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Learning Objectives

In this chapter you will learn to:

• Describe the differences between policy change and policy termination.

• Explain why policy change and policy termination occur.

• Identify the various approaches, frameworks, and strategies involved in policy change and termination.

Changing or Terminating Policy

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Section 7.1 The Nature of Policy Change CHAPTER 7

Most policy making at the federal level—and indeed in most industrialized nations—involves change of existing policies rather than formulation of totally new policies. Following the implementation of a national public policy, inter- est groups mobilize, target groups complain, funding fluctuates, and legal challenges are sometimes launched. Such dynamics force policies to evolve and perhaps even to end. These changes then cause the entire policy process to restart while policies are reformu- lated and reimplemented. An accepted part of the policy game is that sometimes the outcome of the game (policy) changes because variables come into play that change the game’s nature. Such game-changing variables include the context of time, the emergence of other issues and problems, and the replacement of certain policy actors with others who might not share the same beliefs or judgments about the problem the policy addresses.

Sometimes the evaluation of policies (Chapter 6) results in no change to a policy or pro- gram. Policy actors refer to this situation as policy maintenance. Policy maintenance occurs for an array of reasons, including favorable evaluations of the policies, the absence of evaluations, and political support strong enough to overcome unfavorable evaluations. Further, even if political actors want to change a particular policy, many of them and much of the public may not support rapid change. However, far more common is for evaluation to prompt changes to the policies or the programs they create. Policies end because they are no longer perceived to be relevant to the problem or context for which they were formulated. In short, policy termination occurs when the dominant political majority believes a policy should not be the government’s focus or simply because it is no longer needed. The decision to terminate a policy or program is rare, because those who benefit from the program often ensure that the policy or program will not end.

Until recently, despite generally acknowledging that policy change or termination often follows policy evaluation, policy theorists paid little attention to this final stage of the policy cycle (DeLeon, 1978, Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Sabatier, 1986). For many the stages- heuristic approach ends with policy evaluation. Some theorists, however, have suggested that feedback occurs during the evaluation stage, allowing policies to be terminated or reformulated and reimplemented. With the addition of the change and termination stages, the stages-heuristic approach encompasses the feedback process, and the theory itself bet- ter reflects the realities of the policy process.

7.1 The Nature of Policy Change

Policy change happens when a policy is replaced, modified in some respect, or repealed in parts. Policies are rarely maintained exactly as adopted. Because of the intrinsic ambiguity of legislation, change inevitably starts to occur as soon as a policy is implemented. Often, the legislative oversight process produces change. And in the real world, policies evolve as they are formulated, adopted, implemented, evaluated, reformu- lated, and reimplemented. Policies evolve because the goal of a policy is to solve a particu- lar problem or achieve specific objectives. Essentially, policy change can take three forms.

1. Modification of existing policies or programs. 2. Enactment of new legislative statutes in particular policy areas. 3. Major shifts in the goals and objectives of the dominant national mood.

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Section 7.2 Theoretical Models of Policy Change CHAPTER 7

There are various substantive policy areas in which the cycle of change is evident. For example, antipoverty policies today are very different in many aspects than they were in the 1960s. Whether the evolution is good or bad is not relevant. What is germane is the fact that these policies have undergone change and are constantly evolving. Such reshaping and change of policies over time is referred to as policy succession (Peters, 1993).

Multiple factors can result in policy change, including the following:

• Changes in societal dynamics can force a policy to change to meet new condi- tions or facets of the same problem.

• New policies may contradict or invalidate an existing policy. • Individuals or groups may constitutionally challenge a policy or pursue lawsuits

against it. • Technological changes alter a policy’s feasibility or relevance. • New discoveries or revelations alter public support for the policy. • Economic and political conditions change, altering the environment in which the

policy operates. • Elections bring into office policy actors with very different ideological agendas

and interpretations of what a particular policy should or should not be doing. • The problem the policy is meant to address is solved, thereby negating the need

for the policy. • The actors implementing the policy may lack the skills to manage it effectively. • Once implemented, the policy may show its defects and weaknesses. • Target groups may simply refuse to comply with the policy or may mobilize

strongly against the policy.

Hogwood and Gunn, British professors who research policy analysis, suggest three other reasons why policies change (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). First, modern governments can become involved in relatively few new areas of policy making. Thus, most new policies overlap or extend existing policies and programs. This tendency seems to reconfirm polit- ical economist Charles Lindblom’s (1959) classic characterization of U.S. policy making as incremental in nature. Second, the authors contend that existing policies create condi- tions that require change because of the inadequacies or unintended effects of the poli- cies. Finally, Hogwood and Gunn believe that changing policy is easier than terminating policy. Economic conditions may change, and certain policies may be considered unneces- sary, wasteful, or inappropriate. However, groups who support such policies will always exist. Therefore, it is politically easier to modify them than to end them.

7.2 Theoretical Models of Policy Change

Within the literature are various models that help explain how policy evolves over time and thus clarify why policy alterations occur in the United States. Public policy scholarship offers four major frameworks that account for policy change: the cyclical thesis, the evolutionary or policy-learning thesis, the punctuated equilibrium theory, and the backlash, or zigzag, thesis.

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Section 7.2 Theoretical Models of Policy Change CHAPTER 7

As is the case with policy implementation and evaluation, no single model best explains policy change over time. Rather, theorists apply each model to specific policy areas to see whether change in a particular policy reflects societal conflict, shifts in national mood, or transfer of benefits to new target populations.

The Cyclical Thesis

Political historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (1986, 1987) was the main proponent of the model known as the cyclical thesis. Schlesinger’s works state that U.S. politics exhibits continu- ing shifts between public purpose and private interest. In essence, Schlesinger argued that the national mood is conservative during some periods and liberal at others. In other words, the nature of policy making is cyclical. When the national mood is conservative, the public supports the notion that the private sector and individual responsibility is the best way to deal with national problems. When the national mood is liberal, the public supports more government involvement and a commitment to public sector intervention.

According to Schlesinger, such political cycles or mood swings represent approximately 30-year cycles that follow the span of a generation, and each generation brings specific values and beliefs shaped by experiences. For example, from the Harding-Coolidge years (1921–1929) until Frank- lin Roosevelt’s election in 1932, the national mood was conservative, with little public support for large-scale government intervention to deal with the nation’s problems. Roosevelt’s New Deal, however, was supported by a liberal national mood that demanded reform and affirmative government to deal with Depression-era prob- lems. This national mood was similarly evident in the Kennedy-Johnson years (1961–1969), with Kennedy’s New Frontier policy making and John- son’s Great Society programs. The retrenchment of the Ronald Reagan years was supported by a national mood swing back to conservatism in the early 1980s. Many view the election of President Obama as a return to a more progressive national mood, one that demands change and reform of economic elitism, which posits that a minority controls and owns the financial resources of the nation.

