reflection paper

The CIA and the "Secret" War in Laos:

The Battle for Skyline Ridge, 1971-72

by

William M. Leary

University of Georgia

Between December 1971 and May 1972, one of the great

battles of the Vietnam War took place in northern Laos when

over 20 battalions of the North Vietnamese army assaulted

positions held by some 10,000 Lao, Thai, and Hmong

defenders. Yet few people ever have heard of the Battle for

Skyline Ridge. Press coverage of the engagement was slight,

and public interest - at least in the United States - was

minimal. Historians of the Vietnam War also have ignored

this major battle, perhaps because it had limited impact on

the outcome of the war. Still, the Battle for Skyline Ridge

deserves to be remembered. The culmination of efforts by

the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to direct a major and

lengthy war in Asia, it was an impressive - if temporary -

victory for the anti-Communist forces in Laos.

By 1971, the no-longer-secret war in Laos had been

going on for more than a decade.! Prior to the Geneva

Agreements of July 1962 on the neutrality of Laos, United

States military personnel had taken the leading role in

training and advising indigenous forces. Indeed, under the

terms of the Geneva Agreements, which called for the removal

of all foreign military personnel from Laos, the United

States withdrew 666 individuals. 2 The Central Intelligence

Agency, by contrast, had only nine paramilitary specialists,

assisted by 99 Thai Special Forces-type members of the

Police Aerial Reconnaissance Unit (PARU), assigned to train

and support Hmong tribal forces in the northern part of

1

Laos, which constituted the Agency's main program in the

country.3

When fighting broke out again in Laos in 1963 and 1964,

officials in Washington considered reintroducing a sizable

number of U.S. military personnel into the country to train

and advise the Royal Lao Army. Leonard Unger, the American

ambassador in Vientiane, opposed the idea. "As will be

recalled," he cabled the State Department in June 1964,

"experience in "61-62 with MAAG [Military Assistance and

Advisory Group] was not a happy one. MAAG and White Star

[Special Forces] teams did a highly commendable job under

difficult circumstances, but their experience demonstrated

that it is almost impossible to put any real spine into FAR

[Forces Armee Royale or Royal Lao Army].'"

Acting upon Unger's recommendation, Washington decided

to maintain the thin fiction of the Geneva Agreements -

which the Communist Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese

backers had ignored but never formallY repudiated. The

ineffective Royal Lao Army would be given a minimum of

support. At the same time, the Central Intelligence Agency

was assigned responsibility to train, advise, and support

Hmong forces in northern Laos, and to recruit, train,

advise, and support volunteer Lao troops in the southern

part of the country. The CIA presence in Laos was to remain

small. As Unger's successor, William L. Sullivan,

explained, Unger was a "most reluctant militarist and took

2

care in establishing the paramilitary operation to be sure

it was designed to be reversible. Consequently, only a

small portion of it was actually present in Laos, and all

its supporting elements were housed in Thailand, under a

secret agreement with the Thai."5

Between 1964 and 1967, the CIA-supported Hmong army in

northern Laos, the main area of conflict, fought a highly

successful guerrilla war against a mixed force of Pathet Lao

and North Vietnamese troops. The high point of this phase

of the war came in the summer of 1967. Royal Lao Army and

Hmong units had blunted the enemy's dry season offensive of

winter-spring 1966-67, causing local CIA officials to issue

an optimistic appraisal of the situation in Laos. Hmong

forces, a CIA Intelligence Information Cable argued, had

gained the upper hand in the war: "They now have the option

of attempting a permanent change in the tactical balance of

power in North Laos."6

Unfortunately, the North Vietnamese recognized the

danger. Beginning in January 1968, Hanoi introduced major

new forces into Laos and relegated the Pathet Lao to a

support role for the remainder of the war. By March, the

CIA estimated that there were 35,000 North Vietnamese

regular troops in Laos - and the number would continue to

grow. 1

The fighting in Laos took on a more conventional

character, characterized by engagements between large units.

