Please rewrite these papers for (Catherine Owens Only)

AL QA’IDA’S NEXT MAJOR DOMESTIC ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES

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Section I – Overview

The United States Intelligence Community (IC) intercepted two transmissions regarding an attack in the United States. The first intercepted transmission proposes an impending attack in America in the next three to nine months. The second intercepted message consists of fragments of information regarding the potential method and execution of the impending attack. This paper will analyze the intercepted information, propose the mechanics of the impending attack, and identify indicators of the attack to provide means to disrupt the attack prior to execution.

Section II – Proposed Attack Mechanics

Five Afghan males using Christian names will attempt to receive visas from American consulates in Casablanca, Islamabad, and Paris utilizing stolen blank Lebanese passports. The five men will attempt to fly into Kennedy International Airport with follow on travel to a safe house in Brooklyn. The safe house in Brooklyn is for planning and preparation for an attack consisting of 100 liters of Sarin gas at Times Square on New Year’s Eve at midnight. The attack will incorporate an individual having a fake heart attack requiring first responders to respond to Times Square. The attackers will attack the first responders responding to the fake heart attack via suicide vests containing Sarin gas. In the confusion, the attackers will utilize a stolen or purchased ambulance to bypass security measures and conduct a second larger Sarin gas attack on first responders and citizens. The fragmented information regarding an escape route out of La Guardia to Toronto, London, and Islamabad is not for the attackers, but any leadership involved in the planning of the attack. The five Afghan men will carry out the attack and be martyrs.

Section III – Indicators

Indicator 1: Recruitment of an individual with access to Sarin. Sarin production requires large financing, specialized equipment and facilities, and specific technical expertise. The ability to produce, store, and disseminate Sarin effectively remains difficult, especially outside facilities specifically designed for chemical weapon production[footnoteRef:1]. Aum Shinrikyo’s production of Sarin by highly educated scientists consisted of life threatening production and dissemination accidents, while the attack injured 1000s, only 12 individuals died[footnoteRef:2]. This historical evidence of the difficulty involved in the production of Sarin lends credence to the recruitment of an individual with access to Sarin to facilitate the acquisition of Sarin rather than self-production. [1: Small-scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons, by Dana A. Shea and Frank Gottron, Cong. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, 2004), 22-25, accessed August 14, 2016, http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32391.pdf.] [2: Amy E. Smithson, Ph.D., Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project Information Sheet Frequently Asked Questions: Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons (Washington, DC: Stimson Center’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project, 2000), 3.]

Indicator 2: False emergency at Times Square. Observation of response time, procedures, and actions taken by first responders by the attackers to finalize plans for the attack. Analysis of previous attacks illuminates 65% of the time; attackers conducted a preparatory act on the day of the attack; however, this time could span 3 to 6 weeks prior to the attack[footnoteRef:3].   [3: Brent L. Smith, Kelly R. Damphousse, and Paxton Roberts, "Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents: The Identification of Behavioral, Geographic, and Temporal Patterns of Preparatory Conduct," National Criminal Justice Reference Service, May 2006, 8-9, accessed August 14, 2016, https://www.ncjrs.gov/.../nij/.../214217.pdf.]

Indicator 3: Theft of explosives on a small scale. The theft of explosives on a small scale to build suicide vests and turn an ambulance into a Sarin disposal vessel. Based upon the functioning of the United States military M23 mine, minimal explosives would turn an ambulance into a dispersal vehicle[footnoteRef:4]. Small-scale explosive theft would not draw the ire of local and national level law enforcement comparable to a large-scale theft of explosives needed to make a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). [4: "The U.S. Army Chemical Materials Activity (CMA) - Ordnance Viewer," The U.S. Army Chemical Materials Activity (CMA) - Ordnance Viewer, 1, accessed August 14, 2016, http://www.cma.army.mil/ordview.aspx?id=7.]

Indicator 4: Theft or purchase of an ambulance. The acquisition of an ambulance provides the attackers the ability to access the targeted area of Times Square[footnoteRef:5]. The utilization of an ambulance to disperse Sarin provides the attackers the needed cargo capacity without drawing the attention of law enforcement and/or security personnel, while providing the capability to attack first responders to a prior attack.  [5: Gordon Thomas, "MI5 Discover Al-Qaeda Buying Ambulances on Ebay," MI5 Discover Al-Qaeda Buying Ambulances on Ebay, November 18, 2008, 1, accessed August 14, 2016, http://canadafreepress.com/article/mi5-discover-al-qaeda-buying-ambulances-on-ebay#.]

Indicator 5: Release of a video or audio recording associated with a chemical weapons capability. Terrorist organizations require the requisite propaganda for recruitment and funding purposes. Releasing a video or audio recording claiming a chemical weapons capability increases both recruitment and funding. Additionally, Al Qaida issued a fatwa authorizing the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 2003 make the utilization of WMDs religiously authorized[footnoteRef:6]. [6: Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, "Al-Qaeda’s Religious Justification of Nuclear Terrorism," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, November 12, 2010, 5, accessed August 14, 2016, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20518/al_qaedas_religious_justification_of_nuclear_terrorism.html.]