A weakness of the cyclical thesis model is its inability to explain why, when the national mood is conservative about government intervention in the economy, a majority of the public may support an issue such as the right of homosexuals and lesbians to marry, which many would argue is a liberal position. In addition, Schlesinger’s model doesn’t account for the fact that in recent years the national mood has seemed much more volatile than a 30-year span suggests. Similarly, while the national mood has seemed to favor a

Everett Collection/Superstock

Political historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. was the main proponent of cyclical thesis.

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Section 7.2 Theoretical Models of Policy Change CHAPTER 7

particular ideological belief system electorally in recent years, deep-seated support for the opposite ideological belief system has existed as well. Many people perceived the election of Barack Obama as reflective of a centrist or progressive mood, which favored government intervention in the economy to provide for those unable to fend for them- selves. Yet this mood was accompanied by a surge of support for a radical conservatism, demonstrated by the growth of the Tea Party movement, which has supported limited or minimal government intervention and a balanced federal budget—even at the cost of some social programs.

To understand further why national mood swings occur, one may turn to political scien- tist Samuel Huntington’s (1981) argument: Voters become disillusioned with what gov- ernment enacts and move in the opposite direction. According to Huntington (1981), the United States has periods of “creedal passion” (p. 284), which lead to eras of constitutional reform and eras of societal calm. Essentially, Huntington argues that during certain peri- ods, a dominant societal creed dictates change, while at other periods the creed is less than dominant, with the resulting lack of impetus for change. For example, in the 1960s the societal creed dictated change in the form of Johnson’s Great Society programs. That creed emphasized the need for a safety net to provide for those who were less well off, adopting and implementing social programs to alleviate their economic and social conditions.

The Evolutionary, or Policy-Learning, Thesis

Political scientists Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith developed the evolutionary, or policy-learning, thesis, which argues that policy change is a function of three factors that are based on three premises (Sabatier, 1987, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The three factors are:

• the interaction of competing advocacy groups or coalitions within a policy community,

• external changes outside the policy community, and • stable policy community parameter effects.

The three premises are as follows:

1. Understanding policy change requires studying it for a minimum of 10 years— the length of the policy cycle.

2. Policy communities must be a focus because they are networks of institutional and noninstitutional actors interested in and affected by the policy.

3. Public policies can be conceptualized as belief systems.

In sum, policies are composed of value priorities and causal assumptions on how to achieve such priorities. Certain advocacy groups push certain policies based on their belief systems. As time passes, groups may change their beliefs and alter their demands, depending on the context and the information they receive. However, groups and their belief systems are fairly stable over time. In fact, the belief system is set for a period of at least 10 years.

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Section 7.2 Theoretical Models of Policy Change CHAPTER 7

Major policy change normally occurs with large-scale change in socioeconomic conditions or in the dominant governing elite. Such change forces advocacy coalitions to adapt to changing times and needs. Thus, policy learning prompts policy makers to revise policy as they adapt to external events such as conflict or shifts in society’s perception of where its resources should be directed.

Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

As Chapters 3 and 4 discussed, political scientists Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones argue that the policy process intersperses long periods of stability (equilibrium)— characterized by incremental policy change—with periods of instability and dramatic policy change. This model is known as the punctuated equilibrium theory. These authors believe the policy process to be incrementally conservative in nature and therefore stable.

When the system is stable, widespread agreement exists about how problems should be dealt with; change means simply modifying or adjusting policy. However, in times of crisis, dissatisfied groups and interests mobilize to alter the status quo. If the consensus surrounding policy makers’ understanding of the issue and the general policy direction breaks down, the result may be increasing instability and major change in policy. For Baumgartner and Jones, the factors that produce change are elections and external shocks and signals, or new information from society about how government is expected to deal with problems. In sum, the punctuated equilibrium model rests on the concept of fric- tion, or resistance to change. Political mobilization around an issue occurs relatively infre- quently, with a demand for a dramatic shift in how the government is handling a problem.

The Backlash, or Zigzag, Thesis

Sociologists like Edwin Amenta and Theda Skocpol (1989) argue for a backlash, or zig- zag, thesis, which views U.S. policy making as erratic. According to these authors, U.S. policy making doesn’t depend on shifts in national mood. Rather, it is dependent on shifts in perceptions about whom policies benefit. The zigzag reflects a stimulus-and-response cycle that is a backlash against the group or groups who have been benefiting from poli- cies. An example of a zigzag is the demand to regulate the earnings of corporate leaders in the recent economic crisis—this represents a backlash by groups who were negatively affected by the crisis.

In short, policies from one period benefit certain groups and provide the stimulus for other groups to react against these policies, forcing policy change in the next period. Groups who perceive themselves as not benefiting pursue different policies that will allow them to become policy beneficiaries. These changes turn groups who were once beneficiaries into policy “losers.”

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Section 7.4 The Process of Changing a Policy CHAPTER 7

7.3 Patterns of Policy Change

Regardless of the model through which one views the evolution of federal policies, policy scientist B. Guy Peters (1993) argues that change may follow several pat-terns. The most common patterns of policy change are as follows: • Linear change involves replacing one policy with another or changing the loca-

tion of an existing policy. For example, lawmakers replaced the Aid to Dependent Children Act with the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec- onciliation Act. An additional example is the conversion of the 1973 Comprehen- sive Employment and Training Act into the 1982 Job Partnership Training Act.

• Consolidation change combines two or more programs with similar goals and objectives into a single new policy. For example, consolidation occurred when policy makers fused several environmental regulatory programs under the 1992 Energy Policy Act and when they reorganized several security programs under the Department of Homeland Security in 2002.

• Split change divides an agency responsible for a particular policy or program into smaller organizational units or programs, each responsible for part of the original policy. Examples include the splitting of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1974 into two new agencies, the Nuclear Regulatory Agency and the Energy Research Development Agency, and the division of the Immigration and Natural- ization Service into service and enforcement branches.

