“Is there any justification for the prediction that this may be the final crisis of the family farms?”

U p To N o w : A H i s t o r y o f A m e r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r e F r o m J e f f e r s o n to R e v o l u t i o n to C r i s i s

R i c h a r d S. K i r k e n d a U

Richard S. Kirkendall is the Henry A. Wallace Professor of History at Iowa State University. A former president of the Agricultural History Society, his contributions to agricultural history include Social Scientists and Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt, first published in 1966 and republished in 1982, and service as general editor of the Henry A. Wallace Series in Agricultural History and Rural Studies, published by Iowa State University Press. Currently, he is working on a "documentary profile" of "Uncle Henry" Wallace and an "intellectual biography" of H. A. Wallace.

A B S T R A C T Written as a contribution to the Social Science Agricultural A g e n d a Project, this essay in historical inter- pretation assumes that the main contribution that historians can make to the planning process is to describe and explain how the situation facing the planners came to be. Organized around three concepts--Jeffersonian or democratic agrar- ianism, the Great A m e r i c a n Agricultural Revolution, and the farm crisis of the 1980s, the main implication of the paper may be that Jeffersonianism, once so filled with promise, now gets in the way of realistic thinking about farming and rural life. To implement agrarian values in existing circumstances, we would need to do more than end the crisis. We would need to move back against the revolution.

Introduction To define t h e a g e n d a for t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l a n d

r u r a l social sciences, w e m u s t u n d e r s t a n d t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n s in a g r i c u l t u r e a n d r u r a l life a n d t h e w a y s in w h i c h t h e y a r e moving, b u t to accomplish t h a t , we m u s t first c o m p r e h e n d t h e forces a n d decisions t h a t b r o u g h t u s to t h e pres- e n t a n d t h a t a r e i n f l u e n c i n g t h e future. We m u s t , in o t h e r words, g a i n historical perspec- tive. We m u s t go as far b a c k as t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e n a t i o n a n d t h e e m e r g e n c e of a n A m e r i c a n v e r s i o n of i d e a s a b o u t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l impor- t a n c e of farming. We m u s t also t r a c e t h e devel- o p m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d a t t i t u d e s t h a t w o u l d m a k e t h e G r e a t A m e r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r a l Revo- lution. We m u s t explore t h a t revolution, t h e s e n s e o f p o w e r t h a t it, a l o n g w i t h t h e needs of o t h e r n a t i o n s , gave s o m e A m e r i c a n leaders, a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n t s e n s e o f g r e a t o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h a t e m e r g e d a m o n g f a r m people in t h e 1970s. Only t h e n will we b e a b l e to i n t e r p r e t t h e present, t h e s e n s e of crisis t h a t n o w p e r v a d e s A m e r i c a n ru- r a l life, a n d t h e possibilities t h a t a p p e a r to lie ahead. T h e social sciences should, I a s s u m e , ex-

plore, clarify, a n d define t h o s e possibilities, pro- viding b a s e s for decisions.

A m e r i c a n Agrarianism F a r m i n g a n d f a r m people h a v e a l w a y s occu-

pied special positions in t h e A m e r i c a n mind. The b e l i e f t h a t t h e y d e s e r v e h i g h s t a t u s and t h a t t h e n a t i o n should b e b a s e d u p o n t h e m w a s p a r t of t h e A m e r i c a n h e r i t a g e from Europe, run- n i n g b a c k to A n c i e n t Rome, t h e R e n a i s s a n c e , E n g l i s h w r i t e r s o f t h e s e v e n t e e n t h and eigh- t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s , a n d t h e F r e n c h p h y s i o c r a t s a n d o t h e r c o n t i n e n t a l w r i t e r s of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y (Johnstone). This h e r i t a g e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t f a r m i n g w a s t h e b e s t w a y of life a n d t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t economic activity, t h a t it con- f e r r e d psychological as w e l l as economic bene- fits, a n d t h a t it p r o d u c e d t h e b e s t citizens a n d soldiers. T h e s e i d e a s e n c o u r a g e d people to be- lieve t h a t A m e r i c a w a s a s u p e r i o r place for it supplied m o r e a n d b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s to f a r m t h a n E u r o p e did (Eisenger).

A m e r i c a n s b o t h a c c e p t e d a n d r e s h a p e d t h e s e ideas. In t h i s d e v e l o p m e n t T h o m a s Jefferson

was expecially important (Griswold). The great- est "agrarianizer, TM he tried to construct a na- tion with an agricultural base. He took ideas t h a t had not been identified with democracy, at least not exclusively, and democratized them, arguing t h a t to be democratic a nation must have a farm foundation. Although a planter himself, Jefferson emphasized the political value of the family farm, a farm owned and worked by members of one family and large enough to supply their needs. In his view, such a farm conferred independence, since the people on it worked for themselves, not others, and it required self-reliance and hard work. Its most important product was the personality type re- quired for a democracy, r a t h e r t h a n the debased type t h a t appeared to grow out of European ur- ban conditions. With family farms as democra- cy's essential foundation, farming's importance transcended t h e economic goods produced by farmers.

Jefferson did not advocate fully self-sufficient, non-commercial farms. He saw value for the United States in Europe's need for food. It m e a n t t h a t there would be m a n y good opportunities to farm in America. To prosper, American farmers should produce a surplus; t h e y should grow more t h a n farm families needed and more t h a n the nation needed. Thus, the agrarian politician opposed obstacles to American trade with Eu- rope, including protective tariffs and French control of the mouth of the Mississippi River (Appleby, McCoy).

Jefferson and other American agrarianizers saw western lands as even more valuable t h a n the European market. More perhaps t h a n any other feature, they distinguished the United States from Europe. They must be available to farmers, free of control by Indians and Europe- ans, and sold at a low price or given away. Their importance justified t h e purchase of Louisiana, for, by greatly enlarging the land possessed by the United States, the purchase guaranteed the success of American democracy and the contin- uation of American superiority (Pearce, pp. 56, 67, 70, 153; Berkhofer, p. 157; Henry Nash Smith, prologue and ch. 11).

Jefferson came to accept manufacturing but within narrow confines. Fascinated by technol- ogy and fearful of over-dependence on Europe, he also feared an urban proletariat. Thus, he insisted t h a t American factories must be small and placed in rural settings and must employ only a small percent of the total American pop- ulation. F a r m e r s must continue to be the Amer- ican majority (Bender, pp. 21-28).

