REACTION PAPER

The Person in the Purchase: Narcissistic Consumers Prefer Products That Positively Distinguish Them

Seung Yun Lee Hanyang University

Aiden P. Gregg University of Southampton

Seong Hoon Park Yonsei University

Narcissists, who seek keenly to self-enhance, strive to positively distinguish themselves. Might they therefore be inclined to purchase consumer products that enable them to do so? Study 1 found that narcissism, but not self-esteem, predicted dispositions to purchase products for the purpose of promoting personal uniqueness. Studies 2 and 3 found that narcissism predicted greater interest in exclusive, customizable, and personalizable products. Study 3 also found participants higher in narcissism regarded their prized possessions as less likely to be owned by others. Finally, Studies 3 and 4 found that interest in a hypothetical product, respectively, to be bought either for oneself or someone else, covaried with an experimental manipulation of product exclusivity and scarcity, but principally when levels of narcissism were high. Our findings illustrate the impact of narcissism on consumer preferences and support an agentic interpretation of narcissistic self-enhancement.

Keywords: narcissism, distinctiveness, scarcity, consumerism, self-enhancement

I will not choose what many men desire, Because I will not jump with common spirits And rank me with the barbarous multitude

—The Merchant of Venice, Act 2, Scene 9, Line 25

People do not always maximize their material welfare. Fleeing a burning house, a husband may grab a wedding photo rather than an expensive laptop. Indulging a private passion, a collector may pay a small fortune for a rare trinket. Socializing with peers, a teenager may wear unsightly rags rather than elegant clothes. In such cases, goods seem to be desired, not for their physical properties, but for their psychosocial significance. This distinction can be marked as follows: Goods can possess both a physical and a symbolic value (Sedikides, Gregg, Cisek, & Hart, 2007; see also Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000).1

What symbolic values might goods possess? The short answer is many. Just as the physical values of goods can vary widely (e.g., houses give shelter; cars provide transport; drinks quench thirst), so too can the symbolic ones. For example, a wedding photo may signify romantic love, a rare trinket some by-gone era, unsightly rags adolescent rebellion. However, a general set of symbolic

values can be distinguished: those relevant to self or identity (Belk, 1988; Dunning, 2007; Sirgy, 1982).

Self-Related Symbolic Values

Over a century ago, William James (1890) remarked that,

it is clear that between what a man calls me and what he simply calls mine the line is difficult to draw . . . a man’s Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house . . . his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account. (p. 291)

If James is correct, then what one has, and who one is, should interrelate. In particular, the evaluation and acquisition of goods should covary with self-related motives, states, and traits. Further- more, given that no man is an island (Baumeister, 1998; Mead, 1934), relevant effects should manifest themselves both intrapsy- chically and interpersonally (Grubb & Grathwhohl, 1967; Sivana- than & Pettit, 2010). That is to say, the propensity to identify with goods psychologically (Beggan, 1992; Ikeuchi, Fujihara, & Dohi,

1 Sedikides et al. (2007) originally used the term utilitarian instead of physical. Here, we have switched terms to forestall possible confusion with another distinction—that between utilitarian and hedonic goods (Babin, Darden, & Griffin, 1994; Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982). The former goods mainly yield cognitive, practical, and instrumental benefits; the latter mainly yield emotive, sensory, and consummatory benefits. In contrast, we wish to emphasize how any good can provide benefits in one or both ways: in virtue of its concrete effects, or its semantic meaning. Thus, USB sticks and mobile phones are relatively utilitarian, sugar and flowers relatively hedonic. But whereas USB sticks and sugar are often valued mainly for what they can do physically (store data, sweeten taste), mobile phones and flowers are also valued for what they can imply symbolically (I look cool, I am loved).

This article was published Online First June 17, 2013. Seung Yun Lee, College of Economics and Business Administration,

Hanyang University, ERICA, Ansan, South Korea; Aiden P. Gregg, Center for Research on Self and Identity, Psychology Unit, University of South- ampton, Southampton, England; Seong Hoon Park, School of Business, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Aiden P. Gregg, Center for Research on Self and Identity, Psychology Unit, Uni- versity of Southampton, England SO17 1BJ, UK. E-mail: aiden@ soton.ac.uk

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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology © 2013 American Psychological Association 2013, Vol. 105, No. 2, 335–352 0022-3514/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0032703

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2000; Schultz Kleine, Kleine, & Allen, 1995) should covary with the propensity to display them socially (Braun & Wicklund, 1989; Solomon, 1983; Veblen, 1899).

Research has identified many of the self-related symbolic values that goods can afford (Dittmar, 2011; Vigneron & Johnson, 1999). These include equipping people with a sense of control and effi- cacy (Furby, 1978), bolstering their feelings of self-continuity over time (Wapner, Demick, & Redondo, 1990), and cementing their sense of interrelatedness with specific others (Dittmar, 2008). But two general self-related symbolic values stand out: the power of goods to individuate—that is, to convey that one is different, distinctive, and unique (Brewer, 1991; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980); and the power of goods to elevate—that is, to imply that one’s social rank is higher, better, and privileged (Frank, 1985; Zahavi, 1975).

These values are intertwined. First, consider the definitional question: What is social rank? For individual X to rank above individual Y, socially or otherwise, two necessary conditions must be met, both of which are together sufficient: that X be categori- cally distinct from Y and that X be relevantly better than Y. Thus, the power of a good to elevate logically presumes its power to individuate. (See Fiske, 2010, for additional discussion of hierar- chical differentiation.) Second, consider the empirical question: What benefits can mere differentiation from others bring? In particular, would one ever seek to differentiate oneself if doing so obliged one to evaluate oneself as markedly inferior (Gregg, Sedikides, & Gebauer, 2011)? Given the potency of the self- enhancement motive, this is unlikely. Thus, social differentiation is intimately tied up with valence: People typically strive for “posi- tive distinctiveness” (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). That said, if people can take their positivity for granted, then they may strive for distinctiveness per se, in a bid to increase their perceptual salience and attract the notice of potential beneficiaries (Lynn & Snyder, 2002; McArthur, 1981).

But what empirical evidence implicates the self in purchase of goods that afford positive distinctiveness? Sivanathan and Pettit (2010) showed experimentally that consumer interest in “status goods” can wax and wane in response to self-threats and self- affirmations. Participants, told earlier they had performed poorly relative to peers on an ability test, indicated they would pay more for a photograph that was “rare, unique, and available for a limited time” (Study 1) and for a watch that was “exclusive and worn only by a select group of people” (Study 2). However, the effect was eliminated when participants could, in the interim, repair their self-regard by writing about how a value was important to them (Study 2). In addition, thinking about owning a high-status good mitigated the dismay caused by poor test performance (Study 4), and lower levels of self-esteem among lower income participants mediated how much participants were willing to pay for a “lux- ury,” “high-end” car (Study 3).

In a conceptually similar set of studies, Gao, Wheeler, and Shiv (2009) threatened aspects of participants’ self-regard by having them write about a self-relevant topic with their nondominant hand (see Briñol & Petty, 2003). As a consequence, participants were more likely to purchase products in keeping with their threatened self-aspect. For example, when participants (Study 1) wrote about how “exciting” they were with their nondominant hand—thereby subtly conveying the intuitive impression that they might rank lower than they desired on this positive trait—they responded by

choosing more exciting brands (e.g., Apple) over more sober ones (e.g., IBM). Similarly, participants whose intelligence was threat- ened selected a fountain pen over a candy treat as a reward for participation (Study 2). And once again, affirming values impor- tant to the self in advance eliminated the effects (Study 3).

Narcissism, Positive Distinctiveness, and Purchasing Preferences

If situational manipulations of self-relevant states can shape purchasing proclivities, might dispositional variations in self- relevant traits do the same? In particular, might some types of personality be more prone to purchase products that can positively distinguish them? We submit that the answer is yes: Narcissists are just such personalities.

Narcissism began life as a pathological syndrome postulated by psychoanalysts (Ellis, 1898; Freud, 1931). The construct was even- tually codified into a personality disorder, its cardinal symptoms being grandiose delusions, obsessive ambition, arrogant behavior, and interpersonal abrasiveness (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). However, not all putative syndromes are categorically distinct (Meehl, 1995). Accordingly, narcissism was revamped as a normally distributed personally trait. In recent times, the con- struct has often, but not always, been operationalized by higher scores on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979, 1981; see also Foster & Campbell, 2007). Yet, both the factor structure (Ackerman et al., 2011) and construct validity (Rosenthal & Hooley, 2010) of the NPI continue to be debated. Furthermore, several rival measures of narcissism exist (Pincus et al., 2009; Wink, 1991). However, the NPI does at least echo key clinical criteria (Miller, Gaughan, Pryor, Kamen, & Campbell, 2009) and has spawned a rich theoretical and empirical literature (Campbell & Miller, 2011; Rhodewalt & Peterson, 2009). If nar- cissism has any core feature, it may be this: objectively unjustified conceit (Campbell, Hoffman, Campbell, & Marchisio, in press; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Foster & Reidy, 2011), implying an excessive motive to self-enhance (Baumeister & Vohs, 2001; Sedikides & Gregg, 2001).

