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Learning Objectives

In this chapter you will learn to:

• Describe the historical, contemporary, and political evolution of immigration policy within the United States.

• Identify the major policy goals and challenges facing policy makers within the area of immigration policy.

• Articulate why immigration policy poses unique obstacles to implementation and evaluation.

A Case Study in Implementation and Evaluation: The Debates Over

Federal Immigration Policy

12

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Section 12.1 The Immigration Policy Debate CHAPTER 12

Immigration policy has been the subject of a contentious national debate for centu-ries. Since the country’s founding, there has been conflict within the nation regarding immigration. For example, Benjamin Franklin complained about the cliquishness of the Germans who settled in Pennsylvania, and the nativist Know Nothing Party railed against German and Irish Catholic immigrants in the 1840s. Throughout all the disputes, the United States has seen itself as a nation of immigrants, and this defining self-image has made crafting effective and enforceable immigration law a complicated business.

This chapter begins by introducing the debate in the United States over immigration pol- icy. It then gives an historical overview of federal immigration policy, focusing on the period from 1875, when the Supreme Court ruled that it was to be the purview of the federal government. Next, it explores what goals, both practical and political, go into the formulation of immigration policy. It then discusses case studies in immigration policy and two recent attempts by presidents to forge comprehensive immigration reform to address contemporary problems. Lastly, the theoretical framework for both assessing and evaluating immigration policies is discussed in light of literature on the subject.

12.1 The Immigration Policy Debate

In general, stakeholders in the immigration policy debate take two broad positions. The pro-immigration position emphasizes the historical and cultural value of immigra-tion, that the United States has always been a nation of immigrants and a melting pot of people from all over the world, and that it values the short- and long-term economic benefits of continued immigration. To those who hold this view, the benefits of immi- gration—its ability to add to the economic and cultural strengths of the nation—remain evident and as strong as ever. To adherents of a pro-immigration position, the failings and costs of immigration—both legal and illegal—are often exaggerated. For those who adopt a pro-immigration position, current and future policies should seek to promote immigra- tion, ease barriers to legal entry, increase the number visas, and when it comes to illegal immigra- tion, establish a pathway to legal status or citizenship for millions of illegal immigrants.

In contrast, the anti-immigration position perceives uncontrolled immigration as posing a sub- stantial socioeconomic problem, as increasing social and budget- ary costs, and since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 (hereafter referred to as 9/11), as posing a substantial threat to national secu- rity. Adherents of this view frame the discussion of immigration in

imagebroker.net/Superstock

One area of immigration debate addresses border enforcements.

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Section 12.2 The Nature of Immigration Policy CHAPTER 12

terms of the costs, risks, and failed policies. For those who adopt the anti-immigration position, current and future policies emphasize all or some of the following: greater bor- der enforcement, restrictions on social service benefits (especially to illegal immigrants), increased restrictions on visas, greater workplace monitoring, and a reduction in legal immigration.

In between these two contrasting camps are those conservatives who favor a robust legal immigration system that does not reward those who are here illegally or encourage future illegal immigration. So they would favor some policies from each of the other two groups.

While stakeholders may differ in their positions on immigration, it is the enduring ten- sions between pro- and anti-immigration factions that continue to fuel the politically vola- tile evolution of U.S. immigration policy. More to the point, at varying times immigration policies have been implemented not to solve the problems associated with illegal immi- gration (such as gang activity, drug trafficking, or human trafficking) but to limit, control, aid, or punish both legal and illegal immigrant communities. The extent of debate over the failures of immigration policy is best exemplified by the stark differences and opinions among various interest groups. Pro–immigration-control groups, such as FAIR, attempt to emphasize the costs of immigration. In contrast, pro-liberalized immigration groups, such as the Immigration Forum and the National Council of La Raza, stress the promise and benefits of all types of immigration.

Many events have shaped our nation’s immigration policy. However, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the apparent ease with which 19 terrorists entered the United States have for- ever altered how the United States formulates, designs, and implements its immigration policy. Out of 9/11 came an outpouring of public and political anger at such a dramatic and costly policy failure. As a result, dramatic changes were made to the federal agencies responsible for overseeing immigration policy, and political and policy emphasis shifted markedly toward emphasizing control and security when it comes to national immigra- tion policy. Notwithstanding, for at least some policy experts, the events of 9/11 proved why immigration policies—especially those dealing with preventing and deterring illegal immigration—are a classic example of policy failure.

12.2 The Nature of Immigration Policy

The purpose of immigration policy reflects a common desire among all nation-states to manage their population, control access to their borders, fill needed workforces, and to shape their national identities. Immigration policy can be formally under- stood as the chosen set of rules, defined by legislation and administrative decree, that are adopted by the state and designed to govern who can “legally reside and seek employ- ment within its borders, as well as define those who are citizens and those who are not” (Gimpel & Edwards, 1999, p. 5). In other words, immigration policy is as much about defining what type of nation-state we will be as it is about who should be invited into the state (Fitzgerald, 1996, p. 17).

Most government officials, immigration experts, and the public can agree on one thing— that a nation must control who enters and immigrates into it. In fact, it is fair to state that

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there exists no country on earth that does not attempt to control its borders, let alone control who can or cannot immigrate. In other words, there is no significant support for an open immigration system where anyone, from any region or at any time, could freely immigrate to the United States. Conversely, there is no widespread support to prevent or stop all legal immigration. Where passionate disagreement does exist, however, is in attempting to define how one’s policies should control legal immigration and illegal immigration. Doing so requires, at a minimum, a clear definition of what it means to be a legal or an illegal immigrant. Defining lawful immigrant status, as well as determining which foreign nationals, and how many, should be permitted to immigrate, is central to the debate over U.S. immigration policy.

In the wake of 9/11, much confusion has reigned as to what constitutes an illegal immi- grant, and this has muddied the waters of an already contentious debate. This term has taken on a variety of overlapping meanings, which include those who overstay visas they legally obtained, those who breach the country’s borders, and those who pose a national security risk. How the federal government has formally defined immigrants—both legal and illegal—helps clarify the vulnerable position such individuals have in our society. For example, the federal agency formerly known as the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) defined an illegal alien as a “foreign born national who entered the United States without inspection or with fraudulent documentation; or a foreign national who entered legally, violated the terms of their visa status, and remained in the U.S. without authority.” In contrast, a legal immigrant has been defined as “an alien admitted into the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident, accorded the privilege of living permanently in the United States” (Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1991). Figure 12.1 highlights the U.S. government’s most current definitions of a legal and an illegal immigrant, or, as they’re known now, legal resident and unauthorized resident. These definitions were created by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), whose agencies replaced the former INS (which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter).

Figure 12.1: Who is a legal resident and who is an unauthorized resident

Defining lawful immigrant status is a central debate in American immigration policy.

United States Department of Homeland Security, Population Estimates, January 2011. Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets /statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf

Legal Resident: 2011 Definition

The legally resident immigrant population includes all persons who were granted lawful permanent residence; granted asylum; admitted as refugees; or admitted as nonimmigrants for a temporary stay in the United States. Nonimmigrant residents refer to certain aliens who were legally admitted temporarily to the United States for a specified time period such as student and temporary workers.

Unauthorized Resident: 2011 Definition

The unauthorized resident immigrant population is defined as all foreign-born non-citizens who are not legal residents. Most unauthorized residents either entered the United States without inspection or were admitted temporarily and stayed past the date they were required to leave.

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The definition of illegal or legal immigrant carries with it specific policy consequences. Each definition helps highlight the underlying, and often unstated, goal of almost all aspects of immigration policy: control. With respect to illegal immigrants, the overriding emphasis in national policy is to deter or punish the illegal entrant to or resident within the United States. As a group they have, by definition, broken immigration law designed to manage and control legal entrance and residency. With respect to legal immigration, public policy centers on the fact that the foreign-born population has been “accorded the privilege of living permanently in the United States.” Legal immigrants are granted temporary or per- manent residence that can, depending on changing circumstances, be revised or revoked. Even naturalized U.S. citizens or asylum seekers, if they are later found to have been deceptive or broken the law during the naturalization process, can have their citizenship status questioned or revoked.

To help gain a fuller understanding of how the United States has perceived and defined immigrants and how U.S. immigration policy has evolved over time, let’s place immigra- tion in the appropriate historical context.

12.3 History of U.S. Immigration Policy

The history of U.S. immigration policy is marked by a number of seminal events and key legislative acts. However, a closer look at history in this policy area also highlights many unsavory moments and raises many disconcerting questions about how a nation that prides itself on its immigrant origins has been, at times, been so viru- lently anti-immigrant.

Immigration policy was the responsibility of the states until 1875, when the Supreme Court ruled in Chy Lung v. Freeman that the regulation of immigration is a federal respon- sibility. (The full text of the case is available at http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/ us/92/275/case.html.) The subsequent evolution of immigration policy has been marked by institutional dominance by the federal government and an emphasis on federal bureau- cracies to implement immigration policies. In terms of the emerging character and goals of immigration policy, there have been recurring periods of xenophobia-inspired restric- tions on immigration and well-founded concerns for both economic and national security. Table 12.1 highlights many of the legislative milestones relating to immigration during 1882 through 2010.

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Table 12.1: Legislative milestones in immigration policy

Legislation Basic details

Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) • Suspended Chinese immigration for 10 years. Barred Chinese naturalization.

Immigration Act (1891) • Established federal authority over immigration policy. • Created first bureaucratic office responsible for implementation of

immigration policy.

