International Studies Paper(Graduate students)

IAFF 6101 Interna-onal Affairs Cornerstone

Lecture 12 Terrorism

November 15, 2016

Today’s Class •  Defining terrorism

•  The logic of terrorism

•  Types of terrorism and terrorists

•  Data on terrorism

•  Explaining suicide terrorism –  Market share –  NaDonalism –  Salafi jihad

•  EffecDveness of terrorism

A Trumpian Grand Strategy? •  Elements of restraint

–  Burden-sharing by allies on defense –  Willingness to abandon alliances –  Willingness to tolerate nuclear proliferaDon to certain (former) allies –  Would rather not be involved in Iraq; “that’s not our fight” –  Not 100% clear on Israel

•  Elements of deep engagement/primacy –  Increase defense spending – investments in convenDonal forces –  Maintain unquesDoned military dominance –  Bomb the sh-t out of ISIS! In Iraq, Syria, even Libya; send U.S. ground troops to fight them –  Junk the Iran nuclear deal

•  Elements of I’m not quite sure what –  Détente with Russia? –  Extreme version of homeland defense – stopping Muslim immigraDon, deporDng undocumented

immigrants, building a border fence –  Economic naDonalism – junk TPP, renegoDate NAFTA, designate China a currency manipulator

What is Terrorism? •  PoliDcal

•  Violent

•  VicDms ≠ Target

•  Carried out by an organizaDon…that is not a state

•  Hoffman: “The deliberate creaDon and exploitaDon of fear through violence or the threat of violence in pursuit of poli-cal change” (1998, 43).

Anything LeH Out?

•  Nature of the target – civilians!

Terrorism, not Terrorists •  Hoffman conflates terrorism with terrorists

•  Terrorism = tacDc or strategy

•  Different kinds of actors can use that tacDc/ strategy

•  Byman on Islamic State –  IS uses terrorism, but it’s more than just a terrorist group – insurgency, convenDonal war, governance

Terrorism and Compellence

R = B × P(B) – C × P(C) •  R Value of resistance

•  B Expected benefits of resistance •  P(B) Probability of aoaining those benefits •  C Expected costs of resistance •  P(C) Probability of incurring costs

•  Compellence succeeds when R < 0

Grada-ons of Terrorist Violence

•  DemonstraDve

•  DestrucDve

•  Suicide –  Generates most coercive leverage

•  Most destrucDve •  Communicates resolve

LeH-Wing

•  Marxist-Leninist, Maoist

•  Overthrow government, insDtute socialism

•  Two types –  Small, not very violent

•  Red Army FacDon, Red Brigades –  Large and violent

•  Shining Path, FARC, VC

Right-Wing

•  Racist, anD-immigrant –  Neo-Nazis –  White supremacists

•  AnD-lesists –  United Self-Defense Forces (AUC, Colombia)

Ethnona-onalists

•  NaDonal self-determinaDon

•  Control over territory –  Tamil Tigers (LTTE) –  Kurds in Turkey (PKK) –  PalesDnians –  Kashmiri Muslims

Religious/Jihadists

•  Goal: overthrow secular rule in own/other states, establish the rule of a parDcular religion –  Al-Qaeda –  Islamic State –  Armed Islamic Group (Algeria, 1990s) –  Taliban (hybrid)

Problems with Data on Terrorism •  USG has changed the way it counts terrorist incidents twice

since 9/11 –  Before 2003, only data on “internaDonal terrorism” was collected – and not very well

–  From 2004-2011, NCTC tracked all terrorism using its Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS)

–  StarDng in 2012, State Dept. contracted with START to provide staDsDcal data using its Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD)

–  WITS criteria: poliDcally moDvated aoacks that target noncombatants

–  GTD criteria: poliDcal/economic/religious/social moDvaDon, target noncombatants, aimed at broader audience

•  Because of inconsistent counDng rules, it is difficult to compare frequency of terrorism over Dme

Basic Facts on Terrorism: 2015 •  11,774 total aoacks

–  13% less than in 2014

•  28,328 total deaths –  14% less than in 2014 –  24% of deaths = perpetrators of terrorism

•  92 countries with terrorist aoacks –  55% of all aoacks in 5 countries: Iraq, Afghan, Pakistan, India, Nigeria –  74% of all deaths in 5 countries: Iraq, Afghan, Nigeria, Syria, Pakistan

•  Almost 50% of terrorist aoacks kill no one; only 5% kill 10 or more

•  Most common tacDc = bombing/explosion (52%)

Number of Terrorist A]acks, 2005-2015

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Source: Country Reports on Terrorism

Deaths from Terrorism, 2005-2015

Source: Country Reports on Terrorism

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Number of Terrorist A]acks in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2005-2015

Source: Country Reports on Terrorism

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Iraq

Afghanistan

5 Leading Perpetrators of Terrorism in 2015

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

Taliban ISIS Boko Haram Maoists (India) PKK

Aoacks

Deaths

Source: Country Reports on Terrorism

Average Lethality of A]acks by 5 Most Prolific Terrorist Groups in 2015

12.7

7.3

4.4

1.2 0.5

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Boko Haram ISIS Taliban PKK Maoists (India)

