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Islam the eBook An Online Introduction

William E. Shepard

Islam—the eBook An Online Introduction by William E. Shepard

Published by Journal of Buddhist Ethics Online Books, Ltd. c/o Charles Prebish 1030 Grandview Drive Providence, Utah 84332 USA

www.jbeonlinebooks.org

ISBN: 978-09801633-4-6

Cover photograph of Omar Ali Saifuddien Mosque in Bandar, Brunei by Daniel Cubillas

To my wife and children: Elza, Bill and Christina

Contents

Contents iv

Illustrations x

Preface xvi

Notes on transliteration and pronunciation xviii

Introduction

Chapter 1: Approaching the Subject 2

Who represents Islam? 3

What is Islam? 3

Is there a “true Islam”? 4

Empathetic understanding 5

Issues of language and related matters 6

Dates 7

Islamist or Islamicist? 7

An introductory overview of Islam 8

Part I: History of the Community

Chapter 2: On the Eve of Islam 14

Two “superpowers” 15

Religion in Iran 16

Byzantine Christianity 18

Other forms of Christianity 21

Jews and Samaritans 23

Gnostics and philosophers 24

The Axial Age 26

| Contents

Chapter 3: The Beginnings of Islam 28

The Arabs and their religion before Islam 29

The career of the Prophet Muhammad 30

Conflict and conquest after Muhammad 34

Some scholarly reservations 37

Chapter 4: Expansion and Flowering of Islam 40

Later Umayyad period 41

The Early Abbasid period 42

Independent or autonomous realms 44

The later Abbasid period 45

The crusades and after 45

The Mongols and after 47

Ottomans and Safavids 49

Central Asia, China and South Asia 51

Southeast Asia and Africa 53

Part II: Aspects of Islam

Chapter 5: The Qur’an 57

What is the Qur’an? 58

The Qur’an in Muslim culture 60

Some teachings of the Qur’an 62

Other spiritual beings 66

Social teachings 67

Interpretation of the Qur’an 68

Western criticism of the Qur’an 69

Chapter 6: The Prophet Muhammad 73

Muhammad is human, but special 74

How authentic are the Hadith? 77

Muhammad as intercessor and spiritual being 79

Modernist views: Muhammad as hero 81

| Contents

Chapter 7: Rituals and Ceremonies 86

Some basic distinctions and concerns 87

Intention (niyya) 87

Ritual purity 87

The Pillars 88

Other pilgrimages 100

The birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (Mawlid al-Nabi) 101

Life cycle rituals 101

Sibha 103

Halal food 103

Chapter 8: Divisions in the Umma and Political Thought 106

Kharijis 107

Shi‘is 108

Sunnis 112

Persian and Greek contributions 115

Chapter 9: Scholars and Learning 118

Who are the ‘ulama’? 119

The mosque 119

Education 120

The sciences and higher level teaching 121

‘Ulama’ and government 125

Chapter 10: To Know God’s Will: Islamic Law 129

Shari‘a and fiqh 130

The five Shari‘a valuations 130

Usul al-fiqh, the roots of jurisprudence: the Sunni form 132

Sunni “schools” of jurisprudence, Madhhabs 135

Twelver Shi‘i usul al-fiqh 136

Muftis and fatwas 137

A brief history of fiqh 139

The Shari‘a and popular appropriation 141

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Chapter 11: Theology and Philosophy 145

Theology (kalam) 146

Theological issues 147

Philosophy 151

Main teachings of philosophy 151

Chapter 12: The Sufi Path to God 155

Knowledge, love and remembrance of God 156

Tariqa, the path 157

The goal: Fana’ and Baqa’ 159

Walis (saints) 162

Sufism and Shari‘a-mindedness 164

Historical outline 166

Poetry and theosophy 168

Some recent developments 171

Chapter 13: A Philosopher, a Scholar-mystic, and a Reformer 174

Ibn Sina 175

Al-Ghazali 179

Ibn Taymiyya 182

Chapter 14: Culture and Counter-Culture 187

Visual art 188

Architecture 193

Literature 197

Poetry 197

Prose 201

Music 201

Part III: Modern Developments

Chapter 15: Western Imperialism and Muslim Response 206

Modernization, Westernization, secularization 209

The challenge to Islam 210

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Pre-modern reform 210

Responses to the challenge 211

Traditionalism 211

Islamic modernism 212

Secularism 216

Islamism 218

Resurgence of Islam 221

Chapter 16: Turkey: Secularist Reform 226

Ottoman defeats and reforms 227

Ottoman “pan-Islamic” policy and claim to the caliphate 228

“Turkism” in the early twentieth century 229

Nationalist and secularist republic established by Atatürk 230

Retreat from secularism from about 1950 234

Alevi revival 236

Chapter 17: Egypt: Between Secularism and Islamism 239

The beginnings of modernization and secularization in the nine teenth century 240

Muhammad ‘Abduh and Islamic modernism 242

Nationalism and secularization in the early twentieth century 243

The beginnings of Islamism: the Muslim Brothers 245

Revolution: support, control and repression 246

Resurgence of Islam 248

Chapter 18: Iran: From Secularism to Islamic Revolution 254

The Qajars: religion, foreign interference, constitution 255

The Pahlavis: Reza Shah and Iranian nationalism 258

Muhammad Reza Shah: White Revolution 259

Islamic opposition and revolution 261

Islamic republic 263

Chapter 19: Indonesia: Islamic Society or Islamic State? 269

Islamization of Java, Sumatra and other islands 270

Dutch imperialism and continuing Islamization 271

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Twentieth-century movements 273

Independence and the issue of an Islamic state 275

The events of 1965 and Suharto’s regime 276

Post-Suharto: election; violent Islamism 278

Chapter 20: Globalization: Challenge and Opportunity 282

Globalization: meaning and examples 283

Global jihad 284

Why martyrdom operations? 288

Muslim diaspora in the West 289

Liberal/progressive Islam 293

Appendix I: Glossary of Names and Terms 298

Appendix II: Chronology 320

Appendix III: The Islamic calendar 325

Appendix IV: Classical Arabic names 327

Appendix V: Muhammad’s wives 329

Further Reading 331

References 334

Illustrations

Figures

Figure 2.1 Achaeminid Tombs at Naqsh-i Rustam, near Persepolis. The bas-relief in the lower left of the picture is the Roman emperor Valerian, who had been captured in battle (in 260) submitting ti to the Sasasian ruler Shapur. A clear image of this may be found on the internet at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bas_relief_nagsh-e-rostam_al.jpg and at http://www.livius. org/a/1/iran/sapor.JPG 15

Figure 2.2 Persepolis, the Great Stairway leading to the palace area. The figures on the right are people of various nations bearing tribute to the Shahanshah, illustrating the claim to be king of kings. 16

Figure 2.3 Sasanian Coin. Obverse: Head of Shah (note flame above the head). Reverse: Two priests beside fire altar 17

Figure 2.4 Cave church in the Ihlara Valley, Turkey. Looking into the dome with the Christos Pantokrator (Christ the Ruler of All). Below the figure of Christ are the Angels and below them human saints, reflecting the Christian Neo-Platonic view of reality. 19

Figure 2.5 Aya Sofia (Hagia Sophia). Mosaic of the Virgin Mary and child Jesus in the center. The letters in the circles beside the Virgin’s head are the abbreviations in Greek for “Mary Mother of God”. The figure to the left is Justinian with a model of the Hagia Sophia, and to the right is Constantine, under whom the Empire began to become Christian. These pictures were plastered over when the Ottomans converted the cathedral to a mosque and were uncovered when it became a museum under Atatürk. 20

Figure 2.6 Byzantine coin, John Tzimiskes (969–976 C.E.) or later. Obverse: Christ (as Pantokrator). Reverse: Cross and Jesus Christ, King of Kings. The coin reflects both piety and propaganda. 22

Figure 3.1 Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. Built by ‘Abd al-Malik. (Courtesy of Israel Ministry of Tourism www.goisrael.com) 37

Figure 4.1 Ribat, Sousse, Tunisia. Built about 821, it housed warriors who fought in jihad, defended the city and propagated the faith. 41

Figures 4.2 Abbasid coin. Obverse within the circle: No god but God alone; He has no associate. Reverse within the circle: Muhammad is the Messenger of God. 43

| Illustrations

Figure 4.3 Inside the Mosque of Ibn Tulun, in Cairo, 9th century. The minaret resembles that of the Great Mosque of Samarra in Iraq, built by the Abbasids. 44

Figure 4.4 Aya Sofia in Istanbul, formerly the cathedral of the Hagia Sophia (Holy Wisdom), and now technically a museum. The large medallion at the right says “Allah” and the one to the left “Muhammad”. Just behind and above them a figure of the Virgin Mary has been uncovered, presumably since it became a museum (cf. Figure 2.5). 50

Figure 4.5 Mosque in Beijing, China. (Courtesy Peter Sanders/Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA) 52

Figure 5.1 Surat Ikhlas (112) of the Qur’an, by the moderm Pakistani calligrapher, Aftab Ahmad. Kufic style. (Courtesy Calligraphy by Aftab Ahmad/Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA) 61

Figure 5.2 Calligraphy of the opening sura of the Qur’an, the Fatiha. 63

Figure 6.1 The Prophet’s mosque in Medina. (Courtesy Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA) 79

Figure 7.1 Men prostrating in salah at a mosque in London. (Courtesy Ian Yeomans/ Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA) 89

Figure 7.2 Men bowing in salah in a park in London, during demonstrations in 1980 protesting the Soviets’ sending of troops into Afghanistan. The object in front of them is called a sutra; no one should pass between the sutra and the people praying. (Courtesy Hugh Lifson) 90

Figure 7.3 Pieces of clay from Karbala’ for use in salah. Tehran. The wording on one box says, in Arabic, “Salah is a pillar of religion.” 92

Figure 7.4 Ornate mihrab and minbar at the Madrasa of Sultan Hasan (completed in 1362) in Cairo. 93

Figure 7.5 Simple mihrab and minbar in a small “storefront” mosque in a suburban district of Cairo (1977). 94

Figure 7.6 Mosque of ‘Umar Makram at dusk during Ramadan. Note that the street is almost empty since people have gone home to break their fast. The mosque is named after an Egyptian ‘alim and community leader during the period between Napoleon and Muhammad ‘Ali (See Figure 17.3). 97

Figure 7.7 Funeral procession (janaza) in Cairo (1968). 103

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Figure 9.1 Kuttab Sabil of ‘Abd al-Rahman Katkhuda , Cairo, eighteenth century. The upper story was a kuttab and the lower part a public drinking fountain. 120

Figure 9.2 Ibn Batuta as a boy studying (modern rendition). Ibn Batuta (1304–c.1377) became an ‘alim and wrote a book about his travels throughout the Muslim world. (Courtesy Norman MacDonald/Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA) 123

Figure 9.3 The Mosque-University of al-Azhar, in Cairo (1977). 125

Figure 10.1 Dar al-Ifta’ in Cairo, the office of the Mufti of the Republic. 138

Figure 12.1 The Khanqah of Sultan Baybars al-Gashankir, Cairo, completed in 1310. The small doors at the lower right are to cells that served as living quarters for Sufis or were used for khalwa. 157

Figure 12.2 The tombs of Jalal al-Rumi and his son in Rumi’s mausoleum at Konya, Turkey. 161

Figure 12.3 Tambourines and nay (flute) enliven the mawlid of Ahmad al-Badawi in Tanta, Egypt. 163

Figure 12.4 Procession in honor of the khalifa of the Badawiyya during Mawlid of Ahmad al- Badawi . 164

Figure 12.5 A bi-shar‘ Sufi (one who sits lightly by the Shari‘a) as pictured on a leather scroll probably made for tourists. 165

Figure 12.6 Diagram of the relationship between the Shari‘a and the tariqa 166

Figure 12.7 Statue of Hajji Bektash (d. c. 1337), founder of the Bektashi tariqa, near Nevşehir, Turkey. 168

Figure 12.8 Figurines of Mevlevis (“Whirling Dervishes”) engaged in sama‘, in the Mausoleum of Jalal al-Din Rumi. 169

Figure 14.1 Geometrical arabesque, Fez, Morocco. (Courtesy Peter Sanders/Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA) 188

Figure 14.3 Window in the Hospital of Sultan Qalaun in Cairo (completed c. 1293). The windows present geometric arabesques arbitrarily cut off as al-Faruqi suggests. 189

Figure 14.2 Floral Arabesque in the Topkapi Palace, Istanbul. Also shown is the “tree of life”, a frequent theme from early Islamic times. 189

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Figure 14.4 The Arabic word badī‘ (originator, a name of Allah) written in calligraphy, in the normal direction on the right and in mirror image on the left. Rumi’s Mausoleum at Konya. 190

Figure 14.5 “A jug of wine, a Loaf of Bread – and Thou” Wall paintings in the Chehel Sotun Palace in Isfahan (Seventeenth century). 192

Figure 14.6 Minaret of the Zaytuna Mosque, Tunis. The mosque was built about 700, but this minaret, which is typical of the Maghrebi (North African) style, dates from 1894. 193

Figure 14.7 The Mosque of al-Husayn in Cairo. Husayn’s head is said to be buried here. The pencil-shaped minaret is typical of Ottoman mosques ( See also Figure 17.2, the Mosque of Muhammad Ali). 193

Figure 14.8 Minarets from the Mamluke period in Cairo. The one in the foreground belongs to the mosque of Qalaun and the other to the Mosque of Sultan Barquq (1384). 194

Figure 14.9 The Great Mosque of Sousse, Tunisia. The open courtyard with columned area is typical of early mosques. The mihrab is approximately under the small dome at the far right of the picture. (Picture is taken from the ribat, see figure 4.1.) 195

Figure 14.10 Mud built mosques at Pondo, Niger. (Courtesy Brynn Bruijn/Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA) 196

Figure 14.11 Mosque at new Bus Terminal in Konya, Turkey. 196

Figure 14.12 Mausoleum of Saadi, in Shiraz, Iran. 200

Figure 15.1 Jamia Masjid in Kashmir, built about 1385. (Courtesy Harold Sequeira/ Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA) 220

Figure 16.1 Tomb of Atatürk in his mausoleum, Ankara. 230

Figure16.2 Tomb of Shehab al-Din (Şehabeddin) Sivasi (d. 1378) and mosque, Salçuk, Turkey. The plaque describes him as a scholar but he also must have been a Sufi, in view of the practices prohibited by the sign beside the door (see text box). 232

Figure 16.3 Office of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) in Konya, which is one of its strongholds. 235

Figure 16.4 Bektashi sama‘, at the tomb/complex of Hajji Bektash (in 2000). The participation of men and women together makes this quite unusual. Like the Baktashis, the Alevis venerate Hajji Bektash and in Turkey today people often speak of an Alevi-Bektashi tradition. 237

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Figure 17.1 Mosque of Omar Makram in Cairo (See also Figure 7.6). The tent-like structure beside it is called a suradeq. Here it is being used for guests at a funeral. State funerals are generally held at this mosque. 241

Figure 17.2 Mosque of Muhammad Ali in the Citadel, Cairo. Ottoman style. 242

Figure 17.3 The “benefits” of modernizaton: Cairo carpark and billboard advertising a movie called “And I Fell into a Sea of Honey”. It may have been an Islamist who defaced it. (1977) 249

Figure 17.4 Minarets of Old Cairo: A Photo Montage. “Day and night in Cairo”, said Egypt’s most famous architect, Hassan Fathy, “I am surrounded by mosques... with their domes and minarets and so I can say I am living in a skyscape not a landscape”. (Courtesy John Feeney/ Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA) 252

Figure 18.1 Khomeini’s mausoleum in Tehran. 262

Figure 18.2 Inside the Mausoleum of Khomeini in Tehran, 1999. Sermon is being given by Khomeini’s grandson. Large pictures are of Khomeini and Khamane’i, the current leader. 264

Figure 18.3 Sign on the outside of a Tehran hotel in 1984 reads, “Oh God, Oh God, preserve Khomeini until the revolution of the Mahdi.” A comparable sign in 1999 read, “Oh God, Oh God, protect this movement of Khomeini until the revolution of the Mahdi.” 265

Figure 19.1 Pesantren Pabelan, Java; salah at the mosque. 274

Figure 20.1 Islamic Society of North America Headquarters, 1979, Plainfield, Indiana, USA, includes mosque, library and office block. (Courtesy Charlie Nye/Getty Images/ Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA) 291

Maps

Map 1 The Hellenistic-Iranian world 15

Map 2 Muslim lands about 800 c.e. 38

Map 3 Muslim lands in 1250 and 1500 47

Map 4 Road between Mecca and Arafat 99

Map 5 Middle East in the early Thirteenth century and cities mentioned in this chapter 175

Map 6 Modern Islamic World 207

| Illustrations

Map 7 Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey (shaded) 227

Map 8 Egypt 240

Map 9 Iran 255

Map 10 Indonesia 270

Preface

This book seeks to present the Islamic religion and as much as possible of the cultures of which it is a part in a sympathetic way, without ignoring and without unduly emphasizing the negative aspects that have attended them as they attend every human tradition. Over the last fourteen centuries Islam has guided millions of people to live full and productive lives and given consolation in misfortune and tragedy. If today Westerners tend to be more aware of the negative aspects of Islam, this is all the more reason why we need to see the more positive as- pects that have attracted so many to it and still do.

This book comes out of more than thirty years of teaching and research about Islam within the context of Religious Studies. Although seeking to present the tradition in its fullness, it gives particular attention to the political aspects, insofar as these are closely related to religion, and to modern developments, because it is to these that much of my research and teaching has been devoted. It is directed in the first instance at university level students who have limited knowledge of the Muslim world and no knowledge of its languages. I hope, though, that others will also profit from it.

The introductory chapter discusses the appropriate approach to the subject and gives a synop- sis of Islam as a Muslim might give it. The first fourteen chapters present the Islamic tradition as it has developed over the centuries, usually with some attention to modern developments at the end of each chapter. Of these, three chapters (2–4) give a historical overview from the pre-Islamic period to about 1700 and ten (5–14) deal with various aspects of the tradition, including the scriptures, the role of the Prophet Muhammad, sectarian divisions, religious scholars, religious law and mysticism. The remaining chapters (15–20) deal with the chal- lenges of the modern period, with particular attention to religion and politics in Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Indonesia. The last of these chapters deals with disparate aspects of what we call “globalization”.

I have used Western (Gregorian) dates throughout the book because most readers will presum- ably be unfamiliar with Islamic dates, which would therefore be an unnecessary additional burden. An explanation of Islamic dates is found in Appendix III. Transliteration of Arabic words follows a standard system except that I use diacritics consistently only in the Glossary and in the Notes on Transliteration and Pronunciation. I also use diacritics for important Arabic terms and names the first time or few times they appear and sometimes later where there is a long lapse in their appearance. I have tried to keep citations to a minimum and used the Harvard system (abbreviated reference in parentheses in the text) where I have them. The sources for these will be found in the section labeled “References”, at the end of the book.

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| Preface

Qur’anic references are given by chapter number and verse number, using Pickthall’s versi- fication; sources for hadiths, either the name of the collection from which they come or the source from which I got them, are usually given.

The text of this book is virtually identical to that of Introducing Islam, published by Routledge in a series edited by Damien Keown and Charles Prebble, who are also the editors of the se- ries of which this book is a part. There are in this book, nonetheless, some minor corrections, rewordings and additions, and many of the illustrations are different. The main addition to this book is the large number of web links provided throughout the text, along with other sites list- ed under “Web resources” after the reading lists at the end of each chapter. These are intended to provide additional information on particular topics or different approaches or points of view from those found in the text. I do not necessarily agree with the claims or opinions found in these links but I do believe that the reader will profit from being exposed to them. I have tried to choose links that will remain active for a long time but undoubtedly some will become un- available relatively soon. My apologies for these.

It would be impossible to name all of those to whom I owe a debt of gratitude. These include Muslims and non-Muslims and include teachers, colleagues, students, friends, passing ac- quaintances who have taught me significant things in a brief time and many I have never met but whose writings I have read. Perhaps the one who most should be named is the late Wilfred Cantwell Smith, my teacher and dissertation advisor and one of the giants of our field. I be- lieve that my approach considerably reflects his and hope that it is worthy of him. Apart from him, to name any one of my teachers or colleagues without naming a host of others would be an injustice.

I should certainly mention the Muslim community here in New Zealand, who have provided my main living contact with the Muslim umma for thirty years and have encouraged me in my research on them. If one person could stand for all of them it would be the late Abdul Rahim Rasheed, a lawyer who devoted so much time and effort to developing the community.

A debt of gratitude is also owed to my wife and children, who have encouraged me and often put up with my physical absence and my absence-while-present, so to speak.

Appreciation is also due to the staff at Routledge for their assistance in the print version of this book and to those who have read all or part of the manuscript and made many helpful sugges- tions, steering me away from more than one pitfall. Likewise appreciation is due to Damien Keown and Charles Prebish for their initiative in undertaking this series of ebooks and inviting me to participate in it.

Much of what is good is owed to all of these people. The weaknesses are my responsibility.

Notes on transliteration and pronunciation

Proper pronunciation of Arabic and other languages can be learned only with specific instruc- tion, so the following guide is designed to indicate to the speaker of English suitable approxi- mations to the pronunciation of particular letters and combinations. This guide is largely lim- ited to cases that appear in this book.

Arabic The transliteration of Arabic terms follows the system most commonly used today by scholars writing in English except that macrons and dots under certain letters (diacritics) are for the most part omitted for the sake of simplicity in this book. I give them for many words on their first or first few appearances or when they appear after a long break, and I give them consis- tently in the Glossary and in this section. Names of people and places are usually given in the commonly recognized form when such a form exists, e.g. Cairo instead of al-Qāhira and Abdel Nasser instead of ‘Abd al-Nāṣir.

Transliteration and pronunciation are based on Modern Standard (i.e. literary) Arabic; dialects vary considerably.

The following consonants are pronounced approximately as in English: b, d, f, h, j, k, l, m, n, s (as in sight, not rise), sh, t, th (as in thing, not this), w, y, z.

dh is pronounced like th in this.

kh is pronounced like the ch in loch (Scottish) or ach (German).

gh is voiced equivalent of kh, a bit like gargling. “Voiced” means the vocal chords are active; e.g. g (voiced) and k (unvoiced).

The combinations sh, th, dh and kh are pronounced separately if one or both of the letters has a dot under it, e.g. Aḍ-hā. This is relatively rare, however.

q is pronounced like k but is more guttural.

r is a tongue-flap, like the r in the Spanish or Italian caro, also somewhat like the tt in collo- quial American English better.

rr is a trill, like the rr in the Spanish perro.

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| Notes on transliteration and pronunciation

‘ represents the Arabic letter ‘ayn, which has a very guttural sound that can be learned only with practice.

’ represents the Arabic letter hamza. The sound exists in English but is not represented by a letter. It is the breath we often make at the beginning of a word that begins with a vowel, and sometimes in other situations or in certain dialects: e.g. a’ apple, li’l (for little). The sign is not used when hamza is at the beginning of a word, thus adhān, not ’adhān.

The Arabic letter tā marbūṭa, which appears only at the end of a word, usually is like a silent h and in this book is not represented, but when it is constructed with a following word (called iḍāfa in Arabic) it changes to a t and is represented, e.g shī‘a (party) and shī‘at ‘Ali (party of ‘Ali). Some writers use the h in the non-iḍāfa form, e.g. shi‘ah.

Doubled consonants are actually doubled in pronunciation, i.e. stretched out longer.

ḍ, ḥ, ṣ, ṭ and ẓ represent distinct letters in Arabic that have slightly different sounds from their counterparts without dots, generally a “darker” sound. The differences, however, are not great enough to concern the reader who does not plan to study Arabic.

The vowels are a, i and u, and the diphthongs are aw and ay. Long vowels are indicated by a macron, ā, ī, ū. These do make a difference to pronunciation; in particular the accent will usu- ally be on the syllable with the long vowel. The macron is also occasionally needed to distin- guish between words that would appear the same in transliteration without it but are different in Arabic, e.g. Ḥajj, the Pilgrimage to Mecca, and Ḥājj, the one who makes the Pilgrimage.

Long ā is pronounced like the a in had.

Short a is pronounced like the u in but.

Long ī is pronounced like the ee in beet.

Short i is pronounced like the i in bit.

Long ū is pronounced like the oo in soon.

Short u is pronounced like the u in put.

ay is pronounced like the i in bite or like the ay in hay.

au is pronounced like the ow in how.

The definite article (“the” in English) is always transliterated al-. In pronunciation, however, both letters vary. The first letter may become i or u depending on the end of the preceding word. (This need not concern the reader, however, because the transliteration does not usually indicate the relevant vowel.) The second letter may assimilate to the first letter of the follow- ing word, e.g. al-shi‘a (the party) is pronounced ash-shi‘a. This happens with the following

| Notes on transliteration and pronunciation

consonants: d, ḍ, dh, l, n, r, s, ṣ, sh, t, ṭ, th, z, ẓ. This pronunciation is reflected in some writers’ transliterations and in the accepted spelling of many names, e.g. Abdurrahman, which in the transliteration normally used here would be ‘Abd al-Raḥmān.

Plurals of transliterated words are in this book usually made by adding the English s, but oc- casionally Arabic plurals appear. These are made by adding -ūn, -īn, or āt to the word (e.g. mu’min > mu’minīn) or by changing the word in other ways (e.g. ‘ālim > ‘ulamā’) but the lat- ter cases will be explained if necessary where they occur.

The word Abū (father) in names is sometimes Abī for grammatical reasons, e.g. ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (see Appendix IV on names).

Accent: words with no long vowels are accented on the second or third last syllable; words with one long vowel are accented on that syllable; words with more than one long vowel are usually accented on the last long vowel.

Persian Persian names and terms are not transliterated according to a single scholarly system here but according to common usage in scholarly and journalistic writing. Diacritics are not used here. Something like the Arabic iḍāfa exists in Persia and is represented by -i (pronounced some- thing like the a in ate, but very short), e.g. vilayat-i faqih (the governance of the jurist), the Arabic equivalent is wilāyat al-faqīh.

As this example also illustrates, the w in Arabic becomes v in the transliteration of Persian.

Persian words are usually accented on the last syllable, e.g. Khomeiní.

Turkish Modern Turkish is written in Roman script and will generally present no problems, with a few exceptions. Those that appear in this book are as follows:

c is pronounced like j.

ç is pronounced like ch.

ş is pronounced like sh.

Names and terms from before the 1920s are often transliterated as if they were Arabic: e.g. shaykh al-Islam instead of şeyhülislam.

The Arabic ta marbuta becomes a t in Turkish, e.g. şeriat for Arabic sharī‘a.

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| Notes on transliteration and pronunciation

Indonesian Indonesian is also written in Roman script and also should present few problems. Note the following:

c is pronounced like ch.

sy is pronounced like sh (e.g. Syariah for Shari‘a)

dl in recent writings is pronounced like d (e.g. Nahdlatul Ulama)

The Arabic ta marbuta usually becomes h, sometimes t (e.g. Syariah, Syariat)

Previously Indonesian was romanized according to Dutch orthography and this often appears in names (though these are also often updated), e.g. Soeharto instead of Suharto, pantjasila in- stead of pancasila, sjariah instead of syariah.

Introduction

Approaching the Subject

In This Chapter This chapter discusses the approach to Islam taken in this book, and particular the goal of “em- pathetic understanding”. It also provides an introductory overview of Islam from a Muslim perspective.

Main Topics Covered Who represents Islam? •

What is Islam? •

Is there a true Islam? •

Empathetic understanding •

Issues of language and related matters•

An introductory presentation of Islam •

Introduction 1 | Approaching the Subject

Who represents Islam?

Islam has had a bad press in recent years. The destruction of the Twin Towers in New York on 11 September 2001, followed by other high profile terrorist actions in Bali, Madrid, London and elsewhere, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and violence in other places, has led many to associate Islam with violence and fanaticism. Undoubtedly these events do represent one aspect of Islam, or more precisely, of one group of Muslims. But these are very few in comparison to those Muslims who go quietly about their work or household chores, educate their children, lend a helping hand to their neighbors and work for their communities, expressing their faith in doing these things.

This book will give its primary attention to this much larger group, but will not neglect the more radical and violent elements, both past and present.

What is Islam? We may begin by saying that Islam is the religion of those people who have for some fourteen centuries followed the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Today they number more than one billion, living throughout the world but concentrated particularly in the swath of lands stretching from Morocco to Indonesia and from Central Asia to sub-Saharan Africa.

Going further, we may understand the word “Islam” at three levels. At the most basic level it means submitting or committing oneself to God, essentially an inward mental action though with outward consequences. The one who does this is termed a Muslim. This was the earliest meaning of the terms Islam and Muslim. At the second level Islam refers to a religion, that is, a system of beliefs and practices believed to be ordained by God, and Muslims are the adher- ents of this religion. At the third level Islam may refer to a culture and a civilization, indeed several cultures and civilizations, created by Muslims over the course of time but also shared by many non-Muslims. Islamic civilizations integrated into themselves ideas and practices from other civilizations, including those of Greece, Iran and India, and were among the great civilizations of human history. Today, particularly, there are some who may be called cultural Muslims – who do not believe or practice the religion, or sit loosely by it, but who are heirs to the culture and civilization and identify with them.

According to conventional history Islam in the first two senses began with the career of the Prophet Muhammad (c. 610–632 C.E.), although Muslims say that it began much sooner, as we shall see below. Islamic civilization also began to develop at this time but took two or three centuries to reach its first full flowering. Islam as a civilization is a constantly developing tra- dition, varying from one time and place to another. Many, including the author of this book,

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would say this is also true of Islam as a religion, although most Muslims would say that the essentials of the religion of Islam do not change.

This book will focus primarily on Islam as a religion, presenting the symbols, ideas, practices and institutions of which it is composed and tracing their historical development as much as possible. It will also deal with culture and civilization because religion is embedded in these and the line between them and religion is often hard and sometimes impossible to draw. The precise form of the religion of any particular group of Muslims will depend considerably on its cultural context. The diversity of culture has resulted in considerable diversity of belief and practice throughout the Muslim world, but there is still considerable agreement on the core el- ements of the religion.

In fact, however, it is not the religion or the culture that are most important. It is the people. Religion and culture exist only in the people who practice and participate in them. Apart from people they are abstractions. Because the people commit themselves with varying degrees of conviction and consistency and with diverse interpretations, there is enormous diversity at the personal level. We can almost say that there are as many “Islams” as there are Muslims. Behind the unavoidable abstractions and generalizations of religion and culture we must al- ways try to see or imagine the actual people.

Is there a “true Islam”? Many Muslims believe that there is a “true Islam”, which is properly followed only by some. They often differ, however, as to exactly what this true Islam is. What is essential for some is heterodox or mere culture for others. This question is of understandable concern to Muslims, but it is one that as scholars in Religious Studies we do not ask or seek to answer. The closest we come is to note that certain beliefs and practices are more common or agreed upon, and thus more “mainstream”, while others are less common and more contested. We do, of course, take account of the Muslims’ interest in the “true Islam” in our efforts at understanding.

Some non-Muslims may also claim that there is a true Islam, which consists of certain beliefs and practices that they wish to privilege for reasons of their own. Some stress the more attrac- tive aspects of Islam in order to defend it and some stress the more violent practices in order to justify their claim that Islam is a threat. We try to avoid both agendas.

In principle every form of Islam is for us significant and worthy of attention. In practice, of course, we will give more attention to those beliefs and practices that are “mainstream”, but we will not ignore the less widespread beliefs and practices. We will also give more attention to some forms of Islam than their numerical following would dictate because they are inter- esting or important in some way. An example will be Islamic philosophy, which mainly in-

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volved a small elite but is intellectually interesting and had considerable influence on Western thought. We will likewise give more attention to contemporary terrorists than their numbers dictate because of their impact. We will take them seriously as representing one form of Islam, though one that is quite aberrant in relation to mainstream forms.

Empathetic understanding If we do not ask which is the true Islam, we also do not ask whether Islam is true. We do not pass any theological judgment on the doctrines and practices or the people and groups we study, nor usually any moral judgment. We seek simply to understand them, as well and as fully as possible, but this is not always so simple. In the first place, we must get the facts. For example, what do Muslims (or some particular group of Muslims) actually do when they pray? Second, and crucially, we must try to understand what the facts mean to the people. What does praying mean to Muslims? This understanding must be at least an empathetic and, if possible, a sympathetic understanding. By empathy I mean imaginatively entering into the experience of another person and seeing the world as they see it. Sympathy adds to this a favorable at- titude toward them and their experience. In either case, we try mentally to walk the prover- bial mile in their moccasins. In order to do this we must often set aside temporarily many of our own beliefs and disbeliefs, values and presuppositions, and ask what would follow if the beliefs, values and presuppositions of those we are studying were in fact true. This is called “bracketing”, because we bracket off for the time being our own views. It may lead us to ap- preciate that if we were in the situation of those we are considering we would have done what they have done, or at least been tempted to do so. This is possible because we and those we study are all human and on that common humanity understanding can be built. Likewise, our cultures are human cultures and we can usually find parallels that will illuminate any case, al- though these parallels must be handled carefully, as we shall see.

Can we do this with the perpetrators of 9/11 or other terrorists? This is an extreme example and thus a good “test case”. Is sufficient information available about their beliefs and attitudes and the forces playing on them? I believe so. Were they human with recognizably human mo- tivations? We may wish to say no, but the answer is yes. Bracketing our revulsion may be dif- ficult, but all the more necessary for that reason. Can we find parallels in our own culture that will help us? The answer is yes, if we recognize that they were ideologues and “soldiers” will- ing to die for their cause, and that our culture, too, has its ideologies and those who are willing to die for a cause. Sympathy is undoubtedly out of the question in this case, but empathy is possible and very much needed. An effort to do this will be made in chapter twenty.

Fortunately, almost all of this book will deal with less extreme cases, where sympathetic as well as empathetic understanding is attainable. In fact, though, the situations and elements in Islam that appeal to us or seem familiar present their own challenges for understanding. We

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may think we understand them before we do. For example, as we shall see, the Qur’an is the Muslim scripture, so we initially draw comparisons with the Jewish or Christian Bible. These are helpful to a point, but soon we learn that in some ways the Qur’an is more to be compared with the person of Jesus Christ in Christian thinking than with the Bible. Drawing analogies from our own culture and experience is unavoidable but must be done with care.

Empathetic understanding, of course, does not preclude our making moral judgments and act- ing on them. With people like the perpetrators of 9/11, we must sooner or later remove the brackets and judge in terms of our own values and beliefs. This applies also to those whom we judge positively and who deserve our support. The point is to do this after we have empathetic understanding. The process of empathetic understanding, itself, must be as little influenced by our own values as possible.

Empathetic understanding, likewise, does not mean that we reject the critical study of Islamic religion and history that has been carried out by mainly non-Muslim Western scholars over the last two centuries. Their accomplishment is impressive and this book relies heavily on it. Muslims have often viewed Western critical study as an attack on Islam (and in some cases they have been right) but there has been some acceptance. Critical study is not inconsistent with empathetic understanding, but it applies it in its own way. For example, if a critic gives a radically novel interpretation to the first generation of Muslim history, this critic is (or should be) undertaking an empathetic understanding of the Muslims of that generation, not the pres- ent one. For an empathetic understanding of the present generation one would have to rec- ognize that most do not accept the critic’s radical interpretation. Where there is a significant difference between most Muslims’ views of some matter and the views of (mainly) Western academic critics I shall attempt to explain both.

In fact, today many Muslims participate in the (Western) academic study of Islam and accept many of the critical views and methods. In some respects Muslims will have an advantage in the empathetic study of their fellow Muslims, but this is not always the case. When a Sunni Muslim studies Shi‘ism, for example, he or she may find it harder to appreciate some things than a non-Muslim does, because the non-Muslim is not personally committed to any one form of Islam.

Issues of language and related matters Challenges to understanding arise from the problems of translation. For example, one of the most important practices is called ṣalāh in Arabic (also written salat) and namaz in Persian, Urdu, etc. These words are usually translated “prayer” or “worship”, but neither English word gives an adequate idea of what actually happens. In this case one has simply to learn what Muslims do and, if at all possible, use the Arabic or Persian term. In other cases an

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English term may be more or less adequate but is still likely to mislead. For example fiqh is often translated “law” or “ jurisprudence”, but given the differences between the Islamic and Western legal traditions I prefer usually to use the Arabic word. Still another sort of problem is illustrated by the word “Islam” itself. I translate it “submission” or “commitment”. The former is the usual translation and linguistically the most accurate, but “submission” for most English speakers has a negative connotation, whereas for Muslims “Islam” never does. Therefore, I think “commitment” often comes closer to the force the word has for Muslims. Still another sort of problem is illustrated by the name of the late president of Egypt whom we know as “Nasser”. The full form is Abdel Nasser (‘Abd al-Nāṣir in strict transliteration), which means “servant of the One who gives victory (i.e. God)”. Therefore to call him “Nasser” is in effect to call him God! (See Appendix IV on Arabic names.)

I shall therefore introduce and use the Arabic (or other Islamic language) words for the most important terms and encourage the reader to become familiar with them. With proper names I sometimes use the recognized Anglicized form, e.g. Umayyad (proper transliteration is Umawi), and sometimes use the Arabic form in preference to a recognized Anglicized form, e.g. Ibrahim for Abraham, Salah al-Din for Saladin, depending on my sense of the appropriate compromise between precision and familiarity.

Dates With dates I opt for familiarity over precision and use Western dates almost exclusively rather than Muslim dates, although it is important for an understanding of Islam to have an aware- ness of its calendar. Appendix III contains information about the Islamic calendar. When ap- propriate, C.E. (Common Era) or B.C.E. (Before the Common Era) will be used because they are a bit more ecumenical than A.D. (Anno Domini, The Year of the Lord) and B.C. (Before Christ). If a Muslim date is given it will be labeled Hijri or H.

Islamist or Islamicist? Those who engage in the academic study of Islam used to be called Orientalists, but today the usual term is Islamicists. This term must be distinguished from “Islamists”, which refers to those who struggle for an Islamic state and society, among whom were the perpetrators of 9/11.

Introduction 1 | Approaching the Subject

An introductory overview of Islam As has been suggested, there are almost as many Muslim views of Islam as there are Muslims. The following is one such view that might be given by an educated person with fairly good knowledge of the West. (It has been written by the author but shown for comment to several Muslims.)

Islam means submission or commitment to God and what this involves is stated in the words by which we witness to our faith, known as the Shahāda or “Formula of Witness”: “There is no god but God; Muhammad is the Messenger of God.” The rest is commentary, but commen- tary is necessary.

God is the source and ruler of the universe and nature submits to Him. The stars in their gal- axies, the sun and its planets, the mountains, the plains, the rivers and oceans, the plants and animals, large and small, all follow the courses of action He has laid out for them. In fact, the orderliness of nature is one of the most powerful evidences of the existence of one God. The main exception to this is human beings. Our bodies obey God as do other natural things, but when it comes to moral decisions we have the power to disobey God and we often do. In short, nature is always muslim (submitting to God) but humans have to choose to be so. God placed the first man and woman in a paradise, but they disobeyed and so he placed them here on earth, where life is a struggle. They expressed sorrow for their disobedience and God forgave them but they remained on earth where their descendants continue the moral struggle, to be rewarded or punished after death depending on their faith, their actions and God’s grace.

How do we know what God wants us to do? In part we can discover this from the laws of na- ture and also from our human nature insofar as we are born with a God-given inclination to worship and obey Him (called fiṭra), though our lower impulses and our society draw us away from this to a greater or lesser degree. God has therefore also sent us prophets and messengers to inform and remind us of His will. The first messenger was the first man, Adam, and oth- ers have included Nūḥ (Noah), Ibrāhīm (Abraham), Mūsā (Moses), Dāwūd (David) and ‘Īsā (Jesus). These and many others brought messages from God to their societies. In all cases the core of the message was that there is no god but God, that no idols or natural forces or human rulers should be considered worthy of worship or complete obedience, which are due only to God, nor should we give undue rein to our personal desires or to worldly success. In addi- tion they brought specific moral and social rules that varied slightly due to differences among their societies. Some received scriptures from God for their people, such as the Tawrā (Torah) given to Moses, the Zubūr (Psalms) given to David and the Injīl (Gospel) given to Jesus, peace be upon them. Their later followers, however, made changes in their teachings. Jesus, for ex- ample, was a messenger, but his followers made him into the son of God and part of a divine trinity.

Introduction 1 | Approaching the Subject

Some six centuries after Jesus, God sent his final messenger to confirm the messages of the previous messengers and clarify points where disputes and misunderstanding had arisen. This was Muhammad the son of Abdullah, may God bless him and grant him peace, who was born in the city of Mecca, in Arabia, in 570 C.E. and received his first revelation from God in 610. For the next thirteen years he preached God’s message to a small group of followers in the face of increasing opposition and persecution from the Meccan leaders. In 622 he had the op- portunity to move with most of his followers to another city, which we now know as Medina. This event is called the Hijra or “Emigration” and was the turning point in his efforts. In Medina he was able to create what amounted to an Islamic state in today’s parlance. He could not avoid armed conflict with his Meccan opponents, whose forces were initially stronger than his, but after eight years of struggle he prevailed. He then received the Meccans into his com- munity, forgiving even his most bitter opponents. He died two years later, in 632. Under his immediate successors the rest of Arabia accepted Islam.

Muslim armies then spread Muslim rule beyond Arabia until, within a century, it covered a large stretch of land from Spain in the west to what is now Pakistan in the east. These lands were now open to the preaching of Islam although their inhabitants were not compelled to be- come Muslims. Eventually, however, the attractions of Islam, including its pure monotheism and its concern for human brotherhood and social justice, led most to accept it. In time Islam spread further, mainly through peaceful activities of merchants and others, and an Islamic civi- lization developed with accomplishments in philosophy, science, art, architecture and social organization that made it one of the great civilizations of all time. Later Western accomplish- ments in philosophy and science have been built on foundations laid by Muslims.

For Muslims God’s will, as well as other knowledge, is revealed through the Qur’an and the Sunna (teaching and example) of Muhammad. The Qur’an consists of the verbatim words of God, revealed gradually to Muhammad over the twenty-three years of his career, memorized by him and others and written down by scribes. God has preserved it from any modification. The Sunna consists of words and deeds of Muhammad, which were also recorded and some- what later collected as we have them now. These are not direct revelation in the sense that the Qur’an is, but God protected Muhammad from error. The Qur’an and the Sunna are the basic sources for the Sharī‘a, the law of God by which we are called to live.

Scholars have interpreted these sources in order to apply them to new situations and this in- terpretation is called fiqh (literally “understanding”, more often translated “law” or “ jurispru- dence”). We believe that God has guided these scholars though not to the same level as the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna. Islam is also concerned for the inner spiritual life and this has been expressed especially in the Ṣūfī movement, whose teachers provide guidance for indi- viduals in their personal quest for God, as well as providing for certain social needs.

The central beliefs of Islam are belief in God, His angels, His scriptures, His messengers, the Last Day, when all will be raised from the dead and judged, and His determination of good

Introduction 1 | Approaching the Subject

and ill. The most important practices, or Pillars, of Islam are affirmation of the shahāda, ṣalāh (a structured form of prayer five times a day, often written salat), fasting in the month of Ramadan, giving zakāh (alms or poor tax, often written zakat), and performing the Ḥajj (pil- grimage to Mecca) at least once in one’s lifetime if one is able. To this some would add jihād, striving in the path of God whether in war or in moral and spiritual struggle. Jihād is undoubt- edly important but most do not include it among the Pillars.

Islamic practice is not limited to these, however. In fact, we believe that the Shari‘a applies to all areas of life, whether worship, personal and family life, economics, politics and all forms of culture. We are called on to discover God’s will and follow it in all areas of life and to do this, not only as individuals but also as societies. Some speak of giving to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s, but in reality everything is God’s. Therefore, politics is important to Islam. In fact, the major division between Muslims, that between Sunnis and Shi‘is, began with political differences among Muhammad’s followers. Although important differences con- tinue between them, they generally agree on the most basic things. While the Shari‘a guides all areas of life, it is not unduly restrictive because it takes account of human weaknesses and its interpretation is sufficiently flexible to deal with all situations. God in the Qur’an tells us that He has not made our religion hard for us.

Over the last two centuries Western domination and influence have resulted often in putting Western secular institutions and practices in the place of Islamic ones. Today there is an ef- fort to re-Islamize society. For many this means establishing Islamic states, i.e states governed according to the Shari‘a, and also using Islamic banks, wearing Islamic clothing and other things. Others believe it is not necessary to go so far and believe many Western-derived prac- tices are in accord with God’s will. It is also worth noting that many Westerners have been at- tracted to Islam and find it meets their spiritual needs.

Ever since Adam and Ḥawwā (Eve) were expelled from paradise, human life has been a strug- gle. We hope for material success in this struggle, but the real success is to struggle in the way God wants us to. The person who calls us to ṣalāh says, “. . . come to ṣalāh, come to success (falāh)”.

Key Points You Need to Know: The violence associated with Islam in the media in recent years does not represent • most Muslims.

Islam exists at three levels, personal commitment, religion as a system of beliefs and • practices, culture and civilization.

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We do not here concern ourselves with whether Islam is true or what is the “true • Islam”.

Our goal is at least empathetic, usually sympathetic, understanding of Islam and • Muslims.

Translations of key terms can be misleading, so we must consider carefully what is be-• ing said.

Islam means submission or commitment to God and no worship of anything else. •

Muhammad was the last of a series of messengers from God. His scripture, the Qur’an, • and his Sunna constitute the basic sources of authority for Muslim life.

The Shari‘a in principle applies to all areas of life, including politics. •

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading al-Faruqi, Ismail R. Islam. Niles, IL: Argus Communications, 1979.

Haeri, Shaykh Fadhalla. Living Islam: East and West. Shaftesbury: Element Books in association with Zahra Publications, 1989.

Haeri, Shaykh Fadlallah. The Thoughtful Guide to Islam. Winchester; New York: O Books, 2004.

Mahmud, Abdel Haleem. The Creed of Islam. London: World of Islam Festival Trust, 1978.

Martin, Richard C. (ed.). Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1985.

Maududi, Abul Ala’. Towards Understanding Islam. Lahore: Idara Tarjuman ul-Quran, 1960.

Internet Sites The following three sites list a large number of internet resources for the study of Islam and are largely complementary

Introduction 1 | Approaching the Subject

Academic Islamic Studies and Middle East, Central Asian, and other Area Studies Sites http:// www.uga.edu/islam/MESCenters.html

Islamic Studies Digital Library http://www.academicinfo.net/Islammeta.html

Academic Islamic Studies Resources http://www.theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/tam/linkcategory/C122/

The following site presents views about teaching religion that differ somewhat from the one presented in this text.

Stanley Fish on teaching Bible http://select.nytimes.com/2007/03/31/opinion/31fishs.html

Part I: History of the Community

On the Eve of Islam

In This Chapter Historically and culturally Islam may be said to have had two major roots. The best known of these is in the soil of central Arabia, where Muhammad carried out his mission. This will be considered in the next chapter. In this chapter we will consider the other root, which is in the lands north and east of Arabia, from Iran to Greece to Egypt and Ethiopia, what we here call the Hellenistic-Iranian world. The political face of this world was relatively simple, with two major “super-powers” but the religious and cultural face was extremely diverse with a multi- tude of religions, sects and philosophies and numerous ethnic groups. Islam was to prove in some respects a major break with this civilization but in others an heir to it and at continuation of it.

Main Topics Covered Two “superpowers” •

Religion in Iran •

Byzantine Christianity •

Other forms of Christianity •

Jews and Samaritans •

Gnostics and philosophers •

The Axial Age •

Part I: History of the Community 2 | On the Eve of Islam

Two “superpowers”

On the eve of Islam much of the land north and east of Arabia was divided between two large empires, the Persian Sasanians and the Byzantines, two regional superpowers, we might say. The Sasanian empire had been founded about 246 b.c.e. and was quite consciously heir to a Persian imperial tradition going back to Cyrus the Great and the Achaemenid Empire (c. 550–331 b.c.e.) and a cultural tradition going back much further. Persia had, however, known a period of Greek rule following the invasion of Alexander the Great (331 b.c.e.) and been subject to Greek cultural influence, against which the Sasanians were reacting. The Byzantine Empire was the Eastern half of the Roman Empire, which had survived the collapse of the Western half in the Fifth century and would continue until the Fifteenth century. Its beginning can be dated from the Fourth century, when the capital of the Roman Empire was shifted from Rome to

Map 1 The Hellenistic-Iranian world

Shepard Map 1

Rome Constantinople

Ctesiphon

Alexandria

Yathrib

Mecca

BYZANTINE EMPIRE SASANIAN EMPIRE

HIM YAR

Mediterranean Sea

Black Sea

Arabian Sea

Caspian Sea

Aral Sea

Jerusalem

Figure 2.1 Achaeminid Tombs at Naqsh-i Rustam, near Persepolis. The bas-relief in the lower left of the picture is the Roman emperor Valerian, who had been captured in battle (in 260) submitting ti to the Sasasian ruler Shapur. A clear image of this may be found on the internet at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bas_re- lief_nagsh-e-rostam_al.jpg and at http://www.livius. org/a/1/iran/sapor.JPG

Part I: History of the Community 2 | On the Eve of Islam

Constantinople and Christianity was first tolerated and then became the religion of state. The language and culture of the Byzantines was mainly Greek. The Sasanians and the Byzantines were in frequent conflict with each other and between 603 and 628 – during the Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime – they engaged in a particularly destructive war that weakened both empires in the face of the Muslim challenge that was shortly to come.

If the overall political configuration was fairly clear, the religious picture was extremely complex. Each of the empires had an official religion, but beside these was a host of other religions, sects, schools and movements, many of which survived into Islamic times and influ- enced Muslim culture and religion.

Religion in Iran The official religion of the Sasanians is known to us as Zoroastrianism, so named after the Iranian Prophet Zarathushtra (Greek, Zoroaster). It is also called Mazdaism or the “Good Religion”. Zarathushtra undertook a major reform of traditional Iranian religion sometime before 1000 b.c.e. The early history of his religion is not well known but it is clear that the Achaemenid kings were Zoroastrians, although they tolerated other forms of worship and often supported the religions of the other peoples they ruled over. It was Cyrus who permitted the Jews to return

to their land from exile in Babylon. It was only under the Sasanians that Zoroastrianism became fully the state religion, and they were rather less tolerant, although numbers of Jews lived peacefully for the most part under their rule and Christianity spread, sometimes in the face of persecution.

In its developed form Zoroastrianism taught a cosmic dualism of good and evil. There were two primordial spirits, Ahura Mazda, “The Wise Lord”, later known as Ormazd, and Angra Mainyu, later known as Ahriman. At the beginning of time Ormazd chose truth and goodness and Ahriman chose falsehood and evil. They have been and will be in con- flict until the end of time. To assist him in the struggle Ormazd called into being a number of lesser deities or yazatas (worthy of wor- ship) and created the world along with its inhabitants. The highest of the yazatas are

Figure 2.2 Persepolis, the Great Stairway leading to the palace area. The figures on the right are people of various nations bearing tribute to the Shahanshah, il- lustrating the claim to be king of kings.

Part I: History of the Community 2 | On the Eve of Islam

the six Amesha Spentas (Holy immortals). Ahriman is assisted by spiritual beings called dae- vas or divs. The task of humans is to side with Ormazd and struggle for the good “in thought, word and deed”, as it is commonly put. At the end of time a cosmic savior, the Saoshyant, will herald the final victory of good over evil, the dead will be raised, the wicked annihilated and the righteous will enjoy eternal happiness in a transformed earth. This religion is in principle a universal religion but due to historical circumstances it became in effect an ethnic Iranian one. These Zoroastrian conceptions, however, contributed to Jewish, Christian and Muslim concep- tions of angels, demons and the end time.

The state plays an important and positive role in this struggle. The shah (king) is the symbol of Ormazd, who has bestowed part of his sovereignty on him and granted him a divine efful- gence. The prosperity of the people and even the well being of nature depend on the character of the shah. Assisting and advising the king is the priesthood, which was very strong during the Sasanian period. Central to Zoroastrianism is a concern for purity and ritual, and particu- larly important is the cult of the sacred fire, since fire is believed to be the purest element cre- ated by Ormazd and His symbol. Muslims and others have called Zoroastrians fire worship- pers, but the Zoroastrians deny that they actually worship fire. The positive attitude toward both royalty and worldly life is illustrated by the following statement from a late text, “The principal characteristic of kings is pleasure . . . pleasure is consonant with kingship provided it is rooted in greatness. Pleasure rooted in greatness does not pass away” (Zaehner 299). Consistent with this was the considerable luxury and ceremonial that surrounded the shah.

Figure 2.3 Sasanian Coin. Obverse: Head of Shah (note flame above the head). Reverse: Two priests beside fire altar

Part I: History of the Community 2 | On the Eve of Islam

A variant of Zoroastrianism is known as Zurvanism. It postulated the existence of a figure, Zurvan (“Time”), who had engendered Ormazd and Ahriman but does not intervene in the struggle between them. It involved speculations about fate. This view was rejected by the priests but was evidently held by the Sasanian royal family and persisted into the Muslim period.

An influential Iranian “heresy” was Manicheism, founded by Mani (d. c. 275), who claimed to be a prophet and a successor to Zarathushtra, Buddha and Christ, whose true teachings he claimed to restore and complete, a claim similar to that made by Muhammad in relation to previous prophets. Like the Zoroastrians he taught a cosmic struggle between good and evil but unlike them he identified matter with evil. In a complex series of cosmic events sparks from the realm of light have become captive in material human bodies and can only escape through a strict asceticism, including celibacy and vegetarianism. Only the “elect” are capable of this but others can benefit by following a less rigorous regime and supporting the elect. Mani was favored and protected by one of the Sasanian shahs but was later executed at the instance of the chief priest. His movement, however, continued for some centuries, spreading into Central Asia, where it was adopted by the Uigur rulers from 763 to 840, and on to China. It also spread into the Roman Empire, where it presented a significant intellectual challenge to Christianity. It was severely persecuted in most places but lasted more than a thousand years.

Also worthy of mention is the movement led by Mazdak, who taught an ascetic spirituality and also sought a fairer deal for the poor, including some redistribution of property. His de- tractors claimed that he wanted property, including women, held in common. He received sup- port from the shah for a time, probably as a means of weakening the nobility, but in 528 he and many of his followers were killed. This movement did not survive into Islamic times but the memory of it did, serving to warn rulers of the danger of rebellion.

Byzantine Christianity Christianity, the official religion of the Byzantine Empire, had begun in Palestine in the first century as a Jewish sect, made up of those who believed that Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah (Christ in Greek), the hoped for king and savior of the Jews. He had been crucified but they believed he had been raised from the dead, taken up into heaven, and would return to establish the reign of God. While the first Christians were Jews, the movement soon attracted gentile (non-Jewish) converts and became a predominantly gentile movement. It spread rap- idly through the Roman Empire and beyond and attracted sporadic persecution. In the fourth century, however, the emperors made it the official religion, as mentioned above. Christian theology was developed amidst considerable controversy using Greek and Latin categories of thinking, which were significantly different from the Semitic categories of the Jews. The three most important doctrines developed were those of the trinity, incarnation and atonement.

Part I: History of the Community 2 | On the Eve of Islam

According to the first, God is three “persons” in one godhead. According to the second, Jesus was the second person of the trinity present in human flesh. According to the third, Jesus’ death and resurrection have opened the way for humans to be saved from the power of sin and death and to receive eternal life.

The form of Christianity in the Byzantine Empire was what we now call Eastern Orthodoxy, since the church divided in the Eleventh century into the Eastern Church, headed by the Patriarch of Constantinople, and the Western Church, headed by the Pope in Rome. The Western Church later divided into Roman Catholic and Protestant churches. The Eastern Church has a strong sense of the mystery of the divine and its sacramental presence in the material world, of the importance of the Christian community as a community both in wor- ship and in worldly life, and of Christ as the Risen Lord and ruler of the cosmos. (By contrast, Western churches give more emphasis to the crucified Christ.) These characteristics are re- flected in the Eastern liturgy and church buildings. The church is divided by a partition called the iconostasis, so called because icons are placed on it. Behind it is the altar where the priests

perform the sacramental actions by which the bread and wine become the body and blood of Christ. The sense of mystery is increased by the fact that most of the sacramental ac- tion is performed out of the sight of the laity. The differing actions of the clergy and laity are seen as complementing each other and forming an orchestra of worship to God. Most churches have a dome, which symbolizes heaven, and at the top of the dome, looking down on the people, is the figure of Christos Pantokrator, Christ the ruler of all. Of major importance are icons, which are pictures of Christ, his mother or saints, and are painted according to a traditional format. They are powerful symbols and are described as “win- dows on eternity”. An effort was made to eliminate them, known as the Iconoclastic Controversy, in the Eighth to Ninth centuries, an effort partly stimulated by the presence of Islam. It failed, however, because of their popularity.

After it became Christian, the empire came to be seen as an icon or image of the Heavenly Jerusalem and the emperor an icon on earth of

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God’s rule in heaven. Church and state were distinct but not separate and the Emperor played an important role in the church though he could not dictate its teachings. One notes here a similarity, at least in general terms, to the situation in the Sasanian Empire, though state and “church” were more closely linked in the latter case.

Monasticism was also an important aspect of church life. Those who wished to devote them- selves fully to contemplation and prayer renounced normal life to become either hermits or monks living in a community. Monasticism began in Egypt in the Fourth century and became quite popular. It is sometimes described as a form of martyrdom, replacing the martyrdom of blood of the age of persecution. Monasticism suggests that in its attitude toward the mate- rial world Christianity stood in between the world-affirming stance of Zoroastrianism and the world-rejection of Manicheism. Monasticism was to be rejected by Islam.

The doctrines and rules of the church were worked out in seven “ecumenical” councils, be- tween 325 and 787. Especially important were those of Nicaea (325) and Chalcedon (451). At the first it was affirmed that the Son and the Holy Spirit are fully part of the Godhead, over against the Arians, who said that Christ was the highest of God’s creations but not divine. At the other it was affirmed that Christ is fully human and fully divine, the two natures being

Figure 2.5 Aya Sofia (Hagia Sophia). Mosaic of the Virgin Mary and child Jesus in the center. The letters in the circles beside the Virgin’s head are the abbreviations in Greek for “Mary Mother of God”. The figure to the left is Justinian with a model of the Hagia Sophia, and to the right is Constantine, under whom the Empire began to be- come Christian. These pictures were plastered over when the Ottomans converted the cathedral to a mosque and were uncovered when it became a museum under Atatürk.

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inseparably united, over against the Nestorians, who seemed to want to separate the natures, and the Monophysites (“one nature-ists”), who seemed to assert that the human nature was ab- sorbed into the divine nature.

Other forms of Christianity Those whose views were rejected at the councils did not simply recant or pass out of exis- tence, but constituted strong movements for some centuries. The Arians made converts among the peoples outside the boundaries of the Western empire and when these entered the empire Arianism presented a challenge to the followers of the Nicene creed until the Sixth century.

The Nestorians organized themselves after the Council of Chalcedon as separate churches in Iraq and Syria (until the twentieth century Syria, as a geographical term, included what is now Lebanon, Jordan and Israel/Palestine). They developed into a very strong church in Iran and spread northeastward into Central Asia and for a brief period into China. They converted a number of the Mongols, who invaded the Muslim lands in the thirteenth century. After the Mongol ruler converted to Islam at the end of that century, however, they lost ground and after the invasion of Timur (d. 1405) they were reduced to a small minority. Today they call themselves Assyrians and are found in Iran and, at least until recently, in Iraq, as well as in immigrant populations throughout the world.

There were, and are, several Monophysite churches. The Church of Armenia, which was independent of Byzantium and Sassanid Persia and had become Christian even before Rome, was Monophysite. Also Monophysite was the Coptic Church in Egypt, to which virtually all the native population adhered. This church diminished under Muslim rule but still represents today about 10 percent of the Egyptian population. Coptic Christianity spread south to Ethiopia, whose Christian ruler was to play a role in Muhammad’s career. A third Monophysite church was the Jacobite Church, to which a large proportion of the population of Syria adhered. This church continued strong until it suffered successively from the Crusades and the activities of the Mongols and Timur.

In practice, cultural and ethnic differences were no less important than theological differ- ences. The Armenian and Coptic churches used their native languages and have been major bearers of their respective national identities, while the Nestorian and Jacobite churches used the Syriac language and represented a Semitic culture, in contrast to the Greek culture of Byzantium. They enshrined a political and cultural challenge to the Byzantine Empire, which was probably the main reason why they suffered persecution from time to time, a persecution that was particularly intense on the eve of the Muslim invasion.

Another distinct group were the Maronites of the Lebanese mountains, who look back to a fifth-century saint, St. Maron, and developed as a church in the seventh century. They later as-

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sisted the Crusaders and had contact with Rome from the fifteenth century, eventually accept- ing Roman Catholicism. Today they play an important role in Lebanese politics.

The Byzantine Church was culturally Greek. Though its followers in Syria generally spoke Syriac (and later Arabic) they were ministered to by a Greek speaking clergy. They came to be known as Melkites (from the word for “king”, i.e. following the emperor’s religion). When in time Orthodox Christianity spread beyond the empire to eastern Europe, however, it organized itself along national and ethnic lines, as the Russian Orthodox Church, Serbian Orthodox Church and so on. These were united with the Byzantine Church in doctrine and worship but were self governing. They used their own national language and provided an important ele- ment of the national identity.

The groups considered so far are forms of Gentile Christianity, which had rejected most dis- tinctive Jewish laws and practices. Some Christians, however, retained their Jewish identity and a modified version of Jewish law and developed into a separate movement, sometimes called Ebionite, that continued in Syria until the Fifth century, but there is also an account of a community of them in Jerusalem in the Seventh century. They accepted Jesus as a prophet and as messiah but not as the divine Son of God. Their ideas about the unity of God, the historical series of prophets, the relationship between the teachings of Jesus and Moses and falsifications in the latter’s law, as well as some of their specific practices, seem to anticipate aspects of Islam. Some of their ideas may have endured to Muslim times.

Figure 2.6 Byzantine coin, John Tzimiskes (969–976 C.E.) or later. Obverse: Christ (as Pantokrator). Reverse: Cross and Jesus Christ, King of Kings. The coin reflects both piety and propaganda.

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Jews and Samaritans The Jewish community, of course, continued through this period. The Jews looked back to Abraham (c. 1700 b.c.e.?) as their ancestor and Moses (c. 1300 b.c.e.) as their greatest prophet and teacher, who led them out of slavery in Egypt and mediated a covenant by which they became the chosen people of God and would worship him exclusively. They settled in the Land of Israel (geographically today Israel/Palestine) and established a kingdom, which later divided into two kingdoms, one of which was destroyed by the Assyrians in 721 b.c.e. and the other by the Babylonians in 587 b.c.e. In both cases the leading classes were exiled. They came to accept that these catastrophes were punishments from God because they had violated the covenant and not worshipped God exclusively. After they were allowed to return under Cyrus, the Persian conqueror of Babylon, they rebuilt the Temple of God and resolved to order their lives according to God’s laws. Critical scholars cast considerable doubt on the traditional account of the pre-exilic period and believe that complete monotheism, the belief in only one God who is eternal and creator of the universe, probably came into existence around the time of the Exile, although earlier there was a party that called for the exclusive worship of Israel’s God, while probably recognizing the existence of other gods. On the traditional view Abraham was already a monotheist, but the people were constantly turning away from God and it was only after the Exile that the whole community became monotheist in practice.

Since not all Jews returned from Babylon, another result of the Exile was the creation of the dispersion or “diaspora”, of Jews living outside the Land of Israel. The Jews in the Land lived under Persian rule for about two centuries and were probably influenced by Iranian religious ideas, as suggested above. After Alexander’s campaign they came under Greek rule. In 168 b.c.e. efforts to impose Greek culture on them provoked the Maccabean revolt, which led to an independent Jewish kingdom that lasted until 63 b.c.e., when the Romans took control. Roman rule provoked two major revolts, in 66–73 c.e. and 132–135 c.e., both of which failed and the first of which resulted in the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem, which had been the focus of Jewish religion. These events, along with the later Christianization of the Empire, led to the decline of the community in the Land. About the fifth century cultural and religious leadership passed to the diaspora.

These disasters also forced a major reformulation of Jewish religion and Jewish hopes. The Temple having been destroyed and its priests sidelined, Judaism came to focus on the practice of Torah. Torah refers in one usage to the first five books of the Bible, those believed to have been revealed to Moses. In the larger sense, however, it refers to all authoritative religious teaching developed and elaborated over the years by teachers known as Rabbis. The two most authoritative compendia of Rabbinic teaching are the Mishna, compiled about 200 c.e., and the Talmud, compiled in two versions from the Fifth to Seventh centuries. The Babylonian Talmud is the more important one. The Mishna and Talmud are to the Bible, in many respects, what the New Testament is to the Old Testament for Christians. Prior to their defeats many

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Jews believed that God would support an uprising to restore their control of their Land, or that God would intervene in human history in a dramatic, apocalyptic way. After their defeats most Jews came to accept that God intended most of them to live in exile for an indeterminate pe- riod and that their return to the Land could be furthered mainly by faithful practice of Torah, in response to which God would eventually send his messiah. In particular they devoted their attention to studying and practicing Halakah, the practical prescriptions of Torah. This way of thinking predominated until the nineteenth century. Since then various modern movements, particularly Zionism, the movement to regain the Land, have shifted the focus for many Jews.

The Samaritans were descendants of Northern tribes of Israel who separated from the other Jews at the time of their return from exile in Babylon. They had a separate sanctuary and rec- ognized only the first five books of the Bible, in a slightly different version from the Jews. They appear to have prospered until they rebelled against the Byzantine Empire in 529, but they have survived in small numbers to the present day. Some scholars find aspects of Samaritan thinking in Islam; they have a creedal formula that goes, “There is no god but the One”. Others, however, think they are influenced by Islam.

Gnostics and philosophers There were also, from the Second century c.e., a number of movements that we call Gnostic, some identifying themselves as Christian and some not. They believed that salvation was possible only through esoteric knowledge (gnosis) imparted by the teacher to initiates. This gnosis was usually knowledge of one’s true self, which had fallen from the highest spiritual realm and become trapped in the world of matter.

The explanations of how this happened were very complex. There was also usually a mes- senger or savior who had come from the highest realm to bring this knowledge to humans. Christian Gnostics identified this figure with Christ and sometimes held that Christ did not have a physical body or did not actually die on the cross, but merely appeared to do so, a view known as docetism (from a Greek word meaning “to appear”). In Gnostic movements Christian ideas are often inverted. For example, the God of the Old Testament is said to be an imperfect or evil being who created this imperfect world, while only the God of the New Testament is the true God. The serpent in the Garden of Eden may be seen as offering true wis- dom rather than deceptive claims. There are Gnostic gospels, such as the Gospel of Thomas, which give their version of the life and teachings of Christ. Manicheism is commonly con- sidered a form of Gnosticism although its dualism is more complete than most of the others. A non-Christian Gnostic movement that has survived, just barely, to the present day in Iraq is the Mandeans. As far as we know, most Gnostic groups had died out by 600 c.e., but they have had some influence on later Jewish, Christian and Muslim thinking.

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Related in one way or another to most of the movements discussed so far was the tradition of Greek philosophy. It flowered in the Fifth and Fourth centuries b.c.e. with Socrates (d. 399), Plato (d. 347) and Aristotle (d. 322). Socrates was its martyr, who chose death rather than re- cant views that offended the populace. He believed that all knowledge is innate within us and can be elicited by proper questioning, hence the “Socratic method”. Plato was his defender and apologist. Among other things, Plato held that the physical world consists of imperfect copies of Ideas or Forms that exist in a higher realm. The soul is immortal and before its descent into the body it contemplated the Forms. Through intellectual discipline it can perceive them again. Plato’s idea of the immortality of the soul became part of Christian thinking about the future life, and eventually to a lesser degree Jewish and Muslim thinking. It sat somewhat uneasily beside the alternative conception, the resurrection of the body. Aristotle, who was the tutor of Alexander the Great, focused on the empirical world but found that it depended on a perfect God, who is “thought thinking itself ” and who does not intervene in the world directly but motivates it by its attraction to him. These philosophers also had important ethical, social and scientific ideas. In fact Greek philosophy dealt with most of the areas, e.g. physics, that we as- sign to science today. Generally these philosophers continued to participate in the worship of the pagan gods, viewing this worship as good for society and the gods as lesser beings than the intellectual realities with which they concerned themselves or as symbols of these realities. For them there was a clear distinction between philosophy and religion but as the tradition of philosophy continued it took on a more religious character.

Among the later philosophers the most famous was Plotinus (205–c. 270 c.e.), whose views are known as neo-Platonism. According to him the universe emanates from “The One”, which is transcendent and even beyond being, but also present within it. A comparison is made with the sun and its rays. The human goal is to realize one’s unity with The One by turning away from the material world, which is conceived not as evil but as imperfect. Evil is non-being; everything insofar as it exists is good. Some of the early Christians rejected philosophy but others sought to use it in the service of the faith, and neo-Platonism made a major contribution to Christian theology. After the empire became Christian the pagan tradition of philosophy di- minished and finally ended in the empire after the school at Athens was closed by the emperor in 529. Nestorians, however, continued the tradition in Sasanian territory and it was estab- lished in Baghdad under Muslim patronage in the Ninth century. Some Jews took an interest in philosophy, such as Philo of Alexandria, but most Jews turned away from it after the disasters of the first and second centuries, with some returning to it in the Middle Ages.

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The Axial Age The religious movements described in this chapter are the product of what some scholars call the “Axial Age”, a period from about 800 to 200 b.c.e. when radical changes in human think- ing began to take place along the same lines but apparently independently in Greece, Israel, Iran, India and China. The most important of these changes was the conviction that behind the multiplicity of the world there is one ultimate reality, whether conceived personally as God or more impersonally as a force or principle, and this reality radically transcends the world. Under the old polytheism gods, humans, animals and other beings functioned within the same worldly system. Gods, for example, were nourished by the ritual sacrifices made by humans, who in turn depended on the gods for help. The one God or the ultimate force is the source of the universe but is not part of it and does not need sacrifice in this way. The gods are demoted to the status of (or replaced by) subordinate deities or angels, or are converted into demons, or are deemed not to exist. Where a personal God is involved, the new thinking tends to be intolerant of any other worship. Since the transcendent power is one, religious systems relat- ing to it are in principle universal, not limited to a particular tribe or nation. In practice this was often not fully realized. As we have seen, Zoroastrianism, Judaism and, to a lesser degree, Christianity remained ethnic in practice. Greek philosophy largely transcended ethnicity but was limited to the educated classes. The individual becomes more important since the individ- ual can in some way relate directly to Ultimate Reality and will meet his or her final destiny as an individual. Because of the greater gap between the divine and the human there is a greater need felt for a mediator, such as Christ for Christians or Torah for Jews. There are other chang- es that we do not have space to mention here. These changes at first were largely limited to a spiritual or cultural elite but over time they spread outward geographically and down the social scale. Christianity, Zoroastrianism, later Judaism and to some extent Gnosticism represent the extension and popularization, and often the reformulation, of Axial Age thinking, inevitably with some compromises.

One place that Axial Age thinking had not reached significantly by this time was the Arabian peninsula. In the next chapter we will observe the shift from pre-Axial to Axial Age thinking there and the last major reformulation of that movement of Axial Age thinking that had begun in Greece, Iran and Israel.

Key Points You Need to Know There were two major imperial powers in the Iranian-Hellenistic world on the eve of • Islam, the Sasanians and the Byzantines.

In both of these religion and the state were closely connected. Orthodoxy basically • meant following the state religion.

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There were a large number of religions, sects and movements other than the state reli-• gions, some of which represented a rejection of the existing order.

In contrast to the earlier paganism, most of these religions and movements, orthodox • or otherwise, believed that the universe has its source in a single, transcendent God or Principle, were at least potentially trans-ethnic, and gave greater prominence to the individual.

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading Atiya, A.S. (1968) A History of Eastern Christianity, London: Methuen (does not include the

Greek Orthodox Church).

Boyce, Mary (1979) Zoroastrians: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, London; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Yarshater, Ehsan (1983) “Mazdakism”. Yarshater, Ehsan (ed) Cambridge History of Iran, vol. III/2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 991–1024.

Ware, Timothy (1964) The Orthodox Church, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

The Beginnings of Islam

In This Chapter An observer about 600 c.e. would probably have predicted that in due time Arabia would be- come Christian or Zoroastrian or, less likely, Jewish. He or she would hardly have predicted what actually happened, that the Arabs would accept Axial Age thinking but produce the very distinctive form of it that is called Islam. This chapter deals with the Arabian background of Islam, its formative period, and its initial spread into the Iranian and Hellenistic world.

Main Topics Covered The Arabs and their religion before Islam •

The career of the Prophet Muhammad •

Conflict and conquest after Muhammad to about 700 • c.e.

Some scholarly reservations •

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The Arabs and their religion before Islam

The Arabian peninsula lay on the periphery of the lands ruled by the Byzantines and the Sasanians, not part of them but not uninfluenced by them. Both empires sought to control the border tribes of northern Arabia and in the Sixth and early Seventh centuries the kingdoms of the Ghassanids and the Lakhmids served as buffer states for the Byzantines and the Sasanians respectively. They were Christian in religion, Monophysite in the first case and Nestorian in the second.

South Arabia, present day Yemen, was the site of a significant civilization from about 1000 b.c.e. but by the Sixth century c.e. it was in decline and subject to intervention by the Ethiopians and the Persians. In the fourth century Monophysite Christianity had established itself at Najran and in the early sixth century these Christians were persecuted by the king of Himyar, in south Arabia, who had Persian support and had accepted Judaism, an event pos- sibly referred to in the Qur’an (85:4–9). About 525 the Ethiopians invaded the area, while the Persians controled it from about 575 to 631.

In the central Arabia area were tribes, mostly nomadic but some settled in agricultural settle- ments or trading towns. Prominent among the latter was Mecca, which was settled by the Quraysh tribe about 500 c.e. and became prosperous through the caravan trade.

These Arabs worshipped spirits associated with natural features such as stones and trees, and possibly stars, but this worship was highly pragmatic and contingent upon the spirits deliver- ing what was asked for. There were also jinn (we call them “genies”), invisible beings that could help or harm humans, that could possess a person and make him crazy (majnūn, jinn possessed), or could inspire a soothsayer (kāhin) or a poet. They also recognized higher gods, usually connected with particular tribes, and distantly in the background, rarely invoked, was the creator god, Allah. The Quraysh believed that Allah had three daughters, who could be called on to intercede with him. There were sanctuaries used by several tribes, of which the most important was at Mecca, a pilgrimage site dedicated to Allah. According to tradition it had been founded centuries earlier by Ibrahim (Abraham) and his son Isma‘il (Ishmael). It included a building known as the Ka‘ba, which had a black stone set in the wall at one corner that is said to have come from heaven.

The Arabs’ ethical values were not closely related to these spirits and gods, but rather to the tribe, which was primary focus of loyalty and identity. Each tribe’s way of life, or sunna, was laid down by tradition and exemplified in the poetic accounts of the exploits of its past heroes. The most important values were generosity (the word karīm means both noble and generous), courage, fortitude and loyalty. There was no belief in personal immortality; immortality con- sisted in being part of a tribe that continued after one’s death. There were, however, just before Muhammad’s time, people known as ḥanīfs, who appear to have been religious seekers, mono- theists but not part of a religious community.

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Tribal members were roughly equal economically though some families had more prestige. The tribal leader, or shaykh, would come from a leading family but had to be acceptable to the tribe as a whole and ruled largely by consensus. His successor would usually be chosen from his family but not necessarily be his eldest son. Since the tribe was the highest loyalty, a kind of anarchy reigned among tribes (in some ways like international relations today!). They frequently raided each other for plunder but usually took few lives. This state of anarchy was tempered by traditions of hospitality to outsiders and by the law of blood revenge, according to which if a person was killed or injured by members of another tribe, any member of that tribe could be killed or injured in retribution. A similar rule applied between families within a tribe. Gender relations varied. Unwanted girl babies might be killed and wives might be inher- ited as part of their husbands’ estates, but some women clearly had considerable independence and power, not least Muhammad’s first wife. The primary literary expression was poetry, which developed into a very fine art and also served as a means of propaganda for individuals and tribes.

This period is called the jahiliyya, conventionally translated “Age of Ignorance”, but the word also implies wild or excessive behavior. This could be excess in fighting, or in seeking revenge, or in drinking wine, or in violating sexual rules, or even in generosity. The story is told of Hatim al-Tayyi who made a name for himself by giving away all of his father’s cam- els to provide hospitality for visitors. Another, Imru al-Qays, is pictured as a hard drinking vagabond, adventurer and womanizer. When his father was killed, he first caroused for seven days, saying, “wine today, business tomorrow”. Then he swore to eat no meat, drink no wine and touch no woman until he had accomplished his vengeance. Even when an oracle forbade him to act, this did not deter him. He had many adventures in his effort but little success. Eventually he found his way to the Byzantine court, where he was killed for seducing the em- peror’s daughter. Such stories may be more legend than history, but they enshrine the value of jahl, excessiveness. This value was counterbalanced by another, hilm, self control, but a poet sings: “Although I be in need of hilm, of jahl I am at times in greater need” (Stetkevych 8).

The career of the Prophet Muhammad About 570 the Ethiopian governor of Yemen mounted an expedition against Mecca that came to grief, miraculously it is claimed (see Qur’an 105). Accordng to tradition in this same year Muhammad ibn (son of) Abdullah was born into the Hashemite clan of the Quraysh. His grandfather was at the time the custodian of the Ka‘ba, but the clan was not as strong as it had been. Muhammad’s father died before he was born and his mother when he was about six years old, so he was left an orphan in care of relatives, under the protection first of his grand- father and then of an uncle, Abu Talib, a situation in which his basic needs were taken care of but his prospects were limited. Some scholars believe that commercial prosperity in Mecca

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was causing social strains and weakening tribal solidarity as the gap between the wealthy and the poor was increasing and the wealthy were less inclined to look after the poor than had been the case. Muhammad may have suffered from this. Later in life Muhammad is reported to have told his followers that he, like previous prophets, had looked after sheep when he was young. While still young he traveled to Syria in a trade caravan and along the way it is said that a Christian hermit stopped them and recognized that he would be a prophet. He gained a reputation for honesty and was known as al-amīn (the faithful one). It is said that once the black stone fell out of the wall of the Ka‘ba and the tribes could not agree on who should have the honor of replacing it, Muhammad solved the problem by putting the stone on a blanket and having a representative of each tribe take hold of the blanket and raise it to its position. Financial security came when Khadīja, a wealthy widow engaged in the caravan trade, made him her agent and then married him. He was 25 years old at the time and she is said to have been 40. The marriage was a happy one and produced several children. He did not take a sec- ond wife while she lived though he took a number later (see Appendix V).

At some point Muhammad began to make periodic retreats for spiritual reflection in a cave near Mecca called Hira’. During one of these, possibly in the year 610, he had a vision in which an awesome figure appeared to him and commanded: “Recite in the name of your Lord Who created, created humans from a clot; recite, for your Lord is the most generous, Who taught by the pen, taught humans what they did not know” (Qur’an 96:1–5). Unnerved by this and afraid he was becoming a poet or a majnun, he was reassured by Khadija and a Christian relative of hers that this was a genuine message from God brought by the angel Gabriel. After a time he received further messages and began to gather a small group of followers, the first being his wife, Khadija, others including his cousin ‘Ali ibn (son of) Abi Talib and his friend Abu Bakr. The first messages spoke of Allah’s goodness and power but did not ban the wor- ship of other deities. This ban came shortly, however, and provoked increasing opposition from the Meccan leaders. Muhammad was protected by his clan, even though the leader, his uncle Abu Talib, was not a believer in his message. Some of his followers, however, who did not have such protection, suffered for their faith and Muhammad, perhaps in 615, sent some of them to Ethiopia for a time, where the Christian ruler welcomed them. Soon after this, Muhammad’s whole clan suffered considerably when it was boycotted for two years but nev- ertheless stood by him out of clan solidarity. Probably in 619 death took both Khadija and Abu Talib, whose successor as clan leader was not sympathetic to Muhammad. Thus he was sud- denly deprived of major moral and material support.

Muhammad then began to seek support outside Mecca. He went to the nearby town of al-Ta’if but was rejected by them and also by some other tribes he approached. Eventually he was ap- proached by representatives from Yathrib, a city some 230 miles (370 kilometers) to the north of Mecca. Yathrib, a farming oasis, was divided by serious tribal conflict and after some nego- tiations Muhammad was invited to come as a mediator. In 622 most of his followers gradually left Mecca for Yathrib and in September Muhammad himself, along with Abu Bakr, made the

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move, just avoiding an effort by his enemies to kill him. This event is known as the Ḥijra, or Emigration, and is considered the most significant event of Muhammad’s career, indeed, of human history. The year of the Ḥijra was to become Year One of the Muslim (ḥijrī ) calendar. Yathrib was henceforth to be known as Madīnat al-Nabī (the City of the Prophet), or Medina, for short.

Muhammad went to Medina as mediator but over time became its effective ruler and formed a union of tribes called an umma, a new kind of entity that would become the Muslim community. Medina under his rule is viewed as the first Islamic state, i.e. the first polity to try to govern itself by God’s laws. Those who came from Mecca were known as the Emigrants, muhājirūn, and their Medinan supporters as the Helpers, anṣār. There was also a party whose support was undependable, known as the Hypocrites, munāfiqūn. Finally, there were three Jewish tribes, from whom Muhammad had probably hoped for support, but who refused to recognize him as a prophet.

Muhammad’s position in Medina would not be tenable in the long term unless he could deal successfully with the Meccans, whose influence with the surrounding tribes was consider- able. Also, the Emigrants had no means of support in Medina. So he planned raids against the Meccan caravans, a time honored method in Arabia of gaining income by booty and weaken- ing the enemy’s prestige. The first efforts yielded little success but in 624 they undertook to raid a large caravan and when the caravan escaped they engaged with a contingent sent to pro- tect it. This was the battle of Badr, in which they defeated a much larger Meccan force. This they ascribed to divine aid. According to the Qur’an, “You did not kill, but Allah killed them; you did not shoot when you shot, but Allah shot” (8:17). In Mecca the Muslims understood that God did not want them to respond to their enemies with violence, but in Medina they re- ceived different orders:

Permission to fight is given to those against whom war is made, because they were wronged (surely God is able to help them), who were expelled from their homes for no cause, except that they say “Our Lord is God.” (22: 39–40)

There is reason to think that the Muslims in fact were averse to fighting, as suggested by the following passage from the Qur’an:

Fighting is ordained for you, though you hate it; but you may hate a thing that is good for you and love a thing that is bad for you. It is God who knows, not you. (2:216)

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While rooted historically and culturally in the old tradition of raiding, it is now raised to a higher ideological level; it is to be done mainly for God rather than booty or tribal honor.

