International Studies Paper(Graduate students)

IAFF 6101 Interna-onal Affairs Cornerstone

Lecture 11 U.S. Grand Strategy

November 8, 2016

Outline •  What is grand strategy?

•  U.S. grand strategy historically

•  The 1990s debate

•  Current U.S. grand strategy

•  The future of U.S. grand strategy

Grand Strategy •  Grand strategy is “a poliFcal-military, means-ends chain, a state’s theory

about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself” (Posen 1984, 13) –  TacFcal vs. operaFonal vs. strategic vs. poliFcal vs. grand strategic

•  Grand strategy idenFfies naFonal interests and the best military (and possibly other) means available to achieve those interests

•  Sets the broad outline of naFonal security policy

•  Answers quesFons like: –  What internaFonal objecFves should U.S. pursue? –  What regions of the globe (if any) should U.S. protect?

•  Maintain commitments to Europe, East Asia, Middle East? –  Should U.S. revise its strategy in response to China’s rise? –  How secure in the U.S.?

Elements of Grand Strategy •  What interests does the United States have?

•  What are the threats to those interests that currently exist of that we foresee?

•  What military strategies are best suited to counter those threats?

•  What military forces are required to execute those strategies?

Grand Strategy

Interests

Threats to Interests

Strategies to Meet Threats

Forces to Execute Strategies

Fundamental Interests •  Things the state values for their own sake; not means to some other end, but ends in

themselves

•  Security –  ProtecFng U.S. homeland from invasion, destrucFon –  ProtecFng U.S. from coercion based on military threats –  Safety, sovereignty, and territorial integrity

•  Economic –  Maintaining U.S. prosperity

•  Humanitarian –  Increase prosperity of other countries –  Reduce human suffering from war, disease

•  PoliFcal/Ideological –  Spread democracy –  Spread market capitalism

Fundamental Interests, 2 •  Priority assigned to different interests varies over Fme with changes

in the internaFonal environment –  Security dominated during Cold War; humanitarian, democracy

secondary –  Humanitarian and democracy receive greater priority in early post-Cold

War era –  Focus returns to security acer 9/11, although threats are new

•  But, changes in the internaFonal environment don’t change fundamental U.S. interests. Rather, how U.S. makes tradeoffs among interests changes as threats and opportuniFes change –  Security was sFll an interest in 1990s, but relaFve importance assigned to

it decreased relaFve to other interests – decrease in threat, more leeway to spread democracy, pursue humanitarianism

–  Rise of terrorism and WMD à Return to security focus

Threats to Interests: Security •  Iden9fies threats to fundamental interests

•  Security of the U.S. homeland –  Powerful autocracies –  Rise of a hegemon in another region

•  Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, USSR, China? –  Rise of a hegemon that unites resources of Eurasia

•  Nazi G., USSR –  Great power war

•  U.S. is inevitably drawn in –  Spread of nuclear weapons –  Cutoff of Persian Gulf oil

•  Needed for warfighFng purposes

•  Can also think of many of these threats as deriva9ve interests – things that you care about because achieving them helps you achieve a fundamental interest

Threats to Interests: Economic

•  Iden9fies threats to fundamental interests

•  U.S. economic prosperity – Economic naFonalism, return of trade barriers, collapse of open internaFonal economy

– Freedom of the SLOCs – Great power war? – Cutoff of Persian Gulf oil – U.S. dollar no longer the global reserve currency

Threats: Magnitude and Nature •  Magnitude of opposing capabiliFes/potenFal

–  Power of opposing state –  Size and type of opposing forces –  Difficulty of defense (and/or deterrence)

•  Geography •  Nuclear weapons •  Cyber

•  Type of adversary – adversary’s moFves or intenFons –  Security seeking/preserve status quo –  Greedy state/revision of status quo

•  Non-state threats –  Terrorist groups –  Terrorists × WMD –  Cyber

Strategy: Specific •  Strategies to address specific security threats

–  Threat: Powerful autocracies –  Strategy: Spread democracy; containment; alliances

–  Threat: Rise of regional hegemon –  Strategy: PrevenFve war; forward-deployed forces; alliances; rapid deployment force (RDF)

–  Threat: Eurasian hegemon –  Strategy: Keep conFnent divided among mulFple powers, fight to oppose single dominant power

–  Threat: GP war –  Strategy: Keep forces in region; nuclear umbrellas; alliances; RDF

–  Threat: Nuclear proliferaFon –  Strategy: PrevenFve war; coercion; nuclear umbrellas; sancFons; strengthen NPT regime

–  Threat: Cutoff of Persian Gulf oil –  Strategy: Base forces in region; naval patrols; security guarantees; alliances; deterrent threats;

RDF

Strategy: General •  Offense, Defense, or Deterrence – PrevenFve war vs. containment/deterrence

•  Unilateral vs. mulFlateral

•  StaFon troops abroad vs. send them from U.S.