Source: Country Reports on Terrorism

Suicide A]acks, 1982-2015

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

19 82

19 83

19 84

19 85

19 86

19 87

19 88

19 89

19 90

19 91

19 92

19 93

19 94

19 95

19 96

19 97

19 98

19 99

20 00

20 01

20 02

20 03

20 04

20 05

20 06

20 07

20 08

20 09

20 10

20 11

20 12

20 13

20 14

20 15

5,292 total aoacks, 52,966 total deaths

In 2015, ST = 5.5% of all terrorist aoacks, but 22% of all deaths

Source: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism

Loca-ons with Most Suicide A]acks, 1982-2015

2152

1145

516

259 175 137 117 115 114

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

Source: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism

Loca-ons with Most Deaths from Suicide A]acks, 1982-2016

22607

5255 6557

3001 2462 1571 1029 1584 721

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

Source: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism

Largest Suicide Campaigns, 1982-2016

1367

1144

800

510

292

224

174

136

119

116

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600

Iraqi Rebels vs. U.S. & Allies

Afghan Rebels vs. U.S. & Allies

Iraqi Rebels vs. Iraqi Government & Allies

Pakistani Rebels vs. Pakistan & U.S. Allies

Rebels vs. Syria & Allies

Rebels vs. Nigeria & Allies

PalesDnian Resistance vs. Israel

Rebels vs. Yemen

Somali Rebels vs. Ethiopia & Allies

LTTE vs. Sri Lanka & India

Source: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism

Most Prolific Groups, Suicide Bombing, 1982-2016

708

343

147

128

121

114

83

82

79

62

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

Taliban (IEA)

Islamic State

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

Al-Qaeda in Iraq

Islamic State of Iraq

LiberaDon Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Al-Shabaab

HAMAS

Jabhat al-Nusra

Source: Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism

Market-Share Model

•  Suicide terrorism is product of compeDDon among terrorist groups for popular support (Bloom 2004)

•  Much like democraDc poliDcs – Driven by public opinion – Armed groups respond to public opinion, compete for popularity

Market-Share Model: Problems

•  Driven largely by a single case (PalesDnians)

•  Has occurred in places where inter-group compeDDon was absent – Sri Lanka

•  ST deeply unpopular in Iraq – but there was tons of it!

•  StaDsDcal studies find liole support for the argument

•  PalesDnian public opinion doesn’t track with ST anymore

Pales-nian Suicide A]acks and Public Opinion

75%

77%

29%

69%

77%

Public approval for suicide attacks

Na-onalist Model (Pape)

•  Suicide terrorists = NaDonalists –  Driven by goal of ending “foreign” occupaDon of the homeland

•  Targets = democracies. Why? –  Democracies are sos; public has ability to influence policy –  Democracies are nicer –  Easier to organize in democracies b/c of freedoms

•  ST spreads because it works. Why does it work? –  ObjecDves are relaDvely minor

•  Policy ImplicaDon? –  Defense, and avoid occupa-ons at all costs!

Na-onalist Model: Problems

•  Data –  1981-2001: 188 aoacks, 5,397 deaths –  2002-2015: 4,616 aoacks, 37,362 deaths

•  SelecDon on the dependent variable –  Looked only at cases where ST occurred, not at all countries, or even

only occupied countries •  ST, no occupaDon

–  45 countries, many of them not occupied –  Pakistan, Syria, Nigeria, Yemen, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Libya, Turkey,

Egypt… •  Occupiers not primary targets of ST; locals are •  Civilians not primary targets of ST; military is •  Many suicide bombers are foreign fighters – not from the occupied

country •  Religion?

Jihad Model

•  Religion facilitates extreme violence: – Good vs. Evil – Enemy = infidels – Take orders from God – Not afraid of death

•  ST spreading across the globe, including many places with no foreign occupaDon

Jihad Model

•  ST Old-Style = Local –  Conflict – long-standing –  Ideology – varied –  Actors – subnaDonal, recruit locally –  Targets and goals – narrow and local

•  ST New-Style = TransnaDonal –  Conflict – can be new –  Ideology – Salafi Jihad –  Actors – transnaDonal, recruit all over

•  Second-hand humiliaDon rather than direct; role of internet and social media

–  Targets and goals – broad and unlimited •  Aoacks not limited to conflict zone

–  AQ aoacks on “far enemy”, IS aoacks in Europe

Jihad Model

•  Rise of AQ and shis from “near” to “far” enemy in mid-1990s

•  Advocacy of ST by AQ

•  Spread of Salafi Jihad

Jihad Model

•  Of 788 ST aoacks where idenDty of perpetraDng group is known: – 38% Salafi Jihadist – 19% NaDonalist/separaDst – 18% Hybrid

•  74% of aoacks where group is unknown occurred in Iraq

Jihad Model

•  Policy ImplicaDons? – Largely beyond our control?

Jihad Model: Problems

•  More than half of cases occurred in Iraq

•  Important groups were not SJ

•  Eras of suicide terrorism?

Terrorism is Effec-ve

•  ST spreading because it works!

•  Groups obtained concessions in more than 50% of the cases

•  Why? – Weak form of punishment, but concessions are small

•  Cannot achieve major objecDves

Terrorism Is a Failure •  28 FTOs with 42 policy objecDves

•  Terrorists rarely achieve their poliDcal objecDves, especially when they target civilians –  7% overall success rate –  0% when primary targets are civilian

•  Why? –  Correspondent-inference theory: observers infer intenDons from outcomes

–  Infer maximalist objecDves from killing civilians –  Targets refuse to make concessions

Terrorism Is a Failure •  104 rebel groups in civil wars from 1989-2004, 23 of which

used terrorism

•  Groups that use terrorism are less likely to win civil wars, or even achieve a negoDated seolement

•  Why? –  No direct military value –  Not useful for taking territory –  Low cost tool, but may signal weakness –  Drives away potenDal supporters –  Helps gov’t jusDfy draconian measures in response

Condi-onal Views on Terrorism

•  Extreme violence and terrorism has benefits for Islamic State – RecruiDng boon – Deters rebellion in areas IS controls – “repression works, but not in moderaDon”

•  But it also has drawbacks – Terrorizing the populaDon breeds hatred and resentment

–  If IS starts to lose, people will be out for revenge