paper revising

Fig. I T h e Jiangnan area in t h e Yuan dynasty I'

Chapter 1 Heaven o n Earth: The Rise of

Suzhou, 1127- 1550

Michael . - M a r m e _ ? ..

Sltcrnx vou 7'1un rung, xin voic S L ~ Hung.

T h e city of S u z h o u first e n t e r e d t h e historic:~l record a r o u n d 5 0 0 H . c . . when t h e prince of W u m a d e it his capital. T h u s . when t h e p h r a s e . " A b o v e t h e r e is H e a v e n ; o n e a r t h . S u z h o u a n d Hangzhou" w a s first used, S u z h o u was a l r e a d y a millennium-and-a-half o l d . ' T h e p h r a s e is a reHection of China's m a r c h t o the tropics. that s o u t h w a r d shift in China's c e n t e r of economic. cultural a n d political gravity w i t h which we have l o n g b e e n familiar. Its currency should n o t o b s c u r e t h e f a c t that. for S u z h o u , this formula m a r k e d t h e beginning of a n e w s t a g e in t h e city's d e v e l o p m e n t , nor its c u l m i n a t i o n .

D u r i n g t h e half century which s e p a r a t e d the fall of t h e T a n g d y n a s t y (618-906) a n d t h e consolidation uf t h e S o n g (960-1276), S u z h o u was t h e s e a t o f t h e n o r t h e r n m o s t p r e f e c t u r e of t h e kingdom of W u - Y u e . whose c a p i t a l was at H a n g z h o u . A l t h o u g h i t c o ~ i s i s t e d of little m o r c t h a n t h e m o d e r n province of Z h e j i a n g a n d the s o u t h e a s t e r n c o r n e r o f Jiangsu t h r o u g h o u t most of its e x i s t e n c e , t h e kingdom w a s a m o n g t h e most p r o s p e r o u s a n d stable regionb of C h i n a d u r i n g t h e interregnum.' Its ruler voluntarily s u b m i t t e d t o the S o n g in 978. T h c new g o v e r n m e n t was b a s e d , as those w h o ruled t h e Middle Kingdom had a l w a y s b c e n . in N o r t h C h i n a . It reorganized t h e a r e a south of t h c Yangzi a n d n o r t h

of Fujian as the Liatig %he circuit. The circuit wkis all administrative level below the central government controlling a group of neighboring prefectures. l'he officials i n charge at this level-typically, o f military. fiscal, judicial, and supply commissions-had "different functional re- sponsibilities and powers [ i n ] the same area, sometimes with disparatt. hut overlappmg geopmphicai jurisdictions."' These divide and rule tar- tics were intended to prevent the accumulation o f power at the regior 81 level which had llndermined jhc Tang. Boundaries not only varic,! with function, they also shifted over time. Liang Zhe itself was periodi- cally divided inlo two circuit?--a distinction which persisted even whe!: not officially i n use. I n this scheme, Suzhou was assigned to Zhexi ("Western Zhe")."

A m o n g the th~rteen prefectures of the Liang Zhe circuit, Lin'an (Hangzhou) remained the most important. I n 1010, its eight counties had a registered population of 163,700 households. Suzhou's five counties-Wu. Changzhou. Wujiang. Kunshan, and Changshd-had only 66.139. The 1077 commercial tax quoter tell a similar story. Although their assessments ranked both Hangzhou and Suzhou among the empire's most important trading centers. Hangzhou's quota was fixed at 170.813 strings o f cash, Suzhou's at a mere 77.076 ~ l r i n g s . ~ Suzhou was designated Pingjiang / u , one o f Liang Zhe's five "super. ior" prefectures (/u). in 1115. But i t could not rival Hangzhou-much less the Song capital at Kaifeng.' N o discernible social o r economic trends promised to alter this situation.

I n the 1120s. the Jurchen, a Tungusic tribe from Manchuria. broke through the Song's northern defenses. I n 1126, they sacked Kaifeng, capturing the emperor and three thousand members o f his court. I n disarray, what remained of the Song government fled south, with Jurchen armies In hot pursuit." In 1129 the newly proclaimed emperor Gaozong halted in Pingjiang, but only for a few days. Suhse- quent developments proved that, in this case, discrctio~i was the better part o f valor. O n the twenty-fifth day o f the second month. 1130. Jur- chen units appeared at Pingjiang's southern gatc. Brcaking lnto the city, the invaders "plundered government oftice.\ and prtvitle resi- dences. [helping themselves to] sons and daughters. gold and silk. the accumulation of granaries and storehouses. They committed ;irson and fire spread. Smoke could bc seen for 200 l i . I n all, the fires burned for five days and nights."" When o p n hostilities rettlecl into a military stalemate and an uneasy truce after 1141, thc enrperor chose Hang- zhou as Xingzai or "temporary imperial residencc." N v l only was i t a far more important place than Pingjiang but i t was also more centrally

Heaven o n Earth: Tht: Rise of Suzhou. 1127-1550 I 9

located within the truncated realm and must have secmed marginally more secure than places to its north.

Such political choices had social and economic consequences. Wlth Lin'an as the "temporary" capital of the Southern Song (1 127-1276). all o f the 1-iang Zhe circuit benefited. When Marco Polo visited the area-after Mongol conquest had reunifieci 11.: country and returned the capital to the north-he found Suzho!.:, -'a large and magnificen! city. . . the number of [whose] inhabitants 1:; so great as to be a sub- ject of astcnishment," a city as noted for its rci? In trade and manufar- lure as i t was as a center of learning. Yet, four days' journey to the south lay the "noble and magnificent city of [Xingzai], a name that sig nifies' 'the celestial city,' which i t merits from its preeminence to all others i n the world, in point o f grandeur and beauty, as well as from its abundant delights, which might lead an jnhabitant to imagine himself i n paradise."t0

One must conclude that the gap separating Hangzhou from Suzhou widened rather than narrowed over the twelfth and th~rteenth centur- ies. The years which followed brought Suzhou repeated, often bloody conquest, higher taxes, and the exile or execution o f its social, econo- mic. and cultural elites. These scarcely seem ideal conditions for over- taking the more affluent, populous, and developed center to its south. Nonetheless, scholars East and West agree that by the sixteenth cen- tury Suzhou had emerged as the economic and cultural center of the Middle Kingdom's richest. most urbanized and most advanced region. I t remained the central metropolis integrating (and dominating) that region well into the nineteenth century.']

