International Studies Paper(Graduate students)

IAFF 6101 Interna-onal Affairs Cornerstone

Lecture 6 Nuclear Prolifera0on

October 18, 2016

Today’s Class

•  Nuclear weapons and nuclear arsenals

•  Technology of prolifera0on

•  Causes of prolifera0on •  Is prolifera0on dangerous? •  Iran

Nuclear Fission

Fission Weapons: “Gun” Type •  U-235

Fission Weapons: “Gun” Type

•  LiGle Boy (Hiroshima) –  15 kilotons

Fission Weapons: “Implosion” Type •  U-235 or Pu-239

Nagasaki: August 9, 1945 – Fat Man (Nagasaki) •  22 kilotons

Fusion Weapons

•  “Thermonuclear” or “Hydrogen” bomb

•  Fission explosion ignites fusion of hydrogen isotopes

•  Much more powerful than fission alone

•  U.S. first tested in 1952, Soviets in 1953

The Triad: Bombers

•  B-29, B-36, B-52, B-2

•  Strengths –  You can recall them!

•  Weaknesses –  Vulnerability to intercep0on

The Triad: ICBMs •  Land-based intercon0nental ballis0c missiles

•  Mul0ple warheads possible (MRVs or MIRVs)

•  Strengths: reliability, command-and control

•  Weaknesses: vulnerability

The Triad: SLBMs •  Submarine-launched ballis0c missiles

–  Entered service in 1961

•  Strengths: nearly invulnerable because they’re hard to find

•  Weaknesses: command-and-control

The Current U.S. Triad Warheads Delivery

Vehicles Type

Bombers 300 60 B-52, B-2 ICBMs 450 450 Minuteman III SLBMs 1,152 288 Trident II D-5 Total 1,902 798

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulle%n of the Atomic Scien%sts 71/2 (March/April 2015): 107-19.

Current U.S. and Russian Arsenals U.S. Russia

Opera-onal Warheads 1,902* 1,600 Reserve 2,680 2,700† Awai0ng Dismantlement 2,340 3,500 Total Inventory 7,100 7,800

* The United States also has 180 non-strategic (tac0cal) warheads deployed in Europe † 700 of the warheads in Russia’s reserve are strategic warheads; the remaining 2,000 are non- strategic (tac0cal) warheads Under the terms of the New START Treaty, deployed warheads for both U.S. and Russia will drop to 1,550

Other Nuclear Arsenals

Total Inventory Method of Delivery France 300 SLBMs, aircrai China 240 ICBMs, aircrai Britain 225 SLBMs Pakistan 120 Aircrai, missiles India 110 Aircrai, missiles Israel 80 Aircrai, missiles North Korea <10 NA

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Global Nuclear Inventories, 1945-2013,” Bulle%n of the Atomic Scien%sts 69/5 (Sept.-Oct. 2013): 75-81.

Two Types of Bomb Fuel Highly enriched uranium Uranium or Plutonium

Two Types of Uranium

Plutonium: Heavy Water Reactor

•  Use natural uranium as fuel

•  Reac0on produces plutonium

•  Boom!

Plutonium: Light Water Reactor

•  Light water reactor, uses LEU as fuel

•  Plutonium = byproduct of nuclear reac0on

•  Must be reprocessed from spent nuclear fuel rods in large plants

Electricity or the Bomb? The same process can lead to both!

31 States With the Capacity to Build Nuclear Weapons, but only 10 have done so

•  Netherlands •  North Korea •  Norway •  Pakistan •  Romania •  Russia •  Serbia •  Slovakia •  South Africa •  South Korea •  Spain •  Switzerland •  Ukraine •  United Kingdom •  United States

•  Argentina •  Austria •  Belgium •  Brazil •  Canada •  China •  Czech Republic •  Denmark •  Finland •  France •  Germany •  Hungary •  India •  Israel •  Japan •  Latvia

Model Key Variables Examples Security External threat

Availability of nuclear-armed ally

USSR, PRC, Israel W. Germany, Japan, S. Korea, Saudi

Domes-c Nuclear bureaucracy Economic liberaliza0on

India Brazil, Argen0na

Norms Global norms about nukes •  Pres0ge •  Pariah

France, Iran Ukraine

3 Models in Search of a Bomb

ScoG D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” Interna%onal Security 21/3 (Winter 1996/97): 54-87.

NPT •  Entered into force in 1970 •  Divides the world into nuclear “haves” (U.S., Russia, UK,

France, China) and “have nots” (everyone else) •  Grand bargain:

–  “Have nots” promise not to acquire nuclear weapons (Art. II) –  “Haves” promise

•  Not to transfer nuclear weapons (Art. I) •  To work toward nuclear disarmament (Art. VI) •  To help disseminate “peaceful” nuclear technology (Art. IV)

–  Everyone promises not to import/export nuclear tech or materials unless subject to safeguards, and to accept IAEA inspec0ons (Art. III)

•  Membership is nearly universal – 190 member states –  India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, South Sudan

IAEA •  Two jobs

–  Promote civilian nuclear technology –  Monitor nuclear materials

•  Like any good ins0tu0on, the IAEA provides informa0on and monitoring to deter chea0ng

