Community Corrections44


Corrections in the Community.

© 2011, Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 267

Chapter 10

If punishment makes not the will supple it hardens the offender. —John Locke

The effects of our actions may be postponed but they are never lost. There is an inevitable reward for good deeds and an inescapable punishment for bad. Mediate this truth, and seek always to earn good wages from destiny.

—Wu Ming Fu

INterMeDIate SaNCtIONS No discussion of contemporary probation would be complete without exam- ining the development and application of intermediate sanctions. Faced with overcrowded prison and jail systems, criminal justice professionals and policy makers are being forced to search for alternative ways to sanction and control criminal offenders.

A host of intermediate sanctions designed to treat the criminal offender in the community have been developed and implemented. The intermediate punishments described in this chapter include electronic monitoring, house arrest, community service, day-reporting centers, intensive supervision, drug

Intermediate Sanctions

boot camp programs

community service


day-reporting centers


drug courts




home detention

intensive supervised


intermediate sanctions

net widening

shock incarceration

Key terMS

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courts, and boot camps. The purposes of these intermedi- ate interventions are to provide correctional alternatives to confinement.

The U.S. Department of Justice (1990:3) defines intermedi- ate sanctioning as “a punishment option that is considered on a continuum to fall between traditional probation and tra- ditional incarceration.” Intermediate sanctions were largely developed out of the need to relieve prison crowding1 and sat- isfy the general public’s desire for new correctional alterna- tives. Thus, policy makers began to experiment with programs to punish, control, and reform offenders in the community. Figure 10.1 shows the percentage of probationers under sev- eral different types of sanctions. More than 10 percent are under some form of supervision other than regular. Two major issues confronting intermediate sanctions are (1) offender diversion and (2) public safety.

the NeeD FOr INterMeDIate SaNCtIONS With prison and jail populations at an all-time high, most states have acknowl- edged that they will not be able to build their way out of the crisis. It should also be noted that the national annual incarceration expense for a single pris- oner is more than $25,000. Furthermore, with more than 76 percent of correc- tional agencies at or exceeding capacity, it is unlikely that there will be relief in the near future. Alternatives to long-term confinement are a necessity.

Figure 10.1 Probationers and parolees under different types of supervision. Source: Camp & Camp (2003).

1Blumstein argues that the nation has not to date been able to meet the demand for additional prisons to build their way out of the crowding crisis. Blumstein (1995). See also Garland (2001).

Intensive 5%

Regular 89%

Special 5%Electronic


Intermediate sanctions, ranging in severity from day fines to “boot camps,” are interventions that are beginning to fill the sentencing gap between prison at one extreme and probation at the other. Lengthy prison terms may be inappropriate for some offenders; for others, probation may be too inconsequential and may not provide the degree of public supervision necessary to ensure public safety. By expanding sentencing options, intermediate sanctions enable the criminal justice system to tailor punishment more closely to the nature of the crime and the criminal. An appropriate range of punishments makes it possible for the system to hold offend- ers strictly accountable for their actions.

BOx 10.1 INterMeDIate SaNCtIONS

Source: Gowdy (1993).

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Intensive Supervision 269

Despite the ever-increasing cost of incarceration, it is necessary for alternative sanctions to gain public, legislative, and judicial support (Finn, 1991). To earn sufficient support, an alternative to confinement must “be perceived as rea- sonably safe; address the public’s desire for punishment through community control, nonpaid labor, and victim restitution; and offer an opportunity for positive change by providing treatment and employment skills” (American Correctional Association, 1990:2).

INteNSIVe SUperVISION The most widely used community-based intermediate sanction that attempts to meet the aforementioned criteria is intensive supervision. Intensive supervi- sion is most often viewed as an alternative to incarceration. Persons who are sentenced to intensive probation supervision are supposed to be those offend- ers who, in the absence of intensive supervision, would have been sentenced to imprisonment. However, intensive supervision is hardly a new idea. Previous programs of intensive supervision carried the common goal of maintaining public safety, but varied from the “new generation” of intensive supervision programs (ISPs) in very fundamental ways (Latessa, 1986).

Early versions of intensive supervision were based on the idea that increased client contact would enhance rehabilitation while allowing for greater client control. For example, California’s Special Intensive Parole Unit experiments in the 1950s and the San Francisco Project in the 1960s were designed as intensive supervision, but they emphasized rehabilitation as the main goal. Later, with rehabilitation still as the main objective, experiments were “undertaken to determine the ‘best’ case- load size for the community supervision, despite the illogic of the proposition that a magical ‘best’ number could be found” (McCarthy, 1987:33). Nevertheless, the failure of these experiments to produce results fueled two decades’ worth of cynicism about the general utility of community-based methods.

Burkhart (1986) and Pearson (1987) contend that today’s ISPs emphasize pun- ishment of the offender and control of the offender in the community at least as much as they do rehabilitation. Further, contemporary programs are designed to meet the primary goal of easing the burden of prison overcrowding.

Intensive supervision programs are usually classified as prison diversion, enhanced probation, and enhanced parole. Each has a different goal. Diversion is commonly referred to as a “front door” program because its goal is to limit the number of offenders entering prison. Prison diversion programs generally identify incoming, lower-risk inmates to participate in an ISP in the community as a substitute for a prison term.

BOx 10.2 typeS OF ISps


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Figure 10.2 illustrates differences between the objectives of the original exper- iments with intensive supervision and the so-called “new-generation” pro- grams. Early models were successful at accomplishing smaller caseloads and delivering more contacts and services; however, reductions in recidivism never materialized. Similarly, the more recent programs have reduced caseloads and significantly increased control and surveillance but have not had an apprecia- ble impact directly on prison populations.2

Today, no two jurisdictions define intensive supervision in exactly the same way. However, one characteristic of all ISPs is that they provide for very strict terms of probation. As Jones (1991:1) points out: “Their common feature is that more control is to be exerted over the offender than that described as

2Not all new generation ISP programs have abandoned the treatment approach. See Clear and Latessa (1993). The American Probation and Parole Association is working with several states to modify their ISP programs from a control/surveillance orientation to one more treatment focused (

enhancement programs generally select already sentenced probationers and parolees and subject them to closer supervision in the community than regular probation or parole. People placed in ISP-enhanced probation or enhanced parole programs show evidence of failure under routine supervision or have committed serious offenses deemed too serious for supervision on routine caseloads. Treatment and service components in the ISPs included drug and alcohol counseling, employ- ment, community service, and payment of restitution. On many of these measures, ISP offend- ers participated more than control members; participation in such programs was found to be correlated with a reduction in recidivism. …

BOx 10.2 typeS OF ISps—Cont’d

Source: Petersilia and Turner (1993).

Figure 10.2 Models of ISP programs.