Jefferson's democratic agrarianism achieved its most spectacular victory in 1862 with the

Kirkendall: Up to Now

passage of the Homestead Act. Giving 160 acres to those who would m a k e farms out of them, this land policy seemed to be a way of m a k i n g the lands t r u l y valuable and the nation h e a l t h y and strong. And giving lands away seemed benefi- cial to urban workers as well as farmers, for it offered those workers a "safety valve:' Giving t h e m a way of escaping or avoiding oppression, it enabled t h e m to develop a personality t h a t differed from t h a t of the European proletariat and was compatible with democracy. Or so it seemed to American agrarians (Henry Nash Smith, chs. 15, 20).

A l t e r n a t i v e V i s i o n s The Jeffersonian vision competed with alter-

native conceptions of what the United States should be. The competitors included plantation agriculture. Its defenders m a i n t a i n e d t h a t plan- tations, which were larger t h a n family farms and worked by slaves, were the basis for good citizenship for t h e y freed planters from constant toil in t h e fields, but critics condemned t h e m as violations of democratic agrarianism and in- sisted t h a t t h e y m u s t not be spread over the West (Henry Nash Smith, chs. 12-14).

The Civil War and Reconstruction abolished slavery but did not redistribute southern land in family-owned units. It substituted sharecrop- ping r a t h e r t h a n family farming for plantations worked by slaves. Involving heavy dependence of croppers on landlords and merchants, share- cropping violated t h e a g r a r i a n democratic creed (Woodman; Fite, 1984, ch. 1). Midwestern agri- culture, composed mainly of commercial family farmers, conformed much more closely to the Jeffersonian model.

Democratic a g r a r i a n i s m did not even domi- nate t h e distribution of western land (Schieber, Winters). The national government sold land to speculators and gave it to railroad builders as well as farm makers. Champions of land grants to railroads often argued t h a t they would help farmers and encourage growth of the farm pop- ulati'on, but the policy also served another vi- sion of w h a t the nation should be: t h a t of the industrializers.

The granting of land for educational purposes constituted y e t another way of using land at the time. A g r a r i a n i s m exerted some influence on this. F a r m i n g and farm people were so impor- tant, advocates of land-grants for colleges main- tained, t h a t t h e y deserved help from govern- m e n t and higher education. The benefits of those institutions should not be monopolized by other groups. Education for farmers, the argu- m e n t ran, Would hold people on the land and encourage others to settle it by raising the sta-

A G R I C U L T U R E A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W I N T E R 1987

t u s of f a r m i n g a n d f a r m e r s a n d i n c r e a s i n g t h e chances for success in t h a t occupation.

N e v e r t h e l e s s , m a n y a g r a r i a n s a n d m o s t farm- ers opposed l a n d for colleges. T h e y d o u b t e d t h a t f a r m people w a n t e d or n e e d e d help of t h i s t y p e for t h e y could l e a r n from e x p e r i e n c e a n d from one another, r a t h e r t h a n from books. S u c h crit- ics of t h e i d e a p r e f e r r e d giving l a n d to farmers; t h e y f e a r e d t h a t s p e c u l a t o r s w o u l d g a i n control of t h e l a n d g r a n t e d to t h e s t a t e s for e d u c a t i o n a l purposes, c h a r g e h i g h prices for it, and slow t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e West (Gates, 1943, pp. 8 - 2 6 ; Rainsford, pp. 87-95). T h e y also f e a r e d t h a t col- lege e d u c a t i o n w o u l d e n c o u r a g e f a r m boys to d e s e r t farming. A f t e r t h e l a n d - g r a n t colleges w e n t into operation, a g r a r i a n s often criticized t h e m for i n a d e q u a t e service to farmers.

The g r e a t e s t p u s h for t h e l a n d - g r a n t s y s t e m c a m e from critics of t h e f a r m e r s . M e n such as J u s t i n Morrill m a i n t a i n e d t h a t A m e r i c a n farm- ers w e r e n o t good f a r m e r s . Inferior to Europe- ans, t h e y e x h a u s t e d t h e soil a n d t h e n m o v e d west. Consequently, A m e r i c a n a g r i c u l t u r e could b e c o m e i n c a p a b l e of s e r v i n g A m e r i c a n needs, a n d f a r m e r s n e e d e d colleges so as to become m o r e efficient a n d t a k e b e t t e r care of t h e l a n d ( K i r k e n d a l l , 1986a, pp. 6-10).

In a d d i t i o n to t h e hope of c h a n g i n g f a r m prac- tices, t h e i d e a of social m o b i l i t y also influenced t h e l a n d - g r a n t college act. Its advocates, Morrill a b o v e all, insisted, as t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e law indicates, t h a t t h e c u r r i c u l u m of t h e n e w col- leges s h o u l d n o t b e l i m i t e d to a g r i c u l t u r e b u t should include " o t h e r scientific a n d classical s t u d i e s " a n d s h o u l d p r o m o t e t h e "liberal" as well as t h e "practical e d u c a t i o n of t h e i n d u s t r i a l classes in t h e s e v e r a l p u r s u i t s a n d professions of life." B e h i n d t h i s l a n g u a g e l a y a n o n - a g r a r i a n v e r s i o n of d e m o c r a c y t h a t identified it w i t h so- cial mobility, d o u b t e d t h a t f a r m life w a s supe- rior to city life in all w a y s , r e g a r d e d t h e f a r m as p r e f e r a b l e o n l y a s a t r a i n i n g ground, not as an o u t l e t for t a l e n t a n d a m b i t i o n , a n d e n c o u r a g e d m o v e m e n t a w a y f r o m t h e f a r m (Wyllie, p. 28). According to t h i s conception of things, colleges should p r e p a r e people for a b r o a d r a n g e of op- p o r t u n i t i e s . E s t a b l i s h e d colleges w e r e too nar- row in c u r r i c u l u m a n d s t u d e n t body; t h e n e w colleges should n o t r e p e a t t h a t m i s t a k e b y be- coming a n o t h e r k i n d of n a r r o w college; educa- tion s h o u l d n o t lock people into a place in soci- ety, e v e n a farm. Morrill a n d o t h e r s w h o t h o u g h t like h e did h o p e d to open u p e d u c a t i o n a l oppor- t u n i t i e s a n d t h u s o p p o r t u n i t i e s for u p w a r d mo- b i l i t y for f a r m boys, a m o n g o t h e r s (Kirkendall, 1986b).

