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WHITE PAPER

MID-TERM ASSIGNMENT

APUS-AMU INTL 434 Threat Analysis

Dr. Christopher Merritt

November 15, 2016

Question 1:  In what ways is a non-state actor different from a nation-state?  Please be specific and give examples of each to support your argument. 

State and non-state actors play a significant role in the foreign policy and international relations of a country. Understanding the differences between the two categories is required to fully comprehend the importance of the role that they serve. The reason for the separate and definitive categorization of the two is because for a long period of time state actors were considered the main actor when dealing with foreign policy, while non-state actors (International Governmental Organizations (IGO), International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO), Economic Agents and the media) were until recently, considered less impactful regarding foreign policy. The capabilities and flexibilities of non-states lends to their ability to affect foreign policy and international relations much more so than traditional states.

Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention of 1930 states that “The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” (1934) There are a multitude of definitions for state actors, but this particular statement that was classified in the Montevideo Convention is often considered the common accepted term. There are several internationally disputed cases regarding recognition, but it is widely accepted that a state achieves the status of full recognition after it is recognized by a substantial number of others and is admitted to the United Nations. (UN n.d.) Comment by Christopher: Good

While a state is fairly cut and dry, non-states are much more extensive and as stated above, non-states include IGOs, INGOs, economic agents and mainstream media organizations. IGOs are bodies that are founded by formal political agreements between its members through treaties. IGOs are unique because they are fully recognized by international law by their member/host nations but are not treated as resident institutional entities of the nations where they reside. (Michigan 2008) IGOs include such organizations as the United Nations Organization (UNO), European Union (EU), League of Arab States (LAS), World Trade Organization (WTO), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). INGOs are often defined as private, inter-state, non-profit organizations that are comprised of individuals that are other than representatives of states/governments. (UIA n.d.) INGOs are often, although not exclusively, viewed as non-peaceful, non-settled groups that include terrorist organizations, and religious or ethical groups. INGOs function as actors in foreign policy predominantly through their capacity to influence other actors. The capacity and ability of INGOs to influence international settings and agendas is widely recognized. INGOs are capable of putting articles on the agenda, through their actions, of high-power decision makers. Through their influence in the public view, they are quite able to provide or disallow legitimacy to plans and actions agreed upon by international decision makers. Also, they are advantageous and often imperative for helping implement the plans/actions agreed to by global decision makers. (Commonwealth n.d.) Several prominent INGOs include Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and Doctors Without Boarders.

Next, economic agents play a significant role as non-state actors. Although they have ever-expanding international reach and influence, multinational companies do not enjoy unregulated and unsupervised power that is often claimed by critics. The alleged transfer of power from a government to large corporations is drastically exaggerated and misunderstood. The fact is that long-term investments combined with new techniques that allow for transparency and investors to monitor the performance of companies projects the illusion of corporations gaining governmental control. However, companies are involved with international relationships and actually rely on them perhaps more than ever before. Global trades and investments have grown more quickly than what has been yielded. Political barriers have been removed in critical areas that have opened new avenues for investment, and this has in-turn created a much higher level of scrutiny and a new political agenda around issues such as the environment and human rights violations. As a reply, large international companies have become much more involved with change, expansion, and actors of the international system. The most important thing that must be monitored and ensured is that the presence and influence of large international companies in these agendas is for positive change and not political gain or corporate greed. (Werker, Ahmed 2007)

Lastly, the role of media has become fundamental in shaping national and international public opinions. The coverage or lack thereof of certain events transforms the mindfulness and attitude of public opinion throughout the globe, which has great potential to influence international actors. The recent U.S. Presidential Election is a great example. Many people believe that the coverage by broadcasters such as Fox News and CNN had a substantial impact on the outcome. It is important to remember that traditional media outlets are becoming antiquated and more so replaced by social media type platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. (Stratton 2008)

Reference

"About UN Membership | United Nations." UN News Center. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/about-un-membership/index.html.

"International Non-governmental Organisations in the Commonwealth and beyond." International NGOs. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/sectors/civil_society/international_ngos/.

"LibGuides: International Governmental Organizations (IGOs): Guide by Organization: Introduction." Introduction. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://libguides.lib.msu.edu/internationalgovernmentorganizations.

"Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States." Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897.

Stratton, Trevin. Power Failure: The Diffusion of State Power in International Relations. PDF. INFINITY JOURNAL, November/December 2008. http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/international_history_politics/shared/student_profiles/Publications/Copies/Stratton-Power_Failure.pdf

"Union of International Associations." What Is an International Non-governmental Organization (INGO)? Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.uia.org/faq/yb4.

Reference Cont’d

Werker, Eric D., and Faisal Z. Ahmed. What Do Non-Governmental Organizations Do? PDF. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2007. http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication Files/08-041.pdf

Question 2: Why has the Intelligence Community had to adapt with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of more and more non-traditional threats to our national security? Please discuss the differences between how the Intelligence Community addressed traditional threats and how we have to approach the problem today with the addition of the non-traditional threat problem set. Are there any similarities?

The years following the Cold War were times of change, particularly for the intelligence community. Threats evolved from large-scale, traditional state actors to non-traditional and non-state and these new threats forced intelligence agencies to adjust accordingly. The big, sluggish, easily visible targets of the Cold War are no longer; rather targets have become much smaller, fluid, hidden, and nearly shapeless. During the Cold War enemies were quite easily located and observed, but proved rather difficult to neutralize. In the new fight the intelligence community faces, quite the opposite is true. Our new enemies are difficult to find, even harder to observe, but once found, are easily terminated. Smaller, non-traditional, non-state targets use obscurity to their advantage. They demonstrate very low signatures and signal/noise ratios, and indicators that are not unique in any manner that is needed to effectively catch the eyes of intelligence analysts. During the Cold War the majority of intelligence consumers could be found near the top of the national security decision-making totem. Nowadays consumers are expanding to include state/local officials, infrastructure managers, and at times, private citizens. A lowly security officer or even a medical professional now may find themselves with more of a need to know than the POTUS regarding a particular threat because they may be in a more timely or critical position to prevent it. (Treverton, 2009) Also, intelligence during a conventional/traditional war has been typically collected by higher-ranking intelligence officials and sections, and then disseminated to subordinates for action. Presently the militaries of western civilizations are combating counterinsurgencies where intelligence is being collected and acted upon by various unit sizes, from a single platoon to an entire company or battalion. The flow of intelligence has been reversed in a sense that it is now more of a bottom-up format, as opposed to top-down, and this change has created a demand for new ways of approaching information. For over fifty years intelligence agencies spent their time and devoted their resources to the development of complex systems of classification and compartmentalization designed to minimize Soviet espionage, however, these systems are now precluding information from being adequately shared in order to tackle a new breed of enemy, which has no respect for boundaries. (Herman, 2003) The intelligence community now is forced to balance its traditional requirements for exclusion with its need for extended, horizontal networks of information and knowledge. The linear problem solving methods of the past simply will not work with today’s time sensitive and wide spread targets. Today’s targets require continuous and circular interaction among the collector, the analyst, and the consumer. Comment by Christopher: Really? We barely caught the establishment of nuclear missile bases in Cuba, just as one example. Comment by Christopher: Are you referring to terrorist organizations?