Immigration Acts (1921 and 1924)

• Established quota-based system for immigration. • Based quota limits on national origins.

Immigration and Nationality Act (1965)

• Repealed national origins quotas. • Established preferences system that favored family unification and

certain works skills. • Imposed first limits on immigration from Western Hemisphere.

U.S. Refugee Act (1980) • Established permanent procedure for admitting refugees. • No longer defined refugee status along ideological ground.

Immigration Reform and Control Act (1986)

• Established sanctions for employers. • Provided an amnesty program for illegal aliens.

Immigration Act (1990) • Increased legal immigration ceilings. • Expanded employment-based immigration. • Provided expanded asylum for victims of war and natural disasters.

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (1996)

• Imposed restrictions on social benefits for illegal aliens. • Placed renewed emphasis on border enforcement.

USA PATRIOT Act (2000) • Broadened the scope of aliens deemed inadmissible. • Permitted detainment of legal and illegal aliens for up to six

months if determined to pose risk to national security. • Established foreign student monitoring program.

Homeland Security Act (2002)

• Abolished the INS. • Established multiple agencies responsible for immigration and

naturalization, enforcement, and border security.

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (2012)

• Through the use of executive power, established the policy of deferred action, which allows children of illegal immigrants to request that removal proceedings against them be deferred.

• Removed the threat of immediate deportation and adopted many of the eligibility requirements from the 2009/2010 DREAM Act.

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Qualitative Restrictions on Immigration: 1882–1921

Roughly from 1882 to 1921, the primary goal of policy was to restrict immigration of certain groups through qualitative standards. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Alien Contract Labor Laws of 1885 and 1887 were adopted in response to socioeconomic conditions and the belief among critical policy actors that, despite their previous contribu- tions to U.S. expansion, Chinese and other foreign workers were now contributing to the economic plight of the period. The goal of the federal government during this period was to prevent individuals of specific ethnic backgrounds, as well as certain classes of work- ers, from immigrating to or remaining within the United States. National origin exclu- sions were expanded to include the Japanese in 1907 and all Asians in 1917 (Fix & Passel, 1994). The laws excluding Chinese immigration remained in place until 1942 (Gimpel & Edwards, 1999, p. 95). The Immigration Act of 1917 reinforced such qualitative restrictions on immigration by requiring English literacy tests for all eligible immigrants.

Aside from ethnic and language-based restrictions, the Immigration Acts of 1882 and 1891 applied a head tax of 50 cents for each immigrant and barred individuals of “question- able character” or those deemed likely to become a public charges or dependent on pub- lic assistance. Given the socioeconomic status of many incoming immigrants in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, such policies represented a powerful obstacle to immigra- tion. Additionally, under the 1891 Act the federal government established the first agency responsible for the implementation of immigration policy: the Office of the Superinten- dent of Immigration (OSI).

Located first within the Treasury Department, the OSI assumed responsibility for “inspect- ing, admitting, rejecting, and processing all immigrants seeking admission to the United States” (Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1991). The initial mission of OSI was to oversee and manage port-of-entry inspectors and to implement the mandates of current immigration policy that excluded certain groups. In 1895, OSI was transformed into the Bureau of Immigration. This agency was responsible for overseeing the enforcement of the Alien Contract Labor Law and the Chinese Exclusion Act (Immigration and Natural- ization Service, 1991). By 1903 the Bureau of Immigration was transferred to the Depart- ment of Commerce and Labor. And, with the passage of the Naturalization Act of 1906, the functions of naturalization were transferred to the federal government and assigned to the newly renamed Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.

Quantitative Restrictions on Immigration: 1921–1965

Immigration policy during the 1920s was characterized by a refocusing on quantitative rather than qualitative restrictions on immigration. A quota system was established under the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924, whose goal was to sustain a specific national, eth- nic, and cultural makeup based on the total number of persons in each group living in the United States. The 1921 Act limited future immigration based on a per-country cap of 3%. That is, depending on the size of the national group already residing in the United States, only 3% of that group would be permitted to immigrate to the United States every year. The 1924 Act reduced the quota even further, to 2%, curtailing immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe and restricting immigration from Asian nations (Gimpel & Edwards, 1999, p. 94–5). Additionally, in 1924 the U.S. Border Patrol was created to fend off the

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growing numbers of illegal immigrants who began to enter the country in response to the more restrictive, quantitative-based immigration policies.

During the 1940s, immigration policy was redefined both during and after World War II. During the war, the government perceived a threat posed by certain foreign nationals to U.S. national security. In response, policies were adopted, such as the Alien Registration Act, that led to the recording and fingerprinting of every alien and to the moni- toring of internment camps and detention facilities. As this period would highlight (and as the events of 9/11 would rekindle), an enduring tension exists between the ideal of opening the country’s gates to immigrants and the pri- orities of national security.

Following World War II, the 1945 War Brides Act, the 1948 Displaced Persons Act, and the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 helped returning spouses and families of U.S. soldiers immigrate to the United States and allowed various displaced persons to enter the country as refugees. Additionally, policies such as the Hungarian Refugee Act of 1956, the Refugee-Escapee Act of 1957, and the 1966 Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act served U.S. Cold War objectives by helping people from communist states to immigrate to the United States.

New Criteria for Immigration: 1965–2001

One of the most dramatic changes in modern immigration policy, however, resulted from the adoption of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965, which repealed the national-origins quota system that had been in place since the 1920s. In its place, a seven- category preference system was established to attract a variety of skilled workers and to reunite immigrant families. However, INA placed quantitative restrictions on immi- gration from Eastern and Western Europe and the first restrictions on immigration from nation-states of the Western Hemisphere. According to Fix and Passel, the impacts of INA would be long lasting:

The law replaced the national origins quota system with a uniform limit of 20,000 immigrants per country for all countries outside the Western Hemi- sphere. At the same time, though, the law placed a limit for the first time on immigration from the Western Hemisphere (most notably on Mexico). The law contained within it the seeds of the massive shift away from European immigration that would subsequently occur. It can also be seen as setting the stage for expanding illegal immigration from the Western Hemisphere into the United States. (Fix & Passel, 1994, p. 18)

Robert Harding Picture Library/Superstock

The 1924 Immigration Act aimed to sustain a specific national, ethic, and cultural makeup. This act curtailed immigration from specific regions, such as Eastern Europe.

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In light of increasing illegal immigration that followed the adoption of INA, the policy question of how to best deter illegal immigration has garnered a great deal of attention. For instance, in 1972 the House of Representatives “made its first attempt to penalize employers for hiring illegal aliens, imposing mild civil and criminal penalties for know- ingly hiring undocumented workers” (Fix & Passel, 1994, p. 112). The proposed legis- lation, however, died in the Senate. Nonetheless, the growing debate surrounding the costs and benefits of legal and illegal immigration would continue into the decades that followed.

In 1980, the passage of the U.S. Refugee Act sought to redefine asylum status, which had previously been defined along ideological lines, to reflect more uniform standards. This period also resulted in the passage of a major piece of immigration reform: the Immigra- tion Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986. IRCA established an amnesty program for illegal aliens and sought to deter future illegal immigration through the first mandated oversight of the workplace and by sanctioning employers. (For more about this act, see the case study in this chapter.)

The Immigration Act of 1990 continued this period of reform by revamping the selection and preference system for immigration. The 1990 act emphasized attracting particular work skills, adding to U.S. cultural diversity, and providing temporary status to popula- tions displaced by war or natural disaster. The legislation also established the three main categories for immigration: family-sponsored, employment-based, and diversity and other types (Table 12.2).

Table 12.2: Current categories for immigration under the Immigration Act of 1990

Family-sponsored preferences

First preference Unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens and their children.

Second preference Spouses and children of alien residents; unmarried sons and daughters of alien residents, 21 years and older.

Third preference Married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, their spouses and children.

Fourth preference Brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens, their spouses and children.

Employment-based preferences

First preference Priority workers (aliens with extraordinary ability, outstanding professors and researchers, multinational executives and managers) and their spouses and children.

Second preference Professionals, or those with ability, their spouses and children.

Third preference Skilled workers, professionals and other workers, their spouses and children.

Fourth preference Employees of the U.S. mission in Hong Kong, religious workers and their families, juvenile court dependents.

Fifth preference Employment creation. (continued)

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Table 12.2: Current categories for immigration under the Immigration Act of 1990 (continued)

Diversity and other immigrant categories

• Child born subsequent to issuance of a visa. • Widows or widowers of U.S. citizens. • Diversity immigrants, their spouses and children. • Spouses and children of legalized aliens. • Employees of certain U.S. businesses in Hong Kong, their spouses and children. • Diversity transition for natives of certain adversely affected foreign states. • Displaced Tibetans, their spouses and children.

Since 1990, tensions over the direction of immigration policy have culminated in substan- tial restrictions on both legal and illegal immigrant populations. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIR) of 1996 dramatically changed recent immigration policy by limiting access to social services for legal and illegal immigrant population. Some of the goals of the legislation are noted in Table 12.3.

Table 12.3: The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

Highlights of 1996 IIRIR legislation

• Expanded Border Patrol funding, authorized the funding for the hiring of INS agents to investigate alien smuggling, provided 12 million for additional fences at points between the U.S. and Mexico, allowed cooperation of the INS with local and state law enforcement in pursing illegal immigrants.