•  ConvenFonal vs. nuclear

•  Damage limitaFon vs. limited war (nuclear)

Strategy: Disagreements •  Analysts may disagree about the results that will be generated by different strategies – Compe--on: maintain spending such that no other power could possibly catch U.S.? •  Current NSS, primacy in 1990s

– Coopera-on: efforts to stay on top = costly and self- defeaFng, provoke balancing

•  Which you choose may depend on your assessment of the adversary’s moFves

Strategy: Costs and Risks

•  The costs and risks of defending a threatened interest may exceed the benefits – none of the strategies might be worth pursuing – Nuclear proliferaFon

•  Maybe no strategy is effecFve •  Could increase risk of amack on U.S.

–  Security guarantees

– Prevent war among major powers •  Requires costly presence of U.S. troops abroad •  Might be limle risk of war among major powers

Forces •  What military forces are required to execute chosen strategies?

•  Example –  Threat = possibility of great power war of rise of regional hegemon represented by resurgent Russia

–  U.S. Strategy = NATO alliance; forward-deployed forces in Europe; nuclear umbrellas

–  Forces = 62,000 U.S. troops, mostly in Germany •  $3.4 billion European Reassurance IniFaFve •  1 U.S. Army armored brigade (4,200 soldiers + vehicles) rotaFng in and out of 6 E. European countries

•  4 NATO mulFnaFonal bamalions to be deployed to BalFcs + Poland

U.S. Grand Strategy in History, 1

•  1776-1916: Isola-onism –  Avoid entangling alliances, esp. with Europe

–  Work to expel European great powers from W. Hemisphere, and keep them out •  Monroe Doctrine

–  Unilateralism –  Tiny military establishment –  No U.S. forces staFoned abroad

Interests: Homeland security Threats: European GPs Strategies: Exclude GPs from Western Hemisphere Forces BriFsh Navy!

U.S. Grand Strategy in History, 2

•  1917-1945: Offshore Balancing –  U.S. intervenes in WW1 when

it looks like Germany might win, dominate Europe

–  Post-WW1 backlash: U.S. takes its toys and goes home

–  No U.S. leadership in interwar period

–  U.S. content to let Europeans deal with Hitler, unFl fall of France

–  U.S. gets into WW2 to prevent German hegemony in Europe, Eurasia

Interests: Homeland security Threats: European hegemon Strategies: Fight to defeat potenFal hegemons in Europe Forces: U.S. Army and Navy

U.S. Grand Strategy in History, 3

•  1947-89: Containment –  U.S. would like to go home in 1945, but Europe is in ruins

–  Nobody to hold USSR in check – potenFal hegemon

–  Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine

–  NATO –  Permanent U.S. military presence in Europe, Asia

–  Backed by nuclear deterrence

Interests: Homeland security Threats: Soviet hegemony in Eurasia Strategies: NATO, forward deployments, deterrence (convenFonal and nuclear) Forces: Large convenFonal and nuclear forces

Neoisola-onism •  Come Home, America! –  Interests:

•  Security, prosperity –  Threats:

•  Cutoff of oil from Middle East –  Strategies:

•  End U.S. alliances with Europe and Asia •  Close U.S. nuclear umbrella; accept limited nuclear proliferaFon •  Prevent single power from monopolizing Gulf oil

–  Forces: •  Reliance on nukes •  Cut defense budget by 50% •  Keep air and naval forces in Gulf, but no ground forces

Offshore Balancing •  Float like a bumerfly, sFng like a bee! –  Interests:

•  Security, prosperity –  Threats:

•  Rise of regional hegemons •  Resentment generated by U.S. forces abroad

–  Strategies: •  Let countries in the region deal with rising power first •  Only come in if they can’t contain it •  Alliances expendable •  No forward deployed forces!

–  Forces: •  Smaller but robust convenFonal forces, airpower, nukes

Selec-ve Engagement •  An insurance policy

–  Interests: •  Security, prosperity, Gulf oil, GP wars

–  Threats: •  Nuclear proliferaFon •  Economic naFonalism •  Regional hegemon in Gulf •  GP wars

–  Strategies: •  Nuclear umbrellas •  Forward deployed forces •  Deterrence of conquest •  General reassurance

–  Forces: •  Not specified

Primacy

•  Being the top dog –  Interests:

•  Security, prosperity, Gulf oil, GP wars –  Threats:

•  Rise of a peer compeFtor –  Strategies:

•  Preserve U.S. supremacy by outdistancing any global challenger •  Remain heavily involved and deployed in Eurasia •  NATO expansion •  Prevent nuclear proliferaFon