Military defeat, confiscatory taxation, and decimation of local elites are not usually regarded as keys to local prosperity and increased influence. Analysis o f so unlikely an ascent should help us hettcr untler- stand the processes o f development in late imperial society. I t should also allow us to address a number o f other issues. I f contenlporaries re- garded Suzhou as " A l l under Heaven's Heaven on Earth." did this suggest incorporation in, o r transcendence of, the imperial order'! M i n g Suzhou was famous for 11s riots and its eremitism;" i t was an urban corner o f a huge agrarian empire. W;IS i t already home t c i that "other China" which Bergere Invokes in her attempt to lind ind~gcnous roots for twentieth century Shanghai-a China urban rather thiin rural, commercial and capitalist rather than "feud;~l." i~ secular xoci- ety rather than a bureaucratic state. cosmopolitan rather than clc~\ed. open-ended rather than ~ r l h o d o x ' ? ~ J

Recent work demonstrates that we can certainly trace much ut this

"other China" back 11, the early nineteenth ccntury. A t le:~sl a t the great central Yangzi port city of Hankou. many characteristics con- ventionally attributed to Western impact have been shown to have roots i n an indigenous tradition which long predated the treaty ports. Not only was Hankou sharply distinguishable from the countryside which surroun+d i t , i t was also run for (and, de facto i f not de jure. largely by) its merchant community, a community with its own corn- mercial capitali5t interests and values.14 I f "truly urban" cities can be-found in..ghb,Middle Kingdom prior to 1842, i t becomes necessary t n ask how. fa;!b&ck this indigenous urban tradition-a tradition hardy enough to Suf$lve, even flourish, without charters or an autonomous military arrn-can be traced. How widely distributed was i t spatially? I n particular..can we trace the origins o f an autonomous, commercial capiralisr tradition fundamentally at odds with the orthodox, agrarian. bureaucratic statc as far back as M i n g Suzhou-as much of the work on the sprouts o f capitalism seems to imply? O r is this "other China" a separate. and much more recent, development?

Analysis of these issues must begin i n the Song. SuzhouIPingjiang prefecture occupied the lowest lying portlons o f Jiangnan: much o f i t was. and still is, below the water level o f .Lake Tai ; ~ n d the Yangzi R1ver.15 Thus, the fact that this region was developed after other parts o f Jiangnan is not surprising. Without immense investment i n water control, the area would remain, quite literally. a hackwater. I f sodden marshes were t o become productive fields, dikes had t o be built. and the waters behind them drained. The network o f polders and canals which resulted wab extremely delicate. A blocked channel miles away might result i n flood waters breaching an ill-maintained dike. r e ~ u r n i n g paddy field to lake. T o o many polders would leave high water nuwhere to go, increasing the prcssure on dikes throughout the system. Dredg- ing the delta's principal river channels was too large an undertaking t o be left t o individuals or localities: local officials, us in^ corvee labor. periodically addressed this task.16 The work of reclaiming fields from the waters was however usually left t o private individuals. Both public and private efforts wcrc extremely labor intensive. That the number of households registered i n Pingjiang prefecture almost doubled between 1184 and 1275 (rising from 173,042 t o 329,603)-precisely the period i n which construction of polders was transforming the entire Yangzi delta-thus comes as no surprise." Since creation o f polders on this scale required both ctrcrrd~nation and the ability to subsidize many hands while dikes were huilt. tields drained and a lirst harvest ripencd,

Ic.~ving the lilsk to i ~ ~ i p r o v i ~ l p I;~~ttllords insured that high tcnancv r;llck WOUIII result :IS certi~illly :I\ cxl?i~~lsi(rr~ o i the ;Irc;l untlcr c u l t i v ; ~ t i o ~ ~ . ~ ~

I t is hardly surprising t l ~ ; ~ r thc la~rdlords wh11 org;~nizcd i ~ n d p u ~ t l c d this process did not go to tlic trouhlc merely to exp:~~id the ;Ire;] for subsistence agriculture. I'incjii~ng's popul;~tion doubled ;I\ c;rrly. ripening rice and tnultiplc cropping techniques wcrs hecom~ng w ~ d c l \ known i n this p;~rt of China. Out thcsc new ~cchnok~gies werc not cnt- ploycd in Pingji;tny /rc [prcl'ccturcj. No ecological cond~tions b:~rrc(l their use and yet Suzhou pe;ls;lnts co~rtinued to specialize In lower yield, but more com~ncrcii~lly valui~hle. strains of rice."' T h ~ s cho~cc clearly reflected the inlercsts o f n~;irkct-orientcd landlords. t h c ~ r evcs on the inexhaustible m i ~ r k c t of XIIIKZ~II. rather than those of scli- hufficient peilsants. As the Suzhou poet Fan Chengd;~ (1 126-1193) wrote, "Never oncc i n their lives have they [the peasi~ntsl tastedIK~ce clean and bright ;IS the c l o u d s l ~ ~ n e . " ~ ~ ' Water control after all not only raised fields above the w;lters, the carefully dredged rivers and rntrlciltc system of canals provided ;I w p c r h nctwc~rk lor transporting hulk) commodities cheaply and erticicntly. l'his el:~horate web ol.stre;~m\ rid channels facilitated export of h~gh-value grams a r ~ d madc p l ~ s \ ~ b l e the import o f coarse grains for consumption. Without imports. t h r pasants ccruld not havc s;~criticed qu;~ntity f ~ ~ r qu;~lity.

Change marked the cily ;IS well ;I!. 11s hintcrl;~nd. Yet ;I sturdv Iramework to which ;III but the most powcrful forces would h;~vc to adapt was already in placc. S u ~ h ~ ~ u ' s mo;!! provides the most obviou\ example: a section of the (;r;111tl ('~II;I~, wltich linked Ji;~ngn;~n w11l1 North Chlna's Central Plain, fornicd part of thc river systel~l rlnglnp the city. The area within these wiltcrs w.1~ trisacrossetl h y canill\ ;~ncl surrounded by a wall. Local legcncl crcditvd Huang Xie, a Chu ofhci:~l enfeoffed at Suzhou in 203 u.c.. fur both w:ills and the grid-ljke p a l t r r l l of canals within them. From .I ; L I I ~ tinlc* on. IOCBI tradition hcld t11i1t the Jade Emperor had i~ppointed I l u ~ l n p "god of' the walls i1111t moats"-as city gods are stvlell in C:h~nesc-of hi3 old het. '['he choicc may have owed as much to his wtrrh as c;~n;~l-builder as t o his rnlc as wall-builder. City walls not only prtrtcctcd the inhabitants and t h s ~ r Properly from hoslilc forces. thcy illso rcorgicnized space. crc;~linp .I "pivot o f the four quarters.'. which cndowrcl rnundi~ne arrilngemcnl\ with cosmic significance Z 1 Yet, at S ~ ~ z t ~ o u . thc c;~nal system w;~s etlui~l ly important: not only had i t i m p r ~ r t e d lr:lllsprrt ;lnd c c ~ m m o n ~ c : ~ t ~ ~ ~ n within the city but i t also protected rllc xrea wilhin the wi~lls I r o i ~ r

Over the centuries. rei~dcnr. i111d ~ t l t i c ~ i t I \ h;ld eliihor;ttcd

H e a v c n o n E a r t h : 'l'he Rise of S u z h o u . 1127-1 550 23

Table 1: Temple Building in the City of Suzhou - Length No. Rate

Period in years Temples (per year)

Pre-Tang 12 Tang (618-906) 289 8 0.028 Five Dynq.s!i<s i 55 2 0.036 N . s o n g @a-1127) 168 13 0.077 S. Song (1127-1276) 150 39 0.260 Yuan (1 17641368) 93 40 0.430 Ming (1368-1506) 139 4 0.029 Source: G u Su rhi (1506): juan 29.