• Nonlinear change reflects drastic or major policy change. It usually takes place because new social conditions develop, technology advances, or political office holders desire change for ideological reasons. One recent example is the 2001 Patriot Act, a dramatic expansion of government powers in law enforcement and domestic security, and the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act, which vastly expanded the federal government’s power in the area of public education.

7.4 The Process of Changing a Policy

Complex and often uncertain, policy changes must go through the usual policy-making process. Each stage presents new difficulties for policy makers because established organizations, target groups, and stakeholders firmly entrench them- selves in the process, attempting to block or control any change. This extension of the policy cycle reflects how the policy process does not simply begin or end, but continually evolves. Figure 7.1 outlines the complex process of policy change at each stage of the policy cycle.

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Section 7.4 The Process of Changing a Policy CHAPTER 7

Figure 7.1: Policy change as part of the policy cycle

Each stage of the policy process presents new difficulties for policy makers.

The way change occurs within the policy process is evident in the evolution of aviation security policy following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. This evolution can be analyzed and understood by applying the stages-heuristic model, which illustrates how policy develops and the dynamics within each stage of the process.

On the morning of September 11, Americans asked themselves how it was possible that four passenger airliners could be hijacked by terrorists and crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and a field in Pennsylvania. How was it possible that airline security was so vulnerable to foreign terrorists? How could public policy and programs dealing with aviation security fail so dramatically? Since that day the U.S. government and the public have continued to explore answers to these questions. One of the policy actions dealing with issues related to the attacks was the passage of the 2001 Aviation and Transportation Security (ATS) Act. The ATS Act rep- resents a dramatic example of a policy that evolves through a series of policy stages, from problem identification to policy termination or change.

Problem Identification

Airline security is not a new problem or issue of concern. For over 3 decades, studies, reviews, and actions highlighted failures with airline security. Before September 11, the issues surrounding problems and vulnerabilities regarding airport security were well established among political actors and government agencies such as the Federal Aviation Administration, airline experts, the airlines, and airline security firms. Reynold Hoover, an aviation antiterrorism consultant and former Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agent, stated, “What happened on [September 11] . . . is something we in the aviation security business knew could happen for years” (as cited in Wieffering, 2001). And between early 1997 and April 2000, aviation security was the topic of 11 General Accounting Office stud- ies that highlighted issues dealing with poor training of airport security staff, lack of suf- ficient bomb-detection equipment, and the general failings of aviation security (“Security Long a Concern,” 2001). Yet beyond actors directly associated with the aviation industry,

Agenda Setting • Few obstacles

to change occur. • The policy

issue is already an agenda item.

• Policy has a target population of clients.

• Existing administrative organization implements policy.

Policy Formulation • Bureaucracy

lobbies and is lobbied.

• Many obstacles to change occur.

• Clients and stakeholders resist change.

Policy Adoption • Coalitions form

among clients, stakeholders, and bureaucrats exerting heavy pressure on legislators to use logrolling and porkbarreling tactics.

Policy Implementation • If day-to-day

implementers do not perceive change, they can subvert change.

• Conflicts occur within the bureaucracy.

• High partisan- ship is in place.

Policy Evaluation • Obstacles

and problems occur during evaluation.

• Many affected actors resist.

Policy Change

Policy Termination

Policy Maintenance

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Section 7.4 The Process of Changing a Policy CHAPTER 7

not many policy actors were extremely concerned about security problems associated with airline travel.

However, the events of September 11 changed all that. The attacks represent a classic example of a national crisis that reveals a public problem. Before September 11, whether airline security was a public problem and what government’s role should be in solving it was up for debate. But immediately following the attacks, institutional and noninstitu- tional policy actors easily perceived that the dramatic cost and scope associated with the attacks was a public issue. Although other issues and problems still affected the nation, in the hours and days following the terrorist attacks, none was perceived to be as important as terrorism, the safety of airline travel, and threats to national security posed by failings in airline security.

Such public and political perceptions justified immediate and dramatic action by the federal government: All airline travel into and out of the United States was grounded, air combat patrols over U.S. skies were initiated, and the president ordered any hijacked plane that could not be diverted to be shot down. After September 11, 2001, instead of discussing private or public issues related to airline security, the government promptly and directly intervened. Why was this the case? The obvious answer: The problem and the crisis were severe.

Agenda Setting

As understood though Roger Cobb and Charles Elder’s model of agenda setting, the crisis nature of the terrorist attacks “triggered” the issue across the systemic and institutional agenda (see Figure 7.2). Mere minutes after the events, airline security became one of the most important issues on both agendas for most—if not all—of the policy actors inter- ested or active within this policy area.

Irrespective of the biases that had previously stymied placing the aviation security issue higher on either agenda, the crisis of September 11 quickly overcame the intrinsic politics of the agenda-setting process. Consequently, policy formation focused on addressing the problem of aviation security.

Figure 7.2: Agenda setting triggered by the September 11 attacks

It can be difficult to get a policy put on an agenda. But after a crisis situation, a policy is less likely to encounter major political hurdles.

Issue of Concern Airline security— threat to airline travel/nation.

Systemic Agenda Prominent issue on systemic agenda.

Formal Policymaking

September 11 Attacks

Institutional Agenda Policy formulation initiated.

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Section 7.4 The Process of Changing a Policy CHAPTER 7

Policy Formulation and Adoption

The process of policy formulation and adoption associated with September 11, and spe- cifically the airline security issue, can be broken down into two rough stages. The first stage was immediate, decisive, and in need of little politicking. Critical policy actors achieved immediate consensus that significant actions would have to be quickly formu- lated, adopted, and implemented to address an issue this severe. On the day of September 11, the actions taken by the federal government—grounding airline travel and closing all airports—were dramatic policy actions never before taken in the history of U.S. aviation.

In the days and weeks following the attacks, policies were quickly formulated, adopted by presidential order and support of Congress, and implemented effectively by the Depart- ment of Transportation. More important, other relevant and interested policy actors made no public attempt to alter, redefine, or minimize the policy action. Legislative efficiency emerged because of the coalition of support among all institutional and noninstitutional actors. In the initial response to the crisis, policy actors sought to cooperate as much as possible to undertake needed policy actions. This cooperation represents a powerful example of how efficient the policy process can be under crisis conditions.