The following year the Meccans returned for revenge and defeated the Muslims at the battle of Uhud, even wounding Muhammad, but failed to follow up on it. In 627 the Meccans again advanced on Medina but the Medinans dug a trench, it is said on the suggestion of a Persian convert, Salman al-Farisi, a tactic hitherto unknown in Arabia, and the Meccans were foiled. During this period Muhammad managed to eliminate the three Jewish tribes, who were con- sidered a threat. Two were expelled, one after each of the first two battles. The third was ac- cused of treachery in connection with the battle of the Trench and the men were killed while the women and children were enslaved. This treatment was harsh, but was in response to perceived treason in the midst of a life and death struggle. As such, it was not out of line with existing moral standards (the main issue for those involved seemed to have been whether loyalty to the umma should be put above loyalty to the clan protecting the Jews). In 628 the Muslims sought to make a pilgrimage to Mecca but the Meccans refused to allow this. They agreed, however, in the treaty of Hudaybiyya, to allow the pilgrimage the following year and to make a ten year truce. Muhammad and his followers duly made the pilgrimage and the truce allowed Muhammad to spread his message among the surrounding tribes and seek their al- legiance, with the result that his following increased considerably. By 630 Muhammad’s posi- tion had become so strong that, when an incident allowed him to break the treaty, he marched on Mecca. The Meccans capitulated with almost no fighting in return for a general amnesty and the safety of their possessions, an outcome mediated by Abu Sufyan, one of the Meccan leaders and the father of one of Muhammad’s wives. The leading Meccans soon swore al- legiance to Muhammad and became at least nominal Muslims. This was followed by expedi- tions against opposing tribes and an expedition in the direction of Syria, while deputations came from surrounding tribes to profess allegiance. In March of 632 Muhammad made what is called his “Farewell Pilgrimage to Mecca”, and set the precedents for the conduct of future pilgrimages. From this time on pagans were not allowed to make the Pilgrimage; it was strictly a Muslim affair. About this time, the following sura of the Qur’an was revealed:

When God’s help and victory come, And you see the people entering the religion of God in throngs, Then sing the praises of your Lord and ask His forgiveness, For He is ever ready to forgive. (110)

Muhammad, however, was in poor health and he died in June of the same year. At this stage a number of the tribes of Arabia had professed Islam but not all.

As a result of Muhammad’s career the Arabs passed from what I have called in the last chapter pre-Axial to Axial Age thinking, but in a new formulation both attuned to its original Arabian environment and capable of universal appeal. Allah, the remote high god of the pagan period, was now recognized as fully transcendent but also directly involved with and in control of His

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creation. The individual related directly to Him, making a personal witness to his faith, sha- hada, and personally responsible to Him on the Last Day. He was thus less immersed, morally and psychologically, in his tribal context. At the same time he was part of a potentially uni- versal community, the umma, united in its allegiance to God, and he was at least in principle equal to all other members of the community. Mediating between humans and God, primarily to make God’s will known, were the revelations that had come to Muhammad, the Qur’an, as well as the example of Muhammad’s actions, his Sunna, and to some extent his person (see chapters five and six). There were other mediating figures for some as we shall see in later chapters. Much in the Arabian environment was retained, usually in a modified form. For ex- ample, generosity was still a virtue, but not extreme generosity. Raiding for booty was trans- muted into striving, jihad, in the path of God, and thus given a new purpose. Of course, the older tribal mentality did not die immediately, especially among the more nominal Muslims, but continued to influence events over the next century and beyond. From a secular point of view, one of the main reasons for Muhammad’s success was the fact that the Arabs were at that point in time ready to make this transition. The other reason would be Muhammad’s own visionary and leadership qualities. Though military victories were involved, military strength was hardly the main factor.

Conflict and conquest after Muhammad Once the tribes were united and given a higher purpose their combined energy would be di- rected outward, to “open” (fatḥ) the lands beyond Arabia for their rule in the name of God (in Western parlance, to conquer them). But there were also issues of leadership to be sorted out.

According to the majority of Muslims and virtually all secular scholars, Muhammad did not appoint a successor. After his death, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, an early convert and one of the leading figures in the umma, convinced the community to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr, who is reported to have said, “Obey me so long as I obey Allah and His Messenger.” Abu Bakr thus became the first caliph (khalīfa), or successor, of the Prophet. He ruled for only two years (632–634) but during this time the rest of Arabia was brought into the Islamic fold. He also dealt successfully with two or three copy-cat prophetic movements that had arisen in Arabia and successfully fought certain tribes that refused to pay zakah (at this time a tax paid to the leader of the umma) after Muhammad’s death since they viewed their allegiance as being to Muhammad personally, not to his successor. Abu Bakr considered this to be ridda, or apostacy, and compelled them to pay. In so doing he averted threats that could have disintegrated the umma right at the start.

Abu Bakr designated as his successor ‘Umar, who ruled from 634 to 644. He is remembered by most Muslims as quite a strict and upright leader (some stories make him stricter than Muhammad). During his caliphate Muslim armies conquered Syria (including Jerusalem),

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Egypt, Iraq and moved into Iran and key precedents were set for settling and taxing these lands. Thus a considerable proportion of Byzantine and Sasanian lands came under Muslim control and the Sasanian state was soon to disappear. ‘Umar was assassinated by a Persian slave and, on his death bed, chose six men as a shūrā, or consultative council, to choose one of their number to succeed him. The person chosen was ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan, also an early convert but a member of the Umayyad clan, one of the leading Meccan clans most of whose members had accepted Islam only near the end of Muhammad’s career. It was under ‘Uthman that the Qur’an was compiled in its present form, according to the most generally accepted ac- count. One reason for doing this was that variations in reciting the Qur’an had appeared and it was felt that such variations could lead to disunity in the umma. Conquests continued at a diminished rate under ‘Uthman. ‘Uthman was not able to resist the pressure of his Umayyad relatives for favors, or so it was perceived, and this led to increasing discontent and finally to a mutiny in 656 in which ‘Uthman was killed.

This resulted in the first fitna or civil war (fitna means temptation or trial, and it has been sug- gested that this was seen as a trial from God to see if they would choose the right leadership). The people in Medina chose as caliph ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin of the Prophet and the hus- band of his daughter, Fatima. Many of ‘Ali’s supporters, in fact, claimed that Muhammad had designated him as his successor, but that the first three caliphs had usurped his position and he had acquiesced for the sake of the unity of the umma. Others, however, including ‘A’isha, the Prophet’s youngest and favorite wife, demanded that ‘Ali punish ‘Uthman’s killers, some- thing he was unable to do. ‘A’isha gained the support of two of Muhammad’s close associates, Talha and Zubayr, who fought ‘Ali at the Battle of the Camel (named after the camel on which ‘A’isha was seated, watching the battle). Meanwhile, the governor of Syria, Mu‘āwiya, who was a member of the Umayyad clan like ‘Uthman and also a son of Abu Sufyan, a leader of the former Meccan opposition to Muhammad, took up the call for vengeance for ‘Uthman and refused to recognize ‘Ali as caliph. His army met in battle with ‘Ali’s at Siffin in 657. The fighting was inconclusive (or according to some sources ‘Ali’s side was winning) and Mu‘awiya’s side raised copies of the Qur’an on their spears and called for arbitration, which ‘Ali was forced to accept but which did not, finally, produce a satisfactory conclusion.

Meanwhile, some objected to the arbitration on religious grounds and rebelled against ‘Ali. They came to be known as Khārijīs, seceders or rebels. He defeated them in battle but in 661 one of them assassinated him. In later times ‘Ali has often been viewed as the model of a chiv- alrous and idealistic figure (and more than this by his partisans, the Shi‘is, as we shall see) while Mu‘awiya has been viewed as the shrewd and practical politician.

After ‘Ali’s death, Mu‘awiya was able to gain recognition as ruler of the whole umma. Al- Hasan, ‘Ali’s eldest son, had made claims but was, in effect, bought off. Mu‘awiya was the first of the Umayyad dynasty, which lasted until 750. He was an effective leader, who strength- ened the power and finances of the central government and under whom conquests continued in northwestern Iran and in North Africa (the Maghreb). He styled himself khalīfat allāh (the

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deputy of God), but his power largely rested on more mundane things: a loyal army in Syria, his ability to symbolize the unity of the umma, so desired after the excesses of the fitna, and his style of governing, much like that of the old Arab shaykh, conciliating tribal and other interests where possible. The old tribal mentality and tribal loyalties continued to condition politics to a considerable degree. Nevertheless, in order to run a large empire, Mu‘awiya and his successors had to override tribal independence in ways that seemed quite oppressive by the older standards. Moreover, during his lifetime Mu‘awiya insisted on having his son, Yazid, recognized as his successor. Undoubtedly he saw this as necessary to guarantee the harmony of the umma, but he has been criticized, then and since, for turning the caliphate into a hereditary kingdom. Indeed, for the pious, the Umayyads represented a cruel irony, for with them there had come to power the descendants of the people who had so bitterly opposed Muhammad. Still, these were probably the only ones who had the skills and connections to run the empire that the Muslim realms had become.

As we shall see in later chapters, out of these events arose the main sectarian divisions of Islam. Those who accepted the way things had developed and did not oppose the Umayyads were to become the Sunnis, the majority group. Those who rejected the Umayyads out of alle- giance to ‘Ali and his family were to become the Shi‘is. The Khārijīs were to form a third divi- sion, much smaller in number.

Mu‘awiya’s son, Yazid has had a bad press, viewed by Shi‘is in particular as grossly dissolute and oppressive, though others describe him as skilled and capable. His brief reign saw the beginning of the second fitna. Husayn, the second son of ‘Ali, revolted against him and was slaughtered with a small group of followers at Karbala’ in Iraq in 680. This was to become a major event in the minds of the Shi‘is. In 681 there was a revolt in Mecca and Medina under Ibn Zubayr (whose father had died at the Battle of the Camel), who claimed the caliphate and held out in Mecca until 692. The Kharijis were also in revolt in Iran and Arabia. There was a movement to avenge the death of Husayn among some of his followers who repented for not being with him at Karbala’, but this came to nothing. It was followed by a revolt by Mukhtar in the name of another of ‘Ali’s sons, Ibn al-Hanafiyya. None of these succeeded and the ca- liphate went to Marwan (684–685), an Umayyad cousin of Mu‘awiya, and then to his son, ‘Abd al-Malik (685–705).

The latter made several important administrative reforms, drawing on Byzantine and Sasanian models while at the same time underlining Islamic identity and strengthening the state as an institution (as distinct from the person of the caliph). These included the introduction of Arabic as the language of administration in place of the languages of the previous empires, Greek and Persian, which had been used until then. Likewise, coins with Qur’anic phrases replaced the Byzantine and Sasanian style coins that had continued in use (replete with pictures of the emperor or shah and Christian or Zoroastrian motifs). He also built the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. These measures signified the permanence of the new Islamic order and symbolized its claim to be the successor to the previous empires. They also constituted the first steps in the

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building of an Islamic civilization. Islam, however, was still very much an Arab affair. Outside of Arabia, where ‘Umar had decreed only Muslims should live, the Arab Muslims constituted a small ruling class superimposed on the subject population and little or no effort had yet been made to convert these. They were dhimmis, people with a covenant of protection, required to pay special taxes and recognize Muslim pre-eminence in other ways but otherwise self-gov- erning in their own affairs. In Iran this arrangement represented a continuation and formaliza- tion of the arrangements the shahs had had with non- Zoroastrians. In general most dhimmis found Muslim rule less oppressive than that of their previous overlords.

Some scholarly reservations The above account is largely based, indirectly or directly, on sources that in the written form in which we have them date from about 800 c.e. or later, that is, one to two centuries after the events described. They are often, moreover, partisan and contradictory. Among these is the sira or biography of Muhammad, written by Ibn Ishaq (d. 770) and revised by Ibn Hisham (d. 833). Many scholars assume that with careful critical sifting these sources can be used to discover what happened with reasonable accuracy, although there will always be uncertainty

Figure 3.1 Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. Built by ‘Abd al-Malik. (Courtesy of Israel Ministry of Tourism www. goisrael.com)

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and differing opinions on specific matters, as has occasionally been suggested above. They generally agree that little in the period before the Hijra can be said with certainty, and even for the latter period most of what is written above could be questioned to some degree. (See also chapter six.)

Other scholars argue that the traditional Muslim sources are far too late in time and far too tendentious to be of any value at all in reconstructing these events. Even the Qur’an provides little historical information on its own, since it usually alludes to events without identifying them. In recent decades a school of thought has arisen that uses contemporary non-Muslim sources to produce hypothetical reconstructions quite different from the accepted version. Some of these versions have Islam originating in northern rather than central Arabia and they hold that the essential beliefs and practices, as well as the text of the Qur’an, developed gradu- ally over about two centuries. In this case Islam in its formative stage was much more closely involved with the milieu of the Iranian and Hellenistic world, described in the previous chap- ter, than is usually thought. This would explain the fact that there is considerable Jewish and Christian material in the Qur’an. One of the best known protagonists of this position, however, has taken a somewhat more moderate stance recently.

These reconstructions have not been widely accepted since they are highly speculative and the sources on which they rely are no less tendentious than the traditional Muslim sources. It may also be that the revisionists do not give sufficient weight and value to the role of recitation and memory in the early Muslim community. Their criticisms of the Muslim sources, however, must be taken seriously and the student in this field needs to be aware of them. Still, our pri- mary concern here is to understand Muslims, and most of them hold to some form of the tradi-

Map 2 Muslim lands about 800 c.e.

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Mecca

Damascus

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IRAQ

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tional view. Very few have adopted even the more moderate critical views, much less the more radical ones.

Key Points You Need to Know The pre-Islamic Arabs had a distinct set of values focused on the tribe. •

While the pre-Islamic Arabs knew of Allah, Muhammad insisted that worship be fo-• cused on Allah alone.

The key event in Muhammad’s life is generally understood to be the • Hijra.

The period following Muhammad’s death was marked by military success but consid-• erable turmoil in the community.

Islamic civilization, as distinct from Islamic religion, begins with the reforms of ‘Abd • al-Malik, about 690.

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading Armstrong, Karen (1991) Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet, London: Gollancz.

Cook, Michael (1983) Muhammad, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Crone, Patricia and Hinds, Martin (1986) God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hawting, G.R. (1987) The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate a.d. 661– 750, Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.

Ibn Warraq (ed.) (2000) The Quest for the Historical Muhammad, Amherst, NJ: Prometheus Books (critical articles, see esp. chapters 1, 8–13).

Shahid, I. “Pre-Islamic Arabia”, Holt, P.M., Lambton, A.K.S., and Lewis, B. (eds) (1970) Cambridge History of Islam, vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–29.

Watt, W.M. (1961) Muhammad, Prophet and Statesman, London: Oxford University Press.

Expansion and Flowering of Islam

In This Chapter This chapter provides a skeleton overview of Islamic history from the end of the second fitna to the eve of the modern period, about 700 to 1700 c.e. It is intended to provide a framework that will be helpful when reading the later chapters. The reader should not be too much con- cerned to remember all of the names and other details that appear here. The most important will appear in later chapters.

Main Topics Covered Later Umayyad period •

The early Abbasid period •

Independent or autonomous realms •

The later Abbasid period •

The Crusades and after •

The Mongols and after •

Ottomans and Safavids •

Central Asia, China and South Asia •

Southeast Asia and Africa •

Part I: History of the Community 4 | Expansion and Flowering of Islam

Later Umayyad period

After the second fitna, order was restored under Marwan and his successor and administrative reforms, drawing considerably on Byzantine and Sasanian models, strengthened the Umayyad state. A greater degree of force was used to keep the tribes in line. Judges (qadis) were appointed by the government while independent scholars studied the Qur’an and Hadith and began to develop the other religious sciences, such as jurisprudence (fiqh) and theology (kalam). These would develop into the social grouping known as the ‘ulama’ (lit: knowers, learned). Conquests were resumed and by 750 the Islamic realm extended to Spain in the west, into central Asia and to the Indus Valley in India.

Conversion to Islam by non-Arabs increased but these converts had to become clients (mawālī) of an Arab tribe, effectively ac- cepting a second class status after conver- sion. This continued through the rest of the Umayyad period. Hence both mawali and disaffected Arabs supported a revolutionary movement mounted in Khurasan (north- eastern Iran) in the name of ‘Ali’s descen- dants. In fact, when it was successful, in 750, it brought to power not ‘Ali’s descen- dants but the Abbasids, indirectly related to Muhammad by a different line.

Jihad The word jihād is usually translated “holy war” and in recent years has become particularly associated with the most radical and violent Islamists (see chapter fif- teen for a discussion of this term), often called jihadis. In reality, matters are not so simple.

Figure 4.1 Ribat, Sousse, Tunisia. Built about 821, it housed warriors who fought in jihad, defended the city and propagated the faith.

Part I: History of the Community 4 | Expansion and Flowering of Islam

Jihad literally means “striving”. In the Qur’an it often refers to fighting, especially when it speaks of “striving in the way of God”, but in some places it does not refer to fighting or does not clearly do so. As the tradition developed, though, in the ha- dith and in fiqh, jihad did come mainly to mean fighting in the name of God. Rules were elaborated that could in some ways be compared to the Western idea of “just war”. Here are some of the rules. If Muslims wish to attack kafirs they must first invite them to Islam and attack only if the kafirs refuse to accept Islam or dhimmi status. They are not to kill non-combatants. Spoils may be taken and there are rules for its distribution. Prisoners might be enslaved, ransomed or freed. This kind of jihad is an obligation that need be carried out only by some Muslims (fard kifaya). If however, the kafirs invade Muslim territory and the ruler so proclaims, jihad be- comes a duty of everyone (fard ‘ayn) and a wife, for example, may fight without her husband’s permission. The degree to which armies actually followed these rules var- ied, as with just war in the Western case. In modern times most resistance to Western imperialism has been considered jihad (see chapters fifteen to twenty).

There is, however, a hadith according to which Muhammad said on returning from battle that they had come from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad, the battle against the lower self. This idea has been popular among Sufis but not only among them, and today there are many who believe that this is the most important form of jihad. Jihad is also linked with the idea of social development. Iran has an agency called the Jihad for Construction. At the end of the Indonesian war of independence against the Dutch, one of the leaders made the point that they now had to face the greater jihad of building the nation.

Thus jihad is a multi-valent term, even as is indeed the English word crusade.

The Early Abbasid period The Abbasids ruled, at least in name, until 1258. If the Umayyad rule could be considered Arab as well as Islamic, under Abbasid rule Arab and non-Arab Muslims were treated equal- ly, and equally judged by their loyalty to the ruler. The empire’s capital was shifted from Damascus to Baghdad, located near the former Sasanian capital, and Iranian administrative and court procedures continued to be adopted, while Arab and Iranian courtiers competed for cultural influence. Administration became more complex and in time was headed by a wa- zir (vizier). The caliph was presented as chosen by God and legitimated in Iranian as well as

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Islamic terms. The peak of Abbasid political power was reached under the caliph Harun al- Rashid (r. 796–809) of “Arabian Nights” fame.

Under the Abbasids a distinctively Islamic high culture, both secular and religious, flourished for the first time. During their first two centuries the authoritative Sunni collections of Hadith were compiled, the best known biography (sīra) of Muhammad was written, and the “found- ers” of the main schools of Sunni fiqh (jurisprudence) were active, as were the ascetics and mystics who represented the early stage of the Ṣūfī movement. The rulers sponsored the trans- lation of philosophical works from Greek and Syriac, mainly by Nestorian translators, building on the work that they had been doing under the Sasanians. There were also organized disputa- tions between scholars of various religions and sects. These were one factor in the develop- ment of Muslim theology or kalām.

The Abbasids slowly replaced the Arab tribal levies of the previous period with paid soldiers directly loyal to them and about 840 began to recruit mamlukes (slave soldiers) from the Turks of central Asia, beginning a practice that was to be repeated by many Islamic states. The mam- lukes initially were useful because they had no connection with any local faction, but in time they gained considerable power themselves and often made and unmade caliphs. In the prov- inces the caliphs faced numerous revolts and eventually lost control in most places to rulers who were independent in fact though sometimes formally acknowledged the caliph’s authority.

Figures 4.2 Abbasid coin. Obverse within the circle: No god but God alone; He has no associate. Reverse within the circle: Muhammad is the Messenger of God.

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Independent or autonomous realms Andalus, as Islamic Spain is called, had been conquered between 711 and 718 and its rulers had never given allegiance to the Abbasids. It was ruled by an Umayyad line of caliphs who created a strong and unified state until the early eleventh century. It was also the seat of an Islamic culture and civilization that rivaled Baghdad’s and was to serve as an intermediary between the Islamic world and the West in both material technology and ideas. Independent dynasties arose in North Africa in 789 and 800 and in Egypt the governor, Ahmad ibn Tulun, made himself independent in 868.

Several independent dynasties arose in Iran beginning in 821. Of these the Saffarids (873–900) were the first to stimulate the renaissance of Persian literature, now in an Arabized and Islamicized form. Persian was to become the language of administration and culture for much of the Islamic world. The fourth century of the Hijra (912–1010 c.e.) has been called the “Shi‘i century”. It was during this period that the different Shi‘i groups took definitive form, although the distinctions among these and between Sunnis and Shi‘is were still not as clear as they were to become. During this century Shi‘i religious scholarship began to flourish and the authori- tative collection of Hadith for the Twelver Shi‘is (the largest Shi‘i group, see chapter eight) was made. There were several impor- tant political movements. In 905 the Shi‘i Hamdanids established themselves in north- ern Mesopotamia and later Syria and become patrons of poets and scholars. They continued until 1003 but there were other Shi‘i dynas- ties in the area until about 1150. From 945 to 1055 the Buyids (or Buwayhids), who were Twelver Shi‘is, were the effective military rulers in Baghdad. They took Iranian titles, even Shahanshah (king of kings), for themselves but left the Sunni caliph in place as a legitimating figurehead. About 900 the Qarmatis, an Isma‘ili movement (a different variant of Shi‘ism), established a republic in Bahrain and eastern Arabia that lasted until 1077. At one point they carried off the Black Stone from the Ka‘ba in Mecca (since they considered it idolatrous). Another Isma‘ili movement, the Fatimids, took power in Tunis in 909 and in Egypt in 969, re-

Figure 4.3 Inside the Mosque of Ibn Tulun, in Cairo, 9th century. The minaret resembles that of the Great Mosque of Samarra in Iraq, built by the Abbasids.

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maining in power in Egypt until 1171 and claiming the caliphate of the whole Muslim world. Isma‘ili missionaries established themselves in Syria, Iraq and Iran with a mountain fortress at Alamut, south of the Caspian Sea, separating from the Fatimids in 1094. They waged a de- centralized revolutionary effort against the Abbasid rule, assassinating key leaders. The name “Assassins”, given to them, derives from their falsely alleged use of hashish (ḥashshāshīn, hashish users). They continued their efforts until the Mongols destroyed Alamut in 1256.

The later Abbasid period Meanwhile the Ghaznavids (961–1186), a Sunni dynasty, had established themselves in Afghanistan and at their peak they controlled much of Iran and of northwest India. Though independent, they recognized the Abbasid caliphate as a source of legitimacy. They patron- ized scholars, including Firdowsi (d. c. 1020), who wrote the great Persian epic, Shahnameh (Book of Kings), about the pre-Islamic kings of Iran. Baghdad returned firmly to Sunni rule in 1055 when the Saljuk Turks took control there. The Saljuks had come into Muslim lands ear- lier in the same century, having been converted to Islam in central Asia, probably by wander- ing Sufis. For a brief period they established their control over an area from Syria to western Afghanistan in the name of the Abbasid caliph, who was still mainly a legitimating figurehead but had more scope under them than under the Buyids. In 1071 they defeated the Byzantine army at the battle of Manzikert and added part of Anatolia to their realm. Turkish rule in one form or another was to continue in much of the Muslim world for centuries and with it Turkish culture was added to the existing cultural mix.

The crusades and after In 1099 an army of Western European Christians, called “Franks” by the Muslims, captured Jerusalem, carrying out an enormous slaughter of its inhabitants, and established a number of small states along the Mediterranean coast of Syria. These were the Crusaders, who had come to rescue the Holy Land from “infidel” rule. At the time, this part of the Muslim world was disunited and weak. The Fatimid dynasty, which had controlled the area, was well past its prime and most of the area consisted of very small feuding political entities. The Crusaders held Jerusalem until 1187 when Salah al-Din (Saladin) unified the Muslims and led them to victory, pointedly sparing Jerusalem’s defenders and inhabitants. The Crusaders continued to hold some territory until 1291 and even regained Jerusalem from 1229 to 1244. The Crusades had a considerable influence on western Europeans, since the Crusaders encountered a culture much more advanced materially and intellectually than their own and learned much from it. Even Salah al-Din appeared as a model of chivalry. For the Muslim world, apart from the spe-

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cific areas occupied by the Crusaders, the impact was much less at the time. They were just one more “barbarian” invasion and ultimately more ephemeral than most. In fact, those under attack were unable to get help from their fellow Muslims outside the immediate area. One ef- fect in the immediate area was to make Muslims less tolerant of the Eastern Christians that lived among them, who had sometimes cooperated with the Franks but often suffered from them. The Crusaders were, in fact, much more of a threat to the Byzantine Empire, which they initially came to support. In the fourth Crusade (1203) they sacked Constantinople and the Empire never fully recovered from this. In the modern period, however, many Muslims were in retrospect to view the Crusades as the first step in Western imperialism. Western powers are often called “crusaders” today. Salah al-Din has come to be seen as a hero not only of Islam but also Arab nationalism (although he was in fact a Kurd). His defeat of the Crusaders after eighty years occupation is seen as a symbol of what Muslims and Arabs might accomplish against Israel. The term “Frank”, in varying dialectical forms, has been a frequent Muslim term for Westerners until the present.

Western Christian moves against Islam were more successful in Sicily and Spain. Between 1061 and 1091 the Normans took Sicily from the Muslims, who had ruled it since the ninth century. In Andalus, the eleventh century saw the beginning of the long Christian reconquest that finally ended with the termination of the last “Moorish” kingdom by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492.

Salah al-Din had been able to confront the Crusaders successfully because he had taken con- trol in Egypt and then extended his power to Syria. In 1171 he formally ended the Fatimid dynasty and returned Egypt to Sunni allegiance. His successors ruled as the Ayyubid dynasty until 1250, when the Mamlukes, slave soldiers brought in by the Ayyubids, took over. A woman, Shajarat al-Durr, linked the two dynasties, being wife of the last Ayyubid and of the first Mamluke and briefly ruling in her own name. The Mamlukes ruled until 1517, when the Ottomans took control. Both the Ayyubids and the Mamlukes usually ruled Syria as well as Egypt. The Mamlukes are noted for some strikingly monumental mosque architecture and also for driving out the last of the Crusaders in 1291.

In spite of the considerable political instability in the Muslim world during this period, cul- ture in its various forms, both secular and religious, continued to flourish. The breakdown of political unity did not necessarily discourage cultural activity and sometimes encouraged it. The Fatimids had built al-Azhar in Cairo, initially to train Isma‘ili propagandists, but it be- came a Sunni institution under the Ayyubids and continues to this day as the most prominent institution of Islamic learning. Madrasas, schools for ‘ulama’, were first founded in the tenth century in Khurasan but were patronized and spread especially under the Seljuks and became the pivotal institutions for the ‘ulama’ throughout the Muslim world. The Sufi movement also began to become somewhat more institutionalized. A number of Sufi scholars sought to recon- cile Sufi spirituality with Shari‘a oriented legalism. Of these the best known was al-Ghazali (d. 1111, see chapter thirteen), who worked under the Saljuks. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries

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saw the careers of several of the “founders” (mostly eponymous) of the Sufi ṭarīqas (“orders”) that were to dominate the religious scene in the following centuries. Probably the best known of these was the Mevlevi Tariqa, known as the “Whirling Dervishes”, founded by Jalal al-Din Rumi (1207–1273). The greatest of the Sufi spiritual theorizers, Ibn ‘Arabi, died in Damascus in 1240.

The Mongols and after If the Crusades were a localized challenge, the Muslim world faced a large scale disaster when the Mongols appeared. In the early thirteenth century Chinggis Khan (d. 1227) unified the Mongol tribes in Central Asia and his successors soon ruled an empire from northern China to Eastern Europe and extending south into the

Muslim world. Their brutal- ity and devastation in the face of resistance was legendary and served as a means of terrorizing their enemies. In Nishapur they slaughtered all the inhabitants and built pyramids of their skulls. In 1258 they took Baghdad, sacked it and executed the caliph, effectively ending the Abbasid caliphate, though one of the caliph’s relatives was able to take refuge with the Mamlukes in Egypt and maintain a very shadowy claim. The Mongol advance was stopped by the Mamlukes at ‘Ain Jalut in Syria in 1260. The devastation wrought by the Mongols set back the affected lands economically and cultur- ally for some time. In fact, many modern Muslims view the Mongol invasion as one of the main causes for the (supposed) decline of the Muslims. The Mongols have become a by-word of horror for Middle Easterners not unlike the Nazis for Westerners. The Mongols were not Muslims. Some of their leaders were Nestorian Christians and some were Buddhists, while most followed their traditional shamanist belief. This prompted some European Christians to dream of a link-up of Christians against the Muslim world. It was during this time that Marco Polo made his famous journey. In 1295 the Il-Khan (deputy of the Great Khan) Ghazan con- verted to Islam and within a decade the rest of the Mongols followed suit. Buddhist monks

Map 3 Muslim lands in 1250 and 1500 Shepard Map 3

R. Nile

R. Tigris

R. Euphrates

R . I

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R. Ganges

R ed Sea

A r a b i a n S e a

I n d i a n O c e a n

Black Sea

Boundary in 1250

Boundary in 1500

Caspian S

Aral Sea

Mediterranean Sea

Part I: History of the Community 4 | Expansion and Flowering of Islam

were driven out and Nestorians entered on difficult times. The Mongols then began to patron- ize Islamic culture and contributed further to its blossoming. The Il-Khanid dynasty continued to 1336, after which its lands were divided among various regimes. Many of the Mongol rulers were sympathetic to Shi‘ism and important Shi‘i scholars flourished under them. Sufi tariqas also flourished under them.

Another notorious conqueror was Timur, a Turk imbued with Mongol ideals. His conquests from 1379 to 1402 began in Central Asia, extended to Iran, and then to India in one direc- tion and Anatolia in the other. These conquests, though brutal, were carried out in the name of Islam and commonly supported by the ‘ulama’. His successors, for about a century, were also important patrons of Islamic culture.

Conversion to Islam Westerners have often had a picture in their minds of Muslims spreading their reli- gion with sword in one hand and Qur’an in the other. As this chapter makes clear, this is far from an accurate picture. What was spread with the sword during the first century of conquest was Muslim rule, while most of the conquered people became dhimmis and retained their religion. Later on this also happened, although often the Sufis and merchants spread Islam ahead of the conquerors or rulers.

In most of the areas conquered in the first century the population became half Muslim or more after about two centuries. In India and the European parts of the Ottoman Empire Muslims never achieved a majority, while in Java superficial con- version was nearly complete by two and a half centuries after the end of the last Hindu kingdom.

The main factors leading to conversion seem to have been the following (not neces- sarily in order of importance):

The attraction of Islamic doctrine and practice, which may have seemed to many a • simplification and purification of Christianity and Judaism.

The military and political success of the Muslims, which would have convinced • many that they had God’s favor, just as previous empires had made similar claims.

The desire for economic and social advancement by joining the dominant group, • especially since that group was open to entry.

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The desire to escape the disadvantages of • dhimmi status. How great these were is hard to generalize about. In principle dhimmis were second class citizens, their lives and properties were protected but they were subject to a special tax, the jizya, and various disabilities, such as wearing distinctive garb, not riding horses, and not being allowed to build or repair their places of worship. In practice the situation varied considerably. Dhimmis often prospered in trade and rose to high positions in government but they were also sometimes persecuted by rulers and sometimes suffered from mob violence. It was generally understood that their sta- tus was meant to be inferior to that of Muslims (Qur’an 9:29). In general their po- sition was unsatisfactory by current Western standards of human rights but better than Western treatment of minorities in the Middle Ages and often since then.

Once Islamic civilization had developed, its predominance and attractiveness un-• doubtedly provided a context that encouraged conversion.

The proportional increase of Muslims was also assisted by the fact that conversion • is almost entirely in one direction in an Islamic society, since the Shari‘a forbids conversion away from Islam and popular attitudes likewise strongly oppose it.

Over time dhimmi populations maintained themselves in many places but in relative- ly small numbers. In Egypt and Greater Syria Christians have been about 10 percent of the population since the fourteenth century, though decreasing in Palestine-Israel since 1948. Their proportion has been smaller in Iran, and probably larger in Turkey until the population exchange of the 1920s. Jewish communities maintained them- selves from Morocco to India but since 1948 most have emigrated to Israel.

Ottomans and Safavids Timur almost nipped in the bud one of the greatest empires of Islamic history. The Osmanlis, or Ottomans, were a Turkish dynasty of ghazis (warriors on the frontier of Islam) that began in 1281. They conquered northwestern Anatolia and moved into the Balkans, winning a number of battles of which the best known and most symbolic was against the Serbs at Kosovo Field in 1389. Bouncing back from their defeat at the hands of Timur, they continued their expan- sion, finally conquering Constantinople in 1453 and bringing to an end the Byzantine Empire. As ghazis and very strongly Sunni the Ottoman rulers took seriously their role as defenders of the faith. After defeating the Shi‘i Safavids (see below) they took over the rest of Anatolia and northern Mesopotamia. In 1516–1517 they took over the Mamluke Empire in Syria and

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Egypt, though local Mamluke rule was allowed to continue under the Ottoman aegis. They built a strong fleet in the Mediterranean Sea that contended with European powers and they took control of Tunis, Algiers and other North Africa ports (not Morocco) as well as Cyprus and Malta. They also contended with the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. They expanded be- yond the Balkans into Hungary and Romania, besieging Vienna unsuccessfully in 1529, and they also expanded north against the Russians. The Ottomans developed a strong bureaucracy and, more than any other pre-modern Muslim state, incorporated the ‘ulama’ into this bureau- cracy and made them into a hierarchy. Certain Sufi orders were close to the governing elite, such as the Bektashis, Mevlevis and Naqshbandis. A distinctive Ottoman variation of the idea of mamlukes was the devshirme. Under this system boys were recruited from non-Muslim vil- lages, converted to Islam, and trained to become part of an elite military corps known as the Janissaries, who were directly responsible to the sultan. They also systematized dealings with the dhimmis by creating what is known as the millet system. The various millets, Christian and Jewish, were dealt with through representatives, often religious leaders, and managed their own internal affairs. In general the millets supported the government and were supported, and to some extent controlled, by it. The millets generally prospered commercially under this sys- tem and many Christians and Jews had high positions in the government. Although Anatolia had become 90 percent Muslim by the fifteenth century, most of the European parts of the

Part I: History of the Community 4 | Expansion and Flowering of Islam

empire remained predominantly Christian to the end. The empire reached its height under Suleyman the Magnificent (or the Lawgiver, 1520–1566). After this it gradually weakened in- ternally and externally. In 1683 the Ottomans once again besieged Vienna unsuccessfully (an event commemorated on its three hundredth anniversary by the papacy in 1983) but they ulti- mately lost the war and at the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 for the first time made peace as the defeated party. It was a harbinger of things to come.

The Safavid movement began as a Sufi order in northeastern Iran under Shaykh Safi al-Din (1252–1334) a Sunni teacher, but later adopted Shi‘i allegiance. In 1501 they invaded Iran un- der Isma‘il (1487–1524), who declared himself shah. Twelver Shi‘ism was imposed by force on the populace, who were mostly Sunnis at the time, and Shi‘i ‘ulama’ were brought in from Arab areas, such as southern Lebanon and southern Iraq and Bahrain, to instruct the people. Thus a link with the ‘ulama’ of these areas was established that continues to the present. A sys- tem of madrasas was also established so that scholarship flourished. Sufis, however, were per- secuted since they represented a potential challenge to Shi‘i authority and the Sufi movement weakened. The imposition of Shi‘ism was so successful that an effort to make Sunni and Shi‘i Islam equal in the eighteenth century failed. If one seeks evidence that religion can be imposed by force of authority, Safavid Iran provides it. The Twelver ‘ulama’ also claim to be depu- ties of the Hidden Imam and thus were potential competitors with the shahs for authority in a way that Sunni ‘ulama’ never have been. At first and for some time the shahs held the upper hand, in part because the ‘ulama’ were initially outsiders. In time the ‘ulama’ began to assert their claims but the full development of this was to be seen only in the nineteenth and twenti- eth centuries. The Safavid period witnessed a major cultural flowering, especially under Shah Abbas I (r. 1588–1629), as can be seen in the impressive mosques and palaces of the Iranian capital, Isfahan. It was said, “Isfahan is half the world.” It also saw the development of a form of philosophical mysticism known as ‘irfan, whose greatest representative was Mulla Sadra (d. 1640).

Until 1639 the Safavids fought frequently with the Ottomans and Sunnism and Shi‘ism be- came important ideological markers in this contest. It was probably only in this context that Sunni and Shi‘i Islam become as clearly distinct from each other as they are now. The Safavid Dynasty declined in the seventeenth century and was ended in 1736 by the Afghans.

Central Asia, China and South Asia In Central Asia in the sixteenth century a confederation of Uzbek Turks ruled a realm that included major centers of learning such as Bukhara and Samarqand. Uzbek rule continued less firmly until the nineteenth century. Islam penetrated China with merchants and Sufis via Central Asia and with merchants in Chinese seaports. The descendants of the latter group along with others are called the Hui and are Chinese in language and culture. The Uigurs and

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other Muslims of Xinjiang were brought under Chinese rule in the eighteenth century but have maintained their ethnic identities and have been less happy to accept Chinese rule, as recent events have attested.

In India, Sind had been conquered under the Umayyads in 712–713. The Ghaznavids took Lahore in 1030 and their successors, the Ghurids, extended their control as far as Delhi. In 1209 one of the Ghurid generals founded what became known as the Sultanate of Delhi, ruled by several Turkish or Afghan dynasties, some of whose members were mamlukes. These dy- nasties extended Muslim rule to cover almost all of India. Both the Mongols and Timur raided India but did not establish themselves there, although a number of scholars came to India flee- ing the Mongols. The existing social system was left largely intact. Hindus were treated as dhimmis and their chiefs often cooperated with the Muslim rulers, who functioned as a ruling caste in a society organized by caste. The Sufis and their tariqas flourished in India and were instrumental in converting about 25 percent of population of the whole subcontinent, a ma- jority in much of the north, especially since they were prepared to adapt their message to the needs of the local population. This was probably facilitated by at least apparent similarities be- tween Sufism and various Hindu ideas and practices such as the devotional movement known as Bhakti. One result of the cross fertilization between these was the Sikh movement, inspired by the devotional poems of Kabir (1440–1518) and organized as a separate religion in the six- teenth and seventeenth centuries.

Figure 4.5 Mosque in Beijing, China. (Courtesy Peter Sanders/Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA)

Part I: History of the Community 4 | Expansion and Flowering of Islam

The Mughul dynasty first came to power in 1526 and was stabilized and made into an empire by its greatest ruler, Akbar (r. 1556–1605), who was a tireless warrior and dedicated reformer. He is known especially for his tolerance in religious matters. He abolished the jizya tax that non-Muslims had to pay and sponsored discussions and debates between scholars of the reli- gions known to him (including Christians). He was particularly respectful of the Chishti Sufi teachers and later formed a kind of universalistic tariqa with himself as teacher and with a limited number of disciples.

Akbar was followed by three successors covering the period to 1707. One of these, Shah Jahan, built the well known Taj Mahal as a mausoleum for his wife. The last of these three, Awrangzeb, adopted a stricter religious policy, reimposing the jiyza, among other things. In order to accede to the throne Awrangzeb had set aside his brother, Dara Shikoh, who had written a treatise to show that the Hindu Upanishads contained the same truths that the Sufis taught. In contrast, an important Sufi thinker during Awrangzeb’s time, Ahmad Sirhindi, op- posed compromises with Hinduism and also criticized the teachings of Ibn ‘Arabi, which seemed to efface the boundary between God and humans. Akbar and Dara Shikoh, on one hand, and Awrangzeb and Sirhindi on the other, can be seen as symbols of the two attitudes Muslims might take toward Hindus, conciliatory or dominating. The eventual separation of Pakistan from India in the twentieth century may to some extent be seen as a victory for the latter tendency. After Awrangzeb’s death, Mughul power declined rapidly although formally the dynasty continued until 1857.

Southeast Asia and Africa Islam came comparatively late to Southeast Asia, but today this is a very important part of the Muslim world, both numerically (Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country) and in other ways. Islam appears to have been brought by traders and Sufis from both India and from the Arabian peninsula sometime before 1300 and spread south along the coasts of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, and thence to Java, where the last Hindu kingdom was re- placed by a Muslim state by 1550. The Portuguese took Malacca in 1511 and were replaced about a century later by the Dutch, who in time took full control. The presence of Europeans in fact stimulated the spread of Islam as a form of cultural and political resistance. Jihad be- came a form of anti-imperialist struggle, as would happen elsewhere. Islam spread as far as the southern Philippines, where it was blocked by the Spanish.

In Sub-Sahara Africa, as a general rule, merchants and Sufis first brought Islam, which was later accepted by the rulers. Among the most important Muslim kingdoms in the western part of Sub-Sahara Africa between the Eleventh and the Sixteenth centuries were Ghana, Mali and Songhay. Timbuktu was the leading religious and commercial center in this area. Further east, the Hausa rulers became Muslims in the Fourteenth century and made Kano a center of learn-

Part I: History of the Community 4 | Expansion and Flowering of Islam

ing. Traders brought Islam to the East African coast and Somalia from the Ninth century but the coast suffered under Portuguese domination in the Sixteenth century. To the north between the Twelfth and early Sixteenth centuries, Muslims pushed south from Egypt and north from the Blue Nile area, conquering Christian kingdoms. Ethiopia, however, resisted the Muslim push and continues to do so to the present, although a considerable proportion of its population is Muslim.

An observer considering the state of the world in the year 1000 of the Hijra, 1592 c.e., would surely have been most impressed by the physical and cultural strength of the Muslim world. In the center it was dominated by three large empires that were at or just past their prime, while on its periphery it was expanding, especially to the south and southeast. As for the European “Franks”, they had admittedly made some progress from their barbaric state at the time of the Crusades and they were demonstrating political and intellectual vitality, but they were also dis- sipating much of this in internecine religious wars. The intellectual and political creativity that would change the world in the future would have been less evident to the outside observer. For the moment, and indeed for another century, the Muslim world was on top.

Key Points You Need to Know Military conquest extended the realm of Islam to Spain in the west, central Asia to • the north and the Indus Valley in the East. Later the realm was extended much further partly by war but more by traders and teachers.

Until about 750 Islam was predominantly an Arab affair. After that it became • multiethnic.

Various aspects of religious scholarship and culture began under the Umayyads but • reached their first maturity under the Abbasids.

This culture combined Arabian, Persian and later Turkish and other elements in a dis-• tinctive cultural mix.

Under the Abbasids many provincial rulers had de facto independence although they • formally recognized the caliph’s authority.

The Crusades briefly destabilized one part of the Muslim world but were ultimately • more important to Europe, and as a memory to modern Muslims.

The Mongols posed a major challenge to Muslim civilization but soon became • Muslims and supported it.

From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries the central part of the Muslim world was • ruled by three large empires, the Ottoman, the Safavid and the Mughul, that at first were far stronger than any European state.

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Islam spread into sub-Saharan Africa from the eleventh century and into Southeast • Asia from the thirteenth century.

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading Bonner, Michael (2006) Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice, Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press.

Esposito, J. (ed.) (1999) The Oxford History of Islam, New York: Oxford University Press.

Sonn, Tamara (2004) A Brief History of Islam, Oxford: Blackwell (chapters 4 and 5 deal with the modern period).

Part II: Aspects of Islam

The Qur’an

In This Chapter The Qur’an is the Muslim scripture and the primary authority for Muslim life. It is comparable in some respects to the Christian and Jewish scriptures. An English-speaking non-Muslim who first approaches it will probably find some of the content familiar, but the form and the style will often seem strange. This chapter will focus on how Muslims understand their scripture and the influence it has on their life and culture.

Main Topics Covered What is the Qur’an? •

The Qur’an in Muslim culture •

Some teachings of the Qur’an: God, faith, prophecy, other spiritual beings, the Last • Day, social teachings

Interpretation of the Qur’an •

Western criticism of the Qur’an •

Part II: Aspects of Islam 5 | The Qur’ān

What is the Qur’an?

For the Muslim the Qur’an consists of the verbatim words of God, conveyed in the Arabic language to the Prophet Muhammad by the Angel Gabriel, and not influenced by Muhammad’s personality. The Qur’an commands Muhammad to say, “It is not for me to change it of my own accord. I follow only what is re-vealed to me” (10:16). The messages were conveyed in relatively short sections over the twenty-three years of his prophetic mission in response to his needs and those of the umma. Muhammad’s own words and deeds are also important for Muslims and will be discussed in the next chapter, but the distinction between his words and God’s words is kept clear. Non-Muslims usually treat the Qur’an as Muhammad’s words, but this can be offen- sive to Muslims. When quoting the Qur’an, it is best to say “The Qur’an says …” rather than “Muhammad said …”.

As passages of the Qur’an were revealed to Muhammad, whom Muslims believe to have been illiterate, he recited and memorized them and others wrote them down on materials that were available. It is claimed that from time to time Muhammad reviewed with Gabriel the content of what had been revealed, but at the end of his life it was still scattered on “pieces of papyrus, flat stones, palm-leaves, shoulder-blades and ribs of animals, pieces of leather and wooden boards, as well as [in] the hearts of men” (Bell, 1970, 40), as one source puts it. The “hearts of men” refers to the fact that many had memorized part or all of it. From the beginning the Qur’an was transmitted both in written form and in memorized form. The memorized form was the more important since the society of the time was one in which literacy was limited and which therefore relied mainly on memory. The heritage of pre-Islamic poetry was also memo- rized and was only written down much later. Moreover, the Arabic script of the time was very primitive and did not distinguish all of the letters (e.g. b, t, th, and sometimes y and n were written the same way), so that it was mainly useful as an aid to memory. It would take two centuries before it was to be fully adequate to record the Qur’an.

The best known account of the compilation of the Qur’an is as follows. In a battle the year after Muhammad’s death a number of those who had memorized the Qur’an were killed and Abu Bakr, the first caliph, decided that the whole should be collated and recorded. This was done by Zayd ibn Thabit, who had been one of Muhammad’s secretaries, and the text was eventually passed to Hafsa, the daughter of ‘Umar and widow of Muhammad. Under the third caliph, ‘Uthman, as the umma spread geographically, it became evident that different people were reciting the Qur’an in slightly different ways. This he considered a threat to the unity of the umma and so he had Zayd and others produce a definitive edition and sent copies of it to the main centers, ordering all others to be destroyed. In this editon there are 114 chapters, or suras, of quite unequal length, the shortest having three and the longest 286 verses, or āyas. Except for the short first sūra (quoted below), the suras are placed roughly in order of length, from the longest to the shortest, not in the order in which they were revealed nor in any clear

Part II: Aspects of Islam 5 | The Qur’ān

thematic arrangement. Many Muslims believe that at least two of these copies still exist, one in Tashkent and one at the Topkapi museum in Istanbul. Western scholars, however, doubt the authenticity of these. In spite of this, there came to be some seven to ten different “readings” of the Qur’an varying in details that were judged to be acceptable. Some hold that all of these were revealed to Muhammad, possibly to accommodate different dialects of Arabic. Muslims do not consider that these variations compromise the integrity of the text, which they believe has been protected by God from distortion. In recent years most printed editions of the Qur’an follow the edition authorized by the Egyptian government in 1925.

If the Qur’an is the verbatim speech of God, it can only be so in the Arabic language, in which it was revealed. A “translation” into any other language is merely an imperfect effort to convey some of its meanings. Therefore, the Qur’an is always recited in Arabic and serious study of it is done in Arabic. Even apart from this “theological” point, it is a fact that Arabic generally is difficult to translate into English and the Qur’an, with its particular style, is even more so. It is usually not possible to render all of the ideas, allusions and emotions present in a Qur’anic passage adequately into English.

In fact, Muslims insist that the Qur’an is a literary miracle that cannot be equalled as litera- ture. The Qur’an, indeed, makes this claim for itself (2:23–24) and Muslims have devoted a considerable literature to elaborating this claim. It is said that ‘Umar, who was to be the second caliph, had been a bitter opponent of Muhammad but was converted after reading or hearing a page of the Qur’an. It is believed that every prophet’s mission was confirmed by a miracle from God and Muhammad’s main miracle, according to many his only miracle, was the Qur’an. The miraculous aspect is heightened by the fact that he is believed to have been illiterate.

This literary claim is not easy for the outsider to appreciate. The parts of the Bible Westerners most often read have a fairly straightforward narrative, poetic or doctrinal line and the whole has a fairly clear organization. The Qur’an by contrast often jumps unexpectedly from one topic to another, tells only part of a story and elliptically omits words and phrases. (It should be noted, though, that some of the prophetic books of the Bible are closer to the Qur’an in this respect.) Apart from the length of the suras it is hard to discern any overall principle of organization. Thomas Carlyle, who was one of the first writers in English to write favorably of Muhammad, spoke for many who approach the Qur’an for the first time when he described it as “a wearisome confused jumble, crude, … endless iterations, long-windedness, entangle- ment …”, though he also went on to say that in it “there is a merit quite other than the literary one. If a book come from the heart, it will contrive to reach other hearts; all art and authorcraft are of small amount to that” (Carlyle 86–87). One problem, of course, was that he had to read the Qur’an in English, and in a poorer translation than those available today. Even in Arabic, though, the Qur’an has the fragmented style mentioned above. More important, perhaps, is the fact that the Qur’an is more recited and heard than read and is mostly recited in relatively short sections, so that the power of the words and the immediate argument is more important than

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the logical coherence of the larger context in which it is set. In any case, for the Muslim any incoherence can be only apparent, for God has undoubtedly given the Qur’an the form it has for a good reason.

Since Muslims view the Qur’an as the actual speech of God, it is for them the point where God is most fully present in the mundane world. The significance of this can be underlined by a comparison with Christianity. We begin by comparing the Qur’an with the Bible, but for orthodox Christians the point where God is most fully present in the world is not the Bible but the person of Jesus Christ, who was the incarnation of God (God “in the flesh”). Thus Christ is in important ways a closer parallel to the Qur’an than the Bible. There is an interesting confir- mation of this point in the history of Muslim theology. It was debated whether the Qur’an was created or uncreated and it was the latter view that prevailed (see chapter ten). Orthodox Jews, on the other hand, will find that the Muslim view of the Qur’an is fairly close to their own of the written Torah (first five books of the Bible) given to Moses on Mount Sinai.

Being the speech of God the Qur’an has baraka, a spiritual or almost magical power (we shall see this term again later). This is illustrated at the popular level by such practices as putting a passage of the Qur’an into a small container and hanging it around one’s neck as an amulet to ward off bad luck or evil forces or writing a passage on paper and dissolving the ink in wa- ter to drink as a medicine. There are stories such as one that the horse of a Companion of the Prophet bolted when some one recited the Qur’an. One should be ritually pure before touching a copy of the Qur’an or reciting it. Arabic copies of the Qur’an usually have on the title page the following, which comes from the Qur’an: “a well guarded book which none may touch ex- cept the purified” (56:78–80). It is also worth noting that the word aya, used for a verse of the Qur’an, also means sign or even miracle. It is used in the Qur’an for God’s activity in creation, e.g. the rain, the winds, the alteration of day and night (2:164), for a victory in battle such as Badr (3:13) and for “miracles” such as Moses’ rod turning into a serpent (7:106, cf. Exodus 4:3 and 7:10 in the Bible). All of these are signs of God and so is, pre-eminently, each aya of the Qur’an.

The Qur’an in Muslim culture The Qur’an penetrates Muslim cultures to a degree even greater than that to which the Bible used to penetrate Western, especially Protestant, cultures. Muslim names are commonly drawn from the Qur’an, as we shall see below. Phrases such as al -ḥamdu li-llāh (praise be to God), inshā’allāh (if God wills) and Allāhu a‘lam (God knows best) are constantly on people’s lips. Muslims recite a portion of the Qur’an in their regular prayers (salah) and on many other oc- casions during the day. The Fātiḥa, the opening chapter of the Qur’an, is recited on many oc- casions, such as the closing of marriage contracts.

Part II: Aspects of Islam 5 | The Qur’ān

The Qur’an also generates what Westerners would call “art forms”. One of these is calligraphy. The Arabic script, which has been developed in several styles, lends itself particularly well to graceful presentation. One finds Qur’anic calligraphy often on the walls of mosques and other public buildings, as well as on posters and in pictures in people’s homes and elsewhere (see chapter fourteen).

Since the Qur’an is primarily a book to be recited and listened to, recitation also gives rise to something like an art form. Until modern times recitation of the Qur’an, along with its use in learning to read and write, was the mainstay of Muslim primary education. Many learn to recite the whole of the Qur’an, even when they don’t know Arabic and cannot understand the words. They still benefit from the baraka. These people are called ḥāfiz and have consider- able prestige. For some, recitation becomes a profession. They will be called on to recite at weddings, funerals, and various other religious, civic and family occasions. (See Some Web Sources for Qur’an Recitation under Further reading at the end of this chapter.) For purposes of recitation and also learning, the Qur’an is divided into thirty “parts” of equal length and each of these into two ḥizb; this is separate from the division into suras and ayas. There are two styles of recitation, tartīl, which is fairly plain, and tajwīd, which is more ornamental and “musical” (Qur’anic recitation is in fact not considered “music” by Muslims) and more dif- ficult to master. It has been said that a leading Qur’an reciter has a status comparable to a lead-

Figure 5.1 Surat Ikhlas (112) of the Qur’an, by the moderm Pakistani calligrapher, Aftab Ahmad. Kufic style. (Courtesy Calligraphy by Aftab Ahmad/Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA)

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ing opera singer in the West, but in some ways it is also comparable to that of a popular singer. Kristina Nelson describes a dramatic moment in the public recitation of the Qur’an in Cairo in terms that suggest both art and baraka:

“Suddenly the power of the phrase seizes the scattered sensibility of the crowd, focusing it, and carrying it forward like a great wave, setting the listeners down gently after one phrase and lifting them up in the rising of the next. The recitation proceeds, the intensity grows. A man hides his face in his hands, another weeps quietly. Some listeners tense themselves as if in pain, while, in the pauses between phrases, others shout appreciative responses to the reciter. Time passes unnoticed ….” (Nelson xiii)

Some teachings of the Qur’an

God The main teachings of the Qur’an relate, of course, to God, Allah. The Qur’an does not intro- duce Allah, since the Arabs already knew of him, but it has much to say about Him. First and foremost, He is One and has no partner. “Say: He is Allah, One, Allah, the everlasting refuge, he has not begotten nor has he been begotten, and equal to him is none” (Qur’an 112). The recognition that Allah is one is called tawhīd (literally, considering [Allah] to be one), a very important term in the Muslim lexicon. Moreover, Allah is the creator and sustainer of every- thing. He created the universe in six days and “settled on the throne” (32:4 and elsewhere). He did not rest on the seventh day, as the Bible claims, but immediately took charge of his universe. He created humans to praise and obey Him and He guides them. On the Last Day he will dramatically bring the universe to an end and judge humankind.

Most of these themes are captured in the Fatiha, the Opening sura, and the one most often re- cited by Muslims.

In the name of Allah, The Merciful, the Compassionate. Praise be to Allah, Lord of the worlds The Merciful, the Compassionate Master of the Day of Judgment You only do we serve; to you only do we turn for help Guide us in the straight path, The path of those whom you have blessed, Not of those with whom you are angry, Nor of those who are astray.

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The Qur’an has a number of epithets or names for Allah, and from these Muslims have com- piled lists of ninety-nine names (they vary slightly), of which the first two are the Merciful (Raḥmān) and the Compassionate (Raḥīm), mentioned in the Fatiha. These names are some- times recited and often appear in calligraphy in pictures and posters. They also appear in Muslim names, such as ‘Abd al-Rahman, servant of Merciful One, ‘Abd al-Nasir, servant of the Helper (name of the former president of Egypt, usually known in the West as Nasser), and of course, ‘Abd Allah (usually transliterated Abdullah), servant of God.

The opposite of tawhid and the most serious sin humans can commit is shirk, meaning to as- cribe partners or associates to Allah, something the Meccans did with three of their pagan god- desses, whom they considered to be daughters of Allah, as the following passage indicates:

Have you considered al-Lat and al-’Uzza, and that other, Manat, the third? Are you to have sons, and He only daughters? That would be a most unfair division! They are naught but names you have named, you and your fathers. Allah has sent no warrant for them. They follow only their own ideas and desires, Even though sound guidance has come to them from their Lord. (53: 19–23)

It is interesting to note that this is the site of the so-called “Satanic verses”, made famous by Salman Rushdie’s novel. According to some reports Muhammad was overly anxious to convince the Meccans to accept his message and Satan took advantage of this to suggest the following verses as a compromise: “They are the exalted swans whose intercession is to be desired” (after the second line, above). The Meccans were so happy they joined him in prayer,

Figure 5.2 Calligraphy of the open-Calligraphy of the open- ing sura of the Qur’an, the Fatiha.

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but soon Gabriel appeared and told him these were not from God and replaced them with the present text. The Meccans turned away. Gabriel guaranteed that nothing inspired by Satan would be allowed to stand. Most Muslims today deny the historicity of this account.

Shirk may involve the obvious worship of other gods than Allah or, more subtly, it may in- volve giving anything, pleasure, wealth, career, family, nation, equal place in one’s life with God.

Faith The most important requirement for humans is faith, īmān. In fact, the word mu’min (believer) is the most common word used in the Qur’an to denote Muhammad’s followers, the word muslim being comparatively rare. Even today, mu’min is preferred by many. The term iman became the subject of considerable theological discussion and we will return to it in chapter eleven. The opposite of iman is kufr, unbelief or, more precisely, the refusal to recognize and act on the blessings of Allah. It carries also a connotation of ingratitude.

Prophecy Allah’s power and mercy can be perceived in the universe by those with eyes to see but He conveys his commands and moral standards to humans primarily by way of prophets (nabī) and messengers (rasūl) (the relation between these terms is too complex to enter into here). The Qur’an names some twenty-five of these and makes it clear that there are many it does not mention. Muslim traditions suggest that there have been as many as 124,000 prophets over the whole course of history. Most but not all of those named correspond to Biblical figures. In most cases the accounts of each prophet are scattered through the Qur’an with each account giving part of the story from a particular perspective. We will consider a few here.

Although Adam, the first man, is not specifically called a prophet or messenger in the Qur’an, Muslims have generally taken him to be such. Adam was created to be God’s khalifa, or dep- uty, on earth (2:30–39 and elsewhere). This is the same term that is used in a different context for the later leaders of the umma, in their case usually transliterated “caliph”. Adam and his wife, not named in the Qur’an, are placed in paradise (called “the garden”, janna) and told not to eat of a certain tree, but they disobey and are therefore expelled to the earth. There is no indication that Eve first disobeyed and then tempted Adam; they appear to have disobeyed together. Adam then repented and was forgiven and received “words of guidance.” While they are put on earth where they will face temptation and difficulty, sin is specific acts of disobedi- ence to God, not the corruption of their moral nature (as in the Christian doctrine of original sin). They have the ability to obey.

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Nuh (Noah) and several other prophets, including Arabian prophets such as Hud and Salih, who are not in the Bible, convey a warning from Allah to their communities (ummas), most of whose members reject the message and are destroyed by Allah, while only the prophet and a few followers escape. The story of Nuh’s ark is presented in the Qur’an and fits this pattern (11:25–48 and elsewhere).

Ibrahim (Abraham) is particularly important. The Qur’anic Ibrahim was raised in an idolatrous family, discovered the truth of tawhid while observing the heavens (6:75–80), destroyed his father’s idols (21:51-67), was thrown into a fire from which Allah saved him and migrated (29:24–26 and elsewhere, the term hijra is used here) to Palestine. After this, among other things, he was commanded by God to sacrifice his son, who was ransomed at the last minute (37:102–111). The Qur’an does not say which of his sons this was but Muslims believe it was Isma’il (Ishmael), not Ishaq (Isaac). He also traveled with Isma’il to Mecca where they built, or rebuilt, the Ka‘ba (2:125–8) (some think it was built originally in Adam’s time). Ibrahim’s descendants, Ishaq, Isma’il, Ya‘qub (Jacob) and Yusuf (Joseph), were all prophets. The people of Israel (Banu Isra’il) were descended from Ishaq, Ya‘qub and Yusuf, and the Arabs from Isma’il, though the Qur’an is not explicit on the latter point.

The story of Musa (Moses) has much in common with the Biblical account. He is saved from death as a baby (28:4–13 and elsewhere), flees after killing a man (28:15– 21), is called to by God from a burning bush (20:9–24 and elsewhere), and sent to confront Pharaoh, who is more consistently evil than in the Biblical account, and who is drowned as Musa’s people escape (2:50 and elsewhere). Musa receives the Torah from God, but the people worship the calf and prove disobedient in other ways (2:51–54 and elsewhere).

‘Isa (Jesus) is understood to be a messenger sent to the people of Israel and is explicitly stated not to be Son of Allah or part of a Trinity (19:35; 5:73–8). He is born of a virgin and there are accounts of the annunciation and the birth that differ considerably from the Biblical ones (3:42–47; 19:16–34). He receives a scripture, the Injil (Gospel), preaches, performs miracles, and raises the dead. His enemies try to crucify him but fail as Allah raises him to Himself (4:157–158 but see 19:33).

The Qur’an calls Jews and Christians “People of the Book” (ahl al-kitab) and in some places seems to put their faith on the same level as that preached by Muhammad, whose message is said to be the same as theirs and as all the other prophets (2:136; 42:13 and elsewhere). Elsewhere they are criticized for disobedience, for changing their scriptures (4:46 and else- where) and for rejecting Muhammad. Though critical of both, the Qur’an is more consistently critical of Jews while having some favorable things to say about Christians (5:82). The Qur’an says, “No compulsion in religion” (2:256), but it also calls on Muslims to fight the people of the Book until they are humbled and pay jizya, a special tax (9:29).

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Many of the elements in the accounts of the prophets that are not found in the Bible are found in other Jewish and Christian sources, one example being Ibrahim breaking the idols. This has led many Western scholars to speak of Jewish and Christian influence on Muhammad and even to speculate whether Muhammad was more influenced by Judaism or Christianity. For Muslims all these stories come from Allah. They and others were undoubtedly circulating in the environment since the Qur’anic versions, which are usually highly elliptical, would not have been understood otherwise. God in the revelation confirmed what was true in the material being circulated and discarded what was false, as well as adding new material. (Link for fur- ther inforrmaton on prophets.)

These stories are still very much alive in Muslim societies, just as Old Testament stories are alive in Christian circles. Many Muslims are named after these prophets and allusions are of- ten made to events in their lives. Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran, was given the epithet “idol breaker”, alluding to Ibrahim’s action. Several rulers, including the Shah of Iran and President Sadat of Egypt, have been labeled “Pharaoh” by their enemies (see chapters seventeen and eighteen on these).

Other spiritual beings In addition to Allah, the Qur’an speaks of other spiritual beings. Angels are servants and mes- sengers of Allah who praise him and do His bidding. Jinn (singular: jinni) are beings made of invisible fire who may harm or help humans and may be believers or unbelievers. The Qur’an gives an account of a group of jinn who were converted by hearing it recited (46:29–31). Jinn are, of course, the “genies” who supposedly are let out of bottles and grant three wishes. Among the jinn is Iblis (devil) or Shaytan (satan), who was commanded along with the angels to bow down to Adam, after he was created, but refused. For this he was thrown out of heaven, but has been allowed to tempt human beings (17:61–65).

The Last Day Some of the most dramatic passages of the Qur’an deal with the Last Day. For example:

When the heaven is split open, When the stars are scattered, When the seas are poured forth, When the tombs are overturned, Then a soul shall know what it has done, And what it has left undone. (82:1–5)

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Descriptions of Paradise and the Fire (hell) are likewise vivid, including the heavenly maid- ens (houris) who will attend those in Paradise (no number is given in the Qur’an). Feminists complain that the description of Paradise is very male oriented. Interestingly, it is reported that some of the women of the time thought so, too, and complained to Muhammad. Following this he received the following verses: “Muslim men and women, believing men and women, obe- dient men and women … for them God has prepared forgiveness and a mighty wage” (33:35). In this world social rights and duties differ but in the final accounting gender, like other social distinctions, falls away.

Social teachings Many of the Qur’an’s social and moral teachings will be dealt with in later chapters, but it is worth mentioning three that underline the contrast between the Qur’anic ethos and the jahili ethos of the pre-Islamic Arabs.

As mentioned in chapter three, the highest loyalty of the pre-Islamic Arabs was given to the tribe. The jahili poet Durayd ibn Simma sang:

“I am of Ghaziyyah: if she be in error, then I will err; And if Ghaziyyah be guided right, I go right with her.” (Nicholson Literary 83)

By contrast, the Qur’an says:

“O, humankind, Surely, We have created you from a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes so you may know each other. Surely, the most noble of you in God’s sight Is the most pious.” (49:13)

That the jahili attitude of Durayd lives on is suggested by the following statement of the American Stephen Decatur in 1816: “Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong!” This supports the view of many Muslims today that modern nationalism is the moral equivalent of jahili tribalism. The same Qur’anic passage also signals a shift in what it means to be noble (karim). For the jahili Arabs nobility meant having noble ancestry and demonstrating this by noble deed such as bravery in battle and generosity. For the Qur’an nobility is piety, which requires no ancestry.

As also mentioned in chapter three, jahiliyya meant not so much ignorance as a glorying in extreme behavior, as illustrated by the accounts of Imru al-Qays, with his drinking, womaniz- ing and then persistent quest for vengeance and Hatim al-Tayyi giving away all of his father’s

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camels as an act of hospitality. The Qur’an, by contrast forbids fornication, gambling and wine drinking, and calls for the limitation of vengeance or, preferably, forgiveness (5:45). As for generosity, “be neither miserly nor prodigal” (17:29).

For the jahili Arabs the motive of ethical action was essentially honor, especially the honor of the tribe. Hatim says to his father, “Oh my father, by means of [the camels] I have conferred on you everlasting fame and honor that will cleave to you like the ring of the ringdove and men will always bear in mind some verse of poetry in which we are praised. This is your rec- ompense for the camels” (Nicholson Literary 86). As for a future life, the Qur’an quotes them as saying, “There is this life and no other. We live and die; nothing but Time destroys us!” (45:24). For the Qur’an, on the other hand, the primary motive is precisely the “mighty wage” of the future life:

“Say: ‘It is God who gives you life and later causes you to die. It is He who will gather you all on the Day of Resurrection. Of this there is no doubt …. As for those who have faith and do good works, their lord will admit them to His mercy. Theirs shall be a glorious triumph. To the unbelievers …. The evil of their deeds will mani- fest itself to them and the scourge at which they scoffed will encompass them …’. (45:27–33)

Out of fear for honor or fear of poverty jahili Arabs would sometimes bury their girl babies (16:58–60). The Qur’an forbids this, “Do not kill your children, fearing poverty. We shall pro- vide for them and for you. Killing them is a great sin” (17:31).

Interpretation of the Qur’an Like all scriptures, the Qur’an needs interpretation. Indeed, some interpretation is involved in the material presented above. A basic level of interpretation has been the effort to determine the temporal order of the Qur’anic material. Muslim scholars have distinguished between su- ras revealed in Mecca and those revealed in Medina. In general the first group are shorter and more poetic while the latter are longer, more prosaic and more likely to deal with legal mate- rial. Beyond this there has been an effort to determine the order of the suras within each group and this appears in the chapter headings of the Egyptian edition. It is recognized, though, that in some cases a sura includes material from different periods. One reason the temporal order is important is the idea that sometimes a later passage abrogates an earlier one. This is one ex- planation of apparent contradictions and is also important for applying the Qur’an in practice. In such cases it is important to know which is the later passage. For example Qur’an 2:219 says that wine is of some value but greater evil but Qur’an 5:90, which is later, unreservedly forbids it.

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An important part of interpretation is the effort to determine the “occasions of revelation” (asbab al-nuzul), that is the specific circumstances under which a passage was revealed and the issues that were being addressed. Much of the Qur’an cannot be understood without this information, since the Qur’an usually does not provide the context of its statements or at most alludes to it without giving the details. The case of the women questioning about paradise is an example of this.

Also important, and very popular both in the past and the present, is the genre of literature called “stories of the prophets”. These collate the Qur’anic accounts of each prophet and fill in the gaps. In the process, a considerable amount of Biblical and other Jewish and Christian ma- terial is usually included. For example, in this material, contrary to the Qur’an, Eve’s name is given (Ḥawā’ in Arabic) and usually she is first tempted and then tempts Adam, as in the Bible.

The commentaries to the Qur’an that follow the order of the text are called tafsirs and a con- siderable number have been written. These are sometimes divided into those based on trans- mission (especially of hadiths, statements of the Prophet, see the next chapter) and those that make greater use of rational opinion. The greatest of the first group is that of Ibn Jarir al-Tabari (d. 922) and of the second that of al-Zamakhshari (d. 1144), condensed and edited by al-Bay- dawi (d. c. 1286). These and other traditional tafsirs usually contain a considerable amount of linguistic analysis and other technical material, as well as discussion of “occasions of revela- tion” and stories of the prophets, and much else. Tafsirs continue to be produced in modern times, some of them ideological in character, such as those of Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb (both to be discussed in later chapters) and some especially concerned to relate the Qur’an to modern science, such as that of Tantawi Jawhari (1940). These are generally less technical and more accessible to the general reader. A distinction is also often made between tafsir and ta’wil. The former is a straightforward, exoteric interpretation, while the latter seeks hidden, esoteric meanings. An example of tafsir is the interpretation of “Lord” in the Fatiha as mean- ing not only master but also nurturer, based on the root of the Arabic word. An example of ta’wil would be the interpretation of the first letter of the same sura as symbolizing the begin- ning of creation and also ‘Ali, the first Shi‘i Imam.

Western criticism of the Qur’an Western scholars have generally accepted that the present text of the Qur’an is essentially what Muhammad presented as divine revelation, though they raise some questions at particular points and question the traditional accounts of its compilation. The German scholar Nöldeke (1836–1930) developed an analysis of the suras that divided them into three Meccan stages and one Medinan. This has had considerable influence though more recent scholarship ques- tions whether the sura can be the unit of analysis, since many suras contain material from different periods, or, indeed, whether the temporal sequence of the Qur’anic material can in

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fact be determined. Western scholars have also come up with different interpretations from Muslims on specific points. For example, Muslims understand the word ummī when applied to Muhammad to mean “illiterate”. Westerners, by contrast, generally take it to mean something like “gentile”, i.e. belonging to a community that has not received a scripture.

Since the 1970s some scholars have developed a much more radical criticism. As mentioned at the end of chapter three, some believe that the Qur’an was authored and edited over a period of some two centuries before it reached its present form and does not all come from Muhammad. Denying any historical value to the traditional accounts of the compilation of the Qur’an and stressing the piecemeal and, in their view, contradictory nature of the Qur’an, they have sought to apply to it methods of literary criticism that have long been applied to the Bible. They also note that the earliest surviving written passages of the Qur’an date from the late seventh century and often have wordings that are not standard, thus suggesting that the text was not yet standardized at that time. (See link) Muslims may respond that it is the orally transmitted version that has always been most authoritative; critics have suggested that diver- gences are such that the texts could not have been checked against an established tradition of recitation.

This critical school of thought is still a minority among Western scholars but its arguments are strong enough so that it has to be taken seriously. For the purposes of this book, however, it will usually be appropriate to assume that the Qur’an is at least from Muhammad.

Key Points You Need to Know The Qur’an is central for Muslims; it is the verbatim word of God. It is the point where • the divine comes most in contact with earth.

For Muslims the recited form of the Qur’an is more important than the written form • and gives rise to an “art” form.

The Qur’an is believed to be a literary miracle. •

The Qur’an insists on the unity and centrality of Allah. •

The Qur’an tells the stories of a number of prophets, including Ibrahim (Abraham) and • ‘Isa (Jesus).

The Qur’an rejects tribal honor as the central goal of life. •

Some Western scholars have questioned the traditional understanding of the Qur’an. •

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

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Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading

Translations of the Qur’an

Approaching the Qur’an: The Early Revelations (1999), trans. Michael Sells, Ashland OR: White Cloud Press (accompanied by an audio CD).

The Holy Qur’an (1975) trans. A. Yusuf Ali, reprint, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf

The Koran (1974) trans. N. Dawood, reprint, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

The Koran Interpreted (1980), trans. A.J. Arberry, reprint, London: Allen and Unwin.

The Meaning of the Glorious Koran (1953), reprint, trans. M.M. Pickthall, New York: New American Library.

About the Qur’an

al-Said Labib, (1975) The Recited Koran, Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press.

Denffer, Ahmad von (1983) Ulum al-Qur’an: An Introduction to the Sciences of the Qur’an, Leicester: Islamic Foundation.

Esack, Farid (2002) The Qur’an: A Short Introduction, Oxford: Oneworld.

Gätje, H. (1976) The Qur’an and its Exegesis, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Kassis, Hanna (1983) A Concordance of the Qur’an, Berkeley: University of California Press (concordance to Arberry’s translation).

Leaman, Oliver (ed.) (2008) The Qur’an: An Encyclopedia, London: Routledge.

McAuliffe, Jane Dammen (ed.) (2001–2006) Encyclopaedia of the Qurān, 6 vols., Leiden: Brill.

Rahman, Fazlur (1980) Major Themes of the Qur’an, Minneapolis, MN: Bibliotheca Islamica.

Rippin, Andrew (2001) The Qur’an and Its Interpretive Tradition, Aldershot: Ashgate.

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Rippin, Andrew (ed.) (2006) The Blackwell Companion to the Qur’an, Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Watt, W.M. (1970) Bell’s Introduction to the Qur’an, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Some Web Sources for Qur’an Recitation:

(First three by the well known Qur’an reciter Abd al-Basit; fourth is a very nice recitation by a young boy; fifth is the Fatihah by Ahmad al-Ajami; from the sixth you can get other suras by Ahmad al-Ajami, but the labeling is in Arabic, click on the left hand column.)

http://video.aol.com/video-detail/abdul-basit-abdul-samad-quran-recitation/3233126823

http://video.aol.com/video-detail/abd-al-basit-abd-as-samad-surah-shamsh/1240618904

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B74JX-kcGKo&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lsj9GPd5YTg&feature=related

http://www.mp3quran.net/ajm.html

The Prophet Muhammad

The Prophet is nearer to the believers than they are to themselves. (Qur’an 33:6)

The Messenger of God said, “None of you is a believer till I am dearer to him than his child, his father and the whole of humankind. (Muslim)

In This Chapter If the Qur’an is the Book of God, Muhammad is the person through whom that book came to humanity and his words and deeds are the first and most important commentary on it. In his lifetime he was prophet, arbitrator, political leader and moral exemplar. It is this last role, mor- al exemplar and model for his followers, that has primarily continued after his death. In addi- tion, though, he has is also come to be seen as a spiritual intermediary and intercessor and as a focus of emotional attachment. All of these aspects of the Prophet are discussed in this chapter, as well as a distinctively modern role as “hero”

Main Topics Covered Muhammad is human, but special •

Sunna• and Hadith

How authentic are the • Hadith?

Muhammad as intercessor and spiritual being •

Modernist views: Muhammad as hero •

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Muhammad is human, but special

Muslims agree that Muhammad was a human being and not an incarnation of God, as Christians claim for Jesus. He is in no sense to be worshipped. The Qur’an commands him to say, “I am a human being like you. It is revealed to me that your God is one God. Let him that hopes to meet his Lord do what is right and worship none beside him” (18:111). After Muhammad died some were saying he could not have died, so Abu Bakr checked and then said: “O men, if anyone worships Muhammad, Muhammad is dead, but if anyone worships God, God is alive and does not die.” Then he recited from the Quran: “Muhammad is no more than a messenger: other messengers have passed away before him. If he die or be slain, will you turn back on your heels?” (3:144). As a human being he was subject to human failings and the Qur’an even reprimands him on one occasion for turning his back on a poor man who ap- proached him while he was trying to win over a rich man (80:1–10).

Muslims insist, nonetheless, that if the Prophet was human he was a very special human, a gemstone in comparison to ordinary stones. The Qur’an shows its respect for him in the fol- lowing terms: “God and His angels bless the prophet. O believers, do you also bless him and grant him peace (or greet him with a worthy salutation)” (33:56). From this is derived the formula: “May God bless him and grant him peace”, which regularly follows the name of Muhammad in Muslim speech and writing. This phrase is used only for Muhammad, while other phrases are used for other prophets and for Muhammad’s companions, typically “Peace be upon him” and “God be pleased with him”, respectively.

It stands to reason, of course, that God would have chosen only the best of humans to receive His final message and Muhammad is described in some devotional formulae as “the best of all creatures”. In fact, most Muslims believe that Muhammad had God’s protection (‘iṣma) from error. Minimally, this is protection from error when reciting the Qur’an and from major sins after he became a prophet, but most Muslims believe it is protection from all sins over his whole life. Therefore, most believe that he did not participate in Meccan idolatry even before his prophetic call, though Western scholars are inclined to believe that he did, a view appar- ently supported by the Qur’an when it says to Muhammad, “Did He not find you erring and guide you?” (93:7). Commentaries, however, argue that “erring” in this case does not mean sin and also that this refers to the period before he was a prophet. In any case, the Qur’an says, “He who obeys the Messenger obeys God” (4:80) and, “You have a good example in God’s Messenger” (33:21).

Sunna and Ḥadīth This “good example” is the Sunna of the Prophet. The word sunna means literally “a trodden path” and was originally used to refer to the ideal way of life of a pre-Islamic Arab tribe (see

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chapter three). In the Qur’an the sunna of God is the way God invariably acts in dealing with humans. After the coming of Islam it was for a time used to refer to the norms recognized by the Muslim umma or by parts of it, e.g. the sunna of the people of Medina. The predominant usage, however, came to be the sunna of the Prophet, the values, norms and laws implicit or explicit in what the Prophet said, did or knowingly allowed to be done. To be a Muslim is to follow the Sunna of the Prophet. The opposite of the word sunna is bid‘a, innovation, which is the usual Muslim term for heresy.

The Sunna is known through the Ḥadīth. A hadith is a report or a piece of news, specifically about an action or statement of the Prophet. In its complete form it has two parts, the sanad or isnād, which gives the chain of transmitters back to the first witness, and the matn, which gives the actual report. Here is an example:

[sanad:]“ ‘Abdallah ibn al-Aswad told me: Al-Fadl ibn al-‘Ata’ told us: ‘Isma’il ibn Umayya told us on the authority of Yahya ibn ‘Abdallah ibn Sayfi that he heard Abu Ma’bad, the freedman of Ibn ‘Abbas, say: I heard Ibn ‘Abbas say:

[matn:] When the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, sent Mu’adh to the Yemen, he said to him: You will come upon some of the People of the Book, so the first thing you will call on them to do is to profess the Oneness of God. When they have learned that, inform them that God has prescribed for them five ritual prayers a day. When they have made the ritual prayers, inform them that God has imposed zakat on their possessions, to be taken from the rich and given to the poor. When they have accepted all this, then take the tax from them, but leave them their most precious possessions.” (Al-Bukhari as quoted in Williams 68, slightly modified)

There are thousands of hadiths and they cover almost every conceivable area of concern. They include commentary on the Qur’an, details of what is permitted and forbidden (legal hadith), details of ritual action, theology, accounts of creation and eschatology, personal etiquette, descriptions of the Prophet’s character, and more. It is these that flesh out the often terse or general statements of the Qur’an. Without them, essential guidance in many areas would be lacking. Therefore, where some Christians say, “back the Bible”, comparable Muslims say in effect, “back to the Qur’an and the Sunna”.

Here are some examples of hadiths:

God is beautiful and loves beauty. (Schimmel Mystical 291)

None amongst you is a true believer until he likes for his brother or for his neighbor what he likes for himself. (Muslim)

Part II: Aspects of Islam 6 | The Prophet Muhammad

When any man says to his brother, You kafir (infidel), one of the two deserves the name. (Bukhari as quoted in Williams 72.)

I asked ‘A’isha what the Prophet used to do at home. She said: He used to be at the service of his family,” i.e. he would act as their servant (by performing domes- tic tasks), and when the prayer times came around he would go out to prayers …. Never did the Apostle of God strike anyone with his own hand, neither his wives nor his servants, though he fought vigorously in the way of God. Never was there any wrong done to himself for which he took vengeance on the one who did it, but when there was the slightest violation of the respect due to God he would avenge that for God.

(Mishkat al-Masabih, as quoted in Jeffery 31, slightly modified)

The Apostle of God was neither dissolute nor immoderate in speech. He was not one who talked loudly in the streets, nor did he return evil for evil, but rather he would pardon and forgive.

(Mishkat al-Masabih as quoted in Jeffery 31, slightly modified)

I saw the messenger of God eating fresh dates and cucumbers

(Al-Bukhari as quoted in Williams 73)

Abdullah reported that the Messenger of God (peace be upon him) had a signet ring fashioned of gold but kept its stone on the inner side of his palm as he wore it; so the people had such rings fashioned. Then one day as he sat on the pulpit he pulled it off, saying: “I wore this ring and kept its stone towards the inner side.” He threw it away, and said: “By God, I will never wear it.” So the people threw their rings away.

(Muslim)

The great and glorious Lord said (to the angels): Whenever my servant intends to commit an evil, do not record it against him, but if he actually commits it, then write it as one evil. And when he intends to do good but does not do it, then take it down as one act of goodness, but if he does it, then write down ten good deeds.

(Muslim)

Part II: Aspects of Islam 6 | The Prophet Muhammad

The last of these is a hadith qudsi (divine saying), one of a group of hadith in which God is the speaker. The previous two are “legal” in that they may influence action in specific ways. Some of the strictest wanted to follow the Sunna to the point of eating only what the Prophet was known to have eaten. The hadith therefore permits dates and cucumbers. The hadith about the ring leads many to the view that a man should not wear a gold wedding band. I have heard this argued vigorously.