Indicator 6: Social Media statements condemning recent American actions in Afghanistan. An error in American actions in Afghanistan such as the hospital bombing October 3, 2015 incites retaliation and drives individuals to take action[footnoteRef:7]. Terrorist organizations utilize the aforementioned action as propaganda to recruit members and incite retaliatory actions. An act as prolific as the bombing of a hospital will generate additional hatred towards the entity responsible for the act, thus illuminating the need to observe for potential threats via Social Media. [7: ]

Section IV- Conclusion

Understanding historical Al Qa’ida ideology, intentions, and capabilities illuminates Al Qaida’s willingness to conduct a chemical attack against the United States. Cronin states, “the growth of militant religious groups with political agendas as a percentage of all terrorist groups, the increasing global availability of CBW information and stockpiles, the internationalization of the threat of terrorism, and the clear evidence of terrorist interest and capabilities.”[footnoteRef:8] Al Qa’ida’s intent is to eliminate all enemies, viewing the “West” as their main threat, followed by the creation of the Caliphate. Byman states, “Although the ultimate goal of Al Qaeda is to overthrow the corrupt “apostate” regimes in the Middle East and replace them with “true” Islamic governments, Al Qaeda’s primary enemy is the United States, which it sees as the root cause of the Middle East’s problems.”[footnoteRef:9] [8: Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context, Audrey Kurth Cronin, Cong. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, 2003), 2-5, accessed August 14, 2016, https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL31831.pdf.] [9: Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets (2015) (testimony of Daniel L. Byman).]

Al Qa’ida remains a legitimate threat based upon Threat = Capabilities + Intent. Fifteen years ago on September 11, 2001 Al Qa’ida proved to the world their capabilities to attack America and their intent to take the fight to America. The passage of the fatwa authorizing the utilization of WMDs against America remains another step in the process of conducting a WMD attack against America. The ability to conduct the attack within the borders of the United States enables Al Qa’ida to capitalize on positive propaganda while eliminating negative annotations from Muslim populations, ultimately garnering greater support and resources.

The present day difficulty in acquiring WMDs remains under constant strain due to failing states and state sponsors of terrorism. The ability to acquire a WMD increases with each failed state and the loosening of restrictions on state sponsors of terrorism. The unrest in the Middle East continues to strain governments’ ability around the globe to prevent Al Qa’ida from acquire a WMD. The recent cooperation between Russia and the United States to eliminate all chemical and biological weapons from Syria illuminates the importance of preventing a WMD from falling into the wrong hands.

Fifteen years of continuous warfare by the United States in the Middle East provides the base for Al Qa’ida’s ideology. Al Qa’ida exploits America’s intervention in the Middle East to recruit individuals to their cause. The more Al Qa’ida can recruit the greater the odds of recruiting an individual with the ability to develop a WMD program for Al Qa’ida. Recruiting such an individual remains just one more step in the process as Al Qa’ida will still need an influx of financing and the ability to hold territory prior to developing his or her own WMD program.

The aforementioned needs to fulfil the requirements for a WMD program illuminates key indicators to prevent the development of a WMD program, ultimately prevent a WMD attack by Al Qa’ida. Constant alertness for the aforementioned indicators by IC, Department of Defense, Department of State, and Homeland Security personnel continues to prevent the acquisition of WMDs by Al Qa’ida. A whole of government approach remains essential to the continued prevention of acquisition, thusly central to preventing dissemination.

Section V - Selected Bibliography

Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the House Committee on Homeland Security Cong. (2015) (testimony of Daniel L. Byman).

Chuck, Elizabeth. "'Tragic Mistake': U.S. Misidentified MSF Hospital Before Bombing It." NBC News. November 25, 2015. Accessed August 14, 2016. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/msf-hospital-was-misidentified-u-s-it-was-bombed-report-n469411.

Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. "Al-Qaeda’s Religious Justification of Nuclear Terrorism." Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. November 12, 2010. Accessed August 14, 2016. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20518/al_qaedas_religious_justification_of_nuclear_terrorism.html.

Smith, Brent L., Kelly R. Damphousse, and Paxton Roberts. "Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents: The Identification of Behavioral, Geographic, and Temporal Patterns of Preparatory Conduct." National Criminal Justice Reference Service. May 2006. Accessed August 14, 2016. https://www.ncjrs.gov/.../nij/.../214217.pdf.

Smithson, Amy E., Ph.D. Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project Information Sheet Frequently Asked Questions: Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons. Washington, DC: Stimson Center’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project, 2000.

"The U.S. Army Chemical Materials Activity (CMA) - Ordnance Viewer." The U.S. Army Chemical Materials Activity (CMA) - Ordnance Viewer. Accessed August 14, 2016. http://www.cma.army.mil/ordview.aspx?id=7.

Thomas, Gordon. "MI5 Discover Al-Qaeda Buying Ambulances on Ebay." MI5 Discover Al-Qaeda Buying Ambulances on Ebay. November 18, 2008. Accessed August 14, 2016. http://canadafreepress.com/article/mi5-discover-al-qaeda-buying-ambulances-on-ebay#.

U.S. Congress. Small-scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons. By Dana A. Shea and Frank Gottron. Cong. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, 2004. Accessed August 14, 2016. http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32391.pdf.

U.S. Congress. Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use Placing the Threat in Context. By Audrey Kurth Cronin. Cong. Rept. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Services, the Library of Congress, 2003. 2-5, accessed August 14, 2016, https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL31831.pdf.