This week we will focus on CO-1 Define the nature and varieties of the primary internal Federal Regulatory efforts that govern Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Welcome to HLSS215 Regulatory Issues in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This course focuses on the legal and regulatory issues associated with WMD responses. Topics include: appropriate public law, reporting authorities, jurisdictional and functional issues that govern organizational, technical, medical, scientific, moral/ethical issues, and, other aspects of response. Further, This course is offered to provide interested students with an introduction to regulatory issues associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents and the potential liabilities federal, state and local governments. Working under the premise that anyone (including governments and their representatives) can be sued anytime by anyone for anything, how can we prepare for, respond to, and recover from a terrorist Weapons of Mass Destruction attack, under such legal and regulatory pressure.
In our effort to gain an understanding of the primary internal Federal Regulatory efforts we need some historical perspective. On November 14, 1994, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America signed Executive Order 12938, which states, the President of the United States finds that “the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons [weapons of mass destruction] and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat” (Office of the President of the United States 1994).
The United States Department of Homeland Security (2007) released:
The perceived threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has become one of the most important issues on foreign policy and national security agendas. The WMD threat has, for example, profoundly influenced the Bush administration's national security and homeland security strategies. For the United States and like-minded allies, Iraq's alleged possession of WMD has become a casus belli. The rise to prominence of the WMD threat raises questions about the role of international law concerning WMD in this new environment.
In the post-Cold War period, political and technological developments created three WMD challenges that rendered the historical reliance on arms control treaties suspect. First, in the 1990s, concern mounted about WMD proliferation by states and terrorist groups, suggesting the world confronted increasing interest in WMD by state and non-state actors. In light of these increasing motivations to possess WMD, the traditional arms control approach seemed insufficient to address either kind of proliferation.
Second, experts argued that the technological difficulties traditionally confronted in developing WMD were diminishing for state and non-state actors. Advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering revolutionized, for example, the technological context of bioweapons. The arms control approach had long struggled with the challenges posed by the dual-use nature of all WMD technologies; and the transformed technological contexts exacerbated the dual-use problem and complicated verification efforts in arms control for all three WMD areas. The perceived increase in the technological feasibility of WMD development combined with concerns about growing state and terrorist interest in WMD to compound fears about the WMD threat.
Third, the political and technological developments described above forced governments to confront the vulnerabilities their societies faced from terrorism involving WMD. Events, such as the chemical terrorism perpetrated by Aum Shinriyko in Japan in 1995, stimulated efforts to improve domestic preparedness for catastrophic terrorism. The September 11th and anthrax attacks accelerated attempts in the United States and other countries to improve homeland security.
The arms control approach to WMD did not address the vulnerability crises countries faced in the post-Cold War period.
Further, what we know, is that according to Fiddler (2003),
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world’s security landscape is said to have undergone a transformation from the seeming stability of the bi-polar balance of power to a system in which not only any nation, but sub-national groups as well, may be able to acquire WMD. Strategies based on containment and deterrence, it is argued, are insufficient to guarantee security in the twenty-first century threat environment; terrorists and “rogue” nations are not amenable to being deterred or contained.
And lastly, that Schmitt (2003) presented that,
while their possession and threatened use raise serious moral questions, such weapons also have profound implications for international law and security. There can be no doubt that the world's hopes to eliminate such weapons will depend critically upon both the evolution of the law and the security perceptions of states. While disarmament will occur only if it advances security interests, the rule of law will have many significant roles to play in shaping perceptions of such interests and in ensuring the sustainability of disarmament as a global public good.
References/Works Cited:
Office of the President of the United States. (1994). Executive Order 12938; Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, D.C.
Department of Homeland Security (2007). The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (October 2007), http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=479633 (October 2007)
Fidler,D.F. (2003). Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Law available at http://www.asil.org/insigh97.cfm
Schmitt, M. (2003). Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 513, 515-18 (2003) (describing the Bush Administration’s assessment of national security priorities)
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