• Immigrants with illegal status of 1 year or more were barred for 10 years. • Developed three test-pilot workplace projects in five of the seven states with the highest illegal im-

migrant populations. • Set minimum immigrant sponsor requirement at 125% of the poverty level. • Denied various social services to illegal immigrants, including Social Security, HUD, food stamps. • Denied visas for immigrants wanting to attend a public or secondary school for over a year.

Summary of points provided by Gimpel & Edwards, 1999, pp. 290–295.

Post-9/11: The Immigration Debate Reframed

The horrific events of 9/11 fundamentally—and quite possibly, permanently—reframed the debate about immigration policy to center on the goal of national security. It is an irony of history that before September 11, 2001, the Bush administration had been considering significant, if not progressive, changes to immigration policy. Among the proposals being considered were a new temporary guest worker program, a second amnesty program for illegal aliens that would grant them future permanent residency, the easing of restrictions on obtaining a green card, and additional immigration reforms forged between Mexico and the United States (Smith & Chen, 2001; Peterson, 2001). As late as September 7, 2001, President Vicente Fox of Mexico was confident that a deal on immigration and migration reform between Mexico and the United States could be reached within a short time (Smith & Chen, 2001). However, progress toward such progressive reforms was abruptly halted after 9/11.

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The implications of 9/11 for understanding the importance of policy implementation cannot be underestimated. The realization that policies had failed were evidenced by several facts:

1. All the terrorists were foreign nationals. 2. Fifteen of the 19 terrorists were Saudi nationals who obtained visas at the U.S.

Embassy in Riyadh or at the consulate in Jidda. 3. Some of the 19 were able to train for the attack at U.S. flight schools under stu-

dent visas that some had overstayed or that had fallen out of status while in the United States.

4. Some of the attackers had been on terrorist watch lists, unbeknownst to the for- mer INS.

These facts were a powerful indictment against past policies and the incapacity of certain federal agencies to implement immigration policies effectively or to communicate with one another when it counted. The failure to implement sound policy is best exemplified by the fact that two of the terrorists received visa renewals from the former INS six months after the terrorist attacks (Potter & Phillips, 2002).

To date, the terrorist acts of 9/11 provide a dramatic, if not the most tragic, indication of the consequences of failing to successfully implement and evaluate critical facets of immigration policy. To critics of a liberal immigration policy, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 represented the most dramatic example of the failings of U.S. immigration policy. For pro- ponents of greater immigration, 9/11 caused authorities to assume that all immigrants— illegal or not—are possible threats to national security.

Since 9/11, the federal government has taken a series of aggressive policy actions to address the threat of terrorism and to tackle the failings in immigration policy. These include the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2000, commonly known as the Patriot Act, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created an entirely new agency solely responsible for domestic security. The DHS is now responsible for all facets of immigration that fall under its umbrella. The Homeland Security Act formally removed the INS from the Justice Department, divided the agency into multiple separate bureaus responsible for naturalization and immigration, and others responsible for enforcement and border security. The INS, its mandate, its focus, and its responsibilities effectively ended in 2002.

The Patriot Act redefined the scope of those ineligible for immigration, altered the criteria by which a potential immigrant could be classified as a terrorist, expanded the federal government’s apprehension powers over immigrants, and authorized surveillance of for- eign students within the United States, among other measures. Influenced by the passage of the Patriot Act, the INS instituted sweeping changes in its regulations under the INS Special Registration system, formally known as the National Security Entry-Exit Regis- tration System. These regulations, similar to those in place in more restrictive countries such as Russia, have changed the rules governing entrance to the United States for all for- eign visitors, students, and those traveling on business. The visa changes can restrict for- eign travelers and those traveling on business to a term of 30 days. For foreign students, the new regulations prohibited a prospective student from starting school without first obtaining INS approval. Most significant, male immigrants from 18 Middle East states who are over the age of 16 are now subject to fingerprinting, photographing, and ques- tioning (Ginsberg, 2002).

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A good example of how policy failures have significant legislative consequences is exem- plified by some of the dramatic policies that were proposed, but not all yet adopted, dur- ing the 107th Congress. While these proposals had many different designs on solving this policy problem, all shared similar goals of controlling immigration and ensuring national security (Table 12.4).

Table 12.4: Post-9/11: Proposals for dramatic changes in immigration policy by the 107th Congress

Examples of proposals

• Student and Exchange Visitor Program (HR 3205 and S1618). • Required background checks for incoming foreign students (HR3239). • Prohibiting student visas to students who are from a nation-state suspected of terrorism (S1627). • A moratorium on the issuance of all visas to all nonimmigrant foreign students (HR 322). • Utilizing biometric technology in the issuance of visas (S.1518).

The fallout from 9/11 forever altered the role of the INS and its successor agencies. The failures of the INS to successfully implement and evaluate its mandate, coupled with the increasing political anger over the depth of its failures, resulted in some of the most dra- matic bureaucratic changes within the federal government in over half a century. These changes were intended to shore up this nation’s immigration laws, to ensure that policies were better implemented, and to see to it that responsible agencies were structured in a manner to ensure effective implementation.

The Lessons of History

The historical evolution of immigration policy highlights the intimate relationship between all facets of policy making and the socioeconomic and political period in which they are made. Concerns over threats to the economy and national security, as well as xenophobia bordering on outright paranoia, have at times led to dramatic changes in immigration pol- icy. From the early racially motivated restrictions and head taxes on certain ethnic groups, to a quota-based system that sought to perpetuate a specific ethnic vision of the United States, 20th-century immigration policy has sought to control the very socioeconomic and demographic makeup of the nation. Until mid-1965, significant political tensions existed as to what extent legal immigration was even desirable (Gimpel & Edwards, 1999, p. 3).

Since the 1980s, the perceived negative effects of illegal immigration, fueled in part by the recessions of the late 1980s and early 1990s, further targeted the illegal immigrant for what amounted to punitive actions, even as it let the employer off the hook by poorly enforcing and monitoring sanctions. With the welfare reform policy initiatives by the mid-1990s, immigrants were once again the targets of new policies that restricted access to social ser- vices, even though a number of studies have found that illegal and legal immigrants have a positive effect on the economic overall. In fact, studies by the National Research Council and the CATO Institute determined that, overall, immigrants may add as much as $10 billion to the economy each year, contribute to lower prices, pay more in taxes than they

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receive in public benefits, and have an overall positive effect on the national economy. However, other research studies suggest that the evidence is, at best, unclear as to the eco- nomic benefits or costs from immigration (Fix & Passel, 1994). What is clear is that since 9/11, the immigration-as-threat perspective seems to have gathered wider political and institutional support. From the scope of policy actions already taken, to the initiatives still being proposed, immigration policy has been focusing on upping control and national security—even at the expense of all other stated goals.

12.4 Contemporary Immigration Policy in the United States

The goal of controlling legal immigration entails regulating the method and number of individuals who may legally enter or reside within the United States. Policies that focus on illegal immigration seek to control illegal entrance to the country as well as limit access to government services, benefits, and employment. In addition to control, Michael Fix and Jeffrey Passel (1994, p. 11) have identified five specific goals for U.S. immigration policy:

• Social • Economic • Moral • Cultural • National and economic security

Socially, immigration policies have been designed to aid and assist family reunifica- tion, especially among close family members. Economically, critical workers (skilled or unskilled), as well as certain qualified investors, are invited to immigrate in order to pro- mote domestic economic growth and add to technological expertise, foreign capital, and seasonal workforce needs. Moral and humanitarian aspects of immigration policy include providing asylum for refugees from war or political or religious persecution. Culturally, immigration policy seeks to further national diversity. For example, the yearly lottery for the green card, an identity card signifying permanent resident status, provides immigrants from diverse national backgrounds the opportunity to stay indefinitely and work in the United States. The goal of national and economic security protects the interest of the state to ensure territorial integrity and economic prosperity. Driven by such security-focused policies, immigration policies have been designed to regulate border access, detain and deport illegal aliens, identify threats to national security and public safety, monitor work- place employment, and enforce employer sanctions.

What is implicit and explicit in all the goals identified by Fix and Passel is a pervasive assumption that the manner and method of immigration must and should be controlled for the betterment of the state. The policy goal of immigration control assumes that unfet- tered access to all who would choose to immigrate poses an unacceptable burden and risk to the country. While most stakeholders accept the idea that immigration policy must exert some degree of control over the foreign-born population, the debate over the costs or benefits of immigration (let alone what is considered good or bad policy) persist. In order to better understand the failures and successes of past policies, let’s now continue to explore the evolution of immigration policy, both statistically and in terms of actual policy.

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Competing Statistics on U.S. Immigration

Immigration has played a central role in the growth of our nation’s character, argu- ably, unlike any other nation in the world. As Table 12.5 shows, at the beginning part of the 20th century, as much as 14% of the population was foreign born. As of 1990, the percentage of foreign-born residents had declined to 7.9%, but between 1990 and 2000, it resurged to 11.1%. By 2010, however, the percentage of foreign born had spiked to 12.9%—the highest since 1920. According to the Migration Policy Institute, “the foreign- born population includes naturalized citizens, lawful permanent residents (LPRs), certain legal nonimmigrants (e.g., persons on student or work visas), those admitted under refugee or asylee status, and persons illegally residing in the United States” (Migration Policy Institute, 2010).