T h e Morrill Act, in o t h e r words, w a s influ- enced b y a vision of A m e r i c a t h a t differed sig-

nificantly from Jefferson's. The act's vision w a s l i n k e d w i t h t h e vision of t h e industrializers. In fact, Morrill w o r k e d for t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n for A m e r i c a n m a n u f a c t u r e r s as well as l a n d - g r a n t s for colleges.

The i n d u s t r i a l i z e r s h o p e d to b u i l d a m a n u f a c - t u r i n g b a s e for t h e nation. A t first, t h e y h a d t r i e d to deal w i t h t h e a g r a r i a n f e a r s of factories as i n e v i t a b l y c r e a t i n g a large, debased, corrupt w o r k i n g class. T h e y a r g u e d t h a t m a c h i n e s w o u l d e n a b l e w o m e n a n d children to do t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g w h i l e m e n c o n t i n u e d to farm; t h e y m a i n t a i n e d t h a t E u r o p e a n m e r c h a n t s w e r e t h e c o r r u p t i n g influences m o s t to b e feared; t h e y p o i n t e d o u t t h a t A m e r i c a n w o r k e r s h a d alter- n a t i v e s in t h e West, a n d t h e y developed facto- ries in s m a l l c o m m u n i t i e s . As t i m e passed, how- ever, t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e r s g r e w bolder, no longer felt compelled to m a k e concessions to a g r a r i a n fears, a n d p r o c l a i m e d t h a t i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n w o u l d s u p p l y t h e m e a n s of d e v e l o p i n g t h e wil- derness, t h e r e b y f r e e i n g it from savagery, a n d w o u l d l i b e r a t e people from d r u d g e r y a n d scarc- ity (Marx, pp. 1 4 5 - 2 2 6 ; Bender, pp. 1-52; Kas- son, pp. 3 - 5 1 ) .

As it a d v a n c e d , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n affected f a r m i n g a n d f a r m e r s in m a j o r w a y s . Most ob- viously, it p r o m o t e d t h e u r b a n i z a t i o n of A m e r - ica. N e a r l y all A m e r i c a n s h a d lived a n d w o r k e d on f a r m s w h e n t h e n a t i o n began. B y 1890, only 42.3 p e r c e n t of t h e people did (Historical Statis- tics, p. 457). R a t h e r t h a n t h e m a j o r i t y s t a t u s t h a t J e f f e r s o n h a d r e g a r d e d as essential, farm- ers h a d b e c o m e a minority, a l t h o u g h still a l a r g e one (Fite, 1981, ch. 1). In addition, t h e a d v a n c e of i n d u s t r y a n d t h e city d r e w f a r m e r s increas- i n g l y into t h e m a r k e t ( H a h n a n d P r u d e , A t a c k a n d B a t e m a n ) . F r o n t i e r f a r m families d e p e n d e d a l m o s t e n t i r e l y on t h e m s e l v e s , p r o d u c i n g t h e i r food, c l o t h i n g a n d m a n y o t h e r p r o d u c t s (Riley, 1981, 1988). E a s t of t h e frontiers, n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y f a r m e r s p r o d u c e d m u c h of t h e i r food a n d clothing a n d also s u c h i t e m s as energy, seed, a n d fertilizer, b u t as p r o d u c e r s of food a n d f b e r , t h e y m o v e d m o r e a n d m o r e into t h e m a r k e t . In fact, t h e i r a b i l i t y to p r o d u c e a s u r p l u s b e y o n d t h e n e e d s of t h e i r f a m i l i e s m a d e it possible for a g r o w i n g n u m b e r of A m e r i c a n s to live in cities a n d w o r k in factories. In o t h e r words, t h e expan- sion of A m e r i c a n a g r i c u l t u r e a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n c o n t r i b u t e d significantly to t h e frus- t r a t i o n of t h e hope for a n a t i o n composed m a i n l y of f a r m e r s .

The decline of f a r m e r s to a m i n o r i t y position as well a s o t h e r f e a t u r e s of t h e n e w A m e r i c a c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e l a t e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y m a s s u p r i s i n g k n o w n as t h e P o p u l i s t R e v o l t (Good- wyn). L a r g e l y white, middle-class, l a n d o w n i n g

6

farmers in the South and on the Great Plains, the participants produced cotton and wheat, crops t h a t sold now in an over-crowded world market. Served by an inadequate money sys- tem, farmers suffered falling prices and thus had difficulty paying their debts or achieving prosperity. Influenced by democratic agrarian- ism, t h e y felt t h a t the America they believed in had been displaced and t h a t they were exploited in the new America by an immoral, unproduc- tive "money power" or "monopoly capital." Con- vinced t h a t t h e y were virtuous, hard-working people, they believed t h a t they deserved to flourish, so they tried to change, not farmers and farming, but the political and economic systems within which t h e y functioned. Not seeking a "Golden Age" free of cities and factories, they pressed for political reforms t h a t would give farmers political power and for economic re- forms t h a t would destroy monopolies, change t h e money system, and free farmers from depen- dence on off-farm economic institutions and thereby permit family farmers to enjoy indepen- dence and good times. They failed, although some of t h e i r specific proposals became laws later on. The new America of factories and cities moved forward.

The Land-Grant Colleges Some of those who envisioned a new urban

industrial America hoped to fit the farmer into it by means of agricultural science and educa- tion. Congress gave t h e m a boost in 1887 by passing the Hatch Act t h a t supplied federal funds for experiment stations connected with land-grant colleges (Marcus), and the stations quickly enlarged the body of knowledge the col- leges could pass on to farmers. Emphasizing re- search to make farmers more productive, the colleges gained some strength by the beginning of the t w e n t i e t h century. Not m a n y future farm- ers enrolled in the four-year programs. Instead, t h e y educated agricultural teachers and scien- tists and people for off-farm agricultural busi- nesses. To reach farmers, the colleges developed extension programs with the farmers' institutes as the main feature in the early days. These institutes encouraged farmers to change their ways so as to become more efficient and produc- t i v e - t o diversify their production, to use more fertilizers, to substitute technology for people and m a k e other alterations. Some farm organi- zations, the Wisconsin Dairyman's League, for example, became enthusiastic supporters, but m a n y farmers resisted the advice (Kirkendall, 1986a, pp. 8-11).

