

Myths about the
St. Bartholomew's Day Massacres

1572-1576

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prepared to launch counter massacres of Catholics, particularly of priests and religious leaders. For Protestants in sixteenth-century France were not beyond using brutal violence in support of their faith. Perhaps the most spectacular and best-documented example of Protestant violence is to be found in events occurring in Nîmes in 1567 on St. Michael's Day, for this reason called the *Michelade*. At that time the second war of religion was still raging, confessional tensions were running high, and the city of Nîmes, then controlled by a Protestant government, faced a military threat. A group of young Protestant thugs began by attacking a number of priests and monks. Soon Catholic heads of households as well as members of the religious community were being butchered. Corpses were chopped to pieces and dumped into city wells, thus polluting the city's water supply for some time to come. A few Protestant ministers and the local Consistory frantically tried to stop this use of force, with little success.⁷⁰

The massacres unleashed by the assassination of Coligny did not unify France religiously or even end violence between the religious communities. The royal government next turned to more concerted and calculated action, mobilizing royal armies to reduce the communities that remained under the control of defiant Protestants. That only moved the conflict to a different plane and created new types of martyrs for Goulart and other Protestant writers to memorialize.


3

Heroic Communities: Sancerre and La Rochelle

ALTHOUGH the Goulart *Mémoires* begins its first volume with descriptions of the assassinations of Coligny and many other individual Protestants, its second volume turns, with some overlapping, to descriptions of sieges. The collection thus seeks to move attention from individual martyrs for the Reformed faith to entire communities of martyrs. The most dramatic of these descriptions is of the siege of Sancerre. It was first published as a separate book in 1574; almost all of it, carved into segments, was reprinted in the Goulart collection. Even more space is allotted for descriptions, again in segments, of the siege of La Rochelle, whose survival proved to be far more important historically than the survival of Sancerre.¹

The Protestant defiance provoked by the massacres was most pronounced in the south of France, particularly in Languedoc, one of the provinces farthest from the capital and thus hardest to control, an area that at least since the days of the Albigensians had combined religious heterodoxy with political dissent. Much of Languedoc, including many of its cities—most notably Nîmes and Montauban—was in the hands of Protestants at the time of the massacres. Other parts were controlled by Catholics at least prepared to tolerate Protestantism. There was no question of massacring Protestants here and indeed little respect for the royal authority that had encouraged massacre. Languedoc was ripe for general revolt.

Other parts of France closer to the capital had pockets of equally defiant Protestants, and it was to these towns in western central France that the royal government next turned in its attempt to establish religious unity. Calvinist Protestantism had been strong in this area from the beginning, but it had also proved susceptible to Catholic and royal pressure. The city of Tours had housed one of the earliest Protestant communities in France; it is even alleged that the epithet "Huguenot" had



Siege of the town of Sommières in Languedoc, 1573. Period engraving. Courtesy of Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

first been developed there, in allusion to a statue of the ghostly King Hugues near the place where they met.² The city of Orleans served as the general headquarters of the Protestant armies during the first war of religion, 1562–1563, and as the home of an important Protestant academy for the training of ministers.³ But Protestant power in these cities was sharply diminished in the third war of religion and had been virtually eliminated by the St. Bartholomew's massacres, which had been particularly virulent in Orleans.

Remnants of committed Protestants who found refuge further to the west and south won complete control of several smaller cities. The most important of these was La Rochelle, a port on the western Atlantic coast of France, with a long history of defying royal authority and close com-

mercial connections with Protestant England and the Dutch mariners then rising in revolt against Catholic Spain. La Rochelle had served as Protestant headquarters during the third war of religion, in 1568–1570, had played host to a particularly important synod of the French Reformed Church in 1571, and was now fully controlled by a Protestant local government. Another new if smaller center of Protestant power in that general area was the city of Sancerre, located in the central province of Berry not far from the valley of the Loire.

The royal government decided to make an example of these two cities. It ordered both to stop all Protestant worship services, on the grounds that these "preachings, assemblies, and communion services" were being used to plot seditious revolt. Both communities refused. The government then ordered them to receive aristocratic representatives of royal power, allegedly for the protection of their Protestant citizens against possible further massacres. Authorities in both cities, mindful of the fact that massacres had often followed the introduction of royal troops elsewhere, refused to permit the entry of these garrisons. The two towns were placed under siege by royal armies, the larger of which, around La Rochelle, was commanded in person by the lieutenant general of the realm, the king's handsome and popular younger brother, Henri, duke of Anjou. Anjou had earlier won fame and distinction as the nominal commander of royal armies in victories over Protestants at Jarnac and Moncontour in 1569 and 1570 during the third war of religion, and had thus become something of a hero to French Catholics. His deep involvement in the planning and execution of the St. Bartholomew's massacres in Paris had added to his reputation for some French Catholics, and he hoped to gain yet more fame at La Rochelle.

The city of Sancerre was much less important in the royal plan to subdue this part of France and its siege did not require commanders of royal rank. Yet we are more fully informed of what happened there, because of a remarkable book describing that siege. Its author, Jean de Léry, was a Calvinist minister from the nearby city of La Charité who had taken refuge in Sancerre following massacre in his hometown. His *Histoire mémorable de la ville de Sancerre* was first published in 1574, in Geneva, and later incorporated into the Goulart *Mémoires*, beginning in volume I but with most of it appearing as segments of volume II. It is one of the most fascinating pieces provoked by the St. Bartholomew's massacres, for Léry had both a flair for dramatic narrative and an anthropologist's eye for telling detail. In 1558 he had served as chaplain on an expedition of French Calvinists attempting to set up a colony in the Rio de Janeiro area of Brazil and his close description of the habits of the Topinambou Indians among whom he lived has become a minor

classic, serving as grist for modern anthropologists of the distinction of Lévi-Strauss.⁴ His description of the siege of Sancerre, which was in fact published before the account of his earlier voyage to Brazil, contains many of the same qualities.⁵ In the writing of Léry we come closer to the "thick description" cherished by some modern anthropologists than in almost any other writing of this period.