The profile of narcissists conveyed by NPI items suggests a keenness to elevate the self.2 Items tapping subcomponents like authority (“I see myself as a good leader”) and entitlement (“I find it easy to manipulate people”) convey an interest in attaining a higher social rank, by fair means or foul. Items tapping subcom- ponents like exhibitionism (“I am apt to show off if I get the chance”) and grandiosity (“I know that I am good because every- one keeps telling me so”) convey a corresponding interest in proudly broadcasting that higher social rank. Empirical findings back up such qualitative analyses: Narcissists’ self-regard depends more on successfully competing than on smoothly affiliating (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003), and they care more about being admired by others than about gaining their approval (Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991). Moreover, given that narcissists are more materialistic, and prone to compulsive buying (Rose, 2007), their keenness to elevate the self is also liable to shape how they spend their money. Indeed, in terms of their goals

2 For brevity, we sometimes use the word narcissist as shorthand for “person scoring relatively higher in narcissism.” No categorical difference is implied.

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336 LEE, GREGG, AND PARK

and aspirations, narcissists explicitly report more interest in pur- suing financial success and social recognition, and less interest in promoting affiliation or community feeling (Kasser & Ryan, 1996). They also report prioritizing economic goals, such as at- taining a high standard of living and wealth or pursuing an influ- ential and prestigious career, whereas they report disdaining social goals, such as helping others in need or engaging in voluntary service (Roberts & Robins, 2000). Little wonder, then, that nar- cissists rate themselves dominant but insensitive (Bradlee & Em- mons, 1992; Mahadevan, Gregg, De-Waal Andrews, & Sedikides, 2012a), and on experimental tasks denigrate others to magnify their own performance (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, & Gregg, 2002). An ancillary finding is also worth noting in this connection: Priming people with reminders of money makes them, on the one hand, more likely to try harder and select more ambi- tious challenges, but on the other hand, less likely to offer assis- tance or seek out interpersonal closeness (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008). When they have money in mind, people mimic narcissists.

All the above can be summarized by saying that narcissistic self-regard is rooted in agency—accomplishing goals to achieve social status—rather than in communion—relating harmoniously to ensure social inclusion (Campbell & Foster, 2007; Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Wiggins, 1979). This makes it likely that, among the self-related symbolic values that a product could serve for narcissists, the power to elevate will figure prominently.

The same goes for the power to individuate the self. Narcissists are known to enhance their distinctiveness in several ways. First, they report a higher need for uniqueness in general (Riketta, 2008; see also Fromkin, 1970), uniqueness being the ultimate distinc- tiveness. Second, narcissists are apt to use the pronoun I in de- scriptions of themselves and their activities (Chatterjee & Ham- brick, 2007; Raskin & Shaw, 1988), so that even their grammar highlights the self. Third, narcissists give off definite public signs: For example, they present a better looking appearance (Holtzman & Strube, 2010), promote themselves forthrightly on Facebook (Buffardi & Campbell, 2008), and behave overtly in line with subjective self-reports (e.g., have an outgoing social profile; Holtz- man, Vazire, & Mehl, 2010). Fourth, narcissists report being keener to buy several products that look impressive than products that perform better (Sedikides, Cisek, & Hart, 2011). This indi- cates an interest in consumer products for what they show rather than for what they do.

Thus, if narcissism is construed as a dispositional inclination toward agency at the expense of communion (Campbell & Foster, 2007), then there are both empirical and theoretical grounds for hypothesizing that narcissists will be especially attracted by con- sumer products that enable them to enhance their positive distinc- tiveness, thereby both individuating and elevating the self. Fur- thermore, other perspectives on narcissism arguably converge on the same prediction, albeit more circuitously. For example, the dynamic self-regulatory model of narcissism (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001) proposes that narcissists possess positive but fragile self- images, which they chronically attempt to shore up by strategically managing social feedback. One obvious way to manage such feedback in a modern society would be to individuate and elevate the self by purchasing products that positively distinguish them in the eyes of others. Or consider an evolutionary hypothesis for why narcissism persists: that it serves as a frequency-dependent variant of behavioral dominance that promotes successful short-term mat-

ing (Holtzman & Strube, 2011). This hypothesis is supported in part by the finding that narcissists are reliably judged to be more physically attractive (Holtzman & Strube, 2010). One way of achieving physical attractiveness, of course, is to embellish one’s appearance with products one can purchase.

Nonetheless, we favor deriving our hypotheses from the premise that narcissists are hyperagentic but hypocommunal for two rea- sons: first, because the agency– communion distinction is broad enough to subsume the perspectives above (e.g., behavioral dom- inance is one manifestation of agency) and second, because the agency– communion distinction is beginning to be applied else- where in consumer psychology, for example, with respect to perceptions of brand personality (Aaker, Vohs, & Mogilner, 2010; Bennett & Hill, 2012; Kervyn, Fiske, & Malone, 2012).

Study 1

Overview

To investigate whether people higher in narcissism prefer prod- ucts that enhance their positive distinctiveness, we began by ex- amining the link between the standard trait measure of narcis- sism—the NPI—and a specialized trait measure—the Consumers’ Need for Uniqueness scale (CNFU; Tian, Bearden, & Hunter, 2001). The latter is designed to assess “the pursuit of differentness relative to others . . . through the acquisition, utilization, and disposition of consumer goods for the purpose of developing and enhancing one’s personal and social identity” (p. 50). The CNFU comprises three subscales, each reflecting a related but distinct dimension of consumer counterconformity: (a) Creative Choice Counterconformity (CCC)—purchasing to effect a new and unique personal style; (b) Unpopular Choice Counterconformity (UCC)— purchasing to deliberately defy social norms; and (c) Avoidance of Similarity (AOS)—refraining from purchasing when products de- cline in distinctiveness.

We chose the CNFU in part for its psychometric merits (Tian et al., 2001). Its threefold factor structure emerges cleanly; it pos- sesses high reliability (Mdn �SCALE � .94; Mdn rRETEST � .77); it successfully identifies known groups (e.g., owners of distinctive “low-rider” automobiles); it correlates highly but not redundantly with nomologically related scales (e.g., r � .44 with the Need for Uniqueness scale [Snyder & Fromkin, 1977]; and r � .65 with the Desire for Unique Consumer Products scale [Lynn & Harris, 1997a, 1997b]); and it predicts realistic choice among more or less unique consumer products above and beyond these scales.

In addition, to test whether effects were specific to narcissistic self-regard, rather than a function of ordinary self-worth, we included a standard of self-esteem so that patterns of correlation could be compared and contrasted.

Method

Participants and procedure. One hundred nineteen stu- dents—a mix of undergraduates and postgraduates enrolled either at McGill University in Canada or Yonsei University in South Korea—participated. All were recruited via advertisements posted locally for a “15-minute marketing survey.” Upon expressing interest by e-mail, prospective participants were sent a reply con- taining a relevant link for completing the study online (hosted on

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337NARCISSISTIC CONSUMERISM

iSurvey, University of Southampton, 2011). After completing the study, and being debriefed online, participants were sent an elec- tronic $5 (CAD) voucher for a Starbucks coffee.

Preliminary screening led to the exclusion of data from 17 participants: Three did not complete all measures; six completed them with atypical haste (i.e., in under 4 min, where median completion time exceeded 15 min); five exhibited zero or almost- zero variance in their ratings (suggesting noncompliance); and five more rated their English-speaking ability below the scale midpoint (see below). Of the 102 retained participants, most were in their 20s (M � 26.96; SD � 5.46). The sample was almost equally split by gender (52% female, 48% male) and university attended (52% McGill, 48% Yonsei).

Measures. After indicating their informed consent online, participants reported their gender, age, university, and English- speaking ability (5 � Perfect; 1 � Poor). They then completed the four key measures, described below, in randomized order.

The CNFU (Tian et al., 2001) featured 31 items (� � .98) in all, 11 assessing CCC (� � .95), 11 assessing UCC (� � .95), and nine assessing AOS (� � .97). Respective sample items include the following: “Often when buying merchandise, an important goal is to find something that communicates my uniqueness”; “I enjoy challenging the prevailing taste of people I know by buying something they wouldn’t seem to accept”; “I often try to avoid products or brands that I know are bought by the general popula- tion.”