Huang Xie's initial design: dozens of bridges were thrown across the canals, and, in 922, the city wall had been rebuilt in b r i ~ k . ~ '

A rough indicator of the rhythms of development within this frame is available: the record of temple building within the city. (Table 1) These hgures are obviously i n ~ o m p l e t e . 2 ~ But, flawed as they a r e , the general thrust-particularly the dramatic increase in activity during the Southern Song and Yuan-seems too marked and too markedly a t odds with the Chinese tendency t o prefer early origins to more recent ones, to be attributed t o inadequate data, Although the scenic north- western quarter continued to have the greatest concentration, by the end of the Yuan. Buddhist temples a n d Daoist monasteries could be found in every quarter of the city.

Even more dramatic changes can be traced in the commercial sphere. Although a few specialized markets had already been estab- lished in other parts of the city, as late as 1008-1016, the principal business district was still t h e e a a and west markets at either side of the Yue Bridge. These central markets were a continuation of the T a n g system of organizing urban space by wards rather than streets, a sys- tem which facilitated careful control and official regulation of the market.25 By the end of the Song, the commercial district had ex- panded in every direction. usurping broad stretches of the urban land- scape (see map 1). In the same period, secondary market districts had developed; the most notable were north of the Changzhou county yamen and beside the Xihe.26

With trade came industry: in addition to textiles, Suzhou was a center for agricultural processing of rice and vegetable oils, the pro- duction of wine and vinegar, the manufacture of articles for daily use

(ropes. bottles, stovcs, shoes), boat building, rush-sail mc~king, and thc armaments industry. It was also a center for building trades, for copper work, and for financial transactions. Much of this activity was carried on within the boundaries of the (much expanded) market Yet. by the end o f Song. such limits had become too constricting. The area within the northeastern gates was given over to stables and pasture for travcl- ers' mounts; boat-building yards had taken over the area north 01 the Wu county yamen as well as several neighborhoods in :he southern half o f the city; the southeast corner had become a centci. for grain processing; and textiles were being produced north of the Changzhou county yamen a s well as in the area south of the prefect's ~ f t i c e s . ~ '

There are clear signs of guild organization, at least in some trades: as early a s the Northern Song, there was a Jisheng miao (temple to the

i Loom Spirit) northeast of Yue Bridge. Although this structure had dis-

I appeared by Yuan times, a Wujun jiye gongsuo (Guild of the Wu Com- i mandary Loom Industry) was then headquartered in the Yuanmiao

Daoist 'Temple, itself northeast of Yue B~idge.~"s the location of I these organizations suggests. the link between temple building and i

i economic activity was intimate and complex: not only did economlc growth generate funds which might be put to pious use but also tem- ples, once built, might be used to organize economic activity.2"

Even if we n o longer think of the imperial Chinese city as '.the yarnen writ large."wthe state remained a prominent feature of the city- scape. Suzhou. a prefectural capital and the seat of two counties, was no exception. Indeed, the prefect's compound, situated in the eastern half o f the city, was literally a city within the city. Its walled Zicheng occupied almost 5 percent of Suzhou's total area. Separate compounds housed the local county magistrate of Wu (governing the western half of the city and the areas south and west of the wall) and of Changzhou (in charge of t h e eastern half, plus the hinterland north and east). In addition, schools, examination halls, tax offices, granaries, arsenals. and temples of the state cult were scattered throughout the city. There were even twenty-eight separate barracks in which units of the military were housed. Little wonder th;~t the official complex remained one ( T I the most striking features of the Pirlgjiang tu of 1229." (See Fig. 2 . )

The state's impact on the organization of urban space was c v c ~ ~ greater than this catalog suggests for. in addition to preempting bnwd portions o f the landscape, [he state's activities also shi~ped the use\ made by others of what remained. Most obviously perhaps. so large an official establishment required an even larger complement of SUIT- officials, of clerks and runners, were it to rule as wcll as reign. A sub-

H e a v e n o n F.arth T h e R i s e of S u z h o t ~ . 1127 1 5 0 2.5

stantial portlon of the urhan popul;~tion nwst h;~vr: hcrn cn~ployed. d ~ r e c t l y or indirectly, hy the p u b l ~ c sector. More suhtle were the ways In which official power bhaped the residential pattern.; o I the local ellte. In Song times. Wu was fur and away the most ~uccrssful of Suzhou's countles in achieving membership in the scholar-oficl;~l c l ~ t c . Yet these successful families elected to es~abllsh urban resldcncr In the eo.crern

. c (Changzhou) s ~ d e of the city-farther from home perhaps;-hut closer ci t o the prefectural yamen.3'

Clearly Southern Song Suzhou was i m p r e r s ~ v r , few thirteenth- '_ I :,. century cilies anywhere in the world could compare in s1i.c. ~n beauty

' k o r in wealth. Yet as long as Hangzhou remalned the c a p ~ t a l . Suzhou would remain a prosperous satell~te in a Hang~hou-centered u ~ ~ i v e r s e

Y U A N A N D EARLY MING S U Z H O U : "A 1.ARGF A N D

! MAGNIFICENT CITY" Mongol conquest reduced Hangzhou from a blaring sun to the status of another planet. I t %till exerted a considerable gravitational pull In its own neighborhood, but it was no longer the hotly round which all o t h e r s revolved.

In 1 2 3 4 , the Song conspired with the Mol~gols, an Inner Asian group which had recently emerged from the stcppc. to destroy the Jur- chen Jin dynasry in North China. This military trlumph led not to Song recovery of the north, bur t o thc subs~itution of ;i new and tar more formidable barbarian menace for the old Effective defense r e q u ~ r e d mobilization of all the Southern Song's resources. Yet attempt.\ to d o this. ranging from Jia Sldao's public field laws to requisitlonlng of nier- chant vessels, undercut elite support for the dynasty:" The Mongols routinely asked those under ;ittack to surrender voluntarily, i f they re- ,

p. fused and were defeated. the Mongols would show the vanquished n o mercy. Chinese officirls at C h a n y h o u , the prefecture north ol Suzhoa. had chosen resistance: defeat and massacre had followed. I'he bcnctits o f Song rule clearly were outwelghetl by the r ~ r k s of dele:~t and thv costs (expropriation, higher taxes) of loyillty In eilrlp 127h. Plnpj~ang Surrendered to the Mongols without a fight:'-'

Under the Mongols the center of political power (;111d w ~ t h 11. Ihc chief beneficiaries of tax revenue) returned to the Central ~ ' I ; I I I I . As < I