Most of Léry's history is a chronological account, sometimes day by day, of events leading up to, continuing through, and following upon the siege of Sancerre. Set apart from the body of this narrative is a long, highly unusual chapter describing the suffering produced by famine in the city during the siege. It seems to have been written separately, at the special request of the Catholic commander of the forces conducting the siege of Sancerre, during the negotiations leading to the city's final surrender.⁶ It may well have saved Léry's life, for in return for this treatise on famine he received a special passport and an armed escort to a safer place, and was gone from Sancerre when it was reoccupied by Catholic troops.⁷ When he published his account of this siege in Geneva the following year, he folded this special treatise into his narrative as an extended tenth chapter. Within this chapter we see Léry's anthropological interests at their most developed.

Léry's account starts with a rather perfunctory prehistory of Sancerre, denying a legend of Roman origins and speculating that it was established during the Burgundian wars. Léry then provides a brief description of its geography. Sancerre was a hill town circled by a fortified wall, with a population of about 3,000 at the time of this writing. The wall was pierced by four main gates, one at each point of the compass. Between the northern and western gates, on the highest point of the town, was a fortified chateau that served as an arsenal and prison during the siege.⁸ Most of the surrounding hills were covered with vineyards, producing wines that were among the best in France, in Léry's opinion. The city was extremely well stocked with wine; it never ran out during the siege, even when all other kinds of food were gone, and still had a supply of wine to sell in order to pay reparations when the siege ended. Many of the residents were accustomed to work in the vineyards, and Léry speaks with appreciation of the contributions by the vine-dressers to the defense of the city during its siege, despite their lack of military experience.

Sancerre had been Protestant for some time. Indeed, the town, according to Léry, was particularly hated by Catholics because it had been among the first places in France where the Word of God "had been purely preached."⁹ At the end of his account we learn that all the priests and monks had been chased from the town. We also learn that there were a good many people in the neighborhood who would have wel-

comed a chance "to avenge the death of their relatives killed by those of the Religion in earlier wars and to gain vengeance for all the temples, chapels, images, and altars destroyed" by Protestants.¹⁰ This, at least, is the Catholic commander's explanation to Léry of why it was hard to promise safety to the inhabitants of Sancerre once the siege was lifted.

A place so strenuously committed to Protestantism was a natural refuge for those fleeing from the St. Bartholomew's massacres. According to Léry's account, about 500 did in fact come to Sancerre, a substantial strain upon the resources of a city of only 3,000. These refugees came from cities in the nearby area that had been badly hit by massacres, above all from La Charité and Orleans, but also from Bourges, Gien, and other communities.¹¹ (Léry had ministered to the Reformed Church of La Charité.¹²) Among the refugees were military men, including some battle-hardened officers, ministers, and teachers, as well as people of lesser stations in life. This community of refugees tended to be particularly fearful of Catholic pressures and distrustful of Catholic promises, and thus particularly intransigent in its view of what Sancerre's policy in resisting outside pressure should be. They came into open conflict with local residents and shaped much of the defiance for which Sancerre became known. The armed forces mobilized to defend the town against the royal armies included detachments made up mostly of refugees, with their own commanders and equipment. Most of the cavalry defending the city was in these refugee detachments. The government of the city itself was reorganized to provide for refugee participation: in December 1572 the general assembly of citizens expanded its executive council, which ran the city on a day-to-day basis, by adding eleven refugees, including both military captains and other inhabitants, swelling the total membership to twenty-five.¹³ An elected bailiff or governor, a wealthy local merchant named Johanneau, served as chief executive of this government.¹⁴

The first event leading to the siege of Sancerre occurred on September 8, 1572, when the city received from the bailiff of the province of Berry a copy of "a declaration of the king to make all preachings cease." Local authorities refused to accept this new royal order, pointing to the fact that the king's 1570 edict of pacification, which allowed Protestant worship, claimed to be "perpetual and irrevocable." They did make the concession of ordering that church bells no longer be rung before services, to avoid advertising too widely the fact that Protestant worship continued.¹⁵

The city then received a royal order, actually drafted on September 3, that it accept a garrison of royal troops commanded by the Sire de la Châtre, royal governor and lieutenant-general for the entire province.¹⁶

The assignment of an official of this prominence shows that the crown saw Sancerre as a Protestant holdout but was confident the rest of the province was under control. In a general assembly, the local citizens refused to accept this order also.¹⁷ The stated reason for posting the garrison was to protect local Protestants from the spread of massacres, but the Sancerrois did not believe this claim. They had heard of too many other cities where massacres had been permitted or even encouraged by royal garrisons.

Negotiations then began between municipal representatives and the family of the count of Sancerre, which claimed feudal rights over the city. The count's brother-in-law, a M. de Fontaines, reached an agreement with a delegation of local citizens, both Protestant and Catholic, permitting him to bring a small garrison to the chateau within the city. This agreement was promptly repudiated by the city's general assembly, and tensions began to rise within Sancerre between refugees and locals.¹⁸ A party of local citizens, including several city officers, some of whom were also elders in the local Reformed church, tried to force events by smuggling into the chateau a small troop of armed men led by the brother of M. de Fontaines. This attempt was discovered by military captains among the refugees, who forced this troop to withdraw.¹⁹ There was a great religious celebration, featuring lusty singing of Psalm 144, following the suppression of this dastardly plot.²⁰ Most of the local citizens, including moderate Protestants who had supported this maneuver, then left town.²¹ Sancerre was now entirely under the control of really intransigent Protestants.

At that point royal armies began to assemble around the town, with the first detachments arriving in January and a full complement of cavalry, riflemen, infantry, and artillery in place by mid-February. L  ry estimates the total size of the army to be some 7000 men, more than twice the population of the city.²² Although this is probably an exaggeration, it seems quite likely that the attacking forces outnumbered the defenders by a substantial margin. The commander, Sire de la Ch  tre, began by sending a drummer into the city to order the citizens to surrender in the name of the king. Not only was the drummer not sent back, but he was imprisoned for some time and then put to death. The Sire de la Ch  tre never fully forgave city authorities for this flagrant violation of the chivalric code of war.²³ He ordered that the city be placed under siege.