To assess narcissism, we then administered a continuously scaled version of the original 40-item NPI (Raskin & Terry, 1988). This served to maximize the internal consistency of the total scale score (� � .96) as well as that of its subcomponents (considered individually in the later section Subcomponents of narcissism: Reanalysis of Studies 1– 4). The pronarcissism option from each of the original dichotomous items was rated on a continuous 7-point scale (1 � Strongly Disagree; 7 � Strongly Agree), as done in some prior research (e.g., Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino- Browne, & Correll, 2003). Sample items include “I really like to be the center of attention”; “I am an extraordinary person.”

Finally, we assessed self-esteem using the Rosenberg Self- Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965), a 10-item questionnaire (� � .84) balanced for positively and negatively worded items. Participants rated each item on a 7-point scale (1 � Strongly Disagree; 7 � Strongly Agree). Sample items include “I feel that I have a number of good qualities” and “At times, I feel no good at all” (reverse coded).

Results

Replicating past research (e.g., Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Ku- mashiro, & Rusbult, 2004), the NPI and RSES intercorrelated modestly (see Table 1). This is to be expected: Both are measures of self-regard. Also replicating past research (Tian et al., 2001), the three subscales of the CNFU intercorrelated substantially, but not redundantly. Most importantly, and supporting our hypothesis, the NPI correlated substantially with the CNFU and with each of its subscales. In contrast, the RSES exhibited no such correlations. In other words, participants higher in narcissism reported being more inclined to purchase consumer products to satisfy their need for uniqueness—to cultivate a personal style, defy established con- ventions, and avoid looking like others—whereas participants

higher in self-esteem did not. Thus, this pattern of correlations supports our hypothesis that it is narcissistic self-regard in partic- ular that prompts the purchase of products that enhance distinc- tiveness.

Our findings generalized well across culture and gender. Re- garding mean differences, males did not differ significantly from females on the NPI (5.32 vs. 5.30, p � .90), the RSES (5.32 vs. 5.30, p � .70), or the CNFU (5.63 vs. 5.86, p � .33). In addition, Canadians did not differ significantly from Koreans on the NPI (4.71 vs. 4.51, p � .29) or the CNFU (3.90 vs. 3.56, p � .16), but they did on the RSES (5.61 vs. 4.99, p � .0005). Crucially, however, the links between key constructs remained consistent. For example, NPI and CNFU correlated at r(53) � .70, p � .0005, in Canada, and at r(49) � .54, p � .0005, in Korea, with location not significantly moderating the link (� � .07), t(98) � 0.86, p � .39.3 The NPI and CNFU also correlated at r(48) � .61, p � .0005, for men, and at r(53) � .71, p � .0005, for women, with gender not significantly moderating the link (� � .04), t(98) � 0.55, p � .58. One curiosity was that, whereas self-esteem and narcissism correlated at r(53) � .43, p � .0005, in Canada, they did so only at r(49) � .06, ns, in Korea; yet, moderation by location was still not significant (� � .11), t(98) � 1.12, p � .27. Hence, our findings harmonize with research showing that links to self-regard hold up well cross-culturally, even when levels of self-regard differ (Schmitt & Allik, 2005).

Study 2

Overview

Our overall hypothesis is that narcissists prefer products that enhance their positive distinctiveness. The sizable correlations observed in the previous study— between trait narcissism and the disposition to purchase products in order to express particular

3 The beta-weight here refers to the interaction term in a hierarchical regression equation, the product of one centered independent variable (either gender or culture: the putative moderator) and another centered independent variable (one variable in the correlational link). In keeping with standard practice (Aiken & West, 1991), the dependent variable (the other variable in the correlational link) was regressed on both independent variables before being regressed on the interaction term.

Table 1 Intercorrelations Between Narcissism, Self-Esteem, and Consumer Need for Uniqueness Indices

Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6

1. NPI — 2. RSES .27� — 3. CNFU .65�� .08 — 4. CCC .65�� .10 .94�� — 5. UCC .57�� .07 .90�� .77�� — 6. AOS .57�� .06 .90�� .78�� .68�� —

Note. N � 102. NPI � Narcissistic Personality Inventory; RSES � Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; CNFU � Consumer Need for Uniqueness scale; CCC � Creative Choice Counterconformity subscale; UCC � Unpopular Choice Counterconformity subscale; AOS � Avoidance of Similarity subscale. � p � .01. �� p � .0005.

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338 LEE, GREGG, AND PARK

types of uniqueness—supported it. However, demonstrating links between trait narcissism and interest in actual consumer products would provide even stronger evidence. Hence, we sought to show in Study 2 that narcissists, when given the free choice between two otherwise equally desirable products, would incline toward the product more capable of conferring positive distinctiveness.

Method

Participants and procedure. Seventy-five undergraduate students enrolled at McGill University in Canada participated in this study. The sample (63% female, 37% male) consisted of people in their early 20s (no individual age data were collected, but the experimenter noted no exceptions). All participants were re- cruited via advertisements posted locally for a “20-minute market- ing survey.” Upon replying, participants were directed to a re- search room in the business department building, where they proceeded to complete the survey individually. Following a de- briefing, all were paid $10 CAD.

As part of the cover story, participants were led to believe that a marketing survey was being conducted. Its alleged purpose was to “better understand consumer opinions about a new product . . . launched in the market.” Participants were reminded that there were no right or wrong answers and that their anonymity would be ensured. They were given a booklet to guide them through the task and provide space for recording their responses. To reinforce the cover story, each page of this booklet featured the McGill Univer- sity and Desautels Faculty of Management logos as a header.

Participants were asked to imagine that the current MP3 player they owned (whether they owned one in reality or not) no longer worked and that they had decided to buy a replacement: the featured product, an Apple iPod Touch. Participants were further

asked to imagine buying the product by accessing the website of an apparently real, but actually fictitious, online electronics store (“Digital World”). They then inspected a realistic color printout of the alleged online story (see Figure 1). This printout prominently featured an image of the product and was accompanied by the description “Apple iPod Touch 4th Generation 32GB Black Por- table Media Player.”

Crucially, the product came with one of two supplementary “bonus options.” Participants had to imagine choosing either one or the other. One option was designed to help enhance product distinctiveness, whereas the other was not. The option that partic- ipants chose constituted the dependent variable.

The high-distinctiveness option was an “ultra-slim genuine leather case.” It was described as being part of a “limited edition” and as offering the possibility of “personal name engraving.” In contrast, the low-distinctiveness option was an “iTunes gift card.” It was described as permitting the free download of various enter- tainment media (songs, movies, apps, etc.) up to a certain total value. Thus, the high-distinctiveness option (the leather case) was, relative to the low-distinctiveness option (the gift card), appearance-related as opposed to practically useful, in short supply as opposed to in plentiful supply, and particular to the self as opposed to generic.

Two precautions were taken to ensure that, apart from the difference in distinctiveness, the options were otherwise equiva- lent. First, an identical cash value of $50 was ascribed to each option. Second, in a pilot study, 38 undergraduates from the same university rated these two bonus options. They emerged as equiv- alently desirable (Ms � 5.15 vs. 5.24), t(37) � �0.89, p � .38, as assessed on a two-item scale (1 � dislike a lot, 9 � like a lot; 1 � not at all attractive, 9 � very attractive) but as significantly

Figure 1. Advertisement for iPod “options” used in Study 2.

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339NARCISSISTIC CONSUMERISM

different in distinctiveness (Ms � 6.42 vs. 3.76), t(37) � 7.54, p � .0001, in terms of a one-item scale (1 � not at all distinctive, 9 � very distinctive).

After inspecting the printout of the website, individuals an- swered the question: “If you decided to buy the iPod Touch shown on the webpage, which bonus option would you choose?” After- wards, they filled out the same 40-item narcissism questionnaire (� � .91) as in Study 1. Finally, they were debriefed, compen- sated, thanked, and dismissed.

Results and Discussion

Option choice (leather case vs. gift coupon) was logistically regressed on mean narcissism scores. Relative to a null model, the overall model was significant, �2(1) � 6.32, p � .012, yielding a Nagelkerke’s R2 of .11. Moreover, the effect lay in the predicted direction: Participants higher in narcissism were more likely to opt for the leather case than for the gift coupon, Wald �2(1) � 5.57, p � .019. Predictive success reached 62.7%. Thus, in keeping with our overall hypothesis, more narcissistic respondents showed greater interest in a consumer product that could enhance their positive distinctiveness than in one that could not.

Study 3

Overview

In Study 3, we tested our overall hypothesis in three further ways.