The angel Gabriel teaches Muslims their religion

The Prophet – May God bless him and grant him peace – was one day appearing publicly to the people when a man came to him and asked, “What is faith (iman)?” He answered, “Faith is that you believe in God, in His angels, in the meeting with Him, in his messengers and believe in the resurrection.” “Then what,” asked the man, “is Islam?” He answered, “Islam is that you worship God, giving Him no part- ner, that you observe salah, pay the zakah that is incumbent, and that you fast during Ramadan.” “And what,” asked he, “is it to do good (ihsan)?” He answered, “To do good is to serve God as though you saw Him, for though you do not see Him, He assuredly sees you.” “And when will the Hour be?” He answered, “He who is asked knows no more about it than he who asks, yet I shall inform you of the signs of it. It is when the handmaiden gives birth to her master, and when boorish camel-herds comport themselves arrogantly in fine houses. This is one of the five things which no one knows save God”. Then the Prophet recited, “Surely God has knowledge of the Hour” (Q 31:34). At that, the man turned and went off. The Prophet called out, “Bring him back!” but they saw nothing. He said, “That was Gabriel. He had come to Muhammad to teach people their religion.

(Al-Bukhari as quoted in Jeffery 73–4, slightly modified)

How authentic are the Hadith? If the Qur’an is considered authentic by virtually all Muslims (and by most Western scholars), the situation is different with the Hadith. Muslim traditionists, the experts on hadiths, have always recognized that in the two centuries following Muhammad’s death a number of hadiths were fabricated and put into circulation to support various political and other interests. In in- vestigating a hadith some attention was given to the matn, where it seemed problematic, but primary attention was given to the sanad. Did this chain of narrators stack up? Was each one

Part II: Aspects of Islam 6 | The Prophet Muhammad

known to have been in contact with the next one, or at least was this possible? Was each of them a person who could be depended on to tell the truth? This, interestingly, spawned a whole scholarly discipline called “the science of men”, designed to gather the necessary information. This in turn led to the creation of biographical dictionaries. We may note that for many it was important to actually hear a hadith from its transmitter, given the importance of oral transmis- sion in the culture and the limitation of early Arabic script. Written collections were made but were not so authoritative. Therefore many scholars traveled considerable distances to hear ha- diths. One who did this was called a “seeker after knowledge” (ṭālib al-‘ilm), knowledge here being knowledge of hadith. The word ṭālib, seeker, came to mean student in general and still does in Arabic and other Islamic languages (e.g. Taleban in Afghanistan). The hadiths were graded into several categories, of which the most important were weak (ḍa‘īf), good (ḥasan) and sound (saḥīḥ). Within the last category is the subcategory of mutawātir, hadiths that are attested by at least two separate chains of transmitters all of whom are strong. These hadiths are considered to be certain. The result of all this effort was six major collections of hadiths recognized as canonical among Sunnis. The two most important are the Sahih of al-Bukhari (d. 870) and the Sahih of Muslim (d. 875). The others are by Abu Da’ud (d. 888), al-Tirmidhi (d. 892), al-Nasa’i (d. 916) and Ibn Maja (d. 886). There are later collections that largely draw from these such as the Mishkat al-Masabih. Among Shi’is hadiths also include those attributed to the Imams, as well as the Prophet. The main collection is that of al-Kulayni (d. 940). Al- Bukhari claimed to have examined some 200,000 hadiths to find 7,300 sound ones, a number further reduced to 2,762 when duplications are accounted for. In fact, though, many purported hadiths are in circulation that are not found in these collections.

Hadith material was compiled by several writers into biographies of the Prophet, of which the most important is the Biography of the Messenger of God (Sirat Rasul Allah) by Ibn Ishaq (d. 768) revised a century or so later by Ibn Hisham (d. 833), whose version is the one we have.

Did these traditionists, then, get it right? Muslims generally believe that they did. Non-Muslim Western scholars mostly believe that they did not. The latter, following particularly from the work of Ignaz Goldziher and Joseph Schacht, argue from the evident expansion of the number of hadiths over the first two centuries and from the fact that the earliest examples of hadiths do not have isnads or have incomplete ones. They have also felt that the traditionists put too much emphasis on the isnads in comparison to the matns. It has been argued that much of the material has been transmitted by story tellers, whose commitment to entertainment or moral edification was often greater than to historical truth. Their view has been that the hadiths rep- resent the views of Muslims of the second to third centuries of the Hijra. There may be some that go back to Muhammad but it is impossible now to tell which they are. On the other hand some argue that there is evidence for both written and oral transmission of hadiths, particularly within families, resulting in a firm body of written hadiths by the end of the first century. The view of Fazlur Rahman (see chapters fifteen and twenty) is that the close and public relation-

Part II: Aspects of Islam 6 | The Prophet Muhammad

ship between the Prophet and his community guaranteed a continuity of the substance and ethos of his Sunna even though the hadiths may not be strictly historical.

If the followers of Goldziher and Schacht are right, then we have very little hard evidence for the career of the Prophet. As indicated in chapters three and five, the Qur’an alludes to a num- ber of events but without saying much about them and therefore is not sufficient.

Muhammad as intercessor and spiritual being For most Muslims Muhammad has not only been the prime model for living, but has also functioned on a higher spiritual and metaphysical level. He is viewed, with some Qur’anic justification, as an intercessor with God for his people. “Who is he that intercedes with Him (Allah) save by His leave?” (2:255). The passage suggests that someone will be allowed to intercede and surely the most likely candidate for that is “the best of all creatures”. This theme became extremely important. A popular prayer (du‘ā’) goes, “O God, appoint our lord Muhammad as the most trusted of speakers … and the first of intercessors . . . and cause him to intercede acceptably for his nation and his people, with an intercession in which the first and the last are included.” (Padwick, 42)

Muhammad was also a miracle worker. While the Qur’an is seen as the most important mira- cle attesting his status as a prophet, and some would say it is the only one, other miracles have been attributed to him or connected with him and have been important in popular piety. Here are some, in some cases said to be connected with passages from the Qur’an. When his mother was pregnant with him a light went forth from her womb by which she could see distant pal-

Figure 6.1 The Prophet’s mosque in Medina. (Courtesy Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA)

Part II: Aspects of Islam 6 | The Prophet Muhammad

aces. At his birth the palace of the Persian shah was cracked and the fires in the Zoroastrian temples went out. When he was young, angels opened up his chest, washed his heart and re- moved a black spot from it (Q 94). He split the moon at the demand of the Meccans (Q 54:1). When he and Abu Bakr were traveling from Mecca to Medina during the Hijra, they hid in a cave and a spider wove a web across the opening, putting his enemies off the scent. It is be- lieved that Muhammad still appears to people in dreams and any such dream is veridical be- cause Satan cannot assume Muhammad’s form.

Particularly important is the Night Journey (isrā’) and Ascent to Heaven (mi‘rāj), said to be al- luded to in the Qur’an (17:1 and possibly 53:13–18). According to the traditional account this happened during the year before the hijra, when things were going badly for Muhammad since he had lost his wife, Khadija, and his uncle and protector, Abu Talib. He was carried, along with the angel Gabriel, by a miraculous animal, called Buraq, from Mecca to Jerusalem, where he prayed with Abraham, Moses, Jesus and other prophets. He then ascended through the sev- en heavens where, after a look at hell, he met various prophets at different levels and finally was taken into paradise. It is debated whether this was a physical event or more of a dream vi- sion. ‘A‘isha is reported to have said that Muhammad’s body never left his bed but many take the event as physical. Mystics, and perhaps also Dante, have found in it a model for their own spiritual ascent. (Link on isrā’ and mi‘rāj)

It has also been held that there is prophetic Light that passed from prophet to prophet, begin- ning with Adam and coming finally to Muhammad (for Shi‘is it continues through the Imams). It is said that it was visible on the forehead of his father before he was conceived. Muhammad came to be seen by many as a manifestation of the Perfect Man (insān kāmil) or the Essence of Muhammad (ḥaqīqa Muḥammadiyya), a cosmic principle linking the world with God, something like the logos in Greek philosophy and Christian theology, and it was with this that some of the later mystics sought union. A hadith says, “He was prophet when Adam was still between water and clay.” Nevertheless, he never ceases to be the servant of God.

These various themes appear in poems of praise composed in honor of the prophet. Two of the best known are the “Mantle Poem” (Burda) composed in Arabic by al-Busiri (d. 1294), which he is said to have written after having a dream in which the prophet threw his mantle over him, and the “Noble Birth” (Mevlid-i Sherif), composed in Turkish by Suleyman Chelebi (d. 1421). Both are recited on the occasion of the mawlid, the Prophet’s birthday, a major celebration for most Muslims (see chapter seven), as well as on other occasions. A few passages from the “Noble Birth” will illustrate their contents.

“On [Adam’s] brow first God set the Light of Prophets, Saying: This Light belongs to my Beloved. Long years the Light shone there, nor ever wavered, Until the prophet’s earthly life was ended.

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[The Light passes in order to Eve, Seth, Abraham and Ishmael]

“From brow to brow, in linkèd chain unbroken, The light at last attained its goal, Muhammad. The mercy of the worlds appeared, and straightway To him the Light took wing, its journey ended.

“Know first that never did that sacred body Cast shadow on the earth, not e’en at noonday The Friend of God in twain the moon divided, Though he but gestured towards it with a finger.

[During the mi‘raj, God offers to grant Muhammad’s wishes. Muhammad says:]

“What shall become of these thy halting people, How shall they find their way into thy presence? By night and day their deeds compass rebellion; I fear lest the Abyss should be their portion. O Majesty, this is my sole petition – My people, may they be by thee accepted. From Truth Supreme a loving cry resounded: ‘I grant them all to you, my friend, Muhammad!’”

You are the glass which mirrors my reflection; Your name have I inscribed with mine together. (Chelebi 19–37)

Muhammad is here the friend of God. He is also the beloved of God and the beloved of his followers. As the hadith says, “None of you is a believer till I am dearer to him than his child, his father, and the whole of mankind.” An early mystic, Rabi‘a, said she had no space in her heart for any but God, but a century later another mystic gave this answer when he saw the Prophet in a dream and received the reply, “He that loves God must have loved Me.”

Modernist views: Muhammad as hero Many Muslims in modern times see Muhammad largely as their ancestors did, and these poems of praise are still popular. Others, generally called “modernists”, undertake to depict Muhammad in a way that is congenial and acceptable to the outlook of modern people. This writing is usually apologetic, that is, it undertakes to respond to and refute Western criti- cisms of the Prophet, and of Islam generally, and to demonstrate the superiority of Islam to Christianity and other Western doctrines. This writing generally stresses the worldly more than the supernatural accomplishments of Muhammad. It strongly rejects most or all of the miracles

Part II: Aspects of Islam 6 | The Prophet Muhammad

traditionally associated with him other than the Qur’an, which is one that does not violate the natural order. Revelation tends to be understood as an inward voice or vision, though no less veridical, and the mi‘raj is seen in the same terms. Muhammad, thus, relied essentially on ra- tional persuasion. Since previous prophets all performed miracles, Muhammad represents a significant historical step in the direction of modern rationalism and his religion is best suited to modern rationality. (See chapter fifteen for more on modernism.)

Muhammad is also presented as a reformer who considerably raised the social and ethical level of the Arabs of his time, although his successors did not fully maintain his reforms. He called for equality and mutual responsibility among his followers, and for the abolition of class privilege and extremes of wealth. He is described as calling for social justice and sometimes even for socialism.

Muhammad is often criticized by non-Muslims for his wars and violence and such criti- cism commonly contrasts him, implicitly or explicitly, with the non-violent image of Jesus. Modernists respond that Muhammad’s violence was dictated by the anarchic and violent society in which he lived. Jesus and the early Christians lived in societies with a significant measure of law and order, so that non-violence did not lead to their immediate destruction, as it would have for Muhammad. In fact, his violence was always in response to attack or seri- ous threat. One of the most difficult cases is that of his expulsion of two Jewish tribes from Medina and the slaughter of the third. The reason given in the first two cases is that they were a serious threat and in the third case that they were guilty of high treason when Medina was under attack and that their treatment was no harsher than the standard practice of the time. Finally, Muhammad completed his mission and set up a political community, which could not be done without violence, but at least the violence was controlled by divine guidance. Jesus preached non-violence but provided little guidance for the ordering of society. When society did adopt Christianity three centuries later it drew its laws largely from human and sometimes barbarian sources. This is why Western history has been so violent.

Muhammad is also criticized for his attitude toward sex and women. Modernists point out that far from being oversexed, a long standing Christian criticism, Muhammad lived most of his life celibate or with one wife, who was fifteen years older than he. The many wives he had later were to cement political alliances or to provide for women who otherwise would have had no support. His marriages involved responsibility more than sexual pleasure. In fact, Islam improved the condition of women in Arabia and elsewhere, especially by abolishing female in- fanticide and giving women property rights of a sort that English women obtained only in the nineteenth century. It permitted polygyny (plural wives) out of necessity but it set monogamy as the ideal. The Qur’anic passage that permits four wives says one must be equitable among all of them (4:3) but another passage says this is impossible (4:129). Some say that the second verse effectively prohibits polygyny. Others say that polygyny is allowed in extreme circum- stances, such as when there is a shortage of men after a major war.

Part II: Aspects of Islam 6 | The Prophet Muhammad

Such views have been presented in innumerable writings for more than a century, and include a number of biographies or biographical treatments. The two most popular and influential have been The Spirit of Islam by Ameer Ali (1849–1928), an Indian Muslim community leader, and The Life of Muhammad by Muhammad Husayn Haykal (1888–1956), an Egyptian journalist and politician. Both present the sorts of views described above.

Several writings by major Egyptian literary figures take slightly different approaches. Taha Hussein, the greatest of these figures, tells us that the goal of his book, On the Margin of the Sira (three volumes, 1933–1946), is to inspire the readers and encourage them to take an interest in the Arab heritage but that he is not overly concerned with historical accu- racy. Muhammad here seems to be as much a cultural hero as divinely inspired prophet. Najib Mahfouz (the Nobel Prize winner) presents a symbolic and fictionalised version of Muhammad (under the name of “Qasim”) in Children of Our Alley (serialized 1959, published 1967). Here the humanity of Muhammad is brought strongly to the fore and social justice is the entire content of his message and mission. In ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sharqawi’s Muhammad the Messenger of Freedom (1962) attention is specifically directed to Muhammad as a man rather than a prophet, in part to make him accessible to non-Muslims. His message is present- ed in explicitly socialist terms.

In all of these Muhammad is mainly a human hero. This idea had been presented much earlier by Thomas Carlyle in On Heroes and Hero Worship (1866), where Muhammad is “The Hero as Prophet”. Abbas Mahmud al-‘Aqqad refers explicitly to Carlyle in the introduction to his biography, The Genius of Muhammad (1941), and goes on to say that his book:

… is an evaluation of the “genius of Muhammad” to the extent that it can be affirmed by every man and not only by the Muslim, and by virtue of the love of him diffused in the heart of every man and not of the Muslim only. Muhammad is great because his virtues and exploits are a model that any sincere person would want all people to emulate. (‘Aqqad 7)

Hero seems to be a distinctively modern category for Muhammad. Like a prophet, a hero is great and is a model, but divine revelation is not essential to this role and the hero is not pro- tected from moral flaws. This category is both secular and potentially ecumenical. It seems first to have been used by Westerners, possibly beginning with Carlyle.

Few if any of these biographies recognize any significant flaws in Muhammad. Mahfouz does in passing suggest that “Qasim” was “crazy about women” and drank alcohol and smoked hashish socially, but mostly he is presented as a paragon of honesty, gentleness, fairness and strength. By contrast, Twenty-three Years by the Iranian writer, Ali Dashti (1896–1991), pres- ents Muhammad as a man with very human strengths and weaknesses, a flawed hero. Dashti is particularly critical of the supernatural events that people associate with Muhammad and

Part II: Aspects of Islam 6 | The Prophet Muhammad

he criticizes Muhammad’s use of force and consequent restriction of religious and intellectual freedom.

An even greater exception is the famous, or infamous, novel, The Satanic Verses, by Salman Rushdie. Muhammad here becomes almost an anti-hero and is handled in a “deliberately trans- gressive” way. He is given the name, Mahound, an insulting Medieval Christian label, and, among other things, he wrestles indecorously with the angel of revelation and forces the angel to say what he wants. But Rushdie does recognize the power of Muhammad’s uncompromis- ing “idea” (i.e. Islam), which is clearly fanatical but changes the world and has a place for mercy after victory. This book caused an enormous controversy and earned the author a death sentence (not carried out) from the Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini.

The number of Muslims who share the ideas of either Ali Dashti or Salman Rushdie, or even Najib Mahfouz, is undoubtedly small but probably not insignificant. For most Muslims, though, the words of one of Rushdie’s critics apply: “Say what you will about God, but be careful with Muhammad” (Akhtar 1). While God and the Qur’an have a higher status, it is Muhammad who, par excellence, is the human face of Islam. The point is made by a modern writer in the following words, with which we can appropriately close this chapter,

“It is often asked why love for the Holy Prophet has been made the test of a man’s faith. The answer is quite simple. It is in his august personality that we can know the will of the Lord, His love for humanity, and His view how man should live in this world. In him all those values which our Lord wanted us to uphold took flesh and blood without compromise and without alloy. He has been, therefore, made for us the focus of loyalty because it is through him that we have learnt the true concept of God, the real implication of Tauhid, the role of man, his accountability in the Hereafter–in fact the whole of the religion.” (Muslim 31 footnote)

Key Points You Need to Know Muhammad is a human figure, but more than an ordinary human. •

Muhammad’s • Sunna (words and deeds) is a pattern for human life.

Muhammad’s • Sunna is contained in the hadiths, whose authenticity has been investi- gated by Muslims and Westerners.

Muhammad is viewed as an intercessor by most Muslims. •

Many modern people see Muhammad as a hero. •

Part II: Aspects of Islam 6 | The Prophet Muhammad

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading al-Khatib al-Tibrizi, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd Allah (1963–65) Mishkat al-Masabih, trans. James

Robson, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf.

Ameer Ali, Syed (1965) The spirit of Islam: A History of the Evolution and Ideals of Islam, with a Life of the Prophet, reprint, London: Methuen.

Chelebi, Suleyman (1943) The Mevlid-i Sherif, trans. F.L. MacCullum, London: John Murray.

Dashti, Ali (1985) Twenty-three Years: A study of the Prophetic Career of Mohammad, trans. F.R.C. Bagley, London: G. Allen & Unwin.

Haykal, M.H. (1976), The Life of Muhammad, Indianapolis, IN: North American Trust Publications.

Ibn Ishaq (1955) The Life of Muhammad (Sirat Rasul Allah), trans. A. Guillaume, London: Oxford University Press.

Lings, Martin (1983) Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources, New York: Inner Traditions International.

Muhammad, Ali, (1978) A Manual of Hadith, reprint, London: Curzon Press.

Schimmel, Annemarie (1985) And Muhammad is his Messenger: The Veneration of the Prophet in Islamic Piety, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Williams, J.A. (ed.) (1963) Islam, New York: Washington Square Press.

Web Resource Documentary on Muhammad, with Karen Armstrong. Two hours.

http://freedocumentaries.org/theatre.php?filmid=56&id=879&wh=800x520

Rituals and Ceremonies

In This Chapter In this chapter we shall consider some of the main rituals and ceremonies in the lives of Muslims. Of these the five “Pillars” of Islam are the most important, but we shall also consider some of the “rites of passage” in the life cycle of individuals and the mawlid (birthday) of the Prophet, along with food regulations that impinge directly on Muslims’ lives.

Main Topics Covered Basic matters: • ‘ibadat and mu‘amalat; intention; purity

The Pillars of Islam: • shahada, salah, zakah, Fasting in Ramadan, Pilgrimage to Mecca

Other pilgrimages •

The birthday (• mawlid) of the Prophet Muhammad

Life cycle rituals: birth, circumcision, marriage (and divorce), and death (and • inheritance)

The • sibha or “rosary”

Halal• (permitted) food

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Some basic distinctions and concerns

A fundamental distinction is that between ‘ibādāt and mu‘āmalāt. Ritual actions, especially the Pillars and matters related to purification are considered ‘ibādāt, “acts of worship”. These are duties owed directly to God. In general their forms are fixed and it is not thought that humans can discern the reasons for their de-tails, although some of their benefits can be seen and will be mentioned below. They are sometimes compared to a medical treatment in which the patient benefits without understanding the reasons for the cure. The other category is mu‘āmalāt, duties humans owe to each other. Generally laws relating to society fall in this category. Many Muslims today would argue that laws relating to society are no less “worship” than the ritual actions, since they too are prescribed by God.

Intention (niyya) Essential to all human activity is proper intention. For ritual acts, particularly, one must state consciously and, if possible audibly, one’s intention to carry out a particular act and must keep this intention in mind throughout. The Prophet said, “Deeds [are judged] by intentions and ev- ery person will receive according to their intention.” (Bukhari)

Ritual purity Also essential for ritual acts and for much else in life is ritual purity. This is related to cleanli- ness but is primarily a matter of sanctity. There are several kinds of impurity. Najāsa is caused by coming in contact with forbidden or unclean things such as urine, faeces or blood, pigs or dogs, or alcoholic beverages. For purification the affected parts must be washed. Minor ḥadath is caused by such things as sleeping, going to the toilet, intoxication and touching a member of the opposite sex to whom one is not closely related. Major hadath is caused by such things as seminal emission, sexual intercourse, and menstruation. Minor hadath is purified by ablutions called wuḍū’, which involves cleansing the hands, mouth, nostrils, face, arms, head, includ- ing ears and neck, and feet with water in specified ways (there is some variation in the details among different groups). In certain situations this may be replaced by cleansing with clean earth, called tayammum. Major hadath is purified by a complete bath, called ghusl. These laws of purity may seem strange to outsiders, but they stand as a reminder that sanctity relates to the physical as well as the mental and spiritual aspects of life. In general, Shi‘is have been stricter about purity than have Sunnis.

Part II: Aspects of Islam 7 | Rituals and Ceremonies

The Pillars These include the shahāda, ṣalāh (prayer), zakāh (alms), fasting in Ramadan, and the Ḥajj or Pilgrimage to Mecca. The fact that the obligatory parts of the Pillars are identical for all Muslims, or at least all male Muslims, makes them one of the most important unifying factors for the umma. The Pillars are all mentioned and commanded in the Qur’an but their full forms are found only in the Hadith and details are worked out by the scholars of fiqh (law).

Shahāda The first of the Pillars is the shahada, or formula of witness, which consists of the following words:

I testify that there is no god but God; I testify that Muhammad is the Messenger of God.

This is the basis of everything else in Islam. If a person converts to Islam, they will do so pub- licly by saying these words in front of Muslim witnesses. Those born Muslim will not make this statement in a formal way but will have many occasions to utter and to hear the words. In fact, they will usually be whispered into the baby’s ears just after birth (see below). Like the other Pillars, this one has a personal and a public dimension. It is personal in the belief it expresses but public in the act of witnessing, without which one is not a member of the umma. The precise form of the shahada does not appear in the Qur’an but its two elements appear separately (e.g. 47:19; 48:29). It does appear in the Hadith. Shi‘is add to the two phrases a third, ‘Ali is the walī of God (the guardian appointed by God)”.

Ṣalāh Ṣalāh (often written salat; namaz in Persian and Urdu) is a highly structured form of wor- ship, consisting of specified bodily movements, recitations and prayers that most Muslims are required to perform five times during the day. Salah is prescribed in the Qur’an (e.g. 11:114) but the five times are not specified. It is said that these were given by God during the Prophet’s mi‘raj (ascension). It is to be distinguished from other prayers, which are called du‘ā’. These may be spontaneous prayers but are more often set prayers for various purposes and are also quite important, but in a different way. The exact five times are not stated in the Qur’an.

The beginning of the periods for salah are as follows:

Fajr or ṣubḥ• , dawn

Ẓuhr• , noon time

Part II: Aspects of Islam 7 | Rituals and Ceremonies

Aṣr• , mid-afternoon, half way between noon and sunset

Maghrib• , just after sunset

‘Isha• , evening, when the glow of the sun disappears

Each salah may be offered from the beginning of its period until the beginning of the period for the next salah (except that fajr or subh must be offered from the first light of dawn but be- fore sunrise), but it should be offered as early as possible. Times according to the clock vary with date and place. For example on 1 February 2008 in Christchurch, New Zealand (when it was summer and thus daylight saving time) the beginning times were as follows: 4:47 am; 1:43 pm; 5:41 pm; 8:56 pm; 10:30 pm. In the Muslim world the times for a particular day and locality are published in newspapers and elsewhere. Under certain circumstances, e.g. when traveling, two salahs may be joined together or a salah may be made up later. Shi‘is perform the zuhr and ‘asr salahs together, and also the maghrib and ‘isha. Salah is also performed on various other occasions, as we shall see. Salah may not be offered precisely at sunrise, noon or sunset. This is to avoid any idea that the sun is being worshipped.

As noted, those doing salah must be in a state of purity, and mosques normally have facilities for wudu’. A person does not have to do wudu’ if they believe themselves to be in a state of purity, but it is considered advisable to do so. Salah is obligatory for all except those who are

Figure 7.1 Men prostrating in salah at a mosque in London. (Courtesy Ian Yeomans/ Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA)

Part II: Aspects of Islam 7 | Rituals and Ceremonies

insane or suffering serious illness, women who are menstruating or have recently given birth (as these involve impurity that cannot be removed immediately), and children who have not reached the age of puberty, but children may and should be encouraged to start doing salah from about the age of seven.

Salah may be performed alone or in a group and it may be performed anywhere that is ritually clean, but it is preferable that it be performed in a group and in a mosque. It is obligatory for men to pray the Friday noon salah, called ṣalāt al-jum‘a, in congregation in a mosque, and recommended for women. In fact, until recent decades in most places only men went to the mosque but in recent decades more women have been going to the mosques. When they do go, they usually do salah in a separate room or behind the men. In general Muslims believe that mixing the sexes in worship would be too distracting, as do Orthodox Jews and some Christian groups. While salah in a mosque is always preferable, apart from jum‘a it is usually performed for practical reasons at home or in the work place, either alone or in a small group. Prayer rugs are one way of assuring that an area is clean, but these are not usually necessary. When per- forming salah in public it is usual to place a small object a few feet in front of the person or people praying; it is a serious breach of etiquette for anyone to walk between this object and those praying. Whenever there is more than one person performing salah, one of them must act as prayer leader, or imam. This should be the oldest or most knowledgeable person (see

Figure 7.2 Men bowing in salah in a park in London, during demonstrations in 1980 protesting the Soviets’ send- ing of troops into Afghanistan. The object in front of them is called a sutra; no one should pass between the sutra and the people praying. (Courtesy Hugh Lifson)

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chapter nine). Wherever there is a group, the worshippers will place themselves in straight rows and coordinate their actions by following the imam. The imam will be male unless the praying group is made up entirely of women (but see on Amina Wadud in chapter twenty.)

Shortly before the time of salah the adhān or “call to prayer” is recited in a loud voice by the muezzin (mu’adhdhin), ideally from the minaret but possibly from the roof or steps of the mosque or elsewhere. Today adhan is often recited on television, interrupting briefly the regu- lar programming. The words are as follows:

Allāhu akbar• (God is most great): four times

Ashhadu an lā ilāha illā allāh• (I witness that there is no god but God): twice

Ashhadu anna Muḥammadan rasul allāh • (I witness that Muhammad is the Messenger of God): twice.

Shi‘is may add here: • ashhadu anna ‘Aliyan walī allāh (I witness that ‘Ali is the guardian appointed by God)

Hayya ‘ala al-ṣalāh• (Come to salah): twice

Hayya ‘ala al-falāḥ• (Come to success): twice

Al-Ṣalat khayr min al-nawm • (Prayer is better than sleep): twice, only before fajr salah.

Shi‘is say instead: • Hayya ‘ala khayr al-‘amal (come to the best deeds) twice before all salahs

Allāhu akbar• (God is most great): twice

Lā ilāha illā allāh• (There is no god but God): Sunnis once, Shi‘is twice

(Links to Adhan from Mecca, to Shi‘i adhan)

Just before the salah starts the iqāma (entrance into salah) is said, similar in wording but in a lower voice.

When performing salah one must face the qibla, the direction of Mecca. Mosques have a niche, or miḥrāb, to indicate this. Other buildings or rooms that are used for salah may have a mark indicating the qibla. This includes many hotel rooms today. There are now compasses available to determine the qibla. Otherwise, this must be done the best one can; the salah will be accepted if a serious effort has been made.

The actual performance of salah consists of one or more rak‘as. A rak‘a goes as follows: standing and facing the qibla, the worshipper raises his hands beside his head, states his inten- tion, and says Allahu akbar (God is most great, called the takbīr). He then lowers his hands and says further words of praise to God and recites the Fatiha (opening sura of the Qur’an)

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and another short passage of his choice. He then bows and repeats the takbir and other formu- lae of prayer, and then stands again and says, “God hears the one who praises Him; our Lord, to you be praise.” He then prostrates with his forehead on the ground, praises God, repeats the takbir, assuming a sitting position, and then prostrates a second time saying the same things as the first time. This ends the rak‘a. He then stands for the second rak‘a, which proceeds the same way except that the niyya is not repeated. At the end of the last rak‘a the worshipper re- cites the tashahhud, a set of greetings to God and his Messenger and the shahada in a slightly longer form, and then turns to the right and then the left saying, “Peace be upon you and the mercy of God”. These are traditionally seen as directed to the person’s guardian angels, but also to one’s fellow worshippers and all Muslims. These details will vary somewhat, but not much, depending on particular circumstances and also on the madhhab (school of fiqh, see chapter ten) one follows. Shi‘is usually place a piece of clay from Karbala’ on the ground and touch their foreheads on it in prostration. The precise number of rak‘as varies with the times of day; generally there are between two and four obligatory rak‘as and between two and five sunna (recommended, but generally done) rak‘as.

The noon salah on Friday, called salat al-jum‘a (or congregational salah), in- cludes the khutba, a kind of a sermon. The khutba is delivered from the minbar (a kind of pulpit in the mosque) and has two parts, with the preacher briefly sitting down between them. The khutba may deal with a range of re- ligious and moral topics, and political issues as well, but a considerable part of it is de- voted to quotations from the Qur’an, praises to God and du‘a’ for the Prophet and the umma. Traditionally prayers for the ruler or the state have been included, and this has been an im- portant symbolic recognition of the ruler’s authority. Shi‘is have given less emphasis to salat al-jum‘a and sometimes refused to hold it because they so often question the legitimacy of the existing government. In 1979 the revolutionary government in Iran resumed salat al- jum‘a and gave it particular emphasis, thus underlining its claim to legitimacy. It may be noted that Friday is not a Sabbath, i.e. a day of rest. The Qur’an tells people to go about their usual busi- ness after jum‘a (62:10). There has, nevertheless, been some tendency to attach characteristics of the Sabbath to it, and today it is usually part of the “weekend” (often along with Thursday) in Muslim countries.

Figure 7.3 Pieces of clay from Karbala’ for use in salah. Tehran. The wording on one box says, in Arabic, “Salah is a pillar of religion.”

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The philosopher Ibn Sina has suggested that the actions of salah are based on those tradition- ally followed when in the presence of a human king. It has also been suggested that one should face the qibla as facing the throne of God. Certainly at its most intense salah involves a strong and awesome sense of being in the presence of God. Even at a less intense level it is a regu- lar reminder of one’s faith and one’s moral obligations. Salah, like the shahada, effectively integrates the individual and the social dimension. It is an activity done by the individual and brings the individual face to face with God. But it is normally done along with others in a manner that emphasizes group solidarity. Even if one is praying alone, the whole umma is present by virtue of the fact that one is doing the same things as others and at roughly the same time.

How many actually perform salah regularly as described here? The evidence is that there are, and always have been, a considerable number who do not pray regularly or do not pray at all. There are also those who drift away from it for a time and then return to it. The same appears to be true in a sense for societies. Since about 1970 there has been an increased practice of salah and other Pillars. Even those that do not practice, however, generally recognize that it is an obligation. This is important because, while failure to perform salah is a sin, it is only re- fusal to recognize its obligatory nature that puts one beyond the pale of Islam. This is also true of the Pillars that follow, and generally of the prescriptions of the Shari‘a.

Figure 7.4 Ornate mihrab and minbar at the Madrasa of Sultan Hasan (completed in 1362) in Cairo.

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Zakāh Zakah (sometimes written zakat) is a portion of one’s wealth to be paid each year, in money or kind, as a kind of a tax or charity. The word zakah means purity and part of the meaning is that by paying over part of one’s wealth one purifies the rest of it. All adult Muslims who have a stated minimum of wealth (niṣāb) must pay; on most forms of wealth it is figured at 2.5 percent of one’s total possessions above the nisab. The recipients of the zakah are stated in the Qur’an (9:60) and include the poor and needy (i.e. whose income is under the nisab), new converts, prisoners of war to be ransomed, debtors, those who collect the zakah, travelers, and those laboring “in the path of God”, interpreted especially as those studying and propagating Islam. Sometimes the zakah is collected and distributed by governments and sometimes it is given by the donors directly to the recipients or to appropriate charitable organizations. Zakah is not considered a “donation” but rather something that already belongs by right to the re- cipients. Voluntary donations are called ṣadaqa and are separate from zakah. Taxes to govern- ments (apart from zakah where they collect it) are also separate from zakah.

Figure 7.5 Simple mihrab and minbar in a small “storefront” mosque in a suburban district of Cairo (1977).

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Fasting (Ramadan) During Ramadan, the ninth month of the Muslim year, Muslims are obliged to fast from just before the breaking of dawn to just after sunset, abstaining completely from food, drink, smoking and sexual intercourse. Exempted partially or completely from this are children, the elderly, those whose health will be adversely affected, travelers under certain circumstances, expectant and nursing mothers, and women during menstruation (who must not fast). In many cases the person should make up the fast by fasting a day for each day missed or providing a meal for a needy person (or its monetary equivalent). This also applies to people who miss one or more days for any other reason. Those who are not fasting should not, as a matter of con- sideration, eat in the presence of those who are (this should apply to non-Muslim tourists or scholars!). The last meal before fasting, in the early hours of the morning, is called suḥūr. The breaking of the fast, ifṭār, occurs just before the maghrib salah as people take a small amount of food, such as a few dates or fruit juice, and then after salah have a large meal. Cannons are used to mark the beginning and end of fasting. Today one may hear the cannon on the radio or television. Ramadan nights are joyous and even noisy times with feasting, visiting and en- tertainment. Today there is also special programming on television including religious lessons but also quite secular entertainment.

The coffee houses are open and the streets full of people long past the usual hours. There is a tendency for people to overeat at night, though this is hardly approved, and the less pious often miss the fasting but not the feasting.

Ramadan riddles

Television programming in Cairo is geared to Ramadan, when families tend to be at home in the evening, but the programming itself is not necessarily religious. It includes plenty of the usual advertising and Ramadan serials, which may include spy programs and the like. In the 1980s and 1990s it included programs featuring riddles, of which the most popular one was called “Ramadan Riddles” and featured a luxuriantly dressed female performer who each night would present a riddle to a new contestant, act it out and perform in other ways. These and other developments suggest that Ramadan is being commercialized somewhat as Christmas has been in the West.

Still, it is also a time of heightened spiritual awareness. Special salahs, called tarāwīḥ and consisting of between eight and twenty rak‘as, are performed after the ‘isha salah by Sunnis. Some people spend several days and nights in the mosques (some spend the last ten of the

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month), engaging in study, prayers and other spiritual exercises. It is also common for both mosques and families to arrange a khātima, a recitation of the whole Qur’an by Qur’an recit- ers, in which one of the thirty parts of the Qur’an is recited each night. Ramadan is said to be the month when the Qur’an was first revealed and also the month of the Battle of Badr. It has also been held that the jinn are confined in prison during Ramadan, thus allowing humans to celebrate more freely. Most important is the Night of Power, when the first verses of the Qur’an were revealed. It is described in the Qur’an in the following words:

Behold, We sent it down on the Night of Power. And what shall teach you what is the Night of Power? The Night of Power is better than a thousand months; in it an- gels and the Spirit descend, by the leave of their Lord, with all decrees. Peace it is, till the rising of the dawn. (97)

The exact date of the Night of Power is uncertain; it could be any odd-numbered night from the twenty-first to the twenty-ninth of Ramadan, but is usually taken to be the twenty-seventh. On this night the heavens are especially open to convey blessings and answer prayers.

Ramadan reinforces the sense of solidarity of the umma. Those who are well off experience the hunger that the poor experience more regularly and thus have an increased sympathy for them. A certain fellow feeling also arises when you are hungry and looking forward to the iftar and you know that those in the street around you feel the same way. It is sometimes said that fasting makes people grumpy toward the end of the day but my experience does not back that up. More important, I think, is the sense of victory over one’s lower impulses. By denying the lower self its usual due for a period of time, one demonstrates that the higher self is in control and one strengthens this control. Because of this, along with the fact that fasting is an adult thing, children usually do not need to be compelled to fast but want to before they can be per- mitted to. It is fair to say, though proof is lacking, that more Muslims fast Ramadan fully than regularly perform salah.

During Ramadan the rhythm of society changes and slows down as people’s schedules, in- cluding work schedules, are revised. The Muslim year is about eleven days shorter than the solar year and so all of the festivals come earlier each year in relation to the seasons. When Ramadan falls in the summer the period of fasting each day is longer than in the winter, and the heat of summer makes it an even greater trial. Muslims living in non-Muslim countries face additional problems since society does not adjust to Ramadan and the days are often longer in the summer. These are not insurmountable problems, however. In recent years mod- ernizers have complained that Ramadan reduces production. In 1960 the president of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, declared that economic development was a form of jihad and that the prac- tice of Ramadan should therefore be suspended. Though he was a popular leader, he did not convince people of this.

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Dates of Ramadan of the Western calendar 2009–2015

2009: 21/22 August to 20 September

2010: 10/11 August to 9 September

2011: 1 August to 30 August

2012: 20 July to 18 August

2013: 9 July to 7 August

2014: 28 June to 27 July

2015: 18 June to 17 July

Sources: Internet http://theeid.dgreetings.com/ramadan/ramadan-dates.html http://www.when-is.com/ramadan.asp

The day (or three days in some places) following Ramadan is a festival day known as ‘Īd al- Fiṭr (the festival of the breaking of the fast) or the lesser ‘Id. It is one of two such festivals during the year, the other being ‘Īd al-Aḍḥā, described below. There is a special salah for the ‘Id in the morning, followed by visits to cemeteries, and then parties with gifts for chil- dren and the like. It is a national holiday in some countries. There is also the obligatory Zakat al-fitr, in which each person who can gives the value of one meal as charity. Most Muslims do not accept astronomical calcu- lations for their festivals, so the new moon must actually be sighted for Ramadan to end and the ‘Id to begin. As a result it may be cel- ebrated on different days in different places, since the new moon is often visible in one place and not another.

Fasting at other times than Ramadan is rec- ommended, but not obligatory. These times include a few days in the two months before

Figure 7.6 Mosque of ‘Umar Makram at dusk dur- ing Ramadan. Note that the street is almost empty since people have gone home to break their fast. The mosque is named after an Egyptian ‘alim and com- munity leader during the period between Napoleon and Muhammad ‘Ali (See Figure 17.3).

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Ramadan, the six days following ‘Id al-Fitr, and Ashura (tenth of Muharram). One should not fast, however, on Fridays or ‘Ids.

The Pilgrimage to Mecca, or Ḥajj Every Muslim who is physically and financially able must make the Pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in their lifetime. For most this is the high point of their life. Poorer people of- ten save for a whole lifetime to be able to do it. After completing it they are entitled to call themselves Ḥājj or Ḥajjī, a title of considerable prestige (though involving no financial remuneration).

The Hajj was performed in pre-Islamic times and its rituals are believed to go back to Ibrahim and Isma‘il, who erected the Ka‘ba (or according to some rebuilt it after it had been built by Adam and destroyed in Nuh’s flood). There is a black stone set in one corner of the Ka‘ba that is traditionally believed to have come from heaven. Muhammad reformed the rites, purging them of idolatry, and in his “Farewell Pilgrimage” set the pattern for them for the future. Since then non-Muslims are not allowed in the sacred area, ḥaram, around Mecca. Mecca is sacred space par excellence for Muslims and is traditionally believed to be the center of the universe and the place most in touch with heaven. Here, in particular, one is in the presence of the King of the universe, though one prays to Him everywhere.

Before leaving home the pilgrims must pay their debts, make arrangements for any depen- dants and otherwise settle their affairs. Before the modern period the journey was both diffi- cult and dangerous and could take months for those living far from Mecca. Many died on the way or during the Hajj, but it is understood that one who dies in the performance of the Hajj is guaranteed paradise. Because of modern transportation the numbers making the Hajj have increased considerably. Between 1800 and 1940 from 20,000 to 300,000 made the pilgrim- age each year from outside Arabia. In 2006 this figure was more than 1,200,000. It would be a reasonable guess that today more people make the Hajj than regularly fulfill the obligations of salah or Ramadan.

Before or upon arrival at the border of the haram male pilgrims don a special garb, called iḥrām, consisting of two pieces of white cloth. This symbolizes the equality of all believers be- fore God, whatever their worldly status. Women wear modest garb, often ethnic garb, and do not cover their faces. It has been suggested that the male garb symbolizes the unity of umma and the female garb its diversity. From this point they are subject to certain prohibitions, in- cluding sexual intercourse, shedding blood or uprooting plants. Both before and during the pilgrimage the pilgrims regularly recite the talbiya, usually in Arabic:

Here I am, O God, here I am.

Here I am, You have no associate. Here I am.

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Praise belongs to you, and blessing and power.

You have no associate. Here I am.

When recited loudly by a large number this is most impressive.

There are actually two pilgrimages, the umra or lesser pilgrimage, which may be performed at any time of the year, and the Hajj proper, which must be performed on the appointed days during the last month of the Muslim year, Dhu al-Hijja. Those who do the Hajj usually do the umra before it during the same visit.

The umra includes the ṭawāf, circumambulating the Ka‘ba seven times, touching the black stone if possible. One performs salah at the Station of Ibrahim, from which Ibrahim supervised the building of the Ka‘ba, and one runs between two hills called Safa and Marwa, recalling

Hagar’s frantic search for water for her baby, Isma’il (cf. Bible, Genesis 21:14-21). Near the Station of Ibrahim is the well of Zamzam, which burst forth from where Isma’il kicked his heel into the ground. For the Hajj proper the pilgrims travel on the eighth or ninth of Dhu al-Hijja to Mina, a town about four miles from Mecca, and then to the hill called Arafat or the Mount of Mercy, where they stand from noon till sundown, listening to khutbas and engaging in devotions, including the talbiya.

This “standing at Arafat” is absolutely es- sential; without it one has not performed the Hajj. It looks back to the time when Muhammad preached his farewell sermon here, and forward to the Last Day, when all humanity will stand before God, in whose presence the pilgrims are already stand- ing. The pilgrims then rush to a place called Muzdalifa, where they spend the night, and then return to Mina on the tenth of Dhu al- Hijja where they stone three Pillars symbol- izing the devil and then sacrifice an animal commemorating the fact that when God com- manded Ibrahim to sacrifice his son, Isma’il, He substituted an animal at the last minute. Map 4 Road between Mecca and Arafat

Shepard Map 4

ARAFAT

MINA

MUZDALIFA

MECCA

Great Mosque

Ka‘ba

Mount of Mercy

Pillar of Aqabar

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The pilgrims then cut their hair and may remove their ihram garb. They perform another tawaf of the Ka‘ba and sleep at Mina from the tenth to the thirteenth of Dhu al-Hijja and stone the Pillars again on these days. They return to Mecca before sundown on the 13th, which marks the end of the Hajj, and they perform the tawaf again before leaving Mecca. Most pilgrims then go to Medina to visit the tomb of the Prophet, although this is not required. (Link to account of Hajj with pictures.)

It would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of the Hajj. Besides the spiritual di- mension, which is central, there are important social and political effects. The Hajj not only symbolizes the unity of the umma but also helps to effect it. Here people from all parts of the Muslim world meet and, particularly in pre-modern times, this speeded up the exchange of ideas and information. Some have stayed on in Mecca to study before returning as scholars to their homes. The Hajj gives prestige to the government that hosts it, currently Saudi Arabia. In recent decades the Saudi government has expended considerable money and effort to improve the facilities and organization of the Hajj and some years ago the Saudi King took on the title of “Guardian of the Two Sanctuaries (Mecca and Medina)”. In 1987 there were serious riots when Iranian pilgrims used the Hajj to propagandize their revolution and criticize the Saudis. Muslim governments today generally control the number of people going on Hajj and have some system for deciding who goes. Of particular interest is the Tabung Hajji in Malaysia, which since 1963 has helped people save up for the Hajj and then made the arrangements for them.

Other pilgrimages Pilgrimages are made to other places than Mecca, but these, including the visit to Muhammad’s tomb in Medina, are called ziyāra (visit) rather than Hajj. Jerusalem is consid- ered the third sanctuary after Mecca and has been visited by pilgrims since early times, often on the way to Mecca. A hadith says: “A prayer in Mecca equals ten thousand ordinary prayers, a prayer in Medina equals a thousand, a prayer in Jerusalem equals five hundred.” Visits are also made by Shi‘is to the tombs of their Imams and by Sufis to the tombs of their saints (walis).

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The birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (Mawlid al-Nabi) The Birthday of the Prophet is commemorated by Sunnis on the twelfth of Rabi‘ al-Awwal, the third month of the Muslim year, although the festivities sometimes begin some days earlier. So far as is known, it was first celebrated during the Fatimid Dynasty during the eleventh cen- tury and involved only the caliph and his retinue. In the latter half of the twelfth century it was celebrated by Sunnis in Syria, Iraq, and in Mecca, involving the populace as well as the rulers. From these places it spread through the whole Muslim world. The actual ceremonies and fes- tivities have varied, but generally they include the recitation of the Qur’an and poetry in praise of the Prophet, such as the Mevlid-i Sherif (see chapter three), as well as feasts, processions, fairs, and public dhikrs by Sufis. Because it began more than four centuries after Muhammad, it is clearly a bid‘a (innovation) and has always been opposed by some. This opposition con- tinues today, especially among those influenced by the Wahhabi thinking of Saudi Arabia (see chapter fifteen). Excesses of revelry that sometimes occur have also attracted criticism. Others argue that it is a “good bid‘a” and for most Muslims it is an extremely popular and joyous fes- tival. It is a public holiday in a number of countries. Shi‘is celebrate it on the seventeenth of Rabi‘ al-Awwal, but it is not so important for them.

Life cycle rituals The rituals and ceremonies that mark major stages in the individual’s life do not have the sta- tus of Pillars and vary more from time to time and place to place but many are obligatory and all are extremely important to those involved. Here we shall focus mainly on those that in- volve all Muslims.

At birth the adhan is whispered into the baby’s right ear and the iqama into the left ear, al- though precise practice varies. Both of these include the shahada, as mentioned above. The child is publicly named, usually on the sixth or seventh day, and a sacrifice may be performed. The mother is in confinement and ritually impure for forty days from the birth; after this she purifies herself with a ghusl and resumes her full activity.

Circumcision (khitān) is performed on males between the ages of seven days and thirteen years, depending on local customs. It is often accompanied by considerable ceremony and the child is expected to show bravery in the face of the pain. Although some authorities consider it to be recommended rather than obligatory, it is in the minds of most Muslims extremely im- portant, probably more so than some of the Pillars. Female “circumcision” or clitoridectomy (khafḍ) is practiced in some parts of the Muslim world, such as the Nilotic region. It is more

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rooted in custom than religion since non-Muslims in the same areas usually do it too and it is very weakly attested in the Hadith, while neither form of circumcision is mentioned in the Qur’an. Those who practice it, however, see it as commanded by religion as also as a means of guaranteeing the girl’s chastity. They defend it very forcefully, while reformers and most Westerners abhor it with equal or greater force. Here, as much as with terrorism, we need to seek the empathetic understanding discussed in the introduction.

Marriage is expected of Muslims and there are few who do not marry. Muslim spokespeople often contrast the importance of marriage in Islam with the ideal of monasticism among many Christian groups. Marriages are usually arranged and tend to be between related partners, with a certain preference for marriage between first cousins. The bride and groom may not have met before the marriage or may have had limited contact, but this is changing in modern times. Customs and ceremonies vary but usually involve considerable festivity. The core ceremony is the signing of the marriage contract by the groom and the bride’s walī (guardian, if this is the bride’s first marriage) and the payment of the mahr, a sum paid to the bride or her wali by the groom. Usually half the sum is paid at the time of the wedding and half on divorce or death of the husband. The properties of the husband and wife remain separate but the husband is fully responsible for the maintenance of the family. A man may have as many as four wives at one time if he can support them and, when slavery existed, an unspecified number of slave con- cubines. This is the basis of the large “harems” among the wealthy and powerful of which we read. Financial considerations among other things have made polygyny impossible for many. According to some interpretations a clause may be included in the marriage contract prevent- ing the husband from taking a second wife.

In terms of the rules developed by fiqh, divorce is technically quite easy for the husband, since he needs only to pronounce the formula, “You are divorced”, once or three times depending on the circumstances. There are several variants of this and there are also other forms of divorce. The wife may initiate a form of divorce called khul‘, in which she compensates the husband, often by foregoing the part of the mahr still due her. If a woman is divorced she must wait for three menstrual periods before remarriage, to assure that she is not pregnant from the previous marriage. There are, of course, many legal details surrounding divorce, some of which will be mentioned in chapter ten. The traditional rules have been subject to considerable criticism by modern reformers and many Muslim states have modified them. While legally easy, both po- lygyny and divorce have in practice been subject to significant constraints, not least from the families of the wives involved.

When a person is dying his or her face should be turned toward Mecca and the first part of the shahada recited (otherwise, recited into the ear before burial). Sura Ya Sin of the Qur’an (36) should also be recited. After death the body is washed (this is essential) and wrapped in a shroud. A special salah, called ṣalāt al-janāza is performed, either in a mosque or elsewhere. The body is then carried in procession to the place of burial, where it is buried on its side in the grave with the head facing toward Mecca. These procedures are accompanied by Qur’anic

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and other recitations. They take place as soon after death as possible. It is widely believed that two fearsome angels, Munkir and Nakir, question the deceased in the grave about his faith. Mourning customs vary; generally the full period is forty days but the most intense period is during the first few days. There is often loud mourning connected with death but the strictest do not approve of this.

Inheritance laws are among the most complex of the Shari‘a. A person may leave up to one third of his or her estate as a bequest, and the rest goes by a very complicated formula to specified heirs (who cannot receive any of the bequest). In many situations women receive half the share of men. Muslims often justify this on the grounds that men have the full responsibility of supporting the family. There have been some changes in inheritance laws under modern governments.

Sibha A sibḥa (also pronounced subḥa) or misbāḥa is a kind of rosary, usually with thirty-three beads, but sometimes with eleven or ninety-nine, which is used to count the recitations of vari- ous prayer formulae, such as subḥān allāh (praise be to God) or the ninety-nine names of God. It is also often used in a more secular way to keep one’s fingers occupied.

Halal food There are rules concerning what meat may be eaten (comparable to Jewish kosher rules, but less extensive and strict) that are quite important. These are discussed in a number of passages in the Qur’an as well as in the Hadith and by scholars later. The following passage from the Qur’an gives the main points:

So eat of the halal and good food God has provided for you, if it is indeed Him whom you serve. He has forbidden to you only carrion, blood, the flesh of pigs and that which has been offered to something other than God. But if one is compelled against one’s will and without transgressing, God is forgiving and merciful. (16:114)

Figure 7.7 Funeral procession (janaza) in Cairo (1968).

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This gives the main categories of forbidden food. The Hadith adds beasts of prey and other specific animals have been added by later scholars. Animals that are permitted, i.e. halal, must be slaughtered in a specified way, also called halal. For larger animals this includes cutting the throat quickly with a sharp knife so that the animal suffers minimally and as much blood comes out of the body as possible, saying, “In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate”, as the animal is killed, and pointing the animal’s head toward Mecca. Muslims generally believe that what is not halal is bad for our health and that this is the reason that God forbids it.

The importance of halal food is such that many otherwise non-practicing Muslims, in my ex- perience, will go to great lengths to make sure that their food is halal. Some who live far from centers of Muslim population may have difficulty finding halal meat and become effectively vegetarian as a result. In this age of technology and international trade, halal practice can have a significant effect on the meat industry. In New Zealand, for example, meat export to Muslim countries is sufficiently important so that almost all beef and sheep abbatoirs follow halal practice (since non-Muslim countries will accept halal meat they do not produce non-halal meat). Technological issues have arisen, for example, whether it is acceptable for the animals to be stunned before they are slaughtered in the halal manner.

Key Points You Need to Know A basic distinction is made between • ‘ibadat, “acts of worship” and mu‘amalat, duties to other people.

The body is brought into the ritual life in a major way at several points, e.g. purifica-• tion, fasting, circumcision.

Each of the Pillars has an individual and a social dimension. •

Life cycle rituals are extremely important to people but are less standardized than the • Pillars.

Rules around food (• halal) are extremely important in practice.

The two main holidays, or • ‘Ids, are ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha.

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

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Further Reading Abdalati, Hammuda (1975) Islam in Focus, Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications.

al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid (1983) Inner Dimensions of Islamic Worship, trans. Muhtar Holland, Leicester: Islamic Foundation.

Bianchi, Robert R. (2004) Guests of God: Pilgrimage and Politics in the Islamic World, New York: Oxford University Press.

Fakhouri, Hani (1972) Kafr el-Elow: An Egyptian Village in Transition, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston (especially chapters 3–6).

Fernea, Elizabeth (1969) Guests of the Sheik, Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Kamal, Ahmad (1964) The Sacred Journey, London: Allen & Unwin.

Kaptein, N.J.G. (1993) Muhammad’s Birthday Festival: Early History in the Central Muslim lands and Development in the Muslim West until the 10th/16th Century, Leiden: Brill.

Long, David E. (1979) The Hajj Today, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Von Grunebaum, Gustave E. (1951) Muhammadan Festivals, London: Curzon Press.

Divisions in the Umma and Political Thought

O you who believe, obey God, and obey the Messenger and those of you who are in authority. (Qur’an 4:59)

You will be ruled after me by rulers who are righteous and rulers who are depraved. Listen to them and obey them in all that is right. If they do good, it will tell for you

and for them. If they do evil, it will tell for you and against them. (Hadith, quoted by al-Mawardi)

In This Chapter The major “sectarian” divisions of Islam began in the context of the early political struggles within the umma, and provide an illustration of the importance of politics to Islam. These di- visions were never “merely” political, however. They were about the proper guidance of the umma, that is, the way in which God’s guidance should be mediated to it, and thus they were religious and political at the same time. They were also responses to the fact that social reali- ties did not live up to the religious vision. This chapter will focus primarily on three differ- ent visions of how this guidance should take place, presented by the three major divisions of Islam, Khārijīs, Shī‘īs and Sunnīs.

Main Topics Covered The Khariji movments •

The Shi‘is •

The “Fiver” Shi‘is or Zaydis •

The “Sevener” Shi‘is or Isma‘ilis •

The Twelver Shi‘is or • Imāmīs

The ‘Alawīs, Alevis and Druze: Shi‘i related groups •

The Sunnis: political development and theory •

Persian and Greek contributions •

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Kharijis The word Khariji may be translated “seceder” or “rebel”. The Kharijis included those who broke with ‘Ali when, during the battle against Mu‘awiya at Siffin, he accepted arbitration on the question of ‘Uthman’s guilt. They held that ‘Uthman’s guilt was clear from the Qur’an and thus should not be arbitrated by humans and that ‘Ali had committed a serious sin by ac- cepting this. Their slogan was “ judgment belongs only to Allah”. ‘Ali shortly defeated them at Nahrawand but movements based on their ideas mounted serious opposition to the existing governments for about two centuries.

They accepted the validity of the caliphates of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, and part of ‘Uthman’s caliphate, but not that of ‘Ali or of the Umayyads or Abbassids. They held that the imām (the leader of the umma) should be the most pious and capable free person in the umma, whatever his ancestry or family connections, and should be chosen by the believers and receive their unqualified obedience. If he commits a major sin (as ‘Ali was thought to have done), however, he should be deposed. Most Khariji groups separated themselves from the rest of the commu- nity and believed they were the only true Muslims. The strictest of them, the Azraqis, held that people who did not make hijra to them (i.e. join them) were kafirs and should be fought and killed. Their attacks have been described as terrorism. A bit more moderate were the Najdis, who ruled part of Arabia for a time in the late seventh century and viewed outsiders as hypo- crites, but not to be killed. There were also some who lived among non-Kharijis and practiced taqiya (i.e. hid their identity, see Glossary and below). Some believed that there might be more than one imam in different places, while others held that an imam was not absolutely neces- sary. A moderate group, the ‘Ibadis, continue to this day in Oman, where they are the majority of the population. Small groups are also found in Tunisia, Algeria and Tanzania.

Since they were extremely disruptive in the early centuries the word Khariji is a term of abuse for most Muslims, suggesting fanaticism and violence. Apart from the survivals of the early movement, there is a continuing tendency that can be labeled Khariji with some justification though it does not so label itself. Movements such as the Wahhabis in Arabia in the eighteenth century and many of the violent movements of the later twentieth century might be included. In fact, the latter are often labeled Khariji by their critics. One such movement was popularly labeled Takfīr (judging someone to be a kafir) and Hijra, both terms evoking features of the Khariji movement (see chapter seventeen).

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Shi‘is The name Shi‘i derives from the term shī‘at ‘Alī, party of ‘Ali. There are three main groups, the “Fivers” or Zaydis, the “Seveners” or Isma‘ilis and the “Twelvers” or Imamis, each with its own response to the issue of guidance.

In contrast to the common view that Muhammad did not appoint a successor, Shi‘is believe that he did in fact appoint ‘Ali as his successor a few months before his death at a place called Ghadir Khumm. His leadership was justified also by his character and the fact that he was the Prophet’s nearest male relative. When ‘Ali was passed over first for Abu Bakr and then for ‘Umar and ‘Uthman, he remained silent for the sake of the unity of the umma. In the view of most Shi‘is they were, however, usurpers and under them the umma declined morally, whatev- er its material success. ‘Ali, in his brief caliphate, was not able to stem the tide. ‘Ali designated his eldest son, Hasan, as his successor, but, in the face of Mu‘awiya’s greater power, Hasan decided to stand aside so as to avoid useless bloodshed. After his death in 669 his brother, Husayn, succeeded him as rightful Imam. The actions of Mu‘awiya’s son and successor, Yazīd, caused him to set out from Mecca, where he was living, with a band of seventy-two followers, to help the people of Kufa, in Iraq. They were intercepted at a place called Karbalā’ by a large army sent by Yazid and were completely annihilated. This event, which took place in 680, has echoed down the centuries for Shi‘is (and for others to some extent). Husayn has been viewed as sacrificing himself for his people and making a stand against oppression. The few survivors included his sister Zaynab, who along with ‘Ali’s wife, Fatima, is viewed as a model of female courage and devotion in the face of adversity, and Husayn’s young son, ‘Ali Zayn al-‘Ābidīn (or al-Sajjād), who became the fourth Imam and who led a life of pious seclusion. According to most Shi‘is an Imam is a son of the preceding Imam, except in the case of al-Husayn, and must be designated (naṣṣ) by him.

“Fivers” or Zaydis At this point the lines of Shi‘i Imams diverge, as different groups recognize different suc- cessions. In 740 Zayd, one of the sons of ‘Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin was killed in one of the many revolts against the Umayyads, but his movement continued and in 913 one of his successors established a state in the Caspian area that lasted for over a century, while another state was established in Yemen from about 897 and lasted with interruptions until 1962. Zaydis consider Zayd the fifth Imam but after him no specific lineage or designation is required for an Imam beyond being a descendant of ‘Ali and Fatima, nor is there a continuous line of Imams. An Imam gains his position by demonstrating knowledge in religious matters and by his ability to lead a revolt against unjust (i.e. non-Shi‘i) authorities, and Zaydis are obligated to follow him when he appears.

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“Seveners” or Isma‘ilis Most Shi‘is recognize a different fifth Imam, Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 732–743) and recognize Ja‘far al-Sadiq (d. 765) as sixth Imam. Both were known as scholars and Ja‘far was the found- er of the Twelver Shi‘i school of fiqh (see chapter ten). Isma‘ilis consider Ja‘far’s son, Isma‘il, to be the seventh Imam and a line of Imams continues from him to present time, though there is some question (in the minds of non-Isma‘ilis) about the succession at certain points. These Imams have sometimes been in concealment (satr), including Isma‘il’s immediate succes- sors, and sometimes visible. When concealed there has been a visible spokesman, called ḥujja (proof), and under him dā‘īs (propagators, missionaries), who have led the movement in particular areas. Isma‘ilis led several violent revolutionary movements between the tenth and thirteenth centuries, including the Qarmati movement in Bahrain, the Fatimid movement in Tunisia and then Egypt, and the Nizārī movement, so called “Assassins”, in Syria, Iraq and Iran, which arose from a split in the Fatimid movement. The Nizaris, known to their opponents as Batinis (esoterics), went through several major doctrinal transformations – one Imam pro- claimed a spiritual resurrection and the end of the Shari‘a but this was reversed by a later one – before the basis of their power was destroyed by the Mongols in 1256. For some centuries afterwards they survived taking the form of a Sufi tariqa, appearing openly again in the nine- teenth century when their leader shifted to Bombay. Today they are a prosperous and peaceful community spread worldwide, and their leader, claiming descent from Isma‘il, is known as the Aga Khan. (Link for more on Isma‘ili history)

For Isma‘ilis the truth is mediated by the Imam, who provides an esoteric interpretation of the scripture that yields an elaborate cyclical doctrine of the cosmos and of human history. This teaching is given most fully to those at the highest level, who are able to receive it, while oth- ers receive a more exoteric teaching. In practice Isma’ilism stimulated intellectual speculation, and Isma‘ilis developed doctrines considerably influenced by Hellenistic philosophy and other pre-Islamic traditions, through which they saw themselves as sharing in the secrets of the uni- verse. They practiced taqiya, prudent dissimulation. For Twelvers this means the obligation to hide their identity as Shi‘is or aspects of their belief when these would put their community in danger of persecution, but for Isma‘ilis it also means that the initiate is not to reveal the teach- ings to outsiders or even to other Isma‘ilis who are at a lower level of initiation.

“Twelvers” or Imāmīs The Twelvers were the last group of Shi‘is to develop a clear identity, but they are by far the largest group today. They recognize a different son of Ja‘far, Mūsā al-Kāẓim (d. 799), as the seventh Imam and his son, ‘Alī al-Riḍā (d. 818), as the eighth. The latter was actually designat- ed by the Abbasid caliph, al-Ma‘mūn, as his successor, but he died before al-Ma’mun. His sis- ter, Fāṭima Ma‘ṣūma, is revered in her own right and her shrine in Qom is the most important one in that city. The next three Imams were Muhammad al-Taqī (d. 835), Muhammad al-Hādī,

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or al-Nāqī (d. 868), and Ḥasan al-Askarī (d. 872). All of these suffered persecution and all of them, indeed all eleven Imams according to Twelvers, were murdered by the ruling powers. According to Twelvers Hasan al-Askari left a young son, Muhammad, who immediately went into hiding, called the Minor Occultation (ghayba) and communicated with his followers only through four successive deputies. In 939 this communication ended and it was announced that he had entered into the Major Occultation and would no longer communicate with humanity until he reappears as the mahdi, when he “will fill the earth with equity and justice as it was filled with oppression and tyranny” (Tabataba’i 211). Meanwhile, he continues to be the Imam of This Age and the rightful ruler and teacher of humankind. Thus, apart from ‘Ali none of the twelve Imams actually ruled, although they were the rightful rulers of the umma. They did teach their followers, however, and these teachings are authoritative, indeed are at the same level as the Prophet’s teaching, since they were protected from error (ma‘ṣūm). The Imams, along with Muhammad and Fatima the wife of ‘Ali, are called the fourteen ma‘sums. They also have a high cosmic status and have access to esoteric knowledge, though esotericism is not carried as far as with the Isma‘ilis.

Implicit in their story is a pessimistic view of history and a quietist attitude toward politics. The umma went seriously astray as soon as the Prophet died and then from bad to worse after that, finally reaching the point where the world was no longer a fit place for the pure Imam. It is left for the true believers to worship God, cultivate devotion to the Imams, elaborate theo- logical and legal doctrines and wait expectantly for the mahdi, practicing taqiya when neces- sary. In compensation they know that by following the Imam of the Age they are the true be- lievers. It has also been a practice to curse the first three caliphs as usurpers, though this seems less common today.

In the absence of the Imam’s leadership there would seem little scope for political action. In practice, though, it has not quite been this way. Only a few years after the Major Occultation the Shi‘i Buyids took charge in Baghdad and remained in charge for about a century. Though they did not remove the Sunni caliph, they did support Shi‘i interests and patronize Shi‘i devo- tion and scholarship. There were other Shi‘i dynasties in Syria and Iraq from 944 until about 1100 that were either Twelvers or sympathetic to Twelvers, such as the Hamdanids. The tenth and eleventh centuries also saw a flourishing of Shi‘i scholarship. Many of the Mongols and their successors were sympathetic to Shi‘ism, and one became Shi‘i (Oljeitu, r. 1304–1317).

With the rise of the Safavid Dynasty in Iran in the sixteenth century Twelver Shi‘ism became the official creed of a major state. The first Safavid shah claimed descent from the seventh Imam and also the status of the “perfect master” and a divine manifestation, claims inconsis- tent with Twelver doctrine, but his successors made the lesser claim of being deputies of the Hidden Imam, who thus became the legitimating symbol of the regime. Thus Twelver Shi‘ism found a formula for effective guidance in politics without the presence of the Imam, though one that could be contested. In fact, the ‘ulama’ also came to claim status of deputy of the Imam, thus putting them in potential, and eventually actual, competition with the shah.

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Twelvers have a number of distinctive rituals and celebrations. For example, they recognize not only the birthday of Muhammad but also those of all twelve Imams, Fatima and others. They make pilgrimages particularly to the shrines of ‘Ali at Najaf, Husayn at Karbala’, the Imams Musa al-Kazim and Muhammad al-Taqi at Kazamayn, Imam Rida at Mashhad and Imam Rida’s sister, Fatima, at Qom, the first three places being in Iraq and the last two in Iran.

Most important are the extremely emotional activities commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Husayn that go collectively under the name of ta‘ziya (consolation). These include dra- matic recitations of Husayn’s story, called rawḍas, and eulogies, which may be done at any time of the year. There are dastas, processions of young men who flagellate themselves to demonstrate their sorrow for Husayn’s suffering and repentence at not helping his cause suf- ficiently. Best known is the “passion play”, called ta‘ziya or shabīh, that re-enacts the events of Karbala’ with such effect that people often virtually feel as if they are witnessing the actual event. (Those who play the villains have sometimes been in danger of their lives!) The proces- sions of dastas and the shabihs are carried out during the first ten days of Muharram, the first month of the Muslim year, reaching a crescendo on the tenth, ‘Ashura, the day of Husayn’s death. The first recorded commemorations of Husayn’s death were under the Buyids, begin- ning in 963. Commemorations also took place under the Safavids. The first recorded perfor- mance of the shabih took place in 1787 and the shabihs flourished under the Qajars in the nineteenth century. The ‘ulama’ are cautious about the shabih because it involves depicting human beings. Husayn was to play a major role in the Islamic revolution of 1978–1979 as we shall see in chapter eighteen. Twelvers also pay khums, an annual tax of one-fifth of one’s net income, half of which is given to the ‘ulama’ as deputies of the Imam to be used for charitable and educational purposes. This is based on Qur’an 8:41 (concerning the Prophet’s share of booty); Sunnis interpret this passage differently.

Three Shi‘i related groups: Alawis, Alevis and Druze There is not enough space to deal with these groups in detail but a brief mention is necessary since they all play a significant role in parts of the Middle East. They all derive from extreme forms of Shi‘ism. ‘Alawīs (or Nuṣayrīs) in Syria and the Alevis in Turkey are quite distinct groups, though their names are different forms of the same word, meaning “follower of ‘Ali”. Both recognize ‘Ali as the highest manifestation of the divine. The ‘Alawis follow the teach- ings of Ibn Nusayr (ninth century) and believe in the transmigration of souls. They currently (2008) dominate the government in Syria. The Alevis derive from the Shi‘i Safavid move- ment in the sixteenth century and are closely connected to the Bektashi Sufi Order. They have suffered considerable persecution at the hands of the Sunnis but are currently undergoing a significant revival. The Druze believe that the Fatimid ruler of Egypt, al-Hakim, who died or disappeared in 1021, was the final earthly manifestation of God. They also believe that human souls transmigrate. They live primarily in Lebanon, where they have played a major politi- cal role. All of these follow an esoteric interpretation of the Qur’an and in general their full

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doctrine is known only to a spiritual elite. All three groups differ in their ritual practices from other Muslims, many of whom do not consider them to be Muslims.

Sunnis It must be pointed out at the beginning of this section that we conventionally use the word “caliph (khalīfa)” when discussing Sunni usage, but the sources actually use both khalīfa and imām with more or less the same meaning, and I will do this here.

The Sunnis are known in Arabic as ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamā‘a (people of the Sunna and the main-line community) and comprise 85 to 90 percent of the whole umma today. They go back to those who sided with ‘Uthman’s supporters against ‘Ali or stayed aloof from the quarrel and who accepted the rule of the Umayyads, whether willingly or with reservations. In time they came to accept that Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman and ‘Ali were all legitimate caliphs and were to be called the Rightly Guided Caliphs (Rāshidūn). In what later became the standard view, the Umayyads were politically capable but religiously and morally very suspect, oppressing peo- ple and governing arbitrarily or by pre-Islamic tribal standards, rather than by the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet. This assessment is probably unfair and reflects the anti-Umayyad propaganda put forth by the Abbasids. They undoubtedly made many decisions on their own, especially since they had a very high view of their position, taking such titles as khalīfat allāh (deputy of God). But they also would have taken into account the sunna of the community as it was then understood, given that later ideas about the Sunna of the Prophet had not yet devel- oped (see chapter ten).

There were many who disliked their actions, including some who openly criticized them, but refrained from rebelling against them. This was in part because of their power, in part because of the disruption caused by revolt, and in part because they at least maintained the political and military strength of the umma. This attitude toward unjust rule was to become typical of the Sunni position (see below). A good example of this attitude was Hasan al-Baṣrī (642–728), a well known ascetic, popular preacher, sometime qadi and fighter in jihad, who was a forerun- ner of developments in both theology and Sufism. He and his followers openly criticized ac- tions of the Umayyad caliphs but did not actively oppose them. They did encourage a spirit of opposition to them, reflected in hadiths such as “A religious man who goes to see a ruler loses his religion”. (Zilfi 28) Some important scholars did cooperate with the Umayyads, however, such as Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 778) and Abd al-Raḥmān al-Awzā‘ī (d. 774), both leading figures in fiqh.

When the Abbasids came to power they made a show of respecting and following the Shari‘a and consulting the ‘ulama’. They appointed qāḍīs who were to make decisions according to the Shari‘a. Their actions, however, were not so different from those of the Umayyads. Their

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lifestyle was more luxurious and the symbols of their authority more exalted. The title “shad- ow of God on earth” was used for them and many later rulers. Some claimed the right to de- fine doctrine or law and all expected favorable interpretations of the Shari‘a from the ‘ulama’. While most ‘ulama’ cooperated with them there were those who refused to. Abu Hanifa, one of the great scholars of all time, would not accept an appointment from them but his disciples did. While the qadis judged by the Shari‘a, the caliphs appointed and dismissed them and de- termined their areas of jurisdiction. The caliphs carved out a separate legal territory for them- selves by establishing Courts of Complaints (maẓālim), designed to hear complaints about qadis’ decisions and branching out beyond this. This is an example of what came to be known as siyāsa (a word that now means “politics” but in this context means “policy”), the right of the ruler to make fairly free decisions in many areas within the wide bounds of the Shari‘a. They were not willing (or able), however, to implement the recommendation of one of their Persian bureaucrats, Ibn Muqaffa‘ (who also made major contributions to literature, see chap- ter fourteen), that the caliph codify the existing laws, formulating on each question the view to which God would guide him.

Beginning in 833 the caliphs instituted an “inquisition” (miḥna) in an effort to force the ‘ula- ma’ to accept the Mu‘tazili doctrine that the Qur’an is created (see chapter eleven). The tradi- tionalists resisted this, led by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who spent many years in prison for his oppo- sition, and the government finally reversed itself about 848. This was a victory for the relative independence of the ‘ulama’, as it became clear that the caliph’s role was not to determine law or doctrine but to administer it, though with some rights of interpretation, particularly in the areas designated siyasa.

When actual power passed from the hands of the caliph to military leaders, amīrs or sulṭāns, political theory had to allow for this while still asserting the importance of the caliph. An example of this can be found in The Ordinances of Government (Al-ahkam al-sultaniyya) by al-Mawardi (d. 1058), which is usually seen as the classic statement of Sunni theory on the caliphate. It was written to support the Abbasid caliph at a time when actual power was wielded by Shi‘i Buyid amirs but it also justifies the existing situation. It makes the following points, among others: The obligation to have an imam to lead the community and guarantee its political existence is known by divine revelation, not by reason (against the Mu‘tazilis and the philosophers) since the authority of the imam comes from God. The imam must have high moral qualities and sufficient knowledge to make independent decisions, soundness of body, prudence, courage and he must be descended from the Quraysh, but he does not have to be the best person available. His duties are executive and do not include interpreting the Shari‘a. He must be chosen by qualified electors, but one may be enough. He may be designated by his predecessor (but it is not clear whether a father may designate his son). There cannot be two imams at the same time (against the Fatimids and the Spanish Umayyads who also claimed the imamate at that time). The imam should not be designated khalifat allah (as the Umayyads were). If the imam becomes unjust he should resign, but no means is specified for compelling

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this. If he is under the control of one of his officials (the actual situation at the time), this is ac- ceptable for the sake of the public good if that person acts according to the dictates of religion and justice. If someone seizes control of a province but recognizes the authority of the caliph (the case of the Ghaznavids at the time) and governs according to the Shari‘a, this also is ac- ceptable, on the grounds of necessity.

Al-Mawardi’s acceptance of the actual situation is carried somewhat further by another schol- ar, al-Ghazali (see chapter thirteen for more on him), who lived two generations later under the Sunni Saljuk sultans. Ideally, he says, the imam should have practical competence, sufficient learning to interpret the Shari‘a (al-Mawardi is less clear on this), piety and descent from the Quraysh. If he lacks the first three but is willing to take advice from the ‘ulama’, he should be accepted since the effort to overthrow him would cause social disruption and since without an imam all public activities are invalid. He may be chosen by the previous imam or by someone with actual power, such as a military leader. What this meant in practice was that the Saljuk sultan ruled and chose or at least confirmed the imam while the imam in turn legitimated the sultan’s rule as well as social life in general. Both al-Mawardi and al-Ghazali rely on the juris- tic principle that “necessity makes forbidden things permissible”, though al-Ghazali empha- sizes it more and seems more comfortable with the situation.

In 1256 the Mongols captured Baghdad and effectively ended the Abbasid caliphate, although an Abbasid line continued in the court of the Mamlukes in Cairo and was recognized by some. Its authority was supposedly passed on to the Ottomans when they took over from the Mamlukes, but few people knew of or accepted all of this until the Ottomans began to make something of it in the nineteenth century (see chapter sixteen). Also, some rulers took the title amīr al-mu’minīn (commander of the faithful), traditionally associated with the caliphate, to emphasize their commitment to the Shari‘a. Typical of the position to which many Sunnis came in this situation was that taken by Ibn Taymiyya in his book Siyāsa Shar‘iyya (Shari‘a Based Governance). He makes no reference at all to an ongoing caliphate but he insists very strongly that the actual rulers should follow the Shari‘a. For him the only true caliphs are the first four, a view held by others also over the years. Here the Shari‘a is sovereign and the rulers are meant to be its servants. While criticizing rulers, Ibn Taymiyya does not advocate rebellion against them (see chapter thirteen).

Thus the Sunni position came to be that a ruler, caliph or otherwise, is legimated by seeing that the Shari‘a is implemented, though this implementation was never complete. Siyasa should be subordinated to the Shari‘a but often has not been. He is also legitimated by his success in gaining power, since it is assumed that this success is granted by God. The manner of choos- ing the ruler is therefore less important and, in fact, often has happened by force, though the desirability of a Qurayshi imam was usually maintained in theory. If the rulers are unjust but at least remain outwardly Muslims and protect society and its institutions, one should be very slow to rebel against them. The Prophet is quoted as saying, “Thirty years of tyranny are better than one day of anarchy.” With the occultation of the Twelfth Imam the Twelver Shi‘i position

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came to be almost the same for practical purposes, although with more potentiality to delegiti- mate the ruler.

Persian and Greek contributions From the later Umayyad period onward both Iranian and Greek thinking influenced Muslim ideas about government. The mazalim courts, mentioned above, were derived from the Sasanian administrative tradition. The well known saying, “The sultan (authority; later, the one who exercises it) is the shadow of God on earth” is ascribed to the Prophet but is certainly Iranian in origin. The “shadow of God” appears to be connected with the Iranian idea of a divine effulgence (khawarneh or farr) granted by God to the one He chooses to be king. The Iranian courtiers believed that this power had passed from the Sasanians to the Muslims in the time of ‘Umar and Muhammad took pride in the fact that he had been born during the time of Khusraw Nushirvan, one of the greatest of the Sasasian kings. There is a genre of literature known as “mirrors for princes” that provides moral and practical advice for rulers. In this lit- erature pre-Islamic Iranian kings regularly appear as examples of just rule. Muslim and Greek rulers and philosophers also appear. It is said that the Iranian kings ruled for many centuries, though they were unbelievers, because they were just, and the conclusion is drawn that a realm can survive unbelief but not injustice. One such book is ascribed to the Saljuk wazir, Nizam al-Mulk and another to al-Ghazali. Both have been translated into English.

Greek ideas, such as that of the philosopher king in Plato’s Republic, mediated through the later Hellenistic traditions, were taken up and Islamicized by philosophers such as al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Al-Farabi, in his book entitled The Opinions of the Dwellers in the Virtuous City, says that a ruler should be to the polity as the mind is to the body or God is to the world. He argues that the best polity is one ruled by a prophet or a philosopher whose intellect is fully developed and in direct contact with the Active Intellect (the supramundane source of knowledge, see chapter thirteen). Failing these the polity should be ruled by a philosopher or philosophers of lower stature who follow the laws established by the earlier rulers. A polity not ruled by a philosopher will not long retain its excellence. Both the Greek and Iranian visions emphasize strong leadership and have a hierarchical view of society.

A thinker who drew on the philosophical tradition and on the tradition of historiography that had developed among Muslims, but added a distinctive approach of his own, was Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406). In the Introduction (Muqaddima) to his massive universal history he seeks to show the pattern underlying political and social events. A state or dynasty is based on the ‘aṣabiyya, group feeling or solidarity, of the ruling group. A group with strong ‘asabiyya will establish state but then, in a process that includes the absolutism of the ruler and the enjoyment of luxury by the ruling class, its ‘asabiyya decreases and it is eventually defeated and replaced by another group. This is the “natural” pattern. If a state is based on a shari‘a bought by a

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prophet it will be stronger – this is the best kind state – but it still needs ‘asabiyya and is still subject to its laws. This theory provides a largely “secular” explanation of the course of history and thus Ibn Khaldun has been considered by many to be one of the founders of modern social science. Ibn Khaldun, of course, considered God to be in control of “secular” history.

Key Points You Need to Know The main divisions in Islam began and to some extent continue to be over “political” • issues, but these are also religious issues since they concern the manner in which God guides the umma. They illustrate the close relation between religion and politics in Islam.

All groups have had to find a balance between the desire for an ideal ruler and the ac-• tual situations in which they lived.

Kharijis have most insisted that the actual ruler be ideal. Their movement has not pros-• pered numerically but a “Khariji” tendency has always been present.

Twelver Shi‘is have located the ideal • Imam outside the worldly domain and have tend- ed to be pessimistic about worldly politics, although they have often seen the ruler as the representative of the Imam.

Sunnis came to recognize three bases for a ruler’s authority: his actual power, however • acquired, because he would not have it if God had not willed it; his maintenance of or- der in society; his recognition of the Shari‘a and implementation of at least part of it.

Sunnis have seen the period of Muhammad and the first four caliphs as enshrining • the ideal of government. Some have believed that the true caliphate ended with them. Others hold that it continued in less perfect form until the Mongol capture of Baghdad. Others believe that it continued until the end of the Ottoman period.

Persian and Greek contributions have generally strengthened the ideal of an autocratic • and divinely guided ruler.

Ibn Khaldun developed a theory of political development based on the idea of • ‘asabiyya

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

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Further Reading Al Mawardī (1996) The Ordinances of Government, trans. Wafaa H. Wahba, London: Garnet

Publishing.

Ann K.S. Lambton (1981) State and Government in Medieval Islam, New York: Oxford University Press.

Black, Antony (2001) The History of Islamic Political Thought from the Prophet to the Present, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Crone, Patricia (2004) God’s Rule: Government and Islam, New York: Columbia University Press.

Halm, Heinz (1994) Shiism, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Malekpour, Jamshid (2004) The Islamic Drama-Ta‘ziya, London: Frank Cass.

Momen, Moojan (1985) An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Nizam al-Mulk (1960) The Book of Government or Rules for Kings, 2nd ed., trans. Hubert Darke, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Tabataba’i, A.S.M.H. (1977) Shi‘ite Islam, 2nd ed., Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Scholars and Learning

The scholars (‘ulamā’) are the heirs of the prophets. (Bukhari)

In This Chapter It is frequently said that there are no clergy in Islam. This statement is true in some respects but is probably more misleading than helpful. To be sure, there is no group ordained to a sac- ramental function in the manner of Christian clergy but there is a class of people who have a status and functions similar to clergy, though they are more like Orthodox Jewish rabbis than Christian clergy. They are also similar to lawyers in many respects. These are the ‘ulamā’. In this chapter we will consider their some of their various roles and activities, especially in rela- tion to worship and education.

Main Topics Covered Who are the • ‘ulama’?

Their role in the mosque •

Education and learning •

‘• Ulama’ and government

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Who are the ‘ulama’?

