accident investigation unit VI assignment
Running head- BARRIER ANALYSIS 1
BARRIER ANALYSIS 5
Barrier Analysis
Student’s Name
Institutional Affiliation
|
Type of Barrier |
Function of Barrier |
Performance of Barrier |
|
FAILED 1. Existing tank’s liquid withdrawal valve
|
Control out flow of liquid propane gas |
The valve completely failed in its function |
|
NOT USED 1. Formal training of the technician
2. Supervision of junior technician
3. Training of emergency responders
4. placement of the 500-gallon propane tank
5. Evacuation of the area
|
Junior technician should have identified the fault in the liquid withdrawal valve
Guide the junior technician on procedure of transferring liquid propane gas to another tank
Handling the problem uniquely as propane gas leakage
Prevent leaking gas from entering the store through structural openings
Keep people from harm’s way |
No formal training exhibited by the junior technician
Supervision provided over the phone was lacking adequate guidance
Need for evacuation was realized but not keenly implemented The placement made it easy for propane gas to fill the store
|
|
DID NOT EXIST 1. Recognize the defect in the withdrawal valve
2. Refresher training for West Virginia fire fighters
3. Propane emergency training
4. Propane emergency guidance for 911 operators in the United States
|
Immediate fixing of the problem
Keep emergency responders up to date with new regulations dealing hazardous materials
Equip fire fighters with necessary skills in dealing with propane gas leakages
Give advice to the distress caller on way forward of dealing with the propane gas leakage |
The defect was not recognized by the junior technician at all
the emergency responding captain had not attended training in a long time
being optional, none of the responding fire fighters had under taken this training
the 911 respondent gave no advice or guidance to the junior technician
|
Part 1
Part 2
The existing tank’s liquid withdrawal valve was leaking. When the junior technician pulled out the cap without checking for leaks first, the liquid propane gas was released into the atmosphere in excessive amounts. Exposed liquid propane gas is highly flammable and the tinniest hint of a flame was bound to cause an explosion.
The junior technician who was transferring the propane gas form one tank to another was reported to lack any formal training on the matter. While he should have been working under supervision, he was working on his own. Formal training in his part would have made him aware of the danger he was in once the liquid propane gas started leaking. The lead technician was missing when he would have otherwise been guiding the junior technician on the procedure of uncapping the liquid withdrawal valve as instructed by the manufacturing company. This failure of professionalism in their area of work allowed huge amounts of liquid propane gas to be released and thus the subsequent explosion.
The emergency responders that arrived at the scene first after the distress call by the junior technician all lacked background training on dealing with propane gas accidents. They proceeded to carry out their duties as provided for in the Ghent Volunteer Fire Department and not in accordance with the National Incident Management. This overlooking of the eminent danger posed by the Incident Commander, exposed them to propane gas put them directly in harm’s way.
The propane tank was located against the back wall of the store. This is a violation of the West Virginia and U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations. The leaking liquid propane gas made its way into the Little General store through gaps in the roof. This exposed the building to the danger of propane gas explosion. Evacuation, as demanded in times of gas leakages was ignored by the store employees who locked themselves in the store. This put them in the field of danger in the event of an explosion.
The emergency responders that handled the distress call from the junior technician are all reported to lack sufficient knowledge in dealing with propane gas. The 911 respondent for instance, did not offer any advice to the junior technician when he called. The chain of command in obtaining emergency information on dealing with the leakage seemed long and this caused lapse of time and intensification of the problem at hand.
References
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (2008). Little General Store, 1-84.
West Virginia Fire Commission, (2004). State Fire Code, Title 87 Series 1 (87CSR1), West Virginia.