L  ry's detailed description of this siege demonstrates that the advantages remained with the defense in warfare of this type. The invention of gunpowder had not changed warfare as quickly and as dramatically as some military historians claim. The royal army seems to have hoped that it had, for as soon as artillery had arrived and been moved into emplacements in mid-February, they began their attack with a massive cannonade

of the city. L  ry actually kept a day-by-day count of every cannonball fired at Sancerre, and published it as an appendix to his history.²⁴ That log shows that more than half of the rounds fired against the city during the entire eight-month siege were fired in a period of four days near the beginning. L  ry's report also demonstrates that this cannonade made very little difference: although it caused a certain amount of property damage, it did not kill a single one of the defenders, unless one counts a girl who was killed not by a direct hit but by the "wind" of a cannonball.²⁵

When that initial barrage failed, the royal armies prepared to assault the city directly. After another intensive cannonade lasting two days, hundreds of assault troops, including sappers and scouts, attacked the city walls frontally, clambering uphill through the vineyards to storm through breaches in the southern wall of the city. This led to the most ferocious fighting in the siege, with almost the entire local population turning out to protect its city. In addition to the professional fighting men shooting arquebuses or pistols and swinging battle-axes or daggers, dozens of boys and vine-dressers and even some women mounted the walls and rained pebbles and stones down upon the attackers, using to great effect a type of slingshot that L  ry called a "Sancerre pistol."²⁶

This frontal attack failed completely. The royal armies were unable to get any substantial detachment within the city walls. They also suffered great casualties. L  ry estimates that sixty attackers were left dead in the moats, two hundred were so badly wounded they soon died in their tents, and two hundred more were wounded but recovered—although some remained crippled. Against this estimate L  ry provides an actual roll from among the defenders of only seventeen soldiers and one girl who were killed or mortally wounded. He further notes that not a single officer for the defense was killed.²⁷

This smashing victory led to jubilation in the Protestant camp, of course, and was followed by many expressions of relief, including divine services of thanks to God. L  ry quotes in its entirety a song composed to celebrate this victory, to be sung to the traditional tune "Les Bourguignons." After a good deal of crowing about the valiant defenders of Sancerre and the ineffective weapons of the enemy, the song goes on to thank the Protestant pastors who had so valiantly encouraged the defenders and to mock the Catholicism of the attackers. The flavor of this mockery is provided by the following verse, in an untranslatable mixture of French and Latin:

Le foss   de bassin seroit
Et au dessus estoient les nostres
O   chascun d'eux se preparoit
A recevoir ces beaux apostres
L   ne seroyent leurs paternosres,

*Le Libera, ne l'Oremus,
Mais chateons, se disoyent les aures,
Requiem pour Gaudemus.*²⁸

The jubilation proved to be premature, however. Abandoning all hope of taking Sancerre by force, the royal army settled down to starve it out by an extended siege. Engineers guiding squads of troops constructed fortifications that effectively cut Sancerre off from all communication with the outside world.²⁹ They consisted of a number of earthenwork forts built in elaborate shapes, sketched by L  ry,³⁰ and a number of fortified houses or wooden structures, all connected by trenches. A couple of small cannon were entrenched in one of the forts, although most of the artillery had been withdrawn. Armed men patrolled these fortifications day and night, preventing all access to or departure from the city. On occasion soldiers from Sancerre were able to break through this ring to allow passage for a courier with a message to other Protestant communities, but they were never able to make any permanent break in the fortifications. The royal army settled down to an extended siege that was to last another five months, determined to accomplish by starvation what they had not been able to accomplish by attack.

At this point L  ry abandons his chronological narrative for an extended close description of the effects of blockade on the city of Sancerre, particularly during the last three months of the siege, in which his anthropological eye becomes really apparent. His keen natural powers of observation and description seem to have been whetted by his years of life in Brazil, an experience that gave him a sense of comparative human behavior few of his contemporaries possessed. He drew on this background briefly in an earlier part of his narrative, describing how he had taught soldiers in the garrison defending Sancerre to make hammocks like those he had seen in Brazil and how useful they found these strange sleeping devices for escaping vermin, keeping their clothes clean, and avoiding the discomfort of sleeping on straw surrounded by powder flasks, daggers, and other weapons.³¹

In his chapter on famine L  ry describes not only the effects of food shortage but also the increasingly desperate steps taken to alleviate it.³² Some of these steps he seems to have recommended himself, based on personal experience facing severe food shortage on the ship that brought him back from Brazil. He begins by describing the lengths to which the inhabitants of Sancerre went to obtain meat once their stock of beef had run out. First they ate the horses killed in cannonades; then they turned to slaughtering living horses and the many pack animals in the city, both asses and mules. L  ry records elaborate methods for cooking each of these

meats and information on the increasingly high prices paid for them. In May the council instructed the city's butchers to take over the slaughter and sale of horsemeat, keeping some of the horses in reserve for the defense of the city.³³ Before the siege was over, however, even these horses had been slaughtered.

L  ry then describes more exotic kinds of meat eaten in Sancerre, including cats, rats, mice, moles, and dogs. He claims poor children found mice cooked over charcoal particularly tasty, and ate them tails, paws, pelt and all. Although some found dogmeat cooked with spices and herbs quite good, L  ry himself found it tasteless. Again he supplies recipes for each of these meats.³⁴

When meat of all types ran out, the people of Sancerre began eating any available leather and the parchment on which letters and books had been written. L  ry includes even more detailed recipes for making these substances edible, involving careful scraping followed by long periods of soaking and boiling. Even animal horns and bones can be made edible by some of these processes, he claims.³⁵

Far more serious to the general population was the shortage of wheat and therefore bread. By July three-quarters of the population had no bread. Substitutes made from grasses and vegetables tended to cause serious diarrhea and thus were hardly satisfactory. A few people even tried eating hemlock roots, despite warnings that they were poisonous, and died as a result. People who had private gardens had to protect them day and night from the press of famished people looking for food.³⁶ The city tried to alleviate the worst of the famine by arranging for soup kitchens in a number of private homes, but nothing could be served in them except vegetable soups and cooked leather, all that was left.³⁷ The good store of wine never did run out, as the main business of Sancerre was the production and sale of wine, but it could not take the place of food.