Table 12.5: Total and foreign-born U.S. population, 1900–2012

Year Total U.S. population Foreign-born population

Total Percent

2010 309,350 39,956 12.9%

2000 281,421 31,100 11.1

1990 248,710 19,767 7.9

1980 226,546 14,080 6.2

1970 203,210 9,619 4.7

1960 179,326 9,738 5.4

1950 150,845 10,431 6.9

1940 132,165 11,657 8.8

1930 123,203 14,283 11.6

1920 106,022 14,020 13.2

1910 92,229 13,630 14.8

1900 76,212 10,445 13.7

2000 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, American Community Survey 2010.

According to the most recent 2010 U.S. census, of the estimated 40 million foreign-born residents living within the United States, 53.0% were born in Latin America and the Carib- bean, 28.2% were born in Asia, 12.1% were born in Europe, and the remaining were from other regions of the world. While the foreign-born population has indeed grown over the last three decades, total legal immigration during this period has remained relatively steady, except for a sharp increase following the amnesty program of 1986. (See the case study in this chapter for more detail.)

Compared with detailed data on legal immigration, estimating the number of illegal immigrants remains extremely difficult. Because no verifiable hard data exists, the actual number of possible illegal immigrants is estimated using various statistical techniques.

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Section 12.4 Contemporary Immigration Policy in the United States CHAPTER 12

One rough measure of illegal immigration is based on the number of illegal immigration detainments and deportations.

In 2000, according to statistics from the former INS, 1.8 million deportable aliens were located in the United States (Migration Policy Institute, 2010). Between 1976 and 2007, based on DHS figures, the number of illegal aliens who have been located has increased and averaged well over 1 million (Figure 12.2). However, since 2007, a marked drop in deportable aliens has occurred. As of 2010, only 516,992 deportable aliens were accounted for—the lowest level since 1972.

Figure 12.2: Number of deportable aliens located, 1971-2001

It is difficult to verify the precise number of illegal immigrants because no absolute, verifiable data exist.

Based on Department of Homeland Security Data, Deportable Aliens Located: Fiscal Year 1925–2010.

The debate over the number of illegal immigrants living in the United States carries with it significant consequences for formulating, implementing, and evaluating immi- gration policy. For instance, estimates of a large illegal immigrant population serve as a powerful example of the failures of current immigration policies as well as providing political fodder for proponents of more punitive and drastic anti-illegal immigration policies. In contrast, estimates of a small number of illegal immigrants tend to make policies designed to limit entrance, residency, employment, and access to public services seem to have been effective.

For example, in 1996 the Cato Institute, a conservative think tank, suggested that 3.4 mil- lion illegal aliens lived in the United States (Simon, 1996, p. 37). Other groups with less scientific measures and a more anti-immigrant policy agenda, like the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), estimated that more than 4 million illegal immi- grants were residing in the United States as of 1996 (Miller & Moore, 1995, p. 2). In 2002, FAIR suggested that the illegal immigrant population numbered “between 8.5 million or 11 million persons.” More recent estimates by FAIR place the illegal alien population at 11.9 million. Meanwhile, U.S. census data approximated at “least 7 million and possibly as

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Section 12.4 Contemporary Immigration Policy in the United States CHAPTER 12

high as 8 million” illegal aliens residing within the United States as of 2001 (Cohn, 2001). As of January 2011, the DHS estimated that roughly 11.5 million illegal immigrants reside within the United States.

Complexities of Evaluating Immigration Policy

Immigration statistics that seem to reinforce the assumptions of both critics and defend- ers of U.S. policies complicates effective implementation and evaluation of those policies further. Based on which immigration numbers one may choose to focus on (as well how one chooses to interpret such statistical data), immigration policy can be deemed either a failure or a success. For example, anti-immigration actors could focus on the number of illegal aliens within the United State as a measure of how current and past policies have failed to deter illegal immigration. In stark contrast, pro-immigration actors could point out that estimates of illegal immigration are exaggerated and that the extent of illegal immigration, whatever it may be, reflects how current policies have failed to promote suf- ficient legal immigration.

What complicates this field of public policy more than others are the stark disagreements that emerge among policy actors over how to interpret even the most basic immigration statistics. Some would argue that a large and growing foreign-born population is critical to the future of the nation—especially given the historical role immigrants have played in building this nation economically and socially. An influx of immigrants can help the coun- try to remain economically competitive with other nations. It can also be seen as a way of ensuring population stability by shoring up declining birthrates among the nonimmigrant population. Others would argue that the foreign-born population has become too skewed, favoring one region (i.e., Latin America) over others. With respect to illegal immigration, although recent years of official data suggest that the rate is declining, others warn that hundreds of thousands of people are still entering the nation illegally. They would say that the current reprieve does not reflect successful policies but rather an economy that has lost some of its attraction owing to the recession dating from 2007.

In terms of crafting solutions, one cannot underestimate the damage this disagreement over statistics has had on implementing and evaluating policy. Immigration policy is an especially difficult area to evaluate. Depending on one’s ideological or political perspec- tive, these myriad statistics can be used to reinforce already held beliefs as to what types of immigration policy, punitive or not, should be designed and implemented. To better understand the real-world challenges to implementing and evaluating policy, it is useful to explore two recent presidencies, those of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, and how each dealt with immigration policy.

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Section 12.5 The Elusive Quest for Comprehensive Immigration Policy CHAPTER 12

12.5 President George W. Bush: The Elusive Quest for Comprehensive Immigration Policy

President George W. Bush’s record on immigration policy was complex, to say the least. Ideologically, he was both extremely conservative and quite progressive in his quest to achieve the most dramatic, comprehensive immigration policy since the 1986 IRCA Act. Although his critics on the left would say he did not go far enough, others on the right would say he went too far. It is worth noting that President Bush not only real- ized that something had to be done to address this area of public policy, but he was willing to push for significant and dramatic changes that, had they passed, would have provided millions of illegal immigrants a pathway to legal status.

President Bush’s drive for comprehensive immigration reform did not truly emerge until his second term. In May 2006, during an address to the nation, he set out a new vision for immigration policy that would ensure that “America can be a lawful society and a welcoming society at the same time” (White House, 2006). In the speech, President Bush outlined the following five principles that he believed were critical to achieving compre- hensive immigration reform:

1. Secure the borders. 2. Establish a temporary worker program. 3. Conduct employer verification. 4. Create a pathway for legal status for illegal immigrants. 5. Require mandatory English.

In a national address to build public support for his proposal, Bush (2006) outlined the dilemma that the nation faced:

Once here, illegal immigrants live in the shadows of our society. Many use forged documents to get jobs, and that makes it difficult for employers to verify that the workers they hire are legal. Illegal immigration puts pressure on pub- lic schools and hospitals, it strains state and local budgets . . . and brings crime to our communities. These are real problems, yet we must remember that the vast majority of illegal immigrants are decent people who work hard, support their families, practice their faith, and lead responsible lives. They are a part of American life but they are beyond the reach and protection of American law.

President Bush’s solution was to appeal to the public to confront some stark policy reali- ties. That is, while implementation of past laws had failed, it was unrealistic to believe that the U.S. government could deport millions of illegal immigrants. What Bush sought was a middle-ground immigration strategy between policy that granted full amnesty and a “head-in-the-sand” approach that ignored a grave policy problem. For President Bush, this middle ground was based on his belief that there “are differences between an illegal immigrant who crossed the border recently and someone who has worked here for many years, and has a home, a family, and an otherwise clean record.”

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Section 12.5 The Elusive Quest for Comprehensive Immigration Policy CHAPTER 12

Opponents and supporters focused almost exclusively on whether President Bush was granting “amnesty” to millions of illegal immigrants by providing these individuals with a pathway to legal status. However, it is important to recognize that President Bush, in order to win political support, attempted to reassure politicians and the public that his primary objective was to implement policies that would secure the border. President Bush pointed out that his administration had evaluated past failures and had designed new or better policies to address border security. The significance of this approach would only grow after 9/11, when it would become the key element behind any comprehensive immigration proposal. According to the Bush plan, securing the border would entail a multi-instrument strategy that would include increased funds and manpower, fences and barriers, new border monitoring technology, and a strict policy of deporting located ille- gal immigrants back to their home nations (Table 12.6).

Table 12.6: The Bush plan for securing the border

Primary points of action

• Increase the size of the U.S. Border Patrol. • Enhance border security technology, including high-tech fences in urban corridors, new patrol

roads, barriers in rural areas, and use of motion sensors, infrared cameras, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

• End the practice of “catch and release” along the southern border to ensure illegal immigrants are returned to their home of origins, instead of being released to appear at deportation facility.

• Eliminate bureaucratic obstacles between the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and numerous law enforcement organizations to expedite return of illegal immigrants.

• Work with nation’s governors to send National Guard members to the border, providing additional resources for enforcement.

Since 9/11, attempts to win public and political support for new immigration reforms have been based on (some would say distracted by) the promise that the government had learned from its mistakes or failures, and that by implementing new policies, one could effectively secure the border and deter illegal immigration. President Bush’s program, by contrast, highlighted the harsh reality that politics has been, and continues to be, the greatest obstacle to any legislative attempt at comprehensive immigration reform.