Early ISP Program Model: Smaller caseloads

New Generation ISP Program Model: Smaller caseloads

Increased contacts

Improved treatment & service delivery

Reduced recidivism

Increased contacts

Improved surveillance & control

Reduced prison population

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probation in that jurisdiction and that often these extra control mechanisms involve restrictions on liberty of movement, coercion into treatment programs, employment obligations, or all three.” This increased level of control is usu- ally achieved through reduced caseloads, increased number of contacts, and a range of required activities for participating offenders that can include vic- tim restitution, community service, employment, random testing for substance abuse, electronic monitoring, and payment of a probation supervision fee.

Intensive supervision programs vary in terms of the number and type of con- tacts per month, caseload size, type of surveillance conducted, and services offered. In addition, programs vary depending on whether they are staffed by specially trained officers or regular probation officers, and whether an officer “team” approach is used.

A survey conducted by Bryne (1986) on the use of intensive supervision in the United States found that “the numbers of direct personal contacts required ranged from 2 per month to 7 per week. Some programs have specified no curfew checks, while others specified three curfew checks per week” (Pearson, 1987:15). Ideally, supervising officers provide monitoring with a reduced case- load of about 15 offenders per officer. Yet, most officers carry caseloads of nearly 25 offenders. Offender entry into an intensive supervision program may be the decision of the sentencing judge, a parole board, a prison release board, or probation agency.

Table 10.1 shows some of the variation among selected ISPs. The types of cli- ents served, the number of contacts made each month, and the recidivism rates vary greatly from program to program.

Many ISPs have revealed an increase in technical violations for ISP offenders as compared to offenders placed in other sentencing options, but no signifi- cant increase in the new offense rate (Erwin, 1987; Petersilia & Turner, 1993; Wagner & Baird, 1993). Most evaluations, however, suggest that increased con- tact alone does not make a difference in terms of overall recidivism rates. In a study of ISPs in Ohio, Latessa, Travis, and Holsinger (1997) found that offend- ers in ISPs were less likely to be rearrested than offenders under other forms of correctional supervision; however, they were more likely to be subsequently incarcerated. The researchers attributed this higher failure rate to revocations for probation violations. Latessa and colleagues also concluded that ISPs in Ohio were saving the state money as compared to the cost of incarceration.

As currently designed, many ISPs fail to produce significant reductions in recidivism or alleviate prison overcrowding. There does, however, appear to be a relationship between greater participation in treatment programs and lower failure rates (Johnson & Hunter, 1992, Jolin & Stipak, 1992; Paparozzi, no date; Pearson, 1987; Petersilia & Turner, 1993). This is one of the important issues

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table 10.1 Intensive Supervision Probation/Parole

Author and year Site Sample Control groups Contacts Recidivism

Jolin and Stipak (1991)

Oregon N = 70 Drug Users

100 on EM 100 on work release Stratified random sample matched on risk

5 counseling per week & 3 self-help per week, plus curfew & EM

47%ISP 32% EM 33% WR

Erwin (1987) Georgia N = 200 randomly selected from ISP

N = 200 probationers N = 97 prison releasees Matched samples

5 per week ISP 40% ISP 35.5% Probation 57.8% Prison

Pearson (1987) New Jersey N = 554 parolees N = 510 20 per month 24.7% ISP 34.6% CG

Byrne and Kelly (1989)

Massachusetts N = 227 High-Risk Probationers

N = 834 ISP Eligible offenders plus a 35% random sample of all offenders under supervision (N = 2543)

10 month ISP 2 month Probation

56.6% ISP 60.9% Probation

Latessa (1993a) Ohio All offenders in specialized ISP Units Alcohol = 140 Drug = 121 Sex = 64 Mental = 76

N = 424 regular probationers randomly selected

6 month Alcohol & Drug 4.5 month Sex & Mental Health 1 month comparisoon

42% Alcohol 59% Drug 22% Sex 27% MH 46% Probation

Latessa (1992) Ohio N = 82 ISP randomly selected

N = 101 randomly selected from regular probation

7.5 month ISP 2.2 month Prob

28% ISP 21% Probation

Latessa (1993b) Ohio N = 317ISP N = 502 High Risk ISP

N = 424 randomly selected from regular probation

4 month ISP 3 month High Risk 2 month Prob

35% ISP 43% High 34% Probation

Fallen Apperson, Holt-Milligan, and Roe (1981)

Washington N = 289 Low Risk parolees

N = 102 matched parolees

4 per month 32.9% ISP 46.9% CG

Petersilia and Turner (1993)

Contra-Costra N = 170 Randomly selected offenders placed in prison, probation, or parole

12 per month 29% ISP 27% CG

Petersilia and Turner (1993)

Los Angles N = 152 Randomly selected offenders placed in prison, probation, or parole

24 per month 32% ISP 30% CG

Petersilia and Turner (1993)

Seattle N = 173 Randomly selected offenders placed in prison, probation, or parole

12 per month 46% ISP 36% CG

Petersilia and Turner (1993)

Ventura N = 166 Randomly selected offenders placed in prison, probation, or parole

24 per month 32% ISP 53% CG

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Intensive Supervision 273

facing intensive supervision. In an article summarizing the state of ISPs, Fulton, Latessa, Stichman, and Travis (1997:72) made the following conclusions:

n Intensive supervision programs have failed to alleviate prison crowding. n Most ISP studies have found no significant differences between recidivism rates of ISP

offenders and offenders with comparison groups. n There appears to be a relationship between greater participation in treatment and

employment programs and lower recidivism rates.

Author & Year Site Sample Control Groups Contacts Recidivism

Petersilia and Turner (1993)

Atlanta N = 50 Randomly selected offenders placed in prison, probation, or parole

20 per month 12% ISP 4% CG

Petersilia and Turner (1993)

Macon N = 50 Randomly selected offenders placed in prison, probation, or parole

20 per month 42% ISP 38% CG

Petersilia and Turner (1993)

Santa Fe N = 58 Randomly selected offenders placed in prison, probation, or parole

20 per month 48% ISP 28% CG

Petersilia and Turner (1993)

Dallas N = 221 parolees Randomly selected offenders placed in prison, probation, or parole

16 per month 39% ISP 30% CG

Petersilia and Turner (1993)

Houston N = 458 parolees Randomly selected offenders placed in prison, probation, or parole

10 per month 44% ISP 40% CG

Latessa, Travis, Fulton, and Stichman (1998)

Iowa and Northeastern state

N = 401 Selected from urban probation department and rural probation and parole caseload

Varied 39% ISP 40% CG

Robertson, Grimes, and Rogers (2001)

Mississippi N = 153 Juvenile offenders placed on intensive probation, monitoring on regular probation, or counselling with cognitive-behavioral (CB) therapy

12 months Benefit-cost ratio of subjects receiving CB therapy was almost twice that of intensive supervision and monitoring.