The Arabic word ‘ulamā’ means “those who know” and the singular is ‘ālim. The usual English translations are “scholars” or “the learned”. Another term for members of this group is mullah, especially in Iran and in South Asia. The most important functions of the ‘ulama’ relate to interpreting Islamic law and will be discussed in the next chapter. Other functions have included theology (kalam), teaching, leading prayer (as imams) and preaching in mosques, serving as government offi- cials, supervising trusts and acting as guardians, notaries and scribes. In this chapter we will consider some of their roles related to the mosque and then discuss at greater length their edu- cation and their relation to government, the latter having been dealt with to some extent in the previous chapter.

We will be dealing with institutions and practices that have changed and developed over a pe- riod of about a thousand years and have also varied from place to place, but change was com- paratively slow until modern times. While this chapter cannot take account of all of the varia- tions it can generalize about many things without being too misleading. Modern times have seen considerable change, however, and some of this is described at the end of the chapter.

The mosque The central role for ‘ulama’ in the mosque is that of imam, the leader of salah, particularly the Friday noon salah. This role may be carried out by any Muslim but preferably by a trained scholar. Mosques will usually have a designated imam and where possible he will be salaried, either by the government or by an association. Other functions connected with worship are that of the khaṭīb, who gives the Friday khuṭba or sermon, the wā‘iẓ, who gives sermons and teach- es on other occasions, the qāri’, who recites the Qur’an, not only in the mosque but elsewhere, and the muezzin (mu’adhdhan), who gives the adhan, the call to salah. In most mosques one or two people would carry out these functions. Only in the largest mosques would there be separate individuals for each. The imam will usually carry out teaching activities for the peo- ple who attend the mosque and also ritual functions such as those connected with marriages and funerals.

Note that the word imam has at least four distinct usages: the one given here; its use for the twelve Imams recognized by Shi‘is as the rightful leaders of the umma; its use by Sunnis as a synonym for caliph; its use as honorific for great scholars, such as Imam al-Ghazali, Imam Ibn Taymiyya and others.

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Education Primary level education through most of Islamic history was carried out by schools known as kuttābs or maktabs. In Western writings they are often called Qur’an schools. They began be- fore the end of the first century Hijri and in form may have been developed from pre-Islamic teaching arrangements among the Arabs or Byzantine schools but their content was purely Islamic. The kuttab might be located in a room connected to a mosque or in some other place. There was a teacher (shaykh), one or two assistants and usually a small group of students aged from four to around ten. The students were usually boys but sometimes girls also studied. The main activity was the recita- tion and memorization of the Qur’an, along with reading and writing and possibly some arithmetic or other subjects. Typically, each student would have a slate on which the passage to be learned would be written and he would recite and memo- rize it. When he had finished, the old passage would be wiped off the slate and a new passage written on it. Each student would proceed at his own pace and recite what he had memorized to the shaykh or assistant. When the student had memorized a certain amount there would be some sort of recognition and/or reward, but there was no diploma or formal gradua- tion. Students would stay at a kuttab for as long or as short a time as interest and circum- stances dictated. Only a few would go on to become ‘ula- ma’ and there was no organic connection between this level of education and the next.

Figure 9.1 Kuttab Sabil of ‘Abd al-Rahman Katkhuda , Cairo, eighteenth century. The upper story was a kuttab and the lower part a public drinking fountain.

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The shaykh was supported by fees or donations from the parents and these would often vary with the parents’ circumstances. In general, teaching in a kuttab was a low status activity and many of the shaykhs were poorly qualified. The stress on memorization follows from the na- ture of the Qur’an as a sacred text meant to be recited. The student would benefit from the baraka of the Qur’an even if he did not understand its meaning, and in any case it was consid- ered pedagogically appropriate first to memorize a text, to implant it in the heart, and then to learn its meaning. This emphasis on memorization, the prominence given to oral recitation as- sisted by writing and the relatively unstructured and individualistic approach to teaching also characterized the traditional higher level institutions, though to a lesser degree.

Modern reformers have been very hard on the kuttabs, depicting them as dirty, ill-resourced, ill-taught, disorganized and backward in method. Over the last century kuttabs in many places have been replaced by Western-style elementary schools, which include the teaching of religion but stress secular subjects. For over a millennium, however, they met the needs of Muslim peoples.

The sciences and higher level teaching The “religious sciences” are Qur’anic interpretation, Hadith, fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh, and some- what later and problematically, theology (kalām or ‘ilm al-tawḥīd). Various language-related subjects such as grammar and rhetoric and some literature, especially poetry, were seen as necessary for these. The study and teaching of these began with informal circles in mosques or in homes, as almost an inevitable concomitant of piety. They became institutionalized later on but never completely so.

Interpretation of the Qur’an began with the Prophet himself and his immediate followers, as teachers were sent to teach the Qur’an to particular groups or tribes. The Hadith movement be- gan at the same time according to most Muslims but perhaps a century later according to most non-Muslim scholars. As mentioned in chapter six, scholars often traveled considerable dis- tances to hear hadiths from those who knew them. Teaching circles were formed dealing with Qur’anic interpretation and Hadith, and soon also with fiqh, language and other subjects. The teachers were sometimes popular preachers known as quṣṣās (story tellers) or were qāḍis.

In about the tenth century khāns, hostels for students studying in a mosque, were built and the mosque-khan complexes became major centers of learning. The next stage was the madrasa, which brought together the teaching and residential functions. In modern Arabic the word madrasa refers to any school, but prior to the modern period it referred specifically to the kind of school described here. The first madrasas were probably established also during the tenth century but began to flourish in a major way in the following century. While the mosque was primarilyfor worship and used, secondarily, for teaching, the madrasas were primarily for

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teaching, though they might have a mosque attached. Teaching in the mosques might focus on any of a number of subjects but madrasas focused on fiqh. The other subjects (those men- tioned above and sometimes others) were treated as ancillary. Both mosques and madrasas, were funded by awqāf (singular: waqf), a kind of trust under the Shari‘a in which property is set aside by the donor and its income used for various pious, charitable and public purposes. Whereas revenues for mosques came under the control of the caliph or other ruler, the awqaf for madrasas gave much more control to their founders. Particularly famous, and forming a model for others, was the Nizamiyya madrasa, opened in Baghdad in 1067 under the sponsor- ship of the Saljuk wazīr, Nizam al-Mulk, who also built others in other cities. Within two or three centuries madrasas spread throughout the Muslim world from Spain to India. One of the most prolific builders of madrasas was Salah al-Din.

These madrasas taught the Sunni form of Islam and were, in fact, part of the effort to spread and establish Sunni Islam against the various forms of Shi‘ism that were active at the time. Individual madrasas usually taught only one madhhab (school of fiqh, see next chapter) but in time madrasa buildings were built that accommodated up to four madhhabs. While the found- ers of the awqaf that provided for these madrasas were frequently rulers or high government officials, the madrasas were not government institutions. Those who founded them did so in their capacity as private individuals and the awqaf came under the rules of the Shari‘a, inter- preted by the ‘ulama’. In fact, the administrators of the awqaf were usually ‘ulama’. There is also another kind of waqf known as waqf ahlī, in which the beneficiaries are the family of the donor and the purpose is to save the family estate from confiscation or division through inheritance.

Initially each madrasa had one professor and about twenty students, although later there were often more of both. Courses usually taught a particular book. The professor would read aloud the text of the book and make comments along the way and the students would take down the text and make notes of the comments. Later copies of the texts became available but the text was still read out and students took notes. Students sought to memorize the basic texts and also to understand them, though they did not memorize the professor’s comments. Professors would also lecture on their own material. When the student mastered one book he would then move on to another. At a higher level students were often expected to produce compilations based on their notes from their teacher’s lectures and also to engage in disputation on set top- ics. Students still proceeded to some extent at their pace although the program was more pre- scribed than in the mosques. When a student had mastered certain texts, the professor would give him an ijāza, i.e. permission to teach that text to others. In some cases the ijaza would permit the student to teach all the subjects the professor taught. Students would seek to accu- mulate ijazas on various texts and from various professors, and in this way qualify themselves to become professors. The personal relationship between the student and his teacher usually became very close though also respectful. (This has been illustrated in recent years by the fact that many of the leaders of the Islamic Republic in Iran have been Khomeini’s students.) The

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ijaza is the closest this system came to offering a degree or diploma. Under this system the line between students and teachers was not always completely clear since a person might be teaching one book and learning another.

In spite of the relatively structured program in the madrasas and the close relations between student and teacher, students still moved around a fair bit, seeking new ijazas in other places and from other teachers and seeking to study under the best and most famous teachers.

It is to be noted that memorization and recitation still hold pride of place in this system al- though understanding is also demanded and writing holds a necessary place at least as an aid to memory. The tendency is still to see memorization of material as a prelude to understanding it. The scarcity and cost of written texts, which had to be copied by hand, is one justification for the emphasis on memory. (One might almost suggest that these students acquired books by memorizing them where we, today, acquire them by purchasing them.) Another is that an ‘alim, when functioning as a judge, will not have to refer to a written manual if he has the manual by heart. Beyond this there seems to be a sense that one has not really mastered a text if he has not memorized it. A scholar has advised: “When you read a book make every effort to learn it by heart and master its meaning. Imagine the book to have disappeared and then you can dispense with it, unaffected by its loss” (Makdisi 89).

Private teaching circles and the mosques continued along- side the madrasa and institu- tions specifically for teaching the Qur’an and Hadith also existed. There were Sufi institutions that also taught fiqh and other religious sci- ences, variously called ribāṭs, zāwiyas, khanqahs. and tek- kes. Philosophy was viewed as heterodox by many and was generally taught private- ly, but there were some teach- ing institutions for it, known as dar al-‘ilm, until about the twelfth century. Some aspects of philosophy were taught to some extent in the madrasas, such as logic and astronomy. Medicine was generally

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taught separately although it sometimes appears in madrasa curriculums. Libraries established by rulers or wealthy men were sometimes made available to scholars.

Higher education was almost entirely a male venture. We hear occasionally of female students and of female teachers, though probably not often located in madrasas. Ibn Arabi and Ibn Taymiyya had female teachers. We also hear of women endowing madrasas.

In Java, and in other parts of what is now Indonesia and Malaysia, madrasas were commonly connected with communal boarding schools known as pesantrens. These were usually located in rural areas and served their communities. They gave consideration to Sufism and their leaders, known as kiais, were spiritual guides as well as teachers, and were highly respected. Generally a pesantren was founded by a kiai and was not supported by the government or wealthy patrons.

Among the Isma‘ilis schools were established to propagate their version of Islam and these included philosophical subjects. The most famous of these was al-Azhar, in Cairo, which later became a Sunni madrasa and, indeed, the most highly esteemed in the Muslim world as a whole after the Mongol invasion set learning back in so many places.

Learning among the Twelver Shi‘is began with the Imams, who taught their followers, and this teaching function continued among the ‘ulama’, mostly teaching privately. There may have been a Shi‘i madrasa in Najaf shortly after the founding of the Nizamiyya in Baghdad but sig- nificant building of madrasas began in Iran under the Safavids as part of their program to im- pose Twelver Shi‘ism on the populace. The teaching methods and programs have been similar to the Sunni madrasas except that they teach Twelver Shi‘ism and also have more of a place for philosophy. They also have a source of income not available to the Sunnis in the khums tax, distinctive to Shi‘ism, which has increased their independence from the state.

Like the kuttabs, though somewhat less so, the madrasas have suffered in the last century or so from the competition of Western-style high schools and universities. Mostly they have sur- vived with considerable change but they no longer serve the majority of the students in most countries. Often the state has taken control of their endowments, sometimes using the money for other purposes, starving them of resources, as well as exercising considerable control. This happened to the Azhar in Egypt in the nineteenth century, and it underwent state-sponsored reforms in the early 1960s, but it has by no means lost its influence. In Turkey the secular government closed the madrasas in the 1920s and eventually replaced them with theological faculties somewhat on the Western model. In Iran the madrasas were largely marginalized un- der the Pahlavis but kept their independence and played a major role in the Islamic revolution of 1979. In India the most influential conservative madrasa, Deoband, was founded in 1867 in reaction to British influence and continues to be quite important. In Pakistan there were only a few madrasas at the time of independence in 1947 but their number has grown to thousands although their quality is problematic (some may be more like kuttabs) and some are said to be

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training schools for terrorists. In Indonesia pesantrens continue to be strong and have mod- ernized to some degree. They also in some cases now admit women. They form the basis for the largest social movement in Indonesia today, the Nahdlatul ‘Ulama’. In recent years a few have provided a base for terrorists. The state institutes for religious teaching (IAIN, National Islamic Religious Institute) seem not so much to compete with pensantrens as to provide fur- ther training for their students.

‘Ulama’ and government As mentioned in chapter eight, many of the early ‘ulama’ criticized or tried to avoid contact with rulers. There are a number of hadiths supporting this stance, one mentioned in the previ- ous chapter. Two others are “He who accepts the office of qadi is like someone who is slaugh- tered without a knife” (Messic 143) and “Of three qadis two are in hell” (Ibid.). On the other hand there were good reasons for both the ‘ulama’ and the rulers to seek good relations with each other. The rulers had the power to provide both material and political support to the ‘ula- ma’ and their institutions and some of the positions that the ‘ulama’ might fill, such as qadis, were under the control of the rulers. Moreover, while the ‘ulama’ could interpret the law based

Figure 9.3 The Mosque-University of al-Azhar, in Cairo (1977).

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on the Shari‘a, only the ruler could enforce it on society and the ‘ulama’ were concerned that the law be put into practice. From the rulers’ point of view the ‘ulama’ could provide guidance when he sought it and legitimate his actions in the eyes of the people and urge them to obey the ruler. On the other hand, the ‘ulama’ often acted to bring the concerns of the people before the ruler. The ‘ulama’ rarely had anything more than moral power to bring to bear on the rulers but this could be quite effective at times. An interesting combination of the ideals of non-in- volvement and involvement is found in the following statement ascribed to Sufyan al-Thawri, one who did cooperate with the Umayyads, “The best of rulers is he who keeps company with ‘ulama’, and the worst of the ‘ulama’ is he who seeks the society of the king.” (Zilfi 227) A particularly high statement of the ‘ulama’ claims ascribed to ‘Ali among others is that, “Kings are rulers over the people and the ‘ulama’ are rulers over the kings.” In brief, the principle was that the ‘ulama’ should advise the rulers and serve as intermediaries between the rulers and the people. Often enough the rulers refused to heed the ‘ulama’ and the ‘ulama’ allowed them- selves to be corrupted by privilege, though if they got too close to the rulers they could lose the trust of the people. In any case the ideal still stood and provided a benchmark for criticism or reform.

The call for abstinence always had an appeal and there were always some who followed it but most ‘ulama’ accepted the necessity and even the desirability of dealing with rulers. Al- Ghazali, for example, quotes in his writings the strictures against dealing with rulers but in fact considered himself divinely commanded to serve them when called to. Ibn Taymiyya’s views got him regularly into trouble with the ruler and into prison several times, but it was not dis- tance from the ruler that he sought but rather the ruler’s acceptance of his unwelcome advice. In fact, as we have seen, the ‘ulama’ of the late Abbasid period were willing to accept, though not approve, considerable laxness on the part of the rulers so long as they kept order and ad- hered minimally to Sunni belief and practice. This has been largely true of the Sunni ‘ulama’ since then.

Although the ‘ulama’ were recognized as a distinct professional group in society they have usually had little in the way of formal hierarchy. Some degree of hierarchy was involved in the government offices held by the ‘ulama’, as suggested by a title like Chief Qadi. Some ‘ulama’ would hold positions considered more prestigious than others but these did not constitute a hierarchy. Some would be highly respected for their piety and learning and the greatest would come to be called imam, such as al-Ghazali, but none of this resulted from formal decisions by anyone.

The main exception to this was the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans very strongly viewed themselves as defenders of the Sunni faith and included the higher levels of the ‘ulama’ into the governing elite, as a distinct corps known as the ilmiye, with distinct duties and privileges. At the top of the hierarchy was the Shaykh al-Islam, who was appointed by the sultan and was the only one who could confirm the deposition of a sultan (this happened in 1807), followed by the chief judges of the major provinces and the professors in the major schools and madra-

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sas. Below this was a subhierarchy of teachers, preachers and judges with less training who were not given the official title of ‘ulama’, with its perquisites, though they can be considered ‘ulama’ under the more general definition. The ilmiye gained considerable political influence and power within the Ottoman government although it stood a continuing risk of suffering cor- ruption. Under the republican government from the 1920s the ‘ulama’ lost their political power but remained under government control and still with a degree of hierarchy.

Twelver Shi‘i ‘ulama’ for some time remained distant from government partly because their doctrine tended to consider all government in the absence of the Twelfth Imam illegitimate and also because the governments under which they lived were mostly opposed to Twelvers. Even though the Buyids gave them support, the situation was ambiguous since the formal ruler, the caliph, was Sunni. Under the Safavids, however, there was a close relationship from the beginning since the Safavids needed the ‘ulama’ to propagate Shi‘ism and the ‘ulama’, being outsiders initially, depended heavily on the rulers, whom they recognized as deputies of the Twelfth Imam. A post called sadr was created and put in charge of the propagation of Shi‘ism, administering awqaf and supervising some of the judges; later the position of mulla-bashi, head of the mullahs, was created. With the collapse of Safavid authority in the eighteenth cen- tury, however, the ‘ulama’ of Iran learned to flourish independent of government connections. They came to serve as important figures of authority at the local level and began to assert themselves vis-a-vis the ruler and this competition continued into the twentieth century, ef- fectively a competition for the role of deputy of the Twelfth Imam. At mid-century the ‘ulama’ were considerably weakened but maintained a greater independence of the state than Sunni ‘ulama’ elsewhere. This resulted partly from their system of jurisprudence, to be discussed in the next chapter. In the revolution of 1979 this competition ended with victory for the ‘ulama’. The issue of ‘ulama’ relations with the state continues, but on different terms.

In spite of popular criticism and even cynicism about the ‘ulama’, as a group they have gener- ally been held in high respect. In the words of a leading scholar of Salah al-Din’s time, “Know that learning leaves a trail and a scent proclaiming its possessor … the learned man is es- teemed in whatever place or condition he may be, always meeting people who are favourably disposed to him, who draw near to him and seek his company, gratified in being close to him” (Makdisi 91).

Key Points You Need to Know The ‘• ulama’ are the learned, who to some extent function as a clergy but have other roles too.

The main teaching and preaching positions in mosques will be held by ‘• ulama’.

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For nearly 1,000 years before modern times the main teaching institutions were the • kuttab, which focused on memorizing the Qur’an and the madrasa, which focused on fiqh.

Memorization played a large role in the educational institutions of the ‘ulama’ but there • were reasons for this.

The ‘• ulama’s relation to government was complex; sometimes they stood aloof and sometimes they dealt with rulers in different ways. Ideally they wanted to advise them.

Although they have often fallen short of the ideal, they have been and are highly re-• spected by the Muslim community.

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading Dodge, Bayard (1961) Al-Azhar: A Millennium of Muslim Learning, Washington, DC: Middle

East Institute.

Makdisi, George (1981) The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Messick, Brinkley (1993) The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Zilfi, Madeline C. (1988) The Politics of Piety: the Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600–1800), Minneapolis, MN: Bibliotheca Islamica.

To Know God’s Will: Islamic law

In This Chapter In this chapter we consider what is the central concern of Islam next to God Himself, that is God’s law, the Shari‘a. We will consider the nature of the divine law and the ways in which Muslims have sought to discover it, but we will not attempt a systematic overview of the con- tent of this law. Aspects of this content appear in most of the chapters of this book.

Main Topics Covered Key terms: Shari‘a, • fiqh

The five Shari‘a valuations •

Usul al-fiqh• (the roots of jurisprudence), the Sunni form

Sunni “schools” of jurisprudence, • Madhhabs

Usul al-fiqh• , the Shi‘i form

Muftis• and fatwas

Brief history of • fiqh, Sunni and Shi‘i

The Shari‘a and popular appropriation •

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Shari‘a and fiqh

We begin by explaining and distinguishing two key terms, Shari‘a and fiqh, neither of which quite correspond to the Western concept of “law”. The word Shari‘a originally means a path leading to water. The symbolism, especially in an arid land such as Arabia, is clear: it is the path God has laid out for us to walk in our lives to reach the waters of true life. The Shari‘a is understood to cover all areas of human life that involve moral choice, since God is concerned with all of these areas. It therefore covers many things, such as worship, that Westerners would not include under the heading of law. In brief, it represents the will of God for human life as a whole.

The word fiqh means understanding, and soon came to mean the practical understanding of the Qur’an and the Sunna that allowed one to apply them to actual situations in life and actual cases that came before courts. From this understanding a body of law was gradually developed and the term fiqh came to refer both to this body of law and to the process by which it was de- veloped. In the latter case it is often translated “jurisprudence”. The experts in fiqh are called faqīhs; they are ‘ulama’ who specialize in fiqh.

The body of fiqh law is often called Shari‘a although strictly speaking this is not correct, since Shari‘a is what God ordains and fiqh is what humans understand. This usage reflects, how- ever, the confidence that the faqihs have been largely successful in discovering God’s law, so that fiqh is indeed the Shari‘a as it is available to humans. Many modern reformers, however, would insist on the difference since they do not consider traditional fiqh adequate for the pres- ent time.

I will sometimes use the English terms “law”, “Islamic law” and “Shari‘a law” (i.e. law based on the Shari‘a), where both Shari‘a and fiqh are involved and where the meaning is clear.

The five Shari‘a valuations If the Shari‘a differs from Western law codes in being more comprehensive than them, it also differs in that it is not so much a set of “dos” and “don’ts” as a moral classification of actions. In principle all possible human actions can be placed in one of five categories (aḥkam, sing. ḥukm, valuations or qualifications):

Obligatory (1. wājib or farḍ). These must be done and God rewards one for doing them and punishes for omitting them. Examples include salah, fasting in Ramadan, zakah, and Hajj, with qualifications in some cases. The obligatory category is divided into two subcategories: individual obligation (farḍ ‘ayn), such as those just mentioned, and

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community obligation (fard kifaya, obligation of a sufficient number). Examples of the latter are performing the funeral salah and becoming a doctor or a teacher. These are obligatory for everyone in a community until a sufficient number have undertaken them, and then the rest are no longer obliged.

Recommended (2. sunna, mandūb, mustahabb). Highly desirable but not required. One is rewarded by God for these actions but not punished for omitting them. For example, Friday noon salah in congregation is obligatory for men but recommended for women.

Permissable, neutral (3. mubāḥ). These are actions to which God assigns a neutral value, neither rewarding the doing of them nor punishing the omission. The means by which I travel between home and work, for example, would normally come into this category. In fact, the majority of actions probably come into this category. Political and govern- mental matters have often been placed in this category.

Reprehensible (4. makrūh, literally “hated”). Undesirable actions that are not, however, forbidden. One is rewarded by God for omitting these actions but not punished for do- ing them. Divorce is the classic example, since the Prophet said, “Of permitted actions divorce is the most hated by God.”

Forbidden (5. haram). Absolutely forbidden. One is punished by God for committing them and rewarded for avoiding them. Among the best known examples are the con- sumption of wine or pork and the committing of murder, robbery and fornication.

One also often speaks of the permitted (ḥalāl) and the forbidden (ḥarām). Here the permitted include the first four valuations above and the forbidden classification includes the last.

The worldly legal effect of an action is sometimes distinct from its Shari‘a valuation. For ex- ample, the most acceptable form of divorce by a man is when he says to his wife, “You are divorced” and waits for three ‘iddas (periods of purity between the woman’s menstruation), at which time the divorce takes effect. Another form, in which the man says “You are divorced” three times in the same ‘idda is forbidden by the Shari‘a but if the man does it the divorce takes effect immediately.

Penalties fall into a different classification. (1) The penalties to be imposed by God in the af- terlife, the most important in this system. (2) A small number of ḥadd penalties, specifically imposed by God in the Qur’an or Sunna. These include cutting off of the hand of a thief or whipping or stoning those guilty of fornication, and a few others. These depend on conditions, such as a minimum amount stolen. (3) Discretionary punishments (ta‘zīr), to be decided by the judge or ruler. The majority of worldly penalties fall into this category.

The system of five valuations is more flexible than may appear from the presentation so far. Which valuation an action is given can depend on a number of factors. For example, consump-

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tion of wine and pork is forbidden, but if in some situation these are the only foods available and are necessary to sustain life, then their consumption becomes obligatory. Performance of the Hajj is obligatory but only if one has the means and the health. Otherwise it would be forbidden. Al-Ghazali in his discussion of music finds that it may have any valuation except obligatory depending on the circumstances (see chapter thirteen).

Usul al-fiqh, the roots of jurisprudence: the Sunni form How does a faqih determine which valuation an action receives? The answer is suggested by a well known hadith:

“The Prophet asked Mu’adh ibn Jabal, when he sent him to Yemen as governor, ‘How will you decide matters that come up?’

Mu‘adh answered, ‘According to the Book of God.’

The Prophet asked, ‘What if you do not find there what you need?’

Mu‘adh replied, ‘Then according to the Sunna of the Prophet of God.’

The Prophet asked, ‘What if you do not find there what you need?’

Mu‘adh answered, ‘Then I will exert effort (ijtihād) to form my own judgment (ra’y).’

The Prophet then said, ‘Thank God for guiding the Prophet’s deputy to that which the Prophet approves.’”

This hadith mentions three of the four usul al-fiqh, i.e. the roots or sources of understand- ing/jurisprudence. The four are the Qur’an, the Sunna of the Prophet, ijtihād and ijmā‘ (consensus).

Qur’an. The Qur’an is the Book of God, and wherever it speaks on a matter of prac-1. tice it must be followed. Only a small proportion of its verses, however, variously estimated from 80 to 500, deal with matters related to fiqh. Quite often it is in need of interpretation. The faqih dealing with the Qur’an needs a number of the disciplines to be learned as an ‘alim, such as the Arabic language, pre-Islamic poetry (for certain rare words), Qur’anic commentary and especially asbab al-nuzul (occasions of revelation) in the case of the abrogation of an earlier verse by a later one, as mentioned in chapter five.

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Sunna2. . The Sunna of the Prophet, contained in the hadith, is the second “root”. As mentioned in chapter six, the Qur’an commands Muslims to obey the Prophet and this is not taken to be limited to his lifetime. Since he is considered ma‘sum (protected from error), sound hadith are virtually on the level of the Qur’an for fiqh purposes. Both are considered naṣṣ, authoritative text. The Sunna both elucidates the Qur’an and deals with matters not covered in it. For example, the Qur’an commands salah but it is the Sunna that gives the details of how to do it. The faqih will need to have knowledge of which hadith are considered “sound” and which are not, although in practice weaker hadith are often used. The words and deeds of the Companions of the Prophet are also important, though they do not have the same level of authority.

Ijtihād3. . This word means “effort” and has been technically defined as the faqih putting forth all of the effort he is capable of in order to solve a case. The person qualified to do ijtihad is called a mujtahid and his qualifications are generallydescribed as learning and righteousness (‘adala). Learning includes a very high level of accomplishment in the various scholarly disciplines of the ‘ulama’. Faced with a novel situation for which the Qur’an and Sunna do not have a complete and clear answer, the faqih uses various methods (see below) to determine the Shari‘a classification of an action. The purpose of ijtihad is not to make law but to discover God’s law, but the mujtahid is not pro- tected from error. A hadith says: “The mujtahid who errs gets one reward; the mujtahid who gets it right gets a double reward.” One who does not have the qualifications of a mujtahid is called muqallid and practices taqlīd, literally “imitation” or “emulation”, following the guidance of past or present mujtahids.

Ijma‘ 4. or consensus. Ijma‘ is understood to occur when all of the leading mujtahids of a particular time come to the same view on a particular issue. This may occur because of the prestige of a particular faqih or for other reasons. Ijma‘ does not happen in the con- text of a council or formal meeting but is recognized after the fact. Over time a particu- lar position on a given issue comes to be recognized as agreed on. Ijma‘ is often justi- fied by the hadith, “My community will not agree on an error”. It is therefore believed to provide certain knowledge of the Shari‘a, unlike the decisions of individual mujta- hids. In Sunni theory the caliphate, for example, is understood to be based on ijma‘. There have been some who accept only the ijma‘ of the Companions of the Prophet but most also accept later ijma‘ (see below).

Continuing 5. ijtihad. Where there is an ijma‘, ijtihad is no longer necessary or possible, but elsewhere it is still needed (some have questioned this; see below on the history of fiqh). There are a variety of methods, some more acceptable than others, that may be used by the mujtahid.

Qiyas a. or analogy. This is the favored method, involving a strict form of logical reasoning. An illustration of the most common form comes from the prohibition of

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wine in the Qur’an. Is whisky then prohibited? The answer is that wine is prohibited because of the effects it has on human behavior (this is called the ‘illa, or cause). Whisky has the same effect or more so (the same ‘illa), so it is also prohibited. What about hashish? According to the faqihs it too has the same ‘illa, and so is prohibited (although many ordinary people have not agreed). What about coffee? Some effort was made to forbid coffee when it first came into the Muslim world in the fifteenth century, but the consensus was for permitting it. The same was true of tobacco in the sixteenth century, though today there is a diversity of opinion due to health issues.

The welfare of the Muslim community, b. maṣlaḥa (or istiṣlāḥ). Where the other ap- proaches give more than one result, the one that is in the best interests of the com- munity should be chosen. In a variant called istiḥsān (preference), if the strictest analogy gives a result that is clearly not in the interests of the community a less strict approach is chosen, though this method has less general approval. In practice many accept a form of maslaha that is unrestricted, i.e. the interest of the commu- nity should be followed even when not supported by the other sources. Thus, as we have seen, later political theory justified allegiance to rulers who were not qualified by Shari‘a standards on the grounds that the disruption caused by trying to remove them would not be in the interests of the community. A wide view of maslaha has been increasingly common in modern times. The problem with maslaha is that the judgment is more or less subjective and different faqihs are likely to see the commu- nity welfare differently.

Ra’yc. , the considered opinion of the faqih, not based on a formal procedure of rea- soning but on his understanding of the situation and his sense of justice. This was the most common approach in the early days but was later rejected as being too arbitrary and subjective. Nevertheless, it has been followed in practice, though not admittedly so.

Three problematic sources:

Devices (d. ḥiyal). Basically, ways of getting around the law. For example, interest on loans is forbidden, but the “debtor” might sell an item to the “creditor” for a given price and immediately buy it back at a higher price to be paid later. This kind of pro- cedure was rejected by many but also in practice used by many.

Custom, e. ‘āda (or adat) or ‘urf, the existing, usually pre-Islamic, custom of an area. In practice this is usually followed insofar as it does not clearly violate the Qur’an and Sunna (and sometimes when it does). It is not usually recognized as a formal source of fiqh but is very important in practice. Custom may be brought under the umbrella of the Shari‘a by being declared consistent with it, possibly put in the mubah category. In some cases, however, it is perceived as separate from the

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Shari‘a, so that people see some aspects of their lives as coming under the Shari‘a and some as coming under customary law. An example of this comes from Aceh, a strongly Muslim part of Indonesia but one where customary law governs much of life. Among other things women receive houses and often land from their family that are exempt from the inheritance rules of Shari‘a law. Another example would be the “honor killings”, when women who violate the rules of chastity are killed to protect family honor. This is harsher than the standard Shari‘a punishment (hadd) of 100 lashes, though that is harsh enough. The term ‘urf is sometimes used for the law and the courts controlled directly by the ruler rather than the ‘ulama’, as was the case in Iran for some time.

Siyasaf. , governance or policy (see also chapter eight). Generally the practical activi- ties of government that are not subject to the rules of the Shari‘a in practice. Often it has been seen as separate from the Shari‘a but, like ‘ada, the effort may be made to bring it under the Shari‘a. In the Ottoman Empire this was called qanun and was claimed to be consistent with the Shari‘a. Ibn Taymiyyah wanted to bring the activi- ties known as siyasa under the actual control of the Shari‘a, as would Islamist re- formers today.

Sunni “schools” of jurisprudence, Madhhabs While ijma‘ is often discussed as if there were one consensus covering the whole Muslim world, this is not so. In fact there are four different “schools” or traditions of fiqh among Sunnis, each having its own ijma‘, so to speak. These are called madhhabs (“road to follow” or “opinion”) and named after those who are considered their founders. They are:

Ḥanafī, named after • Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 767)

Mālikī, named after • Mālik ibn Anas (d. 795)

Shāfi‘ī, named after Muḥammad ibn Idrīs • al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 819)

Ḥanbalī, named after Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855) •

These generally recognize each other today as equally valid (somewhat like many Protestant denominations) though this was not always so in the past. The Prophet is reported to have said, “Differences of opinion among scholars are a mercy from God.” In principle every Sunni Muslim should be an adherent of one, and only one, of these madhhabs and should follow its rulings. There have always been some, however, who would select rulings from different madhhabs where this seemed appropriate and this is much more common today. Adherence to a madhhab is in practice usually determined by one’s membership in some group, such as fam- ily, village or tribe. Different madhhabs generally predominate in different areas, such as the

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Hanafis in much of the Middle East and South Asia, the Malikis in much of Africa, the Shafi‘is in part of Egypt, Southern Arabia, Malaysia and Indonesia, and the Hanbalis in North and Central Arabia.

Differences between madhhabs in their rulings are usually minor but can be significant. At the beginning of salah, for example, Hanafis fold their hands below the navel, Shafi‘is fold them over the breast, while for Malikis it is not specified where to fold them. On the question of whether the parent or guardian has to give consent for the marriage of an adult woman (i.e. past puberty), the Hanafis say no but the others say yes. On whether a marriage contract that forbids the husband from taking additional wives is valid, the Hanbalis say yes but the others say no. The Shafi‘is hold that the circumcision of a male is obligatory, while others hold it is recommended.

Twelver Shi‘i usul al-fiqh Twelver Shi‘i fiqh is often called the Ja‘fari madhhab after the sixth Imam, Ja‘far al-Sadiq, who is considered its founder. There are two versions of it. The most important today is that of the Uṣūlīs, the other is that of the Akhbārīs, who were stronger in the past. The Usulis recog- nize four “roots”: Qur’an, Sunna, ijma‘ and Reason.

Qur’an. This is the same as for the Sunnis, but the Shi‘is are more inclined to esoteric 1. interpretations and to find references to ‘Ali in the text.

Sunna2. . The Sunna includes not only the words and deeds of Muhammad but also of the twelve Imams, so that there is a considerably larger and more varied body of material. In politics, for example, one might follow the second Imam, al-Hasan, who did not re- sist the tyrant’s power or one might follow the third Imam, al-Husayn, who did resist. Only the Imams know fully the esoteric interpretation of the Qur’an, so that it may be more important to follow them than to follow the apparent meaning of the Qur’an.

Ijma‘ 3. is seen as evidence of the Imams’ views. If during the period of the Imams there was a consensus of Shi‘i scholars on some issue but no direct evidence of the Imam’s view, that consensus may be taken as evidence of the Imam’s view, since it is incon- ceivable that the Shi‘i scholars would have come to a consensus differing from the Imam’s view.

Reason. Human reason is viewed as a reliable guide on ethical matters as it is believed 4. that the Shari‘a and reason cannot contradict each other and that human reason can discern right and wrong. In this they were influenced, more than the Sunnis, by the rationalism of the Mu‘tazilis and the philosophers, to be discussed in the next chap-

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ters. Qiyas, as done by the Sunnis, is too open to error. For example, Sunnis derive the prohibition of hashish by analogy with the prohibition of wine. Shi‘is, by contrast, use reason to derive the same prohibition directly from the harm the drug causes. The sub- stantive difference between the two lines of argument does not seem very great, but the Shi‘is think their approach gives more certainty.

Ijtihad is not considered one of the “roots” of fiqh but refers to the process by which judg- ments are drawn from them. In recent years mujtahids have commonly been given the title Ayatollah (“sign of God”). Every Shi‘i believer who is not qualified to be a mujtahid should choose a living mujtahid and follow his judgments. This is the Shi‘i form of taqlid. In the past century or two it has been usual for a small number of Ayatollahs to acquire a considerable fol- lowing of muqallids and become known as marja‘-i taqlid (“source of emulation”). These are given the title of Grand Ayatollah. This system gives the Ayatollahs more authority than Sunni ‘ulama’ have and in recent years they have been able to turn it into significant political power. To this is added the economic power derived from khums (the one-fifth tax), also distinctive to Shi‘ism.

The other group, the Akhbārīs, are found only in a few places today, such as Bahrain. They recognize only two roots of fiqh, the Qur‘an and the reports, akhbār, of the Prophet and the Imams. Some, in fact, have recognized only the akhbar, on the grounds that only the Prophet and the Imams could interpret the Qur’an and therefore it should be received only through them. Where these roots are silent the faqihs should not presume to exercise ijtihad. In practice this means that large areas of life have been left to more secular agencies, such as the siyasa of the Safavid shahs and their ‘urf courts.

Just as the differences between the rulings of Sunni madhhabs are usually minor but can be significant, so also are the differences between Sunnis and Shi‘is. One well known difference is that Shi‘is permit mut‘a marriage, that is a marriage for a specified period of time and with other conditions. This is understood to be permitted by a Qur’anic passage (4:24) but was forbidden by ‘Umar. Shi‘is do not recognize ‘Umar’s decision. Shi‘i fiqh gives a larger share of an inheritance to women in most situations than does Sunni fiqh. This reflects the fact that Sunni fiqh presumes that pre-Islamic customs were meant to continue unless the Qur’an or the Prophet specifically changed them, so that certain customs favoring male heirs continued, but Shi‘is see the Qur’an and Prophet as instituting a radically new system.

Muftis and fatwas A muftī, among both Shi‘is and Sunnis, is a scholar who gives an opinion on specific issues of fiqh. This opinion is called a fatwa. It is strictly advisory and it is up to the person who requests it to implement it or not. Fatwas are often requested by judges, especially in complex

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cases, and also by rulers to confirm whether their proposed actions are permitted by the Shari‘a. They are also commonly requested by private individuals for a wide range of personal concerns, including questions of ritual. In the earliest centuries muftis were private individuals but in time many came to be attached to the courts and the rulers and today most Muslim states have an official mufti. Fatwas are also regularly given today in newspapers and popular magazines and, more recently, on the internet.

The following example is taken from a Saudi Arabian source on the internet (edited slightly):

Question:

Is there anything wrong with using mobile phones which play tunes, because these tunes are a kind of music, or not?

Answer:

Praise be to Allah. The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) stated that musical instruments are haram when he said: “There will be among my umma people who will regard as permissible adultery, silk, alcohol and musical instru- ments.” (Narrated by al-Bukhari, 5590)

Figure 10.1 Dar al-Ifta’ in Cairo, the office of the Mufti of the Republic.

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This hadith indicates that musical instruments are haram in two ways. First, the Prophet (PBUH) said “they will regard as permissible,” which clearly indicates that the things mentioned – including musical instruments – are forbidden in Shari‘a but those people will regard them as permissible. Second, musical instruments are men- tioned alongside things which are definitively forbidden, namely adultery and alco- hol. If they were not haram, they would not be mentioned alongside these things. (al-Silsilah al-Sahihah by al-Albani, 1/140–141)

Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyah (may Allah have mercy on him) said: This hadith in- dicates that musical instruments are haram. (Majmu’ al-Fatawa, 11/535).

It is not permissible to use musical tunes for telephones or any other devices, be- cause listening to musical instruments is haram, as is indicated by the evidence of Shari‘a. It is possible to do without them by using the ordinary ringing tone. And Allah is the Source of strength.

(http://www.islam-qa.com/en/ref/47407)

A brief history of fiqh So far fiqh has been presented largely from a theoretical point of view. Now we briefly con- sider its development as critical historians see it (but perforce skipping over a number of dif- ferences among these historians).

Sunni fiqh During Muhammad’s career law was largely a continuation of pre-Islamic traditions as modi- fied by the Qur’an and by decisions of Muhammad as leader of the community. Under the “Rightly Guided” caliphs and the Umayyads law continued to be based on decisions of the ca- liph, along with his governors and administrators, and of the qadis, after they began to appoint them. Local custom in various conquered territories also contributed to the content of the law, as did Byzantine and Sasanian administrative and legal practice. The Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet also played some role though the latter would not have been as detailed and specific as it was to become. At this time the concept of sunna often referred to the normative practice of the umma or groups within it, although there were also sunnas of well known indi- viduals. During the later part of the Umayyad period the ‘ulama’ movement began, as we have seen, largely apart from government. This included the beginning of fiqh, often as an implicit or explicit critique of the ruler’s actions, as well as the quest for hadith.

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The leading scholars, such as al-Awza’i (d. 774), relied mainly on the sunna of the umma, and might advise or criticize the existing ruler. Many early faqihs relied heavily on their own considered opinion, ra’y, but as the hadith movement grew its partisans sought to base their judgments on the Sunna of the Prophet, as providing greater certainty. This would also give the ‘ulama’ more authority vis-à-vis the rulers, since they were masters of the hadith. What happened in practice, according to critical scholars, was that rules originally based on custom or rulers’ decisions were reprocessed into hadith. The first two “founders” of madhhabs, made little use of hadith. Malik ibn Anas set forth the doctrines of the scholars of Medina and Abu Hanifa used very few hadith and depended more on ra’y. Abu Yusuf and al-Shaybani (d. 805), Abu Hanifa’s colleagues, made greater use of hadith. The victory of the hadith position was enshrined in the work of al-Shafi‘i, who developed the Sunni theory of usul al-fiqh in its basic form, although it took about a century for it to be recognized and refinements were made later on.

The concept of maslaha appeared about 900 and aspects of Greek logic were introduced by al-Ghazali (d. 1111). Al-Shafi‘i is counted as the founder of the third madhhab. The fourth madhhab is associated with Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the key figure in the mihna, and has tended to stress a fairly literal reading of the Qur’an and Hadith over qiyas. The Ẓāhirī madhhab, found- ed by Dawud ibn Khalaf (d. 884), emphasized a very literal interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith and counted some important figures among their adherents, such as the great mystic Ibn ‘Arabi, but it has not survived, as was the case with a couple of others. The four that have survived struggled with each other for some time but by 1300 had come to recognize each other as valid. The Mamlukes in Egypt, for example, appointed a chief qadi for each of them. By this time the rulers had recognized the right of the ‘ulama’ to determine the content of the law but retained the right to implement it as well as to act in matters considered siyasa, as we have seen.

About 1200 some scholars began to claim that ijtihad was no longer possible, i.e. that “the gate of ijtihad was closed” and this idea came to be widely accepted. By this was meant “ab- solute ijtihad”, i.e. going directly to the Qur’an and the Sunna to derive rules without being bound by previous scholarship. There never was a complete consensus on this, however. The Hanbalis in particular insisted on the possibility of ijtihad and some, such as the reformer Ibn Taymiyya (see chapter thirteen), claimed the right to do it.

Others performed a more limited ijtihad within the guidelines of their madhhab and in most times and places there seem to have been at least a few mujtahids of this type. In other cases ijtihad seems to have been performed in practice without necessarily being called such. To be sure, it was understood that most faqihs would practice taqlid, but this was not necessarily the rigid imitation it is sometimes made out to be. A mufti might be muqallid but he would still confront new situations and would have to adapt the principles of his madhhab to them. It was mainly through the activities of such muftis that fiqh continued to develop.

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If the pace of legal development slowed down in later centuries, it was probably because the legal system had reached a certain maturity, that is to say, a large degree of consensus had been achieved, but it never ceased to develop in response to new situations. But even if the “gate of ijtihad” was not actually closed the idea that it was had considerable influence and reopening it has been one of the main slogans of modern reformers.

Twelver Shi‘i fiqh While the sixth Imam, Ja‘far al-Sadiq is considered the founder of Shi‘i fiqh, developments in usul al-fiqh began in a significant way only with the Greater Occultation, since before that time the Imam could give an authoritative answer to questions. At this point there appear to have been two tendencies, one emphasizing the akhbar (reports) of the Imams, which were be- ing collected at this time, and the other emphasizing ijtihad and a more rationalist approach. From the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries a number of scholars developed this latter ap- proach. In the seventeenth century the other tendency crystallized as the Akhbari school, stimulated by the writings of Mulla Astarabadi (d. 1623), and this was predominant until well into the eighteenth century. Toward the end of that century the more rationalist position, now known as Usuli, was successfully reasserted under the leadership of Vahid Behbahani (d. 1792) and has predominated since then. For them the “gate of ijtihad” has never been closed. The system of Ayatollahs, Grand Ayatollahs and marja‘s developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The Shari‘a and popular appropriation Given human nature, it is not surprising that Shari‘a law is quite diversely appropriated in practice. We have already seen that parts of Shari‘a law can be superseded in practice or very broadly interpreted. But there are other things to notice. The relative importance given by people in practice to particular prescriptions may be different from what the texts say. For ex- ample, the Pillars are all equally obligatory, but one will find many people who do not perform salah regularly but do fast during Ramadan and go on Hajj. Circumcision of males is recom- mended rather than obligatory in three of the four Sunni madhhabs but is often treated in prac- tice as if it were one of the most important obligations. Female “circumcision” is generally un- derstood to be a matter of custom rather than Shari‘a and in most places is not practiced at all, but those who do practice it see it as dictated by the Shari‘a. Wine and pork are both forbid- den, but popular attitudes to them are quite different. Pork is viewed as disgusting and one will find few Muslims, even among those who are otherwise non-practicing, who will knowingly eat it. Wine, by contrast, is viewed as inherently desirable and has been consumed, especially at the higher levels of society, since the beginning of Islam. It is also used as a symbol in both secular and sacred poetry. A reporter in contemporary England describes customers who are at

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pains to make sure a restaurant is halal and then the first thing they ask for is beer. People of- ten make their own judgment about things. For example, the faqihs declare hashish forbidden, on analogy with wine, but it has been widely used in Middle Eastern societies for centuries. Najib Mahfouz has a character in one of his novels, Midaq Alley, say of the Egyptian govern- ment in the 1940s, “It has legalized wine, which God forbade, and has forbidden hashish, which God allowed.” (Mahfouz, 1975, 39) While in some societies custom and Shari‘a are consciously distinguished from each other, in most societies much that is strictly speaking cus- tom is put on the same level as Shari‘a, and even above some Shari‘a provisions, with many members of the society being unaware of the difference.

Despite these various sorts of disjunction between the Shari‘a and social reality, the Shari‘a has been one of the major defining symbols and foci of loyalty for Muslims for centuries and continues to be so. Religious commands do not lose their validity simply because they are not obeyed. In fact, the legal devices mentioned above may be seen as a means of protecting the sanctity of the Shari‘a even though violating its substance. It is worth noting that the definition of apostasy is often given as “permitting the forbidden and forbidding the permitted.” What is serious here is not doing what is forbidden but of refusing to recognize that it is forbidden. It is by no means surprising that the Shari‘a is very much at the center of the current “resurgence” of Islam, as we shall see.

Key Points You Need to Know Though often translated “religious law”, the Shari‘a differs from Western law in three • ways: (1) It comes from God, (2) it covers many more areas of life than Western law does (e.g. ritual) and (3) it is more like a moral evaluation of actions (from commanded to forbidden).

Fiqh• , often translated law or jurisprudence, is the human effort to understand the divine Shari‘a and the results of this effort. It involves discovering the law, not creating it and is done by scholars, not by rulers or governments.

Usul al-fiqh• , the sources of this understanding: the Qur‘an, the Sunna of the Prophet, the effort (ijtihad) of the scholars and the consensus (ijma‘) of the scholars. Shi‘is and Sunnis differ somewhat on this.

Sunni • madhhabs represent four traditions of fiqh that differ in details but generally rec- ognize each other. Shi‘is are often seen as a fifth madhhab.

Muftis• , often translated jurisconsults, are the ones who give opinions based on fiqh in specific cases. They are not judges and their opinions are advisory.

At the popular level the Shari‘a has been followed or not followed in complex ways. •

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Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further reading al-Qaradawi, Yusuf (n.d.) The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam, Indianapolis, IN: American

Trust Publications.

Coulson, Noel J. (1969) Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Dien, Mawil Izzi (2004) Islamic Law: From Historical Foundations to Contemporary Practice, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Esposito, J. (1982) Women in Muslim Family Law, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Hallaq, Wael (1997) A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al- Fiqh, Cambridge University Press.

Mutahhari, M. (n.d.) Jurisprudence and Its Principles, Elmhurst, NY: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an (Shi‘i usul al-fiqh).

Pearl, David (1979) A Textbook on Muslim Law, London: Croom Helm.

Powers, David S. (2002) Law, Society, and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300–1500, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schacht, J. (1965) An Introduction to Islamic Law, 2nd impression, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Zubaida, Sami (2003) Law and Power in the Islamic World, London and New York: I.B. Tauris.

Websites for Fatwas (There are a number of these)

www.islam-qa.com/en

The source of the fatwa quoted in this chapter; deals with a wide range of topics; interpreta- tions appear to be conservative.

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http://www.islamonline.net/english/index.shtml

Scroll down the home page to “Q&A” and click on Fatwa. Has a very large number of topics. Appears conservative but less so than the previous source.

http://qa.sunnipath.com/

http://www.fatwa-online.com/

Appears to be Saudi.

http://darulifta-deoband.org/

From the Deoband school in India; appears more traditionalist than salafi.

Theology and Philosophy

In This Chapter The previous chapter dealt with the will of God for human behavior, the Shari‘a, and how it can be discovered. This has always been the main concern. But Islam has also had both a theo- logical movement and a philosophical movement, which have been of less importance but still significant. These are discussed in this chapter.

Main Topics Covered Theology (• kalam) and the main schools

Theological issues: • tawhid

Theological issues: justice •

Theological issues: promise and threat; faith; commanding the good • and forbidding iniquity

Philosophy •

Main teachings of philosophy •

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Theology (kalam)

There were several stimuli to theological speculation and debate. There were apparent contradictions in the Qur’an and Sunna that needed to be resolved. Political conflicts during the first century particularly those involving the Kharijis, raised issues that had theological implications. Debates with Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians and others in the newly opened lands also raised theologi- cal issues. When the tradition of philosophy deriving from ancient Greece became known to the Muslims, it offered challenges to belief and also tools for argumentation. It contributed to theology and also gave rise to the distinct tradition of philosophy that will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter.

The term for theology among Muslims, especially in the earlier period, is ‘ilm al -kalam (or kalam, for short), literally the science of words, i.e. discussion or debate, reflecting the man- ner in which theology was conducted. It is sometimes called “dialectical theology” in English. Other names for theology in Arabic are ‘ilm uṣūl al-dīn (the science of the roots of religion) and ‘ilm al-tawhīd. It was primarily concerned with defending the truth of religion against er- roneous views. The first school (madhhab) of kalam was the Mu‘tazila, who largely set the agenda for the movement. Then came the Ash‘aris and Maturidis, who represented a reaction against them. Traditionalists (ahl al-ḥadīth) rejected kalam but played an important role in its development.

The Mu‘tazili movement is said to have begun in the circles around Hasan al-Basri (d. 728) though current critical scholarship puts its beginning closer to 800. It was at its greatest politi- cal strength from 833 to about 850 during the miḥna (inquisition), when the caliphs attempted to impose its doctrine about the Qur’an on the ‘ulama’. It continued strong intellectually for two or three centuries among Sunnis and was the main theological madhhab of Twelver and Fiver Shi‘is. The Mu‘tazilis called themselves the “people of tawhid and justice”. Tawhid and justice are the first two of the five fundamental principles espoused by the Mu‘tazila, the oth- ers being “promise and threat”, “the intermediate position”, and “commanding the good and prohibiting evil”. They were influenced both by debates with non-Muslims and by Greek phi- losophy and they used reason to interpret the Qur’an and Hadith and, indeed, often relied on reason alone. The traditionalists (ahl al-ḥadīth), initially under the leadership of Ahmad ibn Hanbal during the mihna, objected strongly to this effort and provided a continuing and often quite forceful critique of the whole venture of theology.

Abu al-Hasan al-Ash‘ari (d. 935) was a Mu‘tazili who converted to traditionalist views but sought to defend them with Mu‘tazili methods. His successors in the Ash‘ari madhhab adopted more philosophical methods and ideas than he did. Al-Ghazali introduced the Aristotelian syl- logism into theology as he did into fiqh and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1210) was particularly no- table for his use of philosophical concepts. Another madhhab, beginning about the same time

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as the Ash‘aris derived from Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (d. 944), who lived in Central Asia. Its teachings differed from those of the Ash‘aris mainly in details. It was not as widely followed as the Ash‘ari madhhab but did have significant influence. The creedal statement il composed by the Maturidi, al-Nasafi (d. 1142), attracted commentaries by both Maturidis and Ash‘aris. Traditionalism continued to be dynamic and its greatest later representative was Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), whose refutations of philosophy and theology were acute and showed a considerable grasp of these subjects. Maturidis were associated closely with the Hanafi madhhab in fiqh. In general the Mu‘tazilis were also associated with the Hanafis, the Ash‘aris with the Shafi‘is and the Traditionalists with the Hanbalis. From the fourteenth century until modern times scholar- ship in theology continued but produced relatively little that was new or creative.

Theological issues It will be convenient to discuss some of the issues dealt with by the theologians using the five principles of the Mu‘tazila as headings.

Tawḥīd The Mu‘tazila held that people are obligated to know God by reason since only in this way can one be sure that He exists and is truthful, and thus be justified in relying on the Qur’an and the Sunna. The later Ash‘aris and the Maturidis also held that the existence of God can be known by reason.

Their strong concern for God’s unity led the Mu‘tazila to insist that various divine attributes, such as knowledge, power, will, life, hearing, sight and speech, could not be faculties distinct from God’s essence. Thus God knows by His essence, not by a distinguishable attribute called knowledge. Otherwise, God’s pure unity would be compromised. They may possibly have been reacting against Christian theologians of the time who explained the Trinity in terms of divine attributes. The traditionalists and al-Ash‘ari stated that God has such attributes since the Qur’an and Hadith speak of them and that we are not to speculate about them but are to accept them, as they put it, bilā kayf (“without [asking] how”). Later Ash‘aris and Maturidis said that the attributes of God are “not He and not other than He”, as their formula goes.

This issue becomes concrete and contentious in relation to the attribute of speech, since the Qur’an is God’s speech. What is the relation between God and the Qur’an that we read and recite? The Mu‘tazila held that the latter was created by God, since otherwise it would be iden- tical with God. The traditionalists led by Ibn Hanbal, however, insisted that the Qur’an is the uncreated word of God. This was the issue on which the miḥna centered and on which the ca- liphs finally gave way, since Ibn Hanbal’s view was clearly the popular view. The Ash‘aris and

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Maturidis also held that the Qur’an is uncreated; like other attributes of God it is “not he and not other than he”. This does not mean that the physical copies of the Qur’an and the spoken words of its recitation are eternal. In the words of Nasafi’s creed, “The Qur’an is the uncreated speech of God and is written on our pages, preserved in our hearts, recited by our tongues and heard by our ears, but does not inhere in them” (Taftazani 58, modified). There was, interest- ingly, a political “pay off” to all this. If the Qur’an were in the category of created things then, like them, it could conceivably be imperfect, and a divinely guided ruler, such as the early ca- liphs often claimed to be, or a Shi’i Imam protected from error, might outrank it. But if it was uncreated it clearly stood in a category of its own above everything else and elevated the status of its official interpreters, the ‘ulama’.

It also is worth noting that the traditionalist position on the Qur’an parallels the orthodox Christian position on Christ as the uncreated Son and Word (Logos) of God and the Mu‘tazili position parallels that of the Arians, who believed Christ to be the highest of creatures. In fact, the caliph al-Ma’mun, a supporter of the Mu‘tazila, complained of the traditionalists, “They are, thus, like the Christians when they claim that ‘Isa the son of Mary was not created be- cause he was the word of God.” (Grunebaum 104–5) The view of the attributes as “not he and not other than he” is reminiscent of the Christian view of the relationship among the Persons of the Trinity. Likewise, the view of the relation between the uncreated Qur’an and the written and recited Qur’an seems reminiscent of the orthodox Christian view of the human and divine natures of Christ. There could be Christian influence here but it may also be that similar issues bring forth similar solutions. As suggested in chapter five, the Qur’an occupies for Muslims a place similar to that which Christ occupies for Christians.

The Qur’an sometimes speaks of God’s face or hand or has Him sitting on the throne. The Mu‘tazila argued that such statements had to be interpreted metaphorically (ta’wīl) since they were rationally impossible if taken literally. The traditionalists and al-Ash‘ari held that these, like other attributes, must be held as true “without [asking] how”. God knows better than hu- man reason what terms should be applied to Him. Later Ash‘aris, however, accept metaphori- cal interpretations of these “physical” attributes.

It is commonly believed that believers will see God in paradise. This also the Mu‘tazilis in- terpreted metaphorically, since God cannot be seen. The traditionalists and al-Ash‘ari insisted that God will in fact be seen but “without [asking] how”. Later Ash‘aris and Maturidis also said that God will be seen but not in any physical manner.

Justice The Mu‘tazilis believed that God is perfectly just and thus incapable of evil. Therefore, He is bound to do what is best for His creatures. Al-Ash‘ari, however, argued that to say this is to put limits on God, and God has no limits since there is no one superior to Him who could

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impose limits on Him. What is right or wrong is so because He makes it so, not because it is inherently so, as the Mu‘tazila believed. For example, if God declared lying to be morally good, it would be good. God himself does not lie, not because lying is bad but because He is incapable of lying. Thus, we can trust His promises.

The Mu‘tazili view suggests that justice in some sense transcends God. If so, it would seem that basic moral principles could be known by humans apart from revelation. The Mu‘tazila held this, although some things, such as the ritual requirements, are known only by revelation. One corollary was that people who did not know of Islam or Muhammad were still obligated to obey God. The Maturidis held a similar view but the ‘Ash‘aris held that moral obligation came only with revelation.

A major issue under this heading was that of predestination (qaḍā’ wa-qadar) versus free will. The Qur’an makes such statements as “Whoever God guides, he is rightly guided and whoever He leads astray, they are the losers” (7:78), but also makes statements such as “God does not change what is in a people until they change what is in themselves” (13:11). While the Qur’an and the Hadith have more statements tending toward predestination than toward free will, the very call to obey God would appear to presume the ability to choose. In the early decades of Islam the idea of predestination seems to have predominated, in part possibly because of a sense of the overwhelming power of God and its manifestation in the dramatic conquests. It also suited the political interests of the Umayyads, since their morally questionable actions could be ascribed to God’s will.

In the latter part of the Umayyad period there appeared people known as Qadaris, who held that humans have the power of moral choice, and some of these were critical of the Umayyads. Al-Hasan al-Basri seems to have expressed this view and it was taken up by the Mu‘tazila, who said that humans create their actions in the moral realm. They argued that God would be unjust if He punished people for actions He had created. Their opponents argued that this would involve creators beside God and thus be shirk and a form of “dualism” (a polemical term used against Manicheans and many others). Moreover, as indicated above, God is not bound to do what is best for his creatures. Al-Ash‘ari, however, proffered a doctrine known as “acquisition”, according to which God creates actions but humans “acquire” them. Al- Ash‘ari’s account involves a special human power for each “voluntary” action, but this power is created by God, so that it is hard to see in what way humans are free. Other explanations, however, claim that this power is created in response to a prior human choice for a particular action. This doctrine became a by-word for complexity and obscurity and further details are beyond the scope of this book. The Maturidis spoke of “choice” rather than “acquisition” and appear to have been closer to the Mu‘tazila on this issue. Muslims who are not theologians have generally believed in the complete power of God and the moral responsibility of humans without seeking to reconcile them rationally. They may believe in free will before they act and in the predestination of the results afterward. Belief in predestination, it is claimed, helps one face the calamities that occur in life.

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Promise and threat The Mu‘tazila held that God must of necessity send the one guilty of serious sins to eternal punishment, since this threat is made clear in the Qur’an. They either rejected the idea of inter- cession by the Prophet or held that it will not benefit such people. The Ash‘aris and Maturidis, however, hold that Muslims who commit great sins may be punished in the Fire but will even- tually come out of it and enter Paradise.

Faith: the intermediate position The issue of the nature of faith was raised very early in Islamic history, since the Kharijis claimed that those guilty of serious sins were kafirs, and for the extreme Kharijis this applied to everyone except themselves. At the opposite extreme were those who are known as Murji’a, “postponers”, who argued that serious sinners were still believers and part of the umma so long as they professed faith, the final decision on them being postponed until God makes it. This appears to have developed out of a political desire to be neutral between ‘Uthman and ‘Ali, i.e. to “postpone” the judgment between them. The Mu‘tazila argued that such people were in an intermediate position, neither believers nor kafirs but fāsiq, corrupt. They are to be treated as members of the umma in this world, but will be punished in the afterlife for their sins. The Ash‘aris and Maturidis took a position similar to that of the Murji’a although they did not accept this label.

By most theologians faith was analyzed into three parts: affirmation in the heart, confession by the tongue and action by the limbs. According to the traditionalists, Mu‘tazila and al-Ash‘ari, all three were part of faith and therefore faith could increase or decrease in terms of actions performed. Others held that faith proper consisted only of affirmation or affirmation and con- fession and does not increase or decrease with deeds.

Commanding the good and forbidding iniquity Commanding the good and forbidding iniquity is a command from the Qur’an (9:71; 22:41 and elsewhere) commonly referred to by Muslims, Mu‘tazili and non-Mu‘tazili, past and pres- ent. It is the obligation to work for a just and moral society in accordance with the power one has, as the Prophet has said: “If you see any wrongful act, you must first correct it with your hand, failing to do so with your speech, failing to do so with your hearts and that is the lowest state of faith.”

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Philosophy If theology uses reason to explicate revelation and rebut error, the philosophers sought to build a positive system strictly on reason. Philosophy was often called falsafa in Arabic, a word that signals its non-Islamic origin, but was also called ḥikma, wisdom, a good Arabic word with a wide range of uses (hekmat in Persian). Islamic philosophy was a continuation of the tradi- tion going back to the pre-Socratics in Greece and continuing modified but unbroken into the Greek and Syriac world of late antiquity. From here it passed to the Muslims and a few centu- ries later was taken up by the Western Christian world. Although claiming to base themselves on reason alone, the philosophers gave considerable authority to the great Greek philosophers, particularly Aristotle. In fact, though, the philosophy they received did not clearly distinguish Aristotelianism from neo-Platonism and included a summary of Plotinus that went under the title of “The Theology of Aristotle”.

Philosophy at this time comprised a much wider range of disciplines than it does today. It in- cluded most of what we would put under the heading of “science”, such as cosmology, astron- omy (and astrology), physics, chemistry (and alchemy), biology and psychology. It was also closely associated with medicine and several of the well known philosophers were also physi- cians. This was one reason they were popular with rulers. Philosophy was the “science” of its time and claimed a status and prestige akin to that which we give to science today, although with much less success.

Like science today, philosophy was very ecumenical. Muslims, Jews, Christians and others participated on a largely equal basis, debated with each other and read each others’ works. The early Muslim philosophers had non-Muslims for teachers and read translations done by scholars such as Hunayn ibn Ishaq, a Nestorian Christian. Between the tenth and thirteenth centuries Spain was the site of an impressive “trialogue” of Muslims, Jews and Christians and it was mainly there that Muslim philosophy was translated into Latin by Jews to be read by Christians such as Thomas Aquinas.

The most important philosophers were al-Kindi (801–866), who was Mu‘tazili in theology, al- Farabi (c. 870–950), Ibn Sina (Avicenna 980–1037), probably the greatest of the philosophers, and Ibn Rushd (Averroes 1126–1198), who distinguished Aristotelian from Neo-Platonic teachings and whose work was particularly influential in the West.

Main teachings of philosophy They sought to coordinate their teachings with Islamic religious doctrine in an interesting way. Philosophy, they claimed, represents the pure truth that can be discovered by reason but only by an elite who has the intelligence and the leisure to pursue it. For the rest religion provides

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a series of concrete symbols and prescriptions that point indirectly to the same truths. Ibn Rushd’s On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy provides an accessible example of this. Hence philosophy by its own understanding as well as in fact was a highly elitist and esoteric movement that could never appeal to a large number. They could, though, hope to be a kind of leaven in the loaf of society and in particular to influence its rulers. Al-Farabi’s descrip- tion of the ideal polity has been mentioned in chapter eight. On the other hand, Ibn Tufayl (d. 1186) wrote a long allegory, Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān, (Alive the Son of Awake) in which the protago- nist grows up on an uninhabited island and works out the truths of philosophy by himself. Eventually someone who has been raised in a traditional religion comes to his island and they work out that the traditional religion is the same as Hayy’s philosophy. They then return to the inhabited island and try to teach the people philosophy, but they fail and finally return to Hayy’s island to devote themselves to contemplation.

The philosophers’ views of God, creation and the afterlife illustrate their approach. The God of the philosophers tends to be rather abstract, a combination of Aristotle’s “unmoved mover” and Plotinus’ “One” from whom the universe emanates. Most people cannot grasp or appreci- ate this, so the Qur’an presents a God with very concrete attributes that people can relate to. The philosophers believed that the universe is dependent on God but has always existed in largely the same form (the “eternity of the world”). The Qur’an teaches that God created the universe apparently at some point in time. This makes the essential point that the universe de- pends on God in a way that all people can appreciate. The philosophers believe that the soul survives the body and receives the consequences of its earthly action while the Qur’an makes the point of reward and punishment by teaching the more concrete doctrine of the resurrection of the body.

Reason, in the philosophers’ usage, generally has a mystical dimension, unlike the usual view today. Discursive reasoning at some point in one’s spiritual journey is transformed into a mys- tical vision of the highest realities, as with Plato and Plotinus. The vision that the philosophers achieve at the highest level is essentially the same as what the prophets have, except that the prophets have a strong imaginative faculty that allows them to create the concrete symbols of religion. As this was presented by al-Farabi it seemed to put the prophets at a lower level than the philosophers, but Ibn Sina reinterpreted it to assure the superiority of the prophets. Most Muslims still have felt that the philosophers do not recognize adequately the distinctiveness of prophecy. A further presentation of some of these doctrines in Ibn Sina’s writings will be given in chapter thirteen.

There was a small number of “free thinkers” who rejected essential Islamic doctrines. Both the eminent physician Abu Bakr al-Razi (d. 923 or 932) and the ex-theologian Ibn al-Rawandi (d. 910) rejected the need for prophecy and argued that reason and philosophy were sufficient for spiritual needs. Al-Razi also believed in four eternal principles in addition to the Creator.

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Philosophy as a distinct movement died out in the Sunni world after about 1200. Elements of it were absorbed into theology, however, and theological treatises and creeds came to have an introductory section dealing with philosophical ideas such as substance and accidents. Also, philosophical concepts and terms were used by the speculative Sufis. Philosophy continued in the Iranian Shi‘i world, where its mystical side developed into a fully fledged mystical philos- ophy known as irfan. Irfan and speculative Sufi thinking are called “wisdom” (hikma/hekmat) in Arabic and Persian and often “theosophy” in English (“divine wisdom”, no connection with the Theosophy of Annie Besant). More will be said of these in chapter twelve.

Key Points You Need to Know Theology represents a response to certain political events, to debates with non-Mus-• lims and to Greek philosophy.

The first school of theology was the Mu‘tazila, who called themselves the People of • Tawhid and Justice, after their two main theses.

These theses led to such issues as the nature of the Qur’an, the metaphorical interpreta-• tion of Qur’anic statements, the relation of ethics to God’s will, and predestination.

The other main schools are the Ash‘aris and the Maturidis. The Traditionalists repre-• sent another option, the rejection of theology.

Philosophy represents a continuation, in Islamic terms, of the ancient tradition of • Greek philosophy.

Philosophy saw itself as conveying in a purer form the basic truths of religion. •

Its teachings included a rather abstract view of God, the “eternity of the world” and the • survival of the soul.

Philosophy as a distinct movement died out in the Sunni world but survived in a mysti-• cal form in the Iranian Shi‘i world.

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

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Further Reading Al-Taftazani, Mas’ud ibn ‘Umar (1980) A Commentary on the Creed of Islam, trans. Earl

Edgar Elder, New York: Books for Libraries.

Ibn Tufayl (1972) Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, trans. L.E. Goodman, New York: Twayne.

Martin, Richard, Woodward, Mark and Atmaja, Dwi S. (eds) (1997) Defenders of Reason in Islam, Oxford: One World Publications (second half deals with modernism in Indonesia).

McCarthy, Richard J. (1953) The Theology of al-Ash’ari: The Arabic texts of al-Ash’ari’s Kitab al-Luma’ and Risalat Istihsan al-Khawd fi ‘ilm al-Kalam, with briefly annotated translations, Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique.

Nasr, Sayyed Hossein and Leaman, Oliver (eds) (1996) History of Islamic Philosophy,Part I, London and New York: Routledge.

Netton, Ian Richard (1989) Allah Transcendent: Studies in the Structure and Semiotics of Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Cosmology, London; New York: Routledge. Watt, W. Montgomery (1985) Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended Survey, 2nd ed., Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Watt, W. Montgomery (1994) Islamic Creeds: A Selection, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Web Resource Islamic Philosophy on Line (has material on a number of Islamic Philosophers, some of which

appears in links in the text and much else) http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/

The Sufi Path to God

In This Chapter We are travelling to see the king. As we cross the border of his realm we are informed of its laws and learn to obey them. As we come closer to the palace we talk with people who have been told a lot about the king but have not met him. When after some effort and preparation we enter the palace we meet people who have met the king and some who know him well. Finally we meet the king himself and our lives are transformed. This is a parable of the Sufi approach to God in comparison to that of fiqh and kalam. In this chapter I will first present a general overview of the Sufi approach and then sketch the main lines of the history of the Sufi movement.

Main Topics Covered Knowledge, love and remembrance of God •

Tariqa• , the path

The goal: • Fana’ and Baqa’

Walis • (saints)

Sufism and Shari‘a-mindedness •

Historical outline •

Poetry and theosophy •

Some recent developments •

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Knowledge, love and remembrance of God

The word Ṣūfī is derived from the Arabic word ṣūf, wool, because the early Sufis wore rough woolen garments. Roughly synonymous are faqīr and dar-wish or dervish, which mean “poor” (i.e. poor in spirit) in Arabic and Persian respectively. Knowledge of the Shari‘a and obedience to it is central to Islam, but the Sufis

wish to go further. They distinguish between two kinds of knowledge, ‘ilm and ma‘rifa. ‘Ilm is the sort of knowledge we get by reading or hearing about something or someone and draw- ing conclusions from what we have read or heard. The ‘ulama’ have this sort of knowledge of God’s will and attributes. Ma‘rifa is the direct and intimate knowledge we have when we have become acquainted with a person. It is this sort of knowledge that Sufis seek of God.

Corresponding to these two kinds of knowledge are two sets of attitudes and relationships. Corresponding to ‘ilm is the obedience that a servant or slave (‘abd) gives to his master. Corresponding to ma‘rifa is the love a lover has for his or her beloved, and love is the central theme of Sufi expression.

How does one achieve this knowledge and love of God? The Sufis speak of dhikr, which is commonly translated “remembrance” but in this context is probably better translated “having in mind” or “being fully aware of ”. This word appears in the Qur’an in varying forms around 300 times, for example: “O you who believe, Remember God with much remembrance” (Q 33:41); a less literal but more accurate translation is “be ever mindful of God”. Since all hu- mans have the fiṭra, the God-given nature that orients them to Him, the point is to clear away distractions and “remember” or become aware of the reality to which this fitra directs us.

Dhikr is also the name of the techniques used to stimulate this awareness, usually involving the recitation of certain of the names of God, often accompanied by bodily motions and con- trolled breathing. In one version seven names of God are recited and these are believed to pu- rify seven levels of the soul. Sometimes individuals recite the names of God or other phrases, such as “Praise be to God” and “God is most great” (subḥan allāh, al-ḥamdu li-llāh, allāhu akbar) with the aid of a sibḥa (rosary). Dhikr may also involve forms of singing and dancing (known as samā‘ or sema) and may be accompanied by singers called munshidūn. The dance of the so-called Whirling Dervishes is a form of dhikr. Similar practices are, of course, known in other religions. One thinks of the Jesus prayer in Orthodox Christianity, the recitations of the name of Amitabha Buddha in Pure Land Buddhism or the names of Krishna recited by the Krishna Consciousness devotees.

Some Sufis will also spend time in retreat (khalwa), engaging in these practices in isola- tion. Forty days is a typical period for this. One may also engage in fasting in addition to that

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of Ramadan. In general a Sufi should lead a lifestyle in accordance with the dictates of the Shari‘a, but go further.

Tariqa, the path By doing these things the Sufi proceeds along the tariqa, or path, toward God, which is marked by a series of stations (maqamāt) and states (aḥwāl), various lists of which have been given by different Sufi writers. The stations usually begin with repentance, that is, turning away from ordinary life to the Sufi path. Other stations include renunciation (of physical plea- sures and whatever distracts one from God, even if allowed by the Shari‘a), complete reliance on God, poverty, patience, gratitude, fear and hope. States include expansion and contraction of the soul (basṭ and qabḍ, enthusiastic joy and something like depression), intoxication and sobriety (see below), love, ma‘rifa, intimacy with God, nearness to God, longing (shawq), annihilation or passing away in God (fanā’) and continuance in God (baqā’, see below). In general, stations are achieved at least in part by human effort and may be permanent once achieved. States, by contrast, are gifts of God’s grace over which the human being has no con- trol and are usually temporary. They are commonly described as forms of ecstasy.

One does not travel this path on one’s own, as it would be far too dangerous spiritually and psychologically, and even physically. One must have a spiritual guide, variously called a shaykh, pir or murshid (comparable to a guru in other traditions and in some respects to a psychological counsellor in the West). The disciple is called a murīd (one who seeks). Ideally the relationship between murid and shaykh is extremely close. The shaykh should be able to discern the spiritual state of the murīd so as to be able to advise him. It has been claimed that a shaykh could do this at a distance telepathically. The murid should obey the shaykh’s advice implicitly. It is said that the murid should be to his shaykh as a corpse in the hand of its washer and also that a person who has no shaykh has Satan for a shaykh. Depending on the situation,

Figure 12.1 The Khanqah of Sultan Baybars al-Gashankir, Cairo, com- pleted in 1310. The small doors at the lower right are to cells that served as living quarters for Sufis or were used for khalwa.

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there will be a number of rules and forms of etiquette (adab) to follow. The relationship to a shaykh normally begins with a formal initiation and pledge of allegiance called a bay‘a (the same term as that used in the political context for the pledge of allegiance the representatives of the umma give to the incoming caliph).

In rare cases a Sufi may not have a human shaykh or formal initiation, but be initiated by the spirit of a great Sufi or prophetic figure of the past. This initiation is called uwaysi or veiysi.

How does one choose a shaykh? Often the choice is determined by a long standing relation between a particular shaykh and a particular family, village or other group. A person may be directed to a shaykh by a friend or acquaintance who is already a murid of that shaykh. A mu- rid may seek out a shaykh on the basis of personal attraction or affinity. It is possible that a dream or a vision may direct the murid to the shaykh or the shaykh to the murid. Shaykhs also have “credentials” in the form of a silsila (“chain” of discipleship), which gives the name of his shaykh, and his shaykh’s shaykh, and so back to Muhammad, usually via ‘Ali. At least in recent times this will be contained in a written document given to him by his shaykh when the latter gives him authority to guide others. Thus the silsila attests his competence and his spiri- tual connection. The silsila has a parallel in the sanad, the chain of authorities that guarantee a hadith. The silsila also has its parallels in mystical and disciplic traditions outside Islam. It may be observed that the way one chooses a Sufi shaykh is not totally different from the way Westerners choose a doctor or comparable professionals. We may have a family doctor with whom we have dealt for years. We may go on the advice of friends who are “satisfied custom- ers”. If appropriate, we may want to know the doctor’s credentials, his “silsila”, so to speak, which will usually be evident in the form of diplomas on his or her office walls. Admittedly we are not likely to be directed by a dream or vision in this.

The shaykh-murid relationship is fundamental to the structure of Sufism. From about the twelfth century c.e. Sufism developed into large scale movements commonly called tariqas, the same word as used above for the “path” but here referring to specific different “paths” leading to the goal. In English these are usually called “Sufi orders”, but this term perhaps puts more emphasis on the organizational aspect than is appropriate. Tariqas are, in the first place, spiritual lineages. The members of a tariqa all trace their silsila back to (or, more precisely, through) a great shaykh of the past, for whom the tariqa is usually named. The oldest tariqa, for example, is the Qadiriyya, which traces its lineage back to ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166). ‘Abd al-Qadir is generally considered the “founder” although it is probably his descen- dants that developed it into a tariqa, and this is true in the case of other tariqas.

Tariqas did in fact develop organizational aspects. Usually there would be a center for instruc- tion and the performance of dhikr, and perhaps the residence of the shaykh and others, cells for retreat, guest quarters and a tomb of the founder of the tariqa. This is called a khanqah or a tekke, or sometimes a zawiya or ribat. There will usually be an inner circle of murids who devote considerable time and energy to the activities of the tariqa and may reside at the center,

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and an outer circle of people who are more loosely involved. The shaykh will often appoint khalīfas, deputies, to carry out some of his functions, such as leading dhikr, when he is not present. The shaykh will normally choose his successor from among his own sons and/or dis- ciples. This does not preclude the possibility of quarrels over the succession, leading possibly to a split in the tariqa.

Tariqas can subdivide for other reasons. For example, one of the most popular tariqas in Egypt is the Ahmadiyya, founded by Ahmad al-Badawi (1199–1278). In the eighteenth centu- ry, one of its shaykhs, ‘Ali al-Bayyumi, was a well known ecstatic and attracted such a follow- ing that they became known as the Bayyumiyya. The Ahmadiyya silsila up to ‘Ali al-Bayyumi is retained, however, and the tariqa may be called Bayyumiyya Ahmadiyya.

Different tariqas have distinctive characteristics. This includes distinctive forms of dhikr (such as that of the “Whirling Dervishes”, mentioned earlier), use or not of dancing and music, dis- tinctive doctrinal emphases, distinctive garb, and distinctive forms of etiquette (adab). Some tariqas are related to particular social groupings or classes; some have been close to craft guilds. Some are interested in politics and influencing rulers, others eschew this. Some tariqas are limited to one area or one country while others, such as the Qadiriyya, are spread world- wide. It is not unusual for an individual to be initiated into more than one tariqa, although some demand exclusive allegiance. A tariqa usually celebrates a mawlid (or mulid), a com- memoration of the birthday of its founder (see below).

The goal: Fana’ and Baqa’ The goal of the Sufi path is commonly called fana’, “passing away” or “annihilation”, viz. in God, along with baqa’, “continuance” in God. This can be related to the Qur’anic verse, “All that dwells upon the earth is perishing ( fana’), yet still abides (baqa’) the Face of your Lord, majestic, splendid” (55:26–27). There is a hadith qudsi that says, “My servant does not cease to draw near to Me with devotions beyond what is obligatory until I love him; and when I love him, I am the hearing with which he hears, and the sight with which he sees, and the hand with which he smites, and the foot with which he walks.”

One of the early Sufis, Bayazid Bistami (d. 874), describes his experience in these words, “Behold, now I say that God is the mirror of myself, for with my tongue He speaks and I have passed away (fana’)” (Smith, M. 27). Elsewhere he says,

“Then I began to melt away, as lead melts in the heat of the fire. Then He gave me to drink from the fountain of Grace in the cup of fellowship and changed me into a state beyond description and brought me near unto Him, and so near did He bring me that I became nearer to Him than the spirit to the body. I continued thus until

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I became even as the souls of men had been in that state before existence was and God abode in solitude apart, without created existence or space or direction or mode of being – may His glory be exalted and His Name sanctified.”

(Ibid. 29)

Mansur al-Hallaj (850–922), another famous Sufi, said, “If you do not recognize God, at least recognize His signs. I am that sign, I am the Truth (al-ḥaqq, also a name of God), because through the Truth I am a truth eternally” (Arberry 60). The phrase, Ana al-ḥaqq (I am the Truth), became famous and has been much commented on and alluded to by al-Hallaj’s de- fenders and detractors.

Statements such as these have attracted much criticism from those concerned for obedience to the Shari‘a, since they appear to constitute an extreme form of shirk, identifying the speaker with God. Sufis, however, deny the charge. Far from identifying the human self with God, the consciousness of the self is obliterated and there is consciousness only of God. In effect, it is God saying, “I am the Truth”. Jalal al-Din Rumi writes,

This is what is signified by the words “Ana al-Haqq”. People imagine that they are a presumptuous claim, whereas it is really a presumptuous claim to say “I am the servant (i.e. human being)”. The one who says, “I am the servant” affirms two existences, his own and God’s, but he that says “I am the Truth” has made himself non-existent and has given himself up and says “I am God,” i.e. “I am naught, He is all: there is no being but God’s”. This is the extreme of humility and self-abasement (Nicholson Rumi 184).

Here the accusation of shirk is turned back on the accuser. Shirk consists not of identifying oneself with God but of claiming, like God, to have (independent) existence. It is not a ques- tion of a human becoming divine but of experiencing God’s unity, tawhid, in its fullness.

Another approach to this question is that of Abu al-Qasim al-Junayd (d. 910), who was for a time al-Hallaj’s teacher. He held that the goal of the path is to return to the primordial state of humans, described in the following words of the Qur’an: “When your Lord took from thee children of Adam from their loins, their seed, and made them testify touching themselves, ‘Am I not your Lord?’ They said, ‘Yes, we testify’” (7:172). At that time humans existed only in God’s mind.

Sufis distinguish between the states of “drunkenness”, when one is in ecstasy and unable to control one’s words and actions, and “sobriety”, when one is in control. Statements such as “I am the Truth” are understood to be uttered in a state of “drunkenness” and are given a special name, shaṭḥ. Bayazid in a state of ecstasy said, “Praise be to me, how great is my majesty!” (Attar 115) but disowned these words when he returned to a normal state. Al-Junayd, well

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known as a sober Sufi, and many others have held that the shaths ought not to be uttered pub- licly since most people would misinterpret them and they might attract persecutions. For al- Junayd and probably most Sufis the state of sobriety that comes after the state of drunkenness is higher than the state of drunkenness. The highest state is to continue with the consciousness of God in a sober state.

Nevertheless, the shaths were uttered publicly and much discussed, and drunkenness was much praised by the Sufi poets. Thus for example, Rumi:

I am intoxicated with Love’s cup, and two worlds have passed out of my ken; I have no business save carouse and revelry. If once in my life I spent a moment without thee, From that time and from that hour I repent of my life. If once in this world I win a moment with thee, I will trample on both worlds, I will dance in triumph for ever. O Shamsi Tabriz, I am so drunken in this world, That except for drunkenness and revelry I have no tale to tell.