Bush’s attempt at reforming immigration policy was stymied and torn apart by an array of political forces—many of them arising from extremely punitive policies proposed by members of his own party. For example, in early 2006, The Border Protection, Anti- terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act, adopted by the House of Representatives along mostly partisan lines, sparked an outpouring of public protests among the His- panic and immigrant community at large. Proposed by Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI), and so known as the Sensenbrenner bill, the bill was dramatic in its scope and intent on dealing with illegal immigration. The language of the bill was not only punitive towards illegal immigrants but would criminalize the very act of aiding illegal immi- grants while expanding enforcement powers over illegal immigration to local and state law officials. Among the critics of the legislation were members of the Catholic Church, who argued it would criminalize their practice of helping the immigrant community. Others argued it would be all but impossible to implement such an unwieldy piece of legislation. The bill failed to pass in the Senate.

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Section 12.5 The Elusive Quest for Comprehensive Immigration Policy CHAPTER 12

Defending Bush’s Immigration Policy Immigration is bound to be a heated issue in a country where most residents are technically immi- grants. The large influx of illegal immigrants has led to some controversial decisions and will continue to do so. Former advisor to President Bush, Karl Rove, defends Bush’s immigration policy in the fol- lowing video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gXBj5PTEUZU

Critical Thinking and Discussion Questions

1. How does Karl Rove describe the immigration problem? 2. What are the key aspects of the proposed policy solution on immigration reform? 3. Describe the elements of the strategy to deal with illegal immigration?

President Bush would make a final push to reach a compromise and pass comprehensive immigration, but it would fail in 2007 with the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA) of 2007. While critics argued that CIRA went either too far or not far enough, the bill emphasized new measures to address border security, employer sanctions, a new focus on education and work skills, and a pathway for illegal immigrants to obtain legal status (Table 12.7).

Table 12.7: The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007

Main components

• Create a four-year renewable Z-Class visa for any qualifying illegal immigrant. • Applicants for Z-Class visa would have to pass an English test. • Z-class holders would be eligible for a permanent resident card after eight years. Eligibility would

depend on payment of $5,000 fine and $2,000 processing fee. • Ended focus on family reunification. • Would establish a point-based merit system that favors skills and education over family

reunification. • Required U.S. employers to verify legal status of employees, and increased employer fines for hiring

illegal immigrants. • Increased size of U.S. Border Patrol and resources for detainment and border fences.

CIRA would garner support from a wide ideological and political spectrum, including President Bush, Senators Ted Kennedy (D-MA), John McCain (R-AZ), and Jon Kyl (R-AZ), who believed that a balanced approach was critical. However, the bill would fail to win enough votes for passage. Among the most vocal opponents were conservative Republi- can members, such as Senators David Vitter (R-LA), Jim DeMint (R-SC), and Jeff Sessions (R-AL), who felt that immigration reform should focus on border and workplace enforce- ment instead of what they saw as Bush’s misguided attempt at what they called “amnesty.” On the left, opposition came from Democrats like John Rockefeller (D-WV), who opined that the bill’s flaws would do little to stem future illegal immigration.

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Section 12.6 President Barack Obama and Illegal Immigration CHAPTER 12

12.6 President Barack Obama and Illegal Immigration

Although President George W. Bush’s attempts to pass comprehensive immigration reform failed in 2007, a central provision of that legislation would become a cen-tral focus of President Barack Obama’s immigration policy agenda. This provision would become known as the DREAM Act, DREAM being an acronym for Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors, and it would provide legal status to children brought illegally to the United States by their parents.

President Obama’s plans for comprehensive immigration reform would be complicated by a devastating national recession, lack of public support, political divisions, and what some critics would argue was a fundamental failure by the president to use his politi- cal capital to achieve it while the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress. Con- trary to public pronouncements, the Obama administration took a restrained approach to immigration policy during its initial months. In fact, rather than marking some radical departure, President Obama’s initial actions would represent more of a continuation of President Bush’s conservative immigration policies. The following are positions Obama shared with Bush (Hsu, 2009):

• Expanding a $1.1 billion program that checks immigration status of individuals booked in local jails.

• Continuing a “zero tolerance” program that charges and jails illegal immigrants who are caught crossing the U.S.-Mexican border.

• Construction of an $8 billion “virtual fence.”

President Obama’s first year in office was also marked by some significant departures from the Bush administration. Among the most dramatic changes were the following:

• An end to workplace immigration raids, which were replaced with a greater emphasis on audits of employers who are suspected of employing illegal immigrants.

• Restricting the authority of local and state law enforcement over immigration matters.

• Ending a post-9/11 policy that led to incarceration for individuals seeking asylum. • Reviewing the failings of the nation’s detention facilities. (Alden, 2009)

What is most striking about President Obama’s early immigration policies is that they were arguably designed to be tough on illegal immigration in order to build political will for comprehensive immigration reform. Like President Bush, President Obama’s desire for immigration reform was predicated on the assumption that, without strongly emphasizing border security and enforcement, the necessary political will would never manifest to support real immigration reform. Unlike President Bush, however, President Obama would pursue a more nuanced punitive approach that sought to distinguish between criminals (whose deportation numbers more than doubled between 2007 and 2011) and noncriminal illegal immigrants (whose deportation numbers have remained stable) (Table 12.8).

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Section 12.6 President Barack Obama and Illegal Immigration CHAPTER 12

Table 12.8: Immigration and Control Enforcement (ICE) total removals, 2007–2011

Fiscal year Total Criminal Noncriminal % Noncriminal

2007 (Bush) 291,060 102,024 189,036 65%

2008 (Bush) 369,221 114,415 254,806 67

2009 (Obama) 389, 834 136,343 253,491 65

2010 (Obama) 392, 862 195,772 197,090 50

2011 (Obama) 396,906 216,698 180,208 45

ICE Total Removals. Retrieved from http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/ero-removals.pdf.

As Table 12.8 shows, the shift toward apprehending criminal illegal immigrants was dra- matic. President Obama, by using his executive authority, was able to shape how current laws were being implemented in order to achieve a policy goal that specifically targeted and removed illegal immigrants with criminal backgrounds rather than casting a wide net over all illegal immigrants. Although the Obama administration had removed nearly one million illegal immigrants by the fall of 2011 (on par with the record held by President Bush), the character of the deportations had fundamentally shifted.

Comprehensive Immigration Reform

While President Obama’s initial record of getting tough on criminal illegal immigrants was designed to win over critics on the left and the right, the realities of the Great Reces- sion, battles with states over immigration, and a policy-making priority to push health care reform greatly complicated his attempts at comprehensive immigration reform. In 2010, President Obama addressed some of these political obstacles, which included tough state laws passed in Arizona and Alabama to fill in the gap left by lax federal enforcement:

Just a few years ago, when I was a senator, we forged a bipartisan coalition in favor of comprehensive reform. Under the leadership of Senator Kennedy, who had been a longtime champion of immigration reform, and Senator John McCain, we worked across the aisle to help pass a bipartisan bill through the Senate. But that effort eventually came apart. And now, under the pressures of partisanship and election-year politics, many of the 11 Republican senators who voted for reform in the past have now backed away from their previous support.

Into this breach, states like Arizona have decided to take matters into their own hands. Given the levels of frustration across the country, this is understandable. But it is also ill conceived. And it’s not just that the law Arizona passed is divi- sive, although it has fanned the flames of an already contentious debate. Laws like Arizona’s put huge pressures on local law enforcement to enforce rules that ultimately are unenforceable. It puts pressure on already hard-strapped state and local budgets. It makes it difficult for people here illegally to report crimes—driving a wedge between communities and law enforcement, making our streets more dangerous and the jobs of our police officers more difficult.

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Section 12.6 President Barack Obama and Illegal Immigration CHAPTER 12

Much like his predecessor, President Obama outlined a vision for comprehensive immi- gration that focused on similar, critical tenets:

1. Increasing and enhancing border security. 2. Stepping up employer enforcement. 3. Creating a pathway to legal residence for illegal immigrants that includes paying

a fine, taxes, and learning English. 4. Streamlining the immigration bureaucracy and process. 5. Establishing a temporary guest worker program. 6. Providing children brought to the United States as illegal immigrants an opportu-

nity for legal status (if they come “out of the shadows”).

Ironically, not only were the Bush and Obama pillars for comprehensive immigration reform strikingly similar, but each would suffer a similar legislative fate. President Obama would cast aside any attempt at comprehensive immigration reform and choose to focus on a more narrow reform: the passage of the DREAM Act in 2010.

The DREAM Act and Executive Power

Versions of the DREAM Act had been introduced in earlier sessions of Congress during the Bush presidency. However, the two versions of the DREAM Act that President Obama focused on were introduced by Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) in 2009 and then later revised in 2010. Each version of the DREAM Act sought to address the same policy problem: how to deal with children of illegal immigrants who, by no fault of their own, were vulnerable to deportation despite having effectively grown up in the United States and knowing no other home nation (Table 12.9). The hope of the DREAM Act’s supporters, from members of Congress to President Obama, was that the plight of children facing deportation would prove enough to help unite the political and public divisions that had stymied such immi- gration reforms for nearly decade.

Table 12.9: The 2009 DREAM Act

Conditional status requirements

• Must have entered the country when they were under 16, prove they lived in the United States for at least five years, and have graduated from a U.S. high school or obtained a GED.

• Demonstrated good moral standing and proved that they have not committed any crimes.

Permanent status requirements

• Must wait six years to apply for permanent residence status. • Prove that they have attended college for two years or have served in the U.S. military. • Demonstrate good moral standing and pass a background check.