In hope of overcoming t h a t resistance, Con- gress passed a major piece of legislation in 1914,

Kirkendall: Up to Now

the Smith-Lever Act. To a significant degree, it was a product of the Country Life Movement. Not a farmers movement, it was composed mainly of people who h a d been born on farms but had moved to cities. A number of features of farm life in the early years of the Twentieth C e n t u r y - - l a r g e - s c a l e migration to cities, ten- ancy and absentee ownership, overworked women, poor health, inadequate roads, poor schools and churches, misuse of the land, ineffi- c i e n c y - t r o u b l e d them, causing t h e m to fear t h a t soon the nation would not have the large, productive, and politically responsible farm pop- ulation it m u s t have to survive and prosper. The high food prices of the time seemed a sure sign of trouble ahead. Thus, the Country Lifers, people such as Liberty Hyde Bailey and "Uncle Henry" Wallace, tried to persuade people ca- pable of becoming good farmers to r e m a i n on farms. To accomplish this goal, they assumed, r u r a l life must be improved and made more like urban life. Thus, t h e y promoted a number of changes, including the consolidation of schools, and, in spite of considerable resistance from farmers, t h e y exerted influence (Bowers, Dan- bom, Fuller, Madison).

The most significant victory for the Country Life Movement, the Smith-Lever Act supplied federal funds for extension programs. It re- flected a strong desire to change farm practices and assumed t h a t persuading farmers to do so was not an easy task. Many were poorly edu- cated, even illiterate, and did not have a high regard for colleges and science. The legislation helped to finance a new i n s t r u m e n t of change: the county agent. Educated in the agricultural sciences, these officials resided and worked in farm communities throughout the year so as to bring the developing knowledge into the daily lives of farm people (Scott; Rasmussen, 1960, pp. 180, 187-8, 195-6).

In spite of the fact t h a t m a n y farmers were black, the land-grant system offered little to black farmers. Because most of t h e m were in the South and the system of segregation prevailed there, few blacks could enroll in the institutions aided by the 1862 legislation. Special legisla- tion, a second Morrill Act, had been passed in 1890 to develop a land-grant system for blacks, and t h e legislation contributed to the growth of colleges, but t h e y emphasized teacher training, not agriculture, and derived few benefits from federal support for agricultural experiment sta- tions or extension. Federal support for research and extension in these institutions would a m o u n t to little until at best the late 1960s and would not become substantial until the 1980s (Williams and Williamson, 2-11).

A G R I C U L T U R E A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W I N T E R 1987

R e v o l u t i o n a n d E v o l u t i o n The c o u n t y a g e n t s a n d t h e forces t h a t stood

b e h i n d t h e m , i n c l u d i n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s De- p a r t m e n t of A g r i c u l t u r e , t h e n p r i m a r i l y a re- s e a r c h i n s t i t u t i o n , w e r e p o t e n t i a l revolution- aries, b u t t h e G r e a t A m e r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n w o u l d n o t b e g i n for a q u a r t e r cen- t u r y a f t e r p a s s a g e of t h e S m i t h - L e v e r Act. Some p a r t s of A m e r i c a n a g r i c u l t u r e h a d e x p e r i e n c e d a technological r e v o l u t i o n in t h e n i n e t e e n t h century. R o o t e d in a n u m b e r of i n v e n t i o n s j u s t before t h e Civil War, it h a d m o v e d f o r w a r d dur- ing t h e w a r b e c a u s e of t h e s h o r t a g e of f a r m la- bor r e l a t i v e to t h e d e m a n d for f a r m products a n d h a d c o n t i n u e d a t a r a p i d pace for a n u m b e r of y e a r s a f t e r 1865. The r e v o l u t i o n involved t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d u s e of m a c h i n e s such as culti- v a t o r s a n d r e a p e r s a n d t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of ani- m a l p o w e r for h u m a n p o w e r in some f a r m j o b s ( R a s m u s s e n , 1962, 1965; Gates, 1965). L a t e in t h e century, i n v e n t o r s , i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , a n d farm- ers also p u t t h e s t e a m e n g i n e to u s e in t h e w h e a t h a r v e s t . The n e w t e c h n o l o g y p e r m i t t e d f a r m e r s to w o r k f a s t e r a n d accomplish m o r e a n d r e d u c e d t h e h u m a n d r u d g e r y on t h e farm, b u t it did not e l i m i n a t e h a r d w o r k for f a r m people. Work w i t h h o r s e s w a s o f t e n h o t or cold a n d difficult; farm- ers, e s p e c i a l l y in t h e cotton South, c o n t i n u e d to do n e a r l y all of t h e i r w o r k b y hand. E v e n in t h e Corn Belt, f a r m e r s t h e m s e l v e s did such s w e a t y t a s k s as pick a n d h u s k corn. A n d t h e revolu- tion's i m p a c t on t h e f a r m h o m e w a s l i m i t e d l a r g e l y to t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e s e w i n g ma- chine (Fite, 1981, ch. 2, 1984, chs. 1-2; H u r t ; Quick).

G i v e n t h e a v a i l a b l e technology, t h e n a t i o n still n e e d e d a l a r g e n u m b e r of f a r m s and farm- ers. The n e w m a c h i n e s did r e d u c e t h e n e e d s for h i r e d h a n d s on e s t a b l i s h e d f a r m s in t h e Middle West (Argersingers), b u t t h e city p o p u l a t i o n w a s g r o w i n g r a p i d l y w h i l e overall a g r i c u l t u r a l effi- ciency w a s g r o w i n g slowly. In 1830, before t h e r e v o l u t i o n hit, one f a r m w o r k e r in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s u p p l i e d t h e n e e d s of 4 people; b y 1890, a f t e r t h e r e v o l u t i o n h a d w o r k e d its wonders, one f a r m w o r k e r s e r v e d 5.8 people (Historical Statis- tics, p. 498). R a t h e r t h a n p r o m o t e a decline in t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n , t h e n e w t e c h n o l o g y en- c o u r a g e d expansion, especially on t h e G r e a t P l a i n s w h e r e l a n d w a s a v a i l a b l e a n d m a c h i n e s a n d h o r s e s could be p u t to work, helping to plant, c u l t i v a t e , a n d h a r v e s t w h e a t . Thus, t h e n e w t e c h n o l o g y w a s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h Jefferso- n i a n a g r a r i a n i s m in a t l e a s t t w o m a j o r ways: it r e d u c e d t h e f a r m family's n e e d to h i r e l a b o r a n d e n c o u r a g e d f u r t h e r e x p a n s i o n of t h e f a r m pop- ulation. P e r h a p s it w o u l d be a c c u r a t e to s u g g e s t t h a t t h e t e c h n o l o g y helped to prolong t h e life of

t h i s form of a g r a r i a n t h o u g h t into t h e t w e n t i e t h centuryY

In t h e e a r l y y e a r s of t h e t w e n t i e t h century, f a r m i n g c o n t i n u e d to d e p e n d on t h e l a b o r of people a n d a n i m a l s , l a r g e n u m b e r s of both. The f a r m p o p u l a t i o n h a d g r o w n to n e a r l y 25 million b y 1890, w h i c h w a s m o r e t h a n six t i m e s t h e p o p u l a t i o n of t h e e n t i r e c o u n t r y a c e n t u r y ear- lier, a n d A m e r i c a n f a r m people i n c r e a s e d t h e n u m b e r of f a r m s from less t h a n 1.5 million in 1850 to o v e r 4.5 million in 1890, m a k i n g t h a t f o r t y - y e a r period t h e g r e a t e s t e r a of f a r m m a k - ing in A m e r i c a n history. The pace of c h a n g e in t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s slowed a f t e r t h a t , b u t t h e n u m - b e r of f a r m people c o n t i n u e d to grow, r e a c h i n g 32.5 m i l l i o n b y 1916 w h i l e t h e n u m b e r of f a r m s i n c r e a s e d to n e a r l y 6.5 million (Historical Sta- tistics, p. 457; Cochrane, chs. 5 - 6 ) .

Technological d e v e l o p m e n t in a g r i c u l t u r e m o v e d a t a p r e d o m i n a n t l y e v o l u t i o n a r y r a t h e r t h a n r e v o l u t i o n a r y pace d u r i n g t h e first four decades of t h e t w e n t i e t h century. A n e w device w i t h r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o t e n t i a l - - t h e gasoline- p o w e r e d t r a c t o r - - b e c a m e a v a i l a b l e e a r l y in t h e century, b u t only a t h o u s a n d w e r e in u s e on A m e r i c a n f a r m s b y 1910. W a r t i m e d e m a n d for f a r m p r o d u c t s e n c o u r a g e d t h e u s e of tractors, w h i c h r e a c h e d 85,000 b y 1918, w i t h m o s t of t h e m on t h e G r e a t P l a i n s w h e r e f a r m e r s b r o u g h t e v e n m o r e l a n d into production. The f a r m p o p u l a t i o n dropped s l i g h t l y d u r i n g t h e war, f a l l i n g to 32 million a n d r e v e r s i n g a t r e n d t h a t e x t e n d e d b a c k to t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e na- tion, a n d declined f u r t h e r d u r i n g t h e 1920s, m o v i n g to 30.5 million as t h e n a t i o n c o n t i n u e d to g r o w m o r e u r b a n . The n u m b e r of t r a c t o r s m o r e t h a n t r i p l e d d u r i n g t h e decade, rising to 920,000 b y 1930, b u t t h a t w a s less t h a n one for e v e r y six farms. A n d t h e coming of t h e G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n r e v e r s e d t h e p o p u l a t i o n t r e n d t h a t h a d b e e n r u n n i n g since 1916 for some people s a w f a r m s a s a r e f u g e from u r b a n u n e m p l o y - ment. T h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n e x p a n d e d to 32.4 million b y 1933. The n u m b e r of t r a c t o r s in- c r e a s e d o n l y to 1 million b y 1935 (Historical Statistics, pp. 457, 469).

T h e F a r m B u r e a u a n d M c N a r y - H a u g e n B y t h e 1930s, a s t r o n g f a r m o r g a n i z a t i o n h a d

e m e r g e d a n d w a s b a t t l i n g for c h a n g e in f a r m i n g a n d profit for t h e f a r m business. This w a s t h e A m e r i c a n F a r m B u r e a u F e d e r a t i o n . It w a s a n a n t i - r a d i c a l g r o u p v e r y different from t h e Pop- u l i s t Revolt. It h a d e m e r g e d in t h e second dec- ade o f t h e c e n t u r y in c o u n t i e s a n d states, aided b y u r b a n b u s i n e s s o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t e r e s t e d in t h e farmer, t h e e x t e n s i o n services a n d t h e i r c o u n t y a g e n t s , a n d t h e U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of Ag-

r i c u l t u r e , a n d h a d become a n a t i o n a l organiza- t i o n b y 1920, t h o u g h one t h a t recognized t h e m i n o r i t y s t a t u s of f a r m e r s , did n o t a t t e m p t to b e c o m e a m a s s m o v e m e n t , a n d t r i e d i n s t e a d to d e r i v e s t r e n g t h from o r g a n i z a t i o n - - o r g a n i z a - t i o n of t h e "right" people. C o n c e i v i n g of f a r m i n g as e s s e n t i a l l y a b u s i n e s s a n d composed m a i n l y of t h e m o r e s u b s t a n t i a l c o m m e r c i a l f a m i l y farm- ers in t h e Middle West a n d South, t h e organi- zation j o i n e d in efforts to m a k e f a r m e r s m o r e efficient b y m e a n s of education, organized farm- ers into cooperatives, a n d p r e s s e d for legislation f a v o r a b l e to f a r m e r s (McConnell, Campbell).

B y t h e mid-1920s, t h e A F B F w a s t h e m a i n f a r m o r g a n i z a t i o n s u p p o r t i n g t h e M c N a r y - H a u g e n plan. D e s i g n e d l a r g e l y b y a f a r m ma- c h i n e r y m a n u f a c t u r e r , George N. P e e k (Fite, 1954), w h o recognized t h a t he could not sell plows to " b u s t e d " f a r m e r s a n d f e a r e d a g r a r i a n r a d i c a l i s m , t h e p l a n s o u g h t to solve t h e " f a r m p r o b l e m " of t h e 1920s b y finding n e w m a r k e t s a b r o a d a n d g u a r a n t e e i n g a profitable price for t h e crops sold on t h e A m e r i c a n m a r k e t . The p l a n defined t h e p r o b l e m as low prices, not t h e p o w e r of b i g b u s i n e s s or p o v e r t y a m o n g t e n a n t f a r m e r s a n d f a r m e r s w i t h poor l a n d or n o t e n o u g h l a n d a n d e q u i p m e n t , a n d it focused on r a i s i n g f a r m prices, n o t r e s h a p i n g r u r a l life or t h e r u r a l social s t r u c t u r e or r e d u c i n g b u s i n e s s power.