Source: Compiled by authors.

table 10.1—continued

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n Intensive supervision programs appear to be more effective than regular supervision or prison in meeting offenders’ needs.

n Intensive supervision programs that reflect certain principles of effective intervention are associated with lower rates of recidivism.

n Intensive supervision programs provide intermediate punishment.

n Although ISPs are less expensive than prison, they are more expensive than originally thought.

Issues in Intensive Supervision

Intensive supervision, as a technique for increasing control over offenders in the community (and thereby reducing risk), has gained wide popularity.3 As of 1990, all states, plus the federal system, had some kind of intensive super- vision program in place. This widespread acceptance has provided states with the needed continuum of sentencing options so that offenders are being held accountable for their crimes while, at the same time, public safety is being maintained. This popularity of intensive supervision has generated much research, thereby raising several issues.

Current issues largely revolve around the effectiveness of intensive supervision. However, measures of success vary depending on the stated goals and objectives each program set out to address.4 For instance, goals of a treatment-oriented program differ from goals of a program that places emphasis on offender pun- ishment and control. However, it is possible to isolate two overriding themes of recent ISPs that raise several issues. First, “intensive probation supervision is expected to divert offenders from incarceration in order to alleviate prison overcrowding,5 avoid the exorbitant costs of building and sustaining prisons, and prevent the stultifying and stigmatizing effects of imprisonment” (Byrne, Lurigio, & Baird, 1989:10). Second, ISPs are expected to promote public safety through surveillance strategies while promoting a sense of responsibility and accountability through probation fees, restitution, and community service activities (Byrne et al., 1989). These goals generate issues regarding the ability of ISP programs to reduce recidivism, divert offenders from prison, and ensure public safety.

3Byrne and Taxman (1994). See also Cullen, Van Voorhis, and Sundt (1996). 4Fulton, Stone, and Gendreau (1994). See also Cullen and Gendreau (2000).

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Intensive Supervision 275

In a recent study of ISP, Lowenkamp, Flores, Holsinger, Makarios, and Latessa (2010) examined program philosophy and recidivism rates. They found that ISP programs that were “deterrence”- or control-oriented actually increased recidivism rates, whereas human service-oriented programs reduced recidi- vism. These results can be seen in Figure 10.3.

The debate over control versus treatment has raged for many years. In recent years, there has been a movement, initiated by the American Probation and Parole Association, to develop a more balanced approach to ISP supervision (Fulton, Gendreau, & Paparozzi, 1996; Fulton, Stone, & Gendreau, 1994). This approach continues to support strict conditions and supervision prac- tices, but within the context of more services, and higher-quality treatment. Indeed, it appears that if ISP is going to live up to its promises, a new model must be developed.

5For example, Whitehead, Miller, and Myers (1995) found that intensive probation in Tennessee resulted in both diversion and net widening. They argued that if diversion is the only objective of intensive probation then the efforts might be misguided. See Whitehead et al. (1995). See also Bonta, Wallace-Capretta, and Rooney (2000).

Figure 10.3 Average change in recidivism for ISP programs by program philosophy. Source: Lowenkamp et al. (2010).

0.01 0.06








All (N = 58) Human service (N = 42)

Deterrence (N = 16)

Reductions in recidivism

Increased recidivism

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Day-repOrtING CeNterS Unlike many other intermediate sanction alternatives, day reporting is of rel- atively recent vintage. While day reporting was used earlier in England, the first day-reporting program in the United States was opened in Massachusetts in 1986 (McDevitt, 1988). This inaugural program was designed as an early release from prison and jail placement for inmates approaching their parole or discharge date. Participants in the program were required to report to the cen- ter each day (hence the name, “day reporting”), prepare an itinerary for their next day’s activities, and report by telephone to the center throughout the day (Larivee, 1990). By 1992, there were six day-reporting centers in operation in Massachusetts with average daily populations ranging from 30 to more than 100 offenders.

Parent (1990) reported that by the late 1980s, day-reporting programs were operational in six states, and many more states were considering the option. The characteristics of these programs and the clients they served varied con- siderably. As McDevitt and Miliano (1992:153) noted, “Although all centers have similar program elements, such as frequent client contact, formalized scheduling, and drug testing, the operations of different DRCs (day-reporting centers) are quite varied. Therefore, it is difficult to define specifically what a day reporting center is; each center is unique.”

In describing the development of day-reporting centers in Massachusetts, Larivee (1990) noted that these centers were created for the purpose of divert- ing offenders from confinement in local jails. Offenders live at home, but must report once each day to the center and are in telephone contact with the center four times each day. By 1990, there were seven centers serving eight counties

Certain persons on pretrial release, probation, or parole are required to appear at day-reporting centers on a frequent and regular basis in order to participate in services or activities provided by the center or other community agencies. Failure to report or participate is a violation that could cause revocation of conditional release or community supervision. Reports indicate that offenders in these programs must not only physically report to their cen- ters daily but also provide a schedule of planned activities and to participate in designated activities. In addition, offenders must call the centers by phone throughout the day; they can also expect random phone checks by center staff both during the day and at home following curfew. In some programs, offenders must contact their respective centers an average of 60 times weekly and, in all but one, take random drug tests.

Source: Gowdy (1993).

BOx 10.3 Day-repOrtING CeNterS

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277Day-Reporting Centers

and the state department of corrections. An evaluation of Massachusetts day- reporting centers reported that more than two-thirds of day-reporting clients completed programs successfully and only two percent were returned to prison or jail for new crimes or escape (Curtin, 1990). An earlier evaluation of the Hampden County center (the first opened) reported more than 80 percent successful completion of the program and only one percent arrested for a new crime while in the program. Larivee concluded about the Massachusetts day- reporting centers, “Every client in a day-reporting center program would other- wise be incarcerated; additionally, no client is held in the center longer than he or she would be kept in jail … Only four percent of the clients were arrested for a new crime or escape, and none committed a violent offense.”

Parent (1990) reported an assessment of 14 day-reporting centers known to be in operation in 1989. Only three of the centers were operated by public agencies, with the other 11 being administered by private, nonprofit organi- zations. Programs ranged in capacity from 10 offenders to 150, with most being able to accommodate 50 or fewer. A survey of these centers revealed that successful completion of programs varied greatly by center and by type of client. Probation and parole violators and those who had been denied discre- tionary parole release had successful completion rates of about one-third or less, whereas offenders received from institutional work release programs or diverted from jail had completion rates in excess of two-thirds (Parent, 1990). The survey also reported a range in center costs from less than $8 per day per offender to more than $50 per day. The mean cost was nearly $15 per day.

In 1993, Parent, Byrne, Tsarfaty, Valade, and Esselman (1995) replicated this survey, this time contacting 114 day-reporting centers operating in 22 states. Fifty-four of these programs responded to the survey. Most of these respond- ing programs indicated that they had opened after 1991. Most centers were still operated by private, nonprofit organizations and there was still a wide variety in services, programming, and contact requirements. Newer centers, however, were more likely to be operated by public agencies than older ones.

