International Studies Paper(Graduate students)

IAFF 6101 Interna-onal Affairs Cornerstone

Lecture 2: Realism September 6, 2016

Today’s Class •  Classical (Human Nature) Realism

•  Structural (Neo) Realism –  Offensive –  Defensive

•  MoBvaBonal & Neoclassical Realism –  DisBnguishing these from non-realist theories

•  Hegemonic Realism (a.k.a. power transiBon theory)

•  The Bargaining Model

Classical (Human Nature) Realism

•  Cause of conflict is the lust for power rooted in human nature –  Animus dominandi, the will for power

•  PoliBcs = the compeBBon for power

•  Acknowledged that internaBonal system = anarchic, but emphasized individual human nature

•  Problem: conflict varies, but human nature doesn’t –  Hard to explain variaBon with a constant

Structural (Neo) Realism: Assump-ons

•  About the System – System = Anarchic

•  About Units – States = main actors – States = like units – States = unitary raBonal actors – States want to survive … – …but are uncertain about others’ intenBons

A Neorealist World

•  CompeBBon for power •  Self-help •  Fear and mistrust •  PotenBal for cheaBng makes cooperaBon dangerous

•  RelaBve gains concerns further inhibit cooperaBon

•  CooperaBon = temporary – No enduring friends, only enduring interests

A Neorealist World, cont.

•  Security Dilemma –  Increase in your security decreases security of others

•  Maximize Security, not power – because states balance, maximizing power triggers SD –  Balancing is dominant tendency in the system –  States balance against power, don’t bandwagon with it

�  Seek an “appropriate” amount of power

•  States balance in two ways: –  Internal (arms build-ups) –  External (alliances)

•  Balance = good; imbalance = bad

•  Bipolarity > MulBpolarity

Neorealism: Rise of China

•  Growth in Chinese capabiliBes induces fears in others – U.S., regional powers

•  PotenBal for SD

•  Return to bipolarity

•  Peace preserved by nuclear weapons, but plenty of compeBBon – a new Cold War

Offensive Realism •  Similar starBng assumpBons

–  Anarchy –  Offensive capability –  Uncertainty –  Survival –  RaBonality

•  Predicted behaviors –  Fear –  Self-help –  Maximize rela:ve power

•  Hard to determine what an “appropriate” amount of power is

•  Best way to survive is to acquire as much power as possible

•  Power accumulaBon only stops when states become hegemons – global or regional? –  Work to prevent others from becoming regional hegemons

Offensive Realism, cont.

•  SD = unavoidable; states have no choice but to compete

•  States don’t always balance – opens the door to try to max. rel. power –  Want to get others to pay the price of containing rising powers

–  Buckpassing common in mulBpolar systems •  How powerful the rising power is •  Geographic proximity of balancers

Offensive Realism: Rising China

•  CompeBBon is unavoidable

•  China will pursue regional hegemony

•  China will compete intensely with the U.S.

•  U.S. will compete to retain its posiBon

•  War is not unlikely

Defensive Realism

•  Same basic starBng assumpBons, but portrays a less compeBBve world where more cooperaBon is possible –  Anarchy –  States –  Unitary actors –  RaBonality –  Survival/security-seeking

�  Bofom-line: The internaBonal system can drive states into compeBBon and conflict, BUT it doesn’t always

•  Puzzle: How does the internaBonal system generate this result?

Defensive Realism: Security Dilemma

•  Emphasis on the security dilemma –  Policies a state pursues to increase its security can reduce its adversary’s

security –  The adversary has the ability to respond in ways that could then reduce

the state’s own security

•  SD is logically necessary to generate compeBBon between security seekers

•  RaBonal security seekers facing an SD can, under some condiBons, choose compeBBon or war

•  BUT, under other condiBons, cooperaBon can be best opBon

The Compe--on Bias in Neorealism •  States seek security

•  One way to pursue that is to compete –  But, compeBng can potenBally reduce your security if the other side reacts –  So, compeBBon is not necessarily smart (or raBonal)

•  Another way to is make the adversary more secure –  If the adversary is more secure, you are more secure!

•  Strategy should be designed to reduce the adversary’s insecurity, as well as to deter –  The need to strike this balance is another way to understand the SD

•  CooperaBon can bring benefits –  Arms control to reduce military risks –  Restraint to send “costly” signals, reducing poliBcal risks

•  Arms control •  Unilateral restraint

Varia-on in the Security Dilemma

•  The SD can vary in intensity –  When SD is mild, internaBonal system does not generate strong

incenBves to compete

•  What causes the SD to vary?

•  Offense-defense balance –  The relaBve ease of afack or defense in war –  RelaBve cost of offense vs. defense

•  ODB determined by: –  Technology –  Geography

Offense-Defense Advantage

•  Military technology –  Mobility favors offense –  Firepower favors defense

Offense-Defense Advantage

•  Geography –  Flat, open terrain favors offense –  Obstacles (rivers, mountains, forests) favor defense

Offense-Defense Predic-ons

•  Offensive Advantage è SD more intense è War more likely

•  Defensive Advantage è SD less intense è War less likely

Defensive Realism: 4 Worlds

OFFENSE

DEFENSE

NOT

DISTINGUISHABLE

DISTINGUISHABLE

Offense & Defense

DisBnguish- able?