–  Forces: •  Nearly Cold War-sized force

U.S. Interests (NSS 2015) •  Security

–  Security of U.S., its ciFzens, and U.S. allies and partners

•  Prosperity –  Strong, innovaFve, growing U.S. economy in an open internaFonal

economic system

•  Values –  Respect for universal values (e.g., democracy, human rights) at home

and abroad

•  InternaFonal Order –  Rules-based order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace,

security, opportunity

Threats to U.S. Interests (NSS 2015) •  Security

–  Terrorism: AQ, ISIL and affiliates –  States:

•  Russia – violaFon of Ukrainian sovereignty, annexaFon of Crimea •  North Korea •  China – South and East China Seas

–  WMD: Irresponsible states (Iran, N. Korea), terrorists –  Access to Spaces: Cyber, space, air, mariFme

•  Prosperity –  Cutoff of energy supplies of U.S. and allies (e.g., by Russia) –  Retreat from open internaFonal economic order

•  Other

–  Weak states –  Climate change –  Epidemic disease

Strategies: Broad (NSS 2015) •  Lead

–  With strength: economic, military, values, resilience of U.S. –  By example: rule of law, democracy –  With capable partners: allies, non-state actors, insFtuFons –  With all instruments of U.S. power: military, diplomacy, economic, intelligence –  With long term perspec-ve: lots of changes underway,

•  Partners –  Alliances –  NATO, E. Asian allies

•  Principled and selecFve use of force –  Will use force unilaterally, if necessary, although prefer to act with allies –  Clear and feasible objecFves; effecFve, just, and consistent with rule of law

Strategies: Specific (NSS 2015) •  Combat terrorism

–  Targeted CT operaFons; no more large ground wars! –  Counter flow of foreign fighters and condiFons that foster terrorism (poverty,

inequality) –  Build capacity in other states; train and equip local partners –  Degrade/defeat ISIL

•  Conflict deterrence and prevenFon –  Alliances, forward deployed forces, building allied capacity

•  Prevent spread of WMD –  CTBT –  Fissile material cutoff treaty –  Iran

•  Preserve access to cyber/space/seas

Clintonian Grand Strategy: Deep Engagement

•  Bomom-lines –  Preserve key alliances –  Maintain forward deployment –  Maintain US military and economic leadership

•  Major powers: Retain key alliances in Europe and Asia – Some believe that a hegemon would threaten U.S. military capabiliFes; others do not •  This logic was more important during the Cold War than now

– War (or security compeFFon) between other major powers is dangerous because: •  The U.S. could get drawn in •  CompeFFon could fuel proliferaFon—Japan, South Korea, •  CompeFFon (and war) are bad for trade/prosperity

Clintonian Grand Strategy: Deep Engagement

•  Prevent ProliferaFon –  ProliferaFon opFmists are too opFmisFc –  AcquisiFon by “rogues” states is more dangerous, even though the

probability of use may be low –  Terrorists are even more worrisome

•  Maintain U.S. Leadership –  Helps maintain the open global economy by reducing insecurity and

compeFFon

–  Improves trade deals and helps maintain the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency

Alterna-ves to Deep Engagement: Restraint

•  U.S. remains highly secure –  Don’t exaggerate terrorist threat – definitely prefer AQ or ISIS to Nazi G or USSR!

•  U.S. power encourages it to pursue policies that are not in its best interest and beyond its reach: –  AcFvist foreign policies fuel opposiFon from terrorists and other states – balancing!

•  Alliances and commitments: –  Reduce/eliminate bases in the Arab world – be “over the horizon” –  End support for Israel (and Egypt!) –  Maintain security commitments to Europe and Asia, but withdraw forces; over 10

years in Europe: Asia trickier; manage transiFons •  Not only saves $$; encourages other states to be more responsible; and makes them share

responsibility for globalizaFon –  Get allies to pull their own weight!

•  ProliferaFon: U.S. requires a more measured assessment of the dangers; prefer deterrence to prevenFve war

A Trumpian Grand Strategy? •  Elements of restraint

–  Burden-sharing by allies on defense –  Willingness to abandon alliances –  Willingness to tolerate nuclear proliferaFon to certain (former) allies –  Would rather not be involved in Iraq; “that’s not our fight” –  Not 100% clear on Israel

•  Elements of deep engagement/primacy –  Increase defense spending – investments in convenFonal forces –  Maintain unquesFoned military dominance –  Bomb the sh-t out of ISIS! In Iraq, Syria, even Libya; send U.S. ground troops to fight them –  Junk the Iran nuclear deal

•  Elements of I’m not quite sure what –  Extreme version of homeland defense – stopping Muslim immigraFon, deporFng

undocumented immigrants, building a border fence –  Economic naFonalism – junk TPP, designate China a currency manipulator