3

This type of warfare took a heavy toll on the Hmong. In the

first five months of 1968, the Hmong lost over 1,000 men,

including many top commanders. A recruiting drive turned up

only 300 replacements, and most of these were under the age

of 14 or over 35. 8 And the situation only grew worse. By

April 1970, the CIA acknowledged that Hmong losses had

crippled the effectiveness of the tribal forces. The Hmong

had fought well, a CIA estimate observed, but "they are

battle weary and their losses over the past year or so have

exceeded their capability to replace them."9

Lao authorities, recognizing the declining strength of

the Hmong, in June 1970 asked the Thai government to supply

regular troops to fend off the North Vietnamese. While the

Thais were anxious to stop the North Vietnamese short of the

Mekong River, they were reluctant to send regular army units

into Laos and thereby take a more prominent role in the war.

Instead, officials in Bangkok agreed to recruit "volunteer"

battalions which would be led by regular army officers and

NCOs. The cost of the units would be underwritten by the

U. S. government .10

On the eve of the Battle for Skyline Ridge, 1971-72,

the CIA's presence had grown far beyond Ambassador Unger's

minimalist objectives due to the expanding nature of the

war, but it still remained small, especially inside Laos.

According to one knowledgeable CIA official, the total

number of people at Udorn and inside Laos - "including all

4

support personnel, the contract wives, and some military

detailee technicians" - never exceeded 225. This included

some 50 case officers. 11

At the top of the command structure for the conduct of

the war stood Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley. By

presidential directive, the ambassador was responsible for

"overall direction, coordination and supervision" of all

military operations in Laos. Godley, by all accounts,

brought a great deal of interest and enthusiasm to the job.

He presided over daily "operations meetings" at the embassy,

lasting from 9 A.M. to 10:30 A.M. (or later), at which he

received detailed briefings from military and intelligence

personnel on developments in the war over the preceding 24

hours. 12

Godley delegated responsibility for the tactical

conduct of the war to his CIA station chief, B. Hugh Tovar.

An experienced and respected intelligence officer who had

served with the Office of Strategic Services during World

War II and had been a member of a small OSS team that had

operated in Laos at the end of the war, Tovar preferred to

exert a general supervision over military affairs and allow

his subordinates to handle the operational details .13

In conformity with Ambassador Unger's original

organizational scheme, the primary CIA headquarters for the

conduct of the war - in effect Tovar's "executive agent" -

was not in Laos but in Thailand." Located in a two-story

5

block building adjacent to an aircraft parking ramp at Udorn

Royal Thai Air Force Base, the 4802d Joint Liaison

Detachment was the CIA's command center for military

operations in Laos. In charge of the 4802d was Lloyd "Pat"

Landry, a paramilitary specialist who had been involved in

Laotian affairs for more than a decade. "As a boss," one

junior officer recalled, "he had a reputation of being blunt

and having the capability to make hard decisions and

sticking to them."15

Landry's chief of operations was George C. Morton, a

retired Green Beret colonel who earlier had "laid the

foundations of the Special Forces effort in Vietnam. "16

Other CIA officers oversaw air operations, photographic and

communications intelligence, order-of-battle assessments,

and coordinated military operations and requirements with

7/13 Air Force headquarters, also located at Udorn. 17

Finally, Landry had excellent rapport with General Vitoon

Yasawatdi ("Dhep"), commander of "Headquarters 333," the

Thai organiz~tion in charge of their forces in Laos.18

Lines of authority ran from Udorn to CIA regional

headquarters in Laos at Pakse, Savannakhet, Long Tieng,

Luang Prabang, and Nam Lieu. The most important of the five

subunits was Long Tieng, the major logistical and

operational base in Military Region II, and headquarters of

Major General Vang Pao, Hmong tribal leader and commander of

the Region. 19 Joseph R. Johnson, the CIA's chief of unit at

6

-----_._------- - -- -- -------

Long Tieng, oversaw some twenty or so paramilitary and

support personnel who advised Hmong and Thai units. He also

directed the activities of Air America, a CIA-owned airline,

and Continental Air Services, a contract air carrier. His

chief of operations, Jerome A. Daniels, who had the

confidence of Vang Pao, was responsible for coordinating

military activities in the Region, especially those relating

to the Hmong. Major Jesse E. Scott commanded the U.S. Air

Force's Air Operations Center at Long Tieng and (nominally)