Offensive or Defensive Advantage

Nuclear Weapons and the SD

•  Nuclear weapons favor defense – Deterrence is funcBonal equivalent of defense – Secure retaliatory capability is the key requirement for deterrence

•  Nuclear weapons make offense and defense disBnguishable, at least with large arsenals

•  Nukes therefore significantly diminish the SD

Defensive Realism and Rising China

•  Peaceful rise is possible and intense compeBBon can be avoided

•  Nuclear weapons provide core security

•  Geography reduces potenBal for invasion –  But U.S. could be pulled into conflict in other ways – allies…

•  Restraint can be reinforcing –  Or compeBBve policies by either side risk damaging poliBcal relaBons

Mo-va-onal Realism: State Type •  InternaBonal system = benign, offers few incenBves for aggression

–  States balance –  ODB typically favors the defense

•  Yet aggression someBmes occurs under structural condiBons when it “shouldn’t”

•  Offensive realist answer = all states are revisionist!

•  MoBvaBonal realist answer = states vary in type –  Greedy –  Security-seeker/status quo

•  State type explains aggression, more than structure

Mo-va-onal Realism: State Type, cont.

•  Divides states into greedy states and security- seekers

•  Doesn’t try to explain where those moBves come from

•  Example: Schweller, Deadly Imbalances – Puzzle: Why do some states bandwagon (ally with the stronger side)?

– Answer: Revisionist states bandwagon, status quo states balance

Mo-va-onal Realism: Informa-on •  Recall that SD reflects uncertainty about moBves

•  But uncertainty itself is a variable

•  High esBmates that the adversary is a security seeker reduce the SD –  CooperaBon = less risky

•  InformaBon can offset dangerous material condiBons –  Power alone does not determine how threatening others are

Mo-va-onal Realism: Variables

•  End up with 6 variables – Material variables

•  RelaBve power •  ODB •  O-D disBnguishability

– InformaBon variables •  Info about adversary’s moBves •  Info about the adversary’s info about your moBves

– State’s moBves •  Security seeker vs. greedy

Mo-va-onal Realism: Rise of China

•  ImplicaBons of China’s rise depends on China’s type, moBves – Peace is possible if China is security-seeking state –  Intense compeBBon and possibly war are much more likely if China is a greedy/expansionist state

•  Name of the game is discerning China’s type – Greedy vs. status quo/security seeker –  If greedy, limited aims vs. unlimited aims –  If limited aims, what does China want?

Non-Realist Theories

•  Some theories are called “realist” when they probably aren’t

•  Theories that explain raBonal behavior given structural constraints and/or state type = realist

•  Theories that explain subopBmal (i.e., non- raBonal) behavior – ojen with resort to theories of domesBc poliBcs – are not realist

Non-Realist Theories: Examples •  Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire –  Puzzle: Why do some states over-expand when there are no structural incenBves to do so?

–  Answer: DomesBc coaliBonal logrolling and naBonalist mythmaking

•  “Cult of the offensive” –  Puzzle: ObjecBve condiBons in 1914 favored defense, yet states nevertheless adopted offensive strategies

–  Answer: European militaries favored offense for organizaBonal reasons + poor civilian control of the military

Hegemonic Realism •  Preponderance = peace – System is stable if there is a clear hierarchy of power

•  Balance = war – Shij away from preponderance towards equality between the leading two powers foreshadows (hegemonic) war

•  “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable.”

The Case For Hegemony/Unipolarity

•  Huge gap in power = no uncertainty

•  No power transiBons

•  Unipole can intervene to nip potenBal challenges in the bud

•  Hard for potenBal opponents to coordinate

•  Bids for regional hegemony likely to be opposed by those in the region

Hegemonic Realism: Assump-ons

•  Law of uneven growth – States grow at different rates over Bme – Moves them up (and down) the hierarchy of power •  In modern Bmes, industrializaBon = key factor

– Triggers conflict between declining hegemon and rising challenger

– Outcome of war re-orders system

Hegemonic Realism: Causal Mechanisms for War

•  Disequilibrium in distribuBon of benefits, presBge, territory, etc., in the system – sBll favors the hegemon

•  No longer reflects actual balance of power, which increasingly favors the challenger

Hegemonic Realism: Causal Mechanisms for War

•  PrevenBve moBve

•  Declining power wages war now to prevent challenger from rising and to head off its own decline

•  Fight war now to avoid possibility of having to fight a war later under worse circumstances

•  Similarity to commitment problem

•  Example = Germany vs. Russia, 1914

The Bargaining Model

•  Key insight: war is costly – States have to pay a cost for fighBng whether they win, lose, or draw

•  Costs of fighBng = big incenBve to negoBate a seflement

•  Why not simply skip the fighBng part and go straight to a deal that reflects their relaBve strength? Why does war nevertheless happen?

Ra-onal Explana-on for War #1

•  States have private informa-on about their capabiliBes…

•  … and incen-ves to misrepresent it

Ra-onal Explana-on for War #2

•  States cannot credibly commit to abide by bargains agreed to now if condiBons change in future

Ra-onal Explana-on for War #3

•  States cannot reach a bargain because the issue under dispute is indivisible

The Bargaining Model and China •  Private informaBon

–  China’s moBves –  Willingness to fight for territorial expansion –  U.S. ability to hit Chinese mobile ICBMs

•  Commitment –  China’s conBnued rise undermines credibility of any deal struck today

•  Indivisibility –  “One China” –  “Nine dash line” –  Status concerns

1st Image 2nd Image 3rd Image

Realism Human nature/ Classical

MoBvaBonal/ Neoclassical

Neorealism Offensive Defensive

Realism and Levels of Analysis