(McNeill and Waldman 243)

Figure 12.2 The tombs of Jalal al-Rumi and his son in Rumi’s mausoleum at Konya, Turkey.

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Along with drunkenness, as we see here, is love. Love here is ‘ishq, a particularly passionate form of love. This is the term usually used by Sufis at least from the time of al-Hallaj. Others, such as Rabi‘a (see below) have used ḥubb or maḥabba, the more usual and less intense terms for love. These themes are drawn from secular poetry, which sings much of love and wine go- ing back to pre-Islamic times. Much of the force of Sufi poetry comes from the often ambigu- ous relationship it has with secular poetry (see also chapter fourteen).

Some Sufis are said to be majdhūb, permanently “intoxicated”, so to speak. Their odd men- tal state and often bizarre behavior would lead most Westerners and many Muslims to call them mentally ill, but others believe they have been overpowered by God and have consider- able baraka. Perhaps they provide support for the argument that mental illness is culturally constructed.

Walis (saints) Those who reach the goal come to be known as walis, close friends of God. In English they are commonly called “saints”. They are understood to be referred to in the Qur’anic passage: “Surely God’s friends, no fear shall be upon them, neither shall they sorrow” (10:63). The founders of the tariqas, along with other great Sufis of the past, are understood to be walis, but there are also walis living in the present who may not be recognized as such by those around them. By virtue of their closeness to God walis have considerable baraka and through them God performs wonders called karamāt (acts of nobility or generosity). These include physi- cal miracles, supernormal knowledge and acts of outstanding judgment. Some, however, have questioned the value of physical miracles. One wali said, “It is better to restore one dead heart to eternal life than to restore to life a thousand dead bodies” (Schimmel Mystical 213). A dis- tinction is made between karamat, the wonders performed by walis, and mu‘ jizāt, the miracles that testify to a prophet. One also distinguishes between the “inspiration” (ilhām, kashf) that comes to a wali and the “revelation” (waḥy) received by a prophet.

Many believe that there is an invisible cosmic hierarchy of walis, headed by the qutb (axis or pole), who is assisted according to one version by three naqibs (substitutes), four awtad (pil- lars), seven abrar (pious), forty abdal (substitutes), 300 akhyar (good) and 4000 hidden walis. Upon them the spiritual well-being of the world depends.

People visit the tombs of walis to seek benefits from them such as cure for an ailment, success in an examination or a business deal, help for marital problems and other things. These visits are known as ziyara (literally, visit), as distinct from the Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca. Walis may appear to people in dreams. Ahmad al-Badawi is reported to have appeared in a dream to berate one of his later followers for failing to visit him, i.e. his tomb. All of these things are extremely important for popular Islam and, indeed, in some times and places they have been

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the primary manifestation of Muslim religion. In fact, in some times and places to deny the ex- istence of walis would have been seen as tantamount to kufr.

The mawlid or “birthday” of the wali is celebrated once or more a year, not necessarily on his actual birthday. These can be very lively and popular events attended by large numbers of people beyond the actual members of the tariqa. One of the most popular is that of Ahmad al-Badawi, celebrated in October each year in Tanta, in northern Egypt. It is a carnival, com- mercial fair and religious event more or less rolled into one. It lasts for a week with the great- est activity at night. Most visitors camp out on the streets. People visit the tomb of Ahmad al-Badawi, circumambulating it and touching the maqsura (wooden protecting screen) for baraka, which seems almost physical here. There are amusements and stalls and stores for all sorts of things, especially chickpeas, which are symbolic of the mawlid and said to especially convey its baraka. Sufis perform dhikrs. Tariqas and other groups erect tents in a large field to provide hospitality. The government participates, as it is politically wise to be seen to support this event. It is considered a good occasion to have children circumcised. During the last 24 hours there are two processions, the first commemorating an event that happened just after the death of Ahmad al-Badawi and the other honouring the current khalifa of the Ahmadiyya.

Figure 12.3 Tambourines and nay (flute) enliven the mawlid of Ahmad al-Badawi in Tanta, Egypt.

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The following account indicates the kinds of benefits people may hope to receive from walis

Once two friends and I were visiting Tanta during the big mulid of Sayyid al-Badawi. Each of us had a problem. I was suffering from a pain in my lower back. One of my friends, a professor of law at Ain Shams University, was worried that his son would fail his college examinations. And the other, a physician, was bothered by debts which he could not pay. After we visited the shrine of Sayyid al-Badawi, each of us found that his problem had been resolved. I had a dream in which two doctors took me into the operating room, and when I woke up the pain in my back was gone. And it has not bothered me since. The law professor learned that his son would receive passing marks on his examination, even before they took place. And the doctor received an inheritance that allowed him to pay his debts.

(Quoted in Reeves 66)

Sufism and Shari‘a-mindedness There is a definite tension between Shari‘a-mindedness and the Sufi orientaton. In terms of moral and ritual activities, Sufis sometimes go to extremes of practice, as they practice extra fasts or take extra precautions about ritual cleanliness. At the opposite extreme, some claim that once ma‘rifa is attained external rituals are not necessary. Groups like the Qalandaris and Malamatiyya openly flout the Shari‘a, at least in public (they may be ascetic in private, concerned to avoid hypocrisy). The use of music and dance by some Sufis is frowned on by some of the Shari‘a-minded, as is the use of love poetry and some theosophical ideas, to be mentioned below. Some engage in ac- tions such as eating glass or putting skewers through part of one’s body to demonstrate one’s baraka or that of one’s shaykh.

Figure 12.4 Procession in honor of the khalifa of the Badawiyya during Mawlid of Ahmad al-Badawi .

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Some have given more importance to Sufi practices such as dhikr and ziyāra than to cor- responding Shari‘a practices such as salah and Hajj. Abu Sa’id ibn Abi al-Khayr (d. 1049) said that the true Hajj is the spiritual pilgrimage within oneself and that the heavenly Ka‘ba comes and circumambulates the wali. He encouraged people to visit the tomb of his shaykh. More often preference has been given to Sufi practices in practice but not in theory; e.g. some who show great devotion at a wali’s tomb may say that salah is necessary but perform it with less fervor. Likewise, the authority of the walis may be more lively for many than that of the prophets. The veneration of walis is viewed by some as kufr or at least bid‘a (see Ibn Taymiyya in the next chapter) and this view has become common among modern reformers.

These tendencies have made Sufis often willing to adopt and adapt the ideas and practices of the non-Muslims around them, ideas and practices that have often been considered “supersti- tions” and bid‘a by other Muslims. This, however, has helped to make them good missionaries

for Islam in much of the world.

Sufism, like Shari‘a-mindedness, has been largely male-oriented, but has had a bit more scope for female expression. One of the great- est of the early Sufis was Rabi‘a al-Adawiya (d. 801), a former slave girl, and there have been women in the tariqas and women shaykhs. Two of Ibn ‘Arabi’s (see below) Sufi teachers were women. Women are quite active in visiting the tombs of walis and par- ticipating in the mawlids. There is an ironic twist to Rabi‘a’s case. One of her biographers writes, “If it is proper to derive two-thirds of our religion from ‘A’isha (i.e. from the ha- diths she transmitted), surely it is permissible to take religious instruction from a handmaid of ‘A’isha. When a woman becomes a ‘man’ in the path of God, she is a man and one can- not any more call her a woman” (Attar 40).

For most Sufis these tensions can be and are reconciled. This can be illustrated by the dia- gram of a circle, radius and center. The cir- cumference of the circle is the Shari‘a, which must be accepted and lived by before going further. The radius is the path, tariqa, leading toward the center, the ḥaqīqa or the divine. Another illustration is drawn from the walnut.

Figure 12.5 A bi-shar‘ Sufi (one who sits lightly by the Shari‘a) as pictured on a leather scroll probably made for tourists.

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Its hard shell, which protects the kernel, is like the Shari‘a, which protects the tariqa. In fact, many of the ‘ulama’ have also been members of Sufi tariqas.

Historical outline The Sufi movement had its roots among the independent scholars and other pious people of the late Umayyad period, as did fiqh and theology. Some of these engaged in extreme asceticism, denying themselves the goods and the glory of this world. The most famous of these was al- Hasan al-Basri (see chapter eight), important also for the beginnings of theology, who wrote, “Beware of this world with all wariness, for it is like to a snake, smooth to the touch, but its venom is deadly … as I am told, God has created nothing more hateful to him than this world” (Arberry, 1970, 33–4). To this was soon added the concern for the love and direct experience, probably first by Rabi‘a al-Adawiya. She sang to God:

I love you with two kinds of love, a “selfish” love And a love that is truly appropriate to you. As for my “selfish” love, It is that thought of you turns me from all else. As for that truly appropriate love, It is that you lift the veil and I see you. No praise to me for either kind, To you the praise for both.

(Arberry, 1970, 43, modified)

Rabi‘a called for a totally disinterested love of God. She is said to have gone about the streets of Basra with a pail of water in one hand and a torch in the other. When asked about this, she

Shepard Diagram

Shari‘a

Tariqa

Haqiqa

Figure 12.6 Diagram of the relationship between the Shari‘a and the tariqa

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said that the pail of water was to put out the fires of hell and the torch was to burn up heaven, so that people would worship God for His own sake.

She was followed by other outstanding individuals. For example, Harith al-Muhasibi (781– 837) wrote especially about self-discipline. Dhu al-Nun the Egyptian (d. 861) is said to have been the first to formulate a theory of ma‘rifa, to have expressed passionate love for God and developed ideas related to fana’ and baqa’. Bayazid Bistami (d. 875) is considered the first of the “intoxicated” Sufis and developed more fully the idea of fana’. He was the first, also, to take the prophet’s mi‘rāj as a model for his experience. Al-Junayd, the well known “sober” Sufi, followed the line of al-Muhasibi and was probably the most important Sufi leader of this time. He provided the classic Sufi definition of tawhid, “separating the Eternal from what is created and temporal”. For him separation from God and union with God were both essential aspects of the Sufi experience. Abu al-Husayn al-Nuri (d. 907) was one of the first to speak of ‘ishq (passionate love) and died when in a state of ecstasy he ran through a field of cut reeds and slashed his feet but did not feel the pain. Al-Hallaj (d. 922) was undoubtedly the most fa- mous Sufi of this period and was executed in part for statements such as “I am the Truth”, but probably more because he was overly popular and perceived as a political threat in powerful circles and because of his own desire for martyrdom. He sang, “Kill me, my friends, for in my death is my life.”

After the death of al-Hallaj, the Sufi movement went through a period of consolidation and reflection. A number of writers compiled books recounting the lives of Sufis, explaining their teachings and seeking to show that Sufism is consistent with the Shari‘a. These include Abu Nasr al-Sarraj (d. 988), al-Kalabadhi (d. 990), Abu Talib al-Makki (d. 996), Sulami (d. 1021), Abu Nu‘aym al-Isfahani (d. 1037), Hujwiri (d. 1071, the first to write this sort of work in Persian) and Abu al-Qasim al-Qushayri (d. 1074). Al-Ghazali (d. 1111; see chapter thirteen) is often said to have reconciled the Sufi and Shari‘a traditions, but he stood very much on the shoulders of his predecessors, nor did the tension totally disappear after his time.

The early Sufis had circles of followers, but from about the thirteenth century the tariqas be- gan to be formed and to draw in large numbers of followers. This coincides roughly with the end of Shi‘i ascendency in many places and also to some extent with the end of mass conver- sion from the older religions, and it would appear that Sufism met spiritual needs that had earlier been met by these. Like Shi‘ism it allowed for considerable devotion to the Prophet’s family and the walis have a somewhat similar cosmic role to the Shi‘i Imams. Nevertheless, there are Shi‘i tariqas though Sufism is not as strong in the Shi‘i as the Sunni world. From probably the fourteenth century to the nineteenth century the tariqas were to be the most popular expressions of Islam in most places. It is possible to mention only a few of the more important here. The first of the tariqas, as mentioned above, was the Qadiriyya. Also early was the Suhrawardiya, founded by Abu Hafs al-Suhrawardi (1145–1234), which has been more willing than most to deal with political rulers. Both of these have spread widely and are strong in South Asia. The Shadhiliyya was founded in Tunisia by ‘Abdallah al-Shadhili (1196–

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1258) and spread to Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world. The Rifa‘iyya, founded by Ahmad ibn ‘Ali al-Rifa‘i (1106–1182), became known as “the howling dervishes” and engaged in dramatic behavior such as walking on coals, eating snakes, and cutting themselves with knives. The Mevlevi (or Mawlawi) tariqa, founded by Jalai al-Din Rumi (1207–1273) and strong in the Ottoman lands, is best known for its “whirling” dance, which is in fact a controlled and highly sym- bolic movement. The Naqshbandiyya, named after Baha’ al-Din Naqshband (d. 1390), are noted for their “silent” dhikr and the fact they trace their silsila to Abu Bakr. They insist on following the Shari‘a and seek politi- cal influence. Other Sufi tariqas that have been mentioned earlier are the Ahmadiyya and Bayumiyya in Egypt. The Bektashis in Turkey were close to the ruling classes in the Ottoman Empire, though their doctrines and practices are quite unorthodox by usual stan- dards. From around 1300 to 1900 the majority of Muslims probably had some connection with a tariqa.

Poetry and theosophy One of the major expressions of Sufism has been in poetry, not only in Arabic but in all of the major Islamic languages and especially in Persian. The greatest of the Persian poets is generally agreed to be Jalal al-Din Rumi, whose poetry arises out of a spirituality that was most strongly experienced in the context of an intense personal relationship with another Sufi, Shams-i Din-i Tabrizi. A few lines of his poetry have already been quoted. The following re- fers to the reed flute used in the Mevlevi dhikr, and evokes the longing both for God and his companion.

Hearken to this reed forlorn, Breathing, even since ‘twas torn, From its rushy bed a strain

Figure 12.7 Statue of Hajji Bektash (d. c. 1337), founder of the Bektashi tariqa, near Nevşehir, Turkey.

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Of impassioned love and pain. “The secret of my song, though near, none can see and none can hear. Oh, for a friend to know the sign, And mingle all his soul with mine! ‘Tis the flame of love that fired me, ‘Tis the wine of love inspired me. Wouldst thou learn how lovers bleed, Hearken, hearken to the reed!” (Nicholson Rumi 31)

A well known poem that deals both with a journey along the Sufi path and the final union with God is “The Conference of the Birds” by Farid al-Din ‘Attar (d. 1220). Here thirty birds set out to find the mythical simurgh (something like the phoenix in Western legend), suffering greatly along the way. When they are finally admitted into the simurgh’s presence they find (a reflec- tion of) themselves, for si murgh in Persian means “thirty birds”.

Sufis have developed speculative theories about God, humans and the universe that we call “theosophy”. These have been especially elaborated by thinkers such as Shihab al-Din al- Suhrawardi and Ibn ‘Arabi. Suhrawardi (1153–1191), who was killed for his views, taught a philosophy of “illumination” focused on light as the true nature of all existence. The human

Figure 12.8 Figurines of Mevlevis (“Whirling Dervishes”) engaged in sama‘, in the Mausoleum of Jalal al-Din Rumi.

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soul seeks to return to the angelic realm of light from which it came. He was influenced by the mystical side of Ibn Sina and claimed to draw on ancient wisdom transmitted through the Greeks and the Persians.

The greatest of the theosophers was Muhyi al-Din ibn ‘Arabi (1166–1240), known to his fol- lowers down to the present as al-shaykh al-akbar, the greatest master. Drawing on a wide range of previous thought, pre-Islamic and Islamic, he developed an extraordinarily complex system. He often used the language of philosophy to express what for him was based on mys- tical intuition rather than reason. At the heart of it is the idea of waḥdat al-wujūd, the unity of existence (or being). The existence of the creation is not other than the existence of God, though creation is not identical with God. “You are no other than God … though you do not become He nor He you …”. Being at its highest level is unmanifest and indescribable but at another level it is Allah, Lord, and the various names ascribed to God in the Muslim tradition, and these in turn are correlated with and interdependent on things in the world. Everything in the world (even evil things) is connected with one or more names of God. In effect, the world is the means by which God knows and expresses himself, “It is for this that the Reality created me, I give content to His knowledge and manifest him” (Ibn al-‘Arabi Bezels 95). This is an interpretion of the hadith qudsi: “I was a hidden treasure and longed to be known, so I created the world”. It is also reflected in the following oft-quoted lines of Ibn ‘Arabi’s poetry:

My heart has become capable of every form: it is a pasture of gazelles and a convent for Christian monks.

And a temple for idols and the pilgrims’ Ka‘ba and the tables of the Torah and the book of the Qur’an.

I follow the religion of Love: whatever way Love’s camels take, that is my religion and my faith. (Ibn al-‘Arabi Tarjuman 67)

This expresses tolerance in that God is manifested in all of these forms, but it also implies the author’s claim to high spiritual status, since he can perceive the divine in all of them, while most people would be limited to one. The Essence of Muhammad (ḥaqīqa muḥammadiyya, see chapter six) corresponds to the totality of the divine names and plays an important role in this system. In these and his many other teachings, his followers say that he was not so much innovating as expressing more fully and openly what his predecessors had believed. Ibn ‘Arabi seems to have seen himself as the “seal of the walis”, i.e. the completer of the cycle of esoteric teaching following Muhammad.

While reviled by many, Ibn ‘Arabi was followed by many more and he massively influenced both his detractors and his followers. Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624) was both a follower and a critic of Ibn ‘Arabi. He taught the “unity of appearance” (waḥdat al-shuhūd), according to which the ecstatic perceives only God but later moves to a state where he recognizes the exis-

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tence of other things, as one may recognize that stars exist even though they are hidden by the sun. He also developed complex ideas about the cosmic hierarchy that seem to have involved a high status for himself.

Iran saw the development of ‘irfan, a mystical but strongly intellectual tradition that is not considered part of Sufism. Its greatest exponent was Mullah Sadra (d. 1640), who developed the ideas of Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi and Ibn ‘Arabi. He takes his departure from the pure experi- ence of existence (as distinct from the idea of existence or qualities in the mind), which is tran- scendent but different on every occasion. God is existence in its purest form. The tradition of ‘irfan continues to this day among the Iranian ‘ulama’ and Ayatollah Khomeini was one of its practitioners.

Some recent developments Since the late nineteenth century the tariqas have been under considerable pressure from re- formers, both modernist and Islamist, accused of superstition, unIslamic activity and lack of relevance to modern society. While they do not have the dominance they once had, they have adapted and retained considerable influence. Under communism they were often better able to maintain themselves than the ‘ulama’ because of their more flexible organization. Some have attracted Western converts and some make use of the internet (e.g. Naqshbandi-Haqqani) and other media. Sufi theosophy has also attracted some attention from intellectuals.

A small but interesting movement is the one called “primordialism” or “traditionalism”. Its propounders are mostly European intellectuals, such as René Guenon and Frithjof Schuon, many of whom have been initiated into Sufi tariqas. For them ultimate reality transcends the personal God and can be intuited by the intellect, but only by an elite. The major religions in their traditional or orthodox forms provide partial symbols through which ordinary people may be guided. These religions are essentially equal, each having its advantages and disadvantages. The “primordialists” reject modern rationalism as a step away from, not toward, the primor- dial truth. They may be said to be modern heirs of Ibn ‘Arabi, but with their own distinctive approach.

Sufism has offered its benefits at several levels. A few claim to reach the highest level of God- consciousness. Many more experience an improvement in their moral and spiritual life. Many focus on the concrete benefits of the karamat. The tariqas also fulfil a number of social needs, for individuals and society.

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Key Points You Need to Know Sufism seeks an intimate knowledge of God and stresses love. •

Tariqa• , the path, refers both to the Sufi disciplines and to the large scale groups often called “orders” in English.

The relationship between master and disciple (• shaykh and murid) is central to the struc- ture of Sufism.

The final goal, often called • fana’, is described in diverse and often unconventional ways.

Both in this and in many of its practices Sufism often seems to violate Shari‘a stan-• dards but Sufis find ways to reconcile these.

Poetry is a major form of Sufi expression. •

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading Al-Attar, Farid al-Din (1966) Muslim Saints and Mystics, trans. A.J. Arberry, London:

Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Arberry, A.J. (1950) Sufism, An Account of the Mystics of Islam, London: George Allen & Unwin.

Biegman, Nicolas H. and Schwartz, Gary (1990) Egypt, Moulids, Saints, Sufis, The Hague: SDU Publishers.

Ernst, Carl W. (1985) Words of Ecstasy in Sufism, Albany: State University of New York Press.

Ernst, Carl W. (1997) Sufism, Boston, MA: Shambala.

Haeri, Shaykh Fadhalla (1990) The Elements of Sufism, Shaftesbury: Element Books Ltd.

Hoffman, Valerie J. (1995), Sufism, Mystics and Saints in Modern Egypt, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

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Ibn al-’Arabi (1980) The Bezels of Wisdom, trans. R.W.J. Austin, New York: Paulist Press.

Mernissi, Fatima (1977) “Women, Saints and Sanctuaries”, Signs 3: 101–112.

Nurbakhsh, Javad (1982) Sufism, trans. W.C. Chittick, New York: Khaniqahi-Nimatullahi Publications.

Rumi (1950) Rumi, Poet and Mystic: Selections from His Writings, trans. R.A. Nicholson, London: Allen and Unwin.

Schimmel, Annemarie (1975) Mystical Dimensions of Islam, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Schuon, Frithjof (1976) Islam and the Perennial Philosophy, London: World of Islamic Festival Publishing Co.

Smith, Margaret (1928) Rabi‘a the Mystic and Her Fellow Saints in Islam, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Trimingham, J.S. (1971) The Sufi Orders in Islam, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Waugh, Earle H. (1989) The Munshidin of Egypt: Their World and Their Song, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

Web Resources Sufi.Soul, Documentary. 49 minutes. Generally a historical format. Considerable music,

underlines contrast with Islamism. http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=47852332608 26397134

Website of the Mevlevi order. http://www.sufism.org/society/index.html

Website of the Naqshbandi Haqqani order. http://naqshbandi.org/

Website of the Nimatullahi Sufi order. http://www.nimatullahi.org/

A Philosopher, a Scholar- mystic, and a Reformer

In This Chapter In this chapter we shall consider three major figures from the classical period. Ibn Sina is gen- erally considered the greatest of the classical Muslim philosophers. Al-Ghazali perhaps did the most to integrate the various strands of Muslim thinking, philosophy, theology, fiqh and Sufism. Ibn Taymiyya was a fearless reformer who inspires both reformers and radicals among Sunnis today.

Main Topics Covered Ibn Sina, his life and teachings •

Al-Ghazali, his life and teachings •

Ibn Taymiyya, his life and teachings •

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Ibn Sina

Abu ‘Ali ibn Sina (980–1037) took the definitive steps in Islamizing the Greek philosophical tradition, although he has perhaps been more appreciated among Westerners than among Muslims. He was no “ivory tower” philosopher, however, but like some others was also a physician and an active politician. Information about his life is mainly based on a biography begun by him and finished by his disciple. Ibn Sina’s father was an official in the Samanid court in Bukhara and had some sympathy with the Isma‘ilis. From family talk Ibn Sina learned something about their doctrines as well as something of philosophy. Based on his own account Ibn Sina was a child prodigy (probably true, given has later accomplishments). By the age of ten he had mem- orized the Qur’an and many literary works and by eighteen he had studied fiqh and mastered medicine and philosophy largely by studying on his own. This was facilitated when the ruler opened his library to him after he had helped treat him for an illness.

When he was twenty-two his father died and he took an administrative position under the ruler, but soon had to flee when the Qarakhanid Turks took control of Bukhara about this time. He kept moving from court to court, spending time in Jurjan, Rayy and Hamadhan. His moves were dictated in part by his desire not to be taken to the court of Mahmud of Ghazna, who was extending his empire into Iran. Mahmud was a patron of scholars but a militant op- ponent of Shi‘ism and Mu‘tazilism. Though Ibn Sina did not admit to either of these positions he preferred the patronage of the Buyids or their allies. Finally, in 1024, he made his way to Isfahan, where he spent the rest of his life enjoying the favor of the ruler, ‘Ala’ al-Dawla ibn Kakuya, who patronized scholars and whom Ibn Sina often accompanied on campaigns. Life was not secure even here, however, as ‘Ala’ al-Dawla was very much under pressure from the Ghaznavids. Ibn Sina died in Hamadhan when he insisted on joining ‘Ala’ al-Dawla there al- though he was quite sick. On more than one occasion his medical ability helped gain him favor

Map 5 Middle East in the early Thirteenth century and cities men- tioned in this chapter

Shepard Map 6

Jurjan Rayy

Hamadhan

Tus

Baghdad

Jerusalem

Nishapur Harran

Cairo

Damascus

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with a ruler. He became a wazir several times but was also almost killed in a mutiny and later imprisoned in Hamadhan. (Link for more on Ibn Sina’s life and writings.)

Through all of this activity he wrote a large number of works on philosophy, medicine and other topics. Much of this writing was done at night after an active day’s work. He regularly took wine to assist him in his thinking and writing, arguing that the prohibition on wine is not absolute for those who can benefit from it and not abuse it. His Qānūn was to be the main authority on medicine even in the West until the sixteenth or seventeenth century. His most important compendia of philosophy are Shifā’ (“Healing”), Najāt (“Salvation”, a sum- mary of Shifa’) Ishārāt wa-Tanbīhāt (“Hints and Pointers”, more mystical in orientation), and Danishnameh-yi ‘Ala’i (“Book of Knowledge” dedicated to ‘Ala’ al-Dawla, the first major philosophical work written in Persian).

Building on the work of al-Farabi and his predecessors, Ibn Sina developed a “grand theory” of the universe impressive for its comprehensiveness and coherence, integrating science and religion in a manner we hardly imagine possible today. In the interests of brevity the following presentation omits many of Ibn Sina’s proofs and many details and sacrifices some precision.

We may begin with his distinction between essence and existence. The essence of a thing is the characteristics it must have to be itself. Its existence is whether it actually exists or not. Something can have essence and not existence, e.g. a unicorn. Other things, such as my house, may exist at one time but not another. These latter are possible or contingent. If one traces back the causes of any contingent thing one must come, finally, Ibn Sina argues, to something whose existence is not contingent but necessary, i.e. whose existence is included in its essence and therefore has to exist.

The lady

Muhammad is reported to have said that a kingdom ruled by a woman would not prosper, and in fact if one looks at the formal of lists of Muslim rulers one finds very few women. Two of these are ‘Asma bint Shihab (d. 1087), who ruled together with her husband and Arwa bint Ahmad (d. 1138), who ruled almost 40 years in her own name. Both were of the Isma‘ili Sulayhi dynasty. Another example is Shajarat al-Durr, mentioned in chapter four. In a number of cases women effectively ruled through their husbands or sons (whose names are found in the lists).

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Ibn Sina lived in Rayy under one such woman, known as Sayyida (the Lady), who ruled from 997 to 1029 in the name of her son, Majd al-Dawla, whom she is said to have distracted with wine and the harem. When Mahmud of Ghazna was asked why he did not intervene there, since his ambitions were well known, he said that since the place was ruled by a woman, he had nothing to fear from that quarter. A differ- ent perspective, however, is afforded by a letter she is said to have written to him, in which she said,

“I said to myself, ‘Sultan Mahmud is a reasonable monarch; he knows that a ruler like himself ought not to make war against a woman like me.’ But should you come, God knows I will not run. For there can be but two outcomes, since one army must be beaten: If it is mine that carries the day, I shall write to the entire world that I have broken Sultan Mahmud, who broke a hundred kings …. But if it is you who are the victor, what will you write? That you have broken the power of a woman?”

(Goodman 27)

After her death Mahmud took over Rayy, but Ibn Sina had already left for Isfahan.

According to Ibn Sina this necessary existent must be one, must know itself and this knowl- edge must be the cause of everything else. In religious terms, this is God. This proof was taken over by Thomas Aquinas and other Christian theologians.

Prior to Copernicus, Muslims and Christians believed that the earth was surrounded by nine heavenly spheres, living beings with bodies and souls, in which the stars and planets were set. According to Ibn Sina these spheres came into existence in the following manner. By know- ing itself the Necessary Existent emanates an intelligence (understood as a distinct substance). This in turn, by thinking of the necessary existent in one way and of itself in two different ways, emanates a second intelligence along with the soul and body of the outer sphere of the universe. The soul of this sphere longs for the intelligence that emanated it but cannot reach it and so rotates. The second intelligence emanates a third intelligence, and the soul and body of the next sphere, that of the fixed stars. This process continues through the spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury and the Moon. This is not a temporal order, however, but an order of causal dependence. The universe has always existed and will always exist es- sentially as it is. The intelligences correspond to angels in religious terminology.

The tenth intelligence, also known as the Active Intelligence and the Angel Gabriel, is too far removed from the source of existence to emanate a single perfect and unified intelligence, soul

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and body. These are, rather, diffracted into a multitude of entities, thus creating the sublunar world of change and decay. At the lowest level is matter, which receives progressively souls that make it into things, plants and animals, each level with its appropriate faculties. Among the animal faculties are the five exterior senses (sight, hearing, etc.) and five interior senses, including imagination and memory. Humans have in addition to the animal soul a rational soul or intellect, emanated directly from the Active Intelligence. Because of this connection with the Active Intelligence this soul is capable of individual immortality. It has a practical intellect by which humans engage in arts and crafts and develop moral principles. It also has a theoreti- cal intellect which puts it in contact with the Active Intelligence and which provides the ability to think abstractly. Beyond this, for some, there is the “acquired intellect”. Here truths come from the Active Intelligence as a direct vision, either in a discursive or fully intuitive way. This is the level of the philosophers and the prophets. The prophets are at a higher level than the philosophers because in addition to receiving the truths they are able, with the aid of the imaginative faculty, to clothe them in symbols for ordinary people.

The “acquired intellect” seems to be a form of mystical experience. Mysticism here does not contradict reason but represents its full flowering. Ibn Sina may have gone further. In three al- legorical stories, Hayy ibn Yaqzan, the Epistle of the Bird and Salman and Absal, he may have pointed toward a symbolism and a mysticism that is less rational and worldly, possibly moving in the direction of al-Suhrawardi’s thinking (see chapter eleven), but this is a matter of debate among scholars.

Religion, including the Shari‘a, depends on the symbols produced by the prophets. For ex- ample, common people are thought to be unable to understand or appreciate the eternity of the universe or the survival of the soul without a body, so the prophet speaks of creation ex nihilo and the resurrection of bodies. The truth behind the first is that the world is totally dependent on God, even if it is eternal. As for the second, those whose intelligences are not adequately developed will miss the highest bliss after death, which comes from contemplating the spiri- tual realms, but their imaginations will create for them a quasi-physical realm in accordance with their moral character, i.e. a heaven or a hell that will be subjectively quite real.

This whole system is driven by ‘ishq, passionate love, as each element yearns for what is above it. (Love makes the world go round!) But it is also quite logical and apparently quite deterministic. Things happen almost by logical necessity and no beings, even God, seem to ex- ercise any real choice. This contrasts with the main line of Sunni theology, which wants to pre- serve absolute freedom for God. Whatever we may say about it scientifically or theologically today, it is one of the most elegant worldviews developed by humans and a major intellectual ancestor of contemporary Western and Muslim thought.

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Al-Ghazali Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111) has been called by some the greatest Muslim since Muhammad, though roundly criticized by others. He made significant contributions to most of the religious sciences and contributed, perhaps more than any other one person, to the recon- ciliation of the Shari‘a-minded and Sufi approaches to the faith.

Al-Ghazali was born in Tus, in Khurasan, and began his studies there. In 1074 he went to Nishapur to study under the prominent Ash‘ari theologian, al-Juwayni, known as the Imam of the Two Sanctuaries because he had spent time in Mecca and Medina. Al-Ghazali stayed there until al-Juwayni’s death in 1085. He may have also had some Sufi instruction during this peri- od. He then went to the headquarters of Nizam al-Mulk, the wazir of the Saljuk Turkish amirs, who had taken control in Baghdad in 1055 and were at the height of their power. Nizam al- Mulk was both a gifted administrator and a patron of scholarship and he became al-Ghazali’s patron. In 1091 he appointed al-Ghazali professor at the Nizamiyya madrasa in Baghdad, the most important of the madrasas currently being built. There he taught fiqh, along with other subjects. He was recognized as a brilliant, up and coming young man and for about four years was one of the most prominent figures in Baghdad. During this period he also studied phi- losophy on his own and wrote a refutation of it. He also wrote a forceful defense of the caliph against the Nizari Isma‘ilis (Batinis), whose campaign of proselytizing and assassination had recently begun. In July of 1095, however, he suffered an emotional breakdown that prevented him from teaching and led him to leave Baghdad. He later gave as the reason for this a feeling that he was working for worldly honor rather than for God and the afterlife and that he was in grave spiritual danger. One thinks that the stress of an extremely heavy work load may have contributed and also political factors. In 1092 Nizam al-Mulk had been killed by the Isma‘ilis and al-Ghazali may have feared the same fate. Also, the political situation in Baghdad had be- come less stable after Nizam al-Mulk’s death.

From Baghdad he went to Damascus and spent his time in ascetic and spiritual exercises. He also visited Jerusalem and made the Hajj (1096). Family and financial concerns led him to return briefly to Baghdad and then to go to Tus, about 1099, where he continued his spiritual practices and did some teaching. During this period he wrote his major work, The Revival of the Religious Sciences (Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn), a major compendium of religious theory and practice. During this period and soon afterward he also wrote two important works on fiqh. In 1106 he was prevailed on by the current wazir, the son of Nizam al-Mulk, to teach in the Nizamiyya madrasa in Nishapur, and did so for four or five years. He then retired to Tus, where he had a madrasa and a zawiya, and where he died soon after.

Near the end of his life he wrote a short, schematic autobiography called The Deliverer from Error, in which he uses his life experience to guide spiritual seekers. (Link to one of several translations of this.) It will be convenient to follow the structure of this book in presenting

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his thinking. He tells us that as a young man he was briefly a complete skeptic, doubting not only religious propositions but also the truth of sense experience and the validity of the basic axioms of reason. God, he says cured him of doubt about sense perceptions and the axioms of reason, but he was left to seek certainty in religious matters.

He first considers theology, but concludes that since it usually argues from the premises pro- vided by its opponents and does not go back to first principles, it is useful only for answering certain objections. For people who do not have those particular objections it will probably be harmful, like the wrong medicine for an illness. He did in fact write a major work of Ash‘ari kalam and made two major contributions to it, introducing syllogistic reasoning and calling attention to certain issued raised by philosophy. He also, however, wrote a work urging that ordinary people be kept away from theology. Next he deals with philosophy, which does claim to start from first principles. Al-Ghazali accepts much of philosophy, including logic, math- ematics and most of natural science, but rejects much of their metaphysics. He first wrote a book, The Intentions of the Philosophers, in which he presented Ibn Sina’s views, and then an- other book, The Refutation of the Philosophers, in which he criticized them on twenty points. Of these, three, he says, involve kufr (unbelief), the eternity of the world, the survival of souls without their bodies, and the claim that God knows universals but not particulars (possibly a misunderstanding of Ibn Sina’s view). On the second of these points, however, there are sug- gestions in other writings that Ghazali may have accepted the philosophers’ view. Third, he deals with the Batinis or Isma’ilis. He rejects their claim that certainty can be found with a liv- ing infallible Imam. There is an infallible Imam, to be sure, but he is the Prophet Muhammad, and ijtihad provides a valid link to his Sunna. In this connection he wrote a book deriving the rules of logic, on which ijtihad depends, from the Qur’an.

Finally, he deals with the Sufis and it is among them that Ghazali finds what he is seeking. The Sufi experience (dhawq) goes beyond intellect just as intellect goes beyond sense experience. While it falls far short of prophecy, it is analogous to it and can provide a glimpse of the nature of prophecy and a reason for faith in it. Indeed, simply associating with Sufis without having their experience is enough and, failing this, dreams are also analogous to prophecy and are ex- perienced by all. Along with this, knowledge about Muhammad and his activities will be suf- ficient to convince one that Muhammad was a prophet.

He affirms the experience of fana’ but denies it involves union with God. In a more advanced work on spirituality, The Niche for Lights, he says that those who in a “drunken” state say such things as “I am the Real” perceive only God in that state but on return to sobriety they realize that there was not a real union, for this contradicts reason and reason is “God’s balance-scale on earth”. Therefore these shatḥs should not be stated publicly. In this same work, however, he ignores the difference between intellect and mystical experience (dhawq) that he draws in the Deliverer and presents a psychology and cosmology that is very neo-Platonic, a point noted by his critic, Ibn Rushd. Moreover, he states that only God has true existence and all other exis- tence is derivative from Him. This is a neo-Platonic position but is stated in a way that could

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be seen as pointing toward Suhrawardi’s illumination or Ibn ‘Arabi’s unity of existence. Al- Ghazali more than once indicates that there are Sufi teachings that cannot be written down, so it is impossible to know his final position on some things.

Sufism is also important to al-Ghazali as a moral force, both for producing moral character and for deepening the understanding of the Shari‘a. For example, in discussing fasting in the Ihya’ he distinguishes three levels: the fast of the common people, which involves abstinence at the physical level; the fast of the elite, which involves abstinence from sinful thoughts, speech, etc.; and the fast of the elite of the elite, which is to abstain from thinking about anything but God and the Last Day.

His approach to those Sufi practices criticized by the strict Shari‘a-minded is illustrated by his discussion of music in the Ihya’. He analyzes the nature and effect of music at some length and concludes that it is not forbidden in and of itself but its actual valuation depends on the listen- ers. It is forbidden for most people because it will stir up their lusts and blameworthy qualities and also where the lyrics involve something forbidden or instruments associated with drink- ing are used. It is reprehensible when these are not the case since it encourages the listener in vain activities. It is permissible for the one who uses it only for wholesome pleasure or where it encourages people to engage in permissible activities, such as permitted love and permitted expressions of joy and sorrow. It is recommended where it encourages recommended or oblig- atory actions, such as going on Hajj or fighting in a legitimate war. It is also recommended for properly prepared Sufis, in whom it will stir up the love of God that is already in their hearts. For them, even poetry in praise of wine or forbidden love will be taken as referring to God or spiritual things and thus be permissible.

Al-Ghazali saw himself as a spiritual physician, tailoring his treatment to different needs. For most people it is enough to follow tradition. For those inclined to question, theology and refu- tation of philosophical errors may be sufficient. For those with the need and ability, Sufism properly practiced is the way. This involves an esotericism in which there is often one teach- ing for the common people, and others for elite. In this lies the key to his “reconciliation” of Shari‘a-mindedness and Sufism, and of his integration of other aspects of the Islamic tradition as it was in his time. Different things are appropriate to different people and if this is recog- nized the different currents of Islam can live in harmony.

Al-Ghazali’s views have been criticized by many, including Ibn Rushd, who wrote a refuta- tion of them, The Refutation of The Refutation, and his books have even been burned. On the whole, however, he has been extremely influential and is still much studied today, by both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars. (Links to articles by Nofal and Nakamura.) His personal inner struggle and his effort to reconcile diverse religious currents echo positively for many today.

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Ibn Taymiyya If Ibn Sina was the greatest of the philosophers and al-Ghazali according to some the greatest of the Muslims generally, Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) was perhaps the greatest of the mavericks. He was convinced that many of the religious leaders and people of his time had deviated seriously from the teachings of the Qur’an and the Prophet’s Sunna, and he called for a society that was truly obedient to the Shari‘a. For him Ibn Sina was one of several major dangers to the umma’s faith and al-Ghazali represented a kind of compromise that was almost as dangerous. He was a pious, learned and courageous man, but also outspoken, defiant and not afraid to make enemies. His greatest enemies were among the leading ‘ulama’ and Sufi shaykhs, while the rulers often protected him.

The political world in which he lived was dominated by the Mamlukes and the Mongols. The Mamlukes had taken control of Egypt and Syria in 1250. In 1258 the Mongols had sacked Baghdad but in 1260 the Mamlukes had stopped their advance at Ain Jalut, south of Damascus. Conflict between the Mamlukes and the Mongols continued, however, even after the Mongol leaders converted to Islam in 1295, and the Mongols threatened Damascus more than once.

The Mamlukes, under whom Ibn Taymiyya lived, were slaves, mostly of Turkish origin, who had been purchased as children and trained to be soldiers. The leading commanders (amirs) formed an oligarchy from among whom the sultan was chosen, often by violent methods. While the Mamlukes were often brutal they patronized the religious and charitable institutions, building monumental mosques, madrasas, hospitals and khanqas, often connected with tombs for themselves. While they could be harsh with religious leaders, they also often listened to them, since they were influential with the people. The sultan during much of Ibn Taymiyya’s career, al-Nasir Muhammad ibn Qalaun (r 1293–1340), was twice deposed and restored to power. He was generally favorable to Ibn Taymiyya.

Ibn Taymiyya was born in 1263 in Harran, in northern Syria (now southern Turkey), into a family of Hanbali scholars. In 1268 the family moved to Damascus to escape the Mongols and there he studied the various religious sciences with his father and others, including one woman teacher, Zaynab bint Makki. He also studied philosophy and theology on his own. He was evi- dently initiated into the Qadiri tariqa by his father and an uncle. After his father died, in 1282, he took his position as professor of Hanbali fiqh and came to have a considerable following in Syria. In 1292 he performed the Hajj, later complaining of some innovations (bid‘a) he had witnessed. In 1294 he was involved in a protest against a Christian scribe who was accused of insulting the Prophet Muhammad. About five years later he produced a statement of belief criticizing the Ash‘ari view of divine attributes, and refused to recognize the qadi’s authority to question him.

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When the Mongols threatened Damascus in 1300 he was one of the leaders of the party calling for jihad in resistance against them and in 1303 he was present as a preacher at the Mongol de- feat at Shaqqab and issued a fatwa saying those fighting do not have to fast. He was also pres- ent at a battle in northern Syria against Isma‘ilis.

Soon afterward he was again questioned by the authorities about his view of the divine attri- butes, first, apparently, in Damascus and then in Cairo, and then was put in prison for a year and a half. There, according to some, he undertook to teach his fellow prisoners and virtually turned the prison into a madrasa.

During this period he demonstrated his opposition to various actions and ideas of the Sufis, writing a letter to one of the leading Sufis in Cairo denouncing Ibn ‘Arabi’s doctrines. Later a popular demonstration against him by Sufis led to his imprisonment for a few months. At a time when Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad had been deposed by a coup, Ibn Taymiyya was again arrested and held for seven months, but released when the sultan returned to power. He was sometimes consulted by the sultan but it is said that he refused to give the sultan a fatwa that would have allowed him to take revenge on his enemies.

In 1313 he returned to Damascus and resumed his teaching position. In 1318 he was forbidden to give fatwas on certain matters relating to divorce. He disobeyed this order and was impris- oned for some months. In 1326 he was imprisoned for a fatwa he had written earlier against the visitation of tombs and remained there until his death in 1328. During this imprisonment he wrote a lot but then was deprived of books, paper and ink, after a complaint by one of his enemies whom he had abused in something he wrote. It is said that as many as 200,000 men and 15,000 women attended his funeral. Some, it is also said, sought pieces of his clothing and other relics, something he would have certainly disapproved of. He was buried in a Sufi cemetery.

Ibn Taymiyya’s basic demand was for a strict, though not necessarily rigid, obedience to the Qur’an and Sunna with minimal admixture of human speculation, partiality or popular practice.

In theology he adhered to Ibn Hanbal’s “without how” (bila kayf). He argued that the philo- sophical, Mu‘tazili and even Ash‘ari views of God’s attibrutes denuded them of reality. If the Qur’an says that God sits on his throne then we must affirm this, while remembering that it also says, “There is nothing like him” (42:11). Any further elaboration leads away from the truth. His opponents accused him of anthropomorphism. Interestingly, he held that the Qur’an was uncreated but not eternal. For him the ethical effect of a doctrine was central. Predestination (qadar) should be accepted as a reason for bearing up in adversity but not as an excuse for sinning or for tyranny.

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While al-Ghazali had accepted logic as propounded by the philosophers and incorporated the syllogism into theological reasoning, Ibn Taymiyya rejected this logic as overly formalized and not giving the certainty claimed for it. He wrote a long book on this subject. Ibn Taymiyya also criticized both the philosophers and al-Ghazali on the grounds that their goal was knowl- edge of God, whereas the proper goal is obedience to God.

While Ibn Taymiyya approved of a moderate Sufism that would help people to obey God, he vigorously opposed Ibn ‘Arabi’s unity of existence (wahdat al-wujud), “God, praises be to Him, is not his own creature, and not a part of His creation or an attribute of it”. To say that we share “existence” with God is misleading, because this shared “existence” is only in our minds, not something “out there”. More seriously, this doctrine appears to destroy the differ- ence between good and evil. The proper goal is not unity of existence but unity of will, where the believer desires and does only what God desires. Likewise true fana’ is complete worship and obedience to God.

Ibn Taymiyya likewise opposed aspects of popular religion such as the veneration of relics and visits to the tombs of holy men, and dramatic activities such as eating of glass, walking on fire, handling serpents, which the Rifa’i Sufis engaged in at the time. His fatwa on this particularly got him into trouble.

As we have seen in chapter eight, Ibn Taymiyya rejected the division between siyasa (gov- ernment policy) and Shari‘a made by some. Government in particular should be carried out according to the Shari‘a and the ruler’s legitimacy was derived precisely from doing this, not from divine choice (in the Shi‘i sense) nor from election by the umma (as in earlier Sunni theory). This was the basis of his fatwa against the Mongols. They now claimed to be Muslims but were still governing according to the pre-Islamic Mongol law. Thus they were still kafirs. This fatwa was to be claimed as a precedent by the assassins of the Egyptian president in 1981.

Interpretation of the Shari‘a must rigorously follow the Qur’an, the Sunna and the ijma‘ of the earliest generations of Muslims (salaf), but beyond this it must not be bound by any exist- ing ijma‘, since circumstances are constantly changing. One must, rather, apply the revealed texts directly to the existing situation with attention to the welfare of the Muslims (maslaha). Ilham (Sufi-style inspiration) was an acceptable source of guidance, and indeed preferable to a weak analogy or weak hadith, but was fallible like all ijtihad. Ibn Taymiyya considered him- self a mujtahid and had no idea that the gate of ijtihad was closed, as some were claiming. His strictness is illustrated in his position on the divorce spoken three times in the same ‘idda (see chapter ten). It is considered by most to be valid in terms of effect but morally a violation of the Shari‘a. Ibn Taymiyya denied its validity as well as its morality.

Ibn Taymiyya was controversial in his lifetime and had limited influence in the immediately following centuries. In modern times, however, he has inspired many Sunni reformers, both

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modernist and Islamist, precisely on the points on which he was controversial. (Link to favor- able and less favorable views.) All three people discussed in this chapter appeal to people in modern times, though for somewhat different reasons.

Key Points You Need to Know Ibn Sina was the greatest of the Islamic philosophers and also led an active political • life.

He produced a comprehensive theory of the universe that provides the framework for • much later thinking, both Muslim and Western.

He understood religion to be a popularization of philosophical truths in symbolic • terms.

Ghazali’s emotional breakdown led him to commit himself to the Sufi way, according • to his account.

Ghazali sought to integrate the various currents of Muslim thinking and practice on a • Sufi basis.

Ibn Taymiyya struggled to get the community to follow the Qur’an and • Sunna and to reject the various practices that he considered bid‘a.

He believed that the Shari‘a should be applied in all areas of life. •

He often got into trouble for his insistence on these things. •

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading

Ibn Sina

Corbin, Henri (1960) Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, trans., Willard R. Trask. New York: Pantheon Books (includes translation of one of the visionary recitals).

Goodman, L.E. (1992) Avicenna, London; New York: Routledge.

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Ibn Sina (1974) The Life of Ibn Sina, ed. and trans., William E. Gohlman, Albany, NY: SUNY Press (Ibn Sina’s autobiography).

Nasr, S.H. (1964) Three Muslim Sages: Avicenna, Suhrawardi, Ibn Arabi, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Netton, Ian R. (1989) Allah Transcendent, London; New York: Routledge.

Al-Ghazali

Al-Ghazali (1924) Al-Ghazzal’s Mishkat al-Anwar (The Niche for Lights) trans., W.H.T. Gairdner: London: Royal Asiatic Society.

Al-Ghazali (1953) The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali, trans., W.M. Watt, London: Allen & Unwin., (Al-Ghazali’s autobiography).

Al-Ghazali (1980) Freedom and Fulfillment, trans., McCarthy, Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers (translates several works).

Moosa, Ebrahim (2005) Ghazali and the Poetics of Imagination, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Watt, W. Montgomery (1963) Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al-Ghazali, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Ibn Taymiyya

Ibn Taymiyya (1984) A Muslim Theologian’s Response to Christianity: Ibn Taymiyya’s Al- Jawab al-Sahih, trans., T. Michel. Delmar, NY: Caravan Books.

Memon, M.A. (1976) Ibn Taymiyya’s Struggle against Popular Religion, The Hague: Mouton (includes translation of a major work).

Culture and Counter-Culture

In This Chapter Islamic religion has been conditioned by the Islamic civilization that it helped to create and cannot be fully understood apart from it. This chapter will give a very selective overview of the art, architecture, literature and music of that civilization as they relate to religion.

Main Topics Covered Visual art: arabesque, calligraphy •

Visual art: pictures •

Architecture, especially mosques •

Literature: poetry, prose •

Music •

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In the case of art and architecture the main attention will be on how it reflects Islamic religion or spirituality. In the case of literature there will be more focus on the anti-reli-gious, or anti-pious, forms, since much religious literature has already been dealt with. Music has held an ambiguous position. In Islam, as in other civilizations, the religious has stood in some degree of tension with aggressively worldly elements. Nevertheless, the line between the secular and the religious is often not very clear.

Visual art

Arabesque One of the most distinctive Islamic art forms is the arabesque, which includes both floral and geometrical ornamental designs (although the term is sometimes limited to the floral form). These may be found on almost any surface, such as the wall of a building, the page of book, a carpet or the surface of an implement or utensil. Historically they derive from the ornamental leaf designs of the ancient world, but they become much more important and less naturalistic in Muslim art.

The floral arabesques involve flowers, leaves and stems in stylized, repetitive and usually interweaving form. Often there is no central focus and the elements may be seen as growing out of each other. Thus the eye is encouraged to move from one part to another, but not in a particular direction. They do not reproduce nature as it is but rather abstract from it something more regular and harmonious, though still quite complex. Much the same can be said of the geometrical form, except that it carries the abstraction from nature much further and presents perhaps “purer” forms.

Figure 14.1 Geometrical arabesque, Fez, Morocco. (Courtesy Peter Sanders/Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA)

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These are often said to express the divine unity underlying the world of diversity and the harmony it imparts to this world. They may be interpreted as the Platonic forms underlying the physical world or, in Islamic esoteric terms, the world of images interme- diate between the mundane world and God. They are sometimes described as a visual expression of what one experiences in con- templation. Also, they reject individualism as an ideal. Arabesques applied to massive walls give them a much lighter and ethereal aspect. We might say that they speak of the ephemeral nature of the physical world, of the beauty and harmony of the spiritual world behind the physical, and of the unity of the source of all of this. Isma‘il Faruqi, a leading twentieth-century Muslim academic, has argued that

the arabesque provides an intuition of infinity and a realization that it cannot be achieved in this world. Since it is repetitive it has no built-in limit but is cut off by an arbitrary boundary (e.g. the end of the wall or page, the frame of the picture). The eye wants to continue on past the limit to infinity if it were possible, but it isn’t. I do not think this holds in every case, but it does in some. Faruqi ar- gues that the main purpose of Islamic art is not to depict the divine, which is impossible, but to depict the fact that the divine cannot be depicted.

Calligraphy Calligraphy (beautiful writing) using the Arabic script arose very naturally as an “art” form in the Islamic context since God has spoken to humans in words and words are put into visual form as writing. Writing has been described as “a distant shadow of the divine act” (Burckhardt 51). The words of God in the Qur’an are the fullest expression of God in the material world and it is appropriate that

Figure 14.2 Floral Arabesque in the Topkapi Palace, Istanbul. Also shown is the “tree of life”, a frequent theme from early Islamic times.

Figure 14.3 Window in the Hospital of Sultan Qalaun in Cairo (completed c. 1293). The windows present geometric arabesques arbitrarily cut off as al-Faruqi suggests.

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they should be put into the most beautiful form possible. Just as an icon of Christ or a saint is a material window on the spiritual world for the Orthodox Christian, so the physical words of the Qur’an are in some sense the eternal word of God for a Muslim (see the debate about the uncreated Qur’an in chapter eleven). The appropriateness of this comparison is illustrated, perhaps, by the fact that when the Ottomans converted the cathedral of the Hagia Sophia to a mosque they covered over the Christos Pantokrator in the dome and replaced it with a passage from the Qur’an.

The earliest form of the Arabic script under Islam was the angular Kufic script, said to have been developed by ‘Ali, and the earli- est Qur’ans were written in this script. By about 900 a number of more rounded scripts had been developed, including naskh, thu- luth, and muhaqqaq, and rules were made for their writing (see two illustrations in chapter five). Later nasta‘liq was developed in Iran and used in India and by the Ottomans. The flexibility and grace of the rounded forms make them especially suitable for calligraphy. It is claimed that calligraphy combines the greatest geometrical strictness with the most melodious rhythms. (For more information and examples links to “Arabic Calligraphy” and Sakkal.) Calligraphy is not limited to the Qur’an but is used for many kinds of writing. Verses of Persian poetry, for example, are immensely enhanced when written in flow- ing nasta‘liq script. Sometimes the letters are made so as to form animals or objects. The toughra was the highly stylised signature of the Ottoman sultan, found on Ottoman coins for example, but the same form is used else- where. In many cases of calligraphy the let- ters are superimposed on each other in a manner that makes them almost impossible to read unless one already knows what they say (as one often does). A line between “utility” and “art” is particularly hard to draw in the case of calligraphy. The tradition of calligraphy is very much alive today and some very interesting work is being done (see illustration 5.2 and links to Husain and Chaudary.)

Figure 14.4 The Arabic word badī‘ (originator, a name of Allah) written in calligraphy, in the normal direction on the right and in mirror image on the left. Rumi’s Mausoleum at Konya.

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Pictures It is commonly claimed that Islam forbids making representations of humans and animals, but the actual situation is more complex. From the Umayyad period onward palaces and other secular buildings have had human figures, but this has been avoided for religious buildings such as mosques. The closest the Qur’an comes to the subject is a prohibition of “wine, games of chance, idols (or statues) and divining arrows” (5:92). In a hadith, however, it is stated that on the Day of Judgement painters will be commanded to breathe life into the forms that they have fashioned and, failing to do so, will be sent to hell. On the other hand, the Prophet is said to have protected a painting of Jesus and the Virgin Mary in the Ka‘ba from erasure (it was destroyed during fighting in 683). Other evidence from the earliest period is inconsistent. The ban, nevertheless, became established and the thirteenth-century faqih, al-Nawawi, stated, “the painting of a picture of any living thing [plants are not included] is strictly prohibited and is one of the great sins . . . because it implies a likeness to the creative activity of God” (Arnold 9). Nevertheless, pictures continued to appear in secular contexts and eventually in religious contexts, more often Sufi and Shi‘i than Shari‘a-minded Sunni.

From the late twelfth century there is an increase in human and animal imagery on ceram- ics, carpets, drinking vessels and other small items. Of particular interest is the illustration of books, including the finely detailed “miniatures” to be found in volumes produced for the wealthy and powerful, especially in Iran and later the Ottoman Empire and India. Perhaps the best known examples are those in several volumes of the Shahnameh, depicting scenes from pre-Islamic Iranian history. Generally the miniatures are somewhat stylized and do not convey distance perspective. It has been suggested that the best ones seek to convey the immutable es- sences of things rather than their mundane reality. From the Mongol period they show Chinese influence, especially in the backgrounds. Illustrations of humans are mostly found in secular books and involve secular subjects, but some pictures of Muhammad, his companions and earlier prophets, as well as religious teaching and Sufi activities are also found, particularly in books of history and poetry. The earliest pictures of Muhammad are found in the universal history written by Rashid al-Din (1247–1318), wazir to the Mongol rulers. These pictures are more naturalistic than most and show the Prophet’s face. Later it became standard to cover the faces of all the prophets and place fiery nimbuses reminiscent of Buddhist iconography about their heads, thus indicating their sanctity. The mi‘raj, with Muhammad riding on Buraq, is one scene often depicted. In fact, one could illustrate most of the major events in Muhammad’s life with pictures produced by Muslims. In spite of their artistic importance, however, such pic- tures are rare and, given the sorts of books in which they appeared, were presumably not often seen by most people. They never appear in copies of the Qur’an or Hadith. The ‘ulama’ have generally condemned them and probably most other Muslims, too. Shi’is have generally been more willing than Sunnis to produce pictures of prophets and other sacred figures. In their case ‘Ali and the other Imams have their faces covered and have fiery nimbuses. Under the influ-

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ence of the ta‘ziya, pictures of Husayn and figures in the Karbala’ epic have become more popular among Shi‘is since the nineteenth century. They are not found in mosques, however.

In spite of initial resistance, human pictures in secular contexts have become quite com- mon in the Muslim world in modern times but resistance to depicting prophets continues strong. When a Hollywood style film, The Messenger, was made about Muhammad in 1976, Muhammad himself never appeared on screen. When a Danish newspaper published cartoons of Muhammad in 2006 much of the ensuing outcry was articulated in terms of the general pro- hibition against depicting a prophet, although it was certainly driven more by the offensive na- ture of some of the cartoons. In the context of this controversy attention was called to a picture supposedly of Muhammad as a boy and said to be a favorite of Ayatollah Khomeini. The point was made, however, that this was of Muhammad before he became a prophet.

Figure 14.5 “A jug of wine, a Loaf of Bread – and Thou” Wall paintings in the Chehel Sotun Palace in Isfahan (Seventeenth century).

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Architecture Architecture is considered by many to be the finest artistic achievement of Islamic civilization. For reasons of space, most of our attention will be given to mosques.

The word for mosque in Arabic, masjid, literally means a place for prostration in prayer, thus indicating its primary but not its only purpose. In the earliest days of Islam the mosques were very much political and communal centers, with Friday congregational salah led by the ruler or his representative and important political announcements made. It also has been a site for teaching activity and has provided shelter for travelers. Mosques range in size and impor- tance from the small muṣallā (“place for salah”, not used for Friday congregational salah) to the often monumental jāmi‘ (“that which brings people together”), often called a Friday or Congregational mosque, where all the people from a town or district are supposed to come for the congregational salah.

Figure 14.6 Minaret of the Zaytuna Mosque, Tunis. The mosque was built about 700, but this minaret, which is typical of the Maghrebi (North African) style, dates from 1894.

Figure 14.7 The Mosque of al-Husayn in Cairo. Husayn’s head is said to be buried here. The pencil- shaped minaret is typical of Ottoman mosques ( See also Figure 17.2, the Mosque of Muhammad Ali).

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The first mosque was connected with Muhammad’s residence in Medina. It consisted of a courtyard with rooms for the Prophet and his family along the east wall and with columns of palm trunks supporting palm branches on the north and south sides, the south being the qibla (direction to Mecca), which may have been marked in some way. The Prophet probably stood on a sort of stool to give his sermons. There was no minaret. This mosque provided the very basic pattern for the later ones. The miḥrāb (which marks the qibla), minbar (pulpit) and mina- ret developed from this or were introduced within the next century. The mihrab developed into a niche usually flanked by pillars and topped by an arch, with considerable embellishment in many cases (see figures 7.4 and 7.5). Although basically a very utilitarian item, it has been seen also as symbolizing the gate to paradise. The minbar is a set of steps with a railing lead- ing to a seat at the top. It has been suggested that the seat is symbolically a throne, suggesting both secular and religious power. The preacher stands on one of the steps below the seat, thus possibly disclaiming the highest human authority, which belongs to the Prophet. The mina- ret is the tower from which the muezzin gives the adhān (today, sadly for lovers of tradition, often by loudspeaker). Its form may derive from the square towers used by Christian hermits in Syria or from church towers. Practically, it allows the adhan to be heard most widely. Symbolically, it indicates the importance of Islamic faith, since it would have been the highest structure in traditional towns and cit- ies. While having the same basic function minarets vary in their specific forms. Square minarets are typical of North Africa, for ex- ample, while pencil-shaped minarets are typi- cal of Ottoman mosques.

As the Muslim world rapidly expanded, impressive mosques were built partly out of need to accommodate large numbers of worshippers and partly as symbols of the power and significance of the umma and its rulers. These include the Umayyad mosque in Damascus (built 706–714), constructed on the site of a Christian church and, before that, of a pagan temple. It still holds the relics of St. John the Baptist that had been in the church. The great mosque of Samarra, the Abbasid capital from 836 to 870, was the largest of all mosques, with a spiral minaret slightly remi- niscent of a Babylonia ziqqurat (though no historical connection has been established).

Figure 14.8 Minarets from the Mamluke period in Cairo. The one in the foreground belongs to the mosque of Qalaun and the other to the Mosque of Sultan Barquq (1384).

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Other early large mosques include that of Ibn Tulun in Cairo (879, see the illustration in chap- ter four), the Great Mosque of Qayrawan in Tunisia (670–875) and the Mosque of Cordoba (begun 784?) in Spain. In these and many other mosques the palm trunks of the Prophet’s mosque become impressive colonnades.

Domes early appeared above the mihrab area and the Ottomans, influenced by Byzantine churches and presumably climate, placed domes over what would have been the courtyard of the mosques. Iranian mosques typically have one or more iwans, lofty semi-circular vaults possibly derived from Sasanian royal architecture, containing an entrance from the courtyard to the mihrab area or other part of the mosque. Other cultural areas also have distinctive fea- tures to their mosques (see those from Niger in this chapter, China in chapter four, Pakistan in chapter fifteen and Indonesia in chapter nineteen, Figure 19.1). Mosques are also included in larger complexes that may include the tomb of the patron (usually a ruler), a madrasa and possibly a hospital or a khanqah. The madrasa of Sultan Hasan in Cairo, for example, contains the Sultan’s tomb and four iwans off the courtyard for teaching each of the four Sunni madh- habs, as well as mosque space. Some modern mosques are built in contemporary architectural styles (see Figure 20.1 in chapter twenty), but probably more of them hold to older patterns. Many newer mosques in Cairo, for example, are built in the Mamluke style.

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The mosque is sacred space, as indicated by the requirement to remove one’s shoes before entering, but as such has its own character. Perhaps the predominant impression is that of spa- ciousness and light, especially where the courtyard is open to the sky. This space is relatively undifferentiated in character. Unlike most Western Christian churches, whose architectural plan directs the eye to the altar or communion table, the plan of the mosque does not usually direct the eye toward the mihrab (which may not be visible from everywhere) or any other feature. Rather, the mosque layout suggests that God is equally present everywhere. If there is a focus to the mosque it is outside the mosque itself, the Ka‘ba in Mecca, to which the mihrab points.

There is space to say only a few words about other forms of architecture. The most notable of these is the earliest surviving Islamic monument, the Dome of the Rock. This is not a mosque, but a place for circumambulation, and is the only one of its type. Built by the Umayyad ca- liph Abd al-Malik between 688 and 692 on the site of the Jewish Temple and the place where Muhammad was believed to have ascended into heaven, its structure and symbolism stress the victory of Islam and its role as successor to previous religions and regimes (it has a number of Qur’anic quotations relating to Christ). At the time when it was built Mecca was in the hands of the anti-Umayyad, Ibn Zubayr, and some say it was meant to offer an alternative destination for pilgrims.

There are mausoleums, particularly of rulers and Sufi walis. Undoubtedly the best known and possibly the best architecturally is the Taj Mahal, built by the Mughal emperor, Shah Jahan (r. 1627–1658), for his wife, Mumtaz Mahal, and in which he too is buried. Palaces and especial- ly the gardens associated with them usually, at some level, symbolize paradise, the “gardens under which rivers flow” (Qur’an 2:25 and elsewhere). This is true also when they appear in pictures. Here, in a sense, the secular becomes sacred, a reminder of the indefinite boundary between them. Other kinds of buildings that may be architecturally significant include ma-

Figure 14.10 Mud built mosques at Pondo, Niger. (Courtesy Brynn Bruijn/Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA)

Figure 14.11 Mosque at new Bus Terminal in Konya, Turkey.

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drasas, khanqahs, ribats (initially, fortified bases for ghazis, frontier warriors) caravansarais, public fountains and public baths.

Literature As indicated above, we will focus here on secular literature, especially some that questions traditional religious values. In fact, the religious and the non-religious elements in Islamic cul- ture, as in other cultures, have influenced and to some extent defined each other.

What we call Arabic or Islamic literature is usually called adab in Arabic, but adab is much more than literature. It refers in the first place to a cultivated lifestyle that developed among the administrators and bureaucrats of the Abbasid empire and was imitated by others. (There is also a separate adab for Sufis, muftis and others.) Literature was one of its main expres- sions, since an elegant style of speaking and writing was highly prized, as was a broad general knowledge. In adab piety was respected but was not necessarily the highest of values. There was also a popular literature but it is not so well known since less of it was recorded and space does not permit us to give it much attention here.

Poetry Pride of place in Islamic literature goes to poetry, which was more commonly recited or sung in public than read in the privacy of one’s home or study. Poetry was the only form of litera- ture in pre-Islamic Arabia and this poetry set the standard for some time. Its standard form was the qasīda (ode), a long poem that begins by describing the traces of an old encampment in the desert and the love affair the poet had there, and then an arduous camel ride through the desert, and then the topic of the poem, which may be boasting (usually of prowess in love or battle), panegyric, satire or lament. The most famous qaṣīdas were seven mu‘allaqāt that were supposedly hung in the Ka‘ba after a competition. The greatest of the Pre-Islamic poets was considered to be Imru’ al-Qays (see chapter three).

This style of poetry continued into the Umayyad and Abbasid periods although it became a standard more to be admired than effectively imitated and although it provoked, for a time, a movement called shu‘ūbiyya that championed the traditions of non-Arab people, especially Persians. The place of the pre-Islamic ode was strengthened, paradoxically, by the fact that it was viewed by the ‘ulama’ as a source for understanding obscure words in the Qur’an.

New forms of poetry soon developed, the first, during the Umayyad period, being the ghazal, used for love poetry. The best known example is the tragic love story of Majnun and Layla.

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Majnun means “crazy” and reflects the extremes to which Layla’s lover went, unsuccessfully, to reach her. It was reproduced in Persian and Turkish literature and the theme was taken up by the Sufis. Two forms of poetry were developed in Andalus, the muwashsha and the zajal, which were probably influenced by the Romance language.

The themes of love, wine, panegyric and satire continued to be important throughout Islamic literature. Praise of a ruler or satire of his enemies was an important form of propaganda and could be highly rewarded. The best known praiser of the libertine life was Abu Nuwas (d. c. 815), but he was also a reformer and genius in poetic style and a boon companion of the caliph Harun al-Rashid. He criticizes bondage to the pre-Islamic ode in the following terms:

The lovelorn wretch stopped at a desert camping ground to question it, And I stopped to inquire after the local tavern. (Kritzek 84)

Of wine he sings:

Come Sulaiman, sing to me, And the wine, quick, bring to me. Lo, already Dawn is here In a golden mantle clear, Whilst the flask goes twinkling round, Pour me a cup that leaves me drowned. With oblivion, ne’er so nigh Let the shrill muezzin cry! (Ibid., 87)

Perhaps the greatest master of the panegyric and satire, as well as of the classical form of Arabic poetry, was al-Mutanabbi (915–965). Described as “gifted with an almost peerless tal- ent and an almost demonic pride” (Ibid., 107) he traveled about seeking to live by his panegy- rics and could be devastating when he found the reception inadequate. For example:

I went there as a guest of liars, who Would neither entertain nor let me go, Liar for whose putrid frames death would not function Unless equipped with a carbolic truncheon. (Ibid., 107)

In a different mode, but hardly pious, is the gently skeptical and pessimistic Abu al-‘Ala’ al- Ma‘arri (d. 1057). Here are some of his verses:

Now this religion happens to prevail Until by that one it is overthrown, – Because men dare not live with men alone, But always with another fairy tale. A church, a temple, or a Kaaba Stone,

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Koran or Bible or a martyr’s bone – All these and more my heart can tolerate Since my religion now is love alone. (Ibid., 126, 128)

It would be a mistake to imagine that these sentiments were very common at the time, but the fact that they were preserved indicates that they had some resonance in the culture.

Persian poetry in Islamic times is marked by no less greatness than Arabic poetry. It used the qasida and the ghazal forms and added to them the mathawi, rhyming couplets, and the ruba‘i, quatrains. The first major poet in this tradition was Firdowsi, whose long epic poem, the Shahnameh.

(Book of Kings) tells the story of Iran from creation to the Muslim conquest. It is consid- ered by many the greatest work of Persian literature. For many Iranians it is virtually sacred literature.

Undoubtedly the best known Persian poet in the English-speaking world is Omar Khayyam (1048–1131), though he was known in his own time and for years afterward mainly as a mathematician and scientist. Only with Edward Fitzgerald’s somewhat free translations of his skeptical quatrains, which spoke to the condition of Victorian skeptics, did his poetry become famous. He praises the quiet life and articulates a hedonistic skepticism. Here are three of his quatrains, the first in both Fitzgerald’s translation and a more literal one and then two others in the more literal translation.

A book of verses underneath the Bough, A jug of wine, a Loaf of Bread – and Thou Beside me singing in the wilderness – Oh, Wilderness were Paradise enow! (Kritzek, 1964, 167)

If chance supplied a loaf of white bread Two casks of wine and a leg of mutton, In the corner of a garden with a tulip-cheeked girl There’d be enjoyment no Sultan could outdo. (Khayyam 234)

If the heart could grasp the meaning of life, In death it would know the mystery of God; Today when you are in possession of yourself, you know nothing. Tomorrow, when you leave yourself behind, what will you know? (Ibid., 5)

From that wine jug, which has no harm in it, Fill a bowl, boy, drink and pass it to me, Before, by some wayside, A potter uses your clay and mine for just such a jug. (Ibid., 68)

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Other poets blended the sacred and the secular in enticing ways, praising drunkenness,Sufi or otherwise, and proffering worldly advice. Rumi, the greatest of the Sufi poets, we have met in chapter twelve. More on the borderline of the sacred and the secular are the three great Persian poets, Nizami (d. 1209), Saadi (d. 1292) and Hafez (c. 1320–1390), the most beloved of all. Hafez illustrates the ambiguous mixture of wine and mysticism in the following:

The rose has flushed red, the bud has burst, And drunk with joy is the nightingale – Hail, Sufis! Lovers of wine all hail, For wine is proclaimed to a world athirst! (Robinson 264)

Is the wine a metaphor? Or perhaps the Sufis are metaphorical. Persian poetry, according to Roy Mottahedeh, is “the emotional home in which the ambiguity that was at the heart of Iranian culture lived most freely and openly . . . In Persian poetry of any worth nothing was merely something else . . .” (Mottahedeh 164). The images had become quite conventional and

Figure 14.12 Mausoleum of Saadi, in Shiraz, Iran.

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were yet open to diverse interpretation, so that the black tresses of the beloved might (or might not) symbolize the darkness of unbelief and a bright cheek might (or might not) symbolize the light of faith. A temple of idolatry might (or might not) symbolize true inward faith in contrast to hypocritical formalism. Here are some lines from a twentieth-century admirer of Hafez:

The city preacher’s moralizing irritated me, I sought help from the breast of the besotted drunkard Permit me to recall the temple of idols I was awakened by the hand of the idol of the wine house. (Fischer 452)

The author is Ayatollah Khomeini, the greatest “preacher” of all.

Prose Adab prose has been described as “highly mannered, anecdotal, reservedly didactic and vastly entertaining” (Kritzek, 1964, 72). The oldest of such works is Kalilah and Dimna, a collec- tion of animal fables translated from a Persian version of the Sanskrit Pancatantra by Ibn al- Muqaffa‘. The style of adab was raised to a high artistic level by al-Jahiz (d. 869), a writer of tracts and essays and philological works and also a Mu‘tazili theologian.

Important types of prose literature have included the “mirrors for princes” (see chapter eight), accounts of travels, of which the most famous is that of Ibn Battuta, who traveled through much of the Islamic world between 1325 and 1354, and universal histories, of which al-Tabari’s is the best known. Another such history is that of Ibn Khaldun, the introduc- tion to which presents the theory of the rise and fall of dynasties mentioned in chapter eight. Undoubtedly the work best known in the West is the Thousand and One Nights (or Arabian Nights), though it is not so highly regarded in the Muslim world. It is a collection of popu- lar stories from many cultures and times. Also close to popular literature in content are the Maqāmāt (Assemblies) of which that of al-Hariri (1054–1122) is considered the greatest. It features the adventures of a witty and somewhat unscrupulous vagabond named Abu Zayd. In one account, an eloquent mosque preacher turns out to be Abu Zayd, who preaches by day and drinks wine by night.

Music We may begin by noting that the recitation of the Qur’an does not come under the heading of music in Islamic cultures, although it is claimed that its recitation has influenced music. Music itself was generally rejected as morally dangerous by the ‘ulama’, but it of course existed at

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both the popular and courtly levels and there was a wide range of opinion as to which music was acceptable (cf. Al-Ghazali in chapter thirteen). Lois al-Faruqi claims that the more accept- able music has an abstract and repetitive quality that suggests infinite continuity, as does the arabesque. Sufis used music, as we have seen, and increasingly so in Ottoman times. Sufi sing- ers called munshidin are active to the present time as are the qawwals, musicians connected with the Chishtiyya tariqa in South Asia, and there are other forms of popular religious music. Sufi music has been appropriated by modern culture in various ways. For example, in Egypt the songs of the munshidin are being remixed into very popular youth oriented dance music. Music is also used in connection with the rituals for Husayn, especially the shabihs. A number of popular singers began their careers singing religious songs, of whom the Egyptian, Umm Kulthum (d. 1975), is undoubtedly the best known. Such contemporary forms as rock, rap and heavy metal are generally condemned by religious spokesmen but are played, sometimes with Islamic themes infused, and listened to by the young. They may express the same alienation that leads others to more violent action.

As we can see, the artistic culture sometimes directly expresses religion, sometimes reacts against it or flouts it and sometimes does both. Rarely if ever in pre-modern times did it ignore religion.

Key Points You Need to Know Islamic art, architecture, literature and music illustrate the varied ways religion has re-• lated to the material and secular world in which it is set.

Abstract patterns are particularly characteristic of Islamic art and may enshrine an intu-• ition of infinity and of an ideal realm behind the mundane world.

Calligraphy is particularly important since it can put the divine word into visual form. •

It is simplistic to say that Islam forbids pictures of living beings. Such pictures exist • but their place is problematic and is usually in more secular contexts.

Architecture is another major form of Islamic artistic expression. •

Mosques are sacred space but also suggest the presence of God everywhere. •

The word • adab refers to a kind of refined, courtly culture and to the literature produced within it.

Of the various forms of secular literature, poetry is the most important not only in • Arabic but in Persian and other Islamic languages.

Much secular literature has an anti-pious character but the Sufis have turned this kind • of poetry to a religious use. This leads to interesting ambiguity in Persian poetry.

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The recitation of the Qur’an is not considered “music”. •

Though often forbidden, music is present in Islamic cultures and often used for reli-• gious purposes.

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading al-Faruqi, Isma‘il R. (1968) “Islam and Art”, Studia Islamica, 37: 81–1009.

Burckhardt, Titus (1976) Art of Islam: Language and Meaning, Westerham: World of Islam Festival Publishing Company.

Denny, Walter (1984) “Contradiction and Consistency in Islamic Art”, and al-Faruqi, Lois Ibsen, “Unity and Variety in the Music of Islamic Culture” in Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, Haines, Brian and Findlay, Ellison (eds) (1984) The Islamic Impact, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Ettinghausen, Richard, Grabar, Oleg and Jenkins-Madina, Marilyn (2001) Islamic Art and Architecture, 650–1250, 2nd ed., New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Grabar, Oleg (1990) The Great Mosque of Isfahan, New York: New York University Press.

Grabar, Oleg (1996) The Dome of the Rock, London: Thames and Hudson.

Khayyam (1979) Rubaiyyat of Omar Khayyam, trans. Robert Avery and John Heath-Stubbs, London: A. Lane.

Kritzek, J. (ed.) (1964) Anthology of Islamic Literature, New York: New American Library.

Sayyid Hossein Nasr (1987) Islamic Art and Spirituality, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Schimmel, Annemarie (1992) Islamic Calligraphy, New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art.

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Vernoit, Stephen (1996) “Artistic Expressions of Muslim Societies”, chapter 8 in Francis Robinson, ed., The Cambridge Illustrated History of the Islamic World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Part III: Modern Developments

Western Imperialism and Muslim Response

The fundamental malaise of modern Islam is a sense that something has gone wrong with Islamic history. The fundamental problem of modern Muslims is how to reha- bilitate that history: to set it going again in full vigour, so that Islamic society may once again flourish as a divinely-guided society should and must. (Smith 47)

In This Chapter What we call “modernity” has come to the Muslim world largely as part of Western colonial- ism and imperialism and the response has been a profoundly ambivalent response of rejection and acceptance. At the religious level the question is posed whether and in what way Muslim society can truly be a divinely guide society. This chapter will survey the main features of Western imperialism and the main kinds of Muslim response to the challenge it poses.

Main Topics Covered European imperialism and colonialism •

Modernization, Westernization, secularization •

The challenge to Islam •

Pre-modern reform •

Responses to the challenge: traditionalism •

Responses to the challenge: Islamic modernisim •

Responses to the challenge: secularism •

Responses to the challenge: Islamism •

Resurgence of Islam •

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In 1798 a French military expedition under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte in-vaded Egypt, primarily in order to cut off the British route to their new colonies in India. He quickly took control of the country, defeating its Mamluke rulers and quell-ing popular revolts. At the same time he proclaimed to the people that he had come to liberate them from Mamluke tyranny, grant them liberty and equality, and respect the true values of Islam. He brought with him a number of scientists and scholars, whose investi- gations of Egypt did much to forward the fledgling discipline of Orientalism (European study of the “orient”) and whose activities also attracted the interest of some Egyptian scholars. He formed a council of ‘ulama’ but the people would not accept being ruled by non-Muslims. They revolted and were put down forcefully. It was mainly the British, however, assisted by disease, who forced the French to leave in 1801. The longer term results of this expedition for Egypt will be discussed in chapter seventeen. It is mentioned here because it is commonly taken as the beginning of the modern period in the Middle East and because it illustrates many of the characteristics that were to mark the European imperialism of the following century.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century, European power spread until, by about 1920, almost all of the Muslim world was under the political control or influence of European coun- tries. Some were ruled directly as colonies; some were protectorates or “native states”; some were nominally independent but subject to restrictions and effective pressure. Only central Arabia and Afghanistan retained genuine independence. Muslim responses had sometimes

Map 6 Modern Islamic World

S hepard M

ap 7

Algeria

France

Morocco

Western Sahara

Mauritania

Senegal Gambia

Sierra Leone Liberia

Ivory Coast

Guinea

Mali

Libya Egypt

Niger Chad

Sudan

Ethiopia

Eritrea

Central African Rep.

Nigeria

Cameroon

Benin Ghana Togo

Yugoslavia

Bulgaria Georgia

Albania

Bosnia- Herzgovina

Tunisia Lebanon Israel

Turkey Armenia

Jordan

Iraq

Saudi Arabia

Syria Macedonia

Democratic Republic of Congo

Uganda

Tanzania

Kenya

Mozambique Madagascar

Comoros

Somalia

Mauritius

Yemen

Malawi

Burkina Faso

Russia

Kazakhstan Azerbayjan

Turkmenistan Kyrgyzstan

Mongolia

Iran

Kuwait

Uzbekistan

Afghanistan

Pakistan

Nepal

India

Bangladesh

Tajikistan

Thailand

Philippines

Brunei

Malaysia

Indonesia

Sri Lanka

Maldives

Oman

Russia, China and India show percentage by region

Muslim population of country as a percentage of total poulation

50% or more

50% or less

Countries with Muslim population of less than 5% are unnmamed

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been military or popular resistance, unsuccessful in the long run, and sometimes more or less reluctant cooperation with the Europeans, complicated by the fact that some elements in the Muslim populations found cooperation to be in their interest while others did not.

After 1920 political and military imperialism retreated, though unevenly. Some countries, such as Egypt, Turkey and Iran, gained substantial independence after the First World War while other areas found themselves under mandates for a time. Most Muslim countries gained independence before 1970, or in 1991 with the end of the Soviet Union. Even this was not complete, however. If the Western armies were no longer center stage, they remained in the wings prepared to return to the stage if it was felt necessary, as they have done in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, what for many Muslims is the most egregious example of imperialism and colonialism, the State of Israel, was planted in 1948 and shows no sign of leaving.

Imperialism has not been just political and military but also economic and cultural. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the Muslim world was integrated into a worldwide economic system created by Europeans for Europeans, almost always on disadvantageous terms for the Muslims, who were usually producers of primary products that were then processed in Europe. Today some countries, especially the oil producers, have carved out a stronger place for them- selves in the worldwide economic system, but it is still largely a Western system favoring Westerners.

Of particular interest to us is what is often called “cultural imperialism”. This included such things as the introduction of modern, i.e. Western, technology, medicine and public health, education, administrative methods, political ideologies, newspapers and other mass media, clothes and entertainment (including plays, opera, novels). New professions were created, such as journalism, law, engineering, and (modern) medicine. All of this has been viewed by Europe as part of its “civilizing mission” or “the White Man’s burden” and has been seen as a justification for imperialism. It has been supported by the idea or “myth” of progress, accord- ing to which human history is the story of continual progress led, currently, by the West. This myth is probably unique to modern Western civilization since the eighteenth century, since other civilizations, including the Muslim and earlier Christian ones, have usually seen the long course of history as cyclical or declining. Whatever else the myth of progress is, it has been extremely effective cultural propaganda. Closely, if ambiguously, related to imperialism has been the modern Christian missionary movement. The missionaries have had little success in converting Muslims to Christianity but they have established schools and hospitals that have been much appreciated and used by many and thus effective purveyors of Western ideas and practices.

Although we label it “imperialism”, cultural imperialism has been driven as much by the de- sire of Muslims for Western cultural goods as by the Western effort to spread them. From the beginning the Muslim elites wanted to learn the “secrets” of Western success and for a time many accepted that they needed a period of European tutelage. Today they feel that the need

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for such tutelage has long passed, if it ever really existed, but cultural imperialism continues with almost unabated force, witness the largely one way flow of new technology, ideology and fashion. From the latest advances in military and medical technology to Barbie dolls (now re- named “Fulla” and wearing Muslim garb) and tee shirts, the Muslim world still largely looks West.