First, we reasoned that, if our hypothesis were correct, narcis- sists would display relatively greater interest in a product whose selling point was its capacity to individuate. This time, we asked participants to evaluate on continuous scales an item of cloth- ing—a dress shirt—that they could customize and personalize so as to visibly mark themselves out from the crowd.

Second, we reasoned that, if our hypothesis were correct, nar- cissists would be either (a) more likely to already possess distinc- tive products or (b) more likely to perceive that the products they already possessed were more distinctive. Regardless, we predicted that, if asked to nominate a prized personal possession, and then to guess how many other people owned it too, narcissists would provide lower estimates. Accordingly, we had participants list up to three appearance-relevant possessions and then estimate what percentage of consumers like them also owned each of these possessions.

Third, we reasoned that, if our hypothesis were correct, the same product would hold greater or lesser appeal for narcissists, as opposed to nonnarcissists, depending on whether it did or did not exhibit a specific feature implying that it could confer distinctive- ness. Accordingly, we manipulated whether a product was— by being part of an exclusive limited edition or not—in either short or plentiful supply, on the grounds that greater product scarcity would signify greater potential for enhancing positive distinctiveness. In other words, we predicted an interaction between continuous levels of dispositional narcissism and the dichotomous manipulation of product supply.

Method

Participants and procedure. One hundred twenty undergrad- uate students enrolled at McGill University in Canada participated.

Most of the gender-mixed sample (45% female, 55% male) were in their early 20s (M � 23.29; SD � 1.80). They were recruited and run as in the previous study. All received in compensation an organic cookie worth $5 (CAD).

The booklet’s introduction claimed that a marketing survey was being conducted, whose alleged purpose was to “better understand consumer opinions about new products being launched in the market.” To reinforce this cover story, each page featured McGill/ Desautels Faculty of Management logo as a header. Participants were reminded that there were no right or wrong answers and that participation was anonymous.

Stimuli, measures, and manipulation. The following mate- rials were administered in a fixed order via the booklet.

Product 1: Individuation potential. Participants learned about a fictitious company called Just for You. This company sold “a full line of clothing and accessories for both men and women.” It was said to have recently launched “a new line of custom dress shirts,” available for sale online via the website http://www.justforyou .com.4 Participants were asked to inspect a printed screenshot of this website, designed to look classy and professional (see Figure 2). It featured images of sharply attired models of both genders, and buzzwords connoting contemporary stylishness. Most images depicted the website’s unique selling proposition: the capacity to tailor shirts in accord with one’s personal preferences. In particu- lar, online shoppers could select their shirts by fabric, color, style, and size. Furthermore, they could append a customized label to each shirt—an option flagged by the onscreen button “individual- ize.” The capacity to create such a desirably distinctive shirt of one’s own was emphasized by the following accompanying blurb:

Just for You is empowering you to be your own dress shirt designer. Forget about shopping at your local retail stores to buy a dress shirt ten thousand other people can get. Design your own custom dress shirt to fit your style, personality, and body. Customize the collar, cuff, placket, pockets, shoulders, buttons and more on your dress shirt. Individualize it with a personalized monogram or a custom label.

To verify that the custom shirt had the capacity to make its wearers distinctive, we asked 34 undergraduates from the same university the following question: “How would wearing such a shirt make a person appear in a crowd?” They answered by providing a rating on a 9-point scale (1 � not at all distinctive, 9 � very distinctive). The mean rating (M � 7.15) was significantly above the midpoint of the scale, t(33) � 11.33, p � .0005.

Having inspected the screenshot, participants were prompted for their reactions. In particular, they were asked about their intention to purchase one of the products depicted (e.g., “How likely would you be to purchase the custom dress shirt?”; 1 � not at all likely, 9 � very likely), their willingness to pay for it (e.g., “How much would you be willing to pay for the custom dress shirt?”; $____), and their overall attitude toward it (“In your opinion, the custom dress shirt is: 1 � dislikeable, 9 � likeable; 1 � bad, 9 � good; 1 � undesirable, 9 � desirable; � � .89).

Product 2: Prized possessions. Participants were asked to “think of up to three things that you own that are extremely

4 This website actually existed at the time—it advertised “Wonderful Vacation Rentals” in the United States. However, all participants were unaware of this. It now advertises “The Amazing Stanley,” a Baltimore- based magician.

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important to you.” Given that publicly observable goods are a potent source of distinctiveness, we provided the following further guidance: “We are talking about the things which we can wear on our body—such as clothing and accessories for both men and women, including jewelry, formal wear, casual clothes, watches, shoes, sunglasses, handbags, ties, and etc.” Participants were ad- ditionally advised to give “precise names and details, NOT just saying the type of thing it is,” so that exemplars, and not merely categories, would be described. For each prized possession they reported, participants were asked to write down their “own esti- mate of what percentage of other people— of about your age and gender—. . . also own each of these things.”

Product 3: Manipulated supply. Finally, participants were asked to imagine that they needed to buy a new watch, and had seen a relevant advertisement for one displayed in a department store. A realistic-looking advertisement was shown on the follow- ing page of the booklet (see Figure 3), which participants were told to inspect. It depicted a brand of watch called Equinoxe. Images of several flagship versions, presented at different angles and mag- nifications, were shown. The accompanying text read, “The Equi- noxe watch was introduced at the iF Design Conference 2009. Add an accent to your business ensemble with the Equinoxe automatic chronometer.”

Critically, the advertisement came in two subtly different ver- sions. One version featured the tagline: “Exclusive limited edition: Hurry, stocks limited!” The other featured the tagline “New addi- tion: Many items in stock!” This constituted the experimental manipulation of distinctiveness: It was implied that the product was, respectively, either in short supply or in plentiful supply. Half the participants received each version of the advertisement.

To verify that manipulating the supply of the Equinoxe watch rendered it more or less distinctive, we took 40 undergraduates from the same university and had half rate one version of the advertisement, half the other, on a 9-point scale (1 � not at all distinctive, 9 � very distinctive). The Equinoxe watch in plen- tiful supply (M � 6.15) was rated as significantly more distinc- tive than the watch in short supply (M � 2.55), t(38) � 9.42, p � .0005.

Having inspected the screenshot, participants again indicated, as they had for the dress shirt, their overall attitude (� � .83) toward, intention to purchase, and willingness to pay for a typical Equinoxe watch. Thereafter, participants completed a two-item manipulation check (r � .51). The items, respectively, read, “According to the ad for Equinoxe, how many watches were available for sale?” (1 � few, 9 � many) and “According to the ad for Equinoxe, what was the availability of Equinoxe watches?” (1 � low availability, 9 � high availability).

Finally, participants completed the same version of the NPI (� � .87) as before.

Results and Discussion

Product 1. As hypothesized, narcissism predicted consumer interest in a product liable to enhance positive distinctiveness—a dress shirt that could be customized and personalized.

In particular, narcissism correlated positively with overall atti- tude toward that dress shirt, r(122) � .24, p � .01; intention to purchase it, r(122) � .39, p � .0005; and willingness to pay for it, r(122) � .53, p � .0005. The last variable, though expressed in

Figure 2. Advertisement for dress shirt used in Study 3.

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dollar amounts, was nonetheless relatively symmetrically distrib- uted (skew � �.25), so the original metric was kept.5

In addition, the three indices of consumer interest were them- selves interrelated: Overall attitude toward the dress shirt corre- lated with intention to purchase it, r(122) � .56, p � .0005, and intention to purchase it correlated with willingness to pay for it, r(122) � .39, p � .0005. However, overall attitude toward the dress shirt did not correlate significantly with willingness to pay for it, r(122) � .11, p � .20.

Thus, these new findings complement those of Study 2. There, more narcissistic participants were more likely to choose a distinctiveness-enhancing product over nonenhancing alternative. Here, more narcissistic participants expressed greater interest in a distinctiveness-enhancing product.

Product 2. As hypothesized, narcissism predicted partici- pants’ perceptions of the distinctiveness of their prized possessions in terms of their estimated ownership prevalence.

The possessions that participants listed met the criteria we requested: They were liable to be both highly prized and publicly displayed. Typical items included designer jewelry (e.g., a Bulgari ring), fashion accessories (e.g., a Hermes handbag), haute couture (e.g., an Armani suit), portable gadgets (e.g., an iPad), and flam- boyant vehicles (e.g., a Hyundai sports car). Unexpectedly, how- ever, only a few participants (24%) reported more than a single prized possession. Hence, we confined our correlational analyses solely to estimates of the percentage of other people who owned the first possession listed. These estimates emerged as positively skewed (�2.71), so we nonlinearly transformed them using natural logarithms. The transformed scores then emerged as negatively

skewed (�1.88). Accordingly, we analyzed both sets of scores. Results converged for both: More narcissistic participants reported that a smaller percentage of other people also owned the personal possessions they prized, rRAW(122) � �.39, p � .0005; rLN(122) � �.45, p � .0005.