However, the second stage of policy formulation and adoption involved the more diffi- cult process of developing ideas, proposals, and solutions in the absence of crisis. During this phase, various policy actors, with their respective beliefs and interests, had to work together to formulate and adopt policy actions in light of perceived problems. During this phase, dramatic changes to aviation security would take weeks of politicking, debate, and negotiation, even as the threats and problems persisted. The politics intrinsic to all policy formulation erupted when it became clear to many policy actors that members of Congress were considering extremely significant changes to aviation security. In particu- lar, the debate began to focus on federalizing airport security. Those actors who disagreed with this policy proposal—the airlines, airline associations, and private aviation security firms—mobilized.

The political and policy debates surrounding the changes to aviation security centered around two basic proposals: first, whether airport security should now fall totally under federal control and management and, second, whether to increase government oversight of the privately managed security firms responsible for airline security. In other words, the question was whether aviation security should continue to remain under private or some public control or become entirely public. Given the scope of policy actions that were being considered, the debate over aviation security policy quickly became mired in vari- ous ideological, political, and administrative agendas (see Figure 7.3).

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Section 7.4 The Process of Changing a Policy CHAPTER 7

Figure 7.3: Public versus private policy solutions and the issue of airport security

Sometimes there is debate about whether a policy solution should be either public or private. Policy actors might have different views about the issue and thus might push different agendas.

Obstacles to “quick” policy formulation and adoption can be explained by the politics and advocacy efforts that quickly emerged after September 11. Aviation security firms began an aggressive lobbying campaign to prevent dramatic changes in aviation security policy, including federalizing control. Airlines were concerned that if added security arrange- ments proved tedious, future travel and the economic viability of the airlines could be jeopardized. Certain policy actors, such as the Republican leadership in the House of Rep- resentatives, opposed the need for a new federal agency for airline security on ideological and political grounds. Finally, other activists simply hesitated because it was not clear that a new federal bureaucracy would perform any better than private actors in improv- ing airport security. Interestingly, it took over 8 weeks to formulate and adopt a policy to address airline security, but less than 2 weeks to adopt policy that provided loans and grants benefiting the airline industry.

Overall, the second round of formulation and adoption affords a classic example of how an issue, perceived initially as a crisis and serious in consequence, cannot entirely avoid the politics intrinsic to the policy process once the crisis begins to dissipate. Nevertheless, the ATS Act of 2001 was signed into law. The legislation’s effectiveness has depended on how well the policy has been implemented.

Policy Implementation, Evaluation, and Change

Implementing the ATS Act represented a formidable task for the federal government. As a result of the act’s adoption, a new bureaucracy, the Transportation Security Administra- tion, was created under the Department of Transportation. This new administration has wide programmatic responsibility over a number of areas:

• Civil aviation security and related research and development activities. • Security responsibilities for other modes of transportation that are exercised by

the Department of Transportation. • Day-to-day federal security screening operations for passenger air transportation

and intrastate air transportation. • Policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to transportation.

PrivatePublic/PrivatePublic

Full Government Managed Airline

Security (Democrat Proposal

Nov 2001)

Airport Security Firms Increased Govern-

ment Oversight (Republican Proposal

Nov 2001)

Airport Security Firms Private Management

and Limited Government Oversight (Prior to Sept 11, 2001)

Minimal Airport Security

(Pre-1970 Reforms)

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Section 7.4 The Process of Changing a Policy CHAPTER 7

• Domestic transportation during a national emergency, including aviation, rail, and other surface transportation, as well as maritime transportation and port security.

• Management of security information, including notifying airport or airline secu- rity officers of the identity of individuals known to pose a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to airline or passenger safety.

The ATS legislation mandated significant changes to existing security measures, includ- ing prohibiting access to the cockpit, placing air marshals on high-risk flights, reducing security threats within all airports, screening all persons and baggage, establishing a 911 emergency-call capability for all airplane telephones serving passengers, strengthening detection against all potential explosives, and transferring direct oversight and manage- ment of baggage screening from the Federal Aviation Administration and private security firms to the Transportation Security Administration.

Although such expansive implementation goals were to be expected, unexpected problems in executing this broad mandate quickly materialized. These include meeting the dead- line for implementing all of the programmatic responsibilities the legislation required. Many actions have taken longer than expected—allocating resources, hiring and training a staff of more than 30,000 people, creating new management positions, supplying bomb- detection devices, and so on. Although recent years have seen systematic efforts to comprehensively evaluate the post–September 11 airline security programs, failures, problems, and weaknesses persist. Nonetheless, in terms of policy change, dramatic policy action fundamentally reshaped airline security within the United States. At a minimum, a radical shift in the role of government did occur.

Another example of the way change occurs within the policy process is the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act, enacted during President George W. Bush’s tenure. See the Case Study box for details about this policy change.

Case Study: The No Child Left Behind Act as a Redefinition of Existing Federal Law Federal education policy underwent considerable change dur- ing President George W. Bush’s first term in office, when in January 2002 he signed into law the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). This legislation redefined the role of the federal government in public education. NCLB is a comprehensive change to Title I of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Educa- tion Act. NCLB was prompted by demands for reform of exist- ing policy from educators, parents, the general public, elected representatives, and corporate America. These groups were united in their criticism of what they perceived to be a U.S. education system that had failed to produce students who could compete in a global market place. These critics believed that the only solution to declining student achievement scores and schools’ inability to replace ineffective teachers with good ones was for the federal government to impose national stan- dards on public education.

AFP/Getty Images

No Child Left Behind is a policy that has undergone policy succession, or reshaping over time.

(continued)

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Section 7.4 The Process of Changing a Policy CHAPTER 7

Case Study: The No Child Left Behind Act as a Redefinition of Existing Federal Law (continued) The NCLB legislation, a bipartisan endeavor, was the product of 4 decades of federal government expansion into public education. Up until the 1960s, states were typically responsible for developing, implementing, and funding education policies. Starting with the Reagan administration, successive presidents had articulated the need for public education reform. The 1980s saw a number of nation- ally appointed commissions investigating the state of U.S. public education and issuing report cards showing the need for major improvements. By the end of the decade, education policy was a priority on state policy agendas, and a sizable number of state initiatives focused on student learning as well as teacher performance. Yet despite increased public spending on education, student learning and achievement were not making significant gains (see National Center for Education Statistics, 2012). Many policy makers believed gains in achievement and learning outcomes should have been signifi- cant, given the increased funding. As such, by the end of the 1990s, education was still a priority issue for both the public and policy makers.