- result, the Hangzhou region stagnated Pingjiang lo (as Sulhou was officially designated trom 1277 to 1 3 5 6 and from 1357 to 1168) o n the

' ' o t h e r hand, experienced dramatic growth: in the hfteer~ vr.lr ~ ~ c r l o d from 1275 to 1290 the prcfccture's registered p o p u l a t l ~ i l ~ r<t\L. I ~ o l l ~ 329,603 households to 46h.151(.'h T h e government's d c c i s ~ t ~ l l 1 0 send southern grain north by sea was a primary cause of thi\ exl>;lns;it~n

Taicang. i n the northeast corner of Yingjiang l u , became a key ccnter of this grain traffic. B y one estimate, its port city. Liujiagang. had a population of half a million people in the early fourteenth century." Suzhou. the prefectural capital, prospered as well: i f we are to judge by the rate o f temple building, growth rates i n the Yuan surpassed those of the Southern Song. Officially sponsored factories were estab- lished east of the prefe.c!:s yamen; the area outside the southeast gate specialized i n the building and repair of ocean-going ships; the north- west (Chang) gate had bcmme a major commercial center complete with shops, warehouses, and a grain processing i n d u ~ t r y . ' ~ Indced, so many merchants collected in the northwest suburbs that, when the city wali was rebuilt i n late Yuan, a moon wall was added to protect them. This moon wall gave Suzhou its distinctive bulge.39

Suzhou's prosperity did not necessarily imply stagnation else- where. D i d other centers within Jiangnan thrive i n equal or greater measure? I n particular, was this the case at Nanjing which, from 1356. had been the capital of Z h u Yuanzhang, the rebel who would succeed i n founding the Ming dynasty? A n extremely influential sketch o f Jiangnan's urban history posits a Nanjing cycle between the Hangzhou cycle of Song times and the Suzhou cycle of late Ming and high I f this sketch is accurate, Suzhou's development i n Southern Song and Yuan times must be regarded as a mammoth false start. checked i f not reversed by the triumph of political forces hostile to it. D i d the patho- logical hostility of the victor bring social and economic developments to a grinding halt. as the received version of events would suggest? O r was Nanjing's ascent simply more rapid than Suzhou's?

Let us first review the received version. Shortly after rebellion broke out in 1351. i t was clear that the Mongols would not regain pow- er. Although by convention the Mongol period extends to 1368. the 1350s and 1360s were in fact a period i n which rival warlords fought among themselves for the succession. F r o m 1356. Suzhou was the capital of one Zhang Shicheng, erstwhile salt-smuggler and self-styled King of Wu. Down to 1367. he was Z h u Yuanzhang's main rival for the imperial post. Only after a ten-month siege, involving some o f the most bitter fighting o f a bitter civil war. d i d Zhu's armies prevail."

According t o Zhu Yunming (1461-1527)-a Suzhou native famous as a calligrapher and writer-the victor, proclaimed first emperor of the M i n g the following year, was:

. . .exasperated with the city [of Suzhou]. For a long time i t did nor submit. H e hated the people's adherence to the ban-

f l e a v e n o n E a r t h : The Kisc o f Suzhou. 1127- 1550 ?

i dit (Zhang Shicheng]; moreover, he suffered difticultiea from the mansions of the wealthy [ f o r j they were dcfendcd to the end. For these reasons, he ordered his men t o seize all the rent registers of the powerful families and t o calculate what was handed over to them [ i n rents]. The civil o f i c ~ a l s oheyed, mak- ing the fixed tax equal t o this amount. Taxes were therefore plentiful and the levy especially heavy i n order to punish the evil practices of one ~ i m e . ~ z

The prefecture's tax quota was tr~pled. The land of absentee own- ers and o f prominent supporters of the Zhang Shicheng regime became "official land." Tens o f thousands of faniilies, especially familres o f the wealthy and skilled, were forced t o move to distant parts of the empire. Many were executed for crimes real or imagined. The excep- tionally heavy tax quotas persisted down to the late nineteenth century.4'

Thanks i n no small measure t o the wealth, culturc. and examina- tion success o f Suzhou men i n the Ming and Qing, this series of mea- sures is one o f the most famous examples of imperial autocracy i n all Chinese history. The individual elements are well-documented. And at least some shreds of the evidence we have already examined-the dramatic decline in temple founding during the early M i n g shown in table 1-suggest that these blows were real and that their impact was lasting. Yet scrutiny of the evidence for the rise of Nanjing and analy- sis o f the real impact of Zhu Yuanzhang's punitive measures leads us to a different conclusion.

Since Nanjing started from a more modest base. it would have to have prospered even more dramatically in the thirteenth and four- teenth centuries to have overtaken, then surpassed, Suzhou. I t is a proposition worth testing-and testable. Under premode;n conditions. population is a reasonable proxy for the size o f an economy. Thus. we can use the figures for 1290 and 1393 in the three regions-centered o n Hangzhou, Suzhou, and Nanjing-which made up the Lower Yangzi macroregion t o compare developments during the fourteenth century. (See Graph, Fig. 3.) The Nanjing region, smallest of the three in 1290. was still the smallest i n 13Y3.44 Although all three regions lost populu- (ion, the Nanjing region lost i t at twice the rate of the other two Suzhou was the only core prefecture which maintained or rncrcased irs size.

Thus, even afler a generation o f forced deportat~ons from Suzhtrtl and a generation of concerted efforts 11, make Nanjing a crty worthy o i

F~ .---------;-: ~ ~ . . . . .. .- - - . - -. .. . . . .

POPULATION I N THE LOWER YANCZI i a MACRORECLON 1290 - 1393

1 BASED ON NUMBER O F HOUSEIIOLDS

Fig. 3 P ~ p u l a t i o n of the I-ower Yangzi Macroregion 1?YU-139345

a Son o f Heaven, the Nanjing region had fallen farther hehind the rest o f Jiangnan than it had been In late Song and early Yuan. Alter twenty-five years of effort (136%-1393), the Nanjing cycle remained i1 gleam i n the first emperor's eye. He had failed t o re-channcl develop- ments which, since the thirteenth century, had contributed to the risc of Suzhou.