Modernization, Westernization, secularization Western imperialism set in train profound changes in Muslim societies, which are variously labeled “modernization”, “development”, “Westernization” and “secularization”. These words refer to substantially the same things, but are conceptually distinct. Modernization and de- velopment refer in the first instance to the technology that increases human control over the physical environment and then, by extension, to such areas as education and politics. It also includes certain attitudes, such as openness to change and innovation. The myth of progress encourages the belief that change will be for the better. Westernization underlines the fact that virtually all of these things come from the West, so that to modernize has almost always meant to Westernize. Secularization means in particular to shift interest from the spiritual world or the future life to this secular world, to draw one’s values and beliefs primarily from human rather than divine sources, and to limit the influence of religious institutions on society, often by separating them from other institutions, but not necessarily seeking to destroy them. While Muslims are generally in favor of modernization and development, many of them reject the identification of these with Westernization and secularization, and this tendency has increased notably in recent years.

A major effect of these changes has been to strengthen enormously the power of the state (as it has done in the West and elsewhere) by giving it the physical means to extend its power and the technological means to accomplish certain social goals. Another effect has been a decrease in mortality rates and a dramatic rise in populations due to the introduction of Western medi- cine and public health. Education and new professions created a new class in many places, often called “effendi”, a Westernized elite, wearing Western-style clothes, sending their chil- dren to Western-style schools and living a largely Western lifestyle, so that society came to be divided into “modern” and “traditional” sectors. In 1900 their numbers were still very small, though their influence was considerable, but they increased rapidly in the following decades and often took control of the state.

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The challenge to Islam All of this has been a spiritual as well as a cultural and physical challenge to Muslims and to Islam. The Qur’an says of the Muslims, “You are the best umma ever brought forth to human- kind, enjoining right conduct, forbidding indecency and having faith in God” (3.110) and also, “Power and glory belong to God and to His Messenger and to the believers” (63:8). This was taken to mean that the Muslim umma, because it properly worshipped God, would be stronger both physically and culturally than other communities. Even when the Muslims did not live up to the high standards of Islam, they at least recognized the truth and came closer to living by it than the kafir nations. As indicated at the end of chapter four, as of the year 1600 Muslims could feel that their history on the whole fulfilled these promises. They could with some justi- fication feel superior to the other civilizations of which they knew. Admittedly the umma had suffered setbacks, but it had rebounded from these. The Mongols had been the greatest chal- lenge and within half a century the Mongols had accepted Islam. The loss of Andalus (Muslim Spain) had been a blow, but God compensated it with the advance of the Ottomans. In any case, they had taken the measure of the uncivilized “Franks” during the Crusades; at their best the Franks were eager students of the sciences and philosophy of the Muslims.

With apparent suddenness, this situation was reversed. Now the Franks were defeating the Muslims and demonstrating their superiority in science, statecraft and a range of other cultural accomplishments, but without ceasing to be kafirs. To some it seemed that the crusades had been revived in a much more virulent form. What could they make of this great reversal? Why had God permitted this to happen?

Many thought God was punishing His people for their sins or testing their faith. For others it was simply that God’s will is inscrutable. But as European success continued for so long and so profoundly, these answers became inadequate for more and more people. It seemed as if the historical process ordained by God had somehow gone off its track, as suggested by the quota- tion at the head of this chapter. How to understand this? What to do about it?

Pre-modern reform Before discussing the responses to these question, we must consider developments in the Islamic world on the eve of European imperialism. At this time as at all times, the Islamic tra- dition was not monolithic and static but diverse and in constant change, although the pace of change was slow by modern standards. The central lands had been going through a period of political decline in the eighteenth century, but there were also reform movements, of which the two most important were the Wahhabi movement in central Arabia and the movements con- nected with Shah Waliullah of Delhi in India.

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The Wahhabi movement was founded by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), an admirer of Ibn Taymiyya, who preached a strict interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna and rejected rigid taqlid to later interpretations. He rejected popular Sufi practices as bid‘a and, indeed, shirk, and his movement destroyed the tombs of walis and also of Shi‘i Imams when it raided the shrine cities in southern Iraq. It took control of Mecca in 1803 and was defeated in 1818, but it had considerable influence on other reform movements. It survived out of the limelight during the rest of the nineteenth century and resurfaced in the twentieth to become the official doctrine of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabis do not call themselves Wahhabis but simply muwaḥḥidūn, people of tawḥīd.

Shah Waliullah of Delhi (1701–1762) was a Naqshbandi Sufi in the line of Ahmad Sirhindi and opposed what he considered the compromises with non-Islamic practices by both rul- ers and Sufis. He also stressed ijtihad over unquestioning taqlid. He called for economic re- forms and was concerned to heal divisions within the community. He undertook to reconcile Sirhindi’s wahdat al-shuhud with Ibn Arabi’s wahdat al-wujud. He had considerable influence on later thinkers in India of various persuasions. One of his successors led a jihad against the Sikhs in the early nineteenth century and later his followers fought against the British.

Responses to the challenge Neither the Wahhabis nor Shah Waliullah were responding to the Western challenge, but they provided resources and precedents for many who later did respond. These responses may be grouped into four broad categories, each of which contains considerable diversity: tradition- alism, Islamic modernism, secularism and Islamism. In each we can consider only a small sample of the many ideas and thinkers involved.

Traditionalism Traditionalists have emphasized continuity with the past. Some became rigid in the face of the challenge from outside, but most continued making gradual changes in the recognized ways. They did not perceive the profundity of the Western challenge. For them the view that God was punishing Muslims for their sins or testing them was adequate. Probably the vast majority of Muslims in the nineteenth century, including the lower classes and most of the ‘ulama’ and Sufis, can be considered traditionalist. Their attitudes and actions toward the imperialists var- ied from open resistance, which rarely succeeded, to reluctant cooperation. Mostly the ‘ulama’ went along with practices and rules they disliked, dragging their feet or subverting where pos- sible, following their time honored practice of supporting rulers and seeking to advise them. Modernization, however, strengthened the rulers’ position vis-à-vis them, with stronger ad-

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ministrative resources, greater control over the law (usually in the name of reform) and, in the twentieth century, the establishment of state run schools that often displaced the kuttabs of the ‘ulama’.

As modernization and Westernization spread pure traditionalism became impossible to sustain, but we can speak of neo-traditionalism, which is strongly concerned for continuity with the past but also appreciates the depth of the Western challenge and selectively adopts Western ideas and practices. The Sufi movement, which maintained its strength through the nineteenth century and remains strong to the present, though not so all-pervasive as before, has gener- ally become neo-traditionalist. To a considerable extent its more dramatic practices have been curtailed by reform. Several reformist tariqas were founded in the nineteenth century, such as the Tijaniyya and the Sanusiyya, stressing obedience to the Shari‘a and criticizing local non-Islamic customs. These were founded without reference to European influence but even- tually came into contact with it. The leader of the Sanusiyya led resistance to the Italians in Libya in the twentieth century and became king of Libya in 1951. Likewise, the movement of the Sudanese Mahdi began as a reform movement with local concerns and then defeated the Egyptians, already influenced by the West, in 1885 and were defeated by the British in 1899. The Deobandi movement founded in India in 1867 established madrasas teaching both the tra- ditional and rational disciplines. It had a Sufi affiliation, while some of its organizational fea- tures showed Western influence. It has been and still is very influential. Movements as diverse as the Tablighi and the Taleban in Afghanistan (see chapter twenty) are connected to it.

In the twentieth century different kinds of neo-traditionalism can be seen in Ayatollah Khomeini and his colleagues in Iran (see chapter eighteen) and in the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia (see chapter nineteen). The former proclaims its resistance to the West while in fact adopting a lot from it, while the latter cautiously cooperates with Westernizing forces. As of the beginning of the twenty-first century most ‘ulama’ and Sufis could probably be considered neo-traditionalist.

Islamic modernism Among the educated and ruling classes there were those who perceived the deeper nature of the Western challenge and recognized that neither response in the old ways nor haphazard copying of Western ways was sufficient. If Islam was the truth from God and if it applied to all areas of life it had to be profoundly rethought to meet the Western challenge. If the West, hav- ing received science and wisdom from the Muslims, had then surpassed them, it was because the Muslims had closed the gate of ijtihad and been satisfied with taqlid, thus stifling creative thinking, and because they had accepted unIslamic superstitions and bid‘a. (Modernists tend to use the terms ijtihad and taqlid in the sense of general creativity and rigidity, not just as fiqh terms.) Only the Qur’an and the true Sunna are authoritative though other sources are

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respected. This position is commonly called salafi (salaf refers to the pious exemplars of the early period of Islam) and to this extent they continued the concerns of the pre-modern reform- ers although they then took them in different directions. The door of absolute ijtihad must be opened wide and the implications of the Qur’an rethought in the light of modern knowledge and practice. Modernists have also been more inclined than traditionalists to reject hadith that were weakly based, thus further limiting the range of authoritative material that must be followed.

In practice modernist interpretation has often meant finding Islamic justification for Westernizing practices. One example is the interpretation of the Qur’anic passages on polyg- yny mentioned in chapter six. Also, it has been common to link Qur’anic concepts to Western ones. Thus shura (Q 42:38), which traditionally has meant the obligation of the ruler to consult with others but not necessarily to follow them, is now often interpreted in terms of parliamen- tary democracy. Another approach has been to choose rulings from different madhhabs as ap- propriate to current needs, rather than being bound to follow one madhhab, as is the traditional expectation. The most thorough approach, as articulated by the twentieth-century modernist, Fazlur Rahman, is to reduce all the positive commands of the Qur’an (such as stoning for adultery or cutting off the hand of the thief) to underlying principles and then to apply these principles to the contemporary situation. This approach is not much applied in practice, so far as I know (but see chapter 20). This is not to say that modernists ignore the scholarship of the past, but they are not bound by it and may try to use it in creative ways.

Modernist discourse usually looks in two directions. On one hand it seeks to persuade tradi- tional Muslims to change their ways; on the other hand it seeks to convince Westerners that the things they criticize about Islam are not part of true Islam. Modernists also go on the offensive and criticize many aspects of Western life, not least its violence, its loose sexual mores, its racism, its use of alcohol, its extreme individualism and its rejection of legitimate authority. Other aspects of Western life, however, are appreciated, such as its order and discipline, its progressive mentality, its inventiveness, and its concern for the rights of the individual and good government. These will also characterize Muslims when Islam is properly understood and practiced. Islam once led the caravan of human progress. It has now fallen behind but with the needed reform it will take the lead again, adding to its own virtues the virtues of the West but avoiding the West’s vices. One reason this is possible is that much of what is desirable in the West was originally learned from Muslim sources.

One of the first modernists was Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898), who was raised within the Mughul nobility and lived through the Bengal Mutiny (1857), which resulted in the of- ficial replacement of the Mughul Empire with direct British rule, and which left the Muslim community in India in disarray and on bad terms with the British. He was determined to im- prove the lot of his community. He argued that there was no call for jihad against the British since the Muslims had freedom to practice their religion and they had much to learn from the British. Among other things, in 1875 he established the Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental College

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in Aligarh, modelled on Cambridge University, which trained many of the next generation’s leaders. One Englishman commented that he taught his people how to play English games and then how to beat them at their games. Sir Sayyid was a rationalist and believed that the Word of God (the Qur’an) could not contradict the work of God (nature). He gave naturalistic expla- nations of the miracles recounted in the Qur’an and claimed that angels are natural forces and the devil is a symbol of the unruly side of human nature. He believed that Shari‘a law needed to be thoroughly reconsidered, using rational methods that took account of changes in society, while there were many areas, such as clothing, in which religious guidance was not needed or in which general ethical guidance was sufficient. For example, on the Qur’an’s prohibition of usury (riba) he argued that this was to prevent poor people from being exploited, but there was no harm in charging interest to those who can pay and the community may benefit. Many other modernists share this view. Sir Sayyid worked for good relations among all the communities, Muslim and non-Muslim, in India. He discouraged Muslims from joining with Hindus in the Indian National Congress founded in 1885, however, as he did not consider it in their interest.

Two other important modernists in India were Ameer Ali (1849–1928), whose The Spirit of Islam has been mentioned in chapter six, and Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1872– 1953), whose trans- lation of the Qur’an is perhaps the most widely used among English-speaking Muslims. He included a modernist commentary but this is not always reprinted.

Another early modernist was Jamal al-Din “al-Afghani” (1838–1897). He was an Iranian and known as “Asadabadi” in Iran, but in Sunni countries claimed to be an Afghan to disguise his Shi‘i background. He was a charismatic figure who inspired disciples but was far from a systematic thinker. He was constantly on the move, traveling in India, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Istanbul, Cairo, Tehran and several European cities. Among his political activities were involvement in the Tobacco Protest in Iran (see chapter eighteen) and some implication in the assassination of the shah in 1896. The most consistent thread in his teaching was his opposi- tion to European, especially British, imperialism. He, perhaps more than anyone else, taught Muslims to think of Europe as a danger. He was a critic of Ahmad Khan for this reason. He argued that religion was necessary for the well being of society and Islam properly practiced would make its followers strong. He called on Muslims to adopt European science and tech- nology and to reopen the gate of ijtihad, clear away the innovations that have weakened them and return to the early practices of Islam. It had made them strong then and would do so again. It is not clear, however, in what sense he thought Islam was true. In a letter to the French writer, Ernest Renan, he said that all religion is against science and that he was not defend- ing Islam but the millions of Muslims. His political program, usually described as pan Islam, seems to have been to find a strong Muslim ruler under whom the Muslims of the world could unite. The most likely candidate was the Ottoman sultan, who did make use of this idea but apparently not as Jamal al-Din would have wished. His utilitarian view of religion and his ten- dency to say different things to different people seem to reflect classical Islamic philosophy,

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which he would have studied in Iran. His most important disciple was Muhammad ‘Abduh, who will be discussed in the chapter on Egypt. (Link for more on Jamal al-Din’s life.)

Muhammad Iqbal (1876–1938) is generally considered the greatest Muslim philosopher of the twentieth century. Born in the Punjab, he was initiated into the Qadiri tariqa and later studied in England and Germany. He was active in the Muslim League (founded in 1906), which spearheaded the movement that led to the creation of Pakistan and is commonly called the spiritual father of Pakistan. His thinking and writing drew on Sufi ideas and themes, which he often transposed and reinterpreted. He was also influenced by European thinkers such as Nietszche, Bergson and Marx. He was best known in India for his poems in Urdu and Persian, which were written in the Sufi style. His main philosophical work, Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, was written in English. In two poems, entitled “Complaint” and “Answer to Complaint” (1911–1912) he laments before God the lost great- ness of the umma and receives the answer that this is the result of the umma’s own failings, especially its lack of activism and self-confidence. The main goal of his efforts was to restore these. His philosophy focuses on the self or ego and inverts the Sufi idea of fana’. God is the supreme self in the universe and each human is a self, meant to affirm its individuality in a constantly evolving universe.

If thou wouldst pass away (fana’), become free of Self: If thou wouldst live, become full of Self!” (Iqbal Secrets 99)

This self is to be characterized by love (‘ishq), which is to be directed toward worldly goals as well as God. It is “the moving power of life which … must be united with power.”

Though greatly influenced by Europe he still saw Europe as a major hindrance to human ethi- cal and spiritual advancement.

The bottle of modern civilization is brimful with the wine of la Perhaps there is no cup of illa in the hands of the cupbearer.

(Schimmel Gabriel’s 92)

The allusion is to the Sufi interpretation of the shahada according to which La ilaha means the destruction of all false gods and spiritual impediments and illa Allah is the affirmation of God.

Islamic law can and must evolve to meet present needs, without rejecting all of the past, and thus there is the need for absolute ijtihad, which he calls “the principle of movement in the structure of Islam” (Iqbal, 1971, 146), and it should be done now by Muslim legislative as- semblies which include laypeople as well as ‘ulama’. In a letter to a colleague he stated, “For Islam the acceptance of social democracy in some suitable form and consistent with the legal

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principles of Islam is not a revolution but a return to the original purity of Islam” (Schimmel Gabriel’s 235). (Link for more on Iqbal)

Modernism became widespread in the twentieth century, to some extent among the ‘ulama’ and more among “lay” thinkers and writers. Specific forms of modernism vary with back- ground, context and individual characteristics. They also vary with the form of Western prac- tice or ideology to which they are attending, such as democracy, nationalism or socialism, and in fact people speak of “Islamic socialism” and “Islamic democracy”. Two variants of modernism that do not have wide followings but represent interesting possibilities are those of Ghulam Ahmad Parwez (1903–1985), in Pakistan, and Mahmud Muhammad Taha, in the Sudan. The former recognized only the Qur’an as binding and rejected interpretations based on hadith. The latter held that the Meccan part of the Qur’an, which contains general princi- ples, is the permanent message of Islam, while the Medinan part of the Qur’an, which contains legal details and sometimes commands violence, was a concession to the social realities of Muhammad’s time. It has now been superseded by the permanent message. This reverses the usual order of abrogation. Taha was executed for his views in 1985.

Although modernism has been widespread, it has rarely provided the ideology for any nation- state. The main and possibly only example is the Pakistani constitution. Its preamble asserts that “sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone” and that the au- thority of the people is a “sacred trust” exercised “within the limits prescribed by Him” and that “the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed”. Here, as often with modernism, it is hard to tell whether es- sentially Western ideas have been given an Islamic cover or whether there has been a genuine reinterpretation of Islam (and also, perhaps, of the Western ideas).

Secularism Secularism in the Muslim world may be defined as the explicit withdrawal of some or all areas of public life from the guidance and tutelage of the Shari‘a. Secularists wish to adopt modern ways without justifying them at the bar of the Shari‘a. Usually they claim not to reject Islamic religion as such, but they do reject the proposition that Islam is a total way of life. In the social arena Islam is replaced with a secular ideology, usually nationalism, often in combination with liberalism or socialism. Secularism has commonly been justified as being required by “modern civilization”, a vague but potent concept that means, in effect, the West. The West is supposed to have separated religion (here viewed as a conservative or reactionary force) from other ar- eas of society in order to make progress possible. Only by doing likewise, secularists believe, can their nations become strong and fully independent in the modern world. Secularism also is seen as the appropriate solution when a society is divided by religion or sect.

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In fact, however, secularism in the Muslim world rarely involves separation of religion and state, because the state almost always controls or tries to control the religious institutions and use them for its purposes. Most of the time certain areas of social life, designated “personal status” and including such matters as marriage, divorce and inheritance, are left under Shari‘a law (which may be reinterpreted in a modernist way). Secularists may or may not be anti- religious. In fact, some are very pious in their personal lives. Though not wanting society to be run by Shari‘a law as such they may want it to be guided by an Islamically informed ethics (where this concern is strong the line between modernism and secularism may not be clear). Secularists may also value the Islamic tradition as “heritage”, often a very important part of the national heritage. For this reason they may engage the same sort of apologetics in defense of that heritage as modernists do and they regularly take an interest in pan-Islamic concerns.

Secularism is largely a twentieth- (and twenty-first) century phenomenon. There were a few in the nineteenth century who articulated a secularist position, such as Chiragh Ali, Ahmad Khan’s associate, and there were those among the rulers who engaged in a practical secular- ism in that they often ignored Shari‘a dictates, but this can be seen as continuation and per- haps intensification of what rulers often did in pre-modern times under the guise of siyasa. Secularism, in fact, can be seen as an intensification of siyasa with a new and more positive justification.

The most extreme forms of secularism were those practiced by communist governments, which were anti-religious and restricted religious practice as much as they could. Albania went the furthest, officially abolishing all religion from 1967 to 1989.

The classic example of secularism is Turkey, where reforms in the 1920s and 1930s located sovereignty in the Turkish nation, replaced Shari‘a law with law codes derived from Europe, closed the madrasas and the Sufi tekkes, and took other measures that will be discussed in the next chapter. This was widely debated throughout the Muslim world and other countries adopted secular constitutions but did not go as far as Turkey. Sovereignty was located in the nation but Islam was usually the religion of state and Shari‘a law was in force in some areas of public life. The cases of Egypt, Iran and Indonesia will be discussed in chapters seventeen to nineteen.

The case of Pakistan is a distinctive one, since its first leaders were secularists but it was a nation based on Muslim identity and claiming to be an Islamic state. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the movement for the partition of India when the British left and first president of Pakistan, had been an associate of Iqbal and was very Westernized in his personal life. He developed the theory, vaguely anticipated by Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Iqbal, that the Muslims and Hindus of India are two different nations and two different civilizations, with dif- ferent religions, different social customs, different literatures, different and often incompatible heroes and historical stories, and cannot be yoked together in the same state. While he wanted a state for Muslims he did not want to institute Shari‘a law in it. Religion would continue as

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personal faith but not as political identity. The opposition to this secularism has been consider- able, however, and its history has been checkered, to say the least.

It should be mentioned that while modernists and secularists have accused traditionalists of taqlid, traditionalists have accused modernists and secularists of engaging in taqlid of the West.

Islamism Islamism, sometimes referred to as “fundamentalism”, appeared in the twentieth century as a reaction to secularism and modernism. For Islamists, the ideology of society must be Islam and the Shari‘a must be applied in society. Secularism is attacked as an open replacement of God’s laws with human laws and modernism as a veiled way of doing the same thing. For some Islamists nationalism is nation worship, thus shirk; for others it is acceptable if subor- dinate to a larger Islamic loyalty. Like modernists, Islamists hold that only the Qur’an and Hadith are fully authoritative and the gate of absolute ijtihad must be open. They insist, how- ever, that ijtihad must be rigorously Islamic and not a cover for taqlid of the West. Also like the modernists, they wish to eliminate the bid‘a and superstitions inherited from the past that traditionalists accept. Thus Sunni Islamists are often called salafis. On the other hand, they generally accept more of the tradition than do the modernists and Sunni Islamists particularly value the writings of Ibn Taymiyya. Their main concern, in any case, is with the bid‘a coming today from the West and they are particularly inclined to anti-Western rhetoric. While some use violent methods, the majority do not. The same is true of traditionalists, modernists and secularists, too.

Islamism is definitely a modern phenomenon. Islamists more than others insist that it is pos- sible to have modernization without secularization. It has especially appealed to people with a scientific or technical education and much less to peasants or workers. Its program would involve a more thorough application of the Shari‘a, or a more thorough Islamization of society, as it is often put, than was the case in pre modern times. For example, the call for an “Islamic state” is particularly characteristic of Islamism, but the state here is not the pre-modern state whose power usually did not go much beyond keeping order and collecting taxes, but the mod- ern state, whose writ reaches to every corner of the land and touches every individual. Such a state will Islamize society far more thoroughly than was possible before. Islamism would also Islamize the new activities and professions that have come into existence with modernity. As for non-Muslims in a Muslim society, Islamists usually call for dhimmi status rather than equality before the law, which is usually affirmed in principle by secularists and modernists.

Such phenomena as Islamic banking and Islamic economics can be considered aspects of Islamism. Where secularists would justify interest on loans as part of the modern world and

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modernists would reinterpret the basic sources to show that they are permitted, Islamists would retain the prohibition and revise the banking system to eliminate interest. There are those, also, who want to Islamize the social sciences,

Tendentious terms

The terms “Islamism” and “Islamist” are used here where many speak of “fun- damentalism” and “fundamentalist”. Since the latter terms are primarily used for Christian fundamentalism, many feel that their use in the Islamic context is mislead- ing and unduly emotive. The term Islamist has therefore been proffered as a more neutral substitute. Unfortunately, media usage in recent years has tended to identify Islamism with violence, so that it is no longer as neutral as it was. Since it is not pos- sible to keep ahead of the media’s debasement of terms, I use it here for those who call for the application of the Shari‘a in all areas of community life, especially gov- ernment, in the modern context, whether they are violent or not.

Also, Islamist must be distinguished from Islamicist. The latter is a scholar whose academic specialization is some aspect of Islam. Unfortunately, not all writers ob- serve this distinction.

The term “secularist” is also tendentious for many Muslims, since it is commonly understood as anti-religious. This is probably even truer of the Turkish term, laik, which is usually translated “secularist” and is associated with Atatürk’s movement. Arabs who see themselves as secularist but not anti religious often use the term madani, which means civil or civilian. In Indonesia the term neo-modernist is used for many whom I would consider secularist. For a book such as this I have not been able to find a suitable alternative to secularism and so I retain it but stress that it does not here mean anti-religious.

since in their present form they are based on secularist assumptions. There is also Islamic dress, primarily for women but also in some respects for men. Contemporary “Islamic garb” covers up as much as traditional garb, if not more, but is different in form and tailoring. It can be quite stylish and, in fact, a fashion industry for this garb has developed. The term “muhaja- babes” has been coined for the young women who are part of this scene. Not all who are in- terested in Islamic banking, Islamic science or Islamic garb, however, are Islamists in politics and want an Islamic state.

The first Islamist organization was the Muslim Brothers, founded in Egypt in 1928. It became a mass organization within ten years and its program included a wide range of educational and

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social service activities, as well as a call for political reform. It spread to other Arab countries after the Second World War. This will be discussed in a later chapter, as will Islamist groups that appeared in Iran and Indonesia after the war and the Islamic Liberation Party, founded in 1952 by a Palestinian judge.

The second Islamist organization to be formed was the Jama‘at-i Islami, founded in India in 1941 by Abul ‘Ala’ Mawdudi (1903–1979), a journalist who had been associated with Iqbal. Mawdudi favored the creation of Pakistan but opposed the secularism of Jinnah. After parti- tion and the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, Mawdudi and the Jama‘at worked to make Pakistan a truly Islamic state. The Jama‘at is a fairly elitist organization, unlike the Muslim Brothers, and has never done well in elec- tions, but still has had considerable influence. Mawdudi’s writings are clear and relatively consistent. They have been widely translated and disseminated and he has probably been the most influential Islamist writer.

He states that Islam is a “total scheme of life”, distinct and not to be identified with some other system such as “democracy” or “communism”, nor may people create “a new Islam to suit the values of their choice”. It is diametrically opposed to nationalism, including the “Muslim nationalism” of Jinnah. Islam is based on creed and morality and offers equal rights to all races and classes, while nationalism divides the human race on the basis of national interest and prejudice.

An Islamic state must recognize that God alone is sovereign and therefore must fol- low His law. Sovereignty of the people, in the sense of making law is excluded, but it is the people who are to run the state and elect the leaders who administer the divine law. Moreover, in many areas the Shari‘a does not give specific guidance and here humans do legislate in accordance with the general principles of Islam. In other words, it is the people, not just the rulers, who exercise the khilafa that was first given to Adam. He suggests the term “theo-democracy” for this. Women should have the vote but not be active in politics (in fact, though, he supported a woman for president of Pakistan in 1965). Dhimmis may participate in government but may not be head of state or occupy certain key government positions. Hadd penalties such as cutting off the hand of a thief apply only in

Figure 15.1 Jamia Masjid in Kashmir, built about 1385. (Courtesy Harold Sequeira/ Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA)

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a truly Islamic society characterized by economic justice and where the government guaran- tees the basic necessities of life to all. This position is taken by many Islamists. (Link to more on Mawdudi.)

Islamic law is not static but develops and evolves by ijtihad, which must be done by fully qualified mujtahids and must be a serious effort to understand the Shari‘a and not an indepen- dent exercise of personal opinion, as some think. Islamic law in fact evolved over the centuries as long as it was applied, but for a century it has not been applied and a strenuous effort must be made to bridge that gap, so that its application and evolution can resume. Mawdudi accepts the idea of progress but it needs to follow the moral avenues laid out by Islam.

Resurgence of Islam Since 1970 there has been a considerable increase in religious interest and expression across the Muslim world, often labeled a “resurgence” of Islam. One major reason appears to be a feeling that secularism has failed to deliver on its promises. Copying “modern civilization” has failed to close the gap between the Muslim world and the West materially or culturally. A prominent symbol of this was the disastrous defeat of Egypt and Syria by Israel in the Six Day War in 1967. There was a feeling that we have tried everything else, now let us try our own home-grown ideology, Islam.

This “resurgence” has taken various forms. There has been increased attendance at the mosques, including a movement for women to become more involved, and increased partici- pation in the fast of Ramadan and the Hajj. Sales of popular religious books have increased as has religious programming on radio and television. More than one preacher or religious teacher has become a media celebrity. Sufi groups have become more active. Islamic banking has taken hold and grown. Islamic dress has become one of the most prominent features of the resurgence.

In politics the “resurgence” has been marked by a striking growth and spread of Islamism. The most dramatic example, and probably the most significant, has been the Islamic revolution in Iran, to be discussed in chapter eighteen. Islamist activity resumed in Egypt after a period of repression, as we shall discuss in chapter seventeen. Also dramatic was the successful Afghan jihad against Russian occupation in the 1980s. In this struggle Islamists, secularists, mod- ernists and traditionalists all participated, but then divided after the Russians were removed. (More will be said about Afghanistan in chapter twenty.) Similar things have happened in other situations. An Islamist government also took power in the Sudan by military coup in 1990. In Pakistan Islamism was strongest under the military rule of Zia ul-Haq from 1979 to 1988, who introduced various “Islamic” laws and had the support of the Jama‘at-i Islami for a time. Pakistan supported Afghan Islamists for political reasons but at home Pakistan has been

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unable to decide between Islamism and a Muslim secularism. Saudi Arabia is a special case. While strongly Islamic it did not reach its position in reaction to a previous secularism, as is usual with Islamism, but as a direct development from its Wahhabi origins. It is probably bet- ter seen as neo-traditional, but it has used its considerable financial resources to support many Islamist movements.

Many associate Islamism with violence and terrorism but this is simplistic and misleading. In fact, secularist groups also engage in violence and terrorism, such as groups connected with the Palestine Liberation Organization and some of the Kurdish groups. Violence, in fact, de- pends very much on the situation. For example, in Algeria the Islamic Salvation Front took part in the first stage of elections in 1991 and appeared set to win the second stage, but the secularist military government cancelled the second stage. As a result many of the Islamists turned violent and violence between them and the government continued for almost a decade, with atrocities on both sides.

The Shi‘i Islamist group in Lebanon, Hizbollah, has gotten the most publicity for the suc- cess of its “suicide bombers” in getting American and French “peacekeepers” to leave in 1983 and its role in the withdrawal of the Israelis in 2000 and resisting them in 2006. But its greater strength lies in the social services it provides its followers and others. In the case of the Palestinians in the 1970s the Muslim Brothers focused on educational and welfare activity and received some encouragement from the Israelis as a counterbalance to the violent PLO groups. In the first intifada, from 1988, however, Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brothers, took the lead in violent resistance, and after the failure of a settlement in 2000, turned to terrorism. They have been joined in this by a secularist group, al-Aqsa Brigades.

In fact, Islamist groups sometimes cooperate with secularist governments, sometimes engage in the political process, sometimes engage in violence depending on the circumstances, as do other groups.

In spite of the resurgence of Islam, secularist governments still rule most of the Islamic world as of 2008. Only Iran and the Sudan have Islamist governments. Almost all secularist govern- ments have become more Islamic, at least in appearance, since 1970. A clear example of this was Saddam Hussein in Iraq, who introduced various Islamic laws and symbols in the 1980s and put the phrase Allahu akbar on the Iraq flag.

While the failure of secularism is commonly given as a reason for “resurgence of Islam”, another lies in the success of modernization. This brought many traditional Muslims into the main steam of “modern” life but without divesting them of their religious beliefs.

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Islam and Zionism

Zionism and the state of Israel (or “occupied Palestine”) are among the most nega- tive terms in the Muslim lexicon today, especially but by no means exclusively for Islamists. Probably the main reason is that Israel enshrines the basic problem of modern Islam, as described by Smith, to a particularly acute degree.

Not only has land been taken away by force but it has been settled by those who took it and is not likely to be returned. And it is closely connected with the West. It was Western powers that brought it into existence and that continue to support it, especially the United States. It was European Jews who created the state, although the majority of Jews in Israel today have their roots in Muslim lands. Israel is a European intrusion as much as were the medieval Crusades.

Moreover, traditional Muslim thinking puts Jews at a lower level than Christians. The Qur’an has both good and bad things to say about Christians, but it has only criticism for the Jews of Muhammad’s time. Jews are viewed as disobedient to God (an attitude that can be found in the Bible also, though a bit more nuanced) and un- der His punishment. Also, for obvious reasons Jews were viewed as weaker than Christians, since there were no Jewish states. All of this did not keep Muslims in the past from often welcoming Jews into their lands and allowing them to prosper, but to have land taken by force by people who are perceived as weak and out of favor with God is doubly galling.

All of this is added to the fact that Jerusalem is the third holiest city for Islam and to the undeniable sufferings of the Palestinian people. This is one reason why Salah al- Din is a great hero today. He threw the Crusaders out of most of Palestine about 70 years after they arrived and there are those who hope history will repeat itself.

In spite of this, I would guess that the majority of Muslims worldwide are recon- ciled to the existence of the state of Israel if not enthusiastic about it. Some Muslim states have relations with Israel and Turkey has since 1949. Undoubtedly many Palestinians would like to see a lasting peaceful arrangement made. Until that hap- pens, unfortunately, Zionism and Israel will continue to be prime symbols of evil for many Muslims.

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These people have felt uneasy with the Westernization and secularization that has accompa- nied modernization and many have transmuted their traditional faith into Islamism as a result, while others have found refuge in more modernized forms of Sufism or practicing more in- tensely the basics while accepting new popular forms, e.g. via the media. Even after four de- cades it is impossible to tell where this resurgence will lead.

Key Points You Need to Know Probably the most important element in the Muslim experience of the last two centu-• ries has been a sense that history has gone wrong, that Muslim societies have not pros- pered as they should.

The main cause of this has been Western imperialism, although there was already • a sense in some quarters before the impact of Western imperialism that reform was needed.

The responses have involved both acceptance and rejection of Western ways, in vary-• ing degrees.

Traditionalists generally seek a minimum of change and change that is continuous with • what went before.

Modernists seek a significant reformulation of Islam in the light of the Western impact. •

Secularists want to create a social space not governed by Islam. •

Islamism wants to create a society whose governing ideology is Islam. •

Since about 1970 there has been a “resurgence” of Islam, which has involved many • forms of Islamic expression.

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading Ahmad, A. & von Grunebaum, G.E. (eds) (1970) Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan,

1857–1968, Weisbaden: Harrassowitz (anthology).

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Ali, Amir (1968) Islam, Lahore: Premier Book House.

Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf (1981) Islamic Awakening between Rejection & Extremism, Herndon, VA: American Trust Publication and The International Institute of Islamic Thought.

Ayoob, Mohammed (2007) The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Enayat, H. (l982) Modern Islamic Political Thought, London: Macmillan.

Esposito, John (1992) The Islamic Threat, Myth or Reality, New York: Oxford University Press.

Khalifa, Abdul Hakim (1965) Islamic Ideology: The Fundamental Beliefs and Principles of Islam and Their Application to Practical Life, 3rd ed., Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture.

Mawdudi, S.A.A. (1969) Islamic Law and Constitution, 2nd ed., Lahore: Islamic Publications.

Rahmena, Ali (ed.) (1994) Pioneers of Islamic Revival, London: Zed.

Sardar, Ziauddin (1985) Islamic Futures: The Shape of Ideas to Come, London and New York: Mansell.

Sedgwick, Mark (2006) Islam and Muslims: A Guide to Diverse Experience in a Modern World, Boston, MA: Intercultural Press.

Sidahmed, A.S. and Ehteshami, A. (eds) (1996) Islamic Fundamentalism, Boulder, CO: Westview.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell (l957) Islam in Modern History, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Taji-Farouki, Suha and Nafi, Basheer (eds) (2004) Islamic Thought in the Twentieth Century, London: I.B. Tauris.

Voll, John Obert (1994) Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World, 2nd ed., Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Turkey: Secularist Reform

“How happy is the one who can say, ‘I am a Turk.’” (Atatürk)

In This Chapter In the middle of the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire was possibly the most power- ful state in the world (see chapter four). By the nineteenth it was “the sick man of Europe”, although still the most powerful state in the Muslim world. This aptly illustrates at the politi- cal level the challenge from Europe described in the last chapter. In the twentieth century the Turkish subjects of that empire were to provide a dramatic response to that challenge at sev- eral levels, including the religious.

Main Topics Covered Reforms prompted by Ottoman defeats at the hands of Europeans and designed primar-• ily to strengthen the power of the central government, including its power over reli- gious institutions.

Ottoman “pan-Islamic” policy and claim to the caliphate intended to • strengthen the Ottoman position in the Muslim world.

“Turkism” among the Ottoman elite in the early 20th century, •

The Nationalist and Secularist Republic established by Atatürk • after the disastrous defeat in World War One.

Retreat from secularism in government policy since • about 1950; appearance of an Islamist movement; con- tinuing strength of the Sufis; the Nurcu movement, deriving from Sufism.

Alevi revival since the 1980s. •

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Ottoman defeats and reforms

In 1683 the Ottomans besieged and almost took Vienna during a war with Austria and other European powers, but in 1699 at the end of that war they had for the first time to sign a peace treaty with Europeans as the defeated party. During the eighteenth cen-tury they had occasional successes but more defeats and loss of land to the Europeans. During the nineteenth century this decline accelerated and their Christian subjects in

Greece and the Balkans developed nationalist aspirations and were able to detach themselves from the empire with the help of the European powers. By the beginning of the twentieth cen- tury the empire had survived mainly because European rivalries allowed it to.

In the face of this situation efforts at administrative and military reform were made and there was a continuing tug of war between the Westernizers or “progressives”, who saw the intro- duction of elements of Western technology and culture as both necessary to the survival of the empire and desirable in themselves, and the conservatives, usually acting in the name of Islam, who saw in these measures threats to their position and to the soul of their society.

The earliest reform efforts were successfully resisted by conservative forces, especially the Janissaries and the higher ‘ulama’ (see chapters four and nine). In 1826, however, serious re- forms were begun, after the Janissaries were brutally destroyed and the Bektashi Sufi order, closely associated with them, was suppressed. The earliest reforms included the creation of a new army with schools for the officers and some sent to study in Europe, a ministry of awqaf to give the government more control over these endowments, a postal service, and the open- ing of the empire to free trade, thus integrating it into the European economic system. Western

Map 7 Ottoman Empire and mod- ern Turkey (shaded)

Shepard Map 8

Istanbul

Ankara

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Gallipoli

Vienna

AUSTRIA

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BULGARIA

ARMENIA

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EGYPT

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T U

N IS

RUSSIA

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SYRIA

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MONTENEGRO

RO MA

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Black Sea

Mediterranean Sea

R ed Sea

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garb began to be popular among the elite and the fez was introduced, a modified European hat with the brim removed so that the wearer could touch his forehead to the ground when doing salah.

From 1839 to 1877 a more extensive series of reforms called Tanzimat (reorganizations) was undertaken. These began with an edict issued by the sultan recognizing the rights of life, prop- erty, honor and equality before the law of all religious groups, officially replacing the dhimmi system (though social realities did not change so quickly). These were claimed to be in accor- dance with the Shari‘a although no fatwa was obtained. Later the death penalty for apostasy from Islam was abolished. The Shari‘a penal and family laws were codified, and their admin- istration taken from the ‘ulama’ and put under a newly created Ministry of Justice. A commer- cial code was promulgated that was outside the Shari‘a and based on French law. Civil courts, distinct from Shari‘a courts, were established. A Ministry of Education was established and state secondary schools were developed. Thus both the legal and educational systems were di- vided into a state run sector and an ‘ulama’ run sector. There was land reform, which gave full ownership of land to some, while others were reduced to the status of share croppers or hired labor. Technological developments included the telegraph and the beginnings of railroads. Newspapers also began during this period though the government tried to suppress some of them. One result of these efforts was government overspending that led to European adminis- tration of its debt.

Although there was talk of limiting the power of the sultan (in theory unlimited) and other liberal concerns, the main purpose of these reforms was to strengthen the central government, both vis-à-vis the provinces and vis-à-vis elements that might challenge it. Traditionally the role of the sultan had been to maintain a balance among the various elements in society. Now the government was to take charge and lead change.

An interesting, though short lived, ideological group during this period was the Young Ottomans, who favored liberal reforms but sought to root them in a reformed Islam. They were among the first Islamic modernists. They were banned by the government in 1867.

Ottoman “pan-Islamic” policy and claim to the caliphate In 1876 a constitution, based on that of Belgium, was promulgated, partly to impress Western powers, but it was soon effectively suspended by the new sultan, Abdul Hamid (r. 1876–1909), who then ruled as an autocrat. Reacting against the previous policy, which seemed not to have strengthened the empire against the West, he based his ideology on Islam, calling it din u dev- let (religion and state). In general he favored a fairly traditional form of Islam and supported

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certain Sufi orders. But he and his supporters also propagated modernist arguments such as the claim that the West is materialistic but Islam properly balances materialism and spiritual- ity, and that what is good in the West comes ultimately from Islam. In the 1890s he launched a pan-Islamic ideology, according to which he was caliph and thus the spiritual leader of all Muslims, and used it to seek support from Muslims outside the empire. This claim goes back to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca with Russia in 1774, when the Ottoman sultan claimed to be the protector of Muslims in Russian territory in response to Russia’s demand to protect Orthodox Christians in Ottoman territory, but it began to be advanced seriously only in about 1860. At the same time, the empire continued to modernize. Technological development con- tinued. Schools spread as did newspapers, and popular literacy increased. In combining an assertive interpretation of Islam with an interest in modernization Abdul Hamid foreshadowed later Islamism. In reaction to his ideology at the time, however, many intellectuals opted for an uncritical pro-Westernism.

“Turkism” in the early twentieth century By the first decade of the twentieth century, Ottoman reformers had three ideological options. One was to base the empire on a reformed and “purified”, i.e. modernist, Islam. The second option was “Ottomanism”, to create a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society in which all groups would be equal and would be loyal to the Ottoman state. This was the hope of most of the “progressives” at this time, but the defection of the Christian millets and the beginnings of Arab nationalism were soon to make it irrelevant. The third was “Turkism”, to build society on a Turkish ethnic basis. This was hardly thought of in 1900 but was soon to become the effec- tive if unstated policy of the government and was eventually to prevail.

In 1908 a successful revolution was mounted by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which had begun as a secret organization in 1889 and was popularly known as the “Young Turks”. Abdul Hamid was deposed the following year. The CUP soon developed into a dic- tatorship and undertook a “Turkification” program among the minority groups. They took the empire into the First World War, calling for a jihad but receiving no response from other Muslim countries. They were responsible for the massacre of around one million Armenians, an event too complicated to deal with here except to note that Turkey has still not come to terms with this (as, for example, Germany has with the Jewish Holocaust). They increased state control over religion by putting the Shari‘a courts, medreses, and awqaf administration under secular ministries.

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Nationalist and secularist republic established by Atatürk The war saw the revolt of the Arabs and defeat confirmed the dismembering of the empire. Moreover, in 1919 the Greeks invaded Western Anatolia seeking to recover what they consid- ered their lost territories, in which there were still many Christians living. The sultan’s govern- ment was powerless in the face of all this and, in 1920, signed the draconian Treaty of Sèvres, which confirmed the various territory claims against the empire. At this point the Muslims of Anatolia took things into their own hands, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the hero of Gallipoli and one of the few Ottoman war heroes, later to be known as Atatürk, “the father of the Turks”. A Grand National Assembly was called together in Ankara and it declared the sul- tan’s government deposed and mounted an army that defeated and drove out the Greeks. They were then able to negotiate the more favorable Treaty of Lausanne (1923) from the allies, es- tablishing essentially the current boundaries of Turkey.

It is important to note that all of this was done in the name of Islam. Some twenty per- cent of the Grand National Assembly were ‘ulama’ or leading Sufis and on the defeat of the Greeks Mustafa Kemal was given the title ghazi, an Islamic title traditionally given to those who fight the kafirs on the frontiers of Dar al-Islam. In 1924 there was a popula- tion exchange of Greeks from Anatolia and Turks from Greece, and whether one was Greek or Turk was determined by one’s reli- gion. The concept of a Turkish nation barely

existed in 1918 among Turks. Among Westerners the word “Turk” had an ethnic meaning (earlier it had also meant Muslim) but in Turkish it meant a country bumpkin from Anatolia. The sense of Turkish national identity was created by these events and what followed. It is one measure of the extent of this accomplishment that a derogatory term such as “Turk” became a label of pride, summed up in the saying of Atatürk, “How happy is the one who can say, ‘I am a Turk.’”

Having driven out the Greeks in the name of Islam, Mustafa Kemal and his supporters under- took drastically secularizing reforms in the name of Turkish nationalism over the next decade and a half. His party, the Republican People’s Party, ruled unchallenged until 1950. The reform measures included the following:

The statement in the 1921 Constitution, “Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the • nation.” Later constitutions have substantially the same provision.

Figure 16.1 Tomb of Atatürk in his mausoleum, Ankara.

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The provision making Islam the religion of state was deleted in 1928. Laicism (• Laiklik) was explicitly written into the constitution in 1937.

The abolition of the sultanate (secular power of the sultan) in 1922 and the caliphate • (spiritual authority over the umma) in 1924.

Separate Shari‘a courts were abolished (1924) and Shari‘a law was replaced with a • civil code adapted from the Swiss code (1926).

Medreses • were closed (1924), replaced for a time by government schools for imams and a faculty of theology but these were closed by 1933. There was no religious in- struction in state schools until 1948.

The office of the Shaykh al-Islam was replaced with a government department control-• ling awqaf and paying the costs of mosques, etc.

Sufi • tariqas were disbanded and tekkes closed after a Kurdish revolt in 1925 under the leadership of the Naqshbandi Shaykh Sa‘id. Sufi orders were seen as hotbeds of super- stition, but were also dangerous because they had the support of people and a tradition of independence of the government. On this Atatürk said: “The straightest, truest tariqa is the way (tariqa) of civilization. To be a man, it is enough to do what civilization re- quires.” (Lewis 405) (It should be noted that the Kurds, as Muslims, had supported the Turks against the Armenians, but then the government of the Turkish Republic refused to recognize the Kurds as a distinct ethnic group. This eventually led to a long running Kurdish rebellion from 1984 to 1999. Only in the 1990s did the government recognize the Kurds as distinct ethnic group. Thus nationalism divided two Muslim peoples. )

The • adhan was to be given in Turkish rather than Arabic (1932). This may have caused more resentment than anything else. It was reversed in 1950.

People were expected to wear Western garb and the fez, in particular, was forbidden • (1925). Veiling by women was discouraged. Note that in a century the fez had gone from being a Westernizing innovation to an intolerable symbol of tradition. Atatürk’s statement on the subject speaks eloquently of his values and goals:

“It was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred to progress and civilization, and to adopt in its place the hat, the customary headdress of the whole civilized world ….”

(McNeill 446)

Polygyny was outlawed and men and women were given equal rights in divorce. • Women were given equality in education and employment, and were given the vote in national elections.

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Arabic script was replaced with Latin script for writing Turkish (1928). Practically this • had the effect of cutting off later generations from direct access to their written heri- tage. Also, Arabic script is closely identified with Islam, so that the change of script powerfully signals a turn from Islam to the West.

History was rewritten to stress the continuity of Anatolian/Turkish civilization back to • the Hittites and Sumerians, a typically nationalist move.

Obviously these measures are not secular in the sense of separating “mosque” from state. They clearly subordinate “mosque” to state. In doing this they constitute the final step in a devel- opment that had been going on for a century. At the same time, Islam is and continues to be an essential part of Turkish identity, so much so that in common parlance no one is called a Turk who is not a Muslim, at least by cultural background. A non-Muslim may be a citizen of the Turkish Republic but not a Turk. Thus, for all that Kemalism seems anti-religious, Islam viewed as a cultural tradition is part of it, while religion as a purely private affair is acceptable to it. On the other hand, it is possible in this context to be an atheist Muslim just as it is pos- sible to be an atheist Jew. In fact, Atatürk is said to have been agnostic in his personal beliefs. (Link to biography of Atatürk)

Atatürk’s statements above illustrate the identification of “civilization” and “progress” with Western civilization and the use of these as almost religious symbols, typical of much secular- ism. “Modernity” likewise is identified as Western. He stated to a journalist, “Our aim is to establish a modern, therefore a Western state in Turkey” (Toprak, 1981, 144).

There is also a case for considering the ideology of Atatürk and his followers, called Kemalism, a kind of religion itself. There is some tendency to deify the nation or the state in the constitution (1983) since it speaks of the “Eternal Turkish nation”, “sacred Turkish state”, and “abso- lute supremacy of the na- tional will”, though this is, of course, found in other nationalisms. It has been suggested that for Kemalism today Atatürk is a “virtual de- ity”, the military and political elite its clergy and Atatürk’s Mausoleum in Ankara its Mecca. Certainly Atatürk’s picture and sayings are every- where to be seen in Turkey. It has also been suggested

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that his published sayings are functionally comparable to the Hadith of Muhammad, although one might also compare them to something like the sayings of Chairman Mao. There is un- questionably material here for any discussion about the relation of nationalism to religion or idolatry.

The sign beside the door of Shehab al-Din’s tomb reads roughly as follows:

Attention, visitors. According to Islam, your religion; At tombs and graves!

Votive offerings are not to be presented.1.

Animals are not to be slaughtered as sacrifices.2.

Candles are not to be lit.3.

Strips of cloth are not to be fastened.4.

Coins not to be placed.5.

One is not to bow as one enters.6.

Money is not to be thown on or in.7.

People are not to leave food around.8.

One should not rub one’s hand and face.9.

Miraculous cures should not be expected from tombs and graves.10.

One should not circumabulate tombs or graves.11.

One should not lie down or sleep inside a tomb.12.

These and similar things are heresies and superstitions.

They have been forcefully [?] and definitely forbidden.

Department of Religious Affairs.

One presumes that this is a fairly accurate list of the practices associated with this tomb.

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Retreat from secularism from about 1950 While Kemalism was the ideology of the ruling elite, it did not capture the hearts of all Turks, or even a majority of them. Outside the cities women remained veiled, Sufi orders continued underground and older ways generally prevailed. When, in 1945, the government decided to allow the formation of other political parties and to hold elections, it was found expedient to relax some of the restrictions on religion and to take some measures encouraging it. These were not sufficient to prevent the defeat of the Republican People’s Party when the elections took place in 1950. The succeeding government was more favorable to religion and, generally, public religious expression has increasingly been allowed over the years, while religion has sometimes been something of a political football. Sufi tariqas have had considerable behind- the -scenes political influence and have owned a number of media outlets.

Still, governments have remained committed to secularism and to maintaining considerable control over religious expression. The military remains firmly committed to Kemalism and is the ultimate arbiter in politics. Four times it has intervened in civilian politics (1960–1961, 1971–1973, 1980–1983, 1997) when the generals felt things were out of control, the first three times forming a government of its own for a period of time. Not all of the reasons have been related to religion but some have.

Among the measures favorable to religion have been the appointment of military chaplains (1941), permission to get foreign currency to go on Hajj (1948), recitation of the adhan in Arabic, the airing of religious radio programs (1950), teaching of religion in primary schools, initially as an elective (1949) but near compulsory later, the opening of schools for imams and preachers (1949) and the establishment of a Faculty of Divinity in Ankara University and later elsewhere. In the 1960s politicians began to mention God in their speeches. Turkey has been a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference since its founding in 1969. Women’s head coverings appeared in the 1970s and have been a source of considerable debate, being banned in the universities and the government service. The state run imam and preachers’ schools have become something of a parallel system to the regular state schools since their graduates were eventually able to get jobs in state schools and government service. With these schools and the theological faculties the state has sought, with some success, to train ‘ulama’ who are attuned to secularism.

From 1983 to 1993 Turgat Özal, known to be a practicing Muslim in his personal life, was president. He relaxed state control of society to some degree and this opened more room for religious activities. In 1969 an Islamist party was formed under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, first called the National Order Party and then the National Salvation Party. It has had a close relationship to the Naqshbandi tariqa and has adhered to an ideology its founder called National Vision (milli görüş). It has called for a “ just order”, which may be taken as the Shari’a or simply less corruption. This ambiguity is presumably intentional since it would

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not be permitted to call openly for the Shari‘a or even to have Islam in its name. One member has described the party as Islamic with a “secularist overcoat”. It uses considerable nationalist rhetoric and calls for industrialization. It draws support from technically educated people and business communities in the provinces. Erbakan has a background in industrial technology. The source of its support is typical of Islamism generally but its nationalism and Sufi connec- tion are not.

The party has periodically been banned and resurfaced under a different name. It has polled roughly 10 to 20 percent of the vote and participated in some governments. Of all the parties it has apparently been the best at grass roots organization and women have played an important role here. In the 1970s it, along with the National Action (fascist) Party and leftist parties, was involved in considerable political violence that led to a military intervention in 1980. In 1995 as the Welfare Party it gained the largest number of votes and Erbakan became prime minister in coalition with a secularist party. He was forced out by the military after two years on the grounds of his presumed Islamist agenda and the party was again banned, to resurface as the Virtue party, which was banned in 2001. It appears that much of the party’s vote has been a protest vote. A researcher reports one voter as saying he voted for the Welfare Party because of government corruption, inflation, unemployment and inadequate public services. When asked if he wanted the Shari‘a enforced he said he was sure that the generals would prevent that.

After the last ban, the party split and the more liberal group took the name of Justice and Development Party. It supports secularism defined as “the state’s impartiality toward every form of religious belief and philosophi- cal conviction” but has a strong Islamic ethos (e.g. most of its women cover their heads), which makes secularists suspicious. It was elected to power in 2002 and in its early years enacted measures, such as the abolition of the death penalty, greater freedom for the media, limited cultural rights for minorities, such as the Kurds, and some restriction on the

military. These can be described as liberal but not as distinctively Islamic. It also favors mem- bership in the European Union whereas Erbakan had preferred links with Muslim countries. Whatever else one may say, political Islam in Turkey is evolving in interesting directions.

A movement with Sufi roots and wide influence is the Nurcu movement, based on the teach- ings of Badiuzzaman Said Nursi (1876–1960). Nursi’s main achievement was a vast commen- tary on the Qur’an, Risala-i Nur, which covers a wide range of topics and particularly seeks to show that the Qur’an is consistent with modern science and technology. While he hoped even- tually for a Shari‘a based society, his immediate goal was to strengthen and enlighten the faith

Figure 16.3 Office of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) in Konya, which is one of its strongholds.

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of individuals. He soon developed a following and the movement consists of a large network of people who meet in study sessions to discuss his writings. Since his death the movement has grown considerably both in Turkey and worldwide. Its emphasis is not political although it has supported different political parties over the years and many secularists are suspicious of it.

One later branch of the Nurcu is the movement led by Fathullah Gülen, which is active in business and media but is especially known for the schools it has founded and supports, both in Turkey and beyond. In these Islamic ethics and ethos is taught “by example” but there are no classes in Islamic doctrine. He is revered by his followers as an inspirational and moderate leader but has been attacked others as a threat to Turkish secularism. He had to leave Turkey for the United States in 1999.

Alevi revival The Alevis comprise 15 to 25 percent of the population of Turkey but have been largely in- visible to outsiders. They were persecuted under the Ottomans and hence resorted to taqiya. They supported Atatürk’s movement, which ended persecution but could not eliminate popular prejudice against them. Moreover, the cultural uniformity enforced by the republican govern- ment worked against their maintaining their distinctive customs and practices. In politics they have tended to gravitate to left-wing parties, and to become very secular. All of this resulted in a situation in which their esoteric religious teachings, traditionally passed on in personal instruction by spiritual teachers known as dedes, were in danger of being lost. Since the 1980s there has been a considerable cultural revival among them and also an effort to revive spiritual teachings and practices and put them in more modern form.

There are some interesting anomalies in the Turkish experience. For example, it is said that the politicians took the decision to allow the adhan in Arabic over cocktails. In one town al- cohol was prohibited near Atatürk’s statue (Atatürk was a heavy drinker) and I saw people at Atatürk’s mausoleum reciting the Fatiha for him. As for attitudes toward political Islam, in a survey in 2000 some 60 percent opposed the existence of a religious based party although 46 percent reported that they pray five times a day, 84 percent of the men reported that they attend mosque for Friday prayers, and 91 percent give zakat. In general, the Turks have come to ac- cept both secularism and Islam, but they are still trying to work out exactly how to relate them.

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Key Points You Need to Know The Ottomans were one of the first Muslim states to experience the growing power of • Europe.

Their response was to undertake Westernizing reforms while retaining their Islamic • faith and institutions, but the result was significant changes in these institutions.

The reforms did not, finally, save the empire but they did prepare the way for the next • stage, of nationalism and secularism.

Turkish secularism does not mean separation of “mosque” and state but state domina-• tion of “mosque”.

The people of Turkey remained largely religious and the Sufi orders strong, though • banned, and this has reflected itself in various ways, including the strength of Islamist parties and the popularity of the Nurcus.

Figure 16.4 Bektashi sama‘, at the tomb/complex of Hajji Bektash (in 2000). The participation of men and wom-Bektashi sama‘, at the tomb/complex of Hajji Bektash (in 2000). The participation of men and wom- en together makes this quite unusual. Like the Baktashis, the Alevis venerate Hajji Bektash and in Turkey today people often speak of an Alevi-Bektashi tradition.

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Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading Berkes, N. (1964) The Development of Secularism in Modern Turkey, Montreal: McGill

University Press.

Jenny, B. (2002) Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Kinzer, Stephen (2001) Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

Pope, Nicole and Hugh (1997) Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and After, London: John Murray.

Toprak, B. (1981) Islam and Political Development in Turkey, Leiden: Brill.

Yavuz, M. Hakan and Esposito, John L. (eds) (2003) Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Egypt: Between secularism and Islamism

In This Chapter Turkish leaders responded to the Western challenge with a dramatic program of secularization, from which they later retreated in part. The Egyptians have also secularized, but to a lesser degree and less definitively; their retreat has been greater but more ambiguous. Also, whereas Turkey effectively eliminated its non-Muslim minorities, Egypt still has a strong Coptic Christian community comprising about 10 percent of the population that is culturally homoge- neous with the majority.

Main Topics Covered The beginnings of modernization and secularization in the nineteenth century •

Muhammad ‘Abduh and Islamic modernism •

Nationalism and secularization in the early twentieth century •

The beginnings of Islamism; the Muslim Brothers •

Revolution: support, control and repression •

Resurgence of Islam •

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The beginnings of modernization and secularization in the nine teenth century

Egypt became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1517, but the Mamlukes, who had ruled previously, continued to run the country under the loose control of the Ottoman governor. During the last decades of the eighteenth century Mamluke rule degenerated into considerable anarchy as the Mamluke leaders fought with each other, but economic activity was strong. Sufi tariqas flourished, as did the ‘ulama’, who often mediated between the people and the rulers. More than a fifth of the land was held by awqaf, which were managed by ‘ulama’ and often used for the benefit of their institutions.

The French occupation from 1798 to 1801, described in chapter fifteen, effectively destroyed Mamluke author- ity and left a power gap. The ‘ulama’, who had led revolts against the French, briefly stepped into this gap and then supported the choice as governor of Muhammad ‘Ali (r. 1805–1849), an Albanian officer in the Ottoman army. His ambition was evidently to take control of the Ottoman empire using Egypt has his base. To do this he had to remove or neutralize those who might threaten his control and to institute a number of mod- ernizing reforms. He dealt with the Mamlukes in 1811 by inviting their leaders to a ceremony and having them all slaughtered He dealt with the ‘ulama’ by exiling some of the most influ- ential and by attacking their economic base and thus their independence. He confiscated the awqaf that provided their institutions with income, replacing these with government grants at a lower level. He also replaced the iltizam (tax farming), in which many ‘ulama’ participated, with direct taxation. The result of this was a decline in the madrasas and other ‘ulama’ run in- stitutions during the nineteenth century. He never openly violated the Shari‘a but also showed little respect for the ‘ulama’s’ views. Authority over the tariqas and their shrines was given to the shaykh of the Bakriyya tariqa. This authority was somewhat amorphous at first and never complete, but served to increase government influence on the tariqas. At this time virtually all adult male Muslims were connected with a tariqa. Other reforms included establishing spe-

Map 8 Egypt Shepard Map 9

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Asyut

Aswan

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cialist schools for the military in subjects such as language, medicine and engineering, with many of the teachers being Europeans. Muhammad ’Ali’s designs on the Ottoman sultanate were eventually stymied by the Europeans but he had started a modernization process that had sufficient momentum to keep going. Today he is respected as the “Great Modernizer” but is loved by few, if any.

In 1850 the Ottoman commercial code, based on the French code, took effect in Egypt and in 1855 the law abolishing jizya and granting legal equality to religious minorities also took effect in Egypt. The political elite had been Turkish-speaking but now native Egyptians were reaching important positions and in 1858 Arabic became the language of official correspondence. Nevertheless, the Turkish element continued to be important, and some- what resented, until the Free Officers coup in 1952.

Modernization continued under Muhammad ’Ali’s successors, especially his grandson, Isma‘il (r. 1863–79) whose Westernizing inclinations were strikingly symbolized by his building an opera house in Cairo, along with many other ambitious projects, and by his statement that Egypt had become part of Europe. The Western calendar was also ad- opted alongside the hijri calendar. In 1874 Egypt gained legislative autonomy within the Ottoman Empire and in the next few years secular civil and penal codes were promulgat- ed, both based largely and openly on French

codes though with some influence from Shari‘a law. New courts were established to admin- ister the new codes and had lawyers practicing in them, a Westernizing novelty. A system of Shari‘a courts was set up, staffed by the ‘ulama’, to deal with “personal status” matters such marriage, divorce and inheritance. Non-Muslims had separate courts for these matters. Thus began a dual court system, secular and religious, that continued until the 1950s. A small num- ber of government primary schools was established, including a girls’ school. Dar al-‘Ulum (The House of Sciences) was established in 1872 separate from the Azhar, to train teachers of Arabic language and, for a time, judges, combining modern and traditional methods. Isma‘il’s

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modernizing ambitions led him to overspend, with the result that the European powers took charge of the government finances and got Isma‘il removed.

This situation prompted army officers led by Ahmad ‘Urabi to demand a constitution that would limit the ruler’s powers. Their grievances included preference given to Turkish- speaking officers over Arabic speaking officers in the army and the European intervention. This movement was described by its partisans as a jihad. The British ended the movement in 1882 by sending in military forces and occupying the country, an occupation that lasted for 40 years. They did not remove the existing government but British “advisors” largely determined policies and made a number of administrative and economic reforms. State and private (non- ‘ulama’) schools continued to develop, though most Egyptians believe that the British did not encourage education enough.

Muhammad ‘Abduh and Islamic modernism One of ‘Urabi’s supporters was Muhammad ‘Abduh (1842–1905), an Azhari who had been a close disciple of al-Afghani (see chapter fifteen) when the latter was in Cairo in the 1870s. He was exiled after the ‘Urabi movement and collaborated with al-Afghani in Paris in 1884 on a

Figure 17.2 Mosque of Muhammad Ali in the Citadel, Cairo. Ottoman style.

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short lived but influential newspaper. His path diverged from al-Afghani’s, however, when he became convinced that the struggle for Egyptian independence was premature and that Egypt needed a period of European tutelage before she could become truly a part of the modern world. He returned to Egypt in 1888, where he became a judge in the new courts and was ap- pointed to the Legislative Council, an advisory group to the government. He was also appoint- ed to the administrative council of al-Azhar where he worked with partial success for adminis- trative reforms. He was appointed Mufti of Egypt, in which capacity he worked for reforms of the Shari‘a courts and gave fatwas on matters of public interest. He was a salafi in the sense of wanting to revive the spirit of early Islam while flexibly meeting current needs. Ijtihad should be bound only by the Qur’an and the best attested hadiths and should follow maslaha, the in- terest of the community, broadly interpreted. In his fatwas he ruled, for example, that Muslims could eat meat slaughtered by Jews and Christians and take bank interest.

He claimed that Islam is a rational religion, de-emphasizing miracles but not going quite as far in this as Sayyid Ahmad Khan. As for the miracles ascribed to walis, he cautiously says that no one is obliged to believe them. Many Egyptians believed that anyone who denied such mira- cles was a kafir. Right and wrong can largely be discovered by human reason, though prophets are needed for some matters and to provide certainty and full authority. Muhammad’s message provides the final revelation that a rationally mature humanity needs. He contrasts the rational- ity of Islam with what he sees as the miracle mongering and authoritarianism of Christianity. He interprets the ideas of qadar and kasb (acquisition) in the direction of genuine human choice rather than predestination, while recognizing the ultimate divine control over all things. His positions were often close to those of the Mu‘tazila. He also opposed takfir, the practice of declaring people kafir because of sectarian or doctrinal differences. He is probably the best known and most influential of the modernist reformers, both in Egypt and beyond. (Biography of ‘Abduh.)

Nationalism and secularization in the early twentieth century By 1900 Egypt was divided between a small “effendi” class, who lived a Europeanized life style and a large “traditional” population. The numerical difference is suggested by statistics from 1899 indicating that there were 7,735 students in state schools and 180,000 students in the kuttabs of the ‘ulama’. The effendi class, however, had disproportionate political and cul- tural influence and saw itself as the wave of the future. Among these were many who were keen to end the British occupation. Mustafa Kamil, a charismatic (or demagogic, according to his critics) politician called for the immediate departure of the British from Egypt but died in 1908, before he could accomplish much. His interpretation of Islam was modernist, identify- ing the “real” Islam with patriotism, justice and tolerance, but his main focus was Egyptian

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patriotism. Another important writer of the time was Qasim Amin (1865–1908), a disciple of ‘Abduh, who wrote two books on the emancipation of women. The first argued in a modernist manner from the Islamic sources but the second argued in a more secular manner from sci- ence, freedom, progress, and civilization. In both it is stated that the emancipation and educa- tion of women is necessary for the welfare of the nation, an argument to be made by many others.

Nationalist and patriotic feeling increased in Egypt during World War One and led to a move- ment for independence under a former colleague of ‘Abduh, Sa‘d Zaghlul (1857–1927). There was a popular revolt in 1919 that led to the end of the British occupation in 1922, although the British retained certain privileges, including control of the Suez Canal. This revolt was in a secular nationalist mode, with Muslims and Christians cooperating. One of its slogans was, “Religion is for God but the fatherland is for all.” On independence the ruler from the line of Muhammad ‘Ali took the title king and a parliament was elected. The constitution stated that all authority stems from the nation, that Islam is the religion of state, but that there is freedom of religious belief and all Egyptians are equal before the law.

Women played a prominent role in the 1919 revolt and in 1923 an upper class woman, Hoda Sha‘rawi, founded the Egyptian Feminist Union and prominently discarded her veil, as other women of the effendi class soon did. The feminist movement at this time was both strongly nationalist and strongly Westernizing.

After independence there was a considerable expansion of state education at all levels, while the traditional kuttabs and the Azhar system lost ground. By 1970 there were some five million students in secular primary and secondary schools while students of the same level in religious schools, now organized under the Azhar, numbered only about 83,000. In 1966 religion con- stituted about 11 percent of the state primary curriculum. The first university was founded in 1908 as a private institution and was taken over by the government in 1925. Other universities were established from 1942. Reform of the Azhar itself was limited since the ‘ulama’ resisted losing control. Education for women increased dramatically from the 1920s and the first wom- en entered university toward the end of that decade.

Atatürk’s abolition of the caliphate in 1924 occasioned much debate in Egypt. Out of the de- bate came the best known defense of secularism on Islamic grounds, Islam and the Bases of Government, written by ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Rāziq (1888–1966) in 1925. Its argument is that the ca- liphate is not clearly stipulated in the Qur’an or the Sunna, a point generally recognized, that there had never been a true ijma‘ on it, and that this particular form of government could not be shown to be necessary for the welfare of the community (maslaha). Moreover, the mission of Muhammad did not include politics. Admittedly he had the elements of government, the ap- pointment of governors and judges, the collection of taxes, etc., but these were done in an ad hoc fashion and only as necessary actions to sustain his preaching. In any case, a prophet’s au- thority is spiritual rather than material. Muhammad’s mission was to unify humankind, some-

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thing that might be possible religiously but not politically. The book raised a storm and was condemned by the ‘ulama’ of the Azhar, and its author lost his status as an ‘alim. Still, many educated people in the following decades held views similar to his.

During the 1920s and 1930s there was a lively literary and intellectual life, many of whose participants articulated secularist and nationalist views. At first the emphasis was on Egyptian nationalism, as it had been earlier. By the 1930s, however, there was more interest in pan- Arab nationalism. The latter, we may note is easier to square with Islamic sensibilities, since the Arabs and the Arabic language have always had a special place in Islam. The early Arab heroes and the early heroes of Islam are the same people. By contrast, the ancient Egyptians were pagans and Pharaoh is a great villain in the Qur’an. In the 1930s and 1940s several lead- ing literary figures wrote studies of Muhammad and other early Islamic figures, some of which have been discussed in chapter two. These signal a partial retreat from secularism but are still secularist insofar as they treat their subjects as heroes and Islam as heritage.

A storm was raised in 1926 by a book on jahili poetry by Taha Hussein, probably the greatest modern Egyptian literary figure, because it denied the historicity of some events recounted in the Qur’an. Combined with politics this later caused the author to lose his university posi- tion for a time. In the 1940s there was another controversy over a doctoral dissertation by Muhammad Khalafallah, on the Qur’anic stories of the prophets, which argued that they were not meant to give precise historical information. These events, along with the case of Abu Zayd mentioned below, signaled a line not to be lightly crossed.

The beginnings of Islamism: the Muslim Brothers If some of Muhammad ‘Abduh’s successors took his legacy in a secularist direction, oth- ers took it in an Islamist direction. Rashid Rida (1865–1935), a close associate of ‘Abduh, developed his doctrine of salafiyya in a conservative direction, influenced by the success of the Wahhabis in Arabia. His interpretations included the view that jihad is defensive and that interest on loans was acceptable because of necessity but he favored the traditional predomi- nance of men over women and justified polygyny. He contributed to the debate over the ca- liphate with a book, The Caliphate or the Great Imamate, attacking the idea of a “spiritual” ca- liphate, which the Turks instituted between 1922 and 1924. A true caliph should have material as well as spiritual authority and should be a mujtahid, although a caliph of necessity would be acceptable for a time. Legislative power is authorized by God and confided to the umma, which through consultation (shura) and ijma‘ makes enforceable decisions that the caliph can- not overturn. Ijma‘ here becomes an active and intentional process rather than the ex post facto recognition of what was already the case, as it traditionally was.

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One who was influenced by Rashid Rida was Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), a young gradu- ate of Dar al-‘Ulum and a state school teacher. In 1928 he founded the Muslim Brothers (al- Ikhwān al-Muslimūn), initially a social and educational group but soon a mass movement articulating a political message. The ultimate goal was an “Islamic Order”, in which Islam would be followed in all areas of life, if possible by convincing the government to implement this. Their focus, however, continued to be on educational, social and economic activities, including youth groups and women’s activities. Modern methods of propaganda were used to spread the message. The organization had a strong leadership structure, and al-Banna, who was a member of a Sufi tariqa although he criticized many current Sufi practices, ran the orga- nization with something of the manner of a Sufi shaykh. The membership was largely middle class, members of the effendi sector of society, though efforts had been made to reach workers and peasants. The movement spread to other Arab countries after World War Two and pro- vided some of the best fighters on the Arab side in the 1948 war in Palestine. Politics in Egypt were quite chaotic after the war and the Brothers were one of the strongest forces, but in 1948 a Brother assassinated the prime minister and Hasan al-Banna was killed in retaliation, and the movement was banned until 1951.

Revolution: support, control and repression In 1952 a group of army officers, some of whom had had contact with the Brothers, took con- trol of the government under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, while Abdel Nasser and others were probably more personally pious than previous leaders, they adopted secular Arab nationalism as their ideology, and then Arab Socialism from 1961. These ide- ologies have a place for Islam, but not what Islamists want. In a small book entitled “The Philosophy of the Revolution” Abdel Nasser speaks of Egypt as part of three circles, an Arab circle, which is the most important, then an African circle, and finally an Islamic circle, in the context of which he speaks of the Hajj as potentially a congress of Muslim leaders in a pan-Is- lamic mode. Elsewhere in response to criticism he describes socialism as the law of God. With the Coptic minority in mind he describes his government as adhering to “religion”, Muslims to their religion and Christians to theirs. Far from separating religion from government his government undertook to incorporate and reform the religious institutions. Separate religious courts were abolished in 1956 though the distinctive religious laws remained. Awqaf (many had been created since Muhammad ’Ali’s time) that supported institutions such as mosques were put under the control or the Ministry of Awqaf (or Ministry of Religious Affairs). In 1961 the Azhar and its system of feeder schools were brought more firmly under state control and new faculties were added to the Azhar, including business administration, medicine and en- gineering. It was argued that in this context religion could be made more relevant to worldly affairs but some have questioned the quality of these courses. The Shaykh of the Azhar (the leading figure in the religious establishment) gave fatwas supporting the regime’s socialist

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measures, arguing, among other things, that while private property is permitted, the Prophet said, “All people partake in three things, water, pasture and fire” and this is taken to justify state ownership of comparable modern necessities such as electricity and transport.

The Brothers at first supported this regime, hoping that it would implement their program, but then turned away from it. In 1954 after an assassination attempt against Abdel Nasser blamed on the Brothers, the organization was again banned. A few of its leaders were executed and many of the members were given long prison sentences. Others left Egypt. The prison experi- ence radicalized some of them.

Among these was Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), who had been one of the secular literary elite for two decades, then adopted an Islamist position, joined the Brothers and become their chief ideologue. He was influenced by Mawdudi, but was to go beyond both Mawdudi and Banna in his Islamism. He presented his ideas in a number of writings, of which the most important is his multi-volume commentary to the Qur’an (In the Shade of the Qur’an) and the best known and most radical is Milestones, which circulated in manuscript in prison and was published in 1964. In his later thinking the difference between good and evil, faith and unbelief is stark and uncompromising. There can be no mixture or compromise between a society run by God’s laws and one run by human laws. The latter are jahili societies, but jahiliyya is not just non- Islamic, it is actively anti-Islamic. According to Qutb all societies in his time were jahili, in- cluding those that called themselves Muslim and very much including Abdel Nasser’s Egypt (though he could not quite say this openly in print). Mawdudi had spoken of these societies as mixtures of Islam and jahiliyya, but Qutb would not allow this compromise. Given this, the only way to establish an Islamic society is by jihad, which in Qutb’s interpretation meant a revolutionary takeover after a long period of preparation and then a long struggle. His picture of the process was patterned after the Prophet Muhammad’s experience but probably also in- fluenced by Marxist ideas. Qutb had other ideas of significance but these were his most radical ideas and they were to inspire a number of extremists in the decades to come. Qutb himself was released from prison in 1964, rearrested in 1965 on charges of conspiring against the gov- ernment and executed in 1966, thus adding the power of martyrdom to his ideas. (Link to more on Qutb)

Through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Sufi tariqas continued to be impor- tant, though not as all encompassing as before. It is said that the height of their activity was in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Criticism from both secularists and salafis has led to the decrease of some of the more spectacular activities of the tariqas. Their numbers declined in the first half of the twentieth century in the face of the secularization of society but have risen since then. To a significant degree they have been able to develop a middle class urban following. The system of organizing the orders and bringing them under some degree of government jurisdiction was strengthened with the creation of the Sufi Council in 1895, and this system has continued, although many tariqas are not part of it. The tariqas were involved in politics at the level of seeking favors from politicians and providing them with support.

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The government of Abdel Nasser gave support to the tariqas, in part as a counterbalance to the Islamists, and used them for propaganda. Abdel Nasser himself is said to have had a Sufi shaykh as a spiritual advisor.

Resurgence of Islam The defeat in 1967 at the hands of the Israelis in the “Six Day War” was devastating to the prestige and the ideology of the Abdel Nasser government although Abdel Nasser remained personally popular. After his death in 1970, his successor, Anwar al-Sadat removed his more left-wing colleagues and opened Egypt to a greater degree of capitalism and trade with the West, a policy known as infitāḥ (opening). In part as a counterbalance to the left-wing he gave more of a place to religion and referred to his government as “the government of science and religion” and himself as “the believer president”. He released the members of the Muslim Brothers who were in prison and allowed them to reorganize and publish a magazine but did not grant them legal status. The Brothers renounced violence and sought to work within the system for their vision of an Islamic society. With the help of the government, Islamist groups were able to take over the university student councils from the leftists and control them for several years. In 1972 the constitution was amended to state that “the principles of the Islamic Shari‘a are a principal source of legislation.” In 1980 this was amended to read “ … the princi- pal source of legislation.” This comes close to the Islamist position (which would presumably say “the source of legislation”) but it did not have too much effect on actual legislation. When Sadat went to war with Israel in 1973 he called it “Operation Badr”, after the Prophet’s famous battle. On the other hand, on one occasion when Sadat was criticized by Islamist organizations he responded “no religion in politics and no politics in religion”. Without denying his personal sincerity, it is probably fair to say that he desired the authority religious symbols would give him but not the restraints religion would impose.

The 1970s saw the beginning of the “re-veiling” phenomenon. Young women, mainly uni- versity students, many of whose grandmothers had removed the veil in the 1920s and 1930s, began to wear “Islamic garb”, which covered all but their faces and hands and was different from traditional forms of Muslim garb. Since then this has spread and become more varied. It has become a visible marker of Islamism, although not all who use it are strictly speaking Islamists nor are all who do not use it secularists. Since the 1950s women had made consider- able progress in education and employment but the family laws pertaining to them have not changed much. In 1979 President Sadat promulgated by decree a law that would, among other things, have given a woman the right to divorce if her husband took another wife. This aroused considerable opposition and was labeled “Jihan’s law”, after the president’s wife, who had worked for it. The law was declared unconstitutional in 1985 but, in the context of consider- able debate, partly reinstated in 2000.

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Some of the younger Islamists, radicalized in prison, formed potentially violent groups and there were two prominent incidents in the 1970s. In 1974 one group took over the Military Academy as part of a failed coup d’état. Another, popularly known as “Takfir and Hijra” was suppressed by the government in 1978, after kidnapping and killing a former government min- ister. The popular name reflects the group’s ideology, which was an extreme variant of Sayyid Qutb’s ideas. They held that the whole of society was kafir (thus takfir) and that true believers should withdraw physically from it (hijra) to prepare for a time when they could take it over. In declaring the whole of society kafir they were close to Qutb’s view but went further than other extremist groups, who believed that only the leaders were kafir and that society would follow them once the leaders were removed. The popular label also alludes to the Kharijis of the early years of Islam, and in fact critics of the extreme lslamists frequently refer to them as Kharijis.

In 1979 Sadat made a peace treaty with Israel, getting a fatwa from the Shaykh of the Azhar in support of it, but attracting violent criticism from many quarters, leftist, Islamist and oth- ers, leading him to imprison many of the critics and ban the many Islamist groups of students and others that he had earlier supported. Out of these Islamists were formed several extremist groups of which two, Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group (al-jamā‘a al-islāmiyya) have been the most prominent. Members of Islamic Jihad assassinated Sadat in 1981, hop- ing to spark a revolt that did not materialize. One of their leaders, Abd al-Salam Faraj wrote a booklet, The Forgotten Obligation, explaining their views. Jihad, in the sense of fighting, is an obligation and it should be directed at the “near enemy”, i.e. the kafir leadership of Egypt, before the “far enemy”, i.e. Israel. He used the fatwas of Ibn Taymiyya against the Mongols to make the case that a ruler who claims to be Muslim but does not rule according to the Shari‘a is a kafir. The Azhar produced a lengthy rebuttal.

Figure 17.3 The “benefits” of modernizaton: Cairo carpark and billboard advertising a movie called “And I Fell into a Sea of Honey”. It may have been an Islamist who defaced it. (1977)

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Sadat was replaced as president by Husni Mubarak, whose government is secularist but has walked an uneasy tightrope between the demands of the Islamists and those of the secularists, as indeed has society itself. The government has attended sometimes to one side and some- times to another. It has banned liquor sales (except in tourist areas!) and banned books that offended Islamists but has destroyed Islamist books for schools and replaced them with secu- larist books.

The Azhar continues to support the government much of the time but has become more asser- tive and critical and more successful in getting its way on specific matters. It produced a draft Islamic constitution in 1979. It also provides fatwas for individuals on a wide range of issues mainly relating to the family. In 2007 the Shaykh of the Azhar gave a fatwa approving the government’s appointment of female judges over the disapproval of many Islamists.

Attendance at mosques has increased since 1970 and more women have attended salat al- jum‘a. There has also been a proliferation of religious associations, many not political in ori- entation. The Ministry of Awqaf has set itself the target of supervising all of the mosques in the country, partly because extremist groups often center on private mosques, but it has not had the resources to do this. In 1999 it was claimed that about 41,000 of 67,000 mosques were supervised. Religious books and tapes of popular preachers are widely sold. There have been a certain number of religious “personalities”, both male and female, such as Shaykh Sha‘rawi, who combined a fairly traditionalist message with a very dramatic presentation and had a pop- ular television program. A certain number of well known secular intellectuals have publicly changed from a secularist to a modernist or Islamist position. A number of Islamic financial institutions have come into existence and regular banks often have Islamic sections. There was something of a “bubble” in these institutions in the late 1980s that burst, causing many people to lose money.

The Sufi movement has continued to grow. Official figures calculated 3 to 5 million Sufis (not counting women) in 1989 but a Sufi shaykh claimed that as many as half of all Egyptians have some sort of connection with a tariqa. There have been a number of walis recognized in recent decades. One is said to have been refused passage on a Nile ferry because he was impolitely criticizing the morals of the tourists, so he crossed the river on his handkerchief.

The Muslim Brothers, still unrecognized legally and often harassed by the government, have been the main opposition group. They have participated, under other labels or as independents, in all of the parliamentary elections but one since 1984 and they have done relatively well, given that Egyptian elections are engineered to return a large majority for the ruling party. In 2005 they won 88 of the 454 seats. The Brothers and other Islamists have also sought with some success to gain control of professional associations (or syndicates). Between 1987 and 1992 they were successful with the lawyers, physicians and engineers’ syndicates and the Cairo University Faculty Club, but the government soon found ways to reverse most of these. More recently they have been satisfied with representation on the governing boards of syn-

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dicates without control. Islamists continue to engage in education and social service. During an earthquake in Cairo in 1992 they embarrassed the government by providing aid faster and more effectively than it did. The Brothers now speak favorably of democracy and claim it is consistent with Islam. In 1996 a group of Brothers broke away to form the Wasat (Middle-of- the-Road) Party, taking a more liberal position, but they have not been allowed to register as a political party. Its ideology may possibly be compared to that of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey.

