Homeland Security forum post

As you learned last week, a great deal of attention is typically focused on the federal government’s role in intelligence activities and the major changes that occurred in the post-9/11 era. However, this can sometimes give the impression that the federal government plays the most critical role in intelligence, which is simply not accurate. There is not a hierarchy of  importance  in the world of intelligence. Every player, including state, local, private sector…and even individuals…play an equally important role in the nation’s holistic approach.

Each entity is best positioned and resourced to fulfill their unique roles. As was previously discussed, state, local and private sector entities are, by their geographical placement, much more able to gather community level intelligence that the federal government would likely not otherwise have access to.

Successfully gathering and using intelligence to protect the nation is not a score sheet of which level of government is most important and does the best work. It is a true team effort with every player fulfilling a critical role.

Post 9/11 Changes at the State and Local Level

Before 9/11, the domain of national security intelligence was strictly in control of the United States intelligence community leaving state and local law enforcement in the dark. Since the attacks of 9/11 and the 9/11 Commission Report that followed, it was determined that the key to prevent another large scale terrorist attack within the United States was to bridge the gap between national security intelligence and local law enforcement intelligence.

New responsibilities of state and local agencies made their officers walk a fine line between protecting the homeland and protecting the civil rights of its citizens. 

“Long-term success demands the use of all the elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense.”

National Strategy

While it was clear that state, local and private sector entities must become integral players in national intelligence, there was not a national strategy that formally addressed this issue. To resolve this disconnect, in 2007, President George W. Bush issued the first National Strategy for Information Sharing. This strategy marked the first time that the full national vision was articulated into a singular document. Like any good strategy, this is a living document that continues to be updated and reflects the currents needs and intelligence environment. The most current version is entitled, National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding and was released in December 2012.

Drive Collective Action through Collaboration and Accountability

We can best reach our shared vision when working together, using governance models that enable mission achievement, adopting common processes where possible to build trust, simplifying the information sharing agreement development process, and supporting efforts through performance management, training, and incentives.

Improve Information Discovery and Access through Common Standards

Improving discovery and access involves developing clear policies for making information available to approved individuals.  Secure discovery and access relies on identity, authentication, and authorization controls, data tagging, enterprise-wide data correlation, common information sharing standards, and a rigorous process to certify and validate their use.

Optimize Mission Effectiveness through Shared Services and Interoperability

Efforts to optimize mission effectiveness include shared services, data and network interoperability, and increased efficiency in acquisition.

Strengthen Information Safeguarding through Structural Reform, Policy, and Technical Solutions

To foster trust and safeguard our information, policies and coordinating bodies must focus on identifying, preventing, and mitigating insider threats and external intrusions, while departments and agencies work to enhance capabilities for data-level controls, automated monitoring, and cross-classification solutions.

Protect Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties through Consistency and Compliance

Integral to maintaining the public trust is increasing the consistency by which we apply privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections across the government, building corresponding safe- guards into the development of information sharing operations, and promoting accountability and compliance mechanisms.

The Role of State and Local Entities

While some overlap exists, local, state, and federal agencies have different responsibilities in relation to intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.  Intelligence agencies have typically been viewed as needed in relation to the collection of intelligence outside of the U.S.  State and local agencies are tasked with assisting federal agencies in the collection of information domestically.  The private sector also plays a role by contributing resources and manpower and participating in reporting of suspicious activities.     

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, a revolution has been underway in the relationships of federal, state, and local homeland security, law enforcement, and intelligence organizations. At the federal level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been created, the “wall” between law enforcement and intelligence has been nearly obliterated, some law enforcement organizations are being directed to become more like intelligence agencies, and the foreign intelligence community is being fundamentally reformed.

The impact of these changes has been even greater at the state level: state governments have been assigned the lead role in homeland security. Most states have responded by bringing together existing public security, law enforcement, and emergency response capabilities—linking them to similar local assets—and opening channels to other states.

But a piece has been missing. Before 9/11, none of the states had a robust intelligence capability. Most now have created multiple intelligence cells in existing structures, as well as fusion centers, which for the first time connect state and local homeland security and law enforcement—and especially the new intelligence organizations—with federal, community, and, in some cases, foreign intelligence services.