R a t h e r t h a n a t t a c k t h e g i a n t corporations as t h e P o p u l i s t s had, t h e M c N a r y - H a u g e n move- m e n t a d v i s e d f a r m e r s to accept t h e h i g h protec- t i v e t a r i f f a n d e m p l o y a two-price s y s t e m , one price for t h e domestic m a r k e t a n d a l o w e r one for t h e foreign m a r k e t , as m a j o r i n d u s t r i a l firms did. C o n g r e s s e n d o r s e d t h e p l a n in 1927 a n d 1928; P r e s i d e n t Coolidge d e f e a t e d it w i t h v e t o s b o t h times, b u t it h e l p e d to p r e p a r e t h e w a y for action b y t h e federal g o v e r n m e n t on b e h a l f of h i g h e r f a r m prices.

T h e N e w D e a l for A g r i c u l t u r e The N e w D e a l for a g r i c u l t u r e t h a t b e g a n in

1933 s o u g h t to m a i n t a i n a l a r g e f a r m popula- tion, a n d t h e n u m b e r of f a r m people did r e m a i n l a r g e a t t h e e n d of t h e decade, b u t this politi- cal m o v e m e n t did f a c i l i t a t e t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of t e c h n o l o g y for people in a g r i c u l t u r e . The N e w D e a l e r s a t t e m p t e d to s a f e g u a r d a n d s t r e n g t h e n A m e r i c a n f a r m i n g b y r a i s i n g prices for f a r m p r o d u c t s a n d t r i e d to do t h a t b y t a k i n g p a r t s of f a r m s o u t of t h e p r o d u c t i o n of m a j o r crops. T h e y a s s u m e d t h a t excess o u t p u t h a d become t h e ba- sic f a r m p r o b l e m a n d rejected s u g g e s t i o n s t h a t n a t u r a l forces should be relied u p o n to s h r i n k t h e n u m b e r of f a r m s a n d f a r m e r s to t h e size t h a t w o u l d e n a b l e A m e r i c a n a g r i c u l t u r e to o p e r a t e

K i r k e n d a l l : U p to N o w

a t a profit. B u t t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n did decline, d r o p p i n g to 30.5 million b y 1940, a d e c r e a s e of n e a r l y 2 million since F r a n k l i n R o o s e v e l t h a d come to power. T h e decline c a m e m a i n l y in t h e Middle West w h e r e m e c h a n i z a t i o n m o v e d for- w a r d a n d on t h e S o u t h e r n P l a i n s w h e r e d r o u g h t a n d d u s t e n c o u r a g e d people to m i g r a t e o u t of t h e region. The n u m b e r of f a r m s fell from 6.8 million in 1935 to 6.1 million five y e a r s l a t e r w h i l e t h e n u m b e r of t r a c t o r s on t h o s e f a r m s rose from 1 to 1.6 million as N e w D e a l agencies h e l p e d f a r m e r s o b t a i n f u n d s t h a t t h e y i n v e s t e d in t h e s e m a c h i n e s . As t h e l a r g e s t g o v e r n m e n t p a y m e n t s a n d l o a n s w e n t to t h e l a r g e s t opera- tors, t h e y w e r e t h e ones m o s t c a p a b l e o f invest- ing in t h e n e w technology, u s i n g it to f a r m e v e n l a r g e r u n i t s , a n d b u y i n g l a n d from t h e i r neigh- b o r s so a s to u s e t h e t e c h n o l o g y efficiently.

B y t h e l a t e 1930s, t h e pace of technological c h a n g e in r u r a l A m e r i c a w a s accelerating. W h i l e n e a r l y 25 p e r c e n t of t h e f a r m s h a d trac- t o r s b y 1940, e q u i p m e n t d e s i g n e d to be u s e d w i t h t r a c t o r s w a s also b e i n g introduced, a n d f a r m e r s h a d m o r e c a r s a n d t r u c k s . Also b y 1940, 75 p e r c e n t of t h e f a r m e r s in t h e C o r n B e l t w e r e u s i n g a n o t h e r n e w technology, h y b r i d seed corn (Bogue, Brown), a n d t h r o u g h o u t t h e nation, f a r m e r s w e r e m a k i n g g r e a t e r u s e of commercial fertilizers a n d electricity. S u c h c h a n g e s frus- t r a t e d efforts to c u t b a c k on p r o d u c t i o n b y re- d u c i n g t h e a c r e a g e d e v o t e d to m a j o r crops, a n d t h u s f a r m prices r e m a i n e d b e l o w goals a n d sur- p l u s e s piled u p (Historical Statistics, p. 469; Kir- k e n d a l l , 1975, 1980; Saloutos; Fite, 1981, ch. 4).

S o m e c h a n g e t o o k place in t h e r u r a l South, b u t t h e o b s t a c l e s to it t h e r e , i n c l u d i n g t h e n e e d for a l a r g e l a b o r force to c u l t i v a t e a n d h a r v e s t cotton, r e m a i n e d strong. The n u m b e r of f a r m s o p e r a t e d b y s h a r e c r o p p e r s fell 30 p e r c e n t d u r i n g t h e decade, in p a r t b e c a u s e of t h e i n c r e a s e d u s e of t r a c t o r s , b u t t h e n u m b e r of f a r m l a b o r e r s in- c r e a s e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y a n d t h e t o t a l s o u t h e r n f a r m p o p u l a t i o n i n c r e a s e d b y a s m a l l a m o u n t . A l t h o u g h s o u t h e r n f a r m e r s did e x p a n d t h e i r u s e of t r a c t o r s , only 8 p e r c e n t of t h o s e f a r m e r s h a d t r a c t o r s b y 1940 w h i l e 55 p e r c e n t of Iowa's farm- ers h a d t h e m . To e n c o u r a g e w i d e s p r e a d u s e of t h o s e m a c h i n e s , t h e S o u t h n e e d e d o t h e r tech- nological changes, a b o v e all t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a m e c h a n i c a l cotton p i c k e r (Fite, 1984, chs. 6 - 7; Daniel, 1985, b o o k s 2 - 3 ) .