The DREAM Act: Good for our economy, good for our security; good for our nation. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites /default/files/DREAM-Act-WhiteHouse-FactSheet.pdf

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Section 12.6 President Barack Obama and Illegal Immigration CHAPTER 12

Even though the DREAM Act had bipartisan support, the legislation faced the same polit- ical obstacles that had plagued previous attempts at immigration reform. In the post- 2010 midterm election environment, in which Democrats had suffered one of the largest defeats in congressional history, the political will for reform all but collapsed. In December 2010, a Senate cloture vote to advance the DREAM Act failed by a 55–41 vote, with three Republicans voting for cloture and five Democrats voting no. In a 2012 interview with Univision Radio, President Obama stated that, while he understood the displeasure and frustration of immigration advocates, there were limits on what he could do. He famously stated that, “We don’t live in a monarchy. I’m not the king. I’m the president. And so I can only implement those laws that are passed through Congress” (Moffett, n.d.). Ironically, months later, President Obama would utilize his executive powers to implement dramatic changes to how immigration law is applied to the grown children of illegal immigrants.

Deferred Action

On June 15, 2012, President Obama announced a new policy whereby the DHS would take deferred action on deportation cases. Under this scheme, individuals would not be subject to deportation for a “period of two years, subject to renewal, and may be eligible for employment authorization” (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2012b). The significance of this executive order is that President Obama chose to exercise his power over the executive branch and the federal bureaucracy to define and implement a new policy without congressional approval. As Table 12.10 indicates, the eligibility require- ments for deferred action all but mirrored those which had been outlined by the proposed DREAM Act.

Table 12.10: Eligibility requirements for deferred action on deportation of illegal immigrants

Immigrants eligible for deferred action

1. Were under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012. 2. Came to the United States before reaching 16th birthday. 3. Have continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 2007, up to the present time. 4. Were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012, and at the time of making

request for consideration of deferred action. 5. Entered without inspection before June 15, 2012, or lawful immigration status expired as of

June 15, 2012. 6. Currently in school, have graduated or obtained a certificate of completion from high school,

have obtained a general education development (GED) certificate, or are an honorably dis- charged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States.

7. Have not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, three or more other misde- meanors, and do not otherwise pose a threat to national security or public safety.

Although the policy of deferred action did not grant permanent legal status or a pathway to it, it would end the fear that qualifying children or young adults could be deported, for a renewable period of two years, if they came forward to register. Initial estimates are that as many as 1.7 million illegal immigrants could be eligible to receive work papers and driver’s licenses. To date, 180,000 people have applied.

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Section 12.7 Implementing and Evaluating Immigration Policy CHAPTER 12

12.7 Implementing and Evaluating Immigration Policy

President Obama’s executive order raises new questions about the scope of presi-dential power in implementing immigration law. However, it does not address the more important question of why past immigration policy has failed. To opponents, a generation of policies has failed to curb illegal immigration. Therefore, any new policy that provides legalization assistance to illegal immigrants, be they children or adults, can never staunch future illegal immigration and may even encourage it. In stark contrast, supporters of comprehensive immigration reform see the borders as more secure than ever and believe that one must accept the reality that the approximately 11.5 million indi- viduals the DHS estimates are living here illegally will never be deported. These points are central to understanding why immigration policy has become such an intensely politi- cized issue.

Implementation is the action phase of the policy process (Chapter 6). Thus, in immigration policy, as for any policy issue area, a failure to implement the policy effectively results in a failure to redress the identified policy problem. Further, effective policy implementation depends on how well the policy was designed and whether any evaluation is conducted after implementing it. Implementation and evaluation, however, do not occur within a

A Different Kind of Illegal Immigrant Immigration is often discussed, but sometimes important people are left out of the conversation. Young people brought to the United States as children, who do not pose any of the common risks of illegal immigrants, are one such group often overlooked during such conversations. President Obama discusses a new DHS policy to change this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6RXSlMu5EDI

Critical Thinking and Discussion Questions

1. How does President Obama describe the immigration problem? 2. What are the key aspects of his proposed policy solution? 3. What does this proposed action not accomplish?

Although immigration advocates and supporters of the DREAM Act praised the bold actions of the president, critics have argued that such executive actions went beyond the scope of his executive powers. Already, states such as Nebraska and Arizona have made it clear that they will not implement the president’s order. This conflict in policy imple- mentation has raised a constitutional question that, as of October 2012, may eventually lead to the Supreme Court (Johnson, 2012). The current conflict reflects previous conflicts over state versus federal authority in immigration law. For example, in 1994 California passed Proposition 187, the Save Our State initiative. It would have established a state-run citizenship screening system and prohibited illegal aliens from using health care, public education, and other social services in the state. Because the law was a first attempt by a state to control immigration policy, which is usually a federal area, the law was challenged in a legal suit and found unconstitutional by a federal court.

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Section 12.8 Immigration and the Role of Bureaucracy CHAPTER 12

political vacuum. To the contrary, the evolution of immigration policy shows that the design of such policy develops within a political and socioeconomic environment where the main target populations, legal and illegal aliens, are often negatively framed. Hence, it may be argued that the intensely political process from which immigration policies develop all but ensures that not only will the best policy not be designed, but its very implementation will sow the seeds of future policy failure.

12.8 Immigration and the Role of Bureaucracy

Until 2003, the sole agency responsible for implementing and evaluating immigra-tion policy was the INS, an agency torn between two conflicting administrative roles of enforcement and service. Historically, the INS was tasked to execute new rules and sanctions as they applied to all facets of immigration. It was the responsibility of the INS to prepare and define proposed rules, interim rules, and final rules as to how policy decisions would be implemented by the agency. Long criticized as an ineffectual bureaucracy that could perform neither key role well, the events of 9/11 inspired elected leaders to pursue a dramatic restructuring of the INS into multiple agencies within DHS. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 divided the INS and immigration enforcement, ser- vice, and border security responsibilities, into three new agencies: the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). All were created to improve ability of the federal government to better implement and evaluate current immigration policy.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

USCIS’s implementation responsibilities consist of broadly overseeing lawful immigra- tion to the United States, but its strategic goals focus on the following priorities:

• Strengthening the security and integrity of the immigration system. • Providing effective customer-oriented immigration benefits and information

services. • Supporting immigrants integration and participating in U.S. civic culture. • Strengthening the infrastructure that supports the USCIS mission. (U.S. Citizen-

ship and Immigration Services, 2012a)

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Whereas the USCIS focuses on the service aspects of immigration policy, ICE’s mission focuses on the control aspects: enforcement, homeland security, and public safety. ICE’s goals in their mission statement are “to promote homeland security and public safety through the criminal and civic enforcement of federal laws governing border control, cus- toms, trade, and immigration” (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, n.d.). The agen- cy’s strategic plan for 2010–2014 outlined four key priorities:

• Prevent terrorism and enhance security. • Protect the borders against illicit trade, travel, and finance.

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Section 12.8 Immigration and the Role of Bureaucracy CHAPTER 12

• Protect the borders through smart and tough interior immigration enforcement. • Construct an efficient, effective agency.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

The CBP is on the frontline of immigration. This agency is responsible for securing ports of entry and border crossings. The agency addresses legal entry and combats illegal entry along the many points of access into the United States. (See Table 12.11.)

Table12.11: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP)

Some basic facts

• CBP officers protect U.S. borders at official ports of entry, while border patrol agents prevent illegal entry into the United States of people and contraband between the ports of entry.

• CBP’s Office of Air and Marine, which manages the largest law enforcement air force in the world, patrols the nation’s land and sea borders to stop terrorists and drug smugglers before they enter the United States.

• CBP agriculture specialists prevent the entry of harmful plant pests and exotic foreign animal dis- eases and confront emerging threats in agro- and bioterrorism.

• CBP is responsible for guarding nearly 7,000 miles of land border the United States shares with Canada and Mexico and 2,000 miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida peninsula and off the coast of Southern California. The agency also protects 95,000 miles of maritime border in partner- ship with the United States Coast Guard.

Implications of Restructuring

The impetus behind such a dramatic restructuring was that each new agency, by focusing on a specific set of responsibilities, would prove more effective than its predecessor. What remains unclear, however, is whether these new agencies will prove more effective and efficient than the INS. In the past, through funding and legislation, the overriding empha- sis of the INS was visa inspection, border enforcement, and alien apprehension, even at the expense of naturalization. Will demands on the USCIS to provide immigration and naturalization services conflict with its mission to monitor, prevent, and deter undocu- mented or illegal immigration?

In an era of growing restraints on federal spending, will legislative stakeholders prefer to focus on enforcing immigration law (CBP and ICE) or on service to potential immigrants (USCIS)? If past is prologue, one must wonder whether this new bureaucratic structure will only serve to hinder the ability of the federal government to service millions of poten- tial immigrants. To better understand how immigration policy must be implemented, it is important to look back at what has succeeded and what has failed. Take a look at this chapter’s case study about the 1986 IRCA Act, which offers a classic example of what hap- pens when poor design, poor implementation, and poor evaluation converge.

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Section 12.8 Immigration and the Role of Bureaucracy CHAPTER 12

Case Study: The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act: A classic policy failure The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 sought to address the problem of illegal immigration by recog- nizing that far too many illegal aliens were resulting from what are called “nonimmigrant overstays.” These are people who obtain visas for temporary visits and stay beyond the autho- rized period of admission (Immigration and Naturalization Ser- vice, 1995). Not only are up to half of all illegal aliens those who overstayed their visas, but the government has no system in place to track when or if these people leave the country.