One thing is clear—replicating the federal IC structure in 50 states is NOT appropriate. Some of the concepts we use in analyzing national intelligence missions and structures are useful—for example, differentiating between national (or state-level) intelligence and departmental intelligence. But for the most part, the federal model is just not relevant: collection is less a state function than is analysis; single-function collection agencies such as NSA and NGA have no comparable state analogue; HUMINT (confidential informants) is the dominant collection discipline at the state level; and we clearly do not want any state-level entities developing covert action capabilities. Finally, most states simply do not have the resources to create and maintain the multilayered, redundant structures so prevalent at the federal level. On the other hand, states need to tailor the structures they build to accommodate the robust capabilities that national organizations with intelligence capabilities maintain within their geographic boundaries. In addition, state requirements vary significantly across the country, and a single model will not meet every state’s needs.

State and local fusion centers are the designated focal points connecting the federal IC to state and local intelligence collectors and analysts on counterterrorism threats. In most cases, state police manage state fusion centers. The centers’ primary mission is to move counterterrorism (CT) intelligence from the local level to the federal community and from the federal level back to local law enforcement. But as we shall see below, state-level intelligence missions go well beyond providing operational intelligence support to law enforcement CT programs. Some fusion centers have taken on broader missions, especially in the public safety arena, and have other customer sets, including state executives and the public. Others have remained narrowly focused on CT or intermediate all-crimes intelligence.

Much has been written about fusion centers from the perspective of their primary mission and their relationship with federal law enforcement and the IC.

The Breath of State and Local Responsibilities

With the United States’ newly recognized need for state and local support, state law enforcement agencies were tasked with added responsibilities.  In addition to the need to collect, analyze, and share critical information and intelligence, they were tasked with protection of critical infrastructure and intelligence that might come as a result of threats of attack on the critical infrastructure they were tasked with protecting.

State and local law enforcement agencies investigate crime that could possibly be used as a foundation for terrorist activity.  These agencies might conduct surveillance or collect information on suspicious activity in their communities.  State and local officers may also participate in federal task forces such as the FBI’s joint terrorism task force (JTTF).

COP, POP, ILP

It is important to understand that most activities that might counter terrorism are routinely part of an officer’s daily work.  A focus should be on “what can police do to alter the environment that must exist in order for an act of terrorism to occur.”  Officers must maintain community relationships, particularly with immigrant communities.  A focus should be on using Community Oriented Policing (COP), Problem Oriented Policing (POP) and Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) philosophies.

It is important to understand the origins of ILP as many changes have occurred in recent years.  ILP did not originate in the United States and was actually first used in the United Kingdom to reduce burglary and motor vehicle theft with great success (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007, p. 144).  Although American law enforcement is a bit more fragmented than in the United Kingdom, the philosophy can easily be and has been implemented in the States (Cordner & Scarborough, 2010, p. 2).  ILP is often seen as conflicting with community policing (COP); however, there are many similarities and ILP has evolved from the COP philosophy.

Community Oriented Policing (COP), According to Marks and Sun (2007):

Community policing is typically characterized by an emphasis on bridging the divide that had previously alienated police from their communities. Unlike the strictly hierarchical traditional form of policing, community policing is more decentralized. This decentralization gives line officers the flexibility and autonomy necessary to develop more intimate ties with their community.

Relationships with the community quickly evolved into partnerships.  Partnerships are nurtured in several ways by allowing the community access to the police via permanent officer assignments, substations, and nontraditional patrol such as bikes (Chappell, 2009, p. 7).  These partnerships developed into trusting relationships with the public in order to promote positive changes (Williams, 2008, p. 137).  Officers take ownership in their communities in order to help clean up neighborhoods in an effort to reduce the vulnerability of crime.  Through these initiatives, criminals would be less likely to find the area as appealing and would be forced to leave (Chappell, 2009, p. 7). 

Balancing the needs of the community and the need for police agencies to actively reduce crime, a new prospective for addressing community problems was needed.  The evolution of COP eventually led to Problem Orientated Policing or simply put, problem solving.

Problem Oriented Policing (POP)

Problem Orientated Policing (POP), developed by Herman Goldstein, required a slight shift in COP practices that began in the 1990s (McGarrell et al., 2007, p. 145).  POP is based on the idea that crime could be “analyzed according to the crime triangle with the idea that interventions be designed to minimize the likely confluence of motivated offenders, suitable victims, or targets in the absence of effective guardianship” (McGarrell et al., 2007, p. 145).  Simply put, if police took away a variable in the triangle, they could possibly prevent and ultimately reduce crime. 

