risk homework
26 ACTUARIAL REVIEW NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2013 • WWW.CASACT.ORG
Whatever Happened
By STEVEN SULLIVAN
100-Year Event?
to the
B y September 16, 2013, more than 4,500 square
miles of Colorado were under water. Th at’s
an area roughly the size of Delaware by some
estimates; others compared it to Connecticut.
Th e territory on the eastern slope of the Rocky
Mountains had already been subjected to
six straight days and 17 inches of rain, more than fi ve
inches above the annual average for the area. More than
1,200 people were missing, 19,000 homes were damaged
or destroyed, 12,000 people evacuated. Fatalities were
still unknown, but expected to be numerous. Television
images showed raging torrents in streams and creeks
that rivaled the last few hundred yards of the Niagara
River before the Falls.
Colorado was experiencing not just a 100-year event; this
was a 1,000-year event, a fl ood that even the National Weather
Service characterized as not only historic, but biblical.
Th at turns out to be a pretty good characterization of a
100-year event. Th ey’re big, we know them when we see them,
and we remember them: Hurricane Katrina in 2005; Super
Storm Sandy in 2012; the tornado that devastated Moore,
Oklahoma in 2013; the entire wildfi re summer of 2012. And if
one of them takes your loved ones, your home, or your posses-
sions, it doesn’t really matter if it makes the record books.
Th ey're big, we know them when
we see them, and we remember
them.
WWW.CASACT.ORG • NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2013 ACTUARIAL REVIEW 27
Misleading Term
Th e term “100-year event” (or whatever number you want to
attach to it) expresses a probability rather than a certainty.
Events this extreme are commonly measured by how likely
they are to happen. In the case of Boulder, Colorado, a fl ood of
this magnitude is expected to occur only once in a thousand
years. Lesser catastrophes may happen more frequently, say
once every 100 years. But these are only guesses. Projections.
Th ere’s nothing to say that another 1,000-year event won’t
happen next year. Or next week. Or not for another 2,000 years.
Th e term became popular in 1973 when the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) needed a standard to mea-
sure fl ooding across the country. Some areas are more prone
to fl ooding than others, some fl ood more frequently than oth-
ers, and some areas of the country haven’t kept records long
enough to ensure statistical accuracy for prediction. Neverthe-
less, the NFIP was mandated to map all
the fl ood plains in the country. Bringing
all these factors together, along with a
number of diff erent ways for measuring
fl ood magnitude, it compromised on
the 100-year frequency as a standard.
“Th e term ‘100-year event’ is mis-
leading and is often misinterpreted by
both the general public and insurance
professionals,” says Mark Bove, senior
research meteorologist with Munich
Re America. “A ‘100-year event’ refers
to a natural catastrophe that has one
percent annual probability of occurring at a given location. For
example, if Miami, Florida, is impacted by a 100-year hurri-
cane event in 2013, this doesn’t mean the next 100-year hur-
ricane in Miami will occur in 2113; the probability for another
hurricane in Miami in 2014 of the same intensity remains one
percent. Hundred-year events in consecutive years are rare,
but certainly not impossible.”
“We need to make sure we’re communicating that we
don’t mean this is going to happen only once every 100 years,”
adds Mary Frances Miller, an actuary with Select Actuarial
Services in Nashville. “It’s possible to get two in a row. Highly
unlikely, but possible. And we need to communicate that
it’s based on a model. It’s not like we’re absolutely confi dent
that the probability is one in 100. It might really be one in 60.
Or one in 200. We can’t confi dently say it’s not one in 10. It’s
unlikely, and it’s out on the I-don’t-really-know- how-unlikely
end of the scale.”
In other words, there’s nothing
certain about predicting any extreme
event. Yet certainty is what many people
are looking for. Certainty makes them
feel confi dent, and that confi dence can
get them into trouble.
Probably Questionable Behavior
Dr. Howard Kunreuther and Erwann
Michel-Kerjan, both of the Wharton
School at the University of Pennsylva-
nia, wrote an op-ed piece in Th e New
“We need to make sure
we’re communicating
that we don’t mean this
is going to happen only
once every 100 years.”
—Mary Frances Miller
28 ACTUARIAL REVIEW NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2013 • WWW.CASACT.ORG
York Times (“Paying for Future Catas-
trophes”) after Super Storm Sandy. “Our
research shows,” they said, “that half
of all policyholders cancel their fl ood
coverage after only three or four years.
Why? Because they paid premiums
without getting anything in return and
are likely to think ‘Bad investment!’ But
insurance is a safety net, not a bet.”