the ten U.S. Air Force forward air controllers, who used the

radio call sign "Raven."W

The United States in 1971 was in the process of

withdrawing from Vietnam. President Richard M. Nixon had

proclaimed in 1969 that Asia boys should fight Asian wars.

By the end of 1970, U.S. troop strength was down to 280,000,

and declining rapidly. With regard to Laos - where Asia

boys were fighting Asian wars - the Nixon administration

adopted a defensive posture. Like Kennedy before him, Nixon

wanted a neutral Laos that would serve as a buffer between

pro-Western Thailand and the aggressive intentions of North

Vietnam and China. However, it was clear by 1971 that

Laotian neutrality would have to be achieved without a major

commitment of U.S. power.

Early in 1971, the Royal Lao government ordered General

Vang Pao to seize as much territory as possible in Military

Region II before Congressional restraints reduced available

7

u.s. air sorties to 32 per day after July 1. Vang Pao

launched a major offensive in June. Effectively using his

air mobility and tactical air resources, the Hmong leader

captured the Plaine des Jarres (PDJ), a strategic area that

had changed hands several times in the past. In order to

blunt the anticipated enemy dry season offensive, which

usually began in December or January, it was decided to

establish five major artillery strong points on the PDJ.

Manned and defended by Thai troops, these mutually

supporting bases were intended to attract the enemy's

attention. The NVA would assault these fixed positions -

and be destroyed by artillery fire and tactical air power.21

As the time neared for the expected enemy offensive,

intelligence reports coming into the CIA operations center

at Udorn grew ominous. Hanoi, it had learned, had appointed

one of their senior army commanders - General Le Truong Tan

- to direct the year's dry season offensive. Overhead

photography revealed a growing number of troops and supplies

moving along Route 6 toward the PDJ, including large covered

trailers. Although B-52s and "fast movers" were targeted

against the road, the traffic continued. U

Nonethel3ss, there a general feeling of confidence that

the enemy offensive could be stopped. James E. Parker, Jr.,

a newly arrived intelligence officer who had been assigned

as desk officer for Military Region II, inspected the Thai

artillery bases in early December and came away impressed.

8

The firebases, with their 105mm and 155mm guns, were placed

so that each base could be protected by artillery fire from

two or three adjacent positions. Visiting the northern-most

position, Parker received an optimistic appraisal of the

situation from its Thai commander. The position, he said,

was "impregnable," with its three inter-connected rings of

firing positions, bunkers, well-fortified mortar pits,

barbed and concertina wire, and mines. Local artillery, he

boasted, was available within seconds; flareships, gunships,

and tactical air support were on call.~

December 15 and 16 saw only light ground activity on

the PDJ. On December 17, smoke enveloped the area during

the daylight hours, cutting short resupply flights to the

Thai strong points. At 1835 hours that evening, all hell

broke loose. Using for the first time in Laos Soviet-made

long-range 130mm guns that far outranged the Thai artillery

(16 miles versus 9 miles), the NVA hit all Thai positions

simultaneously. Tank-supported infantry then broke through

the defensive rings around the bases. By the next morning,

the northern-most position had fallen, and the other bases

were under heavy pressure. U

As the enemy attack continued during December 18 and

19, tactical air support - upon which the entire defensive

scheme had been premised - was noticeable by its absence.