As governor of Texas, George W. Bush had witnessed the implementation of a statewide standardized testing system for students in grades 3 through 8. The president asserted that during his 6 years as governor, Texas had experienced marked increases in student learning as borne out by increasing test scores across all grades. Minority students made the largest gains. (Educators and various interest groups have since challenged Bush’s claims.) The NCLB legislation incorporated some of the prac- tices of the Texas system. For example, under NCLB all students in grades 3 through 8 take annual, standardized tests in reading and math. This testing is in addition to the Department of Education’s National Assessment of Educational Progress tests, given annually to a sample of public and pri- vate school pupils in fourth through eighth grades. In addition, states must produce yearly public report cards by district and school and demonstrate progress from year to year. Those districts and schools that fail to make adequate yearly progress toward statewide proficiency goals face sanctions designed to improve their performance. Furthermore, parents of children in “failing” schools may send their children to another public or charter school within their school district. The school dis- trict is required to pay transportation costs for those students to attend better-performing schools. Finally, school districts must use Title I funds to ensure school choice, as well as additional educa- tional services such as private-sector tutors.

Basically, the reform bill increased funding to schools to promote better performance and penalized schools in which students need better instruction. For example, a school in which test scores fail to improve over 5 years can be restructured and restaffed. Failing schools also lose part of their budget when children transfer to another school. In addition, states were given a period of 4 years from the enactment of the NCLB legislation to ensure that all teachers are qualified to teach in their subject areas and that funds provide for such professional development. Finally, schools must develop annual report cards showing how their standardized test scores compare with those of both local and state schools. The act’s supporters argue that this requirement gives parents the information about the quality of their children’s schools, the qualifications of teachers, and their children’s progress in key academic areas.

Critics of NCLB argue its emphasis on standardized testing does not promote student learning but a culture of teachers teaching to the test. Another criticism is that the federal government does not fully cover the costs of NCLB’s implementation, thus burdening local governments. Since the election of Barack Obama, a concerted effort has pushed for comprehensive reauthorization of the NCLB legislation, but Congress has made little movement. In 2011 U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan (continued)

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Section 7.5 The Nature of Policy Termination CHAPTER 7

7.5 The Nature of Policy Termination

When policy actors evaluate or reevaluate implemented policies, they may not want to retain or change the policies. Instead, they may decide to end, or termi-nate, them completely. In their text on public policy, theorists G. D. Brewer and Peter DeLeon (1983) define policy termination as “the deliberate conclusion or cessation of specific public sector functions, programs, policies, or organizations” (p. 385). Other political scientists, such as James Lester and Joseph Stewart, contend that termination is the dissolution of an agency, the redirection of policy, the elimination of a pro- gram, or fiscal retrenchment (as cited in DeLeon, 1987). Policy termination is not easy. Indeed, the political and economic costs are often so high that decision makers and beneficiaries are reluctant to terminate policies or programs (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). In reality, policy termination is a rare phenomenon, happening only sporadically. Thus, much of the scholarly discussion is theoretical, and little research on the dynamics of policy ter- mination exists.

One factor explaining the rarity of policy termina- tion is the desire of organizations to survive. Even after an organization’s original policy goals are accomplished, its administrators may create new goals to help legitimize its continued existence. Additionally, when they face difficulties, such as weak evaluations, administrators will change program goals rather than terminate a program. This desire to survive also accounts for the vested

Blend Images/Superstock

The government cannot legally withdraw altogether from the provision of education, even if the general consensus is that it is not working.

Case Study: The No Child Left Behind Act as a Redefinition of Existing Federal Law (continued) campaigned to get Congress to change the law because he believed a large number of schools were “failing” under the law. Data shows that he was correct; by the start of 2012 several states had school failure rates over 50% (McNeil, 2011a, 2011b). The Obama administration countered Con- gress’s reluctance to change the legislation with a program giving states the right to apply for waiv- ers to exempt them from NCLB standards. Republicans in Congress have responded by charging the president with overreaching his authority and imposing his vision for education on the states.

Although NCLB has met with mixed reviews in terms of its effectiveness, it does offer a useful case study of how existing policy and programs can be reformed and changed through reauthorization of existing legislation.

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Section 7.5 The Nature of Policy Termination CHAPTER 7

interest of administrators in seeing their organization continue—they do not want to lose their jobs.

Legal obstacles are another factor inhibiting policy termination. Current laws require the existence of some programs—whether the programs fulfill their goals and objectives is irrelevant. For example, a general consensus has it that public education is not achieving its goals. However, even though some individuals and groups would like the government to stop providing education altogether, by law it cannot.

Additional obstacles to policy termination include costs, certain coalitions, and politics. Specifically, the high start-up costs of new programs can block policy termination, which some view as wasteful. Ironically, it is often cheaper to keep a program than to terminate it. Administrators and staff can also seek to prevent termination by joining forces with political actors, individuals, and groups opposed to the policy’s end. DeLeon (1987) calls such unions antitermination coalitions. Finally, decisions to terminate are often political. As such, policy termination is often embedded in ideological struggles that occur within the political arena.

When, despite the obstacles, a policy is terminated, decision makers have ended the pol- icy for one or a combination of the following reasons:

• The policy is no longer effective, is not meeting its specified objectives and goals, or is simply not solving the problem it is supposed to address.

• The need for the program disappears. • Budgetary requirements force the end of a policy or program. Good examples of

termination based on budgetary requirements are cuts in the space exploration program or recent attacks on affirmative action programs at the state level.

• An evaluation study makes the case that the policy is unsatisfactory in impact or outcome. For example, airline deregulation came about when the 1978 Commer- cial Regulation Act was terminated because evaluation after evaluation found that the regulation was not achieving what it was supposed to.

• The political environment may no longer support the goals of a policy. The change in welfare policies during the 1990s resulted largely because of a whole- sale societal belief that the welfare system was malfunctioning and needed major reform.

• Ideological conviction prompts certain policies or programs to end (Cameron, 1978; DeLeon, 1987). The election of a conservative president or a liberal Congress will undoubtedly affect not only what becomes policy but also what remains as a policy or program. For example, Ronald Reagan essentially eliminated the Emer- gency Maternity and Infant Care program and the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children by reducing their funding. He argued that it was inappropriate for the federal government to be involved in such pro- grams, even though evaluations showed them to be cost-effective, with a favor- able cost-benefit ratio. Reagan’s ideological views drove him to cut the programs; he believed government provision of food and medical resources encouraged women to be single mothers or indigent. Similarly, President Bill Clinton over- saw a significant reduction in defense spending based on his ideological stances favoring expenditure on nondefense policies and cutting deficits.