The ability to overstay the temporary entrance visa suggests that these individuals have been able to work illegally with- out being caught by border enforcement. Whereas employer sanctions had been considered in the early 1970s, the over- whelming emphasis on punitive regulations directed at the

illegal alien continued until 1986. IRCA represented the first piece of legislation to design a bal- anced policy that addressed both the supply of labor provided by illegal immigration and employers’ demand for cheap and unauthorized labor. IRCA sought to regulate the role that employers played in the illegal market, as well as the first to establish sanctions against the employer (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2012c).

IRCA did not solely target employer enforcement but represented far more sweeping and ambi- tious reform. The act included initiatives designed to protect the supply of legal foreign workers to perishable-crop growers between fiscal years 1990 and 1993 (U.S Department of Labor, 1991). These programs were expected to improve employment opportunities for legal workers while addressing the problem of illegal immigration. In addition, IRCA established an amnesty program that ensured the transitions of millions of illegal aliens to legal status. With respect to employer sanctions, IRCA sought to ensure greater economic security by deterring future illegal immigration and exerting greater controls over employers who willingly hire illegal labor. Even so, in evaluating the effects on illegal immigration, the data suggest that IRCA had a limited impact.

An analysis of the number of aliens apprehended after IRCA suggests that the three-year drop between 1986 and 1989 can be best explained by the amnesty program’s legalization of millions of illegal aliens. Moreover, based on the number of illegal aliens both apprehended and deported, as well as those estimated to reside in the United States, it is doubtful that the policy successfully deterred or prevented illegal immigration. As a 1991 Labor Department study concluded, “it is dif- ficult for the analyst . . . to pinpoint which facet of the law led to specific changes in question” (1991, p. 3). A GAO study from 1990 more directly highlights the ease with which IRCA and employment verification requirements were overcome. Fraudulent documents were readily available, indicating that the policy of employer sanction has not been implemented effectively.

Within three years of the passage of IRCA, the GAO evaluated the employer sanction provision. It concluded that implementation had been less than successful (1990). Among the problems were confusion among employers as to their responsibility, that only 134,000 (3%) of all employers had received INS visits, and that between 1986 and 1989, only 3,532 businesses were fined, with less than $5 million collected from them. Between 1989 and 1994, “fewer than half of the 12,700 U.S. employers that INS inspectors recommended be fined between 1989 and 1994 for employing illegal aliens . . . were in fact fined” (Migration News, 1996). The average INS fine levied

Glow Images/Superstock

The IRCA was the first act that tried to regulate the role of employers in the demand for illegal labor.

(continued)

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Section 12.8 Immigration and the Role of Bureaucracy CHAPTER 12

Case Study: The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act: A classic policy failure (continued) between 1989 and 1994 was only $1,612 and did not represent a significant punitive measure that would ensure widespread employer adherence (Migration News, 1996). Lastly, the number of INS workplace inspectors actually dropped by half and led to a decline in workplace investigations from 14,700 in 1989 to 6,000 in 1994 (Migration News, 1996).

Illegal immigration is largely an urban issue, and most immigrants are processed by cities. In cities like Los Angeles, Chicago, San Antonio, Miami, and New York, the number of sanctions staff ranged from a low of 0.9 to a high of 4.6 per 10,000 INS agents (Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1989). In 1996, only 700 workplace inspectors were part of the 19,000 employees of the INS (Migration News, 1996). In 1999, 13 years after the adoption of IRCA, another GAO study uncovered more damning evidence: The agency determined that since 1994, the INS had devoted only 2% of its resources to workplace enforcement, that only 3% of suspected employers had been investigated, that the Department of Labor had failed to provide information to the INS on potential employers who hire illegal aliens, and that the INS “infrequently imposed sanctions on employers” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1999).

Since IRCA was enacted, no significant pieces of immigration legislation were adopted that included either positive or negative employer sanctions or any kind of improved employer-based enforcement. In fact, the 1990 Immigration Act actually weakened many of the employer sanctions established four years previously. Presidents Bush and Obama did emphasize improved employer verification as elements of their comprehensive immigration proposals. However, it remains unclear to what extent these new measures would have been implemented effectively, especially given the post-9/11 agency structure.

Why haven’t employer sanctions become a more attractive method for regulating illegal immigration? Was IRCA and its emphasis on employer sanctions simply bad policy design, bad implementation, or the result of a lack of evaluation? In 1991, a U.S. Department of Labor report stated that “removing one of the major incentives for illegal immigration—available employment—was expected to deliver handsome dividends of a tightening labor market (i.e., improved job opportunities, better working conditions and increased wages) to U.S. workers” (1991, p. xiii). If this is true, what logic explains the Immigration Act of 1990’s weakening of employer sanctions? Was evidence or analysis simply not available to policy makers in 1990? Moreover, what can explain the failure to create and expand a national verification workplace program in the IIRIR Act of 1996? In terms of policy implementation and evaluation, it is evident—based on a number of GAO studies and recent policy actions—that the failures in implementation resulted from a political process that leads to bad policy design and poor implementation. In fact, the lack of institutional and budgetary resources committed to this segment of IRCA since 1986 raises pressing questions as to whether policy makers ever intended or desired to implement this part of the legislation.

How does one conclude the implementation of the employer sanctions program failed when, for all intents and purposes, the INS hardly ever enforced this aspect of the legislation? To date, it is all but impossible to determine what effect, if any, this legislation could have had on illegal immigra- tion. However, understanding these failures forces one to realize that implementation, much like the entire policy process, does not operate in a vacuum. Politicians, special interest groups, and other policy actors all blunt the effectiveness of implementation and evaluation of immigration policy. Thus, IRCA offers us a case study of the consequences this has for public policy.

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Section 12.9 The Policy Process and Immigration Policy CHAPTER 12

12.9 The Policy Process and Immigration Policy

Politically, the lack of legislation dealing with the employer sanctions discussed in this chapter’s case study is quite understandable. Elected representatives are sus-ceptible to the political power of business lobby groups, their political parties, and their constituents. Since Congress and the President are the sources of major changes to immigration policy such as IRCA, it is not surprising that these players are reluctant to develop policies that would increase sanctions on U.S. industries that hire and depend on illegal labor. While Presidents Bush and Obama made increased employer sanctions a central tenet of their plans for comprehensive immigration reform, each one’s efforts would fail under withering public and political opposition. This organized opposition remains focused on controlling, through punitive actions, illegal immigrants rather than the actions of employers who hire them.

Since IRCA, the design of immigration policies has focused more on addressing political and public concerns than on a practicable desire to develop practical policies that address the conditions that create illegal and legal immigration. Moreover, little thought has been given to how any new poli- cies, once adopted, would be implemented effectively. Such a narrow focus reflects a pol- icy process driven by political interests, where elected mem- bers fear the public backlash that may arise if they support policies that could be perceived as freely given “amnesty” or as stifling business. As a result, the quest for comprehensive immigration reform continues to elude lawmakers—even as prominent leaders from both political parties have striven to achieve it. The belief persists that any attempt to offer legal status to illegal immigrants, no matter how conditional, would constitute unfair amnesty.

From an administrative point of view, it remains unclear how effective the CBP, ICE, and USCIS will be in addressing the many areas of immigration without a fundamental rethinking of the policies that define this problematic area. Historically the INS, with its many competing missions and goals, became all but paralyzed. In terms of illegal immi- gration, the INS was clearly reluctant to or politically constrained from pursuing more aggressive employer sanctions, let alone dealing with the backlog of legal immigration applications. From a practical policy perspective, it is difficult to argue that illegal immi- gration can be reduced as long as the agencies responsible for controlling it are unwilling or unable to implement critical policies such as employer enforcement.

Visions of America/Superstock

Recent immigration policies have focused more on addressing political and public concerns about illegal immigration than on controlling access and entry into the United States.

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Summary CHAPTER 12

Looking ahead, the political and economic costs of any attempt to truly increase employer sanctions, coupled with the political power of business interest groups like chambers of commerce, make it unlikely that Congress will be motivated to develop stronger legisla- tion. Such legislation could, if effectively implemented, have a dramatic impact on the rate of illegal immigration. However, if the current flavor of immigration policy is any indication, future policy will follow an even more punitive bent. It is likely to target the illegal and legal alien but ignore the fact that this problem cannot be solved by such nar- row policies.

Summary

The focus of immigration policy should be not only on ensuring desirable immigra-tion, such as immigration that allows skills workers and deters criminal activity, but also on diversity and defining what kind of nation the United States is and will be. Unfortunately, it has recently devolved into a policy struggle between the public and its elected decision makers over who can best secure the border or punish the illegal immigrant. For advocates of immigration reform, more open immigration would serve to strengthen and revitalize the United States. For opponents of immigration, both legal and illegal, the influx of foreigners places a burden on state resources, represents a threat to domestic jobs, and a potential national security threat in the wake of 9/11. For those who favor legal immigration but desire tough policies on illegal immigration, the middle ground is shrinking.

One of the greatest sources of anger and frustration toward immigration policy among all stakeholders stems from past failure by elected leaders and bureaucratic agencies to ensure that immigration policies, such as IRCA, were implemented effectively. Unfortu- nately, the events of 9/11 brought to life the most dramatic example of the national secu- rity consequences that can arise when our immigration and border enforcement processes fails. That such policies failed should not be surprising, in that these persistent failures do not stem from bad policy per se, but from ineffective implementation, lack of political will, and limited evaluation.