When asked to identify goals of their day-reporting center, respondents to the survey identified four purposes of the programs. The most important purpose, according to respondents, was to provide offenders with access to treatment services. Second most important was to reduce jail and prison crowding. Additional program goals included building political support for the program and the provision of surveillance/public safety.

The survey revealed wide variation in day-reporting center organizations, pop- ulations, costs, and effectiveness. Most centers were operated at the local level by agencies affiliated with the courts. Newer day-reporting centers were likely to serve a preimprisonment population, whereas older centers primarily super- vised offenders released from incarceration. Day-reporting center populations

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included pretrial releasees, offenders diverted from imprisonment, probation and parole violators, and newly released prison and jail inmates. As Parent and colleagues observed (1995:22), “The average negative termination rate for all such programs is 50 percent, with a wide distribution that ranges from 14 to 86 percent.” They found that characteristics of the day-reporting programs were correlated with higher rates of negative termination. The survey did not provide any information specifically concerning the rearrest rates of program partici- pants. Rather, “negative termination” refers to offenders removed from the pro- gram for rule violations, which would include the commission of a new crime.

Centers operated by private agencies were more likely to have high negative termination rates than those operated by public agencies. Those centers offer- ing more services and those using curfews had higher rates of negative termina- tions. Finally, policies toward violations of center rules were related to rates of negative termination. As would be expected, those centers with stricter policies and fewer alternatives within the program were more likely to experience high rates of negative terminations. It may also be that changes in day- reporting populations to include a variety of offender types and an increase in the num- ber of expectations and conditions placed on these offenders (drug testing, mandatory treatment attendance, community service, curfews, etc.) combined to increase the likelihood of program failure. A final correlate of higher rates of negative terminations was line staff turnover. Programs that experienced higher rates of staff turnover also had higher rates of negative terminations. However, “… it is not clear which characteristic influences the other,” as Parent et al. (1995:22) note.

Day-reporting programs offered a variety of services to program participants. Most centers offered job skills, drug abuse education, group and individual counseling, job placement, education, life-skills training, and drug treatment. While most services were provided in-house, it was common for drug treat- ment programs to be offered by providers not located at the day-reporting center. A trend noted in the survey was the tendency for newer, public pro- grams to colocate social service programs with the day-reporting program. The most common in-house programs (those offered at more than three- quarters of the centers) were job-seeking skills, group counseling, and life-skills training.

Community service requires that the offender complete some task that helps the community. It is considered a form of restitution, with labor rather than money being supplied. Common jobs include cleaning neighborhoods, working at nursing homes, painting schools, and doing assorted chores for the elderly. Community service can be a sentence in and of itself or can be included with other sanctions, such as probation.

BOx 10.4 COMMUNIty SerVICe

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279Day-Reporting Centers

The costs of these services are usually paid by the day-reporting center. For some programs, other agencies pay the costs of services such as drug treatment, transitional housing, and education and job placement assistance. Seldom are offenders required to pay for services. The costs of operation ranged from about $10 per offender per day to more than $100 per offender per day, with the aver- age daily cost per offender being slightly more than $35. Public centers were found to generally have lower daily operating costs, and costs increased with the stringency of surveillance/supervision requirements. Costs of day report- ing were found to be more than intensive probation supervision, but less than residential treatment or incarceration.

Talbert House, Inc., a private, nonprofit organization, administers a day-reporting program in Cincinnati, Ohio. The program began in 1994. The objective of the program was to provide an alternative disposition for probationers facing revocation, which combines high levels of supervision and service delivery. The philosophy of the program emphasizes surveillance and compliance with probation supervision requirements. There are seven characteristics or com- ponents of the program:

1. Reporting 7 days each week 2. Development and monitoring of daily itineraries 3. Electronic monitoring 4. Regular, random urinalysis 5. Breath testing 6. Close monitoring of income to ensure payments of court financial requirements 7. Community service work through the Hamilton County Probation Department.

The program operates with a staff of three, including two caseworkers and a manager. Day reporting is ordered as a condition of probation for all referrals. The program excludes those with a history of substance abuse, repeat violent crimes or assaultive behavior, sexual offenses against minors, a long-standing association with organized crime, or a conviction for arson. Additionally, clients are required to consent to treatment prior to acceptance to the program. Cases referred to the center are given a risk/needs assessment. Offenders must report to the center 7 days each week, provide urine and breath tests as requested, and, if unemployed, must participate in employment-seeking activities. Offenders meet with center staff each afternoon to participate in program activities until 5:00 p.m., when they leave to return home or go to other arranged treatment activities. Offenders stay in the program between 1 and 6 months, based on judicial stipulation. The program currently serves about 10 offenders per day. The center pro- vides in-house treatment, including individual and group counseling by appropriately licensed/ registered staff. Other services include chemical dependency, case management, introduction to Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous, life skills education, HIV education, bud- geting, and nutrition. Additional services available to offenders include education, parenting, financial management, community service, mental health services, and leisure. The goals of the programs are identified as:

BOx 10.5 the talBert hOUSe Day-repOrtING CeNter


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Unfortunately, there have not been many empirical studies of day-reporting centers. Latessa, Travis, Holsinger, and Hartman (1998) examined five pilot day-reporting programs in Ohio. Offenders from the day-reporting programs were compared to offenders supervised under regular probation, intensive program, and those released from prison. Rearrest and incarceration rates for each group are presented in Figures 10.4 and 10.5. Rates of rearrest for the day-reporting group were slightly higher than those reported for the other groups. The incarceration rates indicate that the day-reporting group per- formed slightly better than those offenders supervised under intensive super- vision, worse than those on regular probation, and similar to those released from prison. Noteworthy, the authors also found that the quality of the treat- ment provided by the five day-reporting centers in this study was judged to be poor.

1. Provide a community sanction option for probation violators. 2. Identify problems facing offenders that may lead to criminality. 3. Provide on-site or community referral to treat those problems. 4. Provide for public safety through intensive supervision, accountability, and retribution.

BOx10.5 the talBert hOUSe Day-repOrtING CeNter—CONt’D

Figure 10.4 Ohio day-reporting study: Rearrest rates. Source: Latessa, Travis, Holsinger et al. (1998).







42.0% Probation PrisonISP Day


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Home Detention 281

hOMe DeteNtION House arrest, usually conjuring up images of political control and fascist repres- sion, is court-ordered home detention in this nation, confining offenders to their households for the duration of sentence (Meecham, 1986). Introduced in 1984 in Florida, home detention spread rapidly throughout a nation searching for punitive, safe, and secure alternatives to incarceration (Maxfield & Baumer, 1990). The sentence is usually in conjunction with probation but may be imposed by the court as a separate punishment (as in Florida). Florida’s Community Control Program (FCCP) was designed to provide a safe diversion alternative and help address the problem of prison population escalation and associated high costs (Flynn, 1986).