Problem solving based on the SARA model of scanning, analysis, response, and assessment, allows officers to build on the guardianship premise in order to reduce crime in their community.  According to Bilcher and Gaines (2005), studies have shown that lower level officers are able to identify problems to be addressed but actually implementing a means to address the issues is still lacking.  

Local law enforcement is more likely to see something suspicious or out of place in their communities before federal officials.  Local law enforcement knowledge coupled with perceptive citizens working together to provide information that leads to action has led to the next phase of problem solving known as intelligence-led policing (ILP). 

Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) philosophies

ILP was initially coined in the United Kingdom by military style police forces in Kent and Northumbria (McGarrell et al., 2007, p. 144).  Although the initial purpose was targeted at reducing specific crimes such as burglary and motor vehicle theft, the strategy systematically has shown to have a positive decrease in crime rates in high crime areas through locating common offenders. Ultimately, the initiative was seen as a success.   

Although ILP originated in the United Kingdom, American agencies are learning from their U.K. counterparts and that they too may find the idea helpful in combating overall crime and specifically terrorism.  According to McGarrell et al. (2007),“The arrests following the London subway and the Madrid train bombings, for instance, suggest that intelligence gathered from multiple sources, including surveillance cameras, community informants, and prison officials, was instrumental in post event investigations” Local law enforcement played a significant role. 

Fusion Centers

A key concept to integrating state and local entities into intelligence activities is a concept called fusion centers. The Department of Homeland Security implemented fusion centers across the country as a mechanism for intelligence sharing between all levels of law enforcement and the intelligence community.  Fusion centers were envisioned to be a hub for federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination. 

The 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing mandated the establishment of” baseline operating standards for fusion centers”. In 2008, a collective effort between the federal government and SLTT produced a document, entitled: Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers.

Using this document as a guide, in 2010, fusion center directors in conjunction with the federal government identified four Critical Operational Capabilities (COCs)

Critical Operational Capabilities (COC’s)

Receive:

Ability to receive classified and unclassified information from federal partners

Analyze:

Ability to assess local implications of that threat information through the use of a formal risk assessment process

Disseminate:

Ability to further disseminate that threat information to other state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector entities within their jurisdiction

Gather:

Ability to gather locally-generated information, aggregate it, analyze it, and share it with federal partners as appropriate

How Fusion Centers Get Information

Primary Fusion Centers are located in every state except Wyoming and also in the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and Washington D.C.  Primary Fusion Centers are designated in the state as the central location for gathering, analysis, and dissemination.  Other Recognized Fusion Centers exist and are located in large metropolitan areas or serve regions.

As you can see, fusion centers are positioned across the vastness of the nation and in doing so are positioned to receive a great deal of information from varying sources.

However, one common source is Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs).   The Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) was developed as a result of the guidance provided by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 and the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing.

The NSI is a collective effort between federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement. The NSI ensures that there is a national and uniform capability for “gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing SAR information—also referred to as the SAR process—in a manner that rigorously protects the privacy and civil liberties of Americans" (NSI, 2015).

A source of information that should be leveraged, but isn’t always incorporated in the best way is the private sector. State and local law enforcement must engage the private sector in information gathering.  As a result of the threat to the economy, businesses have a vested interest in deterring terrorism and therefore public-private partnerships are key elements to the approach.

Benefits of Fusion Centers

There are several benefits to fusion centers.  Through the creation of fusion centers, baseline capabilities and standards were created.  Fusion centers allow state and local agencies to have input and provide context to the information that has been reported.  They also allow for a shared responsibility and improved capabilities.  Additional funding in the form of grants is available, training, and overall technical support can be garnered to state and local agencies via fusion centers. 

There are several publically available success stories that explain the work of fusion centers. Their accomplishments geographically span the entire country and involve the work of many national and international entities.