The worst result of this famine, in L  ry's eyes, was an instance of cannibalism, which he describes with special horror and fascination.³⁸ A wine-dresser named Simon Potard, his wife, and an old woman who lived with them were caught eating the couple's three-year-old daughter. They claimed she had died naturally. When her body was being laid out for the funeral, the wife left the house briefly and the old woman, saying it was a shame to waste good meat, persuaded the husband to carve the little body up for eating. The three had already eaten the brain, liver, and viscera of the little girl and were about to eat her tongue when caught. L  ry reports he saw the girl's legs and feet in a pot with vinegar, spices, and salt, ready to cook. He also saw her shoulders, arms, hands, and chest, all dressed and prepared for cooking. L  ry had seen canni-

balism before, in Brazil, where it was a custom of the Topinambou Indians to eat prisoners of war, but he found this episode far more revolting.³⁹ He was inclined to hold the old woman primarily responsible. He had observed in Brazil that old women, not men or young women or children, were most insistent on the killing of prisoners and primarily responsible for cooking them, on special grills. He had also heard of other cases in which old women were responsible for cannibalism, most notably an elderly woman in Burgundy who in 1438 had been executed for killing, dismembering, and salting the bodies of several small children.⁴⁰ He seems to have shared the common stereotype of the period that elderly women were often involved in atrocities and witchcraft.

There were some in Sancerre, Léry reports, who thought that the Potard family should not be punished, given the severity of the famine and the fact that the little girl had died naturally. That was not the majority point of view. A full trial was held, which established that the family had received vegetable soup and wine earlier in the day as alms, so could not claim to have been completely without food. It was alleged that the Potards were gluttons, drunkards, and cruel to their children, that Simon had once killed a man and stolen a horse, that they might even be bigamists. Mme. Potard had been married earlier. Back in 1563 the Reformed Consistory had refused to permit her remarriage because it was not certain her first husband had died. The couple had then arranged for a Catholic wedding and were still under a ban of excommunication from the Reformed Church for this defiant misbehavior. This combination of crimes convinced the court that the Potards would have to die. Simon was burned to death alive; his wife was strangled and her body then burned; the body of the old woman, who had died in prison awaiting trial, was also burned.⁴¹ Léry thoroughly approved of this punishment. Quite apart from the fact that it was fully deserved, he suggested that it was needed to prevent cannibalism from spreading. Léry reports that he had been asked by a man, at about this time, if it would not be permissible to eat the buttock of another man who had just been killed.⁴²

Léry concludes this part of his account by reporting the devastating impact of the famine on the population. He estimates that at least 500 died of starvation and 200 more were so seriously weakened that not all of them survived.⁴³ He believes that practically all the children under twelve died.⁴⁴ Léry's heart-breaking descriptions of some of these deaths also draw edifying lessons from them, as in a report of a dying ten-year-old boy who begs his weeping parents not to cry. This boy does not blame his father and mother for not giving him bread since he knows there isn't any; he reminds them of the pious Lazarus who also was desperately hungry; he finally tells them this must be God's will; then

he expires.⁴⁵ Far more people in Sancerre died of starvation than of battle wounds; Léry's list of all those known to have died in battle reaches a total of only eighty-four.⁴⁶

The people of Sancerre tried a number of desperate measures to gain relief. They smuggled out couriers to the Protestant communities of Languedoc to beg for help, but many were caught before they got very far and usually executed.⁴⁷ They sent out bands of boys with armed guards to glean food in the fields, but harassment from the soldiers in the siege army made these sorties ineffective.⁴⁸ They even encouraged the starving poor simply to leave the city and beg the besiegers for food and mercy, but this also did not work.⁴⁹

Meanwhile peace had returned to the rest of France. The Sire de la Châtre sent a Protestant nobleman acquainted with Léry to the city walls to try to persuade the minister to act as a go-between in negotiating surrender. Léry was informed that La Rochelle and other Protestant cities under siege had already reached terms of peace and had been permitted to retain Protestant worship by a new royal edict. The duke of Anjou, one of the main persecutors of Protestantism in France, had been elected king of Poland and was about to move to his new realm. There was no reason to resist any longer. Léry passed this news on, but the people of Sancerre refused to believe it, and many were still inclined to hold out until death.⁵⁰

More poor people left the city, however, and substantial numbers of soldiers began deserting. Soon resistance was no longer possible. The government of Sancerre finally negotiated a surrender that permitted them to remain Protestant, although without the right to conduct public worship, and required them to provide fairly substantial reparations to pay off troops in the royal army.⁵¹ The soldiers of Sancerre marched out, receiving the honors of war, and the civilian government permitted the royal troops to march in. Catholic priests returned, for the first time in many years. Nevertheless Sancerre remained primarily a Protestant city. It had saved its religious freedom by its stubborn defense. There were a few continuing episodes of violence: the civilian governor of the city was assassinated by soldiers a few days later and one of the Protestant ministers of the city was robbed and killed in a neighboring village several weeks later.⁵² But peace had returned, more or less, to Sancerre.

Léry's account of the siege of Sancerre was designed to encourage similar heroism elsewhere. It showed that Protestants in this community were willing to accept extreme deprivations and risk agonizing deaths in order to protect their religious beliefs. It was designed to portray the people of Sancerre as martyrs, and to make the example of their martyrdom all the more compelling by depicting them as susceptible to the

temptations and foibles all humans share. L  ry's history provides an example of Protestant reactions to the St. Bartholomew's massacres that is in many ways similar to the portrayals of the death of Coligny and other individual victims, yet different enough to provide powerful reinforcement to those accounts.

The extended descriptions of the siege of La Rochelle are not as arresting as L  ry's description of Sancerre. Goulart includes two complementary accounts in his *M  moires*. One is by a Protestant who had obviously lived through the siege within La Rochelle, ordered chronologically, often day by day, and printed in segments, usually of one month each.³³ Most of these segments are paired with selections from L  ry. This account is often interrupted with full copies of letters and other official documents exchanged between royal representatives and the city's government. The other account included by Goulart is by a Catholic who had accompanied the army of siege.³⁴ It had previously been printed in Lyon.