For exploratory purposes, we also conducted a follow-up analysis afforded by the unexpected variation in the number of possessions that participants reported. We reasoned that if narcissists used these possessions to distinguish themselves, then they should have listed more of them (on a scale from 1 to 3). They did, r(122) � .42, p � .0005. Moreover, listing more possessions correlated negatively with estimates of the percentage of people who owned the first possession listed, rRAW(122) � �.23, p � .02; rLN (122) � �.22, p � .02.

As pointed out earlier, these findings could reflect perceptions or reality. It could be that narcissists actually buy products that are more distinctive in that fewer people are liable to buy them, or it could be that narcissists regard whatever products they buy as more distinctive, or it could be both. To help settle the matter, we had five postgraduates, all blind to participants’ narcissism scores, independently rate the distinctiveness of each of the possessions that participants listed first (1 � not at all distinctive; 9 � very distinctive). We then averaged those ratings to create an objective index of possession distinctiveness. We also took and averaged complementary ratings of the desirability (1 � not at all desir-

5 Following transformation of willingness-to-pay scores by a natural logarithm, the correlation decreases slightly, r(124) � .48, p � .0005, likely reflecting the induced skew of �1.51.

Figure 3. Advertisement for Equinoxe watch used in Studies 3 and 4.

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ability; 9 � very desirable) and value (1 � not at all valuable; 9 � very valuable) of each of the possessions.

As hypothesized, narcissistic participants reported owning pos- sessions that were objectively rated as more distinctive, r(122) � .28, p � .002. However, participants’ estimates of the percentage of people who owned those possessions did not covary with this objectively rated distinctiveness, rRAW(122) � �.17, p � .06; rLN(122) � �.09, p � .33: The two dependent variables were independent. Moreover, the link between narcissism and partici- pants’ estimates of the percentage of people who owned those possessions persisted after partialing for the objectively rated dis- tinctiveness of those possessions, rRAW(121) � �.34, p � .0005; rLN(121) � �.44, p � .0005, with the same being true when the target and partialed variables were reversed, rRAW(121) � .24, p � .01; rLN(121) � .27, p � .002. Thus, the data are consistent with narcissists distinguishing themselves in terms of consumer prod- ucts both by actually buying more objectively distinctive products and by regarding whatever products they buy as being more distinctive, with the two effects being independent.

Finally, our findings showed an interesting specificity. As re- gards objective ratings of participants’ possessions, correlations unsurprisingly emerged between distinctiveness and likability, r(122) � .49, p � .0005; likeability and value, r(122) � .28, p � .0005; and value and distinctiveness, r(122) � .78, p � .0005. However, although the possessions of more narcissistic partici- pants were objectively rated as more distinctive (see above), they were not objectively rated as either more desirable, r(122) � �.06, p � .50, or as more valuable, r(122) � .14, p � .12. Indeed, the correlation between narcissism and objectively rated distinctive- ness remained almost unchanged after simultaneously controlling for both objectively rated likeability and objectively rated value, r(120) � .27, p � .005. Thus, more narcissistic participants seemed to own, in the eyes of others, more purely distinctive possessions. Only in their own eyes may their possessions have been prized as positive.

Products 1 and 2: Combined analysis. If interest in Product 1, and estimates of ownership of Product 2, both reflected a desire for positive distinctiveness, then these variables should have cor- related. Our results partly supported this prediction. On the one hand, neither intention to purchase the dress shirt nor overall attitude toward it correlated significantly with ownership estimates of prized possessions (�.03 � r[122] � �.13; .77 � p � .14). On the other hand, willingness to pay for the customizable dress shirt did correlate negatively with ownership estimates of prized pos- sessions, rRAW(122) � �.29, p � .001; rLN(122) � �.27, p � .005. Moreover, the same pattern (in the opposite direction) was also observed when number of prized possessions listed replaced ownership estimates: No correlation emerged with intention to purchase the dress shirt, or with overall attitude toward it (.02 � r[122] � .06; .87 � p � .53), but one did emerge with willingness to pay for it, rRAW(122) � .27, p � .002; rLN(122) � .26, p � .005. Given that narcissism had earlier shown the highest correla- tion with willingness to pay for the dress shirt, this may have been the most sensitive index to capture such a relation.

Furthermore, if narcissism lay behind the quest for positive distinctiveness, then it should also have largely accounted for the link between, on the one hand, willingness to pay for the dress shirt and, on the other hand, ownership estimates of prized possessions and the number of prized possessions listed. This turned out to be the

case. After partialing for narcissism, the link between willingness to pay for the dress shirt and ownership estimates of prized possessions fell substantially and became insignificant, rRAW(121) � �.11, p � .21; rLN(121) � �.05, p � .61. So did the corresponding link to the number of prized possessions listed, r(121) � .06, p � .51.

Product 3. As hypothesized, the same product held greater appeal for more narcissistic participants when it was portrayed as being exclusive and in short supply.

First, the scarcity manipulation worked: Together, fewer Equi- noxe watches were deemed available in the scarce condition (M � 3.65) than in the plentiful condition (M � 6.82), t(122) � 9.94, p � .001. Moreover, the scarcity manipulation check was signif- icantly below the scale midpoint (5) in the scarce condition, t(61) � 7.17, p � .0005, and significantly above it in the plentiful condition, t(61) � 7.00, p � .0005. Nonetheless, if ratings on the “correct” side of the scale midpoint are taken as the criterion of success, then the manipulation “worked” in only 77% of cases— most, but hardly all. Hence, we report results both (a) across all participants and (b) across those participants whose ratings of scarcity were above or below the scale midpoint in the intended direction (i.e., for whom it “worked”). Whereas results for (a) maximized power via sample size, results for (b) maximized power via true variance.

Given that the Equinoxe watch, whether in short or plentiful supply, was still arguably a reasonably exclusive product per se, it would not have been surprising had narcissism simply predicted consumer interest in it. On two out of three indices, it did. In particular, although narcissism did not predict overall attitude toward a typical Equinoxe watch, r(122) � �.13, p � .14 (scarcity subset: r[93] � �.14, p � .18), it did predict both intention to purchase it, r(122) � .21, p � .02 (scarcity subset: r[93] � .19, p � .06), and willingness to pay for it, r(122) � .46, p �. 0005 (scarcity subset: r[93] � .44, p � .0005). (Note: willingness-to- pay scores, being positively skewed [�1.01], were transformed via natural logarithm, thereby normalizing their distribution [�.04].)

The key question, nonetheless, was whether narcissism would interact with the manipulation of product scarcity to predict con- sumer interest. To answer this question, we hierarchically re- gressed each of the three consumer interest indices— overall atti- tude toward a typical Equinoxe watch, intention to purchase it, and willingness to pay for it— on the same three predictor variables— narcissism, the experimental manipulation, and their statistical interaction. In keeping with standard practice (Aiken & West, 1991), we first centered scores for narcissism and the experimental manipulation, and the computed interaction term as their multipli- cative product. Next, we regressed each consumer interest vari- able, at Step 1, on both narcissism and the experimental manipu- lation, and at Step 2, on their interaction. A significant interaction term—such that the experimental manipulation of scarcity led to greater consumer interest when narcissism scores were higher— would have confirmed our prediction.

Indeed, for all three consumer interest variables, this significant interaction emerged. In particular, for overall attitude toward a typical Equinoxe watch, it was t(1, 120) � 3.70, p � .0005; for intention to purchase it, t(1, 120) � 4.80, p � .0005; and for willingness to pay for it, t(1, 120) � 2.49, p � .02. The pattern of interaction in each case suggested that a difference in consumer interest among more narcissistic participants was the key driver. Simple effects analyses confirmed this: The links between the

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scarcity manipulation and the consumer interest indices were con- sistently significant and substantial when narcissism was plotted at �1 SD (.42 � � � .67; 3.77 � t[120] � 5.92; all ps � .0005), but consistently significant and negligible when narcissism was plotted at �1 SD (�.10 � � � .04; �.89 � t[120] � .32; all ps � .38).

Finally, those participants among whom the scarcity manipula- tion “worked” showed almost identical results. In particular, the corresponding values for the three interaction terms were, respec- tively, t(1, 91) � 3.16, p � .002; t(1, 91) � 3.92, p � .0005; and t(1, 91) � 1.98, p � .05. Also, the corresponding ranges of values when plotting narcissism at �1 SD were (.38 � � � .65; 2.77 � t[91] � 4.86; all ps � .004), and when plotting it at �1 SD were (�.13 � � � .05; �.94 � t[91] � .36; all ps � .35). To illustrate these interactions, Figures 4, 5, and 6, respectively, plot the ex- trapolated means for each dependent variable (overall attitude toward the Equinoxe watch; intention to purchase it; and willing- ness to pay for it) at each level of the scarcity manipulation, for levels of narcissism at 1 SD.

