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#### CHAPTER 4

### THE DYNAMICS OF PREJUDICE

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#### Introduction

Prejudice has a bad reputation. It should have. It is everywhere and always destructive. Prejudice prevents an objective and sympathetic view of or address to anything. It is uniformly and consistently uncongenial with the best interests and quality of human life. Most human beings, I am quite sure, find prejudice reprehensible, but all of us are afflicted by it. We disapprove it, but we do it nonetheless. Pogo was right, "We have met the enemy and it is us!"

Prejudice afflicts us in two ways. We are all prejudiced about something and that obstructs our ability to deal with that specific matter, or the persons to which it applies, in the best possible way. Moreover, we are all recipients of the damage other persons' prejudices inflict upon us. I am 70 years old. It was a shock to me to notice that as I passed the age of about 60, at which time I suffered some heart trouble and aged rather more quickly than I had before then, the young clerks in the drugstore or hardware store clearly distanced themselves from me. Whereas the former attendants had been rather congenial, the new and younger ones now treated me as an object. Of course, they had no way of knowing that I was a retired U.S. Army colonel, an internationally known scholar, a noted lecturer, and a rather nice guy. They could only see that I was an old man who had not had the good sense to die and stop cluttering up their lives. At least that is my perception, perhaps my prejudice.

I notice that whether it is a matter of courtesy in driving on the highway, caring for my interests at a department store, or responding to my requests at a restaurant, airline counter, or other service setting, I am no longer seen by young adults as a *person*; unless they know me, need something from me, or are under my authority as in the case of my students, for example. Instead of being a person I am now an object, often made to feel that I am an inconvenience to those folks. I notice that I am not alone. I watch this happening as well to my friends and colleagues. It always makes me chuckle to see the reaction when I am with one of my elderly friends and we are treated like objects until I introduce him as the federal judge, or the U.S. senator whom they may not have recognized, or a general officer from my army days. Suddenly the prejudice that we are simply a couple of old guys who are a drag upon the U.S. economy evaporates and for a little while we are seen as persons.

I am certain that if one asked these young folks whether they were prejudiced against old people, they would stand aghast at the suggestion. I am sure they are not at all aware of their internal image of gray-haired and wrinkled persons as irrelevant, burdensome, and undesirable. That is the nature of prejudice, theirs and mine. It usually operates quite destructively at the unconscious level, and for that very reason is so abusive and does so much damage to the personhood and circumstances of real live human beings. Moreover, young folk have no special mortgage on prejudice or a special predilection toward it. As I write these paragraphs I am very much aware of my need to reflect upon my own temptation to paint all young adults with this same tar brush, when in fact my own adult children and young people I work with everyday are ample evidence that most young adults are sensitive and generous, perhaps less dogmatic and judgmental than I.

The sensitivity of a senior scholar and old soldier and the insensitivity toward an old man by young people are painful, of course, but they are relatively trivial forms of prejudice, if one compares them with the biases which have wreaked upon humanity the destruction of racism, genocide, exploitive warfare, economic manipulation, or class and caste distinctions and elitism. These forms of institutionalized prejudice have formed the underpinnings of the abuses of power and have written the subtext of human history from its earliest recording until now. Moreover, the tragedy of it is in the fact that the pain and abuse of prejudicial behavior fall upon real live and lively human persons of flesh and blood and mind and spirit. This violence

is tangible, not theoretical; palpable, not abstract. "If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die?" (Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice*, III, 1).

## Exposition

Recently, my friend federal Judge John Feikens sent me a note with a fine piece attached from the *New York Review of Books* (October 18, 2001). It was Henry Hardy's column, "Notes on Prejudice," in which he presented a direct transcript of a manuscript of Isaiah Berlin. Hardy quoted at length Isaiah Berlin's "hurried notes . . . for a friend,"<sup>1</sup> explaining that Berlin's inner soul "is vividly expressed" in those notes. The friend, who was planning a lecture on prejudice, had asked Berlin for some suggestions. Since Berlin was going abroad that day, he quickly penned his answer.