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Section 7.6 Major Actors in the Termination of Policies or Programs CHAPTER 7

Obama Announces Total Iraq Troop Withdrawal In October 2011 President Obama announced an end to the war in Iraq. He confirmed that the United States and Iraq will continue to have a strong and enduring partnership with a shared goal to support an Iraq that is stable, secure, and self-reliant. By the holiday season, President Obama promised, all of the troops would be home from Iraq. Watch Obama’s announcement in the following video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GnbRAy5wG9I.

Critical Thinking and Discussion Questions 1. Does this announcement signal policy change, policy termination, or both? 2. What helps explain the reasons the president has taken this position now? 3. What implications does the president’s Iraq position have for future presidents?

Research identifies situations that are more conducive to terminating a policy or program (Daniels, 1997). First, termination is more likely to happen when presidential administra- tions are elected on a mandate and wish to deliver that mandate to the public that voted them into office. For example, the change from liberal to conservative politics during the late 1970s led to the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act. Next, termination occurs with a shift in the public’s dominant ideological position. At times, such as in the 1960s, the public has supported expansion of welfare programs; during other periods, such as the 1980s and 1990s, the public has called for retrenchment. A third situation conducive to policy termi- nation is social, economic, or political turbulence. For example, part of President Obama’s mandate was support for change because of economic turbulence in the United States. Hence, many Americans supported terminating military programs with high expendi- tures, such as policing Iraq.

7.6 Major Actors in the Termination of Policies or Programs

Despite reluctance to terminate policies or programs and the rarity of termination, it is important to identify those actors who play a role in termination. The President

Over the last 30 years, presidential power in terminating policies or programs has dimin- ished due to Congress limiting the presidential powers of rescission and deferral of funding. The rescission of funding allowed presidents to decide not to use congres- sional-appropriated funds for their intended purpose. Rescission terminates a policy or program essentially by blocking its funding. The deferral of funding allowed presidents to choose not to spend resources authorized by Congress for a stated period and spend those resources at a later time. The powers of rescission and deferral enabled presidents to terminate any program with which they disagreed. Congress moved to limit these powers because of what it believed to be extreme abuse by President Richard Nixon, who used rescission to block social welfare programs he ideologically opposed.

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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GnbRAy5wG9I

Section 7.6 Major Actors in the Termination of Policies or Programs CHAPTER 7

Since the late 1970s, presidents have increasingly used their budget to terminate particular policies and programs. By omitting certain policies from the budget or severely under- funding policies and programs, presidents can promote policy termination. Congress may interpret both of these decisions as the president’s desire to terminate a particular policy or program. However, because of the political costs associated with termination, presi- dents often choose to consolidate policies and programs instead. For example, the 1996 welfare reform joined together several health and welfare programs.

Congress

Members of Congress want to get reelected. They are therefore sensitive to what they believe their constituents want, and most often their constituents do not want programs terminated. However, Congress does have the tools necessary to seek termination of poli- cies and programs. Both the Congressional Budget Office and the General Accounting Office can research and quantify policy and program outcomes, costs, and effectiveness— evidence that Congress can use to terminate. Terminating a policy is not a route that Con- gress often pursues, because of the political costs and resources associated with it. The process is time-consuming, and it may hurt members in terms of reelection, as well as affect their relationships with fellow members of Congress, from whom they need sup- port for proposed legislation. However, although it can be politically costly, terminating a program is more feasible because often the associated policy remains in place.

Interest Groups

Terminating some policies and programs might not affect large numbers of the public. However, it can directly affect an interest group or a number of groups. For example, if the government terminates a program that supplies certain types of food to inner-city schools at no cost, the program’s termination will not just affect the families of those schoolchil- dren. It will also have an impact on the food producers and suppliers, the workers who transport the food, and the agencies that oversee the program.

Bureaucracies

For the most part, interest groups aid bureaucratic agencies to fight termination of a pro- gram they oversee. Bureaucrats have little incentive or interest in seeing programs termi- nated, because termination affects their survival. In sum, termination of a program means personal upheaval for the bureaucrat, often in the form of a transfer to another program or physical location, new expectations, and new colleagues.

Program Clients

Generally, clients of a program that results from a given policy will not favor policy or program termination if the clients benefit from that program. For example, many senior citizens who benefit from Medicare oppose its abolition.

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Section 7.7 Types of Policy Termination and Terminators CHAPTER 7

Courts

The courts historically do not have a large role in policy termination unless they are asked to decide on the constitutionality of a policy. If the courts declare a policy unconstitutional, they are effectively terminating it. For example, the court’s 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision declaring segregation unconstitutional ended segregationist educational policies at the state and local levels.

7.7 Types of Policy Termination and Terminators

Policy theorists have defined multiple types of policy termination (Lester & Stewart, 2000). Following are the four main types: 1. Functional termination: This is dramatic and a complete ending of govern-

ment responsibility for a particular policy or program. This type of termina- tion is extremely rare, but cases do exist. An example is the privatization of a responsibility that was once the exclusive province of the public sector, such as when California allowed energy to be supplied by private companies. More recently, schools in some cities are no longer government controlled and fall under the control of a private education corporation.

2. Organizational termination: This is the elimination of an entire organization or agency responsible for a policy area. An example is the elimination of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment in 1995. Organizational ter- mination is uncommon. Rather than terminate an agency, government mostly chooses to reorganize and split an agency into multiple units of responsibility.

3. Policy termination: This is the complete abandonment of a policy because its underlying principles no longer have common societal agreement. For exam- ple, Jim Crow laws were discarded in the South with the advent of civil rights legislation in the mid-1960s.

4. Program termination: Program termination eliminates a particular program under a policy. The overall policy, however, remains in effect. Program ter- mination is the most common type because the number of actors involved or affected is limited. For example, in 1986 the Reagan administration terminated revenue-sharing programs adopted during the Nixon administration. Revenue sharing channeled revenues to state and local governments with few require- ments. Reagan terminated the program as a result of large federal deficits and public pressure.

Policy terminators—the decision makers who end policies or programs—can be classified according to their motivations for doing so (Bardach, 1976). The first type of terminator is an oppositionist. Oppositionists believe that a policy or program should be terminated because it is simply bad. They perceive a policy or program in this manner mainly because of ideological reasons. Economizers are the second type of terminators. They view ter- mination as a way to cut government expenditure in times of need. The third type of terminator is a reformist. Reformists see termination as the only choice if a better and more useful policy, program, or organization is to be created. Theory identifies these three types of policy terminators, but in reality, termination is so rare that to distinguish types of terminators is difficult.

