts to link Marxism with psychoanalysis such as those of the Critical Theory or Existentialism,*^ as well as Reich, Fromm, and much of what came to be called the Freudian Left, It is prob- ably the idea of alienation and the offer of solutions to undo it that makes psychoanalysis so attractive for Marxist thinkers. Also, Freud was very sceptical about Marxist theory, especially its method of explaining alienation only by materialistic criteria and the reduction of human his- tory to a socio-economic process.*^ Especially in Über eine Weltanschau- ung^ Freud criticizes the complete absence of psychological arguments in Marxist theory, the similarity of Marxism and religion as producers of illusions, the intolerance of the "practical Marxism"—Bolshevism— toward critics, which reminds Freud of the former intolerance of the Church etc.... Freud compares the expectance of a future paradise on earth to Jewish messianism—more than a decade before Löwith does the same in Meaning in History.*^ Furthermore, for Freud the transformation of human nature within a few generations as intended by Marxism is deeply unrealistic.

If one follows the German historian Heinz Dieter Kittsteiner who argued that Marx's term Naturwüchsigkeit is a synonym for the unconscious and communism nothing else than the abolishment of the unconscious his- tory,*^ psychoanalysis for Marxist thinkers would have the funcfion of sup- plementing a political-economic theory psychologically, of a psychological

Freud as a Philosopher of History 63

method to abolish tbe unconscious. But at tbe same time tbe differences between Marxist and psycboanalytic tbeory become clearer: Psycboanaly- sis does not aim to "abolisb" tbe unconscious, but only to transform alien- ated parts of tbe ego, to get tbem back from tbe id. Tbe psycboanalytic def- inition and interpretation of consciousness is mucb more complex tban tbe pbilosopbical one. For Psycboanalysis consciousness is influenced by many factors otber tban tbe material or social being.̂ ^

Tbere migbt be an at least indirect parallel in tbeir respective notions of alienation. Freud, in a letter to Romain Rolland in 1936,'*^ says tbat alien- ation exists in two forms: either a part of reality seems to be alien or a part of tbe ego does. Alienation is a special kind of defence tbat wants to deny tbe existence of elements from tbe outside world or from tbe inner world. In tbe concrete case tbat be tries to explain to bis friend Rolland, a guilt feeling causes a disturbance of memory on tbe Acropolis. Tbis guilt feeling is evoked by tbe encounter witb tbe spbere of Greek antiquity— wbicb for Freud is a symbol of baving surpassed tbe fatber by baving, in contrast to bim, learned Greek at scbool and bad a bigber, bumanistic education. Surpassing tbe fatber tbougb is analogous to violating an interdiction. Interpreted psycboanalytically, also bistoric alienation could result from tbe sense of guilt of tbe son wbo surpasses tbe fatber, wbicb occurs in tbe course of tbe progress of civilization.

CONTINGENCY After tbe questions concerning tbe bistorians' duties, tbe process of ratio- nalisation, tbe dialectic and tbe alienation in bistory, tbe last, and in tbe present time perbaps, tbe most important problem of pbilosopby of bis- tory regards tbe unintended consequences of buman action. Yet Droysen suggested tbat bistorical facts are not based on tbe conscious acts of voli- tion of few individuals, but on tbe interaction of many, tbat tbey are tbe result of a correlation of action.*^ In Droysen's time anotber concept became more and more important and was popular already before tbe rise of tbe psycboanalysis: Scbelling bad introduced tbe unconscious into tbe pbilosopbical discourse (altbougb Leibniz bad bad similar ideas bun- dred years earlier), but especially Eduard von Hartmann's book The Phi- losophy of the Unconscious (1869) was very important in tbe second balf of tbe 19tb century^o Freud claimed later tbat only bypnotism—wbicb be considered a forerunner of psycboanalysis—bad made tbe unconscious an object of scientific experiment.^^ However, tbe unconscious finally found its way not only into psycbology, but also into tbe theories of bis- torians. Ernst Troeltscb describes, as tbe major problem of bistorical researcb, tbe tension between tbe common and tbe particular, between