Hardy described Berlin's intense observations there as "somewhat breathless and telegraphic" and conveying "with great immediacy Berlin's opposition to intolerance and prejudice, especially . . . stereotypes, and aggressive nationalism." The wisdom of Hardy's selection of this material for *New York Review of Books* is obvious when we note that its date is just one month after the World Trade Center tragedy. There venomous religious and cultural prejudice wreaked havoc on our entire nation—indeed upon the entire world. One might summarize Berlin's passionate expression in one sentence. "Few things have done more harm than the belief on the part of individuals or groups (or tribes or states or nations or churches) that he or she or they are in the *sole* possession of the truth: especially about how to live, what to be and do—and that those who differ from them are not merely mistaken, but wicked or mad: and need restraining or suppressing. It is a terrible and dangerous arrogance to believe that you alone are right: have a magical eye which sees the truth: and that others cannot be right if they disagree."

In 1996 Elizabeth Young-Bruehl published a superb analysis of this affliction of human psychology and society. She called it *Anatomy of Prejudices*.<sup>2</sup> Her superior work has not been superseded. Her focus is mainly upon anti-Semitism, racism, sexism, and homophobia. However, her general assessment of the psychodynamics of this psychosocial malady leads us to an appreciation of the similarities all forms of prejudice manifest, the distinctive characteristics of each type, and the subtle and blatant forms of their social expression. From the slightest slur to the stupid joke to the violent act, even war,

prejudice functions like the sophisticated computer virus which adapts its own structure as it goes along eating up all the resources available, and using the wholesome qualities and energies by turning them on their heads and redirecting their trajectories to create evil. What were growth-inducing insights are turned into malevolent analyses and defensive-aggressive reactions, filled with and generating paranoia and hate.

155 Young-Bruehl observes upon the great difficulty we have in stepping outside our own prejudices, even in our endeavor to speak or write wisely about prejudice. She wonders why, "... on this topic of prejudices, so much has been written on such shaky foundations, with such a recycling of clichés and unfounded conclusions. I became convinced that the way we have learned to speak in ... America about prejudices is a very large part of our prejudice problem, a part of which we are, daily, unaware" (2). She points out that when Gordon Allport wrote his valuable treatise, *The Nature of Prejudice*, and surveyed the total scope of the subject in mid-twentieth-century America, he announced his objective as seeking out the root of prejudice so as to understand its nature.<sup>3</sup> While the course Allport set for the investigation of prejudice was a worthy one, his model was limited by the implied assumption that "prejudice is something singular with one nature and one root" (Young-Bruehl, 16). However, Allport actually is at some pains to declare that, "It is a serious error to ascribe prejudice and discrimination to any single taproot, reaching into economic exploitation, social structure, the mores, fear, aggression, sex conflict, or any other favored soil. Prejudice and discrimination ... may draw nourishment from all these conditions, and many others" (Allport, xii). Allport wishes to teach plural causation, but he acknowledges that he is by professional habit disposed to emphasize the role of learning, cognitive processes, and personality formation. "It is true that I believe," says he, "it is only within the nexus of the personality that we find the effective operation of historical, cultural, and economic factors ... for it is only *individuals* who can feel antagonism and practice discrimination ... I place a heavy and convergent emphasis upon psychological factors" (xii-xiii).

Allport drew out these psychodynamics of prejudice in a surprisingly creative way for a scholar working on this issue so early in our cultural awareness of the need to study it systematically. He put his finger on the central dynamic of prejudice. His words seem as wise and applicable a half century later as they must have seemed forward-



A visitor to the Henry Ford Museum looks inside the actual bus on which civil rights pioneer Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat to a white man in Montgomery, Alabama, during the early days of the American civil rights movement. AP/Wide World Photos.

looking and wise when he published them a decade after the close of World War II.

At the time when the world as a whole suffers from panic induced by the rival ideologies of east and west, each corner of the earth has its own special burdens of animosity. Moslems distrust non-Moslems. Jews who escaped extermination in Central Europe find themselves in the new State of Israel surrounded by antisemitism. Refugees roam in inhospitable lands. (ix)

Allport points out that black people particularly suffer indignities from whites and fanciful racist doctrines are invented to justify it. He believes, undoubtedly correctly, that this constitutes a kind of condescension. Moreover, he is especially indignant about the pervasive prejudices in the United States and thinks them the most intricate and endlessly antagonistic of all, based upon no good foundation in reality, but rather in uninformed imagination. "Imaginary fears can

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cause real suffering." The rivalries and hatreds are as old as sin, but the technology for inflicting damage upon one another is more lethal because it brings us so much closer to each other.

Allport did not develop his psychological perceptions very extensively because his approach was, in the end, primarily sociological. However, one experiences throughout his work that he kept his eye open to the inner psychodynamics of the individual. He would, I think, have agreed with the perception that prejudice is primarily a defensive aggressive psychological phenomenon, that it is rooted in ignorance or bad information about the person or community against which the prejudice is directed, that it is generated by the primal human urge to survival combined with the paranoia which lack of accurate information produces, and that it expresses itself as an intention to devalue, disarm, and extinguish the relevance of the object of the prejudice. This psychological process may take the form of slights and verbal disrespect, intimidations and social degrading, physical deprivations and assaults, catastrophic violence and war, or extermination of the object of the discrimination and hatred.

In their superb chapters in this volume, Stirling and McGuire explicate the model of René Girard for explaining how specific persons or groups become identified in or by a society as the object of prejudice and its social consequences. They develop Girard's essentially psychoanalytic understanding of these forms of isolation, alienation, devaluation, and extermination, pointing out particularly his metaphor of the scapegoat. This is, of course, an old metaphor, already prominent in ancient Israelite religion and in the Hebrew Bible, which that religion produced. It is carried over in formative ways into the Christian Scriptures of the New Testament and into Islam's sacred scriptures, the Qur'an.

Girard's point comes down to the psychoanalytic insight that the scapegoat, whether it is an individual or another society, becomes a projection of the shadow side of the source or enactor of the prejudice. Prejudice always generates and is generated by an "us versus them" mindset. The circumstances of life often produce realistic situations in which there arise a real-life us and them. My family and I live in North America. There are many other humans who do not, including a number of my relatives for whom I have great affection. They live in Germany. Whether we discuss the geography of Greenland or the current perspectives on American policy toward the Near Eastern nations and cultures, it is inevitable that their perspective will be that of those who must look westward toward Greenland

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and ours that of those who must look eastward. That may seem irrelevant, but psychoanalytic psychologists know that the simple difference makes a discernible psychological difference in the way we and they think of Greenland.

On the infinitely more complex and serious matter of Near East policy, the differences in perspective will inevitably be much more remarkable. We may even have the same basic facts and principles in mind, but we will see the implications of them differently if our primary unconscious interest is American and theirs is German. With some significant conscious and rational thoughtfulness we may be able to place ourselves in each other's shoes and gain more global views that might be almost identical, but even then certain flavors and tastes, so to speak, will still make our feelings about the matter distinctive to each of us.

We can, of course, have important differences without resorting to prejudice. We may take a gracious, thoughtful attitude which empowers us to understand a wide range of views on a matter without feeling less passionate about the one we support. We may be able to allow the others to have their point of view as a legitimate alternative way of looking at things. Or we may feel strongly that the facts are such that they really have no moral right or rational justification to hold to such an ill-informed outlook. However, even then, it is not necessary for us to resort to prejudice, which is a need to devalue or damage the other person or community because of the positions they take, the attitudes they evince, or the behaviors they act out.

Prejudice is the irrational, unconscious, devaluation of another for no other reason than that the "other" is different. Prejudice increases with ignorance and the paranoia it generates. Prejudice identifies, isolates, and alienates its object. The further this process progresses the easier it is to project upon that "other" those things we hate in ourselves. We always hate most in others what we cannot stand in ourselves. Our own flaws, distortions, iniquities, self-defeating habits, and failures we see readily in others, or believe we do, and unconsciously we attack those in them that we know we should extinguish from ourselves. Therefore, those things that we cannot face in ourselves, for which we cannot forgive ourselves, we make into the reasons for devaluing or destroying them.

If those dysfunctions in ourselves which we cannot stand, cannot deal with, cannot correct, or cannot forgive, happen to be religiously and morally laden with some kind of divine censure, in our perception, we will see our attack upon those very things in others as

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divinely sanctioned, justified by God, even the imperatives of his own will and mandate for us. We may feel called by God, in such instances, to wreak havoc upon those others who are the "legitimate" objects of our prejudice. This surely was the motive and mindset of the terrorists of the 9/11 tragedy. It is the outlook of Christian pro-lifers, whose disgust with abortion on demand may be appropriate, but who are intent upon killing doctors and nurses who service abortion clinics. It seems to have been clearly the case of the ancient biblical Israelites who confused their own acquisitive prejudices with the divine will when it came to extermination of the Canaanites "because the cup of their iniquity was filled." Few readers notice that the cup was filled with exactly the idolatrous and abusive behavior to which the Israelites were forever inclined themselves, given half a chance to diverge from the "call of Yahweh" to be a distinctive people of grace. It is surely the disposition and dynamics of the modern Palestinians and Israelis who seem forever ready to destroy their own world to save it.

Allport had an interesting way of getting at the underpinnings of these psychological dynamics of prejudice. He thought that our negative prejudices are the obverse of those things that we love and cherish, and that the most important categories we have in terms of which to think and feel about things are our personal values. We live by and for them, without consciously needing to think about them or evaluate them. We defend them in terms of the intensity of our feelings about them, and we compel our reason and assessment of evidence to fit in with them. "As partisans for our own way of life we cannot help thinking in a partisan manner. Only a small portion of our reasoning is . . . 'directed thinking' . . . controlled exclusively by outer evidence and focused upon the solution of objective problems. . . . Such partisan thinking is entirely natural, for our job in this world is to live in an integrated way as value-seekers. Prejudgments stemming from these values enable us to do so" (24).

Unfortunately, prejudgments can easily slide into prejudice. Allport was aware of the fact that affirming our way of life may lead to the "brink of prejudice." He cites Spinoza's notion of "love-prejudice," namely, having more love feelings for someone or something than is appropriate to that object. We "overgeneralize" the virtues of such objects, whether a lover, a doctrine, a church, a nation, or a cause.

. . . This love-prejudice is far more basic to human life than is its opposite, hate-prejudice (which Spinoza says "consists in feeling about anyone

through hate less than is right"). One must first overestimate the things one loves before one can underestimate their contraries. . . . Positive attachments are essential to life. . . . Why is it that we hear so little about love-prejudice—the tendency to overgeneralize our categories of attachment and affection? (24–26)

Allport answers his own question by pointing out that love-prejudices create no social problems. Hate-prejudice, however, is a narcissism in which my interests are asserted at the expense of other people. This social danger gives rise to conflict because of the overvaluing of my own mode of life and the underprizing of that of the others. This produces a sense of threat in both directions. Freud asserted that it is in these undisguised "antipathies and aversions" that the destructive self-love of narcissism can be discerned, inciting social violence.

Particularly relevant to our present moment in history and the international circumstances in the Western world is Allport's next paragraph.

The process is especially clear in time of war. When an enemy threatens all or nearly all of our positive values we stiffen our resistance and exaggerate the merits of our cause. We feel—and this is an instance of overgeneralization—that we are wholly right. (If we did not believe this we could not marshal all our energies for our defense.) (26)

The implication of this is that if we are completely correct in our view the enemy must be completely in the wrong and should be exterminated. War exemplifies clearly how our primal love-prejudice is our primary motivation and our hate-prejudice is the derivative underside of it.

Isaiah Berlin thought that under these circumstances of significant conflict of values we tend to operate from the certainty that there is only one worthy goal for one's self, church, nation, or humanity; "only one true answer to the central questions which have agonized mankind"; and that it is worth risking all for that final solution, no matter how costly. We tend to be particularly willing to accept exorbitant costs in loss and suffering, particularly if it is mainly the enemy's loss and suffering. He cited Robespierre as saying, "through an ocean of blood to the Kingdom of Love."<sup>4</sup>

Berlin grieved that if we have not learned from history the foolishness and self-defeat in this outlook, "we are incurable." That may be so. It is almost certainly so if we cannot rid ourselves of the West's endemic tendency to assume that human conflicts, like God's con-

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flicts in the Hebrew Bible, are ultimately best resolved by precipitating catastrophe. This leads us to delay earlier, safer, and saner resolutions of misunderstandings and collision courses of policy or ambition, trusting that if all else fails, which it surely will in such an irresponsible model, we can always resort to the ultimate violence. We are inherently addicted to cataclysm, so we do not fear our prejudices as much as we fear the loss of what we "love more than is right."

During the last decade of the twentieth century Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum edited a series of psychosocial studies entitled *Contemporary Issues*. These amounted to a series of handbooks on various topics related mainly to legal and ethical issues in social management. One useful monograph in the series was entitled *Bigotry, Prejudice and Hatred, Definitions, Causes and Solutions*.<sup>5</sup> Two chapters in this volume proved to be particularly helpful. Chapter 10 by Elliot Aronson investigated "Causes of Prejudice." Pierre L. van den Berghe wrote the following chapter on "The Biology of Nepotism." Both of these relate directly to this particular phase of our discussion here, in that they address the underside of our love-prejudice and paint a picture of a Girardian take on our hate-prejudice. Aronson led off with the following paragraph,

\* ... one determinant of prejudice in a person is a need for self-justification ... if we have done something cruel to a person or a group of people, we derogate that person or group in order to justify our cruelty. If we can convince ourselves that a group is unworthy, subhuman, stupid, or immoral, it helps us to keep from feeling immoral if we enslave members of that group, deprive them of a decent education, or murder them. We can then continue to go to church (or Synagogue or Mosque, I would add) and feel ... good ... because it isn't a fellow human we've hurt. Indeed, if we're skillful enough, we can even convince ourselves that the barbaric slaying of old men, women, and children is a ... virtue—as the crusaders did when, on their way to the holy land, they butchered European Jews in the name of the Prince of Peace. ... this form of self-justification serves to intensify subsequent brutality. (111)

Sociological studies tend to suggest that the more the security of one's status and power is jeopardized, the more prejudiced one tends to be and behave. Van den Berghe, who published *The Ethnic Phenomenon* with Greenwood Press in 1987, makes a cogent argument for finding the roots of prejudice in nepotism. His basic argument is that "ethnic and racial sentiments are extensions of kinship

sentiments. Ethnocentrism and racism are thus extended forms of nepotism—the propensity to favor kin over nonkin. There exists a general behavioral predisposition, in our species as in many others, to react favorably toward other organisms to the extent that these organisms are biologically related to the actor. The closer the relationship is, the stronger the preferential behavior" (125). Blood is still thicker than water, apparently.

It is interesting, of course, that humans are seldom cannibals, and if they are it is generally with great revulsion and in extremity. Most humans are willing to consume other mammals, birds, and creatures lower on the evolutionary tree, such as fish. Even many of those who argue for being vegetarian on the grounds that one ought not to eat "meat" will, nonetheless, eat chicken and fish. The former is presumably from the dinosaur line and the latter from the reptilian line, both a long way from our human branch of the tree. Those vegetarians who also avoid chicken, fish, and dairy, vegans, who wish only a strictly vegetarian diet, are usually mystified when I ask them how they can possibly tolerate killing these living things they eat, the poor lettuce leaf, celery stalks, beautiful carrots, and the like. They tend to respond that these are short-lived forms of life anyway, are planted for harvesting, and have no consciousness or feelings.

Of course there is a significant debate about whether the last claim is true. There seems to be adequate evidence that plants respond to what seems comparable to our central nervous system stimulation. However, when all is said and done, the argument boils down to the fact that plants are so far down the evolutionary tree as to be not worth considering as a life-form in the sense that humans are life-forms. Van den Berghe's claim is vindicated by this rather simple human proclivity to argue for the privilege of those most like us and against the privileged status of those most unlike us. Thus blacks can more easily feel and act out prejudice against whites than against other blacks, and whites have demonstrated the same thing on their side of the equation, in monstrous ways, throughout history.

However, Young-Bruehl is less certain than van den Berghe that the familial connections in the dynamics of prejudice are biological or grounded in kinship issues. She wonders, with Erich Fromm, whether the familial influence is not rather psychosocial, particularly the sociological side of it. She investigated (Young-Bruehl, 1996, 64–65) the extent to which it is the family power structure and the values related to it that set the course for prejudicial patterns and dis-



positions. Adorno and Horkheimer were sure that the patriarchal family is the nexus of prejudice by reason of its authoritarian socialization of the family members.<sup>6</sup> This is basically the "frustration-aggression" model for explaining prejudice as rage displaced upon a scapegoat and forming the foundation for such models as that of Girard.