The late 1980s to the late 1990s saw considerable political violence involving Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group. This included the assassinations of the speaker of parlia- ment and of a prominent secularist writer, and attempts on the life of President Mubarak and of the Nobel Prize winner Neguib Mahfouz. There was violence against Copts and attacks on tourists. The police response was likewise violent and a number of Islamists and others were killed. In 1997 the leaders of the Islamic Group called for an end to the violence. Many of the leaders of Islamic Jihad followed the same path a couple of years later, while others, follow- ing Ayman al-Zawahiri, merged with al-Qaeda in 2001 (see chapter twenty). Violence against tourists reflects the fact that many tourists dress and act in a manner that is offensive to many Egyptians (not just Islamists) and also the fact that tourists symbolize the imbalance between the West and Islam that lies at the heart of the modern problem. Still, Egypt depends heavily on tourists and their actions were hardly designed to appeal to the average Egyptian.

This same period saw a major controversy over the case of Nasr Muhammad Hamid Abu Zayd, a professor at the University of Cairo, whose critical theories of the Qur’an, emphasiz- ing its human dimension, prompted an Islamist lawyer in 1993 to sue in the courts to have his marriage dissolved on the grounds that his views made him a kafir, and a kafir cannot be mar- ried to a Muslim. The suit was first denied, then upheld on appeal, and then later the law was changed, but by that time Abu Zayd had left Egypt because of the threats he had received. The case can be compared to those of Taha Hussein and Khalafallah, but the consequences were more serious for Abu Zayd.

In spite of all this, the majority of Egyptians are probably not Islamist in their views. The government is still secularist and entrenched in power. The protest movement against it in 2004–2005, “Enough” (Kifaya), was also predominantly secular. There are still spokespeople for secularist and modernist views, though preferring not to use the label “secularist”(see box in chapter fifteen). A prominent example is the retired judge, Sa‘id al-Ashmawy. He has criti- cized what he and others call “political Islam” quite trenchantly. Among other things he argues that those who call for the application of the Shari‘a are really calling for the application of fiqh, which is human opinion. In fact, Western law and Islamic law are related and in adopting Western laws the Egyptians have not violated the Shari‘a. A true “government of God” is only possible during the life of the Prophet.

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The resurgence of Islam in Egypt has definitely shifted the cultural balance away from secular- ism but has not produced an Islamic government. While society may become more Islamic, it seems likely that that government will continue to be secular though with more of an Islamist tinge, so to speak; more so than in Turkey.

Key Points You Need to Know In Egypt both the • ‘ulama’ and the Sufis were influential in the eighteenth century, lost ground especially in the upper levels of society in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but seem to have regained some influence since about 1950.

Modernization led to a dualism between “modern” and “traditional” in many areas of • society, e.g. law, eduation, dress, but this has decreased in recent decades.

Secularism has been strong but much less aggressive in Egypt than in Turkey. •

The state has sought to control religious expression but with only partial success. •

Islamism has taken both moderate and violent forms. •

Egypt has had major secularist, Islamic modernist and radically Islamist thinkers. •

Egyptians may think of themselves as Egyptians and/or as Arabs. The latter fits better • with Islam.

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Figure 17.4 Minarets of Old Cairo: A Photo Montage. “Day and night in Cairo”, said Egypt’s most fa- mous architect, Hassan Fathy, “I am surrounded by mosques... with their domes and minarets and so I can say I am living in a skyscape not a landscape”. (Courtesy John Feeney/Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA)

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Essay Questions

Further Reading ‘Abduh, Muhammad (l966) The Theology of Unity, trans., I. Masa’ad and K. Cragg, London:

Allen & Unwin.

Gaffney, P.D. (1994) The Prophet’s Pulpit: Islamic Preaching in Contemporary Egypt,Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Hourani, A. (1970) Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, London: Oxford University Press.

Jansen, J.J.G. (1986) The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, New York: Macmillan (includes a translation of The Neglected Duty by ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj).

Kepel, Gilles (1986) Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh, trans., J. Rothschild, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Kerr, M. (l966) Islamic Reform, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Mitchell, R.P. (l969) The Society of the Muslim Brothers, London: Oxford University Press.

Qutb, Sayyid (1978) Milestones, Beirut: Holy Koran Publishing House.

Rugh, Andrea (1993) “Reshaping Personal Relations in Egypt”, Chapter 7 in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds) Fundamentalisms and Society, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Starrett, Gregory (1998) Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics and Religious Transformation in Egypt, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky (2002) Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt, New York: Columbia University Press.

Internet Resource: Article comparing Takfir wa-Hijra and Islamic Jihad http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue3/

jv3n3a1.html

Iran: From secularism to Islamic revolution

Some said that “the King is God’s representative on earth and the Prophet’s in guiding the people; and that the Sadr and all other clerics must not interfere in the government or politics.” (Recorded by seventeenth-century French traveler, Jean Chardin. Martin 17)

“Our kings being iniquitous and unjust men, their domination is a tyranny to which God has subjected us to punish us, after having withdrawn from the world the le- gitimate successor of His Prophet. The supreme Throne of the universe belongs only to a Mujtahid, or man who possesses sanctity and science above ordinary men. It is true that since the Mujtahid is holy, and consequently a peaceful man, there must be a king who carries a sword for the exercise of justice; but he must only be like his minister, and dependent upon him.” (Jean Chardin. Keddie 222)

In This Chapter If Turkey in the twentieth century opted dramatically for secularism and Egypt walked an uncomfortable path between secularism and Islamism, Iran first opted for a path like Turkey’s and then made a dramatic about face with its Islamic revolution. This chapter will follow this dramatic history including the secularist reforms of Reza Shah and his son and the Islamic revolution lead by Khomeini and its aftermath.

Main Topics Covered The Qajars: religion, foreign interference, constitution •

The Pahlavis: Reza Shah and Iranian nationalism •

The Pahlavis: Muhammad Reza Shah: • White Revolution

Islamic opposition and revolution •

Islamic republic •

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The Qajars: religion, foreign interference, constitution

As we have seen in chapter four, Iran became predominantly Shi‘i under the Safavid Dynasty (1501–1736). This dynasty was followed by two short-lived dynasties and then by the Qajar dynasty, which lasted into the twentieth cen-tury (c. 1779/1794–1925). Qajar control over the whole country, however, was tenuous at best and tribal chiefs and other local leaders were often virtually independent. The Qajars made only limited efforts at the sort of centralizing and modernizing reforms undertaken by the Tanzimat in the Ottoman Empire and Muhammad ’Ali and his suc- cessors in Egypt. They did not, for example, create a unified army under their control. They lost the Caucasus and Armenia to Russia in two wars in 1804–1813 and 1826–1828 and their central Asian provinces between 1864 and 1885. In the second half of the century there was increasing Western economic penetration and political meddling, especially by Russia and Great Britain, until in 1907 the country was formally divided into Russian and British spheres of influence. There was sufficient reform and Westernization to create a small class of modern- izing intelligentsia, calling themselves “enlightened thinkers”.

The ‘ulama’ had been largely dominated by the govern- ment under the early Safavids but later they became more independent and influen- tial. (The quotations at the beginning of the chapter il- lustrate the range of opinion on this.) Under the Qajars their influence with both the people and the government increased. In addition to be- ing spiritual leaders, judges, and administrators of awqaf, some ‘ulama’ were local

power brokers, landowners and traders. They were often viewed as protectors of the people against unjust government action. Their authority was strengthened by the victory of the Uṣūlīs over the Akhbārīs at the end of the eighteenth century and the development of the Usuli system of ijtihad (see chapter ten) through the nineteenth century. A key figure in this devel- opment was Ayatollah Morteza Ansari (d. 1864), who was the first to be sole marja‘-i taqlid for all the Shi‘i world. Normally there are several marja‘s with more or less equal status. The ‘ulama’ also regularly opposed foreign influence. They urged the government to engage in

Map 9 Iran Shepard Map 10

Tehran

IRAQ

The G ulf

QomSamarra

Esfahan

Shiraz

Mashhad

IRAN AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

Caspian Sea

Gulf of Oman

Baghdad

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jihad against the Russians in 1826 with disastrous results. They later successfully opposed, with Russian assistance, the extensive economic concessions given to the British entrepreneur Baron de Reuter in 1872. It was about this time that their alliance with the bazaar merchants began, based on common interest and often on family ties. It has continued to the present.

Views of the relationship between government and religion varied, as they did in the earlier periods. Some saw the shah as appointed by God. Some saw all worldly government as in some measure usurping the rights of the Twelfth Imam but as necessary during the time of Occultation. Probably most common was the idea of “dual agency”, according to which the ‘ulama’ were the general agents of the Imam for guiding (vilayat) the umma and the shah was the special agent of the Imam for enforcing order in the world. Beside the courts of the ‘ula- ma’, which administered Shari‘a law, there were the ‘urf courts, run by government officials under the shah’s authority. Shari‘a courts generally dealt with civil cases and ‘urf courts with criminal cases, but there was some overlap and thus some competition between them. ‘Urf law was not written law and varied from place to place, but both kinds of law were fairly unsys- tematic. The establishment of a Ministry of Justice in the 1850s did not change this much.

Actual relations between the ‘ulama’ and government varied according to circumstances but were not devoid of tension. Muhammad Shah (1834–1848), for example, favored the Sufis and sought to limit the ‘ulama’. The Shi‘i ‘ulama’ have generally opposed the Sufis for reasons mentioned in chapter twelve and they were severely persecuted under the Safavids, but the Dhahabi and Ni‘matullahi tariqas re-established themselves in the later eighteenth century and the Ni‘matullahis have been able to attract a number of government officials and upper class people. The spread of Sufism has been limited, however, by ‘ulama’ opposition.

A greater danger to the ‘ulama’ came from the three related “heterodox” movements, the Shaykhis, the Babis and the Baha’is. The first was founded by Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa’i (1753– 1826), whose most controversial claim was that the occulted Twelfth Imam is not located in the material world but in an intermediate spiritual realm called hurqulya (this is also the realm where resurrection, heaven and hell take place) and he communicates with the world through inspiration to one representative, a “Perfect Shi‘a” or the “Gate (Bab)” to the Imam. There is always one such person in the world. He is not publicly announced but Shaykh Ahsa’i’s fol- lowers were convinced that he and his successor were this figure. This represented a clear challenge to the authority of the ‘ulama’, who persecuted the Shaykhis although the Qajars generally protected them. The movement exists in small numbers to the present but has modi- fied its doctrine in an orthodox direction.

The year 1844 marked the 1,000th anniversary of the occultation of the Twelfth Imam and many expected his return. In this year a member of the Shaykhi movement, Sayyid Ali Muhammad Shirazi (1819–1850), claimed to be the Bab (Gate of the Imam) and gained a number of followers. Later he claimed to be the Twelfth Imam (more precisely, a human fig- ure corresponding to the archetypal Imam in hurqulya) and announced the abrogation of the

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Islamic Shari‘a and the beginning of a new dispensation, which would among other things not have ‘ulama’ and grant a higher place to women. He raised a revolt against the shah’s govern- ment but was defeated and in 1850 was executed. The Bab had promised the advent of another figure, “Him whom God shall make manifest”, and in 1863 Mirza Husayn Ali (1817– 1892) claimed to be this figure and took the title Baha’ullah (Splendor of God) and was followed by the majority of the Babis. He came to be seen as a new prophet following in the line of Buddha, Zarathushtra, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad so that Baha’ism came to be a separate religion. Baha’ism has spread worldwide and become Westernized in its expression. For these reasons Baha’is have often been persecuted in Iran. The remaining Babis came to be known as Azalis and some of these became active in later reform movements.

As mentioned in chapter eight, the practices connected with the ta‘ziya gained in popularity during the Qajar period and were supported, sometimes lavishly, by the Qajar shahs. The ‘ula- ma’, however, generally opposed the more extreme practices involved.

In 1890 the shah granted a concession to a British company for a monopoly over the produc- tion, sale and export of tobacco. The result was a growing number of protests on the part of growers, merchants and city mobs, led or at least fronted by the ‘ulama’. Allied to them were modernizing reformers such as Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (Afghani), many of whom put secular reform ideas into traditional religious language to appeal to the people. Opposition was based not only on economic concerns but also resentment against Western influence and a fear that non-Muslims handling tobacco would make it ritually impure. The protests came to a head when a fatwa banning the use of tobacco was solicited and gained from Ayatollah Mirza Hasan Shirazi, who was the sole marja‘ of the time (the second one, after Ansari) and resident in Samarra, in Iraq, beyond the reach of the shah. The response was so overwhelming that the shah was forced to cancel the concession. This was the first nationwide protest of this sort. It strengthened the position of the ‘ulama’ and forged an alliance between them and the modern- izing intelligentsia. It is worth noting that the success was made possible by a modern inven- tion, the telegraph, used to communicate with Ayatollah Shirazi. Unfortunately, the Persian government went into debt for the first time to pay the indemnity to the concessionaire. This was followed by other borrowing and by 1900 most of the country’s resources were mortgaged to British and Russian creditors.

The Tobacco protest was a forerunner of the Constitutional Revolution that began in 1905 and plunged the country into civil war for several years. Protests by some ‘ulama’, merchants and intelligentsia forced the shah in 1906 to call a majles (parliament) and accept a constitution modeled after that of Belgium. The ‘ulama’ appear not to have understood at first the differ- ence between the secular constitution desired by the modernists (mashruteh) and government by the Shari‘a (mashru‘eh). When this became clear many ‘ulama’ turned against the consti- tution, although a supplementary law added the next year provided for a committee of five mujtahids that could veto bills that contravened the Shari‘a. The constitution in fact sought to combine the Islamic and the secular. Twelver Shi‘ism was declared the religion of state and

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sovereignty was described as a “trust, confided, by the grace of God, to the person of the shah, by the nation.” Elsewhere it says that “the powers of the state are derived from the nation” and grants equal right to all inhabitants. The continuing civil war followed by the occupation of Iran during World War One by the British and Russians, meant that the constitution had little chance to operate at that time, but it remained on the books until 1979. The committee of muj- tahids was never actually established.

The best known defense of the constitution on Islamic grounds was the book The Admonition and Refinement of the People by Mirza Muhammad Husayn Na‘ini (1860–1936). He argued that all human government usurps the authority of the Twelfth Imam, but tyranny also usurps the right of the people while constitutional government does not. Moreover, if the ‘ulama’, as agents of the Imam, approve of it, then it does not usurp the Imam’s authority either. This book disappeared from circulation soon after 1910 but was republished in 1955, when its ideas were still relevant. The leading anti-constitutionalist was Shaykh Fadlullah Nuri (1842– 1909). He argued that laws are made by God, not by humans, and it is not for the majority of people to interpret these laws but for those specialized in it. Moreover, justice does not mean equal rights for all but recognizes distinctions, as between minors and adults, sane and insane, healthy and ill, slave and free, father and son, wife and husband, learned and ignorant, mujta- hid and follower (muqallid), Muslim and kafir, and so on.

The Pahlavis: Reza Shah and Iranian nationalism Years of civil war and occupation left Iran in a weak and anarchical situation. Into this situa- tion came the man who was to be in many respects the “Muhammad Ali” of Iran. Reza Khan was the commander of the Cossack Regiment, the only strong and disciplined military force in the country. He became Minister of War in 1921 and shah in 1925, deposing the last Qajar shah. He took the dynastic name Pahlavi, which means “heroic”, but is also the name of the pre-Islamic Persian language. Influenced by the example of Atatürk, he espoused Iranian nationalism and sought to unify Iran and make it strong. He introduced conscription, forced tribes to sedentarize, strengthened the administration, improved communications and estab- lished a national bank. These and other measures unified Iran as never before. He also forced a revision of the oil concession that the British had held since 1914, although he did not get as good terms as he might have.

At first Reza Shah sought the support of the ‘ulama’. He followed their advice against setting up a republic and expressed a desire to implement the Shari‘a. Soon, however, he acted to weaken their influence and diminish their place in society. He expanded the state school sys- tem (without adequately funding it) at the expense of the maktabs (Persian for kuttab), which

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were eliminated by about 1950, although the upper level madrasas survived with decreasing numbers and largely maintained their independence. He introduced new civil, commercial and criminal codes that included some provisions of Shari‘a law (especially on issues of gender) along with French-derived laws and set requirements for judges that excluded most ‘ulama’. Registration of documents was taken out of the hands of the ‘ulama’ and given to the secular courts. Government control of awqaf was increased. He dictated “modern” dress for men and commanded women to abandon the chador (the traditional all covering garb), though with limited success. He also attempted to suppress the ta‘ziya rituals. His nationalist ideology glo- rified the pre-Islamic period and people were encouraged to take names from that period, such as Cyrus or Darius. This had considerable success since, unlike Egyptians, Iranians had always retained a significant awareness of their pre-Islamic past. He made the Persian solar calendar official with the Persian names for the months and a modified Islamic calendar, based on the solar year and called solar hijri (e.g. 1428 hijri is 1386 solar hijri, see also Appendix III). He also declared the name of the country to be Iran (related to the word Aryan), which he saw as associated with the glories of ancient Iran rather than the weakness of recent times. While the ‘ulama’ were forced to be quiet politically, the learning centre at Qom was re-established and became the main center in Iran. Here the future leader, Ayatollah Khomeini was trained along with many of his colleagues.

In many respects Reza Shah accomplished in a generation what took a century in Turkey and Egypt, but this was done in a highly authoritarian and often brutal manner. One result was to create a considerable cultural and economic gap between the “traditional” sector of society, consisting of the lower classes and the “traditional” middle class (bazaaris), and the smaller “modern” sector, consisting of the upper class and the “modern” middle class. This was to prove significant in the 1970s. His achievements were not enough to prevent the Russians and British from occupying the country in 1941 and forcing him to abdicate because of his pro- German sympathies.

Muhammad Reza Shah: White Revolution Reza Shah was succeeded by his son, Muhammad Reza Shah, and for a time there was a lively and diverse political scene, including the Marxist Tudeh (Masses) party, moderate and radical nationalist parties and two religious groups, the Mujahidin-i Islam, led by Ayatollah Abol- Qasem Kashani, and the Fada’iyan-i Islam, led by Navvab Safavi. The latter was made up of younger and more lower class people and was more radically Islamist. It had contacts with the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. It also engaged in assassinations. In 1951 the majles acted to na- tionalize Iranian oil, under the influence of the National Front, which included both nationalist parties and Kashani’s party and was led by Muhammad Mossadegh, a secular nationalist with strong personal religious beliefs. This led to a stand off with the British and the Americans and

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the brief flight of the shah from the country in August 1953. Kashani abandoned Mossadegh when he felt that the Communists were gaining too much power. Riots, partly arranged by the American CIA, led to the shah’s return and Mossadegh’s arrest. Oil was allowed to remain formally in Iranian hands but pricing and distribution were under the control of the British and Americans. The Americans were the winners in this since they gained access to Iranian oil!

After this the shah determined to rule with a strong hand and, among other things, created SAVAK, his secret police. He managed to eliminate or coopt most of the secular opposition but the ‘ulama’, though quiet, retained considerable independence and many were unrecon- ciled. From 1947 to 1961 the Shi‘i world had its third sole marja‘, Grand Ayatollah Burujerdi. He generally cooperated with the shah and tried to persuade the ‘ulama’ to stay out of politics, but he also improved the organization of the ‘ulama’s’ activities. After his death there were again several marja’s, among them Ayatollah Khomeini, who had for some time taught irfan but then shifted to fiqh.

In 1963 the shah announced a “White Revolution” that included several measures opposed or feared by the ‘ulama’. These included land reform measures that the ‘ulama’ feared would af- fect their awqaf, establishment of a literacy corps, which would undermine their authority in the villages, and electoral reforms giving the vote to women. These were in addition to a more general opposition to his dictatorial ways, his alliance with America and his support of Israel. Opposition was led by Khomeini and on ‘Ashura he was arrested, a number of students killed and bloody demonstrations took place in several cities. All of this evoked the martyrdom of Husayn. Khomeini was eventually exiled to the shrine city of Najaf in Iraq. For many Western observers this seemed to be a last gasp of mullah opposition to “progress”, but events were to prove otherwise.

For some time, though, the shah appeared firmly in control and Iran an “island of stability” as the American President Jimmy Carter was to say. In 1967 the shah felt secure enough to have himself crowned, taking the title aryamehr (Light of the Aryans). His wife became the first empress or shahbanou since pre-Islamic times. Pre-Islamic symbolism was to the fore when he staged a lavish celebration of 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy in Persepolis in 1971 and when in 1976 he changed the official calendar from solar hijri to one dating from Cyrus the Great (1976 ce = 1355 hs became 2535 Iranian Imperial). Two family protection acts gave greater protection to wives in cases of polygyny and divorce. He claimed to be a faithful Shi‘i but also saw Shi‘ism as a patriotic matter. The ta‘ziya passion plays were presented as folk- lore in the 1970s. He created a “religion corps” as a step toward “modernizing” religion. He claimed to have had visions of some of the Shi‘i Imams and to have a sense of divine protec- tion and guidance.

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Islamic opposition and revolution During this time, however, a significant Islamically oriented opposition was developing, not only among the ‘ulama’ but also among the lay intelligentsia. By the mid-1960s people were speaking of “Islamic ideology” and were soon to give an activist interpretation to Husayn, as a revolutionary martyr whose sacrifice delegitimated tyranny for all time. Among the ‘ulama’ people such as Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani (1910–1979) and Morteza Muttahari (1920–1979) sought to engage with modern thinking. The former, who had been connected with the Fadai’yan-i Islam, provided a somewhat “socialist” interpretation of the Qur’an and a progres- sive view of history. The latter developed a traditional but rational Islamic critique of various Western ideologies. Among the intelligentsia, Jelal Al-e Ahmad (1923–1969) was a secular writer and one time Marxist who found cultural authenticity in Shi‘i Islam, though he could not quite accept it as faith. He coined the term gharbzadegi, “Westoxication”, which became quite popular. Mehdi Bazargan, an engineer and former adherent of the National Front, held an Islamic version of liberal nationalism. With Ayatollah Taleqani he founded the Freedom Movement in 1961. About 1965 a group of university graduates founded the Mujahidin-i Khalq (People’s freedom fighters), who undertook a campaign of “armed operations” (aka “terrorist attacks”) that got their leaders arrested or killed by the mid-1970s. In their ideology Islam was interpreted very much in Marxist terms, aiming at a “tawhidi” society that would be “classless” and worship one God. By far the most influential of these ideologues was Ali Shariati (1933–77). Son of an‘alim, he studied in Paris in the early 1960s and was influenced by the Algerian struggle and by writers such as Marx, Durkheim, Sartre, Franz Fanon and Louis Massignon, a well known academic scholar of Sufism. On his return he lectured widely and his ideas caught the attention of many university students. In his interpretation Islam be- comes a populist, third-world revolutionary ideology. ‘Ali and Husayn become symbols of the struggle for justice and there is a strong feeling for the mustazafin, the Qur’anic term for the oppressed (4:75). “The people” becomes almost synonymous with “God” when the Qur’an speaks of social matters. “Rule belongs to God” effectively means “Rule belongs to the peo- ple.” He also popularized the phrase “Everywhere is Karbala’ and every day is Ashura”, later to be a revolutionary slogan. Shariati was exiled and died of a heart attack in London in 1977, though many thought he was poisoned by SAVAK.

Ayatollah Khomeini continued to criticize the shah from his exile in Najaf. In 1970 he gave a series of lectures on Islamic government that was later transcribed from student notes and pub- lished. He argued that Islam is primarily concerned with the whole of society, not just purity rituals for individuals (which with Shi‘is have traditionally been especially concerned) and its rules are meant not just to be taught but implemented. In the absence of the Imam, those who are qualified to do this are the ‘ulama’, either one or a group of them. He rejects kingship as unIslamic in principle, something neither he nor others had done before. The argumentation is fairly scholastic in form, but he blames imperialism for many of the current problems and shows an awareness of Western science (Westerners may go to the moon but they lack the

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moral laws Islam provides). This is vilayat-i faqih, the governance or guardianship of the faq- ih, and was to become the slogan and ideology of the revolutionary government. The phrase itself was not new: it had been used for the guardianship of minors, the supervising of mosque or waqf property, general moral guidance, and good government in general. As Khomeini uses it here, however, it is definitely an innovation, probably the greatest of the century.

In the 1970s revolutionary tinder was accumulating. The Oil boom beginning in 1973 in- creased the pressure of Westernization and the gap between the rich and the poor, while there was also a revival of traditional religious practice in Iran as elsewhere. Some of the thousands of informal circles that characterize Iranian society were undoubtedly discussing the revolu- tionary ideas mentioned above. The spark was struck in January of 1978 when a scurrilous newspaper article against Khomeini, published at the government’s behest, provoked dem- onstrations in which many were killed. This was followed by continuing unrest and violence through the year. The shah was depicted as the “Yazid of the age” while the demonstrators were in the role of Husayn. Many women donned traditional Islamic garb (called chador in Iran) in protest. Khomeini came increasingly to prominence, now incorporating the language of the lay ideologues such as Shariati. People began to call him Imam, a title sometimes given to Arab Shi‘i leaders but never before to an Iranian. In October Khomeini was forced to leave Iraq and went to Paris, from where, paradoxically, he was better able to communicate with his followers via telephone and tape recorder (as in the Constitutional Revolution, modern technology played a crucial role). The dastas of the last two days of the Ashura period (December 10–11) turned into mas- sive demonstrations against the shah’s government. In January 1979 the shah left Iran for a “holiday” and in February Khomeini returned to Iran and established a government with Mehdi Bazargan as prime minister.

Figure 18.1 Khomeini’s mausoleum in Tehran.

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Islamic republic It was very disparate factions with incompatible visions for society that briefly united to make the revolution. It is not surprising that they soon fell out with each other and that this revolu- tion, like many others, consumed many of its children. The Bazargan government had to resign in November of 1979 after activists took American diplomats hostage at the “Den of Spies”, setting off a major confrontation with the U.S. The revived National Front and other secular parties, including the Tudeh, which had declared its allegiance to Khomeini, were banned in 1981 and 1982. The Mujahidin-i Khalq demonstrated and engaged in assassinations, including “suicide bombings”, and many of them were imprisoned and executed (martyred like Husayn, in their view). Their leader was forced to flee the country, along with the first president, Bani Sadr, an economist interested in Islamic economics, who was impeached in 1981. They contin- ued activities from exile.

The ruling group that emerged was organized as the Islamic Republican Party and included ‘ulama’, many of them students of Khomeini, along with sympathetic laymen. They too suf- fered. In 1981 “seventy-two” leaders of the ruling party were killed at one time in a bomb blast (actually more, but seventy-two is the number of Husayn’s companions at Karbala’ and thus the number published) and later both the president and the prime minister were assassi- nated. Karbala’ seemed truly to be “everywhere” and “every day”.

Many ‘ulama’, including all of the marja‘s except Khomeini, were opposed to or ambivalent about the government, but kept silent. One who did not, Grand Ayatollah Shariatmadari, was effectively “defrocked”.

During this period a constitution was established by plebiscite. It included much that is typical of Western constitutions, including an elected president and majles (parliament), but it also as- serts the sovereignty of God, who makes man responsible for his social destiny following the continuous ijtihad of the faqihs. It provides for a “ just and pious faqih” and marja‘ to be the leader and highest authority and also a Guardian Council, half of whose members are ‘ulama’, and these determine whether laws passed by the majles accord with Islam. The position of leader is somewhat reminiscent of Plato’s “philosopher king”, a concept Khomeini would have known from his studies.

In 1980 Iraq invaded Iran, thinking to take advantage of the disruption there but underestimat- ing the power of religious and revolutionary zeal. The result was an eight year war that ended inconclusively but cost both sides dearly. The willingness of its youth for martyrdom saved Iran from defeat. The dictum that “Everywhere is Karbala’ and every day is Ashura” was il- lustrated again and again through the revolution and the war. During this period many hoped for the imminent return of the Twelfth Imam and a popular slogan was “O God, O God, pre- serve Khomeini until the revolution of the mahdi”. Khomeini himself stated that the Islamic Republic was a preparation for the return of the mahdi.

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The ruling group turned out to be quite fractious. It is common to divide them into moderates, conservatives and/or radicals, but the reality is much more complex. To a considerable degree the divisions are based on personal relations (as are the relations among the ‘ulama’ generally) but one may note several ideological issues. These include a stricter or looser interpretation of the Shari‘a, a greater or lesser acceptance of freedom of expression and other human rights, preference for a state run or free market economy, and preference for a more or less aggres- sive foreign policy (including whether or not to “export the revolution”). An individual might hold a “liberal” position on one issue and a “conservative” one on another and might change his position. Khomeini has been quoted as forbiddig music and later permitting it. Khomeini generally remained above the factional fighting, seeking to reconcile and intervening when necessary.

In 1982 Khomeini declared secular laws invalid. A very traditional criminal code was passed and the shah’s Family Protection laws were rescinded. Women were largely expected to accept traditional roles but still allowed some activity in politics and encouraged to get educated. The substance of many laws, however, continued from the previous period, presumably judged as not conflicting with Islam (i.e. mubah in terms of the Shari‘a). The Guardian Council has been very conservative and vetoed many bills of the majles. In 1988 this led Khomeini to speak of the absolute vilayat-i faqih, i.e. that the needs of the Islamic state take precedence over all oth- er obligations, even salah, fasting and Hajj. This led some observers to claim that Khomeini had put the state above Islam, but in fact it involved changing the priority of various elements within Islam, one of which is the state, and is explicit or implicit in most radical Islamist thinking. This idea does not appear to have continued after Khomeini’s death, however. For all its fractiousness, the ruling establishment made a calm transition of leadership when Khomeini died in June, 1989. It was claimed that Khomeini had designated the president, Ali Khamane’i, as his successor, even though Khamane’i was not even an ayatollah, much less a marja‘. He was immediately recognized as an ayatollah but has never fully established himself as marja‘.

Figure 18.2 Inside the Mausoleum of Khomeini in Tehran, 1999. Sermon is being given by Khomeini’s grandson. Large pictures are of Khomeini and Khamane’i, the current leader.

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The same year a revised constitution removed the requirement for a marja‘. Khamane’i has held this position to the present (2008) and strengthened his authority.

Over the last twenty years the record of the Islamic Republic has been decidedly mixed. The economy has been in bad condition, while corruption and human rights violations may be worse than under the shah. The revolution has not been exported though Iran has effectively supported Shi‘i Islamist movements in Lebanon and Iraq. It has alienated many of the youth and also some important thinkers. It has done much to bring modernization to the countryside. It has considerably extended the power of the state and its bureaucracy, paradoxically achiev- ing a goal aimed at by the Pahlavis. Politics has been lively and genuinely democratic within somewhat narrow ideological limits enforced by the Guardian Council, who have the power to reject candidates for the majles and use that power extensively. Elections are often unpre- dictable, as with those of the last two presidents, Muhammad Khatami in 1997 and Mahmud Ahmadinejad in 2005. These two illustrate the extremes of acceptable ideology. Khatami is a “moderate” who spoke of a “dialogue of civilizations” and sought to liberalize the system somewhat but was largely stymied by the Guardian Council and other entrenched conserva- tives. Ahmadinejad, who is not an ‘alim, stands for a strict interpretation of the Shari‘a, state intervention to help the poor and a fairly aggressive foreign policy. He has become notorious in the West for his denial of the Jewish Holocaust (at a time when Iranian state television was airing a mini-series on the Holocaust!) and his refusal to accept limitation on Iran’s quest for nuclear capacity, a point on which most Iranians certainly agree with him.

In June of 2009 Ahmadinejad won a second term in an election that had many signs of having been fixed. The result was dramatic street demonstrations by a wide segment of the popula- tion, particularly the young. If the Tobacco protests were facilitated by the telegraph and the Islamic Revolution by the cassette tape, now it was the turn of the cellular phone and twitter. The demonstrators were not opposing the Islamic Republic as such, however, but the conser-

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vatives and hardliners currently in power. The main opposing candidate, Mir Husayn Mousavi, a former prime minister with impeccable revolutionary credentials, provided a focus for the demonstrations but not aggressive leadership. As of the time of writing, the government has dealt forcefully with demonstrations but opposition continues and the longer term effects are not predictable. (See below for sources on these events.)

The Islamic Republic’s combination of radical Islamism and neo-traditionalism has proven viable if unattractive to many. It has survived for more than a quarter of a century and seems likely to continue for some time to come, though perhaps not in the present form.

Key Points You Need to Know Iranian Shi‘ism has a number of characteristics that are relevant to politics, especially • the authority of the ‘ulama’ and the story of Husayn and Karbala’.

The • ‘ulama’ were very influential in the nineteenth century, lost much of their influence through much of the twentieth century and then regained it with the revolution.

Modernization was pushed very fast under the Pahlavis, resulting in social imbalances. •

“Lay” ideologues played an important role in the lead up to the revolution. •

Since the Islamic revolution Iran has in principle been governed according to the • Shari‘a but with divergent interpretations and considerable factionalism.

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading Abrahamian, Ervand (1989) Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin, London: Tauris.

Abrahamian, Ervand (1993) Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Brumberg, Daniel (2001) Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

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Dabashi, Hamid (1993) Theology of Discontent, New York: New York University Press.

Fischer, M.M.J. (l980) Iran, from Religious Dispute to Revolution, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Fischer, M.M.J. and Abedi, M. (1990) Debating Muslims: Cultural Dialogues in Postmodernity and Tradition, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Gheissari, Ali and Nasr, Vali (2006) Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Halm, Heinz (1991) Shiism, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Khomeini, R.M. (1981) Islam and Revolution, Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, trans., H. Algar, Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press.

Loeffler, Reinhold (1988) Islam in Practice: Religious Beliefs in a Persian Village, Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Milani, Mohsen, M. (1988) The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Mottahedeh, Roy (1986) The Mantle of the Prophet: Politics and Religion in Iran. London: Chatto & Windus.

Shariati, Ali (1979) On the Sociology of Islam, trans., H. Algar, Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press.

Internet Resources The Hajj, by Ali Shariati. A revolutionary interpretation (also available as a book). http://www.

al-islam.org/hajj/shariati/

“Patterns of Discontent: Will History Repeat in Iran?” by Michael Rubin and Patrick Clawson. Good survey of events from the Revolution to 2006. http://www.meforum.org/921/patterns- of-discontent-will-history-repeat-in-iran

“Death of the Islamic Republic in 5 Acts”, by Daniel Brumberg. Interesting synopsis of the politics of the Islamic Republic. http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/ georgetown/2009/06/death_of_the_islamic_republic_in_5_acts.html#more

“Inside Iran, a rebellion that is familiar and unpredictable” Favorable to the demonstrators in 2009 http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-rahmini18-2009jun18,0,451907.story

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“Analysis of Iran’s Presidential Elections”, by Zafar Bangash; pro-Ahmadinejad http:// pedulipalestina.blogspot.com/2009/06/analysis-of-irans-presidential.html

Indonesia: Islamic Society or Islamic State?

In This Chapter Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world today in terms of population and its cul- tural background is different from that of the countries of the Middle East. It became Muslim later than Turkey, Iran or Egypt, experienced colonial rule more directly and gained indepen- dence more recently. Like Egypt, has sought to find a way between secularism and Islamism, but its path has been somewhat different. This chapter will outline the background and trace the path during the last century.

Main Topics Covered Islamization of Java, Sumatra and other islands •

Dutch Imperialism and continuing Islamization •

Twentieth-century movements •

Independence and the issue of an Islamic state •

The events of 1965 and Suharto’s regime •

Post-Suharto: election; violent Islamism •

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Islamization of Java, Sumatra and other islands

Indonesia consists of some 6,000 inhabited islands and its various areas differ consider-ably from each other in language, culture and historical background. The present politi-cal boundaries were created by Dutch imperialism in the nineteenth century. Before that there were a number of autonomous political entities in the area. While it is pre-dominatly Muslim, about ten percent of its population is Christian or Hindu. More than half of the population lives on Java, and there has been a tendency for Java to dominate the other areas, resulting in a complex and sometimes tense relationship with them. This chapter will unavoidably focus more on Java than elsewhere and ignore some areas completely.

As mentioned in chapter four, Islam was brought to the area by traders and independent teach- ers, many of them Sufis. It is unclear when it first arrived but there were Muslim rulers in the north of Sumatra before 1300. Over the previous millennium Java and Sumatra had had major Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms. The last of these, Majapahit, collapsed about 1525 and was re- placed by the Muslim kingdom of Mataram. Islamization took place first in the coastal areas and then proceeded inland. This process was largely complete, at least superficially, by the late eighteenth century but in some places continued into the twentieth. Bali remains Hindu to the present. In central Java the Hindu Code of Manu continued in use until 1768. The Islam that came was strongly Sufi; Javanese tradi- tion speaks of nine walis who brought Islam there and the miraculous, that is, Sufi ba- raka, features significantly in their stories and other conver- sion accounts. Undoubtedly the perception that the Muslim teachers had more baraka than the local spirits, gods and mediums played an important role in conversion. Several Sufi tariqas took hold, especially the Qadiriyya, the Naqshbandiyya and the Shattariyya. Sufi theosophy appeared with Hamza Fansuri (d. c. 1600) who propagated the teachings of Ibn Arabi, and Nur al-Din al-Raniri (fl. c. 1637–44) who op- posed Ibn Arabi’s doctrine of wahdat al-wujud.

For most people becoming Muslim meant adding some Muslim symbols and practices to the ones they already had, possibly modifying the latter. In many cases the actual relationship between Islam and the pre-Islamic traditions, whether folk, Hindu or Buddhist, is complex

Shepard Map 11

Aceh

JAVA

Jakarta

BALI TIMOR

BORNEO CELEBES (SULAWESI)

SUM ATRA

M A L A Y S I A

AUSTRALIA

PHILIPPINES

Singapore

SOUTH-EAST ASIA

CERAM (BANDA

ISLANDS)

Map 10 Indonesia

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and subject to debate, both scholarly and political. For example, in Java the slametan is a cer- emonial feast given for neighbors on a wide variety of occasions partly to placate the local spirits, who also partake of the food, partly to affirm communal solidarity and partly to induce a psychological state of equanimity or tranquility called slamet. It includes a speech by the host in formal Javanese, but it also includes recitation in Arabic including passages from the Qur’an and it will be held on Islamic as well as non-Islamic occasions, e.g. the birthday of the Prophet. Moreover the name, slamet, derives from Arabic (salāma, well being). While the ceremony is generally seen as pre-Islamic it has clearly taken on Islamic elements. It has been suggested that its goals represent local interpretations of Sufi theories. More clearly pre-Islam- ic is the popular wayang kulit or “shadow play” based on the Hindu classics, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana. Many Javanese, especially in the upper classes, have a strong awareness of and pride in their Hindu-Buddhist heritage and some follow distinctive spiritual traditions often referred to as “Javanese mysticism” (kejawen or kebatinan), aimed at an awareness of the divinity within and without and a concentrated state of slamet. But this is not so different from the Sufi sense of wahdat al-wujud and may be influenced by it. Hindu-Buddhist kings had been viewed as having access to cosmic powers; their Muslim successors were viewed as “shadows of God”, “God’s caliph”, as having wahyu (literally revelation but here a divine energy) and even as walis. In the legal and political sphere adat (custom) was recognized and played a large role (an example from Aceh is mentioned in chapter ten).

Important to Islamization were the Islamic boarding schools known in Java as pesantrens. (See chapter nine) These, interestingly, are continuation of pre-Islamic schools and the name de- rives from Sanskrit. They particularly taught Sufism and their teachers, known as kiais, would have seemed similar to the gurus of the Hindu period. (Link for a contemporary view of this period.)

Dutch imperialism and continuing Islamization Europeans appeared on the scene while the process of Islamization was still under way. The Portuguese took Malacca in 1511 and were a significant trading and naval force in the area for about a century. They were then replaced by the Dutch, who founded Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1619 and by the middle of the eighteenth century had established bases throughout the area and forced local rulers to grant them trading monopolies. It was only in the nineteenth century that they began to take direct control of the inland areas, often in the face of popular armed resistance, stimulated in part by economic arrangements that disadvantaged the peasants. This resistance included the Java War of 1825–1830, led by Prince Dipanegara, who came to be seen as one of the early heroes of Indonesian independence, the Padri Wars in Sumatra, 1821– 37, endemic resistance in West Java from 1820 to 1869 and a major insurrection in 1888, and war followed by guerrilla resistance in Aceh from 1871 to about 1910. All of these were peas-

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ant revolts that were seen as jihads and were largely led by ‘ulama’, while the local chiefs and nobles often sided with the Dutch.

Although the revolts failed, they deepened the Islamic identity of those involved and helped to spread Islam. The ‘ulama’ tended to become identified with resistance to Dutch, in the minds both of the Dutch and of others. Improved internal communications also aided the spread of Islamic teaching and practice. Improved external communications facilitated the Hajj and other overseas travel and many returned with a wider sense of the umma and a commitment to a more Shari‘a oriented version of Islam. As a result pesantrens began to give more attention to fiqh. Often reform efforts and resistance to the Dutch went together. In the legal area, the Dutch had a policy of retaining adat law but also introduced considerable Dutch statute law. In 1900 they introduced the “Ethical Policy”, according to which the colonial government would seek paternalistically to improve the condition of its subjects. As part of this Islam was not to be viewed simply as the enemy; Islam as a religion was acceptable but Islam as political doc- trine was not. This, of course, amounted to promoting secularism as defined in this book.

It is common in discussing Indonesia, and particularly Java, to distinguish three groups, aban- gan, santri and priyayi. This distinction had become clearer by 1900 than it had been before. The abangans are sometimes called “statistical Muslims”, since they identify themselves as Muslims but do not follow Islamic practices very much. They are more interested in “tradi- tional” practices, such as the slametan, mentioned above. They are found among the peasants and lower classes generally. The santris are the “practicing Muslims” and have tended to be strong particularly among the merchant class. (The term santri refers, in the first instance, to students of the pesantrens.) The reform movements and jihads of the nineteenth century strengthened this group. As scholars returned from places such as Egypt in the early twentieth century the santris came to be divided between the kaum muda (young group), who accepted the ideas of modernist reformers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abduh, and the kaum tua (old group), who did not. The priyayis were the old nobility, particularly in Java. Some were practicing Muslims, thus also santris, but more of them gave primary value and allegiance to the heritage and ethos continuing from the pre-Islamic civilization and from the religious point of view may be considered abangan. The priyayis lost political power as the result of Dutch imperialism but compensated by becoming public servants under the Dutch. It was priyayis who had access to the limited number of European-style schools that were available to Indonesians before 1900. They were, therefore, the most Westernized of the three groups.

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Twentieth-century movements In the twentieth century the jihad resistance movements were replaced by modern social and political associations. This was facilitated by the extension of Western style education at all levels after 1900. Some of these, such as the Budi Utomo (“Noble Endeavor”), founded in 1908, and the Taman Siswa (“Garden of Learning”), founded in 1922, were secular and took a particular interest in Javanese culture. Also secular was the Indonesian National Party (PNI), founded in 1927 under the leadership of Sukarno, who became the primary spokesperson for the independence movement. The first labor union was founded in 1905 and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was founded in 1920; it was banned in 1927 and went underground after provoking a series of strikes and revolts but emerged as a major force after 1945.

The first Islamic association was the Muhammadiya, founded in 1912. It took a modernist position along the lines of the teachings of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida and opposed many customary practices, such as visits to the tombs of walis. It did not recognize the four madhhabs but to some extent developed a fiqh of its own. In theology it accepted the Ash‘ari position on the attributes of God, the nature of the Qur’an and qadar. It calls for a truly Islamic society but avoids politics. It engages in dakwa and has established a large network of schools, clinics, hospitals and orphanages. Unlike the pesantrens, the schools were organized on modern lines and teach religion along with a considerable range of secular subjects. It also has organizations for women and youth. The Muhammadiya has been one of the two largest Islamic associations and is found throughout Indonesia.

More political was Sarakat Islam, founded about the same time as the Muhammadiya. It called for political and social reforms, while its charismatic leader was viewed by many as the ratu adil (just king), a kind of Javanese mahdi. It attracted peasants, merchants and also radical so- cialists and for a brief time was a mass movement. It could not, however, hold these disparate groups together and declined after the radicals were expelled in 1921. Its leaders sought to root socialist principles in the Qur’an.

Somewhat along the lines of Muhammadiya but more radically Islamist is Persatuan Islam (Persis), founded in 1923. Initially it was non-political though holding a political point of view; during the 1940s and 1950s it was involved in politics but later withdrew and now con- centrates on educational and dakwa activities. It calls for a society and state that will imple- ment the Shari‘a and sees loyalty to the world wide umma as taking precedence over loyalty to the nation-state. It does not totally reject adat but this must never take precedence over the Shari‘a. It sees a form of democracy as compatible with Islam and does not advocate violence to further its aims. Its long term goals can be compared to those of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and Mawdudi in India/Pakistan.

In conscious response to the modernists, the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was founded in Java in 1926. It was, and is, based on the network of pesantrens and their kiais and is the

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largest of the Islamic associations in Indonesia but with its strength mainly in Java. It has explicitly defended such things as the four madhhabs and visits to tombs, along with other activities opposed by the modernists, but it uses modern methods of organization and pub- licity to defend them. Many of the pesantrens have added modern schools to their activi- ties. NU people generally value local traditions, quite self-consciously in recent decades, but would not favor adat where it is seen to contradict Islam. Some have even spoken of the “Indonesianization” of Islam as opposed to the Islamization of Indonesia. They wish to in- fluence government and were involved in party politics from 1945 until 1984, favoring an Islamic state, but then formally withdrew and no longer favor an Islamic state. In general they have found it easier to cooperate with secular nationalists than have the modernist groups since they tend to follow the long standing Sunni approach that accepts much less than perfect rulers on the grounds of necessity.

Some smaller Muslim groups called for independence from the Dutch but it was the secular nationalists, especially the PNI under Sukarno, that took the lead in the independence move- ment. Sukarno had some involvement with the Muhammadiya but believed in the separation of religion from state. During the Second World War the Japanese occupied Indonesia from 1942 to 1945 and sought to use Islam to gain support. They created an Office of Religious Affairs, which laid a basis for the later Ministry of Religious Affairs, and they brought the various Islamic groups, including Muhammadiya and Nahdlatul Ulama, into a single organiza-

Figure 19.1 Pesantren Pabelan, Java; salah at the mosque.

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tion, Masyumi (Supreme Indonesian Council of Islam). This brought santris closer to govern- ment than they had been under the Dutch and gave them expectations and political instruments that would make a difference in the future.

Independence and the issue of an Islamic state After the Japanese defeat, Indonesian independence was declared but it took five years to fight off the Dutch effort to return. In general abangans, santris, priyayis and non-Muslims all par- ticipated in this effort, but a number of Muslim leaders declared it a jihad. After victory, one of the contentious issues was whether the new state would be Islamic. It was finally decided to base the state on “five principles” (pancasila), of which the first was “belief in the one and only Divinity”. An earlier version added “with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practice the Shari‘a” but after considerable debate these “seven words”, as they are often called (they are seven words in Indonesian), were deleted along with some other references to Islam in the interest of national unity.

A Ministry of Religious Affairs was created that deals with all religions but primarily over- sees and supports Islamic institutions such as mosques, state-funded Islamic schools, Shari‘a courts, arrangements for the Hajj and promotional literature for dakwa. It also provides a source of patronage for the Islamic movements. It has sometimes been called an Islamic “state within the state”. Both pancasila and the Ministry of Religious Affairs represent a distinctive Indonesian compromise between secularism and Islamism.

The Masyumi continued as one of the main political parties in the new state but the NU withdrew in 1952 to form a separate party, leaving the Masyumi primarily associated with the Muhammadiya. There were two main secular parties, Sukarno’s PNI and the PKI (Communist). There was a national election in 1955, in which PNI gained 22.3 percent of the vote, the largest of any single party, the Islamic parties gained 42.5 percent of the vote among them, less than they had expected, and the PKI gained 16.4 percent. The result was unstable government and in 1959 Sukarno introduced his authoritarian “Guided Democracy”, in which the nationalists, the religious groups, the communists and, increasingly, the army were all to have a major role. The communists were well organized and feared by many, not least the Muslim groups. There were clashes between Muslim and communist youth.

Sukarno’s religious views are hard to pin down but worth noting. He presented himself as the son of a father whose Islam was mixed with Javanese religion and a Balinese mother whose Hinduism was mixed with Buddhism. He believed in God in what he called a “pantheist” way (though panentheist may be more accurate) and was concerned for the current backwardness of Muslims, who must not look to the past but “run forward, catching up with the time” and follow “the spirit of Islam”, not “the spirit of the pesantren” (Boland, 1971, 126-9).

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During this period there were at least three Islamist revolts labeled “Dar al-Islam” seeking to set up Islamic states. A movement in West Java began in 1948 and continued until 1962. It proclaimed itself the Islamic State of Indonesia. One in South Sulawesi was initially con- cerned with regional grievances and later became Islamist and proclaimed itself the Indonesian Islamic Republic. It lasted from 1950 to 1965. The third movement, in West Sumatra and elsewhere from 1958 to 1961, called itself the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia but was actually an attempt to change the government in Jakarta. Some of the Masyumi leaders were implicated in the last two of these and this, added to the fact that they had been strongly criticizing Sukarno’s move toward guided democracy, led to the banning of the Masyumi party in 1960 and the arrest of its leaders. The NU, more flexible in such matters, remained in the Sukarno government to the end.

The events of 1965 and Suharto’s regime On 30 September 1965 several army generals were killed in an attempted coup d’etat ascribed to the communists. The coup was quickly put down by General Suharto but the aftermath was an extensive pogrom throughout the country of communists and those who might be as- sociated with them (often to settle personal scores). As many as half a million may have died, though others put the number lower. The communist movement, which was now outlawed, never recovered. The Muhammadiya had declared this a jihad (but not justifying the excesses) and many Muslims saw it as a great victory for Islam. The following year Suharto took control of the government and in 1968 officially became the president of the republic. He was to rule, effectively as a dictator though with democratic trappings, until 1998.

After the events of 1965 all Indonesians were required to declare themselves adherents of one of five religions: Islam, Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, or Buddhism. The groups adhering to Javanese mysticism have sought but failed to get themselves considered a recognized religion.

Although he had disposed of the communist threat Suharto gave little joy to the Islamists for the first twenty years of his rule. Suharto himself is said to have been inclined toward Javanese mysticism and the higher echelons of the army during this period were largely abangan or non-Muslim. From 1983 to 1988 the head of the army was a Roman Catholic who was con- siderably suspect in Muslim eyes. The Masyumi Party was not reinstated and in 1973 Suharto decided to coalesce all parties into three. The Golkar was the government party and always destined to win. The Muslim parties, including NU and those who had been part of Masyumi, were joined together into the United Development Party (PPP) and closely regulated by the government. Although it could not win, however, how well it did was noted. Many radical Islamists were imprisoned, especially those connected with the Komando Jihad in the mid- 1970s and the riots at the Jakarta port of Tanjung Priok in 1984. The former was in fact a

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“sting” operation by the army. A revolt began in Aceh, a very strongly santri area, in 1976 that continued off and on until 2005, but social, economic and political factors were more impor- tant than religious ones.

In the early 1980s the government undertook to make pancasila a more substantial ideology than it had been and demanded that all organizations, religious and social as well as political, accept pancasila as their “sole basis”. NU already accepted pancasila as the basis for society, but this went further. How could a Muslim group (or a Christian one) accept something as vague as pancasila as its sole basis? The pressure was put on, however, and all of the groups fell into line, the Muhammadiya being the last to do so. It appears that some took the position that “belief in the one and only Divinity” could be interpreted as tawhid.

The Suharto government was not, in fact, anti-Islamic where it could control Islamic activi- ties and where they were not political. The Ministry of Education promoted Muslim reli- gious education and provided materials. Religious instruction continued to be compulsory in state schools and universities as it had been since about 1960. The State Institutes of Islamic Religion (IAIN) were expanded. These offer upper level theological education to pesantren graduates as well as others and include modernists on their faculties. About 1978 the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI) was established to provide fatwas for the government but some describe it as a “cynical creation” of the regime. The government appears to have encour- aged non political dakwa in areas where santri Islam was weak and in fact many abangan and priyayi became santri during this period. To its critics, Suharto’s policy looked like the Dutch “Ethical Policy”.

Apart from the government there was considerable and varied Islamic activity, including the Muhammadiya, NU and other groups mentioned above. More radically Islamist was the Dakwah Council (Dewan Dakwah) founded by Mohammad Natsir, a former leader of Masyumi, in 1967 and linked to the Saudi-based World Muslim League (Rābiṭat al-‘Ālam al-Islāmī). The groups connected with the Indonesian Students Association (HMI) were quite active and diverse. There were some who took a radically Islamist position, particularly stimu- lated by the example of the Iranian revolution, but most were apolitical and stressed individual moral improvement.

A numerically small but influential group calls itself “neo-modernist”. Its most prominent representatives have been Nurcholish Madjid (1939–2005) and Abdurrahman Wahid (1940–), both of whom came from a pesantren background. After his pesantren studies Nurcholish Madjid attended the IAIN in Jakarta and was active in the student movement in the 1960s and 1970s. Initially close to Masyumi, he soon took the position “Islam yes! Islamic parties, no!” From 1978 to 1984 he studied for a Ph.D. in the United States under Fazlur Rahman, the Pakistani scholar by then teaching in Chicago, who had labeled his own views “neo- modernist”. Later Nurcholish taught at the IAIN and founded Paramadina, an educational and social foundation. Abdurrahman Wahid was born into a highly respected NU family and had

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a wide cultural exposure in addition to his pesantren education. From 1964 to 1971 he was in the Middle East, studying first at al-Azhar in Cairo and then at Baghdad University. On his re- turn he became active in institutions related to the pesantrens and the NU. In 1984 he became General Chairman of the NU. He played an important role in taking the organization out of party politics and getting it to accept pancasila as the sole basis. Later he was to become presi- dent of Indonesia for a brief period, as we shall see.

In general, neo-modernists see themselves as “progressive”, looking to the future rather than to the past greatness of Islam. They are more favorable than most to Western culture and give considerable value to democracy, tolerance, pluralism and human rights. Religion and state should be separate; some speak of “Islamic values” or “Islamic society” rather than Islamic state. Abdurrahman Wahid has said he wants not an “Islamic society” but an “Indonesian so- ciety” in which the Muslims are functioning well. The Shari‘a does not contain a blueprint for society but general principles that must be applied flexibly to each situation. Abdurrahman particularly is concerned to respect and build on local traditions. At the same time ijtihad should be systematic and well grounded in traditional Islamic scholarship. Although they were often critical of Suharto, their position is quite consistent with pancasila. In terms of the types presented in chapter fifteen, neo-modernism is secularist but with clear neo-traditionalist roots. It has been claimed that these thinkers do not manifest the common “inferiority complex” vis- à-vis the West.

In the late 1980s Indonesian Islam could be described as politically enfeebled but culturally vigorous. About 1989 Suharto changed his stance to one more favorable to Islam. In 1991 he prominently went on Hajj. Shari‘a courts were given a higher status and a government spon- sored Islamic bank was established. Women were permitted to wear Islamic head covering in state schools. More santri were appointed to the higher echelons of the army. Suharto also en- couraged the formation of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), inviting to join it a number of activists who had previously been out of favor. Most Muslim intellectu- als joined it, at least nominally, but Abdurrahman Wahid criticized it, fearing that it would be a political tool for the government and would foster sectarianism. He and others formed the in- terfaith Democratic Forum (Forum Democrasi). Abdurrahman also criticized the government on other occasions.

Post-Suharto: election; violent Islamism It was economic collapse that finally brought down the Suharto government in 1998. After a transition period under the vice-president, who had been the chairman of the ICMI, the first free election was held since 1955. Some 48 parties took part. In addition to the PPP, there were parties backed by the NU and by Muhammadiya respectively and several smaller Islamist par- ties. The Muslim parties got a total of 38 percent of the vote, not very different from the 1955

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results, except that the major Muslim parties in 1955 could all be considered Islamist while the parties backed by the Muhammadiya and the NU in 1999 are not. “Back room” negotiations led to the choice of Abdurrahman Wahid as president but he lasted only two years, defeated by the difficulties of the situation and, in part, by his own outspokenness and erratic style. He was succeeded by the daughter of Sukarno, Megawati Sukarnoputri.

Since the fall of Suharto a number of small radically Islamist groups have formed or become visible. The best known and most infamous are the Jemaah Islamiya and the Laskar Jihad. It was members of the former that bombed the night club in Bali on October 12, 2002, the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2003, the Australian Embassy in 2004 and possibly sites in Kuta in 2005. While this group has connections with the international jihad movement to be discussed in the next chapter, its main roots are within Indonesia. Its leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and others were members of the youth wing of the Masyumi and then were involved in the Dar al-Islam movements and the Kommando Jihad, spending time in prison after the last. Some of the leaders were in Afghanistan between 1985 and 1995 and Ba’asyir came into contact with the Egyptian Jama‘a Islamiyya (Islamic Group) in the mid-1990s. In 2000 he organized a Mujahidin Congress in Yogyakarta and established the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), dedicated to the goal of a new international caliphate, similar to the goal of the Hizb al-Tahrir, which has increasing influence in Indonesia.

Laskar Jihad was formed in 2000 and is known for its attacks on Christians and generally ex- acerbating communal tensions in some of the outer islands. It claims that its mission is to de- fend Muslims by attacking “belligerent” kafirs. It has been accused of receiving support from elements in the army and harboring al-Qaeda cells, though it has denied both of these.

If Indonesian Islam could be described as politically enfeebled but culturally vigorous in the 1980s, it is still culturally vigorous, perhaps more so, but is no longer politically enfeebled. Rather, it is interestingly diverse, but no closer to establishing an Islamic state today than it was fifty years ago. Two elections for the legislature and one for president have been success- fully carried out but Muslim parties have lost ground, gaining 38 and 24 percent respectively in the 2004 and 2009 parliamentary elections. Indonesian Islam has the reputation of being more tolerant and flexible than most, and possibly no other country has produced as signifi- cant a group of Muslim liberal intellectuals as the Indonesian “neo modernists”. The Jemaah Islamiya and others, however, remind us that Indonesian Islam has no less potential for radi- calism and violence than others.

Key Points You Need to Know Islam penetrated the area that is now Indonesia gradually and mixed with earlier • practices.

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The Dutch presence served to strengthen Islam and particularly Shari‘a oriented forms • of Islam.

It is common to distinguish three groups, • abangan, santri and priyayi in discussing Indonesia.

The twentieth century saw the creation of several Islamic movements, of which the • Muhammadiya and the Nahdlatul Ulama are the largest.

The struggle for independence was led by Sukarno and the secularist Indonesian • National Party but the Muslim groups participated.

Pancasila • became the ideological basis of the new Indonesian state.

The communist movement was destroyed after the pogrom of 1965, in which many • Muslims participated.

Suharto’s government generally favored secularists but took on a more Islamic color-• ing from about 1989.

A small but influential movement has been that of the “neo-Modernists”. •

There have been several violent movements over the years, the most recent including • the Jemaah Islamiya, responsible for the Bali bombing in 2002 and others.

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading Barton, Greg (2005) Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam, Sydney:

University of New South Wales Press.

Barton, Greg and Fealy, Greg (eds) (1996) Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, Clayton, Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, Monash University.

Boland, B.J. (1971) The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, The Hague: Nijhoff.

Federspiel, Howard M. (1970) Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Modern Indonesian Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.

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Geertz, Clifford (1960) The Religion of Java, Glencoe, NY: Free Press.

Woodward, Mark R. (1989) Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta, Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.

Woodward, Mark R. (ed.) (1996) Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought, Tempe, Arizona, AZ: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Asian Studies.

Globalization: Challenge and Opportunity

In This Chapter The “globalization” of human society in recent decades has influenced Muslims and their un- derstanding and practice of Islam in diverse ways. This chapter will consider three of them: the development of a “global jihad”, exemplified and symbolized by the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York, the creation of a Muslim “diaspora” as Muslims have emigrated to Western countries largely for economic reasons, and activities of a number of liberal or “pro- gressive” Muslims both in the Muslim world and in the diaspora.

Main Topics Covered Globalization, various examples •

Global • jihad

Muslim diaspora in the West •

Liberal/Progressive Islam •

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Globalization: meaning and examples

The term globalization commonly refers to the fact that organizations, institutions and individuals increasingly function on a worldwide level little inhibited by dis-tance or even, often, by national boundaries. Science, technology, ideas and fash-ions spread quickly from their sources to other parts of the world. Multinational corporations source raw material in one country, produce in another, are man- aged in a third and market almost everywhere. Political events in one place influence almost immediately what happens on the other side of the world. All of this has been made possible by advances in transportation and communication, most recently such developments as satel- lite communication and the internet. In some respects globalization is not new. The term is sometimes used for the spread of the European based political and economic system around the globe in the nineteenth century, and behind that is a history that goes back, presumably, to the invention of the wheel. But the last few decades have witnessed what seems like a quan- tum leap. Today we can more literally speak of a global society than ever before.

The whole history of Islam can be seen as a process of globalization. The umma was global in intent from the earliest conquests and has never stopped spreading geographically. Even though it was soon divided politically people, ideas and goods could travel relatively unob- structed by political boundaries. Some Sufi tariqas spread throughout much of the Muslim world. The Hajj was probably the greatest symbol and manifestation of this global tendency.

If nineteenth-century European imperialism was a form of globalization many Muslim po- litical and ideological responses have also been global. The pan-Islamic movement of the late nineteenth century attempted to give a global response to imperialism. The ideas of Muhammad ‘Abduh spread from Morocco to Indonesia, as did the influence of Atatürk’s reforms and the ideas of Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brothers and the Jama‘at-i Islami. The awareness of the Palestine problem spread to other Muslim countries from the 1930s. Some Sufi tariqas, such as Inayat Khan’s (1882–1927) Sufi Order International, the Ni‘matullahis under Javad Nurbakhsh (1927-2008) and the Naqshbandis (see chapter twelve, Web Resources) have spread to the West, as have other forms of da‘wa. The Islamic revolution in Iran very quickly had repercussions throughout the world.

Islam and Muslims are involved in the current phase of globalization in many ways, of which several will be mentioned briefly and then a few dealt with in more detail. Muslims are largely recipients of science and technology but there are some developments in Muslim countries and a number of Muslim scientists work in the West. Popular culture and the media provide many examples of globalization. The “Barbie” doll was mentioned in chapter fifteen and another example is the “I ♥ New York” sticker, which has spawned among other things “I ♥ Islam”. Satellite dishes make it easier for television viewers to by-pass government controls. Even government controlled stations convey much Western material. I remember watching

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the American sit-com “Love Boat” in Egypt in the 1980s, for example. Of course, all sorts of Muslim groups and movements make use of the world wide web. For example, one can seek a fatwa or a Muslim marriage partner on the appropriate websites. Much of this is done in English, so that English is becoming a major Muslim language. Much, though not all, of this could be seen as examples of “cultural imperialism”.

There is also a growth of worldwide organizations. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is an intergovernmental agency formed in 1969 at the instance of the Saudi king. It has fifty-seven member states and seeks to promote Islamic values and cooperation among its members and the welfare of their peoples. The Muslim World League (Rābiṭat al- ‘Ālam al-Islāmī), a non-governmental organization supported primarily by Saudi Arabia, was founded in Mecca in 1962 and actively supports a wide range of activity throughout the world. Its orientation can be described as salafi and many claim that it propagates a Wahhabi form of Islam.

Two very widespread movements that can also be considered salafi, though with different ideological orientations, are the Tablighi Movement and the Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr. The former was founded in India in the 1920s and its main goal is to get Muslims to perform regularly the basic obligations such as salah. Groups of volunteers travel from place to place, both within countries and internationally, spreading their message. They do not involve themselves in poli- tics. They have a presence in some eighty countries, both Muslim and diaspora. Hizb al-Tahrir (The Liberation Party) was founded in 1952 by the Palestinian judge, Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1909–1977) and aims to create a caliphate governing the whole of the umma by the Shari‘a. It rejects the present system of states, which it considers to be the abode of unbelief (Dar al- kufr) though “unbelief ” applies to the governments, not all of the people. Both the doctrine and the organization are highly structured and Nabhani wrote a detailed constitution for the caliphate. While its goal is radical its actions have not been violent. It hopes to come to power through a bloodless coup d’état and made several unsuccessful attempts in several Arab coun- tries between 1968 and 1983. It has spread to over forty countries, including several Western countries. It is usually controversial and has been banned in most Arab and central Asian coun- tries and restricted in Germany. (More on Hizb al-Tahrir or go to http://www.hizbuttahrir.org/ and click on “About Us”.)

Global jihad One of the most dramatic forms of globalization has been what is sometimes referred to as “global terrorism” and seen as part of a “global jihad”. We will consider here only that strand of it that is connected with Afghanistan and al-Qaeda. Although the British and the Russians competed in the “great game” of empire in Afghanistan in the nineteenth century, neither could subdue the country and Afghanistan entered the twentieth century as one of the few

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Muslim countries not subject to European control. In the second half of the century, however, Afghanistan was caught up in the pressures of the Cold War. In 1978 the Afghan communists seized power but in fighting among the leaders, along with other factors, led the Soviets to send in troops in 1979. The same year a number of Afghan groups mounted jihad against them.

This jihad forced the Soviets to withdraw in 1989 though the Afghan communist president managed to hold on until 1992. From the Soviet point of view the whole campaign was a ma- jor disaster, worse than the American experience in Vietnam. The mujahidin groups were quite diverse ethnically, ideologically, and in other ways. Most were Sunni but some were Shi‘i. Some were traditionalist; at least one was secularist and several were Islamist, influenced by Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and/or Abul ‘Ala‘ Mawdudi. Many of the Islamist fighters had been in refugee camps and many had studied in madrasas in Pakistan that have sprung up in recent years. The mujahidin received assistance from various sources including the United States government. They were also joined by one to three thousand young men from various parts of the Muslim world who came to fight in the jihad (somewhat reminiscent of leftist youth who fought in the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s). These were called “Arab Afghans”, although many were not Arabs. Some of them went to fight in Bosnia and Chechnya in the following decade, and others went back to their home countries, such as Egypt, Algeria and Indonesia, to participate in violent Islamist activities there. The Afghan jihad also had enor- mous psychological repercussions throughout the Muslim world. For many it destroyed the “myth” of superpower invincibility. If the Soviet Union was vulnerable, why not the United States?

Unfortunately, the mujahidin groups could not form a stable government in Afghanistan af- ter their victory. In reaction to their squabbling and corruption an ultra-traditionalist group known as the Taleban (the word refers to madrasa students) was formed by Mullah Omar in 1994. According to one account this happened after a local mujahid commander had abducted two teenage girls and Mullah Omar and his students rescued them, acquiring weapons in the process. After considerable fighting they gained control of most of the country by 1996. They managed to impose order and make the country safer than it had been, but they did so with a very conservative interpretation of the Shari‘a and pushtunwala (the local form of customary law). Their harsh restrictions on women have received considerable international attention. In 2001, after the events of 9/11, the Americans and their allies invaded Afghanistan and forced the Taleban out because of their support for al-Qaeda (see below). They retreated to the moun- tains and to the adjacent areas of Pakistan, where many of their followers had been students in madrasas. Since 2006 they have made a significant comeback to control some areas.

Among the “Arab Afghans” in Afghanistan in the 1980s were Abdullah Azzam (1941–1989), Usama Bin Laden (1957–) and Ayman al-Zawahiri (1951–), leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (see chapter seventeen). Azzam was a Palestinian and a passionate ideologue who preached that jihad is as important as salah and is fard ‘ayn (individual obligation, see chap- ter ten) so long as kafirs occupy or threaten Muslim lands. He was the mentor of Bin Laden,

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who is a Saudi, from a wealthy family of Yemeni origin, and a successful businessman in his own right. Together they gathered a small group of fighters, mostly Egyptian followers of al- Zawahiri, to form the group that would become known as al-Qaeda. After the Russians left Afghanistan Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. When the Iraqis invaded Kuwait, he offered to organize a force of “Arab Afghans” to protect the Kingdom but the royal family rejected this and opted for American troops, getting a fatwa from the leading Saudi ‘ulama’ to justify this. This appears to have been crucial in deciding Bin Laden’s future direction. He went to the Sudan for several years and then, in 1996, returned to Afghanistan and reorganized Al-Qaeda. The precise meaning of this term is debated. It may mean “base” (as in a military base), or “principle”, or “foundation” in the sense of a “strong foundation (qaeda) for the expected vic- tory” as Abdullah ‘Azzam had termed it. Later al-Zawahiri wrote of qaedat al-jihad.

Al-Zawahiri has come to be seen as the brains behind the organization and his followers a key element within it, while Bin Laden has been the spokesperson and financier. In February 1998 the two, along with others, issued the document entitled “World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders”, attacking American activities. On August 7, 1998 “martyrdom operations” (aka “suicide attacks”) were carried out against the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and on August 20 the Americans retaliated with missile attacks, dubbed “Infinite Reach”, on targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan, destroying a pharmaceutical factory in the latter country.

Mullah Omar granted protection to Bin Laden and his group when they came to Afghanistan but the relationship was very uneasy. The Taleban were extremely traditionalist, rigid on mat- ters of authority and interpretation but somewhat accepting of local custom, and localized in their interests. By contrast, the radically Islamist al-Qaeda were more “modern” in their think- ing, more global in their interests and more flexible in matters of authority and interpretation. Among other things, Mullah Omar felt that Bin Laden, who is not an ‘alim, exceeded his au- thority in some of his statements. It is claimed that “Infinite Reach” led Mullah Omar to con- tinue his protection of al-Qaeda when he had been considering withdrawing it. In later years under the influence of al-Qaeda, however, the Taleban would become more sophisticated in the use of modern methods and show a more international orientation.

In 2000 martyrdom operations were continued with an attack on the warship U.S.S. Cole by a small powerboat laden with explosives. On September 11, 2001 the best known operations took place as airplanes crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York and into the Pentagon in Washington D.C., giving Bin Laden worldwide recognition. A num- ber of later operations have been connected with, or were claimed to be connected with, al- Qaeda, including the bombing of a nightclub in Bali in 2002, the bombing of a commuter train in Madrid in 2004 and the bombings in London on July 7, 2005.

The level of al-Qaeda’s involvement has varied, however. al-Qaeda is loosely organized and appears to have become more so since 2001. It may be pictured as concentric circles. The in-

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ner circle is the hard core group. The next circle consists of people recruited for specific op- erations and other militant groups related to it in various ways and to various degrees. Such individuals or groups may suggest operations and seek Al-Qaeda’s assistance. Beyond this are sympathizers influenced by al-Qaeda but not necessarily in touch with it. The hard core were involved in the operations mentioned above in 1998, 2000 and 2001. Since then many of the hard core have been killed or captured and most operations have been carried out by affili- ated groups or sympathizers. Those who carried out the Bali bombings may be considered an affiliated group and are said to have been funded to a considerable degree by al-Qaeda, for example. Richard Reid, who was caught with a bomb in his shoe during an airplane flight in December 2001, is an example of an individual recruited by al-Qaeda. Late in 2004 Bin Laden recognized Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, the leading “terrorist” in Iraq, as effectively an affiliate. Despite initial claims that the London bombers were connected with al-Qaeda, the official re- port concluded they were not, though they were influenced by it. Likewise, investigations have indicated that the Madrid bombers were inspired by al-Qaeda but did not have direct links with it and the same is true of other cases where claims of al-Qaeda involvement were made at some point. Al-Qaeda need not be directly involved for its influence to be deadly.

As is common among radical Islamists, many connected with al-Qaeda come from middle class backgrounds or better and have gone through higher education, especially in technical subjects. Bin Laden comes from a wealthy family and had studied business administration at university though without completing a degree. Ayman al-Zawahiri is a medical doctor. Muhammad Atta, the leader of the group that flew the airplanes into the Twin Towers, came from a family of professionals and had a degree in architectural engineering and had studied town planning in Germany. On the other hand, Richard Reid came from a broken family and had a prison background.

Al-Qaeda is a network as fully globalized as is probably possible. Since the American inva- sion of Afghanistan in 2001 its geographical base has been problematic, but its leaders can still appear on television and its members can still communicate with each other by cell phone and internet. Also, many of these members are “globalized” in the sense that they have moved around a lot and lack firm roots anywhere. Their loyalty is less to a geographical homeland or a geographical umma than to an ideal umma that exists mainly in their minds.

Al-Qaeda’s campaign may be seen as a particularly extreme response to the basic problem of modern Islam outlined in chapter fifteen: why has God permitted the Western kafirs to dominate Muslims and what should be done about it? The first part of Bin Laden’s answer is to stress the danger of the West. It is a direct physical threat to the Muslims and also a moral threat because of its immoral lifestyle. The labels “crusaders” and “Jews/Zionists” evoke no- table examples of Western assaults, past and present, and suggest that Westerners are all the same and unchanging (as orientalists have often presented the Muslim world). This threat must be dealt with by jihad, in the sense of violent struggle, since the West is using violence and, in fact, only understands force (a point often made by others who are far less extreme).

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Bin Laden believes that jihad, whether offensive or defensive, is a continuing obligation for Muslims, but he appears to see the present struggle as a defensive one, in which the Muslims are fighting for their survival. Therefore participation is incumbent on all people (i.e. is fard ‘ayn) and more desperate measures may be used.

Why martyrdom operations? First, martyrdom is a value in and of itself since it is done for God and receives an immediate heavenly reward whatever the outcome of the operation. “Say not of those slain in the way of Allah that they are dead; in fact they are living, but you are unaware” (2:154).

Second, Muslims are not strong enough to engage in conventional warfare against the West, but martyrdom operations require relatively few resources and are particularly hard to counter. There is something like David and Goliath here. On the attack on the U.S.S. Cole Bin Laden composed a poem:

A destroyer, even the brave fear its might, It inspires horror in the harbour and in the open sea, She sails into the waves Flanked by arrogance, haughtiness and false power, To her doom she moves slowly, A dinghy awaits her, riding the waves. (Lawrence 149)

Terrorism is generally the strategy of the weak.

Third, such operations can achieve concrete results. Martyrdom operations by Hizbollah in Lebanon drove out the American and French “peacekeepers” in 1983 and played a major role in the Israeli army’s withdrawal in 2000. The bombing of the commuter train in Spain was fol- lowed by Spain’s withdrawal of troops from Iraq. It will presumably require a long campaign to weaken America. But who can say? Though outwardly strong, the U.S. is inwardly corrupt and weak, in Bin Laden’s view, as the Soviet Union proved to be in 1989. In the 9/11 attacks a mere nineteen mujahids “shook America’s throne, struck its economy right in the heart, and dealt the biggest military power a mighty blow …” (Bin Laden 149).

Fourth, a major goal of these operations is to encourage the Muslims of the world by demon- strating U.S. weakness. In this connection the symbolism of the action is important. The Twin Towers and the Pentagon symbolize the economic and military power of the United States.

Fifth, these operations provide effective publicity. Bin Laden said that these deeds were “speeches that overshadowed all other speeches made everywhere else in the world. The

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speeches are understood by Arabs and non-Arabs – even Chinese”. (Burke 38). Donations to radical Islamist movements increased after September 11.

Sixth, they are revenge for what the West has done and thus tend to restore the honor of the umma. The Qur’an permits revenge so long as it is proportionate.

Seventh, they are a warning to the West. One of the London “martyrs” said: “Until we feel se- cure you will be our targets. Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture . . . we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier” (Sadiq).

Most ‘ulama’ and other spokespeople have criticized al-Qaeda’s actions on several grounds, of which the more prominent are: that Islam is basically about peace, not violence; that it is forbidden to kill non-combatants, especially certain categories of people such as women and children, and that suicide is forbidden.

Bin Laden and his associates answer the first objection by saying that it is clear from the Qur’an and the Sunna that the way to peace is often through violence, especially when the enemy is as insistent and threatening as the West is. In Bin Laden’s view, Muslims who ally with the West are apostates. To the second point they argue that it is traditionally acceptable to kill non-combatants, including women and children, in situations where they cannot be dis- tinguished from combatants in a legitimate target. This also applies to Muslims who may be killed. Also, since Americans choose their leaders and approve their policies they are not in- nocent. As for suicide, there are no precise precedents for the martyrdom operations but these are analogous to those who plunged to certain death in battle or chose death rather than apos- tasy or dishonor, and these were approved by the Prophet so long as the motive was to serve God. Bin Laden also notes that some of the ‘ulama’ who criticize al-Qaeda on these grounds approve comparable actions by Hamas against Israel. These arguments do not persuade most Muslims but they do have some force and a number of Muslims, though disapproving, prob- ably have a certain sneaking admiration for the group.

Al-Qaeda is undoubtedly the most globalized of the terrorist groups. In comparison to its in- ternational scope and ambitions, groups such as Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine have a more local or regional focus though they do have international support. Space does not permit us to deal with them here.

Muslim diaspora in the West Although there were some Muslims living in the West before 1950, many more have emi- grated to Western countries (see Euro-Islam.Info under Web Resources) since then either to get jobs or to seek refuge from political turmoil. In many cases they have come from former

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colonies of the Western countries to which they have gone. In Great Britain the largest number have come from the Indian subcontinent, while in France most have come from North Africa, especially Algeria and Morocco. In 1962 an agreement between the German and the Turkish governments provided for Turkish “guest workers” to work in Germany. Most of those coming to these three countries took unskilled jobs in industry although some professionals and busi- ness people also came. For reasons of space, we will consider mainly these countries along with the United States, though there are Muslim immigrants in many other countries, as well.

Along with their Muslim identity the immigrants have also had an ethnic identity, and at first the ethnic identity has generally been given priority by both the immigrants and the host coun- tries. It has been common for the men to come alone first and only some years later to bring their families. The first generation has usually not tried to adapt fully to the new environment, in part because many expected to return eventually to their homeland, although only a few have. The second generation, those raised and educated in the new country, stand between the culture of their parents and that of their environment. They have to decide about their identity, including whether and how they will be Muslim.

The United States saw a considerable increase in Muslim immigration after the repeal of re- strictive legislation in 1965, but most of these were professionals and businesspeople, who have found it easier to adapt in the first generation although they still have issues relating to religion and identity.

Most Western countries have also had significant numbers of Muslim students temporarily res- ident who carry the effects of their stay back to their home country. This may include exposure to transnational Islamist groups.

In the early stages the immigrants’ religious practices have tended to be limited to the basics and they would meet in homes or rented premises. Later buildings have been bought and con- verted to mosques; less often purpose-built mosques have been constructed. These mosques take on more of a community center function than is usual in the home countries. Such mat- ters as halal food and space in cemeteries are also arranged. In general the first generation has sought to replicate, to the extent possible, the traditional forms of Islam they knew at home. When the need is felt to pass on the tradition to the children, this may first be done by more or less formal “after school” classes in the mosques. In time some day schools are built, usually following the state curriculum along with Muslim religious education, and sometimes with state funding, but most children will go to state schools.

Trained religious leaders, imams, mostly come from the old country and often do not under- stand the Western culture well enough to meet many of the needs of their people. Efforts to provide training for religious leaders in Western countries are at a very early stage. Regional and national associations have been formed but they do not usually represent all of the existing groups and associations. The immigrants face the challenge of organizing all of this with little

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or no state support and guidance (Turks excepted to some extent). At the same time, they have more freedom than in the home country. Many feel it is safest to avoid involvement in politics, but many do vote and some stand for political office. They also petition the government when they feel Muslim interests are at risk or in relation to developments abroad. Muslims in Great

Britain and Denmark, respectively, played major roles in the protests against Salman Rushdie’s novel, The Satanic Verses, in 1988 and the “Danish Cartoons” depicting Muhammad in 2005, protests that quickly became worldwide.

Various international Islamic groups involve themselves with Muslim immigrants to the West and with students. The Tablighis and Hizb al-Tahrir have been mentioned. Others, such as the Jama‘at-i Islami, the Muslim Brothers and the Muslim World League are active. The Saudi government in particular provides considerable funding for mosques and other needs, and en- courages a salafi version of Islam. The Turkish government provides imams and other support for Turkish diaspora communities. Milli Görüṣ (an ideology in Turkey but an organizational name in the diaspora) and the Nurcus are also active in these communities.

All of this is very much influenced by the attitude of the host country, both official and unof- ficial. Germany for some time tried to keep the immigrants separate. Citizenship has been hard

Figure 20.1 Islamic Society of North America Headquarters, 1979, Plainfield, Indiana, USA, includes mosque, library and office block. (Courtesy Charlie Nye/Getty Images/ Saudi Aramco World/ SAWDIA)

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to get and most of the second generation are not citizens. France seeks assimilation to secular French values. England officially espouses “multiculturalism”. The United States has seen itself as a land of immigrants and has been religiously pluralist but also has a strong sense of American values. All of these recognize the legitimacy of Islam in some way. In America there is some willingness to extend the “Protestant-Catholic-Jew” paradigm to include Muslims and others. At the popular level in all of the countries there has been suspicion of Islam and Muslims and, especially in Europe, an awareness of the antagonistic history between Christendom and Islam. There is often local opposition to the building of mosques. Female hijab has been a major issue in France, sometimes an issue elsewhere. There have been claims of discrimination in various forms. International events, such as the Iranian revolution, the Palestinian-Israeli struggle and “9/11” have roused anti-Muslim feeling. The last has resulted in restrictive actions in the United States. There are journalists and other writers prepared to present Islam as a threat to “civilization” and the immigrants as its fifth column. At the same time, there is no shortage of people prepared to assist and befriend Muslims, dialogue with them and help them seek their rights.

As stated above, the second generation has to decide about its Islam. The traditional forms fol- lowed by their parents often do not appeal, since their exposure to the host culture is too deep. Some seek to assimilate, reducing their Islamic identity and practice to an absolute minimum. Others will give their Islamic identity priority over their ethnic identity, partly because the Islamic identity is more universal. These will probably find some form of salafi Islam attrac- tive, since it strips away the cultural “accretions” of their parents’ religion and allows them to believe that they are practicing a “purer” form. This may be a radically Islamist form, through which they may channel any anger they feel toward the host society. At the extreme they may become involved in terrorist activities. This seems to have been the case with those who car- ried out the 7/7 attacks in London. The fact that many Muslims live in a ghettoized situation in Britain seems to have played a role there. Riots in the French banlieux (lower class suburbs) in 2005 were linked by some to Islam but were really the result of economic and social issues. An alternative option is a more liberal version of salafism, which would replace the traditional “accretions” with more Western material. Such people may speak of creating a “French Islam” or a “European Islam.” Western converts to Islam, who are few in number but often important, are likely to prefer this approach.