With Vang Pao and the Thais screaming for air support, the

CIA urged 7/13 Air Force at Udorn to supply the desperately

9

needed sorties - all to no avail. Finally, Ambassador

Godley contacted 7th Air Force headquarters in Saigon. He

was told that all available U.S. aircraft were involved in

search-and-rescue operations.~

On the afternoon of December 18, an F-4 supporting the

Thai positions on the PDJ had been shot down by a MIG-21,

the first air-to-air loss in Laos. Two other F-4s engaged

the MIG as it fled toward the North Vietnamese border.

Caught up in the chase, the F-4s ran out of fuel, and the

four crew members ejected. The following day, another F-4

had been brought down east of the PDJ by anti-aircraft fire.

The Air Force had launched a massive SAR operation for these

downed crew members, which drew off the tactical air

resources that otherwise would have gone into the battle on

the PDJ. U

Time ran out for the Thai defenders. By the morning of

December 20, all artillery strong points had fallen. The

surviving Thai troops headed south in disarray, pursued by

the NVA. Continental Air Services pilot Edward Dearborn,

who had been airdropping supplies to the Thai positions,

reported the scene: "By 1300 local, our efforts were

confined to picking up the wounded and survivors of the fire

bases. Most of them were working their way to LS-15 [Ban

Nal. A pitiful sight from two weeks before. The majority

were shell shocked and most were suffering from wounds,

exposure, or shock in one form or another.· H

10

The North Vietnamese pushed into the mountainous

terrain south of the PDJ and headed toward Long Tieng, the

last bastion between the enemy and the Mekong River. While

Hmong and Thai defenders strengthened their positions along

Skyline Ridge, the key terrain feature that overlooked the

Long Tieng valley, tactical airstrikes - once again

available - slowed but could not stop the enemy advance. 28

At 1530 hours on December 31, 1971, North Vietnamese

gunners opened fire on Long Tieng. The shelling, which

included rounds from the dreaded 130mm guns, continued

intermittently throughout the night, causing heavy damage to

installations in the valley.

The ground assault against Skyline began a few days

later. An estimated 19,000 North Vietnamese troops were

thrown into the battle. They were opposed by a mixed force

of some 10,000 Hmong, Thai, and Lao defenders. The NVA

offensive went well at first. In hard fighting, the enemy

captured several key positions along Skyline Ridge and took

control of Sam Thong, the former headquarters of the USAID

mission in northern Laos, which was linked to Long Tieng by

a mountainous road.

The CIA brought in Thai reinforcements, together with

several 1,200-man units of irregular troops from southern

Laos, considered to be the government's elite force. By

late January, the CIA-led Lao troops, in bitter - often

hand-to-hand - fighting, had retaken Skyline from the North

11

Vietnamese, at a cost of one-third to one-half of their

effective strength. Thanks to their efforts, Long Tieng was

placed at least temporarily out of the danger - if not out

of range of the 130mm guns.!9

While the Air Force hunted the well camouflaged

artillery pieces - and found several - the defenders of Long

Tieng dug in deeper and waited for the next assault. It

took nearly two months for the North Vietnamese - their

supply lines harassed by B-52s, tactical air strikes, and

Hmong ambushes - to bring up sufficient material to stage

the expected attack.

In mid-March 1972, the NVA once again tried to push the

defenders off Skyline. This time, the enemy planned to use

heavy T-34 tanks, bringing them in along the road from Sam

Thong. Michael E. Ingham, CIA officer in change of Thai

forces in Military Region II, had learned of the enemy's

intentions from a NVA prisoner. He had his men place anti-

tank mines along the road in front of their main defensive

position. As it turned out, NVA sappers removed most of the

mines, except for the two closest to the Thai position. On

March 30, two T-34 lead tanks hit these mines and were

immobilized, effectively blocking the road to Long Tieng. 30

Heavy fighting along Skyline Ridge continued into the

last days of April, with key positions changing hands

several times. Unable to obtain their objective, the NVA

finally removed a division from the area and sent it to

12

support the Easter offensive against South Vietnam. On

May 19, President Nixon congratulated Ambassador Godley:

"The Communist dry season in Laos has been blunted this

year, largely through the tireless efforts of your Missions.