•  Safeguards

•  Addi0onal Protocol –  Collect more informa0on –  Access more facili0es –  Streamlined access for inspectors –  Environmental sampling

Supply Side Prolifera-on Arguments

•  Tradi0onal arguments focus on the demand for nuclear weapons

•  Recent scholarship emphasizes the supply side –  Sensi0ve nuclear assistance – ENR technology, fissile material, weapons or weapons components (Kroenig 2010)

–  Nuclear coopera0on agreements – non-military nuclear assistance of various types (Fuhrmann 2012)

•  Combining the demand and supply side –  Countries that receive peaceful nuclear assistance and face a threatening security environment (Fuhrmann 2012)

Two Schools of Thought

•  Nuclear op0mism – Nuclear weapons are a great deterrent –  Induce cau0on, reduce uncertainty in war outcomes – War more costly à War less likely – Based in realism, 3rd image

•  Nuclear pessimism – States unlikely to deploy weapons securely – Risk of accidents, unauthorized use – More nukes à War more likely – Based in organiza0on theory, 1st and 2nd image

3 Key Ques-ons about Prolifera-on

•  Preven0ve or preemp0ve war?

•  Secure second-strike arsenals?

•  Accidental or unauthorized use?

Nuclear Op-mists

•  Preemp0on/Preven0on – Early stage (Iran): can be done safely, but will have to be done repeatedly •  Israeli strikes on Osiraq (1981), al-Kibar (2007)

– Late stage (North Korea): too risky

•  Survivability – States have big incen0ves to make forces invulnerable, and it’s easy to do so

•  Accidental/Unauthorized Use – New nuclear states will be very careful; soldiers may be more cau0ous than civilians

Nuclear Pessimists: Organiza-ons

•  Preemp0on/Preven0on – Military officers biased toward offensive, have favorable view of preven0ve war

•  Survivability – Making weapons survivable not a highly priori0zed military mission, conflicts with other organiza0onal goals

•  Accidental/Unauthorized Use – Complex, 0ghtly coupled systems almost inevitably have accidents

– Poor weapons design, secrecy, proximity, predelega0on, unrest

Nuclear Pessimism: Leaders •  Some leaders too irresponsible to be trusted with highly destruc0ve weaponry –  Hard to deter, could use them against us –  Could give them to terrorists, who are impossible to deter –  Possession of nuclear weapons could enable regional aggression

Do Nuclear Weapons Make States More Aggressive?

•  Common argument is that acquiring nuclear weapons provides states with a shield behind which they can engage in regional aggression –  Iraq, Iran

•  Not a lot of systema0c evidence here –  One problem is that conflict involvement is a predictor of prolifera0on, which is

then argued to beget further conflict

•  Latest study finds that new nuclear states are more likely to ini0ate militarized disputes vs. non-nuclear targets, but not against nuclear targets

•  New nuclear states primarily target states with which they have no conflict history – picking new targets rather than going aier old foes –  Suggests an “expansion of interests” story rather than a “nuclear shield” story

Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller, “Ques0oning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolu%on 59/1 (2015):74-92.

Do Nuclear Weapons Help States Prevail?

•  Scholars (mostly) agree that nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence

•  Scholars disagree about whether nuclear weapons are useful for compellence or prevailing in crises

•  Yes: Having more nuclear weapons than your adversary enables you to prevail in the compe00on in risk-taking –  States with nuclear weapons more likely to prevail in crises over non-nuclear adversaries, but

not against nuclear-armed states (Beardsley and Asal 2009) –  In crises between nuclear-armed adversaries, states with nuclear superiority more likely to

prevail (Kroenig 2013)

•  No: Threats to use nuclear weapons for offensive purposes oien lack credibility –  States with nuclear weapons not more likely to make successful compellent threats, even

against targets that lack nuclear weapons (Fuhrmann and Sechser 2013) •  Not useful for taking territory •  Nuclear threats are dispropor0onate

Uranium Enrichment: Natanz and Fordow

In November 2013, Iran had: •  c. 19,500 centrifuges installed (almost all IR-1)

•  Nearly 8 tons of LEU (in form of UF6 gas)

•  432 pounds enriched to 20%

Light Water Reactor: Bushehr

•  Started by the Germans in 1970s

•  Completed by Russia in 2010; Russians supplying fuel

•  Went online in Sept. 2011

Heavy Water Reactor: Arak

•  Heavy water produc0on plant running

•  Heavy water reactor under construc0on (AR-40)

•  Heavy water plants use natural uranium, produce more plutonium

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Ac-on •  Reduc0on of installed centrifuges

–  5,060 at Natanz –  1,044 at Fordow for produc0on of medical isotopes—no uranium enrichment –  All IR-1

•  Reduce stockpile of LEU from 10,000kg to 300kg –  Maintain that level for 15 years

•  No enrichment above 3.67%

•  Redesign of Arak heavy water reactor to produce less plutonium –  Spent fuel shipped out of the country –  No addi0onal heavy water or H.W. reactors for 15 years

•  No reprocessing for 15 years

•  Intrusive inspec0ons, including implemen0ng NPT Addi0onal Protocol