S u r p l u s P e o p l e The a g r i c u l t u r a l s i t u a t i o n in t h e l a t e 1930s

e n c o u r a g e d a n u m b e r of people in t h e agricul- t u r a l colleges, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D e p a r t m e n t of A g r i c u l t u r e , a n d o t h e r places to a r g u e t h a t t h e r e w e r e too m a n y people in a g r i c u l t u r e . This,

A G R I C U L T U R E A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W I N T E R 1987

r a t h e r t h a n o t h e r factors, s u c h as class exploi- t a t i o n a n d racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , explained, it w a s a r g u e d , t h e l a r g e v o l u m e of p o v e r t y a m o n g f a r m people. The proposed s o l u t i o n w a s t h e sub- s t i t u t i o n of t e c h n o l o g y for people. T h a t c h a n g e w o u l d p e r m i t t h e o p e r a t i o n of l a r g e r farms, in- c r e a s e efficiency, r e d u c e costs, a n d m a k e farm- ing profitable for t h e people w h o r e m a i n e d in it (Fite, 1984, pp. 143, 148, 151-2, 161).

The S e c r e t a r y of A g r i c u l t u r e , H e n r y A. Wal- lace, h a d b e c o m e a n e s p e c i a l l y significant pro- p o n e n t of t h e t h e o r y of t h e s u r p l u s f a r m popu- lation. Earlier, as a p a r t i c i p a n t in t h e b a t t l e o v e r f a r m policy in t h e 1920s, he h a d e m b r a c e d t h e old a g r a r i a n t h e o r y a b o u t t h e n e e d for a l a r g e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n a n d h a d i s s u e d w a r n i n g s a b o u t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of f u r t h e r u r b a n i z a t i o n of t h e A m e r i c a n people ( K i r k e n d a l l , 1983, 1984). B y t h e l a t e 1930s, however, he w a s ar- g u i n g t h a t t h e s o l u t i o n to t h e nation's f a r m p r o b l e m d e p e n d e d h e a v i l y on e x p a n d e d indus- t r i a l production, low i n d u s t r i a l prices, full ur- b a n e m p l o y m e n t a t h i g h wages, a n d t h e migra- tion of l a r g e n u m b e r s of people to t h e cities ( K i r k e n d a l l , 1967). " T h e r e is a n o r m a l excess of b i r t h s over d e a t h s of from 400,000 to 500,000 on t h e f a r m s of A m e r i c a e v e r y y e a r " he advised E l e a n o r R o o s e v e l t in 1939. " W h e n t h e N a t i o n w a s e x p a n d i n g , t h i s i n c r e a s e in p o p u l a t i o n h a d o p p o r t u n i t y e i t h e r on n e w l a n d or in t h e grow- ing cities. The closing of o p p o r t u n i t y in t h o s e t w o directions h a s r e s u l t e d in d a m m i n g u p on t h e f a r m s of millions of people who n o r m a l l y w o u l d h a v e b e e n t a k e n care of e l s e w h e r e "'3 This i n t e l l e c t u a l c h a n g e on t h e h i g h e s t level in f a r m politics w a s a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t of t h e p r e p a r a - tion for a r e v o l u t i o n t h a t w o u l d s u b s t i t u t e tech- nology for people in f a r m i n g a n d m o v e millions of people from f a r m s to cities a n d towns. On o t h e r levels a n d in o t h e r p l a c e s - - i n colleges a n d c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d on f a r m s - - o t h e r p r e p a r a t i o n s w e r e also b e i n g m a d e .

T h e I m p a c t o f War World War II n o t o n l y e n d e d t h e g r e a t f a r m

crisis of t h e 1920s a n d 1930s; it also b e g a n t h e G r e a t A m e r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r a l Revolution. The w a r a c c o m p l i s h e d t h e first b y c r e a t i n g a v a s t n e w m a r k e t for A m e r i c a n f a r m products a n d b r i n g i n g a h i g h level of p r o s p e r i t y to A m e r i c a n f a r m e r s . A n d as f a r m e r s m o v e d into t h e n e w economic boom, technological c h a n g e m o v e d for- w a r d a t a s t e p p e d up pace, e n a b l i n g f a r m e r s to e x p a n d p r o d u c t i o n in spite of only a s m a l l in- c r e a s e in l a n d d e v o t e d to crops a n d a s h a r p de- cline in t h e f a r m population. F o r some years, t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l colleges, t h e f a r m m a c h i n e r y companies, a n d o t h e r p r o d u c e r s of n e w f a r m

t e c h n o l o g i e s h a d e n c o u r a g e d f a r m e r s to i n v e s t in t h e m , b u t financial difficulties h a d r e s t r i c t e d t h e a b i l i t y of f a r m e r s to do so. Now, t h e decline in t h e f a r m l a b o r s u p p l y provided a d d e d stimu- lus, a n d i m p r o v i n g economic conditions re- m o v e d t h e m a i n obstacle. E v e n in t h e South, m a n y f a r m e r s could n o w afford to accept t h e ad- vice. T h u s , f a r m e r s i n c r e a s e d t h e n u m b e r of t r a c t o r s on A m e r i c a n f a r m s from 1.6 million in 1940 to 2.4 million five y e a r s l a t e r a n d also m a d e g r e a t e r u s e of h y b r i d corn, m e c h a n i c a l corn a n d cotton pickers, combines, h a y balers, p e a n u t h a r v e s t e r s , m i l k i n g m a c h i n e s , a n d chemicals. In spite o f h e a v y w a r t i m e d e m a n d for c o m m o d i t i e s like steel a n d chemicals, govern- m e n t policies e n c o u r a g e d t h e production of t h i n g s f a r m e r s n e e d e d to m e e t w a r t i m e goals.

The technological d e v e l o p m e n t s r e s u l t e d in o t h e r changes. The size of f a r m s e x p a n d e d w h i l e t h e n u m b e r declined, t h o u g h b y only a small a m o u n t , m o v i n g f r o m 6.1 to 5.9 million. Yields i n c r e a s e d m u c h m o r e r a p i d l y t h a n t h e y h a d for m a n y years; t o t a l f a r m o u t p u t a n d o u t p u t p e r f a r m w o r k e r rose e v e n m o r e rapidly.