The siege of La Rochelle was far more important than the siege of Sancerre both to the royal government and to the French Protestant cause. La Rochelle was a larger and strategically more important city. It had also become a highly visible symbol of Protestant resistance, and the crown was determined to crush it. The army assembled to seize La Rochelle included much of the flower of the French nobility. Its commander-in-chief, we have already noted, was the king's younger brother Henri, duke of Anjou. Their still younger brother, Francois, duke of Alen  on, was also in the royal camp, but was assigned no role of importance. The young former leaders of the Protestant cause, the princes of Navarre and Cond  , so recently converted by force to Catholicism, were also present³⁵ but played no role in the battle and in fact seem to have remained under a kind of gilded arrest. The leaders of the more intransigent Catholic faction, the duke of Guise and his brother the duke d'Aumale, were part of the company, along with many of the Catholic nobles who had helped them supervise the St. Bartholomew's massacres in Paris, and they were important actors in the siege. The chronicles do not estimate the size of this royal army, but it was larger than the army that had invested Sancerre. One index to its size is the estimated number of cannonballs fired into the two cities. Intensive cannonades aimed at Sancerre were limited to two occasions of a few days each. The cannonades aimed at La Rochelle continued for much longer periods of time and required much larger numbers of cannon and much larger quantities of ammunition. At the most intense, some 985 or 986 volleys a day were fired at Sancerre. There were days when 1500 volleys were fired at La

Rochelle, and in one month some 12,790 volleys were fired.³⁶ L  ry's count was 5915 for the entire siege of Sancerre.³⁷

Resistance in La Rochelle was strengthened, as it was in most cities under siege in 1573, by refugees from the St. Bartholomew's massacres elsewhere. Indeed the Catholic account of the siege makes the refugees responsible for persuading the locals to provoke hostilities by refusing royal orders.³⁸ Prominent among those refugees were noblemen and ministers. Of the noblemen, the most distinguished was Francois de La Noue, the great military commander of Protestant armies in the wars of religion. He had been a governor of La Rochelle, and at the time of the massacres was a prisoner in a Flemish town under siege by the Spanish, a part of that army invading the Low Countries for which Coligny had been seeking royal support. Under the agreement that ended that siege he was returned to France, but to areas controlled by the royal government, so found himself a commander without an army. The crown sent him to La Rochelle on its team of negotiators, and after a halfhearted attempt to present the royal proposals he deserted to the Protestant camp.³⁹

For some time La Noue provided leadership to the forces defending La Rochelle, frequently leading detachments on sorties into the countryside.⁴⁰ His role remained peculiarly ambiguous, though. He returned to the royal armies with several robes in his suite in March, just before the siege became really intense.⁴¹ Yet he then helped the city negotiate the final agreement in July by which the siege was lifted.⁴²

Other refugee captains were more consistent in their support for resistance in La Rochelle, but the main burden of organizing that resistance seems to have remained in the hands of the mayor and other elected officials of the city. At times the entire population was mobilized for defense. The Protestant chronicler makes much of the chambermaids and other women and girls who were stationed upon the walls at the height of the siege, raining stones and other missiles on the attackers.

More constant in their support of La Rochelle's resistance were the many refugee ministers. In addition to the three Protestant ministers of the city's parishes, the most prominent of whom was O  der de Nort, there were some fifty-four refugee ministers. All were put to work to assist in the city's defense. Each company of defending soldiers had its own chaplain to lead it in prayer every evening and morning. Ministers were even assigned to "exhort" the corps charged with guarding the city walls on Sundays and other days. They were also assigned to visit the sick and wounded, although the chronicler notes that there were fewer victims of natural diseases than usual during this siege. Ministers even worked on the fortifications and accompanied troops on night patrol.⁴³

At a few crucial points in the siege, some of these ministers intervened forcibly in discussions on whether and how peace should be negotiated. In general they demanded that the city insist on full toleration of Protestant services, sacraments, and rites. They also insisted that La Rochelle make no separate peace, but act only in concert with Protestant communities elsewhere in France. In the March negotiations the refugees, apparently still led by the ministers, even persuaded the city to add a refugee nobleman, the Sire d'Estambe, to the negotiating team to speak for their churches as well as for La Rochelle.⁶⁴ Clearly these refugees were thinking to the future and hoping that they could return to their home communities with at least a measure of religious toleration. They did not want to see their hosts agree to terms that would make La Rochelle a unique Protestant enclave in France.

Resistance in La Rochelle, as in Sancerre and other Protestant communities, was provoked by two royal orders: a general order prohibiting all Protestant forms of public worship (although promising not to molest Protestants in their homes), and a specific order instructing the city to accept a resident royal representative, in this case a moderate Protestant, the Sire de Biron. La Rochelle flatly refused to obey either order and for a time would not even negotiate. After its first rather peremptory orders had been rejected, the crown had sent a special negotiator along with La Noue, the abbé Gadaigne. The governors of La Rochelle did not want to meet with Gadaigne or hear his proposals. After some delay and pressure they agreed to send representatives to meet him briefly, but insisted that the royal proposals be put into writing.

A full text of those proposals was duly delivered and is included in the Goulart *Mémoires*.⁶⁵ Its earlier articles simply try to justify royal policy, accusing the Rochellois of using religion as an excuse for rebellion, insisting on the need to assassinate Coligny and his "accomplices" for treason, expressing the wish that all Frenchmen become Catholic. The document then turns to proposals for negotiation, promising that all abjurations would be voluntary, not required by law, and permitting continued Protestant worship in La Rochelle. City officials promptly rejected these proposals, denying that they were in rebellion, pointing out that the refugees within their walls also wanted toleration, and insisting that any peace would require consultation with other "cities and Reformed churches of this kingdom."⁶⁶ This decision was made by the city council and confirmed by a general assembly of the citizens, in which spokesmen for the refugees attacked the royal offer with particular vehemence.⁶⁷

Once negotiations had collapsed the siege began in earnest. In early April groups of construction soldiers started digging tunnels under the

city walls and building cannon emplacements. That was followed by the largest and most devastating cannonades of the siege, which were in turn followed by repeated charges of cavalry and infantry, led in person by many of France's most distinguished aristocrats. The city mobilized to repulse these assaults, and it was at this point that the chambermaids and other women appeared on the city walls. The intrinsic advantages of the defense were again demonstrated. The cannon did not succeed in opening a major breach in the city walls and all attempts to storm those walls failed. The attackers suffered many more casualties than did the defenders. That, indeed, is what most impressed the Catholic chronicler of this siege. He particularly regrets the deaths of so many officers, including those of the distinction of the duke d'Aumale, Guise's brother, and the serious wounding of many others, including the bloodthirsty duke of Nevers so feared by Protestants. Even the commanding general, the duke of Anjou, was wounded, although only slightly. He was lucky, though, for the shot intended for him did kill one of his companions.⁶⁸ As an appendix to his account, the Catholic chronicler provides a complete list of all the Catholic captains killed.⁶⁹ He estimates that altogether several hundred officers were either killed or wounded in the course of the siege.⁷⁰ In contrast, the Protestant losses, both from the cannonades and from the assaults, seem to have remained fairly light.