Miller tells the story of a man in Mi-
ami who was rebuilding in the wake of
Hurricane Andrew in 1992, at that time
the worst storm in Florida history. He
was installing a set of glass doors that
clearly weren’t up to code and would
never withstand another hurricane. When asked why he was
doing this (aside from saving money, of course), he replied
that since Hurricane Andrew was a one-in-25-year storm, and
the doors were designed to last for maybe 20 years, there really
wasn’t anything to worry about.
“We chuckle,” says Miller, “but that just indicates a pro-
found misunderstanding of probability.”
Th e other extreme is becoming too cautious. Th e classic
example of this is fl ying vs. driving. Plane crashes are extreme-
ly rare, but they’re usually spectacular when they happen.
Traffi c accidents happen every day—many times every day.
Yet people tend to be more afraid of dying in a plane crash
than a car accident, even though their chances of dying in a
car are much higher.
Yet somehow we (or at least the media and politicians)
seem to admire the people who refuse to retreat, who are de-
termined to rebuild in the same fl ood plain after they’ve been
wiped out. Th e ones who decide not to make the same mistake
twice are viewed as quitters. So what is the proper response to
a 100-year event?
Th ere’s no easy answer to that question. It may be one
thing if you’re a homeowner living in New Orleans or Miami
or Boulder. It’s another thing if you’re an insurance company
covering properties in those areas.
Where the People Are
Th ere’s a diff erence between a 100-year meteorological event
and a 100-year insurance loss event, says Mark Bove. “Th e
former deals with the frequency and severity of the hazard at a
given location, while the latter is largely infl uenced by the built
human environment impacted by an event. It is quite possible
to have a 100-year (or longer return period) event occur in an
unpopulated area, causing little to no insured loss, while a
weather event of moderate severity, well below a 100-year re-
turn period, could cause a 100-year insurance loss if it impacts
a densely populated area with high insurance penetrations.”
“It all boils down to people,” says Tom Jeff ery, senior prin-
cipal scientist at CoreLogic in Madison, Wisconsin. “People
who live in coastal areas face a known risk, some more than
others. If they continue to live there, there is going to be a
recurring cost of damage.”
It’s too early at this writing to say how bad the 2013 wild-
fi re season was. Th ough memory of the more than 6 million
acres that burned in 2012 may have faded, the more than 3
million scorched acres so far in 2013 seem bad enough.
Th ere have probably been even worse fi re seasons before
recorded history, when lightning strikes ignited hundreds of
square miles of unpopulated wilderness and burned until
the rain eventually extinguished the fi re. Even when Native
Americans began to settle that wilderness, their nomadic
lifestyle enabled them to pull up stakes and move whenever
fi re appeared on the horizon and threatened their settlements.
Th at was their fi re insurance.
It’s not so easy for modern settlers. Wilderness is prime
real estate for those who can aff ord it, and those who can
aff ord it build expensive houses, communities, and busi-
nesses in what was once pristine prairie or forest. None of it is
movable. And in addition to those random lightning strikes, all
those people can accidentally or deliberately start fi res with a
careless match or a spark from a piece of machinery. So even if
Wilderness is prime real estate for those who
can afford it, and those who can afford it build
expensive houses, communities, and businesses
in what was once pristine prairie or forest.…So
even if wildfi res aren’t becoming more frequent,
they’re certainly becoming more costly and
destructive from a human standpoint.
WWW.CASACT.ORG • NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2013 ACTUARIAL REVIEW 29
wildfi res aren’t becoming more frequent, they’re certainly be-
coming more costly and destructive from a human standpoint.
Th is extends to other types of natural disasters, too.
Th e numbers are daunting: Estimates for the cost of
Hurricane Katrina range from $108 billion to $150 billion with
more than 1,800 dead; Super Storm Sandy cost $65 billion and
killed 285; Hurricane Andrew destroyed $26.5 billion in prop-
erty and caused 65 fatalities.
“Th e incidence of extreme events is far more frequent,”
say Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan in their New York Times
article. “Twenty of the 30 most expensive insured catastrophes
worldwide from 1970 to 2011 have occurred since 2001—and
13 of them were in the United States. Aside from the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks, all were natural disasters. Th e increase is most
likely because of the location in high-risk areas of more people
and more valuable properties, along with a changing climate.”
An Understood Currency
Correctly assessing that risk is the work of catastrophe model-
ers. Using high-speed computers, modelers have learned
how to create complex programs that combine data of past
occurrences and emerging science to come up with a reason-
able probability for how many extreme events might occur in
a given time frame, how severe they might be, and the cost of
the damage they might infl ict.
