homeland security forum responses(212)

CBRN terrorism is often portrayed as one of the greatest threats facing the world. Since 11th September 2001 it has been widely assumed that terrorists are intent on causing the highest possible numbers of casualties and that CBRN weapons present their best opportunity for achieving this, thus it is often claimed it is vital to take measures to prevent terrorists from gaining access to these so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A comparison of Aum Shinrikyo the perpetrators of the most lethal CBRN terrorist attack to date – and al-Qaeda – the group considered most likely to carry out an attack of this nature in future – reveals that these unconventional weapons in fact have a very limited appeal to terrorist groups, and that this appeal may in fact have diminished rather than increased over the last two decades.   

By exploring the circumstances which allowed Aum Shinrikyo to pursue its CBRN program and placing them in contrast to the position of al-Qaeda since 2001 it can be shown that at least the top leadership of al-Qaeda has little to gain and much to lose by launching any form of mass casualty attack, and that in any case the use of  CBRN  weapons  is  far  from  guaranteed  to produce this outcome. Chemical, biological and radiological weapons might be used by smaller extremist groups with links to al-Qaeda, but the operational limits on these groups would make any mass casualty outcome unlikely, and the potential benefit would be minimal in return for the difficulties and dangers of using unconventional and unfamiliar weapons. (e-International 2012)

There are many definitions for the term proliferation. In Army Field Manual 3-11,

Proliferation refers to the transfer of WMD-related materials, technology, and expertise from suppliers to hostile state or non-state actors. The proliferation of WMD and supporting technologies and the expansion of terrorism have made the potential use of these weapons against the United States and its allies more likely. In some cases, the entire CBRN development process can be accomplished in hard and deeply buried targets/underground facilities, making it more difficult to generate the intelligence to locate, identify, and characterize CBRN infrastructures.

The proliferation continuum illustrates how hostile states and terrorists may seek to acquire WMD related materials in attempts to threaten the United States and its allies and cause chemical, biological, or radiological contamination in military operational areas. The proliferation continuum refers to a series of activities that adversaries may execute to develop and/or acquire WMD. The generic activities of proliferation include the decision to proliferate, infrastructure and expertise development, production, weaponization, deployment, and employment.

This continuum may be encountered in a non-sequential fashion; for example, an adversary may buy a weapon system that is ready for immediate employment and bypass stages such as production and weaponization. A proliferant group or nation requires the will, equipment, technical knowledge, people, money, and time to successfully develop and sustain this process. Completely halting proliferation is impossible, but restricting it is vitally important and achievable. To that end, the DOD is playing an active role in technology transfer and export controls and in the implementation of arms control and nonproliferation regimes.

Threats from the proliferation of WMDs come from state and non-state actors. State actors may have incentives to acquire CBRN weapons in spite of their adherence to international agreements and treaties forbidding such actions, and non-state groups may not consider themselves bound by such agreements and treaties. State and non-state actors may have incentives to operate outside the norms of acceptable international behavior, especially when important interests are involved.

There are no official definitions for state and non-state actors. However, a state actor can be described as a person or persons who are acting on behalf of a governmental body. Non-state actors are individuals or groups on the international level who are not governmental representatives; they may reside within a governing state, but they are not recognized by the state. Examples of state and non-state actors are shown below:

State actors:

United States

Germany

Argentina

Non-state actors.

Terrorist organizations (such as al Qaeda)

Militias

Warlords

Rebel opposition forces

Drug cartels

Criminals

Nongovernmental organizations (as part of civil society and generally harmless, but having internal governing powers)

A CBRN incident is any occurrence involving the emergence of CBRN hazards resulting from the use of CBRN weapons or devices, the emergence of secondary hazards arising from counterforce targeting, or the release of toxic industrial material into the environment. A CBRN incident is characterized on the basis of the intent, opportunity, and capability of the occurrence. There are three basic reasons why a CBRN incident happens, regardless of the type and nature:

Intentional. An intentional CBRN incident may include—

Criminal acts such as the deliberate dumping or release of hazmat to avoid regulatory requirements. Malicious acts such as the poisoning of one or more individuals. Terrorist acts  that involve serious violence to persons or property for a political, religious, or ideological purpose and/or that are a matter of national interest.

Accidental. An accidental CBRN incident is an event caused by human error or natural or technological reasons. Accidental incidents are usually referred to as hazmat accidents and may include—

Spills

Releases

Leakages

Natural. A natural CBRN incident is a second- or third-order effect from a natural disaster. Examples include—

Toxic chemical release

Biological waste

Intent is the distinguishing difference between the three reasons that CBRN incidents happen. To ensure proper assessment when filtering through the information pertaining to an incident, it is important to know the intent category.

Note.  A CBRN weapon is a fully engineered assembly that is designed for employment to cause the release of a chemical or biological agent or radiological material onto a chosen target or to generate a nuclear detonation.

Depending on the adversary’s specific objectives, widespread or limited methods may be used to create CBRN hazards. These hazards present physical and psychological effects well beyond the immediate target area. The preceding subparagraphs described the characteristics and effects of CBRN hazards and selected toxic materials. Appendix A provides additional information on CBRN hazard considerations. (FM 3-11)

References:

e-International Relations. 2012.  How Appealing Are CBRN Weapons to Terrorist Groups.

United States Army. July 2011.  Field Manual (FM) 3-11, Multiservice Doctrine for CBRN Operations.