6 4 - = • '"'• Martin Klüners

society and individuals, between objective and subjective spirit.^^ To resolve this problem he proposes the unconscious as a "fundamental" term of history.^^ His definition of the unconscious is close to that of psy- chology; Troeltsch though does not refer to Freud or other depth psy- chologists. He even suggests categories equivalent to what psychoanaly- sis calls "preconscious."^'* Both the unconscious and the preconscious operate not only in the individual, but also in society. Troeltsch antici- pates to a certain extent the considerations about the supra-individual unconscious of psychoanalysts like Erich Fromm and Mario Erdheim.^^ Fromm supposed a "filter"—consisting of language, logic, and morals— decides which experiences are allowed to become conscious and which have to remain unconscious. The whole cultural apparatus serves to uphold the supra-individual unconsciousness.^^ A change in the status quo makes it possible for unconscious experiences to come to conscious- ness because they lose their dangerousness.^'' Mario Erdheim defines the supra-individual unconscious as the attributes of a society that do not get reflected in a sufficient way and therefore cause unexpected develop- ments. At the same time they are responsible for cultural change. The central problem of philosophy of history is the lack of regard for uncon- scious factors in history.^^ Also deeply influenced by psychoanalytic thought, the sociological theory of Norbert Elias tries to resolve the prob- lem of contingency by examining the process of human interaction: the analysis of "figurations"—networks of interdependent humans—allow us to reconstruct the structures of human action which seems at first unde- signed, but in reality are the result of interdependent individual acts. The larger the figuration, the more intensive is the control of the affects, the might of the superego.^^ Due to figurational sociology the traditional confrontation of "individual" and "society" as antagonists loses its importance and seems more and more to be an artificial construct. Elias does not only give an answer to the question of why human acts often have unintended consequences, he also demonstrates how Freudian topography, the theory of superego, ego and id, and sociological theory can be synthesized. With this approach there might also be a way to understand the mechanisms by which historic ideas have an effect on individuals and society. Weber's sociology of religion was in fact a refor- mulated philosophy of history, an examination of the influence of the spirit and the ideas and their indirect, unconscious consequences.

CONCLUSION After describing what I consider the five main aspects of philosophy of history and their connections with psychoanalysis, I would like to bring

Freud as a Philosopher of History ' A . . 65

four of them—rationalisation, dialectic, alienation and contingency— together in a short hypothetical reconstruction of their supposed original coherence, as in my opinion they are all different parts of one great socio-psychological problem. ;

For a long time, alienation was the object of philosophic speculation that did not allow secure assertions because of our lack of knowledge about prehistoric societies. But cultural anthropology has made great progress since the 19th century, and what we know today about human prehistory enables us to evaluate philosophic terms by comparing their meaning to certain pre- and protohistoric phenomena. For 99% of his history Man lived as hunter and gatherer with very few cultural changes. The "big bang" of cultural development, took place in what is called Neolithisation today: sedentariness, farming, use of domesticated ani- mals, new forms of labour, the growth of human societies and the increasing number of wars''° had deep impacts on Man's relation to nature, with great psychological consequences.*'̂ We have to imagine the alienation starting here as a psychic alienation, particularly because of the increase of violent conflicts and aggressiveness in Neolithic societies. Guilt is also a special form of aggression—an aggression directed not to the exterior, but to the psychic interior.^^ j would like to suggest that the increase in external aggression—as in wars, but also under growing pres- sure from family conflicts—leads to an increase in internal aggression as well, an increase in guilt. The ego becomes weakened by the id and later by the superego, a development caused by transgenerational transmis- sion of traumatic experiences. The ego tends, as mentioned above, to its own extension—enlightenment, rationalisation, progress in spirituality can all be seen as expressions of the ego-extension. According to cultural anthropologist Marvin Harris, the increase in violent conflicts can lead to another relationship of fathers and sons. Harris believes that the sexually determined hostility between fathers and sons—the Oedipus complex— is not the origin, but the result of the increase in violent conflicts and in new ideals of virility in more and more militant societies.^^ However, the intensiflcation of Oedipal conflicts probably has strengthened the will of the sons to liberate themselves from their fathers' suppression, the will of emancipation. But as they had internalised dominance structures them- selves, their emancipation had to remain a very ambivalent thing. The interior as well as the exterior conflicts were master-slave relationships. Freud was right to regard the dynamic conflicts of ego, superego and id as the foundation of human history. The advantage of psychoanalytic "phi- losophy of history" over the traditional philosophy of history is based on the fact that it takes into consideration the unconscious aspects of

66 v ; : Martin Ktüners

human acting—Psychoanalytic theory makes possible a more realistic image of Man and his history as both social and a natural being.