2014 Fusion Center Success Stories

Alabama Fusion Center Supports the DEA in Combating Transnational Drug Networks

Alabama Fusion Center, May 2014

From January to May 2014, the Alabama Fusion Center (AFC) was instrumental in the success of Project Synergy, a national effort led by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The AFC provided intelligence and research support to the DEA as well as to the 35 other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies involved in the effort. The AFC served as a hub for research and information dissemination, investigating tips and leads submitted by Alabama’s Narcotics Task Force agents for analysis of transnational drug networks, including sources of supply and global money flow. Additionally, AFC intelligence analysts were onsite at the DEA’s operations center, supplying real time information to investigators. Through these joint efforts, Project Synergy resulted in the arrest of more than 38 individuals suspected of being involved with transnational drug networks and the seizure of over 200 pounds of synthetic drugs, $500,000 in cash and bank accounts and 19 guns.

Fusion Center Collaboration with Partner Agencies Leads to Apprehension of Murder Suspect

Southeast Florida Fusion Center, January 2014

In January 2014, the Miami Gardens Police Department (MGPD) contacted the Southeast Florida Fusion Center (SEFFC) with information concerning two residents of Miami Gardens, Florida, suspected of having outstanding arrest warrants in the Bahamas.  The SEFFC discovered that both subjects were Bahamian citizens living in the United States illegally, and notified the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Miami Sector, who coordinated with the MGPD to apprehend them.

During processing, the CBP INTERPOL Liaison confirmed that one of the subjects was wanted in the Bahamas for the murder of a U.S. citizen.  The subject was extradited and turned over to Bahamian authorities.  The second subject was issued an order of deportation and removed from the United States.

The SEFFC’s ability to support local investigations and share information with its federal partners provided an opportunity to identify and remove “wanted” and possibly dangerous individuals from the United States.

Fusion Center Collaboration with DHS Components Leads to Disruption of Synthetic Drug Ring

Virginia Fusion Center, October 2014

In October 2014, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations in Norfolk, Virginia led a multi-agency drug raid in partnership with Customs and Border Protection, the Virginia Fusion Center (VFC), the Food and Drug Administration, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and other state and local partners. A lead analyst from the VFC provided case support to the investigation, conducting in-depth analysis to determine the connections among the businesses and individuals involved. Narcotics investigators from the regional Drug Task Force also contributed to disrupting the crime ring.

This large-scale investigation resulted in the arrest of ten individuals in Hampton Roads, Virginia as part of an effort to thwart the proliferation of synthetic narcotics, or “spice.” The drug is meant to imitate tetrahydrocannabinol in marijuana, a hallucinogen. Authorities charged the individuals with several offenses, including money laundering and false branding, as well as conspiracy charges related to trading the drug. As synthetic drugs are often sold under the guise of legal merchandise at commercial businesses, it is becoming increasingly imperative for federal, state and local agencies to continue cooperating to combat this growing homeland security threat.

Fusion Center Challenges

While there are benefits to fusion centers, there are also challenges. Unfortunately, no one fusion center is alike and issues exist when trying to access information from one fusion center to the next.  Small agencies do not have the manpower to allocate an officer to the fusion center and as a result, they often do not submit information or receive important information.

The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations’ Fusion Center Report found that most often information gathered by fusion centers was related to dug and human trafficking or general criminal activity.  Most information was unrelated to terrorism.  In fact, much of the information was duplicated in nature and had previously been reported by the JTTF in the area.  Even worse, the Subcommittee found that some of the DHS fusion centers do not exist. Mismanagement of funds was found to be likely.    

Conclusion

In addition to the significant changes at the federal level following the events of September 11, 2001, state, local and private sector entities also have undergone a significant transformation. They are not critical players in the field on intelligence and provide much needed capability and capacity that did not previously exist. In next week’s lesson, you will learn the phases on the intelligence cycle and several fundamental concepts about information and intelligence.

Resources

“Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers.” Department of Homeland Security. Federal Emergency Management Agency. Accessed April 7, 2015. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/2010/fy10_hsgp_fusion.pdf

“Fusion Center Success Stories”. Department of Homeland Security. Accessed April 6, 2015. http://www.dhs.gov/2014-fusion-center-success-stories

“Improving Homeland Security at the State Level”. Library. Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed April 6, 2015.https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-53-no.-3/improving-homeland-security-at-the-state-level.html

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. [Washington, D.C.]: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.

“National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding”. White House. Accessed April 5, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf

 “Protecting American from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Force. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Accessed April 7, 2015. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs