International Studies Paper(Graduate students)
IAFF 6101 Interna-onal Affairs Cornerstone
Lecture 3: Liberalism September 13, 2016
Today’s Class • Quick Review of Realism
• Introduc;on to Liberalism
• Neoliberal Ins;tu;onalism
• Economic Interdependence
• Democra;c Peace Theory
Structural (Neo) Realism
• Key assump;ons: anarchy, states, survival, uncertainty
• Structure of the system induces compe;;ve behavior, balancing, imita;on
• Even defensively mo;vated states can end up in compe;;on
• Maximize security, not power, because: – States balance against power – Security dilemma
Offensive Realism
• Same basic star;ng assump;ons
• Different key predic;on: states maximize rela;ve power
• SD = unavoidable; states have no choice but to compete
• All GPs bid for regional hegemony
• But isn’t maximizing power irra;onal if you know the SD exists?
Defensive Realism
• Same star;ng assump;ons, but portrays a less compe;;ve world where coopera;on is not only possible, but some;mes a beTer route to security than compe;ng
• Emphasis on the SD, but SD can vary in intensity
• Offense-defense balance causes the SD to vary
• ODB determined by technology and geography
Mo-va-onal Realism Builds on defensive realism in two ways:
• Introduces varia;on in state type – Greedy/revisionist – Security-seeker/status quo
• Introduces informa;on variables – Your informa;on about adversary’s type – Your informa;on about adversary’s beliefs about your type
– Informa;on is generated through signaling
Hegemonic Realism
• Preponderance = peace
• Balance = war
• “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable.”
• Preven;ve war
The Bargaining Model • Three ra;onal explana;ons for war:
– Private info and incen.ves to misrepresent
– Credible commitment problems
– Issue indivisibility
1st Image 2nd Image 3rd Image
Realism Human nature/ Classical
Mo;va;onal/ Neoclassical
Neorealism Offensive Defensive Hegemonic Bargaining model
Realism and Levels of Analysis
What Unites Realists? • Emphasis on structure of system, defined in material terms
• Emphasis on states as main actors
• Ra;onality
• Security dilemma
• Ins;tu;ons – interna;onal or domes;c – play liTle role
What Divides Realists? • What comprises structure
– Power – Power + ODB
• Interpreta;on of the security dilemma – Highly constraining – Not constraining
• System structure most conducive to peace, stability – Unipolar/hegemonic vs. bipolar vs. mul;polar
• Varia;on in state type – All seek security – Some seek only security, some seek things beyond security
Today’s Class • Quick Review of Realism
• Introduc-on to Liberalism • Neoliberal Ins;tu;onalism
• Economic Interdependence
• Democra;c Peace Theory
The Kan-an Triad
• Republican cons;tu;ons (liberal democracy)
• Interna;onal law and organiza;on
• Cosmopolitan law (free trade)
Wilsonian Liberalism
• Make the world safe for democracy
• League of Na;ons
• Remove barriers to trade
The Liberal Tradi-on in America
• U.S. presidents tend to be liberal interna;onalists – Promote democracy
• More or less forcefully – Work with mul;lateral ins;tu;ons
• Bush excepted – Support free trade
• NAFTA, TPP
• Hillary Clinton?
• Donald Trump?
Dueling Anarchies
Realism • Anarchy: life is nasty,
bru;sh, and short
Liberalism • Anarchy: individuals have
rights, should not violate rights of others
Liberal Assump-ons
• Anarchy, but state of nature ≠ state of war
• Interstate rela;ons not zero-sum
• Coopera;on is possible
• States differen;ated by internal characteris;cs
• States have aims that go beyond security è In sum, anarchy does not preclude beneficial coopera;on and stable, peaceful rela;ons.
Today’s Class • Quick Review of Realism
• Introduc;on to Liberalism • Neoliberal Ins-tu-onalism
• Economic Interdependence
• Democra;c Peace Theory
Neoliberal Ins-tu-onalism
• Primarily a structural theory – Keohane emphasized that neoliberalism is built on the same core assump;ons as structural realism • Anarchy, states, ra;onal unitary actors
• Different conclusions – Significant coopera;on is possible under anarchy – Interna;onal ins;tu;ons are the key
Defini-ons and Types • Ins;tu;ons: “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal
and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain ac;vity, and shape expecta;ons” (Keohane 1989, 3) – a.k.a., regimes
• Possible forms/types – Can include a formal organiza;on (NATO, WTO, IMF), but need not – Alliances – Arms control agreements – Trade deals – Regimes, which can include broader understandings, norms, decision-making procedures • NPT regime: includes NPT, but also addi;onal ins;tu;ons, norm against prolifera;on
Player 2
Keep Quiet (Cooperate)
Rat
(Defect)
Player 1
Keep Quiet (Cooperate)
Good, Good Worst, Best
Rat
(Defect)
Best, Worst Bad, Bad
By doing what is individually ra;onal, both players get a worse outcome than they could have goTen by coopera;ng
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Coopera-on in a Neoliberal World
• Chief obstacle to coopera;on = (fear of) chea;ng
• How to alleviate this obstacle? • Itera;on • Reciprocity • Monitoring and verifica;on
Providing Informa-on: Chea-ng
• A key func;on played by ins;tu;ons is providing informa;on
• Ins;tu;ons usually lack enforcement capability • Anarchy is lem unchanged
• Provide informa;on about state behavior • Reduces barriers created by collabora;on problems, poten;al for chea;ng • Effec;ve monitoring reduces the risks of being cheated • Examples: U.S.-Soviet arms control; NPT—IAEA inspec;ons; Iran nuclear agreement
Providing Informa-on: State Type
• Ins;tu;ons can also provide informa;on about state type • Uncertainty about type = key problem in realism, helps fuel the SD
• State can gain a reputa;on via coopera;on in an ins;tu;ons of being a trustworthy type
• Mechanism: costly signaling • Forego threatening forces • Reducing your ability to cheat à security seeker • Constrain ability to use forces you have – seeking UN authoriza;on
• Enhance credibility of commitments
Establishing a Nego-a-ng Forum
• Reduces costs of beginning nego;a;ons
• Create shared set of understandings, terminology
• Arena to learn about/resolve others’ concerns
• Help resolve issues that arise later, unforeseeable at the ;me ins;tu;on is created
Issue Linkages
• Creates linkages across issues that make deals more feasible • States may have incompa;ble preferences over a single issue
• Broadening the issues being bargained over, linking them, can facilitate agreements • Side payments: climate change example
Neoliberal-Realist Debate • There was—and con;nues to be—debate between realists and neoliberals
• Some debate was unproduc;ve b/c it was based on arguments that were wrong • Realism predicts only compe;;on, not coopera;on
• Some debates ini;ally seemed stark, but evolved as both sides moderated their posi;ons • Rela;ve gains
Neoliberal-Realist Debate, 2 • The big debate con;nues to be over establishing the independent
effect of ins;tu;ons
• The standard realist response is that ins;tu;ons are an effect, not a cause • Ins;tu;ons reflect the balance of power • The same factors that make coopera;on likely also cause ins;tu;ons
Ins;tu;ons Structure Coopera;on
• Ins;tu;ons are “endogenous” to structure – NATO example
Neoliberal-Realist Debate, 3
• Defensive/mo;va;onal realist response – Yes, signaling is important, but ins;tu;ons are not especially important for this • Signaling can some;mes be done unilaterally • Under some condi;ons, ins;tu;ons might help, but are by no means the only (or most important) method of signaling
Neoliberalism and the Rise of China
• Mostly op;mists
• China has joined some important ins;tu;ons – WTO – NPT – 6-party talks on DPRK nukes
• Western liberal order open to China and capable of accommoda;ng it (Ikenberry)
Today’s Class • Quick Review of Realism
• Introduc;on to Liberalism • Neoliberal Ins;tu;onalism
• Economic Interdependence
• Democra;c Peace Theory
Economic Interdependence
Interna;onal commerce and trade è Fewer incen;ves for conflict and war
• No single theory, but rather a lot of poten;al causal mechanisms linking interdependence and peace
Opportunity Costs
• High levels of interdependence è High opportunity costs for war – Not only have to pay the costs of figh;ng – Also lose the benefits you would have gained from trade
– Develop a stake in trading partner’s well-being
Domes-c Cons-tuencies
• High levels of interdependence è Crea;on of domes;c cons;tuencies that oppose war – Exporters will lobby the government to resolve disputes peacefully
Costly Signals
• High levels of interdependence è Costly signal of state’s resolve – If war is caused by private informa;on, threatening to hurt your own well-being by cuqng off beneficial trade is a way to signal resolve in a dispute
Globaliza-on of Produc-on
• Globaliza;on of produc;on è Great power peace (Brooks 2005) – Supply chain is spread around the world – Aggressors cannot capture and exploit modern MNCs
– Reduces cumula;vity of resources, discourages aggression
Realist Responses • Trade dependence creates vulnerability
– States are inclined to expand to reduce it, which increases probability of war
– States are especially concerned to control key resources, e.g., oil
• Security concerns dwarf economic ones – Even if trade brings large benefits, it will not outweigh benefits of a war that increases security
• Trade that results in rela;ve losses (even if absolute gains) is undesirable b/c it reduce state’s rela;ve power
Synthesis: Trade Expecta-ons Theory
• What maTers is not current levels of trade, but expecta;ons about future trade
• States with high levels of trade can s;ll go to war – if they expect trade cut off in future
• Key = costs of adjustment – Once you specialize, become dependent, costs of cut off increase, worse than if you remained autarkic
• For China – Trade currently high with U.S.—but what if Trump wins? – Increasing dependence on imported natural resources
Today’s Class • Quick Review of Realism
• Introduc;on to Liberalism • Neoliberal Ins;tu;onalism
• Economic Interdependence
• Democra-c Peace Theory
Democra-c Peace
• Democracies fight just as many wars as other regime types
• But democracies don’t seem to fight each other
Democra-c Peace?
• Controversial cases • U.S. Civil War, 1861-65 • Spanish-American, 1898 • Anglo-Boer, 1899-1902 • U.S.-Filipino, 1899-1902 • World War I – was Germany a democracy? • Finland in World War II • Kargil, 1999 • Russo-Georgian, 2008
• Data problems • Few democracies + few wars, esp. pre-WW2 • Alterna;ve explana;ons for inter-democra;c peace during Cold War
• Does democracy cause peace, or does peace cause democracy?
Costs
• Because the people pay the costs of wars, they are reluctant to fight them
– Problem: democracies have fought lots of wars!
– Problem: some;mes the people are gung-ho for war!
Norms
• Leaders socialized to norms of peaceful conflict resolu;on in domes;c society; externalize those norms in foreign rela;ons
– Individual rights, non-interven;on – Non-violent conflict resolu;on – compromise, nego;a;on, media;on
– “Con;ngent consent”
Norms, 2
• Leaders socialized to norms of peaceful conflict resolu;on in domes;c society; externalize those norms in foreign rela;ons
• Other democracies warrant trust and respect, non-interven;on; autocracies do not – In permanent state of aggression against own people
– Aggressive internally, aggressive externally
Norms: Problems?
• Other democracies warrant trust and respect, non- interven;on; autocracies do not
– Problem: Covert Ac;on – Problem: Imperialism
Ins-tu-ons
• Leaders are accountable to the public via elec;ons, must heed their wishes to get reelected – Public/group constraint
• Problem: predicts fewer wars in general
– Slow mobiliza;on/surprise aTack • Problem: democracies have launched surprise aTacks
– Democracies fight harder • Problem: why do autocracies aTack democracies?
Liberal Theories and Levels of Analysis
1st Image 2nd Image 3rd Image
Liberalism Democra;c Peace Interdependence
Ins;tu;onalism Interdependence