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Section 7.8 Approaches to Policy Termination CHAPTER 7

7.8 Approaches to Policy Termination

The public policy field is split on whether termination is really something that hap-pens. Many academics researching and teaching public policy find it far more useful to look at policy changes and evolution because the policy-making process is cycli- cal and rarely ends with termination. This view helps explain why policy academicians pay sparse attention to termination and why much of the literature is dated. However, concrete examples of policy termination do exist (see Figure 7.4), and the policy literature is useful in explaining these instances and—more importantly—possible approaches to policy termination.

Figure 7.4: Examples of terminated policies and year of termination

After a policy evaluation there is a possibility the policy will be terminated. Termination happens but not often, because it is a difficult process.

Many textbooks on public policy cite the 1976 Eugene Bardach study on policy termina- tion in looking at approaches decision makers take to terminate policy. Bardach argues that two approaches exist. The first is to terminate swiftly: The policy or program end is quick, decisive, and without a phasing-out process. Bardach calls this method big bang termination and notes that a long political struggle among multiple actors usually accom- panies the approach. Essentially, the government publicly articulates its desire or inten- tion to end a policy or program. The announcement of the program’s end spurs groups to mobilize. Big bang is the most common approach to termination, an example being the unsuccessful proposal to terminate the Department of Energy in the early 1980s.

In contrast, under the second approach, the government announces the termination as a phasing-out over a fixed period. Bardach calls this method long whimper termination,

1975 Fair-Trade Legislation

Permitted manufacturers the right to specify the minimum retail price of a commodity.

1978 Commercial Airline Regulation

U.S. government, through the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), regulated many areas of commercial aviation such as fares, routes, and schedules.

1980 Regulation of Petroleum Prices

Price controls on oil.

1985 Synthetic Fuels Research

Funding through grants and loans for the development of synthetic fuels.

1986 Revenue Sharing

Congress gave an annual amount of federal tax revenue to the states.

1996 Agriculture Production Controls

Producers required to plant within government regulations.

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Section 7.9 Strategies for Successful Policy Termination CHAPTER 7

which can occur in a number of ways. For example, the government might announce that a program will no longer be in place by a certain date. Or the allocated budget for a pro- gram will be slowly reduced over time, and the program inevitably terminates because insufficient funds prevent its functioning. This mostly occurs when one policy is replaced with a completely new one, as happened when the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of the 1970s was replaced by the 1983 Job Training and Partnership Act.

Susan Kirkpatrick, James Lester, and Mark Peterson (1999) provide another insight into how termination can be approached with what they refer to as a process model of termi- nation.These authors posit that any policy or program the public does not view as dealing with an important problem will eventually be terminated. In this model, termination is much more likely to occur when a policy is still relatively new. Termination is also more likely with political changes in leadership and the prevailing ideology. The authors con- clude that policy actors who wish to terminate a policy or program must act swiftly.

7.9 Strategies for Successful Policy Termination

Policy termination is more viable if decision makers pursue certain strategies (Behn, 1978). Such strategies often determine not just how termination may occur but also whether it occurs. They allow decision makers to control the context in which they operate and to mobilize support in order to counter the opponents. Policy termination strategies include the following:

• Decision makers can control the flow and level of publicly available information until they have comprehensively justified the policy’s termination. Providing justification reassures the public that termination will produce more benefits than costs.

• Decision makers may also enlarge the termination constituency beyond the policy’s clientele base. The goal of this strategy is to create sufficient support among policy actors to end the policy or program.

• Using another strategy, decision makers publicly demonstrate that the policy is not being terminated solely because it is inefficient or ineffective, but also because it is harmful. In doing so, decision makers should be prepared to take advantage of ideological shifts in the public mood that would benefit termination.

• Decision makers could also choose to refuse to compromise. Agreeing to com- promise would allow only for policy change instead of ending of the policy.

• Another strategy involves avoiding legislative votes on the termination, as legisla- tors will always favor change over termination because it is less costly electorally.

• Policy makers may also choose to prevent termination from becoming a fight between the executive and legislative branches.

• A further strategy is for decision makers to go outside of an agency to manage its termination.

• A strategy that benefits decision makers is to ensure that the costs of terminat- ing a policy are not higher than continuing it. If termination costs are higher, it is sometimes better to compensate individuals who will suffer as a result of policy termination.

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Section 7.9 Strategies for Successful Policy Termination CHAPTER 7

Policy in Practice: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell For almost 18 years, from late December 1993 to late September 2010, gay and lesbian citizens served in the U.S. military under the policy of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT). Homosexuality continued to be prohibited in the military but, under DADT, was tolerated if gays and lesbians hid their sexual- ity or pretended to be straight. DADT placed homosexual service members in a position that often obligated them to deceive their military commanders about an important aspect of their life and required commanders to seek the expulsion of any service member discovered to be gay or lesbian, no matter how valuable or distinguished that individual’s military service. Despite these problems, DADT was the best compromise at the time. DADT was the middle ground between the Clinton administration’s hope for outright acceptance of gays and lesbians in the armed forces and the strong opposition in Congress and the military to any inclusion of homosexuals in the military.

Gay, lesbian, and civil rights activists, with allies in both the Democratic and Republican Parties, began working for its termination not long after DADT passed. They pursued multiple overlapping strategies for policy change. One strategy focused on the courts. Lawsuits were filed on behalf of soldiers dis- missed under DADT, claiming violation of due process and other constitutional rights. After several unsuccessful court cases involving dismissed soldiers, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington ruled in 2010 that the dismissal of a female major in the U.S. Air Force was unconstitutional.

A second strategy concentrated on opinion leaders within the U.S. military. Military leaders have long feared that openly homosexual soldiers would harm morale and create tension within the ranks. Researchers turned their attention to this question. Rather than work in isolation, these research- ers shared their results with military leaders and often included them in their work. Military leaders began to reconsider their opposition as evidence mounted showing little if any risk to morale and unit cohesiveness from openly gay and lesbian soldiers, especially in light of ongoing and sometimes embarrassing dismissals of talented soldiers and officers whose homosexuality had come to light.

The third strategy was political. Activists continued to speak out in the media about the perceived unfairness of DADT and the dismissals of valuable service members because of DADT. They pressured political leaders to reconsider DADT, and they continued to work within the military to address con- cerns about accommodating openly gay and lesbian soldiers. It was a long process, but in December 2010, after two failed attempts, the Senate passed legislation repealing the policy. DADT was for- mally terminated as military policy 9 months later, on September 20, 2011.