Participants may be required to make victim compensation, perform com- munity work service, pay probation fees, undergo alcohol or other drug testing, and, in some instances, wear electronic monitoring equipment to verify their presence in the residence. (In some jurisdictions, house arrest is used on a pretrial basis,6 as an isolated sentence, in conjunction with probation or parole, or with a prerelease status such as education or work furlough.) House arrest only allows the offender to leave her or his resi- dence for specific purposes and hours approved by the court or supervising officer, and being absent without leave is a technical violation of conditions that may result in resentencing to jail or prison (Government Accounting Office, 1990).

Home detention is a punitive sentence and was designed in most cases to relieve institutional overcrowding. For many offenders, it is their “last chance” to escape from being committed to prison. In addition to surveillance of the offender, home detention is viewed as a cost-avoidance program, a “front- end” solution to prison overcrowding, and a flexible alternative for certain offenders (such as a pregnant offender until time of delivery). The use of telemonitoring devices, discussed later as “Electronic Monitoring Programs,” can significantly increase the correctional surveillance of offenders.

6A discussion of the issues can be found in Goldkamp (1993). See also Rosen (1993); and McCann, and Weber (1993).

Figure 10.5 Ohio day-reporting study: Incarceration rates. Source: Latessa, Travis, Holsinger, et al. (1998)


35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0%

Probation PrisonISP Day Reporting

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The most significant critical argument7 against home detention is that, by mak- ing a nonincarcerative control mechanism available to corrections, many petty offenders are brought under correctional control who would best be handled by diversion, fines, or mental health services. In general, such inclusive actions are viewed as “net-widening,” which occurs when offenders are sentenced to community control who might otherwise have received a lesser or even no sentence.

The National Council on Crime and Delinquency conducted an evaluation of the FCCP and concluded that the impact on prison crowding, offender behav- ior, and state correctional costs has been positive. With an estimated prison diversion rate of 54 percent, community control is cost-effective, despite the combined effect of net-widening and the punishments imposed on almost 10 percent of FCCP participants for technical violations. Furthermore, the new offense rate for community control offenders is lower than for similar offenders sentenced to prison and released without supervision. For every 100 cases diverted from prison, Florida saved more than $250,000 (Wagner and Baird, 1993).

Home detention is an option that has been widely used for many years with juvenile offenders, who are usually remanded to the care of their parents. It is also used for nonviolent adult offenders and, as mentioned previously, is often used in conjunction with electronic monitoring.

electronic Monitoring

Home detention has a long history as a criminal penalty but its new popularity with correctional authorities is due to the advent of electronic monitoring, a technological link thought to make the sanction both practical and affordable (see Figure 10.6).

The concept of electronic monitoring is not new, having been proposed in 1964 by Schwitzgebel, Pahnke, and Hurd as “electronic parole” and initially used to monitor the location of mental patients.8 The first studies of home detention enforced by electronic monitoring began in 1986 and, by early 1992, there were at least 40,000 electronic monitors in use (Gowdy, 1993). It is used almost everywhere in the justice system after arrest (see Figure 10.7).

7See in particular Rackmill (1994). An empirical analysis can be found in Stanz and Tewksbury (2000) 8Schwitzgebel, Schwitzgebel, Pahnke, and Hurd (1964). See also Gable (1986); and Lilly, Ball, and Lotz (1986).

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Home Detention 283

According to the Bureau of Justice Assistance (1989:3), the goals and objectives of elec- tronic monitoring are to:

n Provide a cost-effective community supervision tool for offenders selected according to specific program criteria

n Administer sanctions appropriate to the seriousness of the offense

n Promote public safety by providing surveillance and risk control strategies indicated by the risk and needs of the offenders

n Increase the confidence of legislative, judicial, and releasing authorities in ISP designs as a viable sentencing option

Electronic monitoring can be active or passive. In active monitoring, a trans- mitter attached to the offender’s wrist or ankle sends signals relayed by a home telephone to the supervising office during the hours the offender is required to be at home. Under passive monitoring, a computer program is used to call the offender randomly during the hours designated for home confinement. The offender inserts the wristlet or anklet into a verifier to confirm her or his pres- ence in the residence. There does not appear to be any difference in recidivism

Figure 10.6 Electronic monitoring devices in use. Source: National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (1999). Data for 2003 estimated.








0 1992 1998 2003

Figure 10.7 Key decision points where electronic monitoring (EM) is being used. Source: Bureau of Justice Assistance (February, 1989).

Initial arraignment

Pretrial detention

Trial/ sentencing

Parole release


Pretrial release to EM program

Diversion to residential community corrections (RCC) program with

EM component

Direct sentence

to EM

EM as a condition

of probation

EM at prelease centers

back-end EM


Front-end EM


EM as a parole


EM as a halfway- in option

for probation violators

EM as a halfway

back option for

parole violators

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between those on passive or active systems. Only about one in three offenders on home detention wear monitoring devices (Petersilia, 1987).

National surveys indicate that electronic monitoring was initially (1987) used for property offenders on probation but that a much broader range of offenders was being monitored (1989) than in the past. Monitoring has been expanded to include not only probationers, but also to follow-up on persons after incar- ceration, to control those sentenced to community corrections, and to monitor persons before trial or sentencing.

A 1989 survey on telemonitoring found:

n Most jurisdictions using electronic monitoring tested some offenders for drug use, and many routinely tested all. Some sites charged for the testing; more than 66 percent charged offenders for at least part of the cost of leasing the monitoring equipment.

n The average monitoring term in 1989 was 79 days—the longer the period of monitoring, the higher the odds of success. The chances of termination do not vary by type of offense, except that those committing major traffic violations committed fewer technical violations and new offenses.

n There were no significant differences in successful terminations among probationers, offenders on parole, or those in community corrections. All had successful terminations rates ranging between 74 and 86 percent. (West Palm Beach, Florida reported a 97 percent successful completion rate in 1992.)

The use of active global positioning system (GPS) technology was implemented in Florida in 1997 and utilizes global positioning satellites to track offender’s locations in “real time.” Offenders monitored with active GPS are required to wear ankle bracelets that commu- nicate with a larger device carried by offenders at all times, called a monitoring tracking device (MTD). The MTD communicates with a satellite and transmits a signal to a monitor- ing center through a cell phone. The MTD has an LCD screen to display messages to the offenders from supervising officers. Officers are able to track the exact location of offenders on a computer screen to determine if they have violated the conditions of supervision by entering prohibited areas. Currently, there are more than 14,300 offenders in Florida on EM including probation, community control, and postprison. Of these, about 2200 are on more advanced GPS.

Source: Bales, Mann, Bloomberg, McManus, and K Dhungana (2010).