The siege of La Rochelle was complicated by the natural protection provided by the city's geographic location.⁷¹ Only a small section of its wall could be attacked from firm ground. Much of its wall was protected by moats filled by the sea, beyond which were salt marshes and waterways. The city was open to the sea so that ships could dock on its quay, but its port was protected by seawalls ending in towers, one of which served as a lighthouse. The Catholic forces tried to blockade this port, principally by sinking some ships near its rather narrow entrance. One of these ships was a carrack, a cargo ship huge by standards of that day, bigger even than a galleon, and fully fitted with cannon. Sunk in shallow water, it could serve as a fort and shell the city from its less protected side. A squadron of men was sent out to board the carrack and burn it down to prevent its use as a fort, but they were unsuccessful.⁷² Other smaller ships were then sunk near the carrack to block further entry to the harbor.

This blockade, however, proved relatively ineffective. Even before it began, the city estimated it had a three-month supply of foodstuffs, enough to outlast most sieges of the period.⁷³ A number of ships loaded with provisions managed to make their way into the port in the early days of the siege.⁷⁴ Even after the carrack had been sunk, one Rochellois captain managed to run the blockade with four ships he had captured as prizes, loaded with Bordeaux wine and grain.⁷⁵ La Rochelle's captains

were apparently not only engaging in commerce but also systematically seizing any Catholic ship they could take and on occasion Protestant ships trading in "suspect places." Even when the siege was at its most intense, small fishing vessels apparently frequently made their way out to sea. The Protestant chronicler mentions several times that some of the poor of the city were able to support themselves by sailing out and catching fish.⁷⁶

It was the hope of many in La Rochelle that rescue would come from the sea, specifically from England. A negotiating team of Huguenot nobles was in England, seeking support from the government of Elizabeth I, and La Rochelle repeatedly smuggled out emissaries by sea to urge that this negotiation be concluded successfully and speedily. Some within the city were even willing to renounce their allegiance to France and place themselves under English control if that would win them religious freedom.⁷⁷ This possibility would have horrified most good Frenchmen, however, and most particularly the nobles who still provided leadership to the Protestant faction, so it is never mentioned in the chronicles included in Goulart's *Mémoires*. On occasion rumors would sweep the city that the English were indeed assembling a rescue force and that La Rochelle must hold out until they arrived, but this force never materialized and La Rochelle maintained its freedom with its own resources.

The leaky blockade meant that the royal army investing La Rochelle could never turn, as had the army investing Sancerre, to the tactic of starving the city out. Toward the end of the siege there were some complaints of shortages. In June, according to the Protestant account, a group of 300 inhabitants signed a petition for peace, complaining of a severe shortage of bread. Some of their leaders tried to take control of one of the city gates, but they were quickly seized and jailed.⁷⁸ In that same month, according to the Catholic account, the siege army received report from a woman who had left the city to gather vegetables that there was famine inside.⁷⁹ But neither account speaks of any deaths from starvation. This was not the desperate problem for La Rochelle that it was for Sancerre.

The siege of La Rochelle was finally lifted in July. Terms of peace had been agreed on in June, but had to be cleared with the king and his council before taking effect. Once all parties were agreed, the Sire de Biran, the king's appointee months before as commander of a royal garrison, finally entered the city and formally proclaimed the peace. On the same day ships with loads of biscuit, wheat, and fish entered the port.⁸⁰

The royal edict of pacification of July 1573, the text of which is printed in Goulart's *Mémoires*, was not particularly generous.⁸¹ It permits Prot-

estant worship in La Rochelle, but only in private homes and buildings. It permits the many Protestant gentlemen who were refugees in La Rochelle, once they returned to their home communities, to arrange for certain Protestant rites in their residences, but only baptisms and weddings attended by no more than ten people. It explicitly extends the privileges granted to La Rochelle to two other Protestant strongholds, Montauban and Nîmes in Languedoc. But it does not mention many smaller communities that had remained Protestant in Languedoc. Nor does it mention Sancerre. If the Protestant chronicler's account of the negotiations is accurate, however, it was understood that the rites permitted in the three named cities included not only worship services with preaching and communion, but also baptisms and weddings. It was also understood that preaching, weddings, and baptisms would be permitted in Sancerre. Gentlemen who had taken refuge in Montauban and Nîmes won the same privileges as those who had fled to La Rochelle.

There were no immediate complaints from the people of La Rochelle. The siege had been lifted, the massive royal army was withdrawn, and things could begin to return normal. A preface to the text of the pacification edict in the *Mémoires* observes with some irony that it had been "prepared by the secret council [of the king] to save the honor of the king of Poland [Anjou] and the remainder of his men, who had received such shame in the siege of La Rochelle."⁸² It was clear to all that the royal armies had lost and that this strenuous attempt to reestablish religious unity in France had failed.

There are no accounts of similar length in the Goulart *Mémoires* of the sieges of other Protestant strongholds during the months following the St. Bartholomew's massacres. The royal armies seem to have reserved their efforts primarily for La Rochelle and secondarily for Sancerre. Accounts of developments in many other cities tend to be brief and perfunctory. Montauban, for example, receives only some five pages. It reportedly reacted to news of the massacres in nearby Toulouse by turning on its own Catholic residents. They were all jailed and then "gently" thrown out of the city. Only one was killed, a Catholic hog butcher who began trading insults with the mob on his way to jail.⁸³ Montauban, like Sancerre and La Rochelle, did receive a number of gentlemen refugees, and they persuaded the city government not only to arm for defense but also to seize and occupy a number of neighboring towns. Royal forces were able to retake at least one of these neighboring towns but made no effort to subdue Montauban itself. Delegates from Montauban visited the royal camp outside La Rochelle and were involved in the negotiations leading to the lifting of the siege. But their city flatly refused to accept the resulting edict, calling it "short, capitious, and contrary to the edict

of pacification so solemnly established."⁸⁴ They were obviously insisting on return to the more favorable terms of 1570. It seems probable to me that Monauban objected particularly to a clause of the 1573 edict requiring freedom for Catholic worship in the entire kingdom, including places where it was not then allowed. It had forcibly ejected its Catholics and did not want them back.