The American situation is distinctive in that 20 percent of the Muslim community consists of African-Americans who are not immigrants but are connected with movements originating in America, such as Elijah Muhammad’s “Nation of Islam”. Elijah Muhammad (1897–1975) preached that the blacks were the original human beings and were originally Muslims and in- trinsically righteous while whites were “devils”. This mirrored the prevalent white racism and provided a powerfully positive sense of identity, especially for the most alienated, such as pris- oners. It made it hard for the movement to relate to other Muslims, however. After the death of

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Elijah Muhammad his son, Warith Deen, quickly steered the movement into orthodox Sunni channels and sought a positive integration with American society.

In 1979 Louis Farrakhan broke away to form a new “Nation of Islam”, retaining Elijah Muhammad’s oppositional stance and many of his doctrines. He has gained a significant fol- lowing and considerable publicity. The African-American Muslims and the immigrant groups have had some difficulty working together because of their different backgrounds, but a re- cent study shows that both tend to have a positive view of American society and share the “American dream”, albeit a morally conservative version of it. This moral conservatism is largely true of Muslims in other Western countries.

The question is sometimes raised whether the Shari‘a can be applied in the West. The answer is that those parts relating to ritual, including food laws, are generally applied since they re- quire little or no government involvement. In family matters they are sometimes recognized in law or applied informally, where they do not contravene Western legal or ethical norms (e.g. polygyny). Explicit discussion of the role of the Shari‘a can be quite emotive, as indicated by the response to the tentative and rather obscure suggestions of the Archbishop of Canterbury in 2008 that Shari‘a might have a place in Britain.

Diaspora Muslims face the challenge of how to be Muslim in non-Muslim societies that do not merely tolerate them but hold out the promise of equal participation. This has hardly existed in the past and there is reason to expect distinctive developments in the future.

Liberal/progressive Islam There are a number of intellectuals, mostly not trained as ‘ulama’ and often with degrees from Western universities, who have undertaken or are undertaking radical reinterpretations of Islam. Most of these live in the diaspora, many having moved there because they were forced out of their countries of origin. They are often referred to as “liberal” or “progressive” Muslims. They undertake substantial reinterpretations of the Qur’an and the Sunna and engage in radical forms of ijtihad and are particularly concerned with human rights, gender issues, and religious pluralism. Most of their writing is for fellow intellectuals and is often better received internationally than in their countries of origin. Thus their popular influence has been limited but their accomplishments may be very important for the future. Here I mention just a few of them.

The doyen of these thinkers is perhaps Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988), who headed the Central Institute of Islamic Research in Pakistan in the early 1960s but was forced out for religious and political reasons. From 1968 he was a professor at the University of Chicago. He has been very influential in the field of Islamic Studies, both through his writings and through his stu-

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dents, many of whom are leading scholars in the field today. Among other things, he argued that Muslims must learn to see the Qur’an as both the verbatim word of God and the word of Muhammad, who at the moments of revelation became one with the moral law. He also ar- gued that the Sunna of the Prophet was at first mostly transmitted “silently”, i.e. in behavior, and that most of the hadith in their existing form are later. Ijtihad should proceed (as noted in chapter fifteen) by studying the specific commands of the Qur’an in the light of their historical background and the overall teachings of the Qur’an to discover the ethical principles they il- lustrate and then applying these principles to contemporary cases.

Amina Wadud (1952–) is an American scholar who has used Fazlur Rahman’s method of ijtihad to give a feminist reading of the Qur’an. She has been controversial and particularly stirred debate when she led a mixed congregation in salat al-jum‘a in New York in 2005.

Another scholar who has had to leave his country because of his views is Nasr Abu Zayd (1943–), as mentioned above in chapter seventeen on Egypt. Since 1995 he has been resident in the Netherlands. He appears to go a bit further than Fazlur Rahman when he claims the text of the Qur’an is a human manifestation of the Word of God and, being human, it reflects the practices of its particular time. Justice and freedom are the central teachings of the Qur’an but the particular form in which it presents them is not necessarily to be followed today. He sees himself as heir to the Mu‘tazili ideas of the created Qur’an and metaphorical interpretation.

A scholar who calls himself a neo-Mu‘tazili is Abdolkarim Soroush (1945–), an Iranian phi- losopher. He was an active supporter of the Islamic Revolution and participated in the effort to Islamicize university education, but he soon became disillusioned and became one of the most vocal critics of the regime from within the country. Since 2000 he has been a visiting scholar at various universities outside Iran. He distinguishes between religion, which is divinely re- vealed, and religious knowledge, which is fallible. He believes with the Mu‘tazila that the Qur’an is created but goes beyond them to say that it is created by Muhammad as well as God. As revealed by God the Qur’an is beyond words; the Prophet puts it into words and it thereby becomes human, potentially fallible and influenced by its culture. The Mu‘tazila held that ethi- cal values can be known apart from revelation and for Soroush this means that “primary” val- ues such as reason, liberty, freedom, and democracy do not depend on religious support. These sorts of ideas provide a basis for religious pluralism and political secularism.

Abdullahi An-Na‘im was a follower of the Sudanese reformer Mahmud Muhammad Taha and left the Sudan to work in the United States after Taha was executed in 1985. He has especially been a campaigner for human rights. He affirms the view of his mentor that only the Meccan part of the Qur’an contains permanent teachings, but does not seem to stress this. He also holds that the interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna are human and thus historically condi- tioned, so that new interpretations are needed in the light of today’s realities. He argues that Islam and the state must be kept separate, while maintaining the connection between Islam and politics. Muslims may work to have Islamic principles implemented by the state, not on the

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basis of their divine origin, but by democratic decision and subject to constitutional and hu- man rights safeguards. He calls this “secularism” or “pluralism”.

Tariq Ramadan (1962–) is the grandson of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brothers, but was born in Switzerland and is a Swiss citizen. He is particularly associated with the idea of a European Islam. His attitude to the Qur’an and Sunna is a bit more conservative than that of the others discussed here, but he accepts ‘urf (custom) as a source of Islamic law. Europe, he says, is not dār al-ḥarb but dār al-da‘wa or dār al-shahāda, a place where the sha- hada can be pronounced and Islam witnessed to. European Muslims can and must integrate into the local society while maintaining their Islamic practice. There should be a dynamic and dialectic movement between the sources of Islam and the environment. Oddly, Tariq Ramadan was refused entry to the United States on the grounds of having donated to charities that sup- ported terrorism (before they had been officially designated as such, however).

These are only a few of the figures who might have been mentioned here. Others include Muhammad Arkoun, a highly respected Algerian-French scholar, Khaled Abou El Fadl, a legal expert, originally from Egypt, now in the United States, Farid Esack, a South African social activist, Chandra Muzaffar, a Malaysian known for human rights concerns, Ziauddin Sardar, who has pondered the future of Islam, and several mentioned elsewhere in this book, such as Fethullah Gülen (Turkey), Nurcholish Madjid (Indonesia), Muhammad ‘Ashmawi (Egypt).

It will be clear from the material In This Chapter that globalization, like all the gifts of tech- nology, has its good and its bad aspects. It seems clear that it will make a significant difference for Islam and Muslims, although what that difference will be in the long run is hard to say. The umma will continue with the basic witness: “There is no god but God; Muhammad is the Messenger of God” will remain, and the other Pillars. Beyond that, one predicts with caution what forms it will take.

Key Points You Need to Know Globalization of a sort has characterized the Muslim world since the beginning, but the • present globalization represents a “quantum leap” that infuences the Muslim world at many levels.

This includes governmental organizations such as the OIC and non-government groups • such as the Tablighi Movement.

The “global • jihad”, illustrated by al-Qaeda, represents a particularly intense response to the “great reversal” presented in chapter fifteen.

Considerable Muslim immigration to Western countries has produced communities that • face a distinctive situation and may make distinctive contributions to the umma.

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A number of intellectuals, many living in the West, are rethinking the nature of the • Qur’an and the Sunna and producing radically new interpretations that could have sig- nificance for the future.

Additional Material at Islam Online. Self Test Questions

Class Discussion Questions

Essay Questions

Further Reading

Globalization

Cooke, Miriam and Lawrence, Bruce B. (eds) (2005) Muslim Networks from Hajj to HipHop, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Roy, Olivier (2004) Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, London: Hurst.

Jihad and martyrdom

Burke, Jason (2004) Al-Qaeda: Casting A Shadow of Terror, revised ed., London: Penguin Books.

Husain, Ed (2007) The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left, London: Penguin.

Ibrahim, Raymond (ed.) (2007) The Al Qaeda Reader, New York: Doubleday.

Kepel, Gilles and Milleli, Jean-Pierre (eds) (2008) Al-Qaeda in its Own Words, Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap Press.

Victor, Barbara (2003) Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers, Emmaus, PA: Rodale.

Diaspora

Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck and Smith, Jane I. (eds) (2002) Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible, Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.

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Ramadan, Tariq (1999) To be a European Muslim: A Study of Islamic Sources in the European Context, Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.

Turner, Richard Brent (2003) Islam in the African-America Experience, 2nd ed., Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Liberal/progressive Islam

Esack, Farid (1999) On Being a Muslim: Finding a Religious Path in the World Today, Oxford: One World Publications.

Kamrava, Mehran (ed.) (2006) The New Voices of Islam: Reforming Politics and Modernity: A Reader, London & New York: I.B.Tauris.

Kurzman, Charles (ed.) (1998) Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Noor, Farish A. (ed.) (2002) New Voices of Islam, Leiden: International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM).

Sadri, M. and Sadri, A. (eds) (2000) Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush, New York: Oxford University Press.

Safi, Omid (ed.) (2003) Progressive Muslims: On Gender, Justice and Pluralism, Oxford: Oneworld.

Web Resources Euro-Islam.Info

http://www.euro-islam.info/about_us/ Has considerable information on European Muslims. See, e.g., Country Profiles and Latest News.

Muslims for Progressive Values http://www.mpvusa.org/ An American website with a lot of material and links to liberal groups.

A COLLECTION OF FATWAS AND LEGAL OPINION on the issue of: WOMEN LEADING PRAYERS http://mac.abc.se/~onesr/d/fwlp_e.pdf All the fatwas are against.

Appendix I: Glossary of Names and Terms

Abangan Javanese Muslims who do not follow Islamic prescriptions strictly and follow many traditional Javanese customs; often called “statistical Muslims.”

Abbasid caliphate (750–1258) Line of caliphs claiming descent from Muḥammad’s uncle with their capital in Baghdad; the early period was one of the high points of Muslim political power, while the whole dynasty saw major cultural achievements. A shadow line of Abbasids continued until 1517 in Egypt.

‘Abd al-Rāziq, ‘Alī (1888–1966) Wrote a controversial but influential book defending secular- ism on Islamic grounds in Egypt in 1925.

‘Abduh, Muḥammad (1842–1905) Egyptian modernist reformer, influential throughout the Muslim world.

Abū Bakr (d. 634) The first caliph or successor to Muḥammad as leader of the umma.

Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 767) One of leading early faqīhs (jurists); understood to be the founder of the Ḥanafī madhhab.

‘Āda (or adat) Custom; may be seen as a source of fiqh or as an alternative or complement to the Sharī‘a, also called ‘urf.

Adab Proper manners and behaviour, especially of the courtier or bureaucrat; literature, belles lettres. There is also an adab for Ṣūfīs, faqīhs and other groups.

Adam The first man according to the Qur’ān; also understood to be the first prophet.

Adhān The call to ṣalāh (prayer) five times a day.

Ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamā ‘a The Sunnīs, as opposed to the Shī‘īs, literally: the people of the sunna and the [main stream] community.

Akbar (r. 1556–1605) Ruler of the Mughal Empire at its height; open minded toward other religions and philosophies.

Akhbārī Twelver Shī‘ī school of fiqh that emphasizes the authority of the akhbār (reports of Muḥammad and the Imāms).

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‘Alawīs (or Nuṣayrīs) Sect recognizing ‘Alī as the highest manifestation of the divine but separate from the Alevis; currently they dominate the government of Syria.

Alevis Sect recognizing ‘Alī as the highest manifestation of the divine; located in Turkey, ex- periencing a cultural revival since the 1980s.

‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. 661) Cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muḥammad, fourth caliph in the Sunnī reckoning and first Imām in the Shī ‘ī reckoning.

‘Ālim Singular of ‘ulamā’, q.v.

Al-Kulaynī (d.940) Compiler of the main collection of Twelver Shī‘ī Ḥadīth and akhbār.

Allāh Arabic word for the One God and the one mostly used by Muslims; used in other Islamic languages beside Arabic.

Ameer Ali (1849–1928) Indian modernist, whose book The Spirit of Islām has been quite influential.

Amīr al-mu’minīn “Commander of the faithful”, title of caliphs and other rulers, usually im- plying a serious commitment to religion.

Anṣār “Helpers”, the Medinan supporters of Muḥammad; name also taken by other groups, e.g. the supporters of the Sudanese Mahdī. See also Muhājir.

Ash‘arīs (Ash‘arites or Ash‘ariyya) The most prominent school of Sunnī kalām (theology), founded by Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī al-Ash‘arī (d. 935), who sought to demonstrate traditionalist theses by rational methods.

‘Ashūrā’ Tenth day of Muḥarram, the first month of the Muslim year; the death of Ḥusayn on this day is commemorated by Shī ‘īs.

Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938) Founder of the Turkish Republic; instituted far reach- ing secularist reforms. Atatürk is a title given to him, meaning “Father of the Turks”.

Āya “Sign”, verse of the Qur’ān; also used in the Qur’ān for the signs of nature that point to God and for some miracles.

Ayatollah “Sign of God”, title given to high ranking Shī ‘ī ‘ulamā’ in the Uṣūli school of fiqh; Grand Ayatollah (Ayatollah ‘Uzma) is the title given to those with the highest rank (see mar- ja‘-i taqlid).

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Baha’is Followers of Baha’ullah (1817–1892), who in 1863 claimed to be one promised by God, effectively the next prophet after Muḥammad. The movement began among Iranian Shī ‘īs but is now a separate, world-wide religion.

Baraka “Blessing”; a sacred power, derived from Allāh, believed to be present in the Qur’ān, the actions and tombs of Ṣūfī saints (walīs) and elsewhere.

Bektashis Ṣūfī ṭarīqa, eclectic in doctrine and practice, closely associated with the Janissaries in the Ottoman Empire, suppressed in the 1820s.

Bid‘a “Innovation”, something not practiced in the earliest days of Islām and therefore viewed as heresy; some, however, recognize the existence of “good innovations.”

al-Bukhārī, Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl (d. 870) Compiler of one of the two most authoritative collections of Ḥadīth, known as Ṣaḥīḥ Bukhārī.

Byzantine Empire The later Roman Empire with its capital at Constantinople; Greek speak- ing and Christian, it lost territory to the first wave of Muslim conquest, then held out until con- quered by the Ottomans in 1453.

Caliphs Sunnī rulers, at least in name, of the whole Islamic empire until 1258 (see Abbasid, Umayyad); title claimed by Ottoman sulṭāns in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See khalīfa.

Chishtis (Chishtiyya) Ṣūfī tariqa widespread in India; the tomb of its founder, Mu‘in al-Din Chishti (d. 1236), is a popular site for pilgrimage (ziyāra).

Christ (Ar: Masīḥ) In the Muslim view the last of the prophets before Muḥammad, Christ’s revelation is the Injīl (Gospel) and he is often referred to as Jesus the son of Mary (‘Īsā ibn Maryam).

Crusades A series of expeditions by Western Christians (“Franks”) beginning in 1099 against the Muslims in the Near East with the initial goal of reconquering the Holy Land; today Islamists often refer to Western imperialists as crusaders.

Dār al-Islām The “Abode of Islam”, the whole geographical area ruled by Muslims, tradition- ally contrasted with Dār al-ḥarb, “the abode of war”. Some have recognized an intermediate position, Dār al-ṣulḥ or Dār al-ahd, “Abode of treaty (viz. with a non-Muslim ruler or state). In modern times areas that have passed out of Muslim rule but where Muslims can still prac- tice their religion are considered part of Dār al-Islām by most. The term is also used for cer- tain movements in Indonesia between 1948 and 1965.

Darwish (or dervish) Persian word for “poor” or “poor in spirit”; a term used for a Ṣūfī.

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Deobandi A modern traditionalist movement based on the madrasa at Deoband in India (founded in 1867).

Dhawq “Taste”, the experience of the divine that Ṣūfīs seek and some have.

Dhikr (zikr) “Remembering”; awareness of God; the rituals used by Ṣūfīs to achieve this awareness.

Dhimmīs (zimmis) Non-Muslims with a covenant of protection (dhimma) that allows them to live in a Muslim society under specified conditions; particularly Christians and Jews but others often have this status in practice.

Druze A sect who believe that the Fatimid ruler of Egypt, al-Hakim, was the earthly manifes- tation of God. They live mainly in Lebanon, some live in Israel and some in diaspora.

Du‘ā’ Prayer other than ṣalāh, may be free prayer or formal.

Elijah Muhammad (1897–1975) Founder of the “Nation of Islam” movement in the United States, commonly known as the “Black Muslims”.

Erbakan, Necmettin (b. 1926) Founder of the milli görüş (national vision) ideology in Turkey and several political parties associated with it, e.g. the Welfare Party.

Falsafa Philosophy, the Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy received from late antiquity and developed and taught by Muslim Philosophers (faylasūfs). See also ḥikma.

Fanā’ Annihilation or passing away in God, the Ṣūfī experience of union with God; some say it is to be followed by baqā’, continuance in God.

Faqīh Expert in fiqh (law, jurisprudence).

Faqīr Poor, poor in spirit, term for a Ṣūfī, cf. darwish.

al-Farabi (c. 870–950) One of the Early Muslim Philosophers.

Farḍ Obligatory, one of the five Sharī‘a valuations (aḥkām); also called wājib.

Farḍ ‘ayn An obligation that applies to every individual under the Sharī‘a

Farḍ kifāya An obligation that applies to a “sufficient number”, e.g. teaching; until there are enough teachers in a community everyone is under obligation to become one; when there are enough the obligation is lifted from the rest.

Fātiḥa The opening sūra or chapter of the Qur’ān; recited on many occasions.

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Fāṭima Daughter of Muḥammad and wife of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib; she was the mother of the next two Shī‘ī Imāms and ancestress of the others and is considered ma‘sūm (protected from sin) by Shī‘īs. She is highly respected by all Muslims.

Fatimid Dynasty Ismā‘īlī dynasty that ruled Egypt from 969 to 1171.

Fatwa An advisory opinion by a qualified faqīh stating whether an action is

permitted or forbidden by the Sharī‘a.

Fez A brimless hat worn by Muslim men in Turkey from 1826 to 1925 and in other countries for some time after that; not much used today.

Fiqh “Understanding”, viz. of the Sharī‘a; working out the details of commands and prohibi- tions through the sources (see uṣūl al-fiqh); the substance of the law so worked out.

Fiṭra The created nature of humans that leads them to seek God.

Firdowsi (d. c. 1020) Author of the Shahnameh (Book of Kings), a long epic poem about the pre-Islamic Persian kings; one of the first works in the revival of Persian literature after the Muslim conquest and one of the greatest works of Persian literature.

Ghayba Disappearance or occultation of the twelfth Shī‘ī Imām; during the Lesser Occultation (872–939) he was in contact with people through deputies; during the Greater Occultation he is in the world but out of touch with people until his return as the mahdī.

al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad (1058–1111) One of the greatest Muslim scholars of all time; he played a major role in reconciling the streams of fiqh, theology and Ṣūfīsm and selec- tively adopting falsafa.

Ghaznavids (961–1186) A Sunnī dynasty ruling in Afghanistan and sometimes much of Iran and northwest India. They patronized scholars such as Firdowsi.

Ghusl Complete washing of the body for ablution from major pollution.

Gülen, Fathullah Leader of a branch of the Nurcu movement in Turkey and elsewhere; known especially for its schools, which are non-sectarian in their teaching.

Ḥadd Special class of penalties specifically imposed by God in the Qur’ān or Sunna, e.g. cut- ting off of the hand of a thief.

Ḥadīth A report of something the prophet said, did or approved of, or the sum total of these reports. See also Sunna and Akhbārī.

Ḥāfiẓ One who has memorized the whole of the Qur’ān.

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Ḥajj Annual pilgrimage to Mecca; to be done at least once in a lifetime if possible. One of the five Pillars.

Ḥājj or Ḥajjī One who has performed the Ḥajj.

Ḥalāl Permitted, includes all of the Sharī‘a valuations except forbidden; also specifically used for food that may be eaten.

Ḥamās Acronym (in Arabic) for “Islamic Resistance Movement”, the main Islamist move- ment among the Palestinians; appeared in 1988 and currently (2008) controls Gaza.

Ḥanafī (or Hanafite) Follower of the madhhab of Abū Ḥanīfa.

Ḥanbalī Follower of the madhhab of Ibn Ḥanbal.

Ḥanīfs Figures mentioned in the Qur’ān, taken to be pre-Islamic monotheists in Arabia; also used for any practicer of pure monotheistic worship, e. g. the prophet Ibrāhīm.

Ḥarām Forbidden, one of the five Sharī‘a valuations (aḥkām).

Ḥijāb The most general term for female “Islamic” garb, which according to conservative in- terpretation must cover all of the body but the hands and the face; sometimes used particularly for the head covering.”

Hijra The emigration or flight of Muḥammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina in 622. The year in which it occurred is the first year of the Muslim or hijrī calendar. See also muhājir.

Ḥikma “Wisdom”; may refer to Islamic Philosophy (falsafa) or to the later “theosophy” partly based on it; the term may also be used for a “wise saying” or for the reason something is done, especially something done by God.

Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr (Liberation Party) Islamist organization founded in 1952 by the Palestinian judge, Taqī al-Dīn al-Nabhānī (1909–1977); it seeks to restore the caliphate, is active in many countries and banned in many.

Hizbollah “Party of God”; name of several Islamist groups in modern times; the best known is the Shī ‘ī Islamist party in Lebanon, which is currently (2008) a strong force there.

Ḥukm (pl. aḥkām) “Judgment, valuation, governance”, here particularly used for the valua- tion placed by the Sharī‘a on actions; thus there are five aḥkām, commanded (farḍ), recom- mended, permitted (neutral), disapproved, forbidden (ḥarām).

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Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī (d. 680) The younger son of ‘Alī and Fāṭima; was martyred at Karbalā’ by the forces of the Umayyad caliph Yazīd; focus of intense Shī‘ī piety and considered a symbol of self-sacrifice in the cause of justice.

‘Ibādāt “Acts of worship”, those actions, such as ṣalāh, done specifically for God, in contrast to mu‘āmalāt, duties owed to other humans.

Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, Muḥammad (1703–1792) Reformer in Central Arabia and founder of the movement called “Wahhābī”.

Ibn ‘Arabī, Muḥyī al-Dīn (1166–1240) Considered the greatest of the Sunnī Ṣūfī theoso- phers, known among other things for his controversial doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd (the unity of existence).

Ibn Ḥanbal, Aḥmad (d. 855) Ḥadīth scholar and traditionalist opponent of the Mu‘tazila, held that the Qur’ān is uncreated and that the divine attributes and actions in the Qur’ān should be accepted bilā kayf (without asking how), i.e. without metaphorical explanation. He suffered for his beliefs in the miḥna (inquisition).

Ibn Isḥaq (d. 770) Author of the best known sīra (biography) of Muḥammad; extant in the form revised and edited by Ibn Hishām (d. 833).

Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406) West African scholar and author of a universal history, Kitāb al- ‘Ibar (Book of (historical) Lessons), whose introduction presents a highly regarded theory of political history focusing on ‘aṣabiyya, group solidarity.

Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (1126–1198) Spanish Islamic philosopher and judge; presented the most purely Aristotelian version of Islamic philosophy; wrote a refutation of al-Ghazālī’s refu- tation of philosophy; influential in the West.

Ibn Sīnā, Abū ‘Alī (Avicenna) (980–1037) Perhaps the greatest of the Islamic philosophers (faylasūf).

Ibrāhīm Qur’ānic prophet, the biblical Abraham. Possibly viewed as the most important fig- ure in the preaching of tawḥīd (monotheism) before Muḥammad; his near sacrifice of his son is commemorated on ‘Īd al-Aḍḥā.

‘Īd al-Aḍḥā One of the two major festivals in the Muslim year; commemorates Ibrāhīm’s near sacrifice of his son with the sacrifice of an animal and distribution of its meat; done by those on Ḥajj on the tenth of Dhū al-Ḥijja, and by Muslims everywhere.

‘Īd al-Fiṭr The other major festival of the Muslim year; one to three day celebration after the fast of Ramaḍān.

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Ifṭār Evening meal after the daily fast in Ramaḍān.

Iḥrām Garment consisting of two pieces of plain cloth worn by men during the Hajj.

Ijāza “Permission”; the authorization given by a teacher to a student to teach one or more books the student has studied under him.

Ijmā ‘ “Consensus”, in its fullest form, the unanimous agreement of all the mujtahids of a giv- en age on a point of law; traditionally according to Sunnīs binding on future generations, but modernists disagree. In fact, the consensus is usually within a given madhhab.

Ijtihād “Effort”, specifically the effort of the faqīh to discover the Sharī‘a judgment on a mat- ter. Absolute ijtihād involves going directly to the Qur’ān and Sunna for this. More restricted ijtihād involves following the principles of one’s madhhab. In Uṣūlī Shī‘ī fiqh, ijtihād is the effort to derive judgments from all of the sources of fiqh (uṣūl al-fiqh). See also taqlīd.

Ilhām Inspiration or revelation that may come to Ṣūfīs, as distinct from waḥy, which comes only to prophets.

‘Ilm Knowledge, learning, science; basically knowledge of the Qur’ān and the Sunna and thence of the disciplines such as fiqh and kalām based on them; also exoteric knowledge as op- posed to esoteric knowledge, ma‘rifa. See also ‘ulamā’.

‘Ilm al-tawḥīd Science of tawḥīd, theology; cf. kalām.

Imām “Leader”; leader at the performance of ṣalāh; according to Shī‘īs the divinely chosen leader of the umma; in Sunnī usage a synonym for caliph; title of respect for a great religious scholar.

Īmān Faith, true faith in God. See also mu’min.

Intoxication (sukr) Among Ṣūfīs, the state of ecstasy in which the Ṣūfī does not have rational control of himself but is presumably caught up in God. Contrasted with “sobriety” (ṣaḥwa).

Iqbal, Muhammad (1876–1938) Indian Muslim poet and philosopher, probably the greatest of the Indian modernists; also viewed as the spiritual father of Pakistan.

Iran(ian), Persia(n) These terms are used more or less interchangeably in most of this book, except that Persian is always used for the language and literature and Iran(ian) is always used after this became the official name of the country under Reza Shah in the 20th century.

‘Īsā (Jesus) See Christ.

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Islām Submission or commitment to God, specifically in accordance with the teaching of Muḥammad. The one who submits is a Muslim.

Islamicist Academic scholar who studies about Islām; to be distinguished from Islamist.

Islamist Modern Muslim activist for whom Islām is a political and social ideology covering all areas of life. Islamists criticize modernists for accepting too many Western ways and usu- ally call for an “Islamic state”.

‘Iṣma Protection, viz. from error or sin; according to Sunnīs the prophets have ‘iṣma (i.e. are ma‘ṣūm); according to Shī‘īs the Imāms and Fāṭima are also ma‘ṣūm.

Ismā‘īl Son of Ibrāhīm, the biblical Ishmael. Muslims believe that it was he, not Isḥaq (Isaac), who was almost sacrificed at God’s command.

Ismā‘īlīs Division of the Shī ‘a (q.v.) that accepts Ismā‘īl the son of Ja‘far as the next Imām and a continuing line of Imāms after him, often in concealment. They came to power with the Fatimid dynasty in Egypt (q.v.) and mounted a revolutionary movement in Syria and else- where at the same time. Two lines that continue today are the Nizāris, the followers of the Agha Khan, and the Bohras.

‘Ishq Passionate love; used by many Ṣūfīs to describe their love of God; contrasted with ḥubb or maḥabba, which suggests something more restrained.

Jamā‘a Islāmiyya (Islamic Group) Name of several Islamist groups in Egypt, including stu- dent groups in the 1970s and a group under the guidance of Omar Abdel Rahman involved in the violence of the 1990s. The same phrase in its Indonesian spelling, Jemaah Islamiyah, refers to the Islamist group responsible for the Bali bombings in 2002 and later.

Jama‘at-i Islami (Islamic Society) Islamist movement in India and Pakistan, founded in 1941 by Abul ‘Ala’ Mawdudi, has been ideologically influential but had limited success in Pakistani politics.

Jamāl al-Dīn “al-Afghānī”, known as “Asadabadi” in Iran (1838–1897) Mod ernist reform- er and anti-imperialist activist, mentor of Muḥammad ‘Abduh and extremely influential on a wide range of Muslim movements since his time.

Jihād “Striving”, i.e. striving in the way of God. Usually applied to warfare in a perceived re- ligious cause, including anti-imperialist struggles in modern times, but also applied to striving against the individual’s anti-ethical tendencies (the “greater jihād”) and striving to build soci- ety (e.g. jihād for construction).

Jinn (sing. Jinnī) Invisible beings, made of fire according to the Qur’ān, more powerful than humans, usually evil but capable of good and of faith in God.

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Jizya Head tax paid by dhimmīs to the Muslim ruler or state, in part in return for not doing military service but also a sign of subordination.

Jum‘a Congregation, gathering, also Friday; short for ṣalāt al-jum‘a, the Friday noon ṣalāh, to be done in congregation.

Ka‘ba Square building in Mecca toward which ṣalāh is made and which is circumambulated during the Ḥajj; believed to have been built, or rebuilt, by Ibrāhīm and Ismā‘īl; believed also to be a copy of the heavenly Ka‘ba circumambulated by angels.

Kāfir See kufr, takfīr

Kalām “Words”, theology. Mutakallim is a theologian.

Karbalā’ Place in Iraq where Ḥusayn was martyred; a shrine city for Shī‘īs today.

Khalīfa “Successor, deputy”. In the Qur’ān Adam (and thus humanity) is khalīfa of God on earth; a Muslim ruler as successor of the Prophet or Deputy of God; deputy to the shaykh of a Ṣūfī ṭarīqa. Khilāfa means caliphate.

Khan, Sir Sayyid Ahmad (1817–1898) Early Indian modernist reformer; sought to improve the Muslims’ relations with their British rulers and learn from them.

Khanqah (or khanaqah, etc.) Ṣūfī hostel or retreat center, with facilities for dhikr, retreat, ac- commodation for some. Also called tekke (Turkish), zāwiya (Arabic).

Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi (1902–1989) Grand Ayatollah and leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.

Khul‘ A form of divorce requested by the wife in return for compensation, such as renouncing her right to the unpaid part of the mahr.

Khums A tax of one fifth of one’s income paid by Shī‘īs to the descendants of the Prophet and to the ‘ulamā’ as representatives of the Twelfth Imām.

Khuṭba Sermon given at ṣalāt al-jum‘a; may cover a range of topics but somewhat more for- malized than the usual Christian sermon.

Kiai (or kiyayi) Traditional ‘ālim in Java; commonly head of a pesantren.

Kufic “From Kufa (a city in Iraq)”. Refers to an early form of Arabic script, squarish rather than rounded.

Kufr Unbelief, refusal to submit to God, with a connotation of ingratitude. Opposite of īmān, faith.

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Kuttāb Traditional Islamic elementary school, primarily for reciting the Qurān. Called maktab in some places.

Madhhab School or tradition of fiqh or kalām, but the term is usually used for fiqh; there are four Sunnī madhhabs of fiqh that are today recognized as equally valid.

Madrasa (medrese in Turkish) Upper level school primarily for the teaching of fiqh, but other subjects are also taught. In Arabic the term often refers to a secular school today.

Mahdī (Mehdi in some languages) “Guided”, for Sunnīs usually refers to a figure appointed by God as a reformer or the one who will destroy evil at the end of time; for Shī‘īs the Twelfth Imām on his return.

Mahr Sum of money paid by husband to wife, usually part at the time of marriage and part later, e.g. upon divorce or death.

Mālik ibn Anas (d. 795) Early scholar and faqīh, based in Medina, and considered the founder of the Mālikī madhhab.

Mālikī Madhhab of Sunnī fiqh, named for Mālik ibn Anas.

Manicheism Dualistic Iranian religion founded by Mani (d. c. 275), considered matter to be evil; often called zindīqs in Islamic times (though this term came to be applied more indis- criminately) and severely persecuted.

Mamlukes “Owned”. Slaves trained to serve the ruling dynasty and often becoming rulers themselves; particularly the Mamluke dynasties of Egypt (1250–1517) and the same group as its influence continued under the aegis of the Ottomans, but there were other examples of this in the Islamic world.

Ma‘rifa “Knowledge”, particularly direct personal knowledge as claimed by the Ṣūfīs and contrasted with ‘ilm, seen as second hand knowledge from books or reports.

Marja‘-i taqlid (Arabic form: marja‘ al-taqlīd) “Source of imitation”, in Uṣūlī Shī‘īsm, a leading ‘ālim who has a following of people who accept his fiqh judgments; has the title of Grand Ayatollah.

Maṣlaḥa “Welfare, benefit”. In fiqh, the welfare or benefit of the community as grounds for a judgment (ḥukm).

Ma‘ṣūm Protected from error or sins; characteristic of prophets; according to Shī‘īs, character- istic also of Imāms and Fāṭima. The precise interpretation of this concept varies.

Matn The substantive part of a ḥadīth; see also sanad.

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Māturīdīs Madhhab of kalām, founded by Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 944), popular among Ḥanafīs; their teachings are similar to those of the Ash‘arīs but they are more inclined to allow for rational knowledge of ethical duties and human free will.

Mawdudi, Abul ‘Ala’ (1903–1979) Leader of the Jama‘at-i Islami in India and Pakistan and possibly the most influential Islamist thinker.

Mawlid (or mulid) Birthday celebration of the Prophet Muḥammad or Ṣūfī saints. Very popu- lar but criticized by some reformers.

Mecca (or Makka) Birthplace of the Prophet Muḥammad and place where his mission began. Location of the Ka‘ba.

Medina (or Madina) Short for madīnat al-nabī, city of the Prophet; city to which the Prophet moved in the Hijra when forced to leave Mecca and where he established the first Islamic pol- ity; originally called Yathrib.

Mevlevi (Arabic: Mawlawī) Ṣūfī tariqa founded by Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 1273); also known as the Whirling Dervishes.

Miḥna “Trial, inquisition”, refers usually to the effort of the Abbasid caliph al- Ma’mūn and his successors (c. 833–850) to compel the ‘ulamā’ to accept the doctrine of the created Qur’ān. See also Ibn Ḥanbal.

Miḥrāb Niche in the inner wall of a mosque indicating the direction to Mecca.

Millet Communities into which dhimmīs were organized in the Ottoman Empire; later formed the basis for some Eastern European nations.

Milli görüş (National Vision) Islamist ideology of Erbakan and of several Turkish politi- cal parties led by him; name of several organizations following this ideology in the Turkish diaspora.

Minaret Tower connected with a mosque from which the adhān is given.

Minbar Pulpit in the mosque from which the khuṭba is given.

Mosque (Ar. masjid) ”Place for prostration in prayer”, place where Muslims gather for ṣalāh and or communal purposes.

Mu‘āmalāt Duties owed to other people, in contrast to ‘ibādāt, duties owed specifically to God.

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Mu‘āwiya ibn Abī Sufyān (d. 680) First Umayyad caliph, viewed by many as turning the Islamic caliphate into a worldly kingdom.

Muezzin (mu’adhdhin) Person who gives the adhān, or call to ṣalāh.

Muftī Faqīh qualified to give a fatwa, an advisory opinion in fiqh.

Mughul Empire (1526–1858) Muslim Empire ruling most of India at its height, under Akbar (r. 1556–1605).

Muhājir Emigrant, one who makes Hijra; especially Muḥammad’s Meccan followers who moved to Medina when he did; later groups also, e.g. the Indian Muslims who moved to Pakistan at the time of Partition. See also Anṣār.

Muḥammad ibn Abdallāh (c. 570–632) Last prophet and messenger of God (rasūl allāh), first leader of the Muslim umma.

Muḥammad ‘Alī Ottoman governor and de facto ruler of Egypt from 1805 to 1849, began the process of modernization.

Muhammadiya Influential modernist movement in Indonesia founded in 1912.

Mujāhid Person who engages in jihād; “freedom fighter” often in the modern context.

Mujtahid Faqīh qualified to make fiqh judgments on his own, i.e. to practice ijtihād; generally given the title Ayatollah among Uṣūlī Shī‘īs, especially in Iran.

Mullah Title often given to ‘ulamā’, especially outside the Arab world; suggests a lower level ‘ālim.

Mu’min “Believer, person of faith”; Muslims more commonly call themselves mu‘min than muslim.

Muqallid One who is not a mujtahid and who therefore follows a present or past mujtahid.

Mūsā Qur’anic prophet, the biblical Moses, prophet of the people of Israel.

Muṣalla “Place for ṣalāh”, small mosque not used for ṣalāt al-jum‘a.

Muslim One who submits or commits him- or herself to God, a member of the Muslim umma.

Muslim Brothers (Ar. al-ikhwān al-muslimūn) The leading Islamist organization in Egypt, founded by Ḥasan al-Bannā in 1928.

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Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj (d. 875) Compiler of one of the two most authoritative Sunnī collec- tions of Ḥadīth, commonly known as Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim.

Mustazafin (Ar. Mustaḍ‘afīn) “Oppressed”, Qur’anic term (4:75) used in modern ideological contexts.

Mut‘a “Pleasure”, a marriage contracted for a limited period of time, valid in Shī‘ī fiqh.

Mutawātir Ḥadīth with more than one sound line of transmitters (sanad), considered to be certain.

Mu‘tazila Rationalist madhhab in kalām, called themselves the “People of tawḥīd (monothe- ism) and justice”; taught that the Qur’ān is created, among other things. Their views were re- jected by the Sunnīs but have been influential among the Shī‘īs.

Muwaḥḥidūn People of tawḥīd, name used by a number of reform groups, such as the Almohads in Morocco and Spain in the 12th and 13th centuries and the Wahhābīs in Arabia from the 18th.

Nabī Prophet, one who receives divine revelation (waḥy). According to traditional thinking there have been thousands sent before Muḥammad’s time, one to every community or nation (umma); only a few are mentioned in the Qur’ān. Muḥammad is the “seal of the prophets”. See also rasūl.

Nahdlatul Ulama “Awakening of the ‘Ulamā’”; very influential traditionalist movement in Indonesia founded in 1926.

“Nation of Islam” American movement led by Elijah Muhammad, claims to return African- Americans to their original religion and true identity. Name now used by Louis Farrakhan’s wing of the movement.

Naṣṣ Authoritative text, i.e. the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth. In Shī‘īsm, an Imām’s designation of his successor.

Nasta‘liq A very flowing form of Arabic script developed in Iran.

Nūḥ Qur’anic prophet, the biblical Noah, model of a prophet whose people reject his message and are destroyed.

Nurcus Followers of Said Nursi, q.v.

“Occasions of revelation” (Ar. asbāb al-nuzūl) The circumstances in which a particular verse or verses of the Qur’ān were revealed; useful for interpreting these verses.

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Occultation See ghayba.

Ottoman (or Osmanli) Empire (1281–1924) Sunnī empire ruling much of the Arab, Greek and Balkan world for several centuries; strong vis-à-vis Europe for some time but in the 19th century the “sick man of Europe”. Terminated by Atatürk’s reforms.

Pancasila The “five principles” of the Indonesian constitution: belief in one God, humanity, national unity, democracy, social justice.

People of the Book (ahl al-kitāb) People who follow the scripture of a prophet before Muḥammad, i.e. Jews and Christians. These scriptures are thought to have been corrupted and superseded but those with such a scripture have a higher status religiously than those without a scripture and are qualified to be dhimmīs.

Pesantrens Islamic boarding schools in Java.

Pillars of Islām The most important obligations of Islām: shahāda, ṣalāh, fast of Ramaḍān, Ḥājj, zakāh.

Plotinus (205-c. 270 ce) Neo-Platonist philosopher and a major influence on Islamic philosophy.

Priyayi The old nobility of Java, strongly attuned to the Javanese traditions going back to pre- Islamic times.

Qāḍī Judge, particularly for Sharī‘a law; appointed by the caliph or other ruler or government; may take advice from a muftī.

al-Qaeda “The base”; organization carrying out or supporting “ jihād” and “martyrdom” (aka “terrorist” and “suicide”) attacks on the West, such as the one on the Twin Towers, September 11, 2001. Led, or fronted, by Bin Laden.

Qaṣīda Ode, popular form of poetry in pre-Islamic Arabia and among Muslims.

Qibla The direction to Mecca. See also miḥrāb.

Qiyās Analogy, for Sunnīs the most acceptable form of reasoning in fiqh; not acceptable to Shī‘īs.

Qur’ān “Recitation”, the revelations that came from God to Muḥammad between 610 and 632; memorizing and reciting the Qur’ān is one of the most important religious activities for Muslims.

Quraysh Muḥammad’s tribe; Sunnī caliphs were expected to be descended from this tribe.

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Quṭb, Sayyid (1906–1966) Egyptian Islamist and martyr whose views on Islām, jāhiliyya and jihād have influenced many, including the violent activists of groups such as al-Qaeda. Quṭb was influenced by Mawdudi but became more radical.

Rahman, Fazlur (1919–1988) Pakistani scholar who later taught in the U.S.A.; one of the leading modernists who has influenced other modernists and many Islamicists.

Rak‘a A series of actions, including recitations, bowing and prostration, that constitute one cycle of ṣalāh. A ṣalāh usually consists of more than one rak‘a.

Ramaḍān The ninth month of the Muslim year, when Muslims fast during the daytime.

Rashīd Riḍā (1865–1935) Disciple of Muḥammad ‘Abduh, interpreted his teachings in a more conservative direction, preparing the way for the Islamism of Ḥasan al-Bannā and others.

Rasūl “Messenger”, specifically Muḥammad as rasūl allāh, the Messenger of God. The terms rasūl and nabī overlap in meaning in the Qur’ān; generally there are understood to be fewer rasūls than nabīs; Muḥammad is both.

Ra’y “Opinion”, specifically the considered opinion (in the absence of more formal criteria) of an experienced faqīh in making a judgment; accepted in the earlier centuries, viewed as too arbitrary later.

“Rightly Guided Caliphs” (Ar. al-Khulafā’ al- Rāshidūn) In Sunnī thinking the first four successors to Muḥammad, viewed as the highest examples of proper leadership of the umma.

Rumi, Jalal al-Din (1207–1273) Generally considered the greatest of the Persian Ṣūfī adepts, author of several mystical poems including the Mathnawi and founder of the Mevlevi ṭarīqa.

Ṣadaqa Free-will offering, alms, beyond the required zakāh.

Safa and Marwa Two hills in Mecca that the pilgrims run between in imitation of Hagar seeking water for Isma‘il.

Safavids Dynasty ruling Iran from 1501 to 1736; imposed Twelver Shi‘ism, particularly strong in the 16th century.

Ṣaḥīḥ “Sound”, used of a ḥadīth whose sanad (chain of transmitters) is strong at all points; also, the informal title of collections of such ḥadīths, e.g. Ṣaḥīḥ Bukhārī and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim.

Said Nursi, Badiuzzaman (1876–1960) Author of a major commentary on the Qur’ān stud- ied by his followers, the Nurcus. His immediate aim was to strengthen individual faith but the movement has had some involvement in Turkish politics.

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Salafī Modern reform tendency that seeks to follow the model of the salaf, the righteous lead- ers of the early Islamic centuries; opposes bid‘a (innovation); tends to be strict in interpreta- tion, may or may not be politically oriented; varies in the degree of willingness to accept mod- ern/western ideas and practices.

Ṣalāh (or salat) The formal prayer or worship that is to be done five times a day and on other occasions; consists of set movements and recitations. One of the Pillars of Islām.

Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī (d. 1193) Muslim leader who recaptured Jerusalem from the Crusaders (1187) and re-established Sunnī rule in Egypt. Viewed as a hero by Arab Nationalists and Islamists. Also known as Saladin.

Ṣalāt al-jum‘a Congregational ṣalāh on Friday at noon; obligatory for men.

Samā‘ (or sema) “Hearing”, sessions of music and dance that are part of some Ṣūfī rituals.

Sanad or isnād Chain of transmitters that guarantees the authenticity of a ḥadīth; to be sound (ṣaḥīḥ) the chain must be unbroken back to Muḥammad and the transmitters must have been knowledgeable and trustworthy. See also mutawātir.

Santri In Indonesia, a practicing Muslim. Contrast abangan.

Sasanian Empire (226–651) Pre-Islamic Iranian empire, destroyed in the early Muslim con- quests but generally viewed in a positive light by later Iranian Muslims.

Shāfi‘ī (or Shafi‘ite) Follower of the madhhab of al-Shāfi‘ī.

al-Shāfi‘ī, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs (d. 819) One of leading early faqīhs; important in establish- ing the importance of Ḥadīth in fiqh and in setting the main outlines of fiqh procedure (uṣūl al- fiqh) for Sunnīs; considered the founder of the Shāfi’ī madhhab.

Shahāda The Formula of Witness, “There is no god but God; Muḥammad is the Messenger of God”, by which a Muslim witnesses to his or her faith and a non-Muslim becomes a Muslim. The word also means “martyrdom”.

Sharī‘a “Path leading to water”; the law or way of life laid out by God for human life; in principle covers all areas of life; involves the classification of actions as commanded, recom- mended, permitted (neutral), disapproved, or forbidden; Sharī‘a law is any law (e.g by a mod- ern legislature) that bases itself on the Sharī‘a. Islamists typically call for the “application of the Sharī‘a”. See ḥukm; fiqh.

Shariati, Ali (1933–1977) Iranian Islamic ideologue, influenced by Marx and “Third World” radicalism; played a major role in preparing the people, especially the youth, for the Islamic revolution.

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Shaykh “Elder”, may refer to various sorts of leaders, such as a tribal leader, a highly respect- ed teacher or, especially, a Ṣūfī teacher and guide.

Shī‘īs (or Shi‘a or shi‘at ‘Alī) The Party of ‘Alī; those who believed that ‘Alī should have suc- ceeded Muḥammad as leader of the umma and whose movement developed into a separate division (or sect) of Islām over against the Sunnīs. They are divided into Imāmīs or Twelvers, Ismā‘īlīs or Seveners, and Zaydīs or Fivers.

Shirk Associating anything with God in worship or obedience; outward shirk may be worship- ping a god or an idol; inward shirk may be giving too much attention to possessions, family or ambitions. Salafīs see many popular customs as shirk. Islamists see secular government as shirk (obeying humans rather than God).

Shūrā Consultation; the Muslim ruler is expected to consult with the leaders of the commu- nity; modernists interpret this as the basis for parliamentary government.

Sibḥa (also pronounced subḥa) or misbaḥa String of beads used to count a recitation of the names of God or prayer formulae; a Muslim “rosary”.

Silsila “Chain”, among Ṣūfīs, the chain of teachers and disciples that links a given teacher back to the founder of the ṭarīqa and thence to Muḥammad.

Sīra A heroic biography, especially that of the Prophet. See Ibn Isḥaq.

Sirhindi, Ahmad (d. 1664) Indian reformer and theosopher; criticized Ibn ‘Arabi’s waḥdat al- wujūd, claimed to be the “renewer” of the Islamic tradition after the first thousand years.

Siyāsa “Governance, politics”, actions taken by a government for practical reasons that may be viewed as an alternative to the Sharī‘a or as under the general permission of the Sharī‘a.

Slametan Feast given by Javanese abangans to placate spirits and achieve a state of tranquil- lity (slamet).

Ṣūfī Follower of the mystical or devotional movement called Ṣūfīsm or taṣawwuf; at the high- est level one seeks a direct knowledge of God (called ma‘rifa, q.v.) through exercises called dhikr, q.v.

Suḥūr (or saḥūr) Meal taken in the early morning before fasting in Ramaḍān.

Sulṭān “Authority, holder of authority”, title of many Muslim rulers; implies less of a religious claim than caliph or amīr al-mu’minīn.

Sunna, viz. Sunna of the Prophet Authoritative teaching and example of the Prophet Muḥammad, as found in the Ḥadīth; one of the sources of fiqh (see uṣūl al-fiqh).

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Sunnīs Majority division of Muslims, as opposed to Shī‘īs. See Ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamā‘a.

Sūra Chapter of the Qur’ān; it is usually noted whether a sūra was revealed in Mecca or Medina.

Syria Until after the First World War refers to the area currently including Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel/Palestine, sometimes called “Greater Syria”.

al-Ṭabarī, Ibn Jarīr (d. 922) Author of one of the best known commentaries (tafṣīrs) to the Qur’ān.

Tablighi Salafī movement started in India in the 1920s and now worldwide; emphasizes the faithful practice of the basic obligations of Islām; is not political.

Tafṣīr Interpretation of the Qur’ān, exoteric in contrast to ta’wīl.

Ṭaha, Maḥmūd Muḥammad (d. 1985) Leader of the Republican Brothers in the Sudan; taught that the Meccan sūras supersede the Medinan sūras today; executed in 1985; his fol- lower, Abdullah al-Na‘im, is active in human rights concerns in the U.S. today.

Taha Hussein (1889–1973) Leading Egyptian educator and literary figure; wrote a book on jāhilī poetry that questioned its authenticity; wrote a biographical study of Muḥammad and other books on Islām, generally secularist with an appreciation of Islamic culture and civilization.

Tajwīd A relatively elaborate and “musical” recitation of the Qur’ān, see also tar‘tīl.

Takfīr Declaration that someone is kāfir, no longer a Muslim.

Takfīr wa-Hijra Label given to a group in Egypt that declared the whole of society kāfir and sought to separate from it in the hope of eventually taking it over. Disbanded by the govern- ment after assassinating a former government minister.

Taleban “Students”; very traditionalist movement in Afghanistan founded by Mullah Omar in 1994; ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001; became associated with al-Qaeda; they have con- tinued to struggle after being forced out of government by U.S. intervention.

Tanzimat Series of reforms in the Ottoman Empire in the mid-19th century, designed to mod- ernize and strengthen the central government’s power.

Taqiya “Prudent dissimulation”; keeping silent about one’s true views when they would en- danger oneself or one’s community; obligatory for Shī‘īs in certain circumstances.

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Taqlīd Following the decision of another when one is not a mujtahid; in modernist parlance often a blind conservatism.

Tarāwīḥ Extra ṣalāhs performed at night in Ramaḍān by Sunnīs.

Ṭarīqa “Path”; Ṣūfī practice. Ṣūfī lineage or “order” looking back to a particular founder and with distinctive practices; many are large and popular.

Tartīl Slower and more measured recitation of the Qur’ān, in comparison to tajwīd.

Ṭawāf Circumambulation of the Ka‘ba during the Ḥajj.

Tawḥīd The affirmation of the unity of God, monotheism. See also muwaḥḥidūn and ‘ilm al- tawḥīd.

Ta’wīl Esoteric interpretation of the Qur’ān, in contrast to tafṣīr.

Tayammum Purification with sand rather than water.

Tekke Ṣūfī hostel or retreat center, see khanqah.

Traditionalists In earlier times those such as Ibn Hanbal who wished to base interpretation as exclusively as possible on the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth (ahl al- ḥadīth); in modern times those who wish to hold to the existing tradition.

Traditionists (muḥaddithūn) Experts in Ḥadīth, to be distinguished from traditionalists.

Twelvers (or Imāmīs) Majority division of Shī ‘a, that recognizes twelve Imāms, the last of whom is in occultation (ghayba).

‘Ulamā’ “Those who know”; scholars, experts in religious knowledge, roughly equivalent to clergy or rabbis. Singular is ‘ālim. See also ‘ilm.

‘Umar ibn al-Khattāb Second of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, q.v. (r. 634–644).

Umayyad dynasty (Ar. Umawī) Dynasty of caliphs (661–750) in Damascus founded by Mu‘āwiya, completed the first wave of conquests; Arab in orientation and style; a line of Umayyads continued in Spain after 750.

Umma The whole community or nation of Muslims worldwide. In the Qur’ān it may refer to the communities of earlier prophets. In modern times it may be used for nation in the modern sense.

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‘Umra “Lesser pilgrimage”; first part of the pilgrimage to Mecca, including the circumambu- lation of the Ka‘ba and the running between Safa and Marwa; may be done separately from the Ḥajj at any time of the year.

‘Urf See ‘āda.

Uṣūl al-fiqh “The sources or roots of fiqh”; the sources on which fiqh judgments are based; conventionally given by Sunnīs as the Qur’ān, Sunna, qiyās (or ijtihād) and ijmā‘, with other sources, such as ‘āda or maṣlaha allowed by some. Uṣūlī Shī‘īs give the sources as Qur’ān, Sunna (including the Imāms), ijmā‘ and reason.

Uṣūlī Twelver Shī‘ī school of fiqh that recognizes the authority of mujtahids; predominant in most of the Twelver world for the last two centuries.

‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān (r. 644–656) Third of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, q.v.

Vilayat-i faqih (Ar. wilāyat al-faqīh) The doctrine that a leading faqīh should be the highest authority in the state; currently in effect in Iran.

Waḥdat al-wujūd Unity of existence, doctrine of Ibn ‘Arabī.

Wahhābī Usual name for the followers of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and their successors to the present time in Arabia; extremely strict salafīs, they call themselves muwaḥḥidūn.

Waḥy Revelation, that which comes to a prophet, as distinct from the ilhām that a Ṣūfī may receive.

Walī “Friend of God”, “saint”, Ṣūfī adept believed to have attained union with God and whose baraka can benefit others; visits are therefore made to his tomb; also, in fiqh, a guardian, e.g. of a minor.

Waliullah of Delhi, Shah (1701–1762) Indian reformer who sought to heal the divisions with- in the Muslim community and encouraged ijtihād.

Waqf (pl. awqāf) Trust under the Sharī‘a, used to finance religious and community institu- tions; also used to protect family resources.

Wuḍū’ Minor ablution, when ghusl is not necessary.

Yazīd Second Umayyad caliph, responsible for the death of Ḥusayn at Karbala’; especially for Shī‘īs the symbol of an evil ruler.

Zakāh (or Zakat) “Alms” or “poor tax”; a set portion of one’s wealth to be given as a tax or charity for the poor and other specified recipients. One of the Pillars of Islām.

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Zāwiya See khanqah.

Zaydīs Fiver Shī‘īs; recognize Zayd ibn ‘Alī Zayn al-‘Ābidīn as fifth Imām; the Imām may be any descendant of ‘Alī and Fāṭima who has knowledge and leads a revolt against Sunnī authorities.

Ziyāra “Visit”; pilgrimage to shrine or tomb other than Mecca.

Zoroastrianism Iranian religion going back to the prophet Zarathushtra; recognizing a creator God and an opposing cosmic force of evil; the state religion of the Sasanian empire at the time of the Muslim conquests. Zoroastrians were generally treated as dhimmīs.

Appendix II: Chronology

331 b.c.e. Alexander the Great invades Iran. 322 b.c.e. Death of Aristotle. 226-651 c.e. Sasanian Empire 205-c. 270 c.e. Plotinus c. 275 Death of Mani, founder of Manicheism. 313-392 Roman Empire becomes Christian; eastern half comes to be known as

the Byzantine Empire. 400-800 Jewish Talmuds compiled. 451 Council of Chalcedon defines orthodox Christian doctrine of incarna-

tion; Nestorians and Monophysites separate. c. 500 Quraysh settle Mecca. Jahiliyya (c. 500-630) c. 570 Ethopian governor of Yemen, Abraha’s expedition against Mecca. c. 575-631 Persians control Yemen. 578 Death of Mazdak. 603-628 War between Byzantines and Sasanians; Jerusalem captured and

recaptured 610 Muhammad’s first revelation in the cave at Hira’. 615? Hijra of some of Muhammad’s followers to Ethiopia. 619 Death of Khadija and Muhammad’s uncle and protector. 622 Hijra to Medina. 624 Battle of Badr. 625 Battle of Uhud. 627 Battle of the Trench. 628 Treaty of Hudaybiyya. 630 Mecca capitulates to Muhammad. Ka‘ba cleansed of idols. 632 Farewell Hajj. Death of Muhammad 632-634 Abu Bakr caliph. Wars of ridda. 634-644 ‘Umar caliph. Conquest of Syria, Egypt, Eastern Iran. 644-656 ‘Uthman caliph. 656-661 ‘Ali caliph in Medina. Mu‘awiya opposes him: first fitna. 661-680 Mu‘awiya caliph in Damascus, establishes the Umayyad dynasty. 680 Second fitna. Battle of Karbala’; Husayn ibn ‘Ali killed. 681-692 Second fitna. Revolt of Ibn Zubayr, claimant to caliphate, in Mecca

and Medina.

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685-705 Caliphate of ‘Abd al-Malik; administrative reforms; Dome of the Rock built.

712-713 Sind in India conquered. 642-728 Al-Hasan al-Basri, ascetic, preacher, critic of rulers. 750 Revolt against Umayyads brings Abbasid dynasty to power in

Baghdad. 765 Death of Ja‘far al-Sadiq, sixth Shi‘i Imam. Divergence of Sevener and

Twelver lines. 767 Death of Abu Hanifa, eponym of Hanafi madhhab. 770 Death of Ibn Ishaq, biographer of the Prophet. 795 Death of Malik ibn Anas, eponym of Maliki madhhab. 796-809 Harun al-Rashid caliph. 801 Death of Rabi‘a al-Adawiya. c. 815 Death of Abu Nuwas, poet. 819 Death of Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi’i, eponym of Shafi‘i madhhab. 711-718 Al-Andalus (Spain) conquered. 833-848 Mihna (Inquisition). 855 Death of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, , eponym of Hanbali madhhab. 868-906 Egypt autonomous under Ibn Tulun and his son. 870 Death of al-Bukhari, compiler of Hadith collection. 872 Occultation of the Twelfth Imam. 874 Death of Bayazid Bistami. 875 Death of Muslim, compiler of Hadith collection. 873-900 Saffarids stimulate renaissance of Persian literature. 897-1962 Zaydi state in Yemen. 900-1077 Qarmati (Isma‘ili) republic in Bahrain. 910 Death of Abu al-Qasim al-Junayd. 922 Death of al-Tabari, Qur’an commentator. 922 Martyrdom of al-Hallaj. 935 Death of Abu al-Hasan al-Ash‘ari. 939 Beginning of Major Occultation for Twelver Shi‘is. 940 Death of al-Kulayni, compiler of Shi‘i Hadith collection. 944 Death of Abu Mansur al-Maturidi. 915-965 al-Mutanabbi, poet. 945-1055 Buyids (Twelver Shi‘is) amirs in Baghdad. 961-1186 Ghaznavids (Sunnis) rule in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Patrons of

scholarship. 969-1171 Fatimids (Isma‘ili) rule Egypt. c. 1020 Death of Firdowsi, author of Shahnameh. 980-1037 Ibn Sina.

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1055-1258 Saljuk Turks sultans in Baghdad. 1058 Death of al-Mawardi, author of treatise on caliphate. 1067 Nizamiyya Madrasa opened in Baghdad, sponsored by Nizam al-Mulk. 1071 Saljuks defeat Byzantines at Manzikert; Anatonia open to Muslims. 1085-1492 Christian reconquest of Spain. 1094-1256 Nizari Isma‘ilis (“Assassins”) active, based at Alamut. 1099-1187 Crusaders control Jerusalem and much of the Holy Land. 1058-1111 Al-Ghazali, faqih, theologian, Sufi. 1048-1131 Omar Khayyam, mathematician and poet. 1166 Death of ‘Abd al-Qadir Jilani, “founder” of the Qadiriyya tariqa. 1171-1250 Ayyubid dynasty in Egypt and Syria (Salah al-Din and successors). 1187 Salah al-Din recaptures Jerusalem. 1209 Sultanate of Delhi founded. 1240 Death of Ibn ‘Arabi, the great theosophist. 1250-1517 Mamlukes rule Egypt and Syria. 1258 Mongols sack Baghdad, end Abbasid caliphate. 1260 Mongol advance stopped at Ain Jalut by Mamlukes. 1207-1273 Jalal al-Din Rumi, founder of Mevlevi tariqa. 1281 Ottoman dynasty begins. 1291 Crusaders lose last hold in Holy Land. 1295 Mongol Il-Khan Ghazan converts to Islam. 1263-1328 Ibn Taymiyya. 1379-1402 Campaigns of Timur. 1421 Death of Suleiman Chelebi, composer of the Mevlidi Sherif. 1453 Ottomans take Constantinople, end Byzantine Empire. 1501-1736 Safavid dynasty in Iran 1516-1517 Ottomans take Syria and Egypt. 1520-1566 Suleyman the Magnificent, highpoint of Ottoman power. c. 1525 Last Hindu state in Java ends; replaced by Muslim states. 1526-1858 Mughul empire in India. 1529 Ottomans besiege Vienna. 1566-1605 High point of Mughul power under Akbar. 1588-1629 High point of Safavid power under Shah Abbas. 1640 Death of Mulla Sadra. 1683 Ottomans besiege Vienna. 1699 Treaty of Carlowitz. 1701-1762 Shah Waliullah of Delhi 1787 First recorded performance of shabih. 1703-1792 Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, reformer in Arabia. 1798-1801 Napoleon and the French in Egypt.

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| Appendix II: Chronology

Early 19th century Dutch begin to take control of inland Indonesia, prompting resistance. 1805-1849 Muhammad Ali rules Egypt, “great modernizer”. 1839-1877 Tanzimat reforms in Ottoman Empire. 1863 Mirza Husayn Ali takes title of Baha’ullah, beginning of Baha’i

religion. 1876-1909 Abdul Hamid sultan of Ottoman empire, Pan-Islamic ideology. 1879 Deoband Madrasa founded. 1891 Tobacco protest in Iran. 1838-1897 Jamal al-Din “al-Afghani” 1817-1898 Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan in India. 1842-1905 Muhammad Abduh, Egyptian reformer. 1905 Parliamentary Revolution in Iran. 1912 Muhammadiya founded in Indonesia. 1920-1938 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk leads war against Greeks, establishes a repub-

lic and introduces major secularizing reforms. 1920s Tablighi movement founded in India. 1925 Royal Egyptian edition of the Qur’an. 1925 ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s book Islam and the Bases of Government. 1925-1979 Pahlavi dynasty in Iran. 1926 Nahdlatul Ulama founded in Indonesia. 1928 Muslim Brothers founded in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) 1876-1938 Muhammad Iqbal, poet and philosopher in India. 1941 Jama‘at-i Islami, founded in India in by Abul ‘Ala‘ Mawdudi (1903-79) 1945-1950 Indonesian struggle for independence.. 1947 Independence and Partition of India and Pakistan. 1948 State of Israel founded, defends itself against Arabs. 1950-1961 Dar al-Islam movements in Indonesia. 1952 Free Officers’ coup in Egypt, Abdel Nasser comes to power. 1952 Hizb al-Tahrir (The Liberation Party) founded by the Palestinian judge,

Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1909-1977). 1876-1960 Badiuzzaman Said Nursi, founder of the Nurcu movement. 1962 Agreement between German and Turkish governments for Turkish

“guest workers” to work in Germany. 1965 Violence in Indonesia kills many communists and others; Communist

party outlawed; citizens must declare themselves Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, Hindu or Buddhist.

1966 Execution of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), radical Islamist. 1967 Arab defeat by Israelis in the “Six Day War”; a defeat for secularist

ideologies. 1969 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) formed.

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1969 Islamist party founded in Turkey by Necmettin Erbakan 1897-1975 Elijah Muhammad, founder of “Nation of Islam” in America. 1933-77 Ali Shariati, ideologue of Iranian revolution. 1978-1989 Afghan jihad against Soviet occupation. 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran and Islamic republic led by Ayatollah

Khomeini (1902-1989). 1981 Assassination of Egyptian president by Islamist. 1983 Hezbollah “suicide bombers” induce U.S. and French peacekeepers to

leave Lebanon. 1988 Hamas becomes active in Palestine. 1988 Rushdie’s Satanic Verses published, provokes uproar. c.1989-1997 Violence by Islamist extremists in Egypt. 1991 Dissolution of the Soviet Union; several Central Asian Muslim states

become independent. 1992 Elections cancelled, leading to violence between Islamists and govern-

ment in Algeria. 1993 Nasr Abu Zayd accused of kufr by Islamist. 1996-2001 Taleban government in Afghanistan 2000-2002 Abdurrahman Wahid, NU leader, president of Indonesia. 2001 Twin Towers destroyed on 9/11 by al-Qaeda operatives. 2001 Americans and allies intervene in Afghanistan. 2002 Justice and Development Party elected to power in Turkey (post-

Islamist?) 2002 Bombing of Bali nightclub by Jemaa Islamiya. 2003 Invasion of Iraq by (primarily) American forces.

Appendix III: The Islamic calendar

The Islamic year is a lunar year and consists of twelve months of 29 or 30 days, each begin- ning with the sighting of the new moon. It is therefore approximately 11 days shorter than the solar year, which is used in the West and elsewhere. As a result the Islamic months move backward, so to speak, as each Islamic month begins about 11 or 12 days earlier in relation to the Western calendar and to the (solar) seasons than the year before and makes a full cycle in about 33 years. Ramadan, therefore, cycles through the four seasons in this period.

The months of the Islamic year (with the corresponding Western dates for the first day of the month for the years 1429/2008 and 1430/2008-9) are as follows:

Muharram (10 January, 2008, 29 December, 2008)

Safar (8 February, 27 January, 2009 )

Rabi I ( 9 March, 26 February)

Rabi II ( 7 April, 28 March)

Jumada I (6 May, 26 April)

Jumada II (5 June, 25 May)

Rajab (4 July, 24 June)

Sha‘ban (2 August, 23 July)

Ramadan (1 September, 22 August)

Shawwal (1 October, 20 September)

Dhu al-Qa‘da (30 October, 20 October)

Dhu al-Hijja (29 November, 18 November)

Muharram 1430 (29 December, 18 December)

It is worth noting that the Muslim year 1429 falls entirely within the Western year 2008. This happens only once in about 33 years. 1430 falls almost but not entirely within 2009. Months in fact begin only when the new moon is actually sighted, so that calendars produced in advance provide only a calculation; the above dates are based on such calendars.

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| Appendix III: The Islamic calendar

The Islamic era is called Hijri and is abbreviated h. or a.h. (Anno Hegirae). It begins with the year during which the Hijra occurred (there appears to be some debate as to whether this occurred in Muharram or Rabi‘ I). It was decided on in 638, during the caliphate of ‘Umar, because of the need to date official documents. The year of the hijra was chosen because this was when the Muslims gained political autonomy.

A formula for rough conversion from an Islamic date to a Western date is as follows: 1429 × 0.97 = 1386.13 +622 = 2008.3

At present Muslim countries also use the Western dates, so that both a Western date and a Hijri date are often given.

Hijri solar calendar (Hijri shamsi) This calendar begins with the Hijra but using a solar year beginning at the (northern) Spring equinox, which is Now Ruz, the Persian New Year. The Hijri Shamsi year 1388 corresponds to the Western year 2009–2010 and the Lunar Hijri year 1430– 1431. It is said to have been created by the Persian writer, Saadi (d. 1292 c.e.), and was made the official calendar for Iran by Reza Shah. Its use has continued, except for Islamic religious festivals, under the Islamic Republic. The same calendar is used in Afghanistan but with different names for the months.

The months in Iran are as follows:

Farvardin (21 March)

Ordibehesht (21 April)

Khordad (22 May)

Tir (22 June)

Mordad (23 July)

Shahrivar (23 August)

Mehr (23 September)

Aban (23 October)

Azar (22 November)

Day (22 December)

Bahman (21 January)

Esfand (20 February )

Appendix IV: Classical Arabic names

Full names in Arabic prior to modern times were lengthy and conveyed considerable informa- tion. One may see different versions of a well known person’s name and in ordinary usage only a part of a person’s full name would be used. Moreover different parts of the same per- son’s name might be used in different contexts or by different people; e.g. the great ‘alim and Sufi, al-Ghazali is usually referred to as al-Ghazali, but I have also seen him referred to as Abu Hamid.

Here is a version of al-Ghazali’s full name: al-Imam Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Ghazali al-Tusi al-Shafi‘i Hujjat al-Islam.

The elements of an Arabic name as exemplified here are as follows:

Ism The given name, here Muhammad. This is the basic name, the one given by the par- ents. The isms often have meanings; Muhammad means most praised; Karim means noble or generous; Jamila means beautiful, etc. Often the ism is ‘Abd (servant of) followed by a name of God; e.g. ‘Abd al-Qadir means servant of the One who gives victory; ‘Abd al-Rahman (Abdurrahmam) means servant of the Merciful One; ‘Abd Allah (Abdullah) means servant of Allah. These names should not be separated; Abdul means “servant of the” and appears to be a figment of the Western imagination.

Kunya Refers to the first born son, here Abu (father of) Hamid. If the person is old enough to have a son but doesn’t, a putative one may be given. For a woman umm (mother of) is used, e.g. Umm Kulthum.

Nasab Refers to the father, here ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad. As in this case it may go back more than one generation, but usually only the father is given. For a woman bint (daughter) is used; e.g. Fatima bint Muhammad.

Nisba Indicates a relationship, here al-Ghazali (meaning uncertain, possibly spinner of yarn) al-Tusi (from the city of Tus) al-Shafi‘i (follower of the Shafi‘i madhhab). As with the nasab, usually only one is given but more may be given. It refers most commonly to the place one comes from, e.g. al-Masri (from Egypt), but may refer to a tribal connection, e.g. al-Adawiya (from the tribe of Adi) or occupation, e.g. al-Hallaj (the wool carder) or Khayyam (the tent- maker).

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| Appendix IV: Classical Arabic names

Laqab An honorific, here al-Imam and Hujjat al-Islam (proof of Islam). These are most often religious, e.g. Salah al-Din (soundness of religion) or political, e.g. Nizam al-Mulk (order of the realm).

The order of these elements varies, but the most common order in my experience is laqab, kunya, ism, nasab, nisba. Abu Bakr is generally known by his kunya but ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib is commonly referred to by ism and nasab. Note that the form Abi often occurs in transliterated names rather than Abu for grammatical reasons. Also note that the combination of ism with fa- ther’s kunya is common.

Non-Arab Muslim names may follow this form or something like it, e.g. Abu Yazid al-Bistami (kunya and nisba) becomes Bayazid Bistami in Persian.

Appendix V: Muhammad’s wives

This is a topic often of interest to Westerners, though the concerns we bring to it are dif- ferent from the concerns of Muhammad’s contemporaries as well as many other Muslims. Muhammad was specifically permitted by God to have more than the four wives permitted to others. For many Muslims this is primarily an indication of his status as the Prophet and of his personal capacities. As modernists point out, the fact that he first married at age 25 to a woman 15 years older indicates that sexual passion was not the driving force. In fact, most of the mar- riages were either to cement alliances or to provide for the wife in a society that did not have social security. While there is some uncertainty in the historical records the following list (with the date of marriage, etc.) from W. Montgomery Watt represents something of a consensus (Muhammad at Medina, 395–399).

Khadija bint Khuwaylid. c1. . 595, aged 40. Widow, see the text. She is the only wife who bore Muhammad children that survived, four daughters, one of whom was Fatima, who married ‘Ali and became the ancestress of the Shi‘i Imams.

Sawdah bint Zam‘ah. c. 620, aged about 30. Widow of an early convert, she had par-2. ticipated in the Hijra.

‘A’isha bint Abi Bakr, 623, aged 9. Generally agreed to be Muhammad’s favorite wife; 3. her early age at marriage raises concerns among modern commentators but seems not to have concerned contemporaries very much; undoubtedly one motive was to cement the alliance with Abu Bakr. ‘A’isha later became involved in the politics of the early community and still later an important transmitter of hadith, in which capacity she is sometimes said to be responsible for half of Muslim religion. There was considerable hostility between A‘isha and Fatima and some claim this played a role in the division between Sunnis and Shi‘is.

Hafsah bint ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, 625, aged 18. Widow of a Muslim killed at Badr; 4. daughter of another close companion of Muhammad. She is said later to have played a role in the transmission of the text of the Qur’an.

Umm Salamah bint al-Mughira, 626, aged 29. Widow of Meccan killed at Uhud. 5.

Zaynab bint Khuzaymah, 626 or 625, aged about 30. Widowed and divorced, she died 6. soon after her marriage to Muhammad.

Juwayriyyah, 627, aged 20. Daughter of the chief of an opposing tribe, captured in a 7. raid, married to Muhammad when she professed Islam.

Zaynab bint Jahsh, 627, aged 38. A cousin of Muhammad and divorced from his ad-8. opted son Zayd, about which there was controversy and about which the Qur’an speaks (33:38).

Mariyah the Copt, 628 or earlier. A concubine, presented to Muhammad by the gover-9. nor of Egypt, did not become a wife.

Umm Habibah bint Abi Sufyan, 628, aged 35. Widow, early convert who had gone to 10. Ethiopia with her first husband.

Safiya bint Huyyay, 628, aged 17. Jewish, captured in a raid on the Jewish settlement 11. at Kaybar.

Maymunah bint al-Harith, 629, aged 27. Sister of the wife of Muhammad’s uncle, 12. ‘Abbas (claimed ancestor of the Abbasid dynasty), probably to cement alliance with him.

Rayhanah bint Zayd, 627, aged 17, died 632. Jewish, captured in the raid on the Banu 13. Qurayza (probably a concubine).

The wives who survived Muhammad came to be known as the “mothers of the believers”.

Further Reading

Encyclopedias Esposito, John L. et al. (eds) (1995) The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4

vols., New York: Oxford University Press.

Gibb, H.A.R. et al. (eds) (1960-) The Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed., vols 1–11, Leiden: Brill.

Studies of Islamic civilization and history Armstrong, Karen (2001) Islam: A Short History, London: Phoenix Press.

Fisher, W.B. et al. (eds) (1968–1991) The Cambridge history of Iran, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hodgson, Marshall G. S. (1974) The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, 3 vols, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Holt, P.M., Lambton, A.K.S. and Lewis, B. (eds) (1970) Cambridge History of Islam, 2 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lapidus, Ira M. (2002) A History of Islamic Societies, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rippin, Andrew (ed.) (2008) The Islamic World, London and New York: Routledge.

Robinson, Francis (ed.) (1996) The Cambridge Illustrated History of the Islamic World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shaykh Fadlallah Haeri (2004) The Thoughtful Guide to Islam, Winchester and New York: O Books.

Anthologies Cragg, K. and Speight, M. (eds) (1980) Islam from Within: Anthology of a Religion, Belmont,

CA: Wadsworth.

Jeffery, Arthur (ed.) (1958) Islam: Muhammad and his Religion, Indianapolis, IN and

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| Further Reading

New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

Jeffery, Arthur (ed.) (1962) Reader on Islam, ‘s-Gravenhage: Mouton & Co.

McNeill, William H. and Waldman, Marilyn R. (eds) (1973) The Islamic World, New York: Oxford University Press.

Renard, John (ed.) (1996) Seven Doors to Islam: Spirituality and the Religious Life of Muslims, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Renard, John (ed.) (1998) Windows on the House of Islam: Muslim Sources on Spirituality and Religious Life, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Williams, J.A. (ed.) (1963) Islam, New York: Washington Square Press.

Gender issues Ahmed, Leila (1992) Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, New

Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.

Brooks, Geraldine (1995) Nine Parts of Desire: The Hidden World of Islamic Women, New York: Doubleday.

Joseph, Suad (ed.) (2003) Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures, 6 vols., Leiden: Brill.

Mernissi, Fatima (1985) Beyond the Veil, rev. ed., London: Al-Saqi Books.

Sonbol, Amira El Azhary (ed.) (1996) Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Textbooks and general studies Daniel Brown (2003) A New Introduction to Islam, Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Denny, Fred (2006) An Introduction to Islam, 3rd ed., New York: Macmillan.

Ernst, Carl (2004) Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary World, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Nasr, Seyyed Hossein (2002) Islam: Religion, History, and Civilization, San Francisco, CA: Harper. Rippin,

Andrew (2005) Muslims: Their Beliefs and Practices, 3rd ed., London and New York: Routledge.

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| Further Reading

Web resources The web links in this book and the websites listed represent only a very small proportion of the enormous amount of information (and misinformation) on the world wide web. I have used Wikipedia to great advantage, but always with care. I have not put many links to it, but on most topics the Wikipedia will have something that is likely to be worth looking at. If possible one should check its information with other sources, but this is true of many other websites, too.

A number of scholars in the field have good websites: here are three that I am aware of:

www.uga.edu/islam maintained by Professor Alan Godlas of the University of Georgia; has a very wide range of articles and information.

www.uga.edu/islam maintained by Professor Carl Ernst of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; has a wide range of information and links to other sources including some other academic websites.

www.fordham.edu/halsall/islam/islamsbook.html Internet Islamic History Sourcebook, part of Internet History Source Books Project, edited by Paul Halsall; has a very wide range of material on Islam and Islamic history and culture. For index and copyright information see: www.fordham. edu/halsall/index.html

References

The following is a list of books and articles from which the citations for quotations are taken. These citations are in the form of (Akhtar 1) or (Nicholson Literary 83).

Akhtar, Shabbir (1989) Be Careful with Muhammad, London: Bellew Publishing.

‘Aqqad, Abbas Mahmoud (n.d.) ‘Abqariyat Muhammad (The Genius of Muhammad), revised ed., Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Haditha (in Arabic).

Arberry, A.J. (1970) Sufism: An Account of the Mystics of Islam, New York: Harper and Row.

Arnold, Thomas W. (1965) Painting in Islam, New York: Dover Publications.

Attar, Farid al-Din (1979) Muslim Saints and Mystics, trans. A.J. Arberry, reprint, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Boland, B.J. (1971) The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, The Hague: Nijhoff.

Burke, Jason (2004) Al-Qaeda: Casting A Shadow of Terror, revised ed., London: Penguin Books.

Burckhardt, Titus (1976) Art of Islam: Language and Meaning, Westerham: World of Islam Festival Publishing Company.

Carlyle, Thomas (1910) On Heroes and Hero Worship, London: Ward, Lock & Co.

Chelebi, Suleiman (1943) The Mevlidi Sherif, translated by F. Lyman MacCallum, London: John Murray.

Fischer, M.M.J. and Abedi, M. (1990) Debating Muslims: Cultural Dialogues in Postmodernity and Tradition, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Goodman, L.E. (1992) Avicenna, London: Routledge.

Graham, William (1977) Divine Word and Prophetic Word in Early Islam, The Hague: Mouton.

Grunebaum, Gustave E. von (1966) Medieval Islam, Sixth Phoenix Impression, Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press; Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

335

| References

Ibn al-‘Arabi (1911) The ‘Tarjuman al-Ashwaq’: A Collection of Mystical Odes, ed. and trans., by Reynold A. Nicholson, London: Royal Asiatic Society.

Ibn al-‘Arabi (1980) The Bezels of Wisdom, trans., R.W.J. Austin, New York: Paulist Press.

Iqbal, Muhammad (1971) The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, reprint, Lahore: Ashraf.

Iqbal, Muhammad (1972) The Secrets of the Self, trans., R. A. Nicholson, Lahore: Sh. Muh. Ashraf.

Jeffery, Arthur (ed.) (1958) Islam: Muhammad and his Religion, Indianapolis, IN and New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

Keddie, Nikki (ed.) (1972) “The Roots of the ‘Ulama’s Power in Modern Iran”, in Scholars, Saints and Sufis, N. Keddie, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Khayyam, O (1968) Rubaiyyat of Omar Khayaam: A New Translation, trans., Robert Avery and John Heath-Stubbs, London: Cassell.

Kritzeck, James (ed.) (1964) Anthology of Islamic Literature, New York: New American Library.

Lawrence, Bruce (ed.) Messages to the World: the Statements of Osama Bin Laden, trans. James Howarth, London: Verso, 2005.

Lester, Toby (1999) “What Is the Koran?” The Atlantic Monthly 283/1 (January 1999): 43 (passim) Can be accessed via the internet, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199901/koran

Lewis, B. (1961) The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London: Oxford University Press.

Mahfouz, Naguib (1975) Midaq Alley, trans., Trevor Le Gassick, London: Heinemann.

Makdisi, George (1981) The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

McNeill, W.H. and Waldman, M.R. (1973) The Islamic World, New York: Oxford University Press.

Martin, Vanessa (1989) Islam and Modernism: The Iranian Revolution of 1906, London: Tauris.

Messick, Brinkley (1993) The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

336

| References

Mottahedeh, Roy (1987) The Mantle of the Prophet, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Nelson, Kristina (1985) The art of reciting the Qur’an, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Nicholson, R.A. (ed.) (1950) Rumi, Poet and Mystic, London: Allen and Unwin.

Nicholson, R.A. (1969) A Literary History of the Arabs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, first edition, 1907.

Nizam al-Mulk (1960) The Book of Government or Rules for Kings, 2nd ed., trans., Hubert Darke, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Padwick, Constance (1961) Muslim Devotions: A study of prayer-manuals in common use, London, SPCK

Reeves, Edward B. (1990) The Hidden Government: Ritual, Clientelism and Legitimation in Northern Egypt, Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press.

Robinson, Francis (ed.) (1996) The Cambridge Illustrated History of the Islamic World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sadiq (2005) “London Suicide Bomber Before ‘Entering Gardens of Paradise,’ and Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Threats of More Bombings in the West”, http://memri.org/bin/articles. cgi?Page=archives&A rea=sd&ID=SP97905

Sahih Muslim (1972) trans., Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, Lahore: Ashraf.

Schimmel, Annemarie (1963) Gabriel’s Wing, Leiden: Brill.

Schimmel, Annemarie (1975) Mystical Dimensions of Islam, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Smith, Margaret (1972) Readings from the Mystics of Islam, London: Luzac.

Smith, W.C. (1957) Islam in Modern History, New York: New American Library.

Stetkevych, Jaroslav (1996) Muhammad and the Golden Bough: Reconstructing Arabian Myth. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Tabataba’i, A.S.M.H. (1977) Shi’ite Islam, 2nd ed., Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

al-Taftazani, Mas’ud ibn ‘Umar (1980) A commentary on the creed of Islam, trans. Earl Edgar Elder, New York: Books for Libraries.

337

| References

Watt, W. Montgomery (1956) Muhammad at Medina, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Williams, J. A. (ed.) (1963) Islam, New York: Washington Square Press.

Yarshater, Ehsan (ed) (1983) Cambridge History of Iran, vol. III/2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zaehner, R.C. (1961) The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Zilfi, Madeline C. (1988) The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600-1800), Minneapolis, MN: Bibliotheca Islamica.