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n Rule violations resulted in reincarceration, brief confinement at a residential facility, intensified office-reporting requirements, stricter curfews, or additional community service (Gowdy, 1993).

More recent evaluations in Oklahoma, Florida, Los Angeles, California, England and Wales,9 Lake County, Illinois,10 and Texas indicated some success of electronic monitoring program, whereas others (Courtright, Berg, & Mutchnick, 1997) have found little evidence that there is an impact on recidivism rates. Figure 10.8 shows the program termination from an electronic monitoring program operating in Cleveland, Ohio (Latessa, 1992). This program also gave program participants an exit survey. Table 10.2 shows offender responses to selected questions.

Despite the widespread use of electronic monitoring and the support it has received by some, empirical studies have not been as favorable. A meta- analysis that included an examination of the research on electronic monitoring found that, on average, the effect size was 0.05, indicating that, on average, electronic monitoring increased recidivism about five percent over comparison groups (Gendreau, Goggin, Cullen, & Andrews, 2000)(see Figure 10.9). Note that the authors also examined research on Scared Straight programs and found that, on average, they increased recidivism rates about seven percent.

Perhaps the most interesting study involving electronic monitoring was con- ducted in Canada (Bonta et al., 2000). In this study, offenders were first assessed with regard to risk and need factors using the Level of Supervision Inventory (LSI) and, in addition to electronic monitoring, were required to attend an intensive treatment program. Results from this study are displayed in Figure 10.10. The combination of electronic monitoring and intensive treatment services resulted in a reduction of recidivism for high-risk offend- ers of about 20 percent, but more than doubled the recidivism rates for low- risk offenders. Undoubtedly, this is another example of the harm that can come from targeting low-risk offenders with intensive treatment and super- vision programs.

9Mair (1989). See also Lilly (1990); and National Association for the Care of Offenders and the Prevention of Crime (1989). 10Enor, Block, and Quinn (1992).

Figure 10.8 Program termination from electronic monitoring program. Source: Latessa (1991).

Arrested as violator 24.0%

Absconded 4.0%

Success 72.0%

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table 10.2 Results from Exit Interview with Electronic Monitoring Participants

Before this program have you ever served time in prison or jail? No 44% Yes 56% Do you think the program is better or worse than being in jail? Worse 5% Neither better nor worse 13% Better 82% To what extent did you find the transmitter comfortable or uncomfortable to wear? Uncomfortable 25% Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 44% Comfortable 31% Since you have been on the monitoring program, how well do you get along with the people with whom you live? Better 22% About the same as before 72% Worse 6% While you were on the monitoring program, did you find that you had more or less money than you did before? Less money 30% About the same 33% More money 37% Since being on the monitoring program, do you find you have more or fewer friends? Fewer friends 42% About the same number of friends 50% More friends 8% Do you have the same friends now that you had when you began the monitoring program? Same friends 65% Different friends 35% Did you find the monitoring program better or worse than you expected it would be? Better 44% About as I expected it would be 48% Worse 8% Did anyone ask what the transmitter was? No 30% Yes 70% Were you able to violate any of the rules of the program without being caught by the monitoring equipment and/or the probation officer? No 87% Yes 13%

Source: Latessa (1991)

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Shock Incarceration Programs 287

ShOCK INCarCeratION prOGraMS Technically, shock incarceration programs, or “boot camps,” as they are commonly known, are institu- tional correctional programs, not community-based ones. However, they are considered intermediate sanctions and are a distant cousin to shock proba- tion programs.11 The most recent shock incarcera- tion programs appeared first in Georgia (1983) and Oklahoma (1984). The concept spread quickly and, in 2000, 54 boot camp programs had opened in 41 state correctional jurisdictions and handled more than 21,000 inmates in 2000 (Camp & Camp, 2000), in addition to many pro- grams developed and being considered in cities and counties, and for juveniles (Gover, MacKenzie, & Styve, 2000).

While labeled a recent innovation, the basic elements of boot camp were pres- ent in the Elmira Reformatory in 1876, designed by Zebulon Reed Brockway.








0.0% Electronic Monitoring

Scared Straight

Figure 10.9 Average effect size from studies of electronic monitoring and Scared Straight programs: Percent increase in recidivism. Source: Adapted from Gendreau et al. (2000).

Figure 10.10 Intensive rehabilitation supervision in Canada. Source: Bonta et al. (2000).









High risk Low risk


11Shock probation originated in Ohio in 1965 and was designed to give first-time young adult offenders a “taste of the bars.” Offenders were to be sentenced to prison and then within 30–120 days be released on probation. It was assumed that the physical and psychological hardships of prison life would “shock” the offender straight.

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In its current developments, boot camp combines elements of military basic training and traditional correctional philosophy, particularly rehabilitation. Although there is no generic boot camp because individual programs vary in form and objectives, the typical boot camp is targeted at young, nonviolent offenders.12 Once in the camp, the participant is subjected to a regimen of (1) military drills and discipline, (2) physical exercise, (3) hard physical labor, (4) specialized education and training, and (5) counseling and treatment for substance abuse and addiction.

Most boot camp programs require the inmates to volunteer, offering as an incentive an incarceration period of a few months, compared to the much lon- ger periods they would have spent in prison or on probation. Generally, a state boot camp graduate is released to parole, intensive supervision, home confine- ment, or some type of community corrections.

The philosophy behind the prison boot camps is simple. Offenders who can be turned around before they commit a major crime can improve their own opportunities for living a successful life free of incarceration. Traditional prisons generally have not been viewed as successful in rehabilitating offenders.

According to boot camp advocates, the population at greatest risk of entering prison is the young adult who is poorly educated, comes from a low-income background, has not had proper role models or discipline, has little or no work skills, and is subjected to an environment in which drug use and drug traffick- ing are common. Because many misdirected young persons have become pro- ductive citizens after exposure to military training, the boot camp endeavors to provide this same discipline and direction to persons who still have a chance of being diverted from a life of crime and incarceration.

[R]esearch indicates that although there is a common core of military-type drill and discipline within these programs, there are also wide variations in their operations, activities, time served, number served, release procedures, and aftercare. The rigorous physical exercise, military drill and discipline, as well as the housing barracks and other noninstitutional characteristics, distinguish correctional boot camps from traditional prisons and jails.

Michael russell, acting Director, National Institute of Justice, 1993

BOx 10.7 ShOCK INCarCeratION

12The bulk of the following section is drawn from Government Accounting Office, Prison Boot Camps. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1993.

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The boot camp concept appeals to diverse elements of the justice system. For the offender, it offers a second chance. He or she generally will be returned to the community in a much shorter period without the stigma of having been in prison. For the judge, it is a sentencing option that provides sanctions more restrictive than probation but less restrictive than a conventional prison. For the correctional system, it allows the placement of individuals outside the tra- ditional prison environment and reduces costs and crowding by moving the persons through the system in less time.