In the end, Young-Bruehl concludes that the sources and dynamics of prejudice are so complex that one must avoid above all the temptation to generalizations, normally the objective of all science. Instead, she urges, we must address the operational issues of prejudicial behavior in specific situations: specific categories such as racism, sexism, homophobia, anti-Semitism; and specific incidences such as this lynching, that genocide, this caste system, that slavery, this riot, that family feud. I agree, but it is clear that there are generalizing similarities at work in the tragedies of prejudice. They include the following list of factors. First, the difficulty humans have in living with the unknown and the very different. Second, the human tendency to make dogmatic claims that differences of values and styles mean the moral inferiority of the other. Third, the human inclination to fear the unknown or different and react to or act out that fear in defensive aggressive strategies. Fourth, the human need to justify those feelings and that behavior by demonizing the object of the prejudice. Fifth, the corollary behavior of isolating, alienating, devaluing, degrading, disempowering, and if necessary exterminating that object, whether a person or a community. Sixth, the human inclination to believe there is a single and final solution to the impasse of difference and conflict. Seventh, the willingness to pay any price for the ultimate cataclysm which will resolve the tension, stress, and burden of that impasse, particularly if that cost is mainly at the expense of the object of the prejudice, the enemy.

## Conclusion

It is clear that prejudice is a devastating force in our political and social order, and that it arises in a very sick psychology at the center of our souls and imposes a large toll upon our spirituality. It is the shadow side of our inherent need to survive, grow, develop, and achieve freedom and stasis. It may be considered to have a positive side, in Spinoza's sense of "love-prejudice." Humans are capable of imagining a virtually perfect world and are able to create only a flawed one. The distance that our real world falls short of our ideal-

ized imagination we identify as failure and pain. We internalize that pain as guilt rather than simply being able to accept it as a function of our limited humanness. That guilt prompts us to self-justification and defensive aggressive behavior, setting in motion the strategies of prejudice discussed above.

The general claim of this chapter and of these volumes is that our ancient religious metaphors create that kind of negative psychological archetypes at our centers. These inflame our prejudices and the psychodynamics behind them. At the center this is a spiritual problem, and there is no fixing it except with a spiritual renewal, which is framed and shaped and driven by a theology of grace, a religion of grace, a sociology of grace, and a self-psychology of grace. Divine grace! Human grace. Grace is unconditional positive regard for the other. Judaism hatched this idea of unconditional grace as the redemptive dynamic of true religion and healthy psychology. As I argued previously, all three major Western religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, have, as their mainstream, this notion of grace inherited from the precursors of Judaism, namely, ancient Israelite religion, the religion of the Hebrew Bible.

For 3,000 years, however, this mainstream has been muddled, distorted, and obscured by a completely erroneous religious metaphor: the notion that this world is the arena of an apocalyptic cosmic conflict between good and evil. This useless and psychotic metaphor seems to justify our worst prejudices and our most destructive behavior. Yet it has no ground under it. There is no evidence for ontic evil. However, in all three of these major religions, our sacred scriptures lock us into this notion. It defines us. Unless we radically revise our theology of sacred scriptures in all three religions, we cannot escape this prison house of prejudice. We cannot transcend the built-in bigotry. We cannot become fully human.

## Notes

1. The *New York Review of Books*, October 18, 2001.
2. Young-Bruehl, Elizabeth. *Anatomy of Prejudices*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996.
3. Allport, Gordon. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1958.
4. Hardy thinks this may be a reference Berlin makes "off the top of his head," so to speak, to Robespierre's sentences, "*en scellant notre ouvrage de notre sang, nous pouvons voir au moins briller l'aurore de la felicité universelle*" ("by sealing our work with our blood, we may see at least the bright dawn

# Major Problems in the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era: Documents and Essays

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## 1. Andrew Carnegie Hails the Triumph of America, 1885

The old nations of the earth creep on at a snail's pace; the Republic thunders past with the rush of the express. The United States, the growth of a single century, has already reached the foremost rank among nations, and is destined soon to out-distance all others in the race. In population, in wealth, in annual savings, and in public credit; in freedom from debt, in agriculture, and in manufactures, America already leads the civilized world. . . .

Into the distant future of this giant nation we need not seek to peer; but if we cast a glance forward, as we have done backward, for only fifty years, and assume that in that short interval no serious change will occur, the astounding fact startles us that in 1935, fifty years from now, when many in manhood will still be living, one hundred and eighty millions of English-speaking republicans will exist under one flag and possess more than two hundred and fifty thousand millions of dollars, or fifty thousand millions sterling of national wealth. Eighty years ago the whole of America and Europe did not contain so many people; and, if Europe and America continue their normal growth, it will be little more than another eighty years ere the mighty Republic may boast as many loyal citizens as all the rulers of Europe combined, for before the year 1980 Europe and America will each have a population of about six hundred millions.