According to Kay Cleary, an actuary and director at
the modeling company Risk Management Solutions (RMS),
catastrophe models have come a long way since they were fi rst
used in the 1980s to provide point estimates—like the 100-year
probable maximum loss (PML). But no matter how sophisti-
cated they are, they still can’t provide a straightforward right
or wrong answer.
“Th e 100-year PML just gives you a probability and a
number,” says Cleary. “It would be nice if you could just draw
a couple of lines and say ‘Th at’s my range of uncertainty.’ But
it doesn’t work quite that way because of the complexity of
what goes into it. With the advances in computer speed and
science, you can now drill down and determine the amount of
trouble you’ll be in, assuming you are in trouble. You can do
more sensitivity testing by varying some of the assumptions
and seeing how it shifts things around. You can learn a lot
more, a lot easier, and a lot faster by having more numbers to
look at than just a point estimate of PML.”
What models do provide, Cleary says, is an agreed-upon,
understood currency that enables insurers to quantify the risks
and trade them in the marketplace. “We hope the number is
close to reality, but even so, it’s an agreed-upon amount that
allows things to happen. Th e fact that it’s exactly right or ex-
actly wrong is obviously important, but what it mainly does is
enable us to do business. It’s kind of like a stock price. What is
a stock price, really, but an agreed-upon transaction number?
It’s not a real number.”
According to David Lalonde, a senior vice president with
the modeling fi rm AIR Worldwide, “the one percent exceed-
ance probability loss (or the 100-year return period loss) is
estimated to be just over $200 billion—a fi gure that could be
driven by an active and severe U.S. hurricane season or by a
combination of diff erent perils in diff erent regions, as was the
case in 2011. AIR estimates the average annual loss (AAL) from
natural catastrophes is $59 billion, in line with global catastro-
phes losses from 2012, which are estimated to be around $58
billion.”
So why are we seeing more of these events that are getting
so destructive and so costly? It’s tempting, of course, to blame
global warming. But scientists and modelers are cautious.
Mark Bove at Munich Re says we still don’t know enough
to be certain, but a warmer, moister atmosphere could be
30 ACTUARIAL REVIEW NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2013 • WWW.CASACT.ORG
conducive to more tornado and hail events across the eastern
two-thirds of the United States. Climate change may or may
not produce more frequent extreme events but “those that
form could become more intense, reducing the return period
of severe hurricanes.”
“Climate change makes the model more complicated,”
says Mary Frances Miller. “I don’t know if it makes hurricanes
more or less frequent, there’s argument about that. But it cer-
tainly makes the modeling more diffi cult.”
Global warming, or climate change, is a long-term phe-
nomenon, adds Kay Cleary, and models are better suited to
much shorter-term projections—two to fi ve years—so models
typically don’t refl ect it. “We don’t know enough to do that re-
sponsibly. However, to the degree that there have been trends
recently and the impact of global warming is felt, we do look at
that information in light of the medium-term rate.”
Th ere’s a controversy in hurricane modeling between the
long-term rate and the medium-term rate, Cleary explains.
“Th e long-term
is based on the
112 years of data
that we have. Th e
medium-term
acknowledges that
there are cycles.
Right now we’re in
a somewhat higher
than long-term
average cycle. If
you look at the 112
year average, what
we expect in the
next fi ve years is a little bit higher than that. We don’t make an
explicit adjustment for it, but we think there is some implicit
acknowledgement of those impacts.”
“Attributing every weather anomaly to manmade climate
change—other than the higher temperatures the global
warming phenomenon is named for—is a high-stakes gamble,
rooted more in politics than in science,” says Nate Silver in his
2012 book, Th e Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predic-
tions Fail—But Some Don’t. “Th ere is little consensus about
the ways that climate change might manifest itself other than
through temperature increases and probably rising sea levels.
Th e greenhouse eff ect almost certainly exists and will be
exacerbated by manmade CO 2 emissions. Th is is very likely to
make the planet warmer. Th e impacts of this are uncertain, but
are weighted toward unfavorable outcomes.”
Improved models now account for a previously unrecog-
nized peril: storm surge. Storm surge is a hybrid, neither wind
nor fl ood. Even relatively weak wind events can push huge
volumes of water to surge over the land, causing billions of
dollars of damage.