The boot camp concept also appeals to groups with diverse views on the objec- tives of corrections. For those who believe that corrections should focus more on rehabilitation, the shorter sentence, structured environment, supervision after release, and emphasis on training and treatment can be found in the boot camp. For those who believe that prisons should serve as punishment and a deterrent, the highly disciplined environment, military-style drills, physical exercise, and work within a correctional setting exist in the boot camp. Although boot camps are most often associated with prisons, probation and parole agencies also oper- ate boot camps. According to Camp and Camp (2000), 19 probation and parole agencies operate 32 boot camps and served almost 3000 offenders per year.

Results from studies of the effectiveness of boot camp programs in reducing recidivism have not been positive. Some programs have abandoned the mil- itary-style training and incorporated educational, wilderness, job corps, and industrial components (Gowdy, 1993). An outcome study conducted in Texas (1999) compared the rearrest rates of four different types of community facili- ties for adult offenders: boot camps, treatment centers, intermediate sanction facilities (used for probation violators), and substance abuse treatment facili- ties. Results are presented in Figure 10.11.

Figure 10.11 Rearrest rates for residents discharged from community correctional facilities in Texas: 2 year follow-up (percent). Source: Community Corrections Facilities Outcome Study, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, January 1999.





0.0% Boot camp Treatment

center I.S. Facilities S.A. Treatment


35.9% 18.2% 15.7% 16.7%

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The boot camp reported rearrest rates nearly double the other programs. It should also be noted that when risk and need scores from a standardized assessment tool were compared for offenders in all four programs, the only difference was in the need scores, with boot camp residents reporting fewer higher-need offenders than the other options. Finally, a meta-analysis con- ducted by researchers in Washington State (Aos, Phipps, Barnoski, & Lieb, 1999) found that, on average, juvenile boot camps increased recidivism rates about 11 percent. Some other findings from boot camp evaluations make the following conclusions.

n Low- or moderate-risk juvenile and adult offenders who are subjected to a high level of supervision (boot camps) actually do worse than those left on traditional probation (Altschuler & Armstrong, 1994).

n High percentages of minority youths are served by boot camps: conclusion is that the boot camp model fails to connect with this population.

n Some evidence that the rate of recidivism declined in boot camp programs for adults where offenders spent 3 hours or more per day in therapeutic activity and had some type of aftercare (MacKenzie & Souryal, 1994).

n In general, studies have found similar recidivism rates for those who completed boot camps and comparable offenders who spent long periods of time in prison.

More recent evaluations of boot camps have also produced unfavorable results regarding their effectiveness in reducing recidivism (Bottcher & Ezell, 2005; Weis, Whitemarsh, & Wilson, 2005).

Despite their continued popularity, there are several reasons that boot camps are not producing the desired reductions in recidivism. Boot camps tend to:

— Bond delinquent and criminal groups together — Target noncrime-producing needs such as physical conditioning,

drill and ceremony, and self-esteem — Mix low-, medium-, and high-risk offenders together — Model aggressive behavior

DrUG COUrtS Although some might not consider drug courts an intermediate sanction, it appears that they fall into this category when you consider that they usually combine close probation supervision with substance abuse treatment in an attempt to keep the offender from being incarcerated. Indeed, the phenomenal

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Drug Courts 291

growth and expansion of drug courts can be largely attributed to the dissatis- faction of traditional methods of dealing with drug offenders and the belief that drug courts will reduce substance abuse and criminal behavior through close judicial monitoring and community-based treatment services. As of 1998, there were a total of 275 drug courts in operation, serving an estimated 90,000 offenders (Drug Court Programs Office, 1998). As of 2009, that number had grown to nearly 2500. Table 10.3 shows the number and types of drug courts in operation.

According to Belenko (1998), drug courts differ from traditional courts in sev- eral important ways. First, drug courts attempt to manage cases quickly and make provisions for the treatment to start as soon as possible after arrest. Second, drug courts have adopted a collaborative rather than an adversarial approach found in most traditional courts. Third, judges in drug courts are actively involved in the cases, holding regular status hearings, meeting regularly with treatment providers and probation officers, and providing feedback to the offender. Finally, drug courts focus on providing treatment services rather than simply increasing sanctions.

Drug Court effectiveness

Despite the rapid expansion of drug courts and their growing prevalence and popularity, there is limited research to support their widespread effec- tiveness. Because they differ substantially among jurisdictions, it is dif- ficult to determine if drug courts are effective. Similarly, it is difficult to identify which components or combinations of features are contributing to success or failure. Some evidence, however, suggested that drug courts have been successful at reducing drug use and recidivism among program participants.

table 10.3 Drug Courts Today

2459 drug courts in operation as of the end of 2009

n  1317 adult drug courts of which 354 are hybrid DWI/drug courts n  476 juvenile drug courts n  322 family drug courts n  79 tribal drug courts n  172 designated DWI courts n  5 campus drug courts n  29 reentry drug courts n  19 veterans courts

Source: National Drug Courts Institute:

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Evaluations of drug courts are finally beginning to emerge in the literature base. For example, research on the impact of the first drug court to emerge in 1989 in Dade County, Florida, has provided insight into the drug court model. Outcome findings include lower incarceration rates, longer time to rearrest, and less frequent rearrest among participants (Goldkamp, 1994). Goldkamp (1994) did find higher failure-to-appear rates among drug court participants, but attributes these rates to the frequency of appearances required by the court. Further, an analysis of the Maricopa County (Arizona) Drug Court demonstrated reductions in recidivism and an overall delay in rearrest rates among drug court participants (Hepburn, Johnston, & Rogers, 1994). Data from the Escambia County (Florida) Drug Court indicate that graduates are significantly less likely to be rearrested in comparison to non- graduates of the program (Peters, Haas, & Murrin, 1999; Peters and Murrin, 2000). Finally, a meta-analysis conducted by Shaffer (2006) determined that drug courts reduced recidivism by 9 percent. Results also indicated that adult drug court programs tended to be more effective than juvenile drug court pro- grams. Shaffer’s quantitative review included a total of 83 effect sizes, rep- resenting 76 distinct drug courts and six aggregated drug court programs (Shaffer, 2006).

In an effort to predict treatment success, researchers explored the relation- ship between individual characteristics and treatment success. Specifically, Schiff and Terry (1997:305) explored the impact of a treatment-oriented drug court in Broward County, Florida, and found that “higher education levels and decreased levels of prior crack cocaine use increase the chances of program graduation.” In addition, a study of the Denver (Colorado) Drug Court found that offenders with more extensive involvement with drugs are more likely to be revoked from treatment (Granfield, Eby, & Brewster, 1998). Similarly, one study of the Dade County Drug Court reported that defendants who reported high levels of drug use at program entry showed the poorest performance in the program (Goldkamp & Weiland, 1993). Finally, reports from the Escambia County Drug Court explored the differences between graduates and nongrad- uates and found several differences. Specifically, graduates had fewer prior arrests; were more likely to have completed high school or obtained a GED certificate, report full-time employment, and report living with their parents; and were less likely to report cocaine as their drug of choice (Peters et al., 1999). In the meta-analysis conducted by Shaffer (2006), important modera- tors included the amount of leverage that the drug court holds over partici- pants; the involvement of qualified, competent staff members; and adequate treatment intensity.