The causes which have led to the rapid growth and aggrandizement of this latest addition to the family of nations constitute one of the most interesting problems in the social history of mankind. What has brought about such stupendous results—so unparalleled a development of a nation within so brief a period! The most important factors in this problem are three: the ethnic character of the people, the topographical and climatic conditions under which they developed, and the influence of political institutions founded upon the equality of the citizen.

Certain writers in the past have maintained that the ethnic type of a people has less influence upon its growth as a nation than the conditions of life under which it is developing. The modern ethnologist knows better. We have only to imagine what America would be to-day if she had fallen in the beginning, into the hands of any other people than the colonizing British, to see how vitally important is this question of race. America was indeed fortunate in the seed planted upon her soil. With the exception of a few Dutch and French it was wholly British; and . . . the American of to-day remains true to this noble strain and is four-fifths British.

The special aptitude of this race for colonization, its vigor and enterprise, and its capacity for governing, although brilliantly manifested in all parts of the world, have never been shown to such advantage as in America. Freed here from the pressure of feudal institutions no longer fitted to their present development, and freed also from the dominion of the upper classes, which have kept the people at home from effective management of affairs and sacrificed the nation's interest for their own, as is the nature of classes, these masses of the lower ranks of Britons, called upon to found a new state, have proved themselves possessors of a positive genius for political administration.

The second, and perhaps equally important factor in the problem of the rapid advancement of this branch of the British race, is the superiority of the conditions under which it has developed. The home which has fallen to its lot, a domain more magnificent than has cradled any other race in the history of the world, presents no obstructions to unity—to the thorough amalgamation of its dwellers, North, South, East, and West, into one homogeneous mass—for the conformation of the American continent differs in important respects from that of every other great division of the globe. In Europe the Alps occupy a central position, forming on each side watersheds of rivers which flow into opposite seas. In Asia the Himalaya, the Hindu Kush, and the Altai Mountains divide the continent, rolling from their sides many great rivers which pour their floods into widely separated oceans. But in North America the mountains rise up on each coast, and from them the land slopes gradually into great central plains, forming an immense basin where the rivers flow together in one valley, offering to commerce many thousand miles of navigable streams. The map thus proclaims the unity of North America, for in this great central basin, three million square miles in extent, free from impassable rivers or mountain barriers great enough to hinder free intercourse, political integration is a necessity and consolidation a certainty. . . .

The unity of the American people is further powerfully promoted by the foundation upon which the political structure rests, the equality of the citizen. There is not one shred of privilege to be met with anywhere in all the laws. One man's right is every man's right. The flag is the guarantor and symbol of equality. The people are not emasculated by being made to feel that their own country decrees their inferiority, and holds them unworthy of privileges accorded to others. No ranks, no titles, no hereditary dignities, and therefore no classes. Suffrage is universal, and votes are of equal weight. Representatives are paid, and political life and usefulness thereby thrown open to all. Thus there is brought about a community of interests and aims which a Briton, accustomed to monarchical and aristocratic institutions, dividing the people into classes with separate interests, aims, thoughts, and feelings, can only with difficulty understand.

The free common school system of the land is probably, after all, the greatest single power in the unifying process which is producing the new American race. Through the crucible of a good common English education, furnished free by the State, pass the various racial elements—children of Irishmen, Germans, Italians, Spaniards, and Swedes, side by side with the native American, all to be fused into one, in language, in thought, in feeling, and in patriotism. The Irish boy loses his brogue, and the German child learns English. The sympathies suited to the feudal systems of Europe, which they inherit from their fathers, pass off as dross, leaving

behind the pure gold of the only noble political creed: "All men are created free and equal." Taught now to live and work for the common weal, and not for the maintenance of a royal family or an overbearing aristocracy, not for the continuance of a social system which ranks them beneath an arrogant class of drones, children of Russian and German serfs, of Irish evicted tenants, Scotch crofters, and other victims of feudal tyranny, are transmuted into republican Americans, and are made one in love for a country which provides equal rights and privileges for all her children. There is no class so intensely patriotic, so wildly devoted to the Republic as the naturalized citizen and his child, for little does the native-born citizen know of the values of rights which have never been denied. Only the man born abroad, like myself, under institutions which insult him at his birth, can know the full meaning of Republicanism. . . .