Intelligence agencies the world over have reformed their procedures, some faster than others, in response to the new non-state threat. Middle Eastern security and intelligence agencies forced Islamist extremists and fundamentalists away from their lands, thus causing them to realign their efforts to focus more on the West, or so-called far enemy. (Gerges, 2005) Conversely, the small and highly mysterious intelligence community of Britain has learned to use an appropriate amount of force against the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in a controlled and reasonable fashion. Additionally, British intelligence agencies learned just how critical inter-agency cooperation is, so much so that it is rumored that throughout the entire United Kingdom, three out of every four attempted terrorist attacks were thwarted during the mid-1990s. (Security, 1994) The learning and understanding that took place throughout the 1990s have paid off substantially for the British intelligence community, and has made tackling the threat of Islamist terrorists in recent years a smooth and timely effort. According to several experts, the U.S. intelligence community has been very slow at adapting to current threats. Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. intelligence community opposed recommendations by several commissions to overhaul its practices and procedures. Following the events of Sept. 11, Congress passed legislation that effectively closed the distanced between local and state law enforcement agencies and full-scale intelligence agencies. Although Congress continued to resent the idea of a single, domestic intelligence agency, it did however receive and accept assurances from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that they would modify themselves to be able to predict and prevent acts of terror as opposed to reacting to them as crime scenes after the fact. Furthermore, Congress went on to create the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002 and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in 2004. (Creation, 2016) (History, 2016)e Through all this, U.S. military intelligence agencies were among the quickest to adapt to changing threats. The Department of Defense (DoD) found it easy to work with other federal agencies to form multiple National Intelligence Support Teams, since they were already familiar with the concept of joint intelligence, which led to Joint Intelligence Operations Centers after the turn of the century. (DoD, 2006) Intelligence operations and aerial campaigns have become increasingly synchronized; all while Special Operations Forces have perfected the philosophy of find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze (F3EA). (Flynn, 2008) US para-military forces became vital and truly grew into their roles after 9/11. Covert teams from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked side-by-side with special operations and indigenous forces through the winter of 2001 and successfully overthrew the Taliban in a few, short weeks. (War, n.d.) Shortly thereafter the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) had become the tip-of-the-spear for global operations against terrorist networks. Operation Neptune Spear, the operation took down Usama bin Laden in May 2011, demonstrated that the convert capabilities of the Pentagon since the days of rescuing American hostages Teheran. (Rawlings, 2012) The exploitation portion of the F3EA cycle was vital to launching additional operations following UBL’s death, which created a pattern of and pathway for success. While conducting sensitive site exploitation (SSE) following raids during the post 9/11-counterinsurgency efforts produced large amounts of valuable intelligence, the majority of information was recovered from detainees. This is in stark contrast to how defectors and POWs would voluntarily release valuable information during the Cold War. Now the challenge is acquiring information from subjects that are extremely unwilling to speak, in a timely manner. The find segment of the F3EA cycle is reliant on HUMINT, but HUMINT from spies, that were recruited from Ivy League Schools such as Oxford or Yale, and taught to linger around the embassy crowds was of zero help in the war against terror. Unlike the need to have few agents that were strategically placed in high-ranking positions inside closed systems of the Cold War, focus was put on having a multitude of agents that are capable of directing their agencies to clandestine terror cells. In the years following 9/11, the FBI, through cooperation with state and local law enforcement via Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), has prevented several domestic terror plots. (Joint, n.d.)

Reference

"Creation of the Department of Homeland Security." Creation of the Department of Homeland Security | Homeland Security. Accessed November 15, 2016. https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security.

"DoD to Set Up Joint Intelligence Operations Centers Worldwide." April 12, 2006. Accessed November 15, 2016. http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=15475.

Flynn, Michael T., Rich Juergens, and Thomas L. Cantrell. Employing ISR: SOF Best Practices. PDF. NDU Press, 2008. ndupress.ndu.edu.

Herman, Michael. "Counter-Terrorism, Information Technology and Intelligence Change." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 4 (2003). August 4, 2006. Accessed November 15, 2016. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520310001693181?journalCode=fint20.

"History." History. Accessed November 15, 2016. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/history.

"Joint Terrorism Task Forces." FBI. Accessed November 15, 2016. https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism/joint-terrorism-task-forces.

Miles, Jim. "Why Jihad Went Global." 2009. Accessed November 15, 2016. http://www.palestinechronicle.com/why-jihad-went-global-book-review/?print=pdf.

Reference Cont’d

"News And Speeches." Security and Democracy: Is There a Conflict? | MI5 - The Security Service. June 12, 1994. Accessed November 15, 2016. https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/security-and-democracy-is-there-a-conflict.

Rawlings, Nate. "Operation Neptune Spear: The New Textbook for Special Operators." Time. May 2, 2012. Accessed November 15, 2016. http://nation.time.com/2012/05/02/operation-neptune-spear-the-new-textbook-for-special-operators/.

Treverton, Gregory F. Intelligence for an Age of Terror. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009. PDF.

"War in Afghanistan (2001-Present)." Accessed November 15, 2016. http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/War-in-Afghanistan-2001-Present.pdf.