Study 4

Overview

All findings so far have pertained to how narcissism predicts interest in consumer products intended for the buyer. But we wondered whether these findings would generalize across product recipient. In particular, we wondered whether narcissists would show a preference for products that enhance positive distinctive- ness, not only when spending their own money on themselves but also when spending their own money on close others. (When it comes to consumer products, particularly those that might be expensive, we assumed that the most common recipients would be close others.)

One line of argument suggests that the product preference would not persist. Narcissists are more interested in personal achievement

than in intimate relationships (Foster & Campbel, 2007). Indeed, they are often prepared to sacrifice close others to satisfy their thirst for competitive glory (Sedikides et al., 2002). Hence, when buying gifts for others, narcissists might conceivably refrain from purchasing products that would enhance the distinctiveness of close others, lest it obscure their own distinctiveness.

On the other hand, narcissists may often assimilate themselves to, rather than contrast themselves against, genuinely close others (Tesser, 1988). Otherwise put, narcissists may habitually include close others in their own self-concept (Aron et al., 2004). If so, then close others may be proxy targets for achieving positive distinctiveness. If so, spending on close others might be psycho-

Figure 4. Extrapolated means representing consumer attitudes toward the Equinoxe watch in Study 3 as a joint function of manipulated level of supply (scarce, plentiful) and participants’ measured level of narcissism (low, high). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around estimated intercepts (i.e., the means shown), based on standard errors computed from four derivative regression equations where levels of narcissism were orthogonally coded at �1 SD or –1SD, and levels of supply as 0 or 1.

Figure 5. Extrapolated means representing intention to purchase the Equi- noxe watch in Study 3 as a joint function of manipulated level of supply (scarce, plentiful) and participants’ measured level of narcissism (low, high). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around estimated intercepts (i.e., the means shown), based on standard errors computed from four derivative regression equations where levels of narcissism were orthogonally coded at �1 SD or –1SD, and levels of supply as 0 or 1.

Figure 6. Extrapolated means representing willingness to pay for the Equinoxe watch in Study 3 as a joint function of manipulated level of supply (scarce, plentiful) and participants’ measured level of narcissism (low, high). Units are expressed in the natural logarithm (ln) of the dollar amounts reported. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around estimated intercepts (i.e., the means shown), based on standard errors computed from four derivative regression equations where levels of nar- cissism were orthogonally coded at �1 SD or –1SD, and levels of supply as 0 or 1.

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logically similar to spending on oneself, and prior findings should generalize to buying for close others.

Given that gift-giving constitutes a noncompetitive activity, and narcissists can become communally inclined given the right cues (Finkel, Campbell, Buffardi, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2009), we favored the latter reasoning.

Method

Participants and procedure. One hundred undergraduate students, enrolled at McGill University in Canada, participated in return for $5 (CAD). The gender split of the sample was roughly equal (56% female, 44% male). Most participants were in their early 20s (no individual age data were collected). All were re- cruited and run as in previous studies. Each was paid $5 (CAD) for taking part. The cover story for the booklet, and its presentational format, were identical to those in Study 3.

Stimuli, measures, and manipulation. The booklet came in two versions. Each featured a version of the advertisement for Equinoxe watches previously featured in Study 3 (i.e., implying it was in short or plentiful supply). However, the framing of the advertisements differed. This time, participants were asked to imagine that they had “a gift certificate for a department store” and that they could use to “buy a wrist watch as a gift for someone very close to you on his or her birthday.”

Having inspected the screenshot, participants indicated their overall attitude toward a typical Equinoxe watch (r � .83) and willingness to pay for it.6 They then completed the same manip- ulation check (r � .81) as in Study 3, as well as the same version of the NPI (� � .93).

Results and Discussion

The evidence was broadly consistent with our hypothesis. Nar- cissists showed, or tended to show, more interest in a consumer product when it was portrayed as exclusive and in short supply, even when it took the form of a gift for close others.

As before, the scarcity manipulation worked: Together, fewer Equinoxe watches were deemed available in the scarce condition (M � 3.88) than in the plentiful condition (M � 8.36), t(98) � 12.69, p � .0005. Moreover, the scarcity manipulation check was significantly below the scale midpoint (5) in the scarce condition, t(49) � �3.62, p � .001, and significantly above it in the plentiful condition, t(49) � 19.81, p � .0005. Taking ratings on the correct side of the scale midpoint as the criterion of success, the manip- ulation “worked” in 82% of cases. For the sake of completeness, and to be consistent with Study 3, we again report results both across all participants and across that subset for whom the scarcity manipulation “worked.”

This time, however, narcissism predicted neither overall attitude toward a typical Equinoxe watch, r(98) � .13, p � .20 (scarcity subset: r[80] � .09, p � .43), nor willingness to pay for it, r(98) � .07, p � .49 (scarcity subset: r[80] � �.01, p � .92). (As in Study 3, willingness-to-pay scores, being positively skewed [�2.93], were transformed via a natural logarithm, thereby normalizing their distribution [�.20].) That is, either because the recipient of the product, or the tastes of the sample, differed, the watch per se itself held no greater appeal for narcissists than for nonnarcissists.

Next, we tested the critical Narcissism Scarcity interactions just as in Study 3. Once again, the interaction was significant for

willingness to pay for a typical Equinoxe watch, t(1, 96) � 3.47, p � .001, although not for overall attitude toward it, t(1, 96) � 1.58, p � .12. However, among those participants for whom the manipulation “worked,” the interaction was significant both for the willingness-to-pay index, t(1, 78) � 3.26, p � .002, and for the overall attitude index, t(1, 78) � 1.96, p � .05.

Follow-up simple effects analyses were conducted on this sam- ple subset to help interpret the pattern of interaction. As in Study 3, the link between the scarcity manipulation and the willingness- to-pay index was significant and substantial when narcissism was plotted at �1 SD (� � .50), t(78) � 3.34, p � .001, but not when narcissism was plotted at �1 SD (� � .19), t(78) � �1.25, p � .22. However, although the link between the overall attitude was also insignificant when narcissism was plotted at �1 SD (� � �.16), t(78) � �1.05, p � .30, it was only marginally significant when plotted at �1 SD (� � .27), t(78) � 1.70, p � .09. Yet, the interaction can be alternatively decomposed as follows: Whereas participants higher in narcissism did not evaluate the Equinoxe watch significantly more positively than those lower in narcissism when it was portrayed as being in plentiful supply (� � �.13), t(78) � �0.82, p � .41, they did evaluate it significantly more positively when it was portrayed as being in short supply (� � .30), t(78) � 1.96, p � .05.

Subcomponents of narcissism: Reanalysis of Studies 1– 4. Across various dependent variables in four studies, we obtained consistent evidence that more narcissistic participants prefer con- sumer products that enhance their positive distinctiveness. How- ever, narcissism is not a unifactorial construct. As recurring in- vestigations have highlighted, narcissism comprises several subcomponents that may be psychometrically and predictively distinguished (Kubarych, Deary, & Austin, 2004; Raskin & Terry, 1988), even if the optimal derivation remains debated (Ackerman et al., 2011; Rosenthal & Hooley 2010). Accordingly, by exam- ining how such subcomponents predict preferences for consumer products that enhance positive distinctiveness, more nuanced in- sight may be gained into why narcissism prompts purchasing. Here, we follow Ackerman et al. (2011) by splitting full-scale narcissism (mean � � .92 across all studies) into three subcom- ponents that are, respectively, associated with higher, intermediate, and lower psychosocial adaptiveness: Leadership-Authority (mean � � .77), reflecting assertiveness and social potency; Grandiosity- Exhibitionism (mean � � .79), reflecting vanity and showiness; and Entitlement-Exploitativeness (mean � � .61), reflecting felt desert and antisocial scheming.

A plausible case can be made— especially for the first two subcomponents—that each should predict interest in achieving positive distinctiveness via consumer products. First, people higher in Leadership-Authority should chronically seek to elevate themselves by pursuing more high-status positions. Here, display- ing distinctive products as a way of expressing their aspirations, or of communicating their rising social rank, would help them achieve this goal. Second, people higher in Grandiosity- Exhibitionism should chronically seek to individuate themselves by standing out from the crowd. Displaying products that are personalizable and customizable would help them achieve this

6 Due to a printing error, the intention-to-purchase index was omitted from this study.

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goal. Finally, people higher in Entitlement-Exploitativeness—who are keen to manipulate others to their own advantage, so as to secure what they regard as their due—may use the positive dis- tinctiveness that consumer products afford to exploit other people strategically.

