homeland security forum post (212)

  Welcome to Week 5 of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats to the Homeland course!  A subset of bioterrorism, agroterrorism, is defined as an intentional introduction of a plant or animal disease with the purpose of causing monetary losses, creating fear, and/or undermining social stability (Bergeron 2011; Monke 2006). The wide-ranging vulnerability of the food industry and agriculture to bioterrorism is complex to address and deal with in a systematic and methodical way in a highly concentrated industry that is geographically dispersed based on the intrinsic biology of raising animals and growing plants (Spellman 2008). As Tommy Thompson, former Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services said in his final press conference, “I, for the life of me, cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply, because it is so easy to do” (Taggert 2005, para. 1; Chalk 2005).

John Grote (2007), in his research, demonstrates that there is an assumption that the nation’s food supply (whether it is processed grains, dairy, vegetables, pork, beef, or poultry) will always be abundant, be reasonably economical, and with minor exception, be safe for consumption. Support for this notion is provided by the fact that United States citizens spend only 6.8% of their average income on food, as opposed to a global average of 23% (United States Census Bureau 2011). However, statistics from passive and active surveillance approximate that last year 31 major pathogens caused an average of 9.4 million incidents of foodborne illness in the United States, with an average of 55,900 hospitalizations and up to 2,270 deaths (Scallan, Hoekstra, Angulo, Tauxe, Widdowson, Roy, et al. 2011). Ironically, a higher level of concern and question regarding food sources typically arises only when a sporadic incidence of food contamination is intensely highlighted by media coverage (Grote 2007).  Grote (2007) emphasizes that since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; the attention for potential agroterrorism has become recognized as a serious prospective national security threat. Prior to these historic events, only a miniscule number of emergency planners and policy makers considered the extensive impacts of an attack on the food supply may have or how to respond to such an attack on the nation. As Tommy Thompson, former Secretary of Health and Human Services, stated in his parting address, “For the life of me, I cannot understand why the terrorist have not [targeted] our food supply because it is so easy to do” (Taggert 2005 para. 1). Due to the expansive growth of emergency preparedness as an industry in the post-September 11 era, agroterrorism has reached a level where it has finally become a more significant in the minds of emergency management (Grote 2007).

An agroterrorist incident would typically entail elements of bioterrorism, since likely microorganism or vectors would include pathogens such as fungi, bacteria, or viruses (Monke, 2006). The goal of agroterrorism is not specifically the death of plants and animals, but rather an agroterrorism event is an avenue to undermine consumer confidence, cause social turmoil and create a host of other concerns (Stirrup 2007). Tampering with the nation’s food system would impact the public with feelings of being highly vulnerable and defenseless (Chalk 2003; Monke 2004). 

Based on an extensive literature review, agroterrorism can be divided into three fundamental areas: (1) either as an intentional attack against the food supply where contaminants render the food poisonous or inedible; (2) a pathogenic agent is transferred from one infected host to another directly by contact between animals or is indirectly contagious; and (3) a deliberate introduction of a foreign animal disease (FAD) pathogen to the nation’s livestock population or communicable disease to the poultry population (Bergeron 2011; Grote 2007; Kurkjian & Little 2003). The ability for the emergency management community to assess and manage situations of this nature poses unique challenges. For example, geographical dispersion of farms are typically located in an unsecured environments; livestock are confined and concentrated in undersized areas, like feedlots; processed food products, grain, and live animals are commonly transported and commingled in the processing and production systems; and other numerous circumstantial issues (Monke 2006).  

The threat of agroterrorism is a widespread prospective event that may require a vast knowledge base; extensive resources and a fundamental understanding of emergency management response. Homeland security policy and counterterrorism approaches have not adequately addressed the potential of an agroterrorism attack, thereby leaving a gap in policies and procedures to protect the American public (Monke 2006).  Historically, the focus of homeland defense has been on broader forms of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear WMDs. Recently, however, Congress passed the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011, which among other things, seeks to quell the fears of tainted food through heightened monitoring of domestic and foreign food sources (Food and Drug Administration [FDA] 2011). In addition, DHS has called for new proposals that will focus on research efforts to combat agroterrorism (Bergeron 2011; Homeland Security News Wire [HSNW] 2011).   

References:

Bergeron, M.D. 2011. Agroterrorism: Threats and impacts (Unpublished). American Military University, Charles Town, West Virginia.  

Chalk, P. 2005. The U.S. Agricultural System: A Target for al-Qaeda? Terrorism Monitor, 3 (5), 4 - 6.  

Grote, J. 2007. Agroterrorism: Preparedness and response challenges for the Department of Defense and Army (Civilian Research Project).United States Army War College. Retrieved from  http://www.aepi.army.mil/publications/sustainability/docs/agroterror-prep-resp.pdf

Food and Drug Administration 2011.  The new FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA). Retrieved from the Food and Drug Administration website:  http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/FSMA/default.htm

Homeland Security News Wire [HNSW]. 2011. Agroterrorism. Homeland Security News Wire. Retrieved from  http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/topics/agroterrorism? page=3 June 6, 2011.

Kurkjian, K.M., & Little, S.E. 2003. Modes of introduction of exotic animal disease agents. Retrieved from  http://www.vet.uga.edu/vpp/archives/IVM/ENG/Modes/ definition02a.htm

New Jersey Agriculture Division of Animal Health, Disease Control Program. 2005. Enumeration of diseases and agents contagious, infectious, or hazardous to the health of livestock, poultry, aquaculture or animals raised for fur. Retrieved from http://www.state.nj.us/agriculture/rule2211.pdf

Monke, J. 2006. CRS report for Congress: Agroterrorism: Threats and preparedness. (CRS Report for Congress RL32521).Retrieved from the Congressional Research Service website:  http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/06Sep/RL32521.pdf

Scallan, E., Hoekstra, R.M., Angulo, F.J., Tauxe, R.V., Widdowson, M.A., Roy, S.L….Griffin, P.M., et al. 2011, January. Foodborne illness acquired in the United States—major pathogens. Emergency Infection Diseases. Advance online publication. doi: 10.3201/eid1701.P11101

Spellman, F.R. 2008. Food supply protection and homeland security. Government Institutes. 

Stirrup A. 2007. Hidden cargo: A cautionary tale about agroterrorism and the safety of import produce. San Joaquin Agriculture Law Review. Retrieved from  https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=16+S.J.+Agric.+L.+Rev.+171&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=700acf627d16fe8371c20db8adf28d21

Taggert, J. 2005. Security check. Retrieved from  http://uriahgroup.com/lib/Security% 20Check.pdf

United States Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States. 2011. Percent of household final consumption expenditures spent on food, alcohol and tobacco consumed at home by selected countries. Retrieved from U.S. Census Bureau website:  http://www.census.gov/ compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s1358.pdf