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WEEK 6: Radiological Weapons and Threats |
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Welcome to Week 6 of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats to the Homeland course! LESSON NOTES WEEK 6: Radiological Materials and Toxic Industrial Radiological Hazards
This subject area is broad, fairly new in terms of threats, and encompasses hazards resulting from dirty bombs, medical waste, stolen radiological materials, and more. You should find the instruction you learn this week both enlightening and informative.
“When convicted terrorist Jose Padilla showed up at the Chicago airport in May 2002 allegedly with plans to carry out a dirty bomb attack, few people had ever heard of such a weapon. The federal government since then has taken steps to prevent the use of a radiological dispersal device, or RDD — the technical term of a dirty bomb — but there are still widespread misunderstandings of what these weapons do” (Magnuson 2008).
A Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or “Dirty Bomb” is a device that may spray or otherwise disseminate radioactive debris. According to the US Department of Health and Human Services the full definition of a RDD, “is any device that causes the purposeful dissemination of radioactive material without a nuclear detonation” (DHHS 2012).
The design and type of a RDD is only limited by the imagination of the group or person constructing it. Contrary to popular belief a dirty bomb is more of “terror” device than actually a device intended to cause harm, because as a whole people are extremely afraid of radiation and the potential harmful effects. As such, an RDD is a psychological weapon.
The construction of a dirty bomb as aforementioned is only limited by creativity. It can be an explosive, one that sprays radiological material or a point source material that is fixed and puts out any given area with harmful amounts of radiation. The ability to gather radiological material again is fairly easy making this type of weapon more appealing to the potential terrorist, or anyone who wishes to use a “silent killer” of radiation to harm the public.
An explosion, or suspected dispersal of a RDD leads to certain challenges for monitoring and clean up. The amount of exposure that people have received the element that was used and dealing with a potential for mass or gross decontamination, are definitely challenges associated with this type of device. Special monitoring devices such as Geiger Mueller counters will be required.
From a terrorism standpoint, getting materials and existing methods for bomb construction make this a lucrative weapon. Also as stated this type of device is not just linked to terrorism. There have been reports of angry co-workers in Japan using a point source device to irradiate co-workers that are in direct competition of them.
Dealing with the public’s reaction to this device is going to be extremely challenging, the fear and “worried well” will quickly overwhelm local medical and public safety resources. Local and perhaps state economies will be hit also because of the public’s fear to congregate in large areas and go outside. Fear is the biggest hazard associated. So far a RDD has not been used, as we all know this does not mean it has not been planned for or even tried. We must remain ever vigilant as always to spot this potential hazard.
This week do some research into the case of Polonium poisoning of KGB agent-turned- Kremlin critic Alexander Litvinenko. The following websites are as good a starting point as any.
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/72582/Death-by-Polonium-210.html
References:
ChemiCool. n.d. Plutonium Element Facts. http://www.chemicool.com/elements/plutonium.html.
Magnuson, S. 2008. Public Still in the Dark When it Comes to Dirty Bomb Threat. http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2008/June/Pages/Public2241.aspx.
US Department of Health and Human Services. 2012. RRD. |