You have done a tremendous job under difficult conditions. ,,31

Ambassador Godley certainly deserved President Nixon's

accolades. His CIA-led forces had scored an impressive

victory over a capable and determined enemy. For a time,

U.S. officials believed that this military success might

contribute to the creation of a neutral Laos. For example,

CIA Director William Colby, in awarding an Intelligence Star

to one of the case officers who directed the Lao irregular

forces, commented in February 1974: "I think you made a

major contribution not only to the battle, but also to the

successful outcome in Laos. That was a very sticky period.

And the situation as Long Tieng was considered a critical

one." The recent conclusion of a ceasefire agreement and

"steps toward achieving some kind of coalition government,"

Col by concluded, "is in good part a credit to your work." 32

Unfortunately, the coalition government proved only an brief

interlude. The Communists soon took control of the country.

The CIA, nonetheless, remained proud of its efforts in

Laos. As CIA Director Richard Helms later observed: "This

was a major operation for the agency. . It took

manpower, it took specially-qualified manpower, it was

13

dangerous, it was difficult." The CIA, he contended, "did a

superb job. "33

Helms had a point. Criticized following the Bay of

Pigs fiasco in 1961 for its inability to conduct large-scale

military operations, the CIA directed the war in Laos for

more than a decade - and fought the North Vietnamese and

Pathet Lao to a standstill. The cost - at least in American

lives - had been small: eight CIA case officers were killed

during the war, four in aircraft accidents and four as a

result of enemy fire. M

Lao, Thai, and Hmong losses, of course, were much

higher. The Hmong suffered most, both during and after the

war. As Douglas S. Blaufarb, CIA station chief in

Vientiane, 1962-64, has observed, whatever the Hmong gained

by associating with the United States, "it certainly was not

worth the high price they paid." But, Blaufarb wisely adds,

criticism of the U.S. alliance with the Hmong involves the

application of "a lavish hindsight without regard to the

realities of the time it was undertaken."~

In any event, the anti-communist forces in Laos won the

Battle for Skyline Ridge. However, as in Vietnam, victory

on the battlefield did not mean much in the end. It merely

delayed the final outcome of the war.

14

Notes

1. The best general accounts of the war are Charles A. Stevenson, The Under of Nowhere: American Policy toward Laos since 1954 (Boston, 1972), and Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization (revised edition, New York, 1971).

2. North Vietnam, in contrast, formally withdrew only 40 of its estimated 6,000 troops in Laos at the time of the cease- fire. Statement of Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley, July 22, 1971, in U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Fiscal Year 1972 Authorization for Military Procurement, 92nd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1971), p. 4270. See also Norman B. Hannah, The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War (Lanham, MD, 1987), p. 59.

3. Edward G. Lansdale to Maxwell D. Taylor, "Resources for Unconventional Warfare, S.E. Asia," n.d. [July 1961), The Pentagon Papers (New York Times edition, New York, 1971), pp. 130-38.

4. Unger to the Secretary of State, June 15, 1964, Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), 1989: 2100.

5. William L. Sullivan, Obbligato (New York, 1984), p. 210.

6. Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Cable IN 19395, July 29, 1967, DDRS, 1992: 3089.

7. Central Intelligence Agency, Special National Intelligence Estimate 58-68, March 21, 1968, DDRS, 1989: 1865.

8. Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand: Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia (New York, 1968), pp. 347-48.

9. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates, "Stocktaking in Indochina," April 17, 1970, DDRS, 1977: 270C. The Hmong continued to take severe casualties. In 1971, they suffered 2,259 killed and 5,775 wounded. See Arnold R. Isaacs, Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia (Baltimore, 1983), p. 169.