“It has to do with bathymetry, the study of the underwater
landscape,” Cleary says. “Water pushing against the ocean
fl oor starts to build up and inundates the land, creating a surge
fl ood. Initially, it made a lot of sense to have surge factor off
the wind, but we found that surge has its own characteristics
not necessarily related to the wind. We upgraded our model to
account for not only the severity of what can happen, but also
the types of things to worry about.”
Paying for the Risk
So who pays for all this? Th at, of course, is what insurance
companies are for, but many private-sector insurers have
“Water pushing against the ocean fl oor starts
to build up and inundates the land, creating a
surge fl ood. Initially, it made a lot of sense to
have surge factor off the wind, but we found that
surge has its own characteristics not necessarily
related to the wind.” —Kay Cleary
WWW.CASACT.ORG • NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2013 ACTUARIAL REVIEW 31
increased premiums in high-risk areas to make it virtually
impossible for some people who want insurance to aff ord it.
Some carriers have exited certain markets altogether. And
most carriers depend on reinsurers—like Munich Re and
Swiss Re—to share much, if not most, of the risk.
But there are other mechanisms as well. States prone
to natural disasters, particularly along the coasts, fund wind
pools that off er high-risk coverage at lower rates. Wind pools
grew out of the FAIR (Fair Access to Insurance Requirements)
plans that were formed in 1960s when many insurers pulled
out of areas hit hard by rioting and civil unrest. One of the
largest wind pools, Florida’s Citizen’s Property Insurance
Corp., covers nearly $500 billion in assets. Most wind pools,
however, aren’t nearly so well-endowed and must resort to the
reinsurance market as well.
In 1968, the federal government instituted the NFIP to
subsidize premiums for people living in fl ood plains. But
claims from the disastrous 2005 and 2008 hurricane seasons
forced the NFIP to borrow $18 billion from the U.S. Treasury,
which it hadn’t yet repaid when Super Storm Sandy hit in
2012.
In July 2012, Congress passed the aptly named Biggert-
Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act, which attempts to make
the NFIP more fi nancially stable and ensure that fl ood insur-
ance rates more accurately refl ect the real risk of fl ooding.
Th e act institutes changes in fl ood hazard mapping and fl ood
plain management, but primarily it gradually eliminates the
subsidies that enabled many insureds to pay lower premiums
than are refl ected by their risk.
“Th e Biggert-Waters Act is moving exactly in the right
direction,” says Howard Kunreuther. “It’s the fi rst piece of
Congressional legislation that I’m aware of that has risk-based
rates, not on all homes but on second homes and on repeti-
tive-fl ooding homes. With risk-based rates you can give a rate
reduction when people mitigate.”
Mitigating Circumstances
Risk mitigation is something that Kunreuther has been
championing for years, though he admits it can be a tough
sell because it can be expensive for homeowners. Th e trick, he
says, is to give people a fi nancial incentive to relocate or retro-
fi t their homes to better withstand wind and water damage. He
advocates long-term loans and low-cost, long-term insur-
ance—perhaps as long as 20 years—that would be tied to the
property rather than the property owner. Th e cost of the loan,
he says, will be less than the benefi ts from the lower insurance
premium.
Even though risk-based rates make economic sense for
those who can aff ord them, they’ll still end up pricing many
low-income homeowners out of the market. “Our response to
that is to help them out by using vouchers,” says Kunreuther,
similar to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program.
Th ey would receive the means-tested voucher, as well as a
loan, only if they agree to mitigate and make their homes
safer. “Mitigation will bring their premium down so much that
the actual magnitude of the voucher, even if they pay for the
loan themselves, would be less than just paying the diff erence
between what they can aff ord and the much higher insurance
premium.”
Politically, says Tom Jeff ery, mitigation can be a can of
worms because it ultimately impinges on individuals’ rights to
live and own property wherever they want to. And it’s not just
about the cost of individual insurance coverage. Th e levees
that were rebuilt to protect New Orleans from another Katrina-
level storm cost in excess of $14 billion. Estimates for building
a sea wall that would protect New York from another Sandy
run as high as $23 billion.
“It’s an awfully big undertaking,” he says. “In an area like
New York, it certainly would off er tremendous protection and
reduce or eliminate the tens of millions of dollars of damage
that could come in the future. And that’s the question every-
body wants answered: What can we expect in the future? No-
body knows. We can project based on what’s happened in the
past, but nobody knows if it’ll happen next year, in 10 years, or
in the next 100 years. All we know for sure is that there will be
another one sometime in the future.”
Steven Sullivan is a writer living in Baltimore, Md. ●
Politically, says Tom Jeffery,
mitigation can be a can of worms
because it ultimately impinges on
individuals’ rights to live and own
property wherever they want to.