What then of the infamous land tax? M i n g Hongwu (reign 136% 1398) had tripled Suzhou's tax quota, extracting more grain from thia single prefecture than from whole provinces, producing a t;tx rate that averaged ten times that elsewhere i n the empire. Although reill. this allocation of the tax burden was much lcss capricious than thc sources imply.'h The highest taxes were rent on "official Relds" (guun- rian) some of the most valuable arable i n the empire. "People's lields" (minrian) were taxed :#I rates slrnilar to those imposed in other parts 01 the realm. ~ l l governments need nl8)ney; those attempting t o establish m i l ~ t a r y control over a subcontinent argui~bly need i t morc than nlost. A n d as the Ministry o f Revenue reported t o the throne i n 1370:

Taking the land tax ilntl con~p;~ring i t . only in Zhcxi arc there many wealthy househ~~lds. I n the single prsfecture oi Suzhou, commoners annually submit grain. Four hundred ninety households submit one huiidred to four hundred shi: tifly-six households submit tivc hundred to one thousand .$hi. six households, one thousand .$hi each; 2nd two household, submit an amount between twcl thousilnd and three thousand eight hundred shi. I n all these five hundred tifty-four house- I ~ o l d s annually submit more than one hundred fifty thousand shi.47

Analyzing the figures presented by the Minlsrry of Re\,enue. and applying the average official rate of 0.54 .rhi per m u , these household.: controlled an average of 500 m u 4 " Even tissuming that thc wei~lrhiest h~uscholds paid at the highest ratc on the oflicial land. those two households controlled ten times that much. I t IS not necessar~ly u n l a ~ r or unreasonable t o make the wealthiest 0.1 percent of households. households possessing 3.5 percent of ~ h c rcgistered land, bear 7 per- cent o f the lax burden. When wc turn to rhc way this system was actually administered, i t is even morc difficult to regard this system as the spiteful act of an arbitrary despot. l'ates were routinely remitted. in whole or i n part, i n time of natural dlhaster and. once military con- trol was essentially complete, the dynasty ~nodestly reduced the quo ti^

As long as the complex of Ii111tl taxes and labor service\ was administered as originally intcndcd. the str;~in on loc:ll resources would seem to have been sustainable.

I f we examine the relationship of tax quota, agricultural produc- tion and population district by district. however, this argument de- mands qualification. Consider Wu and Chnngzhou, the counties whew capitals were located ~ i t h i n thc wtllls o f Suzhou c ~ t y . [See Append~x Two, 'Table I . ] Changzhou retained n minimum 20.47 shi of husked rice per household i n the late fnurteenth century. ( I f we assume that all the arable land Qing officials could I(lciltc thrce hundred fifty vcars later was already under cultivation, this figure rlscs to 27.46 s l ~ i per household.) Yet W u was left with a mere 11.77 shi per h<ruscli<~l<l (14.98 shi i f 1725 acreage tigures arc used) 'I.h~s was far less t h i l l ~ ttlc 20 shi per annum conventionaily regarded as nccebsary to suppurr ;I family. Such tax rates would certainly seem 111 justifv conte~~~pc)r;~rv complaints. Indeed. i f Suzhou were IIIC~CIY -the land ol rlcc ;III~ lish." d e p o p u l a ~ ~ o n would have been the i ~ ~ e v ~ i ; ~ h l r . result The Ilguros tor early M i n g trade imply that commerce in ~~onagrlcultural commod~tics

was equal t o 30.78 percent o f thc maximum agricultural production lor W u a n d Changzhou, h o w e ~ e r . ~ " Foodstuffs were tax e x e m p t but. in light of Suzhou's leading position in rhe wholesale grain trade from thc S o u t h e r n Song t o High QingYs' commerce in agricullural c o m m o d ~ t i c s must have accounted for at least a s much activity. Suzhou's ability to prosper while paying these taxes d e p e n d e d from the outset on thc thoroughly commercialized character of the local e c o n o m y . The p r c - fecture was as much the victim of its e c o n o n ~ i c ~ a t u r i t y as of its pollti- cal indiscretions. , .,

L a t e fourteenth-century Suzhou was n o lo"eer t h e half-suhmergctl underpopulated a n d s e m i d e v e l o p e d area that if h a d been a t t h e begin- ning of the Southern Song period in the early twelfth century. Yet, had his successors continued the Hongwu e m p e r o r ' s policies, building u p Nanjing at the expense of Suzhou. Suzhou would h a v e b e e n n o more able in the Ming than it had been in the S o n g t o avoid subordination t o the capital. Political changcs delegitimated a n d destabilized thts design before the Ming founder's plans could reach fruition.

In 1399 the Jianwen emperor (1399-1403), grandson a n d successor o f t h e Ming founder, announced that differential tax rates were inherently unfair a n d ought t o be a b o l i ~ h e d . 5 ~ This policy d i d n o t survive its impe- rial sponsor. It may well never have bcen i m p l e m e n t e d , for the c m - peror was preoccupied throughout his brlef reign with the problem of bringing his uncles ( Z h u Yuanzhang's sons) u n d e r control. T h e most able of these d r o v e his nephew from the D r a g o n 'Throne in 1403. T h i s usurper, who reigned a s the Yongle e m p e r o r (1403-1424), could ill- afford a tax reduction. H e was determined t o m o v e the capital from Nanjing to his base in the north. a decision which required both the costly a n d extensive rebuilding of Beijing a n d t h e restoration of the G r a n d Canal. 'The canal was to funnel tax grain north t o supply the bureaucracy a n d Ming armies which dcfended the Middle Kingdom against a Mongol resurgence. T h e e m p e r o r repeatedly launched major military operations in Inner Asia in hope of keeping t h e Mongols at bay. Simultaneously, Ming forces sought t o quell resistance to t h e annexation of northern Vietnam. A n d , he dispatched hts eunuch Z h e n g H e o n a series of voyages t o t h e South S e a s . Such z~ctivism re- quired additional surcharges on the land tax a n d drancatic incrcases in thc labor s e n i c e burden.

T h e period was o n e of increasing activism at t h e local level as well: in Suzhou t h e Yongle reign saw the second most intensive concentra-

f 1c;rven on E a r t h : T h e Kisc of S u z h o u . 1127-- 1550 01

tion o f a c t i v ~ t y wlth respect tn water control in thc entire Ming perlud. Although maintenance of purcly local irrig:ltion systems was left t o prl- vate i n i t i a t i ~ e , ~ ' an area as low-lying and as dependent on tr;tdc as Suzhou relied o n official coordination of regional cfforts physically a n d economically. Much of the work had to be d u n e far from the places most immediately threatened by failure to k e c p channels o p c n ; thc peasants' desirc tor more land clashed with the system's need for clcar channcls and a m p l e reservoirs." Problcms were acute enough by 1399 to trigger official concern, but continued Hooding made clear the in- effectiveness o f measures adopted in response. In 1403. the emperor ordered t h e Ministel of Revenue, Xia Yuanji, to take charge of the water control eflorts in the Suzhou arca personally. Using corvee labor, he o p e n e d t:~c Wu Song River and 11s attached streams a n d ponds; the effort extended over Kunshan, J ~ a d l n g , Changshu, a n d Shanghai counties. In 1407, the dikcs and banks o f the Lou River were repaired; the work was d o n e in Wujiang, Changzhou, a n d Kunshan counties. In 1411, more than seventy l i of stone and earth ponds. bridges, a n d roads between Suzhou city a n d Iiaxing were repaired. affecting o n e hundred and thirty-one places. A n d , in 1415, on the In- itiative o f the vice magistrate of Wujiang. the areas around Lake T a i were d r e d g e d . T h i s time portions of Changshu. Kunshan, Changzhou. Wu, a n d Wuxi counties were involved.5s As necessary as such eUorts were f o r t h e viability of Suzhou's urban a n d rural economy, they placed additional strains on a population alrcady heavily burllcned by state demands.