10. Theodore Shackley, The Third Option (New York, 1981), pp. 122-24.

11. Information from a retired intelligence officer who was in a position to have a accurate count of CIA presence in Thailand and Laos. William Colby, Lost Victory (Chicago,

15

1989), p. 198, states: "The total number of CIA personnel who support this effort was between 300 and 400." This number seems to be too high.

12. A profile of Godley appeared in the New York Times, July 12, 1973. See also the informative staff report of a visit to Laos by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose: U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Laos: April 1971, 92nd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1971), p. 2.

13. Interview with B. Hugh Tovar, March 13, 1992.

14. As noted by Senate staffers Lowenstein and Moose, following a visit to Southeast Asia in January 1972, Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base was "the most important operational military nerve center in Thailand." U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia: January 1972, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1972), p. 12. My portrait of CIA activities is drawn from interviews and correspondence with several retired intellgence officers.

15. James E. Parker, Jr., to the author, December 1992.

16. Shelby L. Stanton, Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956-1975 (Novato, CA, 1985), pp. 48, 52-53, 62.

17. On U.S. Air Force activities in Laos, see Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 1991).

18. General Vitoon Yasawatdi's activities are discussed in Rueng Yote Chantrakiri, The Thoughts and Memories of the Man Known as Dhep 333 (Bangkok, 1992). I am indebted to the Office of the Vice President for Research at the University of Georgia for a grant to have this volume translated from the Thai by Kris Petcharawises.

19. On Vang Pao's background, see Keith Quincy, HmonS: History of a People (Cheney, WA, 1988), pp. 160-94.

20. V. H. Gallacher and Hugh N. Ahmann interview with Jesse E. Scott, April 6, 1973, U.S. Air Force Historical Research Center (USAFHRC), Maxwell AFB, AL. See also Christopher Robbins, The Ravens (New York, 1987).

16

21. William W. Lofgren and Richard R. Sexton, "Air War in Northern Laos, 1 April - 30 November 1971," U.S. Air Force CHECO Report, June 22, 1973, USAFHRC; Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains: The Hmong. the Americans, and the Secret War for Laos. 1942-1992 (Bloomington, IN, 1993), pp. 266-76.

22. Kenneth J. Conboy, "Vietnam and Laos: of Military Cooperation," Indochina Report, 1989): 1-15.

23. Parker to the author, December 1992.

A Recent History 19 (April-June

24. The progress of the battle can be followed in the daily situation reports by Air America operations managers Thomas H. Sullivan and Jerome S. Connor, located in the Sullivan collection, Air America Archives, University of Texas at Dallas.

25. Tovar interview, March 13, 1992.

26. New York Times, December 21 and 22, 1971.

27. Edwin B. Dearborn, "Notes on PDJ Battle, December 17- 20," December 23, 1971. Copy courtesy of Edwin B. Dearborn.

28. Major General Alton D. Slay, chief of staff for operations at 7th Air Force, End-of-Tour Report, USAFHRC, is more optimistic in appraising the important role of the Air Force.

29. Thailand. Laos. and Cambodia: January 1972, p. 18.

30. Michael E. Ingham to the author, January 7, 1993.

31. A copy of Nixon's message is in the microfilm collection of Air America records in the author's possession.

32. Colby presentation to Elias P. Chavez, February 8, 1974. Copy of presentation courtesy of Elias P. Chavez.

33. Ted Gittinger interview with Richard Helms, September 16, 1981, Oral History Program, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX.

34. Two of the four intelligence officers who were killed in aircraft accidents - Louis O'Jibway and Edward Johnson - died when an Air America helicopter flew into the Mekong River on August 20, 1965, while en route from Nam Lieu, Laos, to Udorn, Thailand. The "Book of Honor" at CIA Headquarters incorrectly lists O'Jibway's death as 1966. In addition to the eight case officers, three CIA employees,

17

serving as Air America crew members, were killed in the crash of C-46 on August 13, 1961, and are memoralized by three stars, without names, in the "Book of Honor."

35. Douglas Blaufarb, CounterinsurBency Era (New York, 1977), p. 168.

18