Martin Klüners (bom 1979) studied History and German Literature at Hum- boldt University in Berlin. His PhD thesis defense was in February 2012 at Ruhr University Bochum (Faculty of Social Science). He can be reached at [email protected].

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68 !' Martin Klüners

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ENDNOTES 1. This article gives an outline of the main results of my PhD thesis that has been

published in 2013 (Klüners, Martin. 2013. Geschichtsphilosophie und Psychoanalyse. Göttingen: V & R unipress). I tried to use original English texts or translations wherever possible.

2. Angehm, Emil. 1991. Geschichtsphilosophie. (Grundkurs Philosophie, 15). Stuttgart [et al.]: Kohlhammer, p. 69. One year before, in 1764, Voltaire used the expression "philosophie de l'histoire" for the first time in a recension of Hume's Complete His- tory of England (Nagl-Docekal, Herta (editor). 1996. Der Sinn des Historischen. Geschichtsphilosophische Debatten. (Fischer-Taschenbücher, 12776). Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, p. 7).

3. Voltaire, François-Marie. 1963. Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des tiations et sur les principaux faits de l'histoire depuis Charlemagne jusqu'à Louis Xni. Edited by René Pomeau. Vol. 2. Paris: Garnier, p. 800.

4. Rohbeck, Johannes. 2004. Geschichtsphilosophie zur Einßhrung. (Zur Einführung, 302). Hamburg: Junius, p. 77. See also Droysen, Johann G. 1977. Historik. Edited by Peter Leyh. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, p. 424.

5. Dilthey, Wilhelm. 2002. The formation of the historical world in the human sciences. Edited, with an introduction, by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 237-238.

6. At nearly the same time Nietzsche saw history as a kind of life's servant whose value resulted only in its meaning for life. Preoccupation with history should, according

Freud as a Philosopher of History ; 69

to Nietzsche, not be exaggerated as it might prevent the individuum—that, by con- cerning itself with that what was, remained mentally in the past—from life. {Untimely Meditations II, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, chapter 3)

7. Ricoeur, Paul, 1984-88 (1983-85). Time and Narrative (Temps et Récit). 3 vols, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

8. White, Hayden. 1987. The content of the form. Narrative discourse and historical repre- sentation. Baltimore, Md [et al.]: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 170.

9. Horkheimer, Max and Adorno, Theodor W. 2002. Dialectic of enlighteriment Philo- sophical fragments. Edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. Translated by Edmund Jeph- cott. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

10. Gehlen, Arnold. 1952/53. Über die Geburt der Freiheit aus der Entfremdung. In: Archiv ßr Rechts—und Sozialphilosophie 40, pp. 338-353 (here: pp. 338-339).

11. Kittsteiner, Heinz D. 2004. Wir werden gelebt—Über Analogien zwischen dem Unbe- wußten in der Geschichte und im „Ich". In: Zuckermann, Moshe (editor), 2004: Geschichte und Psychoanalyse. (Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte, 32). Göttingen: Wallstein, pp. 56-84 (here: p. 66).

12. Angehrn 1991, p. 123. 13. Marquard, Odo. 1982. Schwierigkeiten mit der Geschichtsphilosophie. (Suhrkamp-

Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 394). Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, p. 25. 14. Angehrn 1991, p. 162. ,i , , Ï'

15. Danto, Arthur C. 1965. Analytical philosophy of history. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press. See also Rohheck 2004, 105.

16. Psychoanalysis may be called a Schwundstufe of philosophy of history because according to Marquard psychoanalysis is a "disenchanted" form of German "Naturphilosophie"—"Naturphilosophie" itself yet is a Schwundstufe of philoso- phy of history (Marquard 1982, pp. 91 and 103. See also Marquard, Odo. 1987. Transzendentaler Idealismus, Romantische Naturphilosophie, Psychoanalyse. (Schriften- reihe zur philosophischen Praxis, 3). Köln: Dinter, p. 4).

17. Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. 1971. Geschichte und Psychoanalyse. (Pocket, 25). Köln: Kie- penheuer & Witsch, p. 19.

18. It is true that Freud took several philosophy courses with Professor Brentano at the University of Vienna from 1874 till 1876, that he read Ludwig Feuerbach and that he also attended the Leseverein der deutschen Studenten (reading society of German stu- dents) where he probably had his first contact with the thoughts of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. But, soon after that, he lost interest in philosophy as an academic sub- ject and concentrated on his study of medicine (see Klüners 2013, pp. 187-190).

19. Voltaire 1963, p. 804. 20. See the first volume of Ricoeur's Time and Narrative. 21. See the third volume of Time and Narrative. 22. See above (Untimely Meditations n. On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,

chapter 3).

23. It should be mentioned that the last important theorist of German historism, Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923), also took account of the unconscious which at his time had become an important category in cultural science (see below, chapter Contingency).

24. For the importance of psychoanalysis as basis for the historian's self-reflection see Sträub, Jürgen. 1998. Psychoanalyse, Geschichte und Geschichtswissenschaft. Eine Ein- ßhrung in systematischer Absicht. In: Rüsen, Jörn and Sträub, Jürgen (editors). 1998. Die dunkle Spur der Vergangenheit. Psychoanalytische Zugänge zum Geschichtsbewußt- sein. (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 1403). Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 12-32 (here: pp. 30-31). An English translation of this article can be found at

70 Martin Klüners

Rüsen, Jörn and Sträub, Jürgen (editors). 2010. Dark traces of the past. Psychoattalysis and historical thinking. New York [et al.] : Berghahn Books.

25. Angehrn 1991, p. 72. 26. Baumgartner, Hans M. 1996. Philosophie der Geschichte nach dem Ende der

Geschichtsphilosophie. Bemerkungen zum gegenwärtigen Stand des geschichtsphilosophi- schen Denkens. In: Nagl-Docekal, Herta (editor). 1996. Der Sinn des Historischen. Geschichtsphilosophische Debatten. (Fischer-Taschenbücher, 12776). Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, pp. 151-172 (here: p. 154). My translation. Also Fichte wrote that the order of the world and so equally that of natural processes is rational. Where reason can- not yet be effective by the aid of liberty, it is effective as natural law, as "dark instinct" (Fichte, Johann G. 1845. Sämtliche Werke. Vol. 7: Zur Politik, Moral und Philosophie der Geschichte. Edited by Immanuel H. Fichte. Leipzig: Mayer und Muel- ler, pp. 8-9).

27. Freud, Sigmund. 1939. Moses and Monotheism. Translated from the German by Katherine Jones. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 178-179.

28. Weber, Max. 1920. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie. Vol. 1: Die protestan- tische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus. Tübingen: Mohr, pp. 94-95.

29. "The only Thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplafion of His- tory, is the simple conception of Reason; that Reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process." (Hegel, Georg W. F. 2001. The Philosophy of history. With prefaces by Charles Hegel and the translator, J. Sibree. Translated by John Sibree. Kitchener: Batoche Books, p. 22)

30. Ibid., p. 47. Odo Marquard pulls together the idea of cunning of reason and psycho- analytic sublimation: Marquard 1987, p. 237.

31. Marquard 1987, p. 16. 32. Münchener Vorlesungen (1827), according to Marquard 1987, p. 16. 33. For the characteristics of rationalisation see Laplanche, Jean and Pontalis, Jean-

Bertrand. 1988. The language of psychoanalysis. Translated by Donald Nicholson- Smith. With an introduction by Daniel Lagache. London: Karnac, pp. 375-376.

34. I do not treat the materialistic inversion of Hegelian dialectic here as Marx will be discussed in the next chapter about alienation.

35. Ricoeur, Paul. 1970. Freud and Philosophy. An Essay on Interpretation. Translated by Denis Savage. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 461.

36. Md. 37. Ricoeur 1970, p. 474. 38. Ibid. 39. Ricoeur 1970, p. 477. 40. Freud, Sigmund. 1935. Postscript. An Autobiographical Study (1925). The Standard

Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XX (1925-1926): An Autobiographical Study, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, The Question of Lay Analysis and Other Works. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 71-74.