Tables 2 and 3 list the links in various studies between the key dependent variables and the three subcomponents of narcissism. Table 3 displays links for dependent variables pertaining to the Equinoxe watch (Studies 3 and 4), and Table 2 for other dependent variables (Studies 1, 2, and 3). For convenience, the leftmost column in both tables reproduces links with overall narcissism. To their right, independent links with each subcomponent of narcis- sism are displayed. Next, links with each subcomponent after adjusting for both other subcomponents are displayed. Finally, the rightmost column indicates associated sample sizes.

Overall, all three subcomponents of narcissism always or nearly always showed zero-order correlations with the key dependent variables. Furthermore, adjusting for the other subcomponents, each subcomponent uniquely predicted at least one key dependent variable. However, the pattern of unique prediction varied.

In Study 1, only Grandiosity-Exhibitionism continued to predict scores on the CNFU and on each of its subscales after adjusting for both other subcomponents. (Interestingly, self-esteem correlated only with Leadership-Authority, the most adaptive component of narcissism.) Such specificity is perhaps unsurprising, given that many of the items of the CNFU explicitly refer to individuation (e.g., CCC: “I actively seek to develop my personal uniqueness by buying special products or brands”; UCC: “When I dress differ-

ently, I’m often aware that others think I’m peculiar, but I don’t care”; AOS: “I give up wearing fashions I’ve purchased once they become popular among the general public”). By the same token, it makes sense that, in Study 3, Grandiosity-Exhibitionism proved to be the main predictor of consumer interest in a product designed to individuate: the “Just for You” dress shirt that could be tailored to participants’ taste. Grandiosity-Exhibitionism also uniquely pre- dicted participants’ estimates of the number of people who also owned the possessions that they prized. Again, this makes sense: Whether these estimates reflected reality or fancy, the sense of owning what others do not conveys the impression of being a distinctive individual.

In other cases, Leadership-Authority emerged as the primary or unique predictor: of the number of prized possessions par- ticipants owned (Study 3); of the amount they were willing to pay for distinctive clothes (Study 3); and of their preferences for a special-edition product as opposed to a commonplace one (Study 2). It also uniquely predicted greater interest in a product (for personal use) that was portrayed as being in short supply (Study 3).

Although multiple explanations for this last pattern exist, we suggest two possibilities. First, two of the dependent variables have a “bottom-line” character to them (i.e., number of posses- sions; willingness to pay). People higher in Leadership- Authority should want to actually get ahead, as opposed to merely being regarded as standing out. Of course, both goals are mutually reinforcing, but one can still be prioritized over the other. If so, higher correlations with more objective indices of

Table 2 Studies 1, 2, and 3: Links Between Narcissism, Narcissism Subcomponents, and Key Dependent Variables Not Involving the Equinoxe Watch

Simple coefficients

Regression coefficients

Variable Overall

narcissism Leadership/ Authority

Grandiosity/ Exhibitionism

Entitlement/ Exploitativeness

Leadership/ Authority

Grandiosity/ Exhibitionism

Entitlement/ Exploitativeness N

Study 1 Questionnaires

Self-esteem .27��� .37��� .13 .10 .59��� �.17 �.16 102 CNFU .65��� .49��� .69��� .54��� �.02 .67��� .05 102 CCC .65��� .50��� .55��� .56��� �.03 .54��� .14 102 UCC .57��� .51��� .63��� .46��� �.07 .69��� �.01 102 AOS .57��� .52��� .60��� .45��� �.01 .61��� .00

Study 2 iPhone accessories

Product choice .29� .34�� .16 .27� .40�� �.18 .13 75 Study 3

Individualized shirt Attitude .24� .14 .23�� .17� �.03 .20† .10 124 Purchase intent .39��� .28��� .33��� .25�� .10 .23� .10 124 Willingness to

pay .53��� .46��� .45��� .33��� .27�� .26�� .09 124 Prized possessions

Others owning �.45��� �.32��� �.42��� �.22��� �.10 �.35��� �.03 124 Number listed .42��� .38��� .36��� .31��� .21� �.01 .13 124

Note. Overall narcissism was operationalized as the full-scale score on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Subcomponents of narcissism were operationalized as partial scale scores derived from the item subsets identified by Ackerman et al. (2011). Simple coefficients are Pearson’s rs. Regression coefficients are beta weights derived from multiple regressions featuring all three subcomponents of narcissism as simultaneous predictors of each dependent variable. CNFU � Consumer Need for Uniqueness scale; CCC � Creative Choice Counterconformity subscale; UCC � Unpopular Choice Counterconformity subscale; AOS � Avoidance of Similarity subscale. † p � .10. � p � .05. �� p � .01. ��� p � .001.

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positive distinctiveness—implying real attainment—would be expected for people striving to achieve objectively greater status. Second, products that convey exclusivity might be par- ticularly sought by people higher in Leadership-Authority. The status they seek is necessarily zero-sum: People must divide into those who have it (the haves, or have-mores) and those who do not (the have-nots, or have-lesses). Similarly, the ownership of exclusive products is necessarily zero-sum: People must divide into those who own them and those who do not. (In contrast, run-of-the-mill products are for hoi polloi.) Thus, the keenness of people higher in Leadership-Authority to own exclusive products— both the leather case in Study 2 and the watch in Study 3 having been described as “limited edition”— may reflect their keenness to attain status. To them, owning exclusive products may serve either as a coveted symbol of status or as a self-presentational means of attaining it.

In only one case did Entitlement-Exploitativeness emerge as the primary or unique predictor: Study 4. Here, only partici- pants who were higher in Entitlement-Exploitativeness were prepared to spend more on a product for someone else, when that product was portrayed as being in short supply (Study 4). One implication is that our earlier theorizing about why nar- cissists purchase distinctive products for close others may re- quire revision. Narcissists’ goal here may not be as much ego related—that is, to elevate or individuate themselves vicari- ously by elevating or individuating a close other—as much as it is pragmatic—that is, to bribe a close other into doing some- thing for them that they believe they deserve. There is certainly a precedent for narcissists treating even close others as means rather than ends (Sedikides et al., 2002) and for having Machi- avellian inclinations (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Narcissists may, in particular, pursue gift-giving as a tactical mating strat- egy (Holtzman & Strube, 2011; Saad & Gill, 2003).

General Discussion

Summary of Findings

We hypothesized that narcissists would prefer consumer prod- ucts that enhance their positive distinctiveness. Across four studies and various operationalizations, we found consistent support for this hypothesis.

First, we found (Study 1) that participants higher in narcissism reported, on a well-validated inventory, a greater inclination to purchase products to satisfy their need for uniqueness (uniqueness being the logical limit of distinctiveness). In particular, such par- ticipants reported purchasing products to cultivate a personal style, to defy established conventions, and to avoid looking like others. Importantly, participants merely higher in self-esteem did not show the same inclination. This suggests that narcissistic self- regard, not generic self-worth, lay behind the effects.

Second, we found that more narcissistic participants also showed greater interest in consumer products liable to confer positive distinctiveness. In particular (Study 3), more narcissistic participants rated a shirt that they could customize and personalize (thereby permitting them to distinguish themselves from wearers of regular shirts) more favorably than did less narcissistic partic- ipants. They also indicated they were more likely to buy it and would be willingly to pay a higher price for it. Furthermore (Study 2), more narcissistic participants, given a choice of free accesso- ries, were more likely to opt for a leather case over a gift coupon, where the latter belonged to a limited edition (its scarcity thereby permitting them, by joining a select class of owners, to distinguish themselves from nonowners), and could be engraved with their name (again, offering them the opportunity for distinctiveness via personalization).