It is these causes which render possible the growth of a great homogeneous nation, alike in race, language, literature, interest, patriotism—an empire of such overwhelming power and proportions as to require neither army nor navy to ensure its safety, and a people so educated and advanced as to value the victories of peace.

The student of American affairs to-day sees no influences at work save those which make for closer and closer union. The Republic has solved the problem of governing large areas by adopting the federal, or home-rule system, and has proved to the world that the freest self-government of the parts produces the strongest government of the whole.



# Eurocentrism is based on ten major mythologies

## → 10 Governing Concepts:

Land/Climate	Reason(Rationality)	Religion/Revelation/Idolatry
Civilization	Democracy	
Race	Nation	
Intelligence	Moral values	Prosperity

## → 10 Key disciplines:

Theology	Science	Geography
(Religion)	Anthropology	Economics
Missiology/Soteriology	(Sociology)	Criminal Justice
Philosophy	History	Psychology

## → 10 Key theories("Civilizing Mission Ideology")

Hellenism (Greek miracle ideology)	Diffusionism/Foreign Stimulus
Hegelianism (World history)	Darwinism (Evolution/Progress)
Aristotelianism ("Calore-Colore" paradigm)	Levy-Bruhlism (Grand Dichotomy)
Huntingtonism (Clash of Civilization)	"IQ" Studies
Kiplingism (The burden of the white man)	Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus
or the 3 C's doctrine (David Livingstone)	(soteriology, Mission to evangelize)

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# THE HEGELIAN PARADIGM: TEN EPISTEMOLOGICAL PLAGUES

Misnaming Other religions	Causes of prejudice	Intellectual theories
1. DEUS OTIOSUS/ Polytheism	1. Ignorance	1. Calore-colore theory
2. Idolatry (Paganism/Heathenism)	2. Arrogance	2. IQ studies
3. Animism (Totemism, Zoolatry)	3. Libido Dominandi	3. Civilization, modernity, Progress - 1. Writing (><oral tradition) - 2. Urbanism - 3. Democracy - 4. Science and technology - 5. Linguistic superiority - 6. Capitalism (Material prosperity)
4. Ancestor worship	4. Ethnocentrism Narcissism Self-referential epistemology	4. Grand dichotomy Levy-Bruhlism, Binarism, Dualism, Us versus them Logic of exclusion
5. Primitivism	5. Racism	5. Essentialism
6. Tribalism	6. Sexism	6. Social Darwinism (Theory of Evolution)
7. Fetishism (Magic, Witchcraft)	7. Classism	7. Foreign stimulus ideology (Diffusionism)
8. Shamanism	8. Psychosis Psychological insecurity Fear, anxiety Inferiority complex	8. Rationality
9. Ritualism/Materialism	9. Patriotism Nationalism, Jingoism	9. Poverty
10. ANAMARTESIS - Sexuality (Polygamy) - Polygamy - pictures of naked tribes - Violence (Circumcision)	10. Colonialism Imperialism	10. Revelation/Monotheism (Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus)

⇒ False and evil religions

⇒ Religions of error, terror and horror

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**General Education - C.3: Philosophy and Religion**  
**Matrix of Learning Outcomes and Religious Studies Courses**

Learning Outcomes	RS 100	RS 101	RS 304	RS 307	RS 310	RS 356	RS 361
Discuss and explain a number of significant philosophic views and/or forms of religious expression	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Critically read and evaluate interpretations of philosophical and/or religious ideas and texts	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Formulate questions, examine issues, construct supported arguments, and evaluate alternative arguments arising from philosophic views and/or forms of religious expression	X			X	X	X	X
Describe and explain the roles philosophical and religious thinking and traditions play in shaping human culture and social institutions	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

**General Education -- F: Comparative Cultural Studies**  
**Matrix of Learning Outcomes and Religious Studies Courses**

Learning Outcomes	RS 150	RS 160	RS 306	RS 365	RS 378	RS 380	RS 385	RS 390
Describe and compare different cultures	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Explain how different cultures have contributed to the development of today's world		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Describe and explain how race, class, and/or gender shape experiences and relations	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Define racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, and/or stereotyping and explain their deleterious impact			X	X	X	X	X	

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