If m o r e were bcing demanded, less cure w a s taken to allocate bur- d e n s equitably. A s surcharges increased, the wealthy refused t o pay them. T h e additional burdens thus fell on thcir less fortunate and well- connected neighbors. Eventually many small-holders were forced t o choose between taking flight a n d commending themselves t o the pro- tection of those better c o n n e ~ l e d . ~ ~ ' Either strategy deercased the n u m - ber o f taxpayers, thus ;rugmetltlng the burden for those who rcmained. Massive tax remissions may well have brnefitctl those whose wcalth and connections made it easy ro evade paynicnt rather than the general run o f taxpayers." Nativus of Wu a n d Changzhou passed the provin- cial examinations in record numbers (luring the Yongle p ~ r i o d . ~ ~ Although in theory a career open to talent. succrbs in the e x a m ~ n a t i o n s required years of strenuous preparation--one had tirst t o memorize the classics, then to master the commcntarier ;IS wcll ;IS the specialized f o r m s o f essay writing. It was a game :tt which only the wealthy a n d well-born could usually compete -as accounts of [he rare exceptions

prove. Thus, Chcn Yuanrno. journeying every third yc;lr to the capital in tattered clothes and ruined shocs to try (always without success) to pass the metropolitan examination. stood out."The Yangle cmpercir's anxiety t o co-opt elites here secms to have combined with the auto- crat's indifference to mundane det;~ils of local adm~nistration. I f one were well placed and un~crupulous, this combination of apathy and iippeasement provided n u m k r o t ~ , re:~dily exploited opportunities to advance personal and family interests. I f the number of years that "illustrious officials" occupicd key local posts is any guide. Suzhou was worse governed during the Yongle era than at any other time in the history of the Ming."

The results o f early M i n g policies were nut necessarily detrimental t i 1 the interests o f Suzhou as a collectivity. However unwelcome to the individuals involved. the exile of elite and artisan families-a practice which a k c t e d natives o f Suzhou more often than i t had those o f most other places-had the unintended effect of creating an unusually dense and well~dcvelopcd network of particularistic contacts in every corner of thc empirc. Such networks played a critical role. particularly i n trade, throughout the late imperial The decision to shift the capital from Nanjing to Beijing. although not implemented until 1421. was made in 1403-just ten years ;tftt.r the census indicating Nanjing's emcrgence as a rival for regional primacy was still incomplete. Recon- struction o f the Grand Canal insured that Suzhou would play a key role in the integration of the Mlddle Kingdom's now separate eco- nomic and political centers. Even the need to ship grain to the new capital had its advantages: each year the armada o f grain barges carried some ten thousand tons (ten million kilograms) i n authorized private cargo. I t was an open secret that these quantities were regu- larly exceeded and the prohibition on using the empty barges to ship northern goods south ignored.02

I f Suzhou and its elites could tolerate the emerging r e a l ~ t y , neither the imperial treasury (faced with ;I rise in the number o f tax evaders and an increase in uncollected taxes) nor the area's poor (increasingly forced to shoulder alone a tax burden assessed with less and less atten- tion to abilily to pay) were able to d o so. I n the 1430s and 1440s a complex series o f reforms that were designed to reduce both the sphere fur evasion and the costs o f compliance were introduced. The prefecture's tax quotas were slashed by seven hundred and twenty thousand shi per year; approximately a third o f the burden was then converted from grain to silver at half the currcnt market r a ~ e . ~ ' Re- sponsibilitv for administration was sh~fted from local notables, the "tax

l i c a v c n on E i ~ r t h : I h e Ktsc of Suzhou. 1127-1550 3 3

captains." to the county yamen. Since thc most heavily burdened tax- payers were permitted t o use the most favorable method to settle their accounts. the erosion o f the local rlirc's role i n tax collection merely

I reinforced a growing distaste for service in the sub-bureaucracy. Con- version o f so substantial a portion i ~ f the land tax to specie presup- posed an economy which was already highly monetized. Insofar as tax assessments in the 1440s still reflected ability ((1 pay, the introduction o f G o l d Floral S i l v e ~ . should have ( I ) el~couraged the wealthy to orlent themselves even more intenstvely toward product~on lor the market. I f the wealthy had long since concluded that land on the tax rolls was an investment for fools, this stimulus would have (2) been felt by the peasantry. I n either case, a growing proportion o f the population be- came ~ n v o l v e d i n commercial transactions s growing percentage o f the time. The velocity o f circulation, hence the level of economic activity. should have increased as ;I result-even i f the population and silver supply remained c o n ~ t a n t . ~

Thus, i n and of themselve\. ~ h c Incasures introducecl in the eilrlv fifteenth century should have been a c;~talyst o f furlher commercial- ization. Suzhou was, and remained. a major center o f the wholesale grain trade. Rut growing commerc~al~zation and monetization were made possible, and i n turn encouraged, by the spread of tex~ilc produc- tion. The prefecture had produced Ilnens. ramie. hemp cloth, and silk

: for centuries. Nonetheless down to the twelfth century, its products .: were deemed inferior to those o f North chin^.^

However. from the Southern Song on, Suzhou was famous (clr its , silk. T h e warmth and humidity o f its mild climate and watery ecology

proved an ideal environment for transforming tiny silkworm eggs into fabric. The population explosion of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries provided the huge labor force needed to take advantage of this poten-

. "a1 economic opportunity. N o t only did raising worms require 'roulid- the-clock attention, but obtaining the maximum quantity o f the h~ghest quality silk also demanded a delicate touch and exquisite judgment The rituals o f sericulture-cultivating mulberry, raising silkworms. feeding them on mulberry leaves, tending the cocoons. reeling the raw silk, winding i t , warping it, sizing i t , weaving it-were henceforth part

[he annual local routine. "The third and fourth months of the lunar were called "silkworm months": every fam~ly shut it5 dclors

and stayed at home."" . Cotton had only come t o be widely cultivated i n Jlangnan during

Yuan. Yet i t was the production o f cotton which expanded most q U ' c k l ~ i n M i n g times. B y the beginning of the sixleenth century, every

county i n Surhou prcfccture was producing cotton cloth.*' t v e n ear- lier, in 1466, cotton cloth merchants from Jiading. Kunshan. and Suzhou (i.e. W u and Changzhou) jointly established a guild at [.in- qing, a key trading center i n Shand0ng.u Since cotton was nor grown i n the water-saturated soils o f W u and Changzhou, commercially sig- nificani:production from these counties implied organized importation of thei-Gw fiber irom.:areas bordering the Yangzi. where sandy soils were favorable to cotton.