The repeal of DADT means that men and women may join the military regardless of their sexual orientation and needn’t fear dismissal if their sexuality becomes known. Despite concerns about the impact of openly gay and lesbian soldiers in the military, several credible studies (e.g., Belkin, 2012) suggest that overall military readiness and operation is improved by the repeal of DADT. As former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair Colin Powell said in 2009, “The policy and law that came into effect in 1993 was correct for the time.” But, continued Powell, “a lot has changed with respect to attitudes within our country” (Reuters, 2009). The repeal of DADT demonstrates that policies can be terminated when the assumptions and attitudes that informed such policies change.

• Decision makers may elect to pitch termination not as the ending of a particular program, but rather as a way of adopting a new, necessary policy that improves on existing practices.

• Finally, to justify the policy’s end to the public, decision makers must be very clear why a policy or organization is being terminated.

(continued)

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Key Points to Remember CHAPTER 7

Critical Thinking and Discussion Questions

1. DADT was a compromise between the Clinton administration and its opponents in Congress and the military. Compromise sometimes yields good policy, but sometimes it produces inter- nally inconsistent and counterproductive policy. Using DADT as an example, what do you see to be the potential strengths and weaknesses of policy borne of compromise?

2. Colin Powell’s comments highlight the extent to which public policy is often the expression of prevailing public attitudes. What other policies can you think of that reflected public attitude at the time but were later repealed as attitudes shifted, sometimes radically?

3. The 18-year process of repealing DADT suggests that policy termination can be a lengthy process. Should policies be inherently difficult to terminate, especially those rooted in public attitudes?

Summary

Policy change and termination are both troublesome endeavors for government. Poli-cies are developed to address certain problems or issues. However, they are rarely perceived to do so. As a result, decision makers and the public often judge policies as having failed. Such a judgment does not take into account the fact that problems are often too large for a single policy to handle. Similarly, sometimes the public’s expectations of what a policy can achieve are unrealistic. However, although a policy might not address the problem it was created to solve effectively, it will not necessarily be ended. More often, policies evolve and change. In rare instances a policy may be terminated. However, termi- nation is costly and can have negative consequences.

Key Points to Remember

• Policies are rarely maintained exactly as adopted. • Policies are constantly evolving, and the policy cycle is an ongoing dynamic

process. • Four major models help explain policy change: the cyclical thesis, punctuated

equilibrium, the policy learning thesis, and the zigzag thesis. • Four common patterns of policy change include linear, consolidation, split

change, and nonlinear. • Policy termination is extremely rare, with few real-life examples; it occurs seldom

because politics, legalities, self-preservation of agencies, and costs interfere. • Policies can be ended for a number of reasons, including diminished effective-

ness, absence of need, budget, unsatisfactory outcomes, lack of support, and ideology.

• Key actors in termination are the president, Congress, the bureaucracy, interest groups, and program clientele.

• Policy termination encompasses four types: functional, organizational, policy, and program.

• Three types of policy terminators may be defined based on their motives for ter- minating: oppositionists, economizers, and reformists.

• Two approaches to termination include big bang termination and long whimper termination.

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Key Terms CHAPTER 7

• Certain times are more conducive than others for termination to occur. • Termination can be more viable depending on the strategy pursued by decision

makers.

Key Terms

backlash, or zigzag, thesis A model of policy changes that states that policy change occurs based on changing percep- tions about whom policies benefit. The zigzag reflects a stimulus-and-response cycle that is a backlash against the group or groups who have been benefiting from policies.

big bang termination Swift and complete termination of policy, without a phasing- out process.

consolidation change A pattern of policy change in which existing policies are merged into a new policy.

cyclical thesis A model of policy changes that states that U.S. policy change occurs roughly every 30 years as the national mood shifts between support for public- sector intervention and support for private-sector involvement as solutions to national problems.

deferral of funding A presidential power that allows presidents to choose not to spend resources authorized by Congress during a stated period and instead spend them at a later time. Effectively termi- nates a policy or program by blocking its funding.

economizer A type of policy terminator who sees termination as a way to cut gov- ernment expenditure in times of need.

evolutionary, or policy-learning, thesis A model of policy change that states that policy evolves as policy makers respond to what they learn from advocacy coali- tions and external events, such as societal conflicts and perceptual shifts.

functional termination A type of policy termination that ends a policy completely.

linear change A pattern of policy change in which one policy is replaced by another.

long whimper termination The phasing- out of a policy over a fixed time period.

nonlinear change A pattern of policy change in which a policy undergoes dras- tic or major change.

oppositionist A type of policy terminator who feels, based on ideological beliefs, that a policy should be terminated because it is bad.

organizational termination A type of policy termination that eliminates an entire organization responsible for a policy area.

policy change A situation in which a policy is replaced or modified in some respect or repealed in parts.

policy maintenance A situation in which the evaluation of a policy results in no change to the policy or associated program.

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Critical Thinking and Discussion Questions CHAPTER 7

policy succession The reshaping and evo- lution of a policy over time.

policy termination The complete aban- donment of a policy because the principles underlying it no longer have common societal agreement. It can result in the dis- solution of an agency, the redirection of the policy, the elimination of a program, or fiscal retrenchment.

policy terminator A policy actor respon- sible for the termination of a policy or problem.

process model of termination The even- tual termination of any policy or program that the public does not view as dealing with an important problem.

program termination A type of policy termination that eliminates a particular program that is implemented by a particu- lar policy.

punctuated equilibrium theory A model of policy change that states that the policy process intersperses long periods of stabil- ity (equilibrium) with periods of instability caused by the mobilization of disaffected groups and interests. It is in periods of instability that dramatic policy change occurs.

rescission of funding A presidential power that allowed presidents to decide not to use congressional-appropriated funds for their intended purpose. Effec- tively terminates a policy or program by blocking its funding.

reformist A policy terminator who sees termination as the only choice if a better and more useful policy, program, or orga- nization is to be created.

split change A pattern of policy change in which an agency responsible for a program is divided into two or more smaller organi- zational units.

Critical Thinking and Discussion Questions

1. If the federal government decided to privatize social security arrangements, under what pattern would you classify the policy change? Why?

2. Research both critics and supporters of NCLB and develop a recommendation to terminate the program or not.

3. Do you agree that the reality of the policy process necessitates that policies never end—they just change?

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