Without effective implementation, every policy is all but doomed to fail. Even so, some of the failings of immigration policy, as discussed in the context of IRCA, do not seem to have resulted merely from a lack of awareness of the problems with the program or policy, from weaknesses of the instruments, or even a fault in the design. Rather, the failures of implementation lay within the administrative and political unwillingness to implement or evaluate solutions. One confronts a difficult truth that immigration policy must not only be designed to effectively address a particular policy problem, but it must seek to overcome the politics that shape the entire process.

Immigration policies may continue to maintain a political and administrative status quo that centers on control and greater national and economic security, while all but ignor- ing the enduring human and economic costs to the nation. In light of the events of 9/11, immigration policy is likely to continue to evolve in the direction of ever greater control.

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Key Points to Remember CHAPTER 12

What remains unknown is whether, at some time in the near future, the political stars will align for comprehensive immigration reform. And, if comprehensive immigration reform passes, one must ask whether it will be implemented effectively and whether evaluation studies will be used to improve it when obvious failings emerge. Given our recent past in this policy arena, it may be best to be skeptical but hopeful that stakeholders can choose a better way to craft effective immigration policy.

Key Points to Remember

• The tragic events of 9/11 have had an enduring impact on immigration policy that is unlikely to change.

• Immigration policy reflects a common desire among all nation-states to manage their population, control access to their borders, fill workforce needs, and shape their national identities.

• Central to the debate over U.S. immigration policy is determining which and how many foreign nationals should be permitted to immigrate, as well as defin- ing lawful immigrant status.

• The underlying, and often unstated, goal of almost all aspects of immigration policy is control. Five additional goals are enrichment of the social, economic, moral, cultural, and national and economic security of the country.

• Estimates of a large illegal immigrant population exemplify the failures of current immigration policy, whereas estimates of a small number of illegal immigrants help prove that punitive actions are less necessary.

• Periods of xenophobic-inspired immigration restrictions and concerns for both economic and national security have recurred throughout the history of U.S. immigration policy.

• President George W. Bush’s record on immigration policy was simultaneously extremely conservative and quite progressive. He attempted the most dramatic and comprehensive immigration policy since the 1986 IRCA Act.

• President Obama cast aside any attempt for comprehensive immigration reform and chose to focus on more narrow reform: the passage of the DREAM Act in 2010 and the executive order establishing deferred action in 2012.

• President Obama chose to utilize his power over the executive branch and the federal bureaucracy to not only define and implement a new policy toward the children of illegal immigrants who would have qualified under the DREAM Act, but was able to do so without Congressional approval. It was, by historical stan- dards, a dramatic action.

• The Homeland Security Act of 2002 divided the INS into three agencies: the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The goal of these new agencies was to help the federal government implement and evaluate current immigration policy.

• The 1986 IRCA Act offers students of public policy an almost classic example of what happens when poor design, poor implementation, and poor evaluation of a public policy come together.

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Key Terms CHAPTER 12

Key Terms

amnesty A government pardon granted to a large number of individuals, such asa to illegal immigrants or their children who have been residing in the United States for a certain period of time.

anti-immigration position Perceives immigration to pose a substantial socio- economic problem, highlights the increas- ing social and budgetary costs, and since September 11, 2001, the substantial threat posed by immigration to national security.

asylee status An immigrant granted special status by the government as a persecuted refugee from another country. Allowed to seek refuge in the country for a period of one year, after which he or she can apply for permanent residency (unless conditions in the home country have changed).

deferred action A policy whereby indi- viduals would not be subject to deporta- tion for a “period of two years, subject to renewal, and may be eligible for employ- ment authorization.”

DREAM Act Legislation proposed in 2009 and 2010 that would provide legal status to children brought illegally to the Unites States by their parents.

foreign-born population Comprises naturalized citizens, lawful permanent residents, certain legal nonimmigrants (e.g., persons on student or work visas), those admitted under refugee or asylee status, and persons illegally residing in the United States.

Homeland Security Act of 2002 Formally removed the INS from the Justice Depart- ment and divided the agency into multiple bureaus under the umbrella of the Depart- ment of Homeland Security responsible for naturalization and immigration (USCIS, ICE) and enforcement and border security (CBP).

illegal alien (INS definition) A foreign- born national who entered the United States without inspection or with fraudu- lent documentation, or a foreign national who entered legally, violated the terms of their visa status, and remained in the United States without authority.

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi- grant Responsibility Act (IIRIR) of 1996 Dramatically changed immigration policy by limiting access to social services for the legal and illegal immigrant popu- lation, expanding border patrol funding, authorizing funding to hire INS agents to investigate alien smuggling, providing $12 million for additional fences at points between the United States and Mexico, and allowing the INS to cooperate with local and state law enforcement in pursu- ing illegal immigrants.

Immigration Act of 1990 Legislation that increased legal immigration ceilings, expanded employment-based immigra- tion, and gave expanded asylum for vic- tims of war and natural disasters.

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965 Repealed the national-origins quota system that had been in place since the 1920s and established a seven-category preference system to attract a variety of skilled workers and to reunite immigrant families.

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Applied Internet Exercises CHAPTER 12

Applied Internet Exercises: Immigration Policy 1. Will Immigration Reform Happen This Year?

Congratulations! You’ve just been hired by a major think tank as an immigration policy researcher. Your first project is to put together a memo on whether comprehensive immigra- tion reform is possible during the current congressional session.

Your tasks are as follows:

a. Utilize http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php (as well as Senate.gov or House.gov). b. Identify the 16 members of Congress (8 from the House, 8 from the Senate) whom you

believe are most critical to immigration reform. Here are some hints:

Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 Established an amnesty program for illegal aliens and sought to deter future illegal immigration through the first mandated oversight of the work- place and sanctioning of employers who hire undocumented workers.

legal immigrant An alien admitted into the United States as a lawful permanent resident, accorded the privilege of living permanently in the United States.

middle-ground immigration strategy A policy based on the belief that there are differences between an immigrant who crosses the border illegally and someone who has worked here for many years and has a home, a family, and an otherwise clean record.

pro-immigrant position Emphasizes the historical and cultural value of immigration, as well as the short- and long-term economic benefits from future immigration.

refugee An immigrant seeking sanctu- ary because of persecution or fleeing from war or natural disaster in his or her home country.

USA PATRIOT Act of 2000 In response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, legisla- tion that redefined the scope of eligible immigrants, altered criteria that classi- fied potential immigrants as terrorists, expanded the federal government’s appre- hension powers over immigrants, and authorized surveillance of foreign students within the United States. Commonly known as the Patriot Act.

Critical Thinking and Discussion Questions

1. What should be the primary goal of U.S. immigration policy? Discuss. 2. Do you agree or disagree with the assumption that employer sanctions could

deter or prevent illegal immigration? Discuss. 3. Can immigration be fair to both the interests of the state and the immigrant? If

so, what kind of immigration policy should the United States adopt in the post- 9/11 world?

4. What are the major reasons that President Obama’s and President Bush’s pursuit of comprehensive immigration reform has largely failed?

(continued)

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Applied Internet Exercises CHAPTER 12

Applied Internet Exercises: Immigration Policy (continued) i. Look at leadership and key committees. ii. Look at publicly prominent members (from both the left and the right) who are active

in this issue area. iii. Use an Internet search engine to identify members who have been recently outspoken

about immigration issues. iv. Choose members of both parties

c. Prepare a short summary of each member’s position on immigration, no more than one or two paragraphs for each. Be sure to highlight key votes, sponsored legislation, and recent remarks. At the end of each paragraph, determine each member’s likely support for com- prehensive immigration reform. Use the following scale:

Very likely Somewhat likely Somewhat unlikely Very likely

d. Final Analysis: Based on your review of each member’s position and likely support for reform, provide a final analysis of the obstacles to and likelihood for comprehensive immi- gration reform during this session of Congress. In your final analysis be sure to highlight:

i. Shared positions (as well as differing positions) of key members. ii. Key members who are obstacles to reform. iii. Which member(s) is most likely to modify his or her position iv. What comprehensive reform would look like based on a review of these members’

positions.

2. Immigration Op-ed

You’ve been selected to write a 500-word op-ed piece on illegal immigration for a major national newspaper. Your tasks are as follows:

a. Determine your position on the immigration issue. You must take either a pro-immigration or anti-immigration position.

b. Describe the illegal immigration problem as it currently stands. Be sure to include cur- rent statistics in your explanation of the problem. You can use the following sites for your research (or others you prefer):

http://pewresearch.org/topics/immigration/ http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/ http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics

c. Briefly describe your position and the policies you believe to be the best course of action. Reference why your position is preferable to those who hold the opposite position.

d. Given the fact that so many past immigration reforms have failed, describe the legislative path through which your proposed course of action could become law.

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Suggested Readings CHAPTER 12

Suggested Readings

Capaldi, N. (1997). Immigration: Debating the issues. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.

Daniels, R. (2004, December). Guarding the golden door: American immigration policy and immigrants since 1882. (1st ed.). New York: Hill and Wang.

Fitzgerald, K. (1996). The face of the nation: Immigration, the state, and the national identity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Gimpel, J. G., & Edwards, J. R. (1999). The Congressional politics of immigration reform. Bos- ton: Allyn & Bacon.

Heer, D. (1996). Immigration in America’s future. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Hofstetter, R. R. (Ed.). (1984). U.S. immigration policy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Zolberg, A. R. (2008). A nation by design: Immigration policy in the fashioning of America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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