~ ~ : i ~ . t h e ready avai1,ability of raw silk, the reputation that Suzhou '':..'.'

silk eni~jrjyed and the higher prices silk commanded i n the market, corn- ,, ; mercial productionof cotton cloth in the areas bordering Lake Tai may seem puzzling. Yet, in the early Ming, silk weaving remained a highly specialized skill, the monopoly o f male artisans i n the prefectural capi- tal. The expense o f the looms and the need for specialized training restricted entry into silk cloth production. Only i n the Xuande reign period (1425-1436) did silk production spread to the capitals o f Su- zhou's subordinate counties, a process which demanded importation o f skilled labor from the prefectural seat. The looms needed to weave cotton cloth were cheap, the skills peasants honcd i n centuries o f pro- ducing linen and hemp cloth readily ~ransferable.~" N o t until demand for silk "sky-rocketed" i n the 1470s and 1480s did silk weaving finally cease to be an urban monopoly, tapping the labor power available i n the c ~ u n t r y s i d e . ~ "

The expanded production o f silk cloth in the countryside may well or~ginally have been sponsored, and controlled, by members o f the local elite anxious to seize new economic o p p o r ~ u n i t i e s . ~ ~ Suzhou's hinterland was. however. densely populated, and its canals provided such excellent transport and communications that peasant households were tied directly to higher level markets. A twentieth-century survey measured 27.8 rniles o f navigable canals and rivers i n one square mile o f Suzhou's immediate hinterland.'* Boat ownership seems to have been widespread, and an agency system may already have been in place in the fifteenth century. I n the early twentieth century, agents made their nroney marketing peasant output tor fixed commissions. They provided free transportation to and from town, even m a k ~ n g purchases for their clients, purchases they delivered free of charge." As a result, standard markets-periodic markels dealing i n a limited range of daily necessities, which organized village economic and social life in most of rural China-did not exist here.14

Shi and zhen near the prefectural capital were open daily; even the smallest market towns seem to have housed several hundred

Heaven on Earth: 'l'he Rise of Suzhou, 1127-1.550 3

fa mi lie^.'^ Many of these ccnrral places had recognized s p e c i i ~ l ~ t l c vegetable oils were produced ill Hengtang and Xinguo, rice wine (an butchered pigs) were specialities o f Hengtang, Xinguo. and Henpjir Mudu was famed for metal work, Lumu zhen for pottery ;ind [;I "bones."76 A s descriptions o f the Hushu/Yuechcng coniplex lnak clear (see below), some of these market towns were so t h o r o u ~ h l y i r tegratcd with Suzhou c ~ t y that attcmpts to classify them as scb?arat economic entities would be pointless and artificial: tiiven their opcra tion all day every day, the number o f resident hooscl~<~lds, the populi~ tion of their catchment areas, and the range o f goods and services the offered, most of the other towns rank as central markets l7 Thnlugl them, merchants like Qin Yunyan (1467-1506)- a fifth gencrMron de scendant o f a holder o f the highest degree, "superintended the caplra o f resident and traveling merchants, dispersing it to "shutile and loom households and gathering the [finished] bolts o f cloth in order to returl them Lo the rnerchant~."~",ocal merchants were essential lor tht smooth operation of the putting-out system. for only those who h;t< well-developed networks o f particularistic ties possessed thc dctailec knowledge o f skill and trustworthiness it required. As prosperity and ; taste for ostentation spread trom the court to the elitc in the 1i1tt fifteenth century, demand for Suzhou'\ premium products expitndcd The stimulus was rapidly felt throughout the system, creatirlg :I boon economy which awed visitors and was recognized even hy nattves ;I! unprecedented.79

Nonetheless, as a now-standard pairing o f the Pingjiang ru o l 1225 [See Fig. 2, p. 241 and a U.S. A i r Force reconnaissance photo of 194:

the effect on the cityscape was less dramatic than one m i g h ~ expect. Indeed, i n the course of seven centuries. almost nothing $eem! to have changed. The most obvious innovation within thc walls w;rc officially inspired. Since Zhang Shicheng used t l ~ c Zicheng ;IS Ili? palace. M i n g Hongwu regarded attempts to refurbish I[ ;IS evide~lce 01 subversive intent.81 The area was ilbandoned in fi~vor of ;I Ilew. Iirorc modest prefectural compound on ths west s~de of the city .[.his chilngc had its impact o n the residence pnttcrnh 01' others: clerks and runner, congregated i n the southwest corner o f Ihe CII~. while ~nelnbcrs 01' tllc local elite-in Ming times drawn ,tlmosr equally Iron1 Wu :~n(l Changzhou-concentrated inside the Chnng Gate, in the liorthwcst quadrant o f the The last remnitnts of the o f i c ~ a l m i ~ r k e t syste~,~

BY the middle of the sixteenth century, eonimerce II~IL! been diffused throughour the city. shops lining every ~ t r e c t . ~ . '

Within individual trades, institutional as well ;is physical con-

straints appear t o have fallen away T h e g u i l d system. which h n d p c r - s ~ s t e d f r o m early Song to Yuan times i n t h e textile industry, seems t o have disappeared. As the 1466 f o u n d i n g at L i n q i n g suggests. the guild concept had not been forgotten by Suzhou natives. I n Song and Yuan. g u i l d organizations were often located I n temples dedicated t o t h e god o f the trade (as was the Jisheng m i a o ) o r attached themselves t o pre- existing temples (as the G u i l d o f the W u Commandery L o o m Industry. headquartered i n the Yuanrniao Daoist T e m p l e , d ~ d ) . Y e t exammation o f the sources o n temples and monasteries i n the G u Su zhi (1506) failed t o provide evidence of.ghilds w i t h headquarters i n religious i n - stitutions. T h e earliest records of independent guilds date t o the W a n l i e r a (1572-1620).84 Specialized markets f o r those w i t h particular skills continued t o exist: satin workers at Flower Bridge, those w h o special- ized i n t h i n silks at the Guanghua Monastery Bridge, spinners o f silk at L i a n x i fang. A t each, professional intermediaries (hangrou) matched prospective employer and employee W' C a r e f u l mapping has shown that these were precisely the areas i n which guilds devoted t o these specialities were subsequently e ~ t a h l i s h e d . ~ ~ Some sort of organization clearly persisted, but lack o f physical headquarters suggests that such organization was weaker and less f o r m a l t h a n i t had been i n Song and Y u a n o r w o u l d be i n late M i n g and O i n g .