Reactions in Nîmes similarly fill only a few scattered pages. The actions of citizens of Nîmes were considerably less heroic, indeed downright ambiguous. A number of citizens fled the city or abjured their Protestant faith on receiving news of the massacres. Many who remained were inclined to accept royal orders. An order relayed by the provincial governor to stop all preaching services was deflected by a decision to hold such services only at night. An order to accept a royal garrison, however, was flatly rejected. An armed guard was raised by the Sire de Clausonne, a councillor, who, in spite of the facts that his vocation was "to handle books" and he was "very old," became "chief of war."⁸⁵ Under his leadership the city fortified itself against attack. No attack materialized, however.

In explaining why the sieges of 1573 were lifted, both L  ry and the Protestant chronicler of La Rochelle give appropriate credit, as we would expect, to divine providence. They both also advance a more mundane explanation that gives credit to pressure put upon the French government by officials in the government of Poland. All during these sieges the duke of Anjou, commander of the French royal armies, was being considered for election to the crown of Poland and his representatives were strenuously arguing his case near Warsaw. In May he was in fact elected and word dispatched to him on the tenth. On May 29, word arrived in his camp of the election.⁸⁶ On June 17, Polish ambassadors arrived and arranged for a ceremony of coronation on a ship at sea, marked by cannonades and fireworks.⁸⁷ Within a week terms for negotiating the end of the siege had been established and the troops on both sides of the city wall began fraternizing, with the Protestants trading their wine for Catholic meat.⁸⁸

Anjou and much of his suite had to abandon the siege of La Rochelle in order to go to Poland and take up his new job. He also had to abandon his commitment to making Catholicism the sole religion in France and acknowledge his willingness to permit the establishment of a measure of religious toleration in his native country. The Polish nobility had insisted on this as a condition of Anjou's election, and his representatives in Poland had been willing to concede to this stipulation. As L  ry puts it, the Polish gentlemen sent to France to escort the Duke of Anjou to his new throne pointedly reminded the French that his representatives

had promised that "all the cities and people in France molested for religion" would be given liberty as a condition for Anjou's election to the Polish crown.⁸⁹ The Polish ambassadors meant to hold him to that promise.

For a variety of reasons the French badly wanted the crown of Poland for Anjou. Charles IX was jealous of the public acclaim received by his younger brother for his military victories and jealous also of his mother's obvious favoritism toward Henri. Catherine de M  dicis wanted all her sons to be kings and all her daughters to be queens, whenever and wherever that might be possible. Anjou himself does not seem to have been eager to go to Poland, but he did like the idea of being a king in his own right rather than being a perpetual second to his older brother. So the royal family were agreed that this was a step worth taking, no matter what the consequences for domestic religious policy.

Why had the Poles insisted on religious toleration within France as a condition for electing a French prince to be their king? A good part of the explanation must be the gory reports they had received of the St. Bartholomew's massacres. Those reports had become more than part of a campaign within France to steel the souls of the Protestant faction to remain true to their faith even if it meant violence and siege; the accounts of martyrs, both individuals like Coligny and entire communities like Sancerre, were not intended solely for domestic consumption. They had become part of an international propaganda campaign to influence policy in other countries.

- lence," in *her Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1975), pp. 152–187.
40. Galli to Salviati, September 8, 1572, in Pierre Hurtubise, ed., *Correspondance du nonce en France Antonio Maria Salviati* (1572–1578), vol. 1, 1572–1574 (Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University, 1975), p. 227. For a full account of how news of the massacre reached Rome, see Pierre Hurtubise, "Comment Rome apprit la nouvelle du massacre de la Saint-Barthélemy," *Archivum Historiae Pontificae* 10 (1972), 187–209.
41. Lucien Romier, "La Saint-Barthélemy: les événements de Rome et la préméditation du massacre," *Revue du XVI^e siècle* 1 (1913), 529–560.
42. *Mem. Chas.* IX, 1, fols. 31–31v.
43. *Ibid.*, fols. 265–268v.
44. *Ibid.*, fol. 268.
45. Camillo Capilupi, *Lo stratagemma di Carlo IX . . .* (Geneva, 1574), p. 68 (Italian): 92 (French).
46. *Ibid.*, p. 69; 93.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 69–73; 93–97.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 73–74; 98.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 74; 98–99.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 74–75; 99–100.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 76–77; 101–102.
52. *Mem. Chas.* IX, 1, fols. 392–399. See Capilupi, pp. 67–83; 91–108.
53. *Mem. Chas.* IX, 1, fols. 390v–392v. See Capilupi, pp. 84–87; 109–114.
54. Erlanger, p. 224, plate 30.
55. For a full and carefully illustrated study, see Philipp P. Fehl, "Vasari's 'Extripation of the Huguenots': The Challenge of Pity and Fear," *Gazette des beaux arts* 84 (1974), 257–284.
56. Salviati, *Corresp.*, I, 68–69.
57. Instructions on absolving heretics are contained in practically every one of the many letters from the pope's domestic secretary, Galli, the Cardinal of Como, to Salviati in September and October of 1572. See Salviati, *Corresp.*, I, 224–298.
58. Liisi Karttunen, *Grégoire XIII comme politicien et souverain*, in *Annales Academiæ Scientiarum Fennicae*, series B, vol. 2, no. 2 (Helsinki, 1911). See also Henri Biaudet, *Les nonciatures apostoliques permanentes jusqu'en 1648*, in *ibid.*, series B, vol. 2, no. 1 (Helsinki, 1910), for the wider context.
59. Salviati, *Corresp.*, I, 9–14.
60. *Mem. Chas.* IX, 1, fols. 291–292.
61. *Ibid.*, fols. 399–[400]v.
62. For more on Sureau's abjuration, see Chapter 6.
63. *Mem. Chas.* IX, 1, fols. 385v–386 (Navarre et al.); 399 [400]v (Condé).
64. *Ibid.*, fols. 406v–407.
65. *Ibid.*, fols. 421v–424.
66. *Ibid.*, fols. 436–448. I have not been able to find any evidence of a separate publication of this pamphlet.
67. See Paul-F. Geisendorf, ed., *Livre des habitants de Genève*, vol. 2, 1572–