Third, we found that, if the same brand of watch were described as belonging to an exclusive limited edition, as opposed to being

Table 3 Studies 3 and 4: Links Between Scarcity Narcissism Interactions, Scarcity Narcissism-Subcomponent Interactions, and Dependent Variables Involving the Equinoxe Watch

Independent coefficients

Mutually adjusted

coefficients

Variable Full-scale

NPI Leadership/ Authority

Grandiosity/ Exhibitionism

Entitlement/ Exploitativeness

Leadership/ Authority

Grandiosity/ Exhibitionism

Entitlement/ Exploitativeness N

Study 3 Watch for self

Attitude .29�� .38��� .24� .15 .41��� .09 �.11 95 Purchase intent .36��� .35��� .25�� .23� .30�� .08 .04 95 Willingness to pay .17� .23�� .05 .13 .20† �.10 .08 95

Study 4 Watch for other

Attitude .22� .14 .11 .25� �.02 �.03 .27† 82 Willingness to pay .35�� .29�� .27�� .43��� .05 .02 .41�� 82

Note. Overall narcissism was operationalized as the full-scale score on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI). Subcomponents of narcissism were operationalized as partial scale scores derived from the item clusters identified by Ackerman et al. (2011). Independent coefficients are regression beta weights representing the statistical interaction between the scarcity manipulation and either narcissism or a subcomponent of narcissism, after first controlling for the main effects of both. Mutually adjusted coefficients are regression beta weights representing the statistical interaction between the scarcity manipulation and one subcomponent of narcissism, after first controlling for (a) the main effects of both and (b) the interactive effects of the other two subcomponents of narcissism. All analyses conducted on subsets of participants for whom the scarcity manipulations worked. † p � .10. � p � .05. �� p � .01. ��� p � .001.

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abundantly available, more narcissistic consumers indicated a greater consumer interest in it: They evaluated it more favorably and were willing to pay a higher price for it. Moreover, this effect held whether the watch was being bought for oneself (Study 3) or for a close other (Study 4).

Fourth, we found (Study 3) that more narcissistic participants estimated that the personal possessions they prized were owned by a smaller percentage of other people and that, independently of this, those possessions were also objectively more distinctive, as judged by independent raters. In addition, more narcissistic par- ticipants listed a greater number of prized personal possessions. Finally, narcissism explained the link between estimates of rela- tively exclusive ownership and willingness to pay for the customi- zable shirt referred to above. This strongly implicates narcissism as the driver of these effects.

Finally, in a reanalysis of all the above findings, we found that two subcomponents of narcissism, namely, Grandiosity-Exhibi- tionism—reflecting a striving for social individuation—and Lead- ership-Authority—reflecting a striving for social elevation—inde- pendently predicted, on different occasions, interest in consumer products intended for oneself (Studies 1, 2, and 3). A third sub- component, Entitlement-Exploitativeness, independently predicted interest in consumer products only when they were intended for others (Study 4), consistent with manipulative intent.

Thus, we found consistent evidence that personality—specifi- cally, narcissism or some subcomponent thereof— could intelligi- bly and powerfully predict interest in a consumer product on the basis of its power to satisfy one of two self-related symbolic values—social individuation and social elevation—and thereby enhance the positive distinctiveness of the purchaser. Moreover, there is good reason to believe, based on the cognate research findings (e.g., Gao et al., 2009), that such “agentic” purchasing proclivities ultimately reflect an attempt on the part of narcissists to strategically regulate their self-regard (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001), either via self-enhancement (Sedikides & Gregg, 2001) or via self-protection (Horvath & Morf, 2009).

We close by considering some implications of our findings, both practical and theoretical.

Practical Implications

First, not only did predicted effects emerge consistently across our four studies, but their magnitude was often noteworthy. In Study 1, the NPI and CNFU shared over 40% of their variance in common. In Study 2, the NPI predicted 25% of the variance in money participants would spend on a product with high individ- uation potential. In Studies 3 and 4, the level of manipulated product supply predicted 25% of the variance in willingness to pay for it among high NPI scorers. If such results generalize, then knowledge of consumers’ narcissism, either at an individual or group level, could markedly augment the ability of market re- searchers to predict the purchase of branded or status goods (Berger & Heath, 2007; Sedikides et al., 2011). This is especially so given the availability of briefer assessment instruments (Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2006), which might even be abbreviated even further, as has been done for self-esteem (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001). Moreover, the fact that narcissism seems to be on the rise (Twenge & Foster, 2008) increases its relevance as a basis for purchase predictions.

Second, our findings help to clarify on whom contrasting types of persuasive appeal might work better. Cialdini and Trost (1998), in a comprehensive review, noted that people could be swayed, among other things, by an appeal to social proof—that many other people are doing something (e.g., buying a product)— or by an appeal to scarcity—that not a lot of something is available (e.g., an unusual product).

The concept of social proof has been variously addressed under such headings as bandwagon effects (Leibenstein, 1950) and multiple-source effects (Harkins & Petty, 1981). What most people desire most of the time is likely to be what one will desire oneself, both because human nature is shared (Pinker, 2002) and because the high demand for a good reflected in mass behavior is a signal that the good is objectively beneficial. In contrast, the concept of scarcity derives originally from economics (e.g., Reisman, 1996), where it designates a property of all goods where demand outstrips supply. As a rule of thumb, scarcity is also a signal that a good is objectively beneficial; indeed, it must be, as high demand is built into its very definition. Much empirical evidence also confirms the subjective allure of scarce goods (Brock, 1968; Eisend, 2008; Inman, Peter, & Raghubir, 1997; Lynn, 1989; Verhallen & Rob- ben, 1994).

Note, however, that it is often the physical properties of a good that are understood as being demanded. For example, swayed by a social proof appeal, someone might infer that, if everyone is buying Acme widgets, then they are in high demand, and do their job. Similarly, swayed by a scarcity appeal, someone might infer that if Acme widgets are hard to come by, they are again in high demand, and also do their job. Either way, someone would do well to acquire that good. But consider now the supply element in the question, which is relevant to the symbolic value of these goods. If everyone is buying Acme widgets, and supply is keeping pace with demand, then everyone can get them; however, if demand is outpacing supply, then only a select few people can get them. Crucially, it is only in the latter case that Acme widgets can enhance the positive distinctiveness of their owners; in the former case, indeed, Acme widgets might actually have the opposite effect. Thus, narcissists, relative to nonnarcissists, should be par- ticularly susceptible to scarcity appeals, because the physical and symbolic values of the goods demanded would complement one another. In contrast, narcissists, relative to nonnarcissists, should be less susceptible to social proof appeals, because the physical and symbolic values of the goods demanded would contradict one another.

Theoretical Implications

Our findings underscore the agentic basis of narcissistic self- regard (Campbell & Foster, 2007). That narcissists’ interest in consumer products is strongly driven by the power of those prod- ucts to positively distinguish them illustrates their acute concern with social rank. Presumably, narcissists feel better about them- selves to the extent that they succeed in individuating or elevating themselves.

But if so, then narcissistic self-regard operates at odds with regular self-esteem. For, according to the original version of so- ciometer theory (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995), the function of self-esteem is to track levels of social inclusion. In particular, if inclusion levels fall below a critical minimum, then

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an aversive signal—a drop in self-esteem— ensues, prompting people to redouble their efforts to integrate oneself into society. This self-regulatory system is alleged to have evolved as an adaptation because membership of cooperative groups greatly fa- cilitated the survival and reproduction of ancestral humans. On this view, self-esteem clearly serves a communal function—the pro- motion of greater belonging. Yet, the habit of individuating and elevating oneself, on which narcissistic self-esteem depends, hardly seems a sure-fire recipe for inclusion. Indeed, habitually and visibly indicating how different one is from one’s peers or how superior one is to one’s peers—including via one’s purchases—is liable to jeopardize the likelihood of social acceptance. Little wonder, then, that, although narcissists win over group members initially, they end up alienating them (Paulhus, 1998). Narcissistic self-regard thus seems to serve a function contrary to nonnarcis- sistic self-esteem: It apparently tracks social status, not social inclusion.

This paradox can be resolved by an updated version of sociom- eter theory (e.g., Leary, 2010; see also Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 2001), which postulates that self-esteem tracks any form of social value. As such, the social value in question might sometimes be commu- nal, and more mediated by regular self-esteem, and sometimes agentic, and more mediated by narcissistic self-regard. Nonethe- less, the distinction between these broad bases of self-regard is worth drawing. Recent correlational and experimental research suggest that there is not only a sociometer tracking how well people are fitting in and getting along but also a “dominometer” tracking how well people are standing out and getting ahead: Not only do status and inclusion equivalently predict self-esteem, but status predicts narcissism better than inclusion does (Mahadevan et al., 2012a; Mahadevan, Gregg, De-Waal Andrews, & Sedikides, 2012b; see also Wojciszke, Baryla, Parzuchowski, Szymkow, & Abele, 2011). The results of our four studies here, then, underscore the hyperagentic nature of narcissistic self-regard: Buying prod- ucts that enhance positive distinctiveness pushes the needle on the “dominometer” dial upwards.

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Received August 17, 2011 Revision received February 15, 2013

Accepted March 21, 2013 �

New Editors Appointed, 2015–2020

The Publications and Communications Board of the American Psychological Association an- nounces the appointment of 6 new editors for 6-year terms beginning in 2015. As of January 1, 2014, manuscripts should be directed as follows:

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