41. Rohbeck 2004, pp. 66-67. See also Angehm 1991, pp. 105-119. 42. Marquard 1987, p. 18. 43. Freud precedes the critic by Löwith (Löwith, Karl. 1957. Meaning in history. The the-

ological implications of the philosophy of history. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 33). Löwith's work was first published in 1949.

44. Freud, Sigmund. 1932. The Question of a Weltanschauung. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXII (1932-1936): New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis and other works, XXXV. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 158-182.

Freud as a Philosopher of History 71

45. Löwith 1957, p. 42. 46. Kittsteiner 2004, p. 75. 47. A good summary of the psychoanalytic meaning of the term consciousness can be

found in Laplanche/Pontalis 1988, pp. 84-88. 48. Freud, Sigmund. 1936. A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis. The Standard Edi-

tion of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXII (1932- 1936): New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis and Other Works. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 237-248.

49. Rohbeck 2004, p. 90. 50. Gödde, Günter. 1999. Traditionslinien des „Unbewußten". Schopenhauer, Nietzsche,

Freud. Tübingen: Ed. Diskord, pp. 25-28. 51. Freud, Sigmund. 1924. A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis. The Standard Edition of

the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIX (1923-1925): The Ego and the Id and Other Works. London: Hogarth Press, pp. 189-210.

52. Troeltsch, Ernst. 1922. Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. 3: Der Historismus und seine Pro- bleme. Erstes (einziges) Buch: Das logische Problem der Geschichtsphilosophie. Tübin- gen: Mohr, p. 44.

53. Troeltsch 1922, p. 46. 54. Troeltsch uses the term "halbbewußt" instead of "vorbewußt" (ibid., p. 46). 55. For the psychoanalysts' theories of the supra-individual unconscious see Tessar,

Hans. 2008. Die Produktion gesellschaftlicher Unbewusstheit. Eine neue Anthropologie, Sprachphilosophie, Erkenntnistheorie und Geselischaftsphilosophie. Hamburg: Diplomica.

56. Fromm, Erich. 1990. Die Entdeckung des gesellschaftlichen Unbewußten. Zur Neube- stimmung der Psychoanalyse. Edited by Rainer Funk. (Schriften aus dem Nachlaß, 3). Weinheim: Beltz, p. 81.

57. Fromm 1990, pp. 90-91. 58. Tessar, Hans. 2008. Die Produktion geseiischaftiicher Unbewusstheit. Eine neue Anthro-

pologie, Sprachphilosophie, Erkenntnistheorie und Gesellschaftsphilosophie. Hamburg: Diplomica, pp. 65-69. See e.g. Erdheim, Mario. 1982. Die gesellschaftliche Produktion von Unbewußtheit. Eine Einßhrung in den ethnopsychoanaiytischen Prozeß. Frank- furt/M: Suhrkamp.

59. Lilienthal, Markus. 2001c. Norbert Elias: Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation (1937-39). In: Gamm, Gerhard/Hetzel, Andreas/Lilienthal, Markus, 2001: Interpretationeti. Hauptwerke der Soziaiphilosophie. (Reclams Universal-Bibliothek, 18114). Stuttgart: Reclam, pp. 134-147 (here: pp. 136 and 145) and Elias, Norbert. 1969. The Civilizing Process, Vol.1. The History of Manners, Oxford: Blackwell and, published in 1982, Vol.II. State Formation and Civilization.

60. Harris, Marvin. 1989. Kulturanthropologie. Ein Lehrbuch. Translated by Sylvia M. Schomburg-Scherff. Frankfurt/M./New York: Campus, p. 214 (translation based on: Harris, Marvin. 1987. Cultural anthropology. Second edition. New York [et al.] : Harper & Row).

61. DeMause regards a change of children's education as the real reason for cultural change (DeMause, Lloyd. 1989. Grundlagen der Psychohistorie. Psychohistorische Schriften. Edited by Aurel Ende. Translated by Aurel Ende, Eva Lohner-Horn and Peter Orban. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, p. 285).

62. Freud, Sigmund. 1930. Civilization and its discontents. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXI (1927-1931): The Future of an Illusion, Civilization and its Discontents, and Other Works, pp. 57- 146. London: Hogarth Press, chapter VII.

63. Harris 1989, p. 356.

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