- 1574 et 1585–1587 (Geneva: Droz, 1963), pp. viii–ix and 1–108, for a detailed record of this immigration.
68. E. William Monter, "The Consistory of Geneva, 1559–1569," *BHR* 38 (1976), 481–482.
69. *Mem. Chas.* IX, 1, fol. 366v.
70. See Léon Ménard, *Histoire civile, ecclésiastique et littéraire de la ville de Nîmes*, vol. 5 (Nîmes, 1873), 14–24, for a graphic description of this massacre.
3. *Heroic Communities: Sancerre and La Rochelle*
1. I have found useful in preparing this chapter Malcolm Wallace McDonald, "The Sieges of the Fourth War of Religion in France (1572–1573)" (M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1980).
2. Janet G. Gray, "The Origin of the Word Huguenot," *SCJ* 14 (1983), 349–359.
3. Nathanaël Weiss, "Une des premières écoles de théologie protestantes en France (Orléans 1561–1568)," *BSHPF* 60 (1911), 218–224.
4. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes tropiques*, trans. John Russell (New York: Criterion, 1961), pp. 44, 85–88, 346, 353.
5. See Géraude Nakam, *Au lendemain de la Saint-Barthélemy, guerre civile et famine: Histoire mémorable du siège de Sancerre (1573) de Jean de Léry* (Paris: Anthropos, 1975), for a fine study including a full text of the Léry history. All references to the Léry account are to this edition.
6. Léry, *Sancerre*, p. 327.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 335–336.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 193–195; p. 216 for the population estimate.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 236.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
16. Full text in *ibid.*, pp. 198–200.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 205–207.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 215–230.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 230.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 230–231.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 244, 340.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 345–348.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 248.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 259.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 261.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 261–264; quoted verse on 264.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 265–278.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 267, 269, 273.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 250.
32. See the thoughtful analysis of this chapter in Janet Whatley, "Food and the Limits of Civility: The Testimony of Jean de Léry," *SCJ* 15 (1984), 394–400.
33. Léry, *Santerre*, pp. 280–282.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 283–287.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 287–288.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 303–304.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 291–295.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 291–292.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 294.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 291–293.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 301.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 296.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 297.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 349–356.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 274–278; 304–309.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 300.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 295–296; 311.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 313–314.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 331–334.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 337–342.
53. *Mem. Chas. IX*, II, fols. 97–103v; 124v–131; 135–156; 167–176; 232v–239; 269v–280. I have not found any separate printing of this account.
54. *Ibid.*, fols. 280–293v.
55. *Ibid.*, fols. 15–15v, in the royal letter of November 6, 1572, appointing Anjou and the princes to lead this army.
56. *Ibid.*, fols. 174–174v.
57. Léry, *Santerre*, p. 348.
58. *Mem. Chas. IX*, II, fols. 280–280v.
59. *Ibid.*, fols. 16v–18.
60. *Ibid.*, fols. 102ff.
61. *Ibid.*, fol. 171v.
62. *Ibid.*, fols. 276v and ff.
63. *Ibid.*, fols. 167–167v.
64. *Ibid.*, fol. 169v.
65. *Ibid.*, fols. 144–147v.
66. *Ibid.*, fols. 148–150v, esp. fol. 150.
67. *Ibid.*, fols. 150v–152.
68. *Ibid.*, fol. 290.
69. *Ibid.*, fols. 291–293v.

70. *Ibid.*, fols. 284v, 289.
71. *Ibid.*, fols. 153–156, provides a description of this location.
72. *Ibid.*, fols. 137–137v.
73. *Ibid.*, fol. 169.
74. *Ibid.*, fol. 124v.
75. *Ibid.*, fols. 140v–141.
76. *Ibid.*, fol. 275.
77. Henri Hauser, *François de La Noue (1531–1591)* (Paris: Hachette, 1892), pp. 49–51.
78. *Mem. Chas. IX*, II, fols. 274v–275.
79. *Ibid.*, fol. 290v.
80. *Ibid.*, fols. 279v–280.
81. *Ibid.*, fols. 294–299v.
82. *Ibid.*, fol. 293v.
83. *Ibid.*, fols. 176–176v.
84. *Ibid.*, fol. 180.
85. *Ibid.*, fols. 21–22.
86. *Ibid.*, fol. 289v.
87. *Ibid.*, fols. 290–290v.
88. *Ibid.*, fol. 279.
89. Léry, *Santerre*, p. 321.

4. *International Propaganda: The Reveille-matin*

1. For a thoughtful reading of this pamphlet from a somewhat different perspective than mine, see Donald R. Kelley, *The Beginning of Ideology: Consciousness and Society in the French Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. pp. 301–305.
2. See the *Reveille-matin* entry in the Bibliography for more on these two editions.
3. For a persuasive rejection of this attribution see the article on Barnaud in the *Dictionnaire de biographie française*, V, columns 497–498.
4. Adolf Hauffen, *Johann Fischart: Ein Literaturbild aus der Zeit der Gegenreformation* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1921–1922), remains the fullest biography. See II, 24–27, for Fischart's work on the *Reveille-matin*.
5. For bibliographical descriptions, see François Rirret, *Catalogue des livres du XVI^e siècle* (Strasbourg: Heitz, 1960), I, 36–37, nos. 927–931.
6. *Reveille-matin*, I, sigs. ai,–[aiii].
7. *Reveille-matin*, II, 7–49.
8. *Ibid.*, I, sigs. [aiii]–[aiii].
9. *Ibid.*, sigs. [a7]; bii,; biii.
10. *Ibid.*, sigs. [b8]–cii, "Dialogisme sur l'effigie de la paix"; cii, "Vers au chasseur deloyal"; cii, "Aux vrais gentilshommes français."
11. *Dialogi*, sigs. [q95], "In effigiem pacis Valesiae dialogismus"; [q95], "In