Although a great deal of the research on drug courts is promising, other stud- ies are providing reason for pause. For example, a number of courts across the county have failed to show evidence of a reduction in criminal behavior

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293Effectiveness of Intermediate Sanctions

as measured by rearrest (Belenko, Fagan, & Dumanovsky, 1994; Deschenes & Greenwood, 1994; Granfield et al., 1998; Harrell, 1998; Johnson & Latessa, 1998; Johnson, Sundt, Holsinger, & Latessa, 1998). Although it is difficult to determine why some programs are failing to show evidence of effectiveness, the correctional treatment literature provides a strong case that the quality and content of the treatment programs may have an impact (Johnson, Hubbard, & Latessa, 2000).

Johnson and colleagues (2000) identified some ways that drug courts can increase their effectiveness:

n Improve the assessment of offenders by using standardized and objective instruments that provide levels of risk and need and which cover all major risk and need factors, not just substance abuse

n Use behavioral and cognitive treatment strategies n Provide at least 100 h of direct treatment services and make sure the

level of treatment is matched to the need and risk of the offender n Provide structured aftercare n Monitor the delivery of treatment services

Drug courts will continue to play an important role in community correc- tions. In many ways, they represent the future and the hope that we will see the collaboration of close supervision practices and high-quality and effective treatment and services for offenders. Based in part on the popularity of drug courts, several jurisdictions have started other specialization courts, including those for the mentally ill and for domestic violence offenders. Only time will tell if these initiatives prove to be effective.

eFFeCtIVeNeSS OF INterMeDIate SaNCtIONS There are many justifications for the use of intermediate sanctions as an alter- native to incarceration. However, given the investment that many jurisdictions and states have made in these options, the question of how effective they are in reducing recidivism is an important one. In a National Institute of Justice study of what works, Sherman et al. (1998) listed a number of intermediate sanctions that have not demonstrated effectiveness. Included were correc- tional boot camps, shock probation, home detention with electronic moni- toring, intensive supervision programs, and wildness programs for youthful offenders. In a meta-analysis of intermediate sanctions, Gendreau, Goggin, and Fulton (1996) addressed this question. They examined research results from 44 ISP programs, 16 restitution programs, 13 boot camps, 13 Scared Straight programs, nine drug-testing programs, and six electronic monitor- ing programs. They found virtually no effect on recidivism, and where they

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did find some effect it appeared that some sanctions slightly increased recidi- vism! They conclude that “the ‘get tough’ revolution has been an abject fail- ure when it comes to reducing recidivism.”

Many of the “intermediate sanctions” that have been developed over the past few years are but a few examples of “programs” that often fail to live up to their expectations, particularly in terms of reductions in recidivism (Latessa, Travis, & Holsinger, 1997; Petersilia, 1997). These results are often attributed to policies that emphasize control and surveillance over treatment and service delivery (Fulton et al., 1997). While programs such as boot camps, Scared Straight, and other “punishing smarter” programs remain popular, there is little evidence that they will lead to reductions in recidivism. Unfortunately, evidence seems to indicate that in some cases, these so-called “punishing smarter” programs actually increase recidivism rates.

In a study funded by the National Institute of Justice, Sherman and colleagues (1998) summarized what does not work in reducing recidivism.

— Correctional boot camps using traditional military basic training — Drug prevention classes focused on fear and other emotional

appeals, — including self-esteem, such as DARE — School-based, leisure-time enrichment programs — “Scared Straight” programs where juvenile offenders visit adult

prisons — Shock probation, shock parole, and split sentences adding time to

probation or parole — Home detention with electronic monitoring — Intensive supervision — Rehabilitation programs using vague, unstructured counseling — Residential programs for juvenile offenders using challenging

experiences in rural settings

SUMMary Intermediate sanctions have become a vital component of contemporary corrections. Two developments have led to a search for innovative and cost- effective programs: prison and jail crowding and the development of new tech- nologies, such as electronic monitoring and readily available drug testing. Not only are institutions crowded, probation, parole, and community corrections are also impacted by the waves of offenders caught in the arms of the law.

Our review of intermediate sanctions provides insight into the reasons for the volume of clients, but also programs and strategies for managing the risks posed by different types of offenders who need differing treatments and supervision.

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Intermediate sanctions will likely continue, despite the mixed findings con- cerning their effectiveness. The critical question is whether we can take what we have learned from programs that are demonstrating reductions in recidivism and apply it to approaches that are not working. Day-reporting centers, drug courts, and other treatment-based options appear to offer the best hope that we can currently foresee for delivering effective interventions and services to offenders in the community. Change will continue. This is an exciting time for corrections as a field and for students wishing to impact on the futures of cli- ents and the safety of communities.

reVIew QUeStIONS 1. Define intermediate sanctions. 2. Why are boot camps so popular among the general public? 3. What is “intensive supervision?” 4. What are the two basic types of electronic monitoring programs? 5. What are some of the limitations of electronic monitoring programs? 6. What do we know about the effectiveness of intensive supervision

programs? 7. Why are day-reporting programs gaining popularity? 8. Explain how drug courts differ from traditional courts. 9. What are some of the reasons that boot camps have failed to reduce


reCOMMeNDeD reaDINGS Marciniak, L. (2000). The addition of day reporting to intensive supervised probation. Federal

Probation, 64(2), 34–39.

Morris, N., & Tonry, M. (1990). Between prison and probation: Intermediate punishments in a rational sentencing system. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P., & Bushway, S. (1998). Preventing crime: what works, what doesn’t, what’s promising. National Institute of Justice, Research in Brief. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

reFereNCeS Altschuler, D., & Armstrong, T. (1994). Intensive aftercare for high-risk juveniles: A community care

model. Program summary. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dept. of Justice.

American Correctional Association (1990). Intermediate punishment: community-based sanctions. Baltimore, MD: United Book Press.

Aos, S., Phipps, P., Barnoski, R., & Lieb, R. (1999). The comparative costs and benefits of programs to reduce crime: A review of the National Research findings with implications for Washington State. Olympia, WA: Washington State Institute for Public Policy.

Bales, W., Mann, K., Bloomberg, T., McManus, B., & Dhungana, K. (2010). Electronic monitoring in Florida. The Journal of Electronic Monitoring, 22(2), 5–12.

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