I f [ h e c ~ t y ' s activities had o u t g r o w n inherited institutional forms. they had also outgrown the physical constraints imposed by encircling walls. T h e most striking embodiment o f early M i n g prosperity was found outside the c i t y gates-particularly the northwestern Chang Gate. T h e 1379 edition o f the prefectural gazetteer listed n o lanes (xiatlg) outside the ramparts, a result o f the incorporation o f p r e - M i n g suburbs i n the city proper when the wall was rebuilt i n late Yuan.H7 B y 1506. there were ten new lanes outside the Chang Gate; one o f these, the Yizhe Lane, "although narrow, was nonetheless the spot at which merchants ~ o l l e c t . " ~ Yuecheng was "the place where merchants f r o m the t w o capitals and various provinces assemble. Nan and B e i hno as well as Shang and X i a rang [nearby] had also become markets. [ T h e areal was especially prosperous."RY B y the m i d d l e o f the sixteenth cen- tury. i n the area between Chang a n d X u Gates and "extending t o the west, cottages sit close together l i k e teeth o f a comb. I t is almost the same as the area w i t h i n the city wall. Sojourners d w e l l here i n large n ~ m b e r s . " ~ Z h e n g Ruoceng, (f1. 1505-1580). a Kunshan nalive. w h o c o m p i l e d a n atlas t o aid i n the defense o f China's coastal areas, n o t e d that nine-tenths o f the pirates' interest i n Suzhou during the mid-six- teenth century wokou crisis had centered o n the area outside the wall. H e wrote that:

t l c i ~ v e n o n I:;~rth: I ' h c Kise of S u z h o u . 1 127- 1550

a r c dazzled by its brilllance. Maple Bridge in particul;tr is t h e s p o t where the se:~worthy vessels of t h e m e r c h ; ~ n t s converge to g o up river. North of the river is the center of ;I grcat tradc In beans and grain and in cotton. G u e s t [merchants] trom north a n d s o u t h come and g o , holding the oar a n d wclghing t h e anchor. All a r e here."

.The key point outside Chang G a t e was, h o w e v e r , H u s h u , a market town twenty-live 1; (eight miles) northwest o n the Grand Canal. A police slation a n d a relay post from t h e beginning of t h e Ming. it w a s designated o n e o f the seven Inland C u s t o m s stations created in the mid-fifteenth century. T h e choice no d o u b t reflected the fact that i t was already "the place where t h e goods of the fourteen provinces con- verge, and that merchant boats c o m e a n d g o , e a c h d a y in their rhousands."Y2 H e r e , a r o u n d 1506. " t h e c o m m o n people dwetl by t h e side of the water, peasants and traders living side by side. I1 is ;I great market."9"y the end of the Ming, it had become the empire's major wholcsalc grain market. commodities trading ovcrsh;~dowing 11s tradi- tional role a s a center of handicraft p r ~ d u c t i o n . " ~

T h e city's o t h e r suhurbs developed more slowly and o n a less im- posing scale. By 1506, the Peng G a t e was the only o t h e r a r e a in which settlements outside thc city walls h a d b e c n formally clrgenizcd into l a n e ~ . ~ 5 A century later all save the southern g a t e had oflicially desig- nated lanes, yet their combined n u m b e r was less than that of the lanes outside the "Golden" Chang Gate.* T h e Xu G a t c , s o u t h of t h e Chang G a t e in the west wall a n d linked most dircctly t o L a k c .l'ai, was usually referred to a s an extension of the complex t o its n o r t h . T h u s . its t h r e e lanes can be virwed a s a s o u t h e r n continuation of the C h a n g Gate's twenty-two. In spite of its recognized specialty (frames for rais- ing s i l k ~ o r m s ) , ~ ' the environs of P a n G a t c . located in the southwest corner o f t h e wall, seem t o have becn relatively d e ~ e r t e d . " ~ T h e Oi G a t e , in the northern w;ill, was known a s a center for kiln workers a n d m a k c r s o f rattan pillows by t h c early sixteenth century . v Y A hundred years later, "brokers" o r middlemen ( y a k u a i ) were said t o converge "like spokes at the hub o f a wheel" in these "humbler ~ u h u r b s . " ~ ' ~ '

Significant in themselvcs, the rise o f these suburbs tied t h c villages more closcly to the city, a development reflected by the growing c o n - centration of village population in the urban penumbra."" A s Tahlc ? in Appendix T w o demonstrates.'"2 such integration was vital i f Suzhou's population were t o support itself. Commerce a n d manufnc- ture permitted this area t o evade Malthusian constraints, which would

otherwise have forced resitlent5 to choose befwcen m i p r ; ~ r ~ o n ;I starvation. All the post-1368 incrc;~sc in the population of Wu-in el8 s u b u r b or village--and virtuillly all the m o r e modest incrcilrc Changzhou is ; ~ t t r i h u t ; ~ h l e to the cxp:lnsion of trade a n d hantlic~;it n o t t o agriculture.

By t h e beginning o f the sixteenth century. Suzhou's c c o n o n primacy was recognized hy iill; the important Fujian port of Zh;m z h o u boasted that it was a "little Su Hang."1')' As was true of politic hegemons in antiquity East and West, as lor;^ as the constell;ition forces, which brought i t into heing persisted, such universally rcco nized dominance was n o less eKective for the lack of institution;~l I11rr Such economic hegemony hroupht cultural hegemony in its train Mil

1 policies had pushed the trends which made this hegemony possib 1 f u r t h e r a n d faster than would otherwise have been the cine. Ycl. \r i

should n o t replace the time-honored image of a dynasty henf on In poverishing the base of its defeated rival. Z h a n g Shicheng. with ;I image of Ming polic~cs a s ;in clahorately disguised effort to promote tt. development of Suzhou. T h e Ming imposed taxes. moved Ihe c i l p ~ t ; ~ refurbished t h e Grand Canal. ; ~ n d modified administrativu structurt f o r its own reasons. In doing s o . the dynasty was making the mosl ( existing possibilities. I f Suzhou had not becn as highly comnterci;~ ized, as admirably equipped with cheap and efficient water tritn5porl as o p e n to new c o m m r r c ~ ; ~ l and handicraft possibilities ;IS it w;t! Ming p o l ~ c i e s would have proved unworkable as well ;IS arhitracy.

O n c e in place, the brittleness of the Ming fiscel systcm &ldc th dynasty hostagc to Ihc continued well being of s o important ;I shurce , I 11s revenues. Not only did Suzhou provide a tenth of the state', Iota annual revenue, hut the Ming system of allocating p a r t ~ c u l a r taxc from particular areas t o p;tr~icular ends severely limited the govern ment's ability to cope with fluctuations. Fnr better t o intervene in tin^, o f n e e d t o support a Suzhou than to rejigger the entire fiscal sysfeln."' . l a x . remissions, water control. and the quality of local administrator: all reflect this interest.b11, Yet. i n s o k ~ r ;IS Suzhou's rise f r o ~ r i p r o n ~ i nence to eminence was the work of the st:lie, it wits the producc 11 a d hoc decisions taken to exploit cxist~ng o p p o r t u n ~ t i e s f o r llnperlil advantage.

"A REPUI.ATION FOR H I C ~ I F . ~ AN[) ARUNDANCI:.," Y I ~ I

" A C ~ U A L L Y FUt.1. 0 1 ; WAN.[. AND [)ISTRESS"'?

Suzhou's development was no more the result of the m a c h i n a t ~ o n s ut canny local elites than i t was ol the polity. T h e material a n d h u r n ; ~ ~ ~