A n e w t y p e of a g r i c u l t u r e w a s t a k i n g shape, one t h a t n e e d e d f e w e r a n i m a l s a n d f e w e r people. D u r i n g t h e war, l a r g e n u m b e r s of people m o v e d off of t h e f a r m s a n d into t h e a r m e d forces a n d city jobs. M a n y m o v e d eagerly, h o p i n g to escape u n d e r e m p l o y m e n t a n d low incomes.

The m i g r a t i o n r e d u c e d t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n sharply, m o r e so t h a n e v e r before. It dropped b y m o r e t h a n 6 million from 1940 to 1945, from 30.5 to 24.4 million. F r o m 1916 to 1920, t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n h a d declined 1.5 percent; from 1920 to 1925, t h e drop h a d b e e n 2.5 percent; from 1925 to 1930, 2.2; from 1933 to 1940, 6. N o w t h e decline w a s 20 percent!

W a r t i m e conditions r e d u c e d t h e n u m b e r of f a r m s b y a m u c h s m a l l e r p e r c e n t a g e , only s l i g h t l y a b o v e 3. The m i g r a t i o n consisted m a i n l y of y o u n g people, n o t f a r m owners. It w a s also a m o v e m e n t of s h a r e c r o p p e r s , w i t h t h e n u m b e r o f f a r m s o p e r a t e d b y s h a r e c r o p p e r s in t h e S o u t h falling from 541,291 to 446,556 or 17.5 p e r c e n t as m a c h i n e s r e p l a c e d people. Tech- nology p u s h e d people off of farms; opportunities, b o t h civilian a n d military, pulled t h e m off (His- torical Statistics, pp. 457, 465; Cochrane, ch. 7; Fite, 1981, ch. 5, 1984, ch. 8).

T h e G r e a t A m e r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n

The r e v o l u t i o n c o n t i n u e d long a f t e r t h e war, c o n t r i b u t i n g to t h e e m e r g e n c e of a n a t i o n t h a t w a s v e r y different from w h a t J e f f e r s o n h a d en- v i s i o n e d (Shover, i n t r o d u c t i o n a n d ch. 5; Fite, 1981, ch. 6 - 1 3 ) . U n l i k e t h e r e v o l u t i o n of t h e

10

n i n e t e e n t h century, t h i s one affected f a r m i n g e v e r y w h e r e in t h e nation, n o w h e r e m o r e t h a n t h e South, a n d w a s d e m o g r a p h i c as well as tech- nological. The technological side of t h e revolu- tion r e d u c e d n e e d s for people in t h e e s t a b l i s h e d f a r m i n g areas, and, in c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e nine- t e e n t h century, t h e r e w e r e no l a n d s a v a i l a b l e for m a k i n g n e w farms.

L o n g e s t a b l i s h e d agencies of c h a n g e p r o m o t e d t h e technological d i m e n s i o n of t h e revolution. T h e y included t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l colleges, t h e ex- p e r i m e n t s t a t i o n s , a n d t h e e x t e n s i o n services. T h e s e a g e n c i e s t r a i n e d people for t h e off-farm p a r t s of t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s y s t e m , conducted m u c h of t h e b a s i c r e s e a r c h on t h e n e w technol- ogies, a n d e n c o u r a g e d f a r m e r s to a d o p t t h e m . T h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s w o r k e d m a i n l y w i t h f a r m e r s w h o w e r e m o s t c a p a b l e of a c c e p t i n g a n d m a k i n g good u s e o u t of t h e advice, t h e s u b s t a n t i a l com- m e r c i a l ones, a n d w e r e influenced significantly b y o n l y one p a r t of a g r a r i a n i s m : t h e e n t h u s i a s m for f a r m e r s as producers. S e e k i n g to m a k e t h e f a r m e r s m o r e efficient a n d productive, t h e insti- t u t i o n s w e r e n o t s w a y e d b y a desire to hold a l a r g e p o p u l a t i o n on t h e land. Instead, t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e r e w e r e too m a n y people t h e r e affected t h e w o r k ( K i r k e n d a l l , 1986a, pp. 1 5 - 2 1 ) .

C o r p o r a t i o n s s u c h as J o h n Deere, Pioneer, a n d M o n s a n t o also f u n c t i o n e d as r e v o l u t i o n - aries. I m p o r t a n t p a r t s of t h e r a p i d e x p a n s i o n of A m e r i c a n i n d u s t r y d u r i n g t h e s e y e a r s , t h e y pro- duced t h e n e w t e c h n o l o g i e s a n d p r o m o t e d t h e i r u s e (Broehl, Williams, Lee, Kloppenburg).

The f a r m e r s w h o could afford t h e c h a n g e s wel- comed t h e p r o d u c t s of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . The n e w w a y s s e e m e d c a p a b l e of r e d u c i n g w o r k a n d i n c r e a s i n g efficiency, t h e r e b y m a k i n g f a r m life e a s i e r a n d t h e f a r m b u s i n e s s m o r e profitable. F a r m e r s w e r e no longer a c o n s e r v a t i v e group, a t l e a s t in t h e i r a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d technological change. Two decades of low financial r e w a r d s for t h e i r h a r d w o r k h a d h e l p e d to m a k e t h e m recep- t i v e to s u g g e s t i o n s t h a t t h e y should c h a n g e t h e i r w a y s . T h e y gave up t h e i r old h o s t i l i t y to "book f a r m i n g " a n d w e r e n o t h e l d b a c k b y a g r a r i a n i s m .

T h e technological c h a n g e h a d s e v e r a l compo- nents. The m o s t obvious w a s t h e mechanical: t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of t h e gasoline e n g i n e for ani- m a l a n d h u m a n p o w e r ( R a s m u s s e n , 1962). This involved f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e in t h e u s e of tractors. B y 1970, f a r m e r s e m p l o y e d 5 million of t h e m , well o v e r one for e a c h A m e r i c a n farm. A n d t h e y b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y p o w e r f u l a n d fast, p u l l i n g t w o - r o w p l a n t e r s a n d c u l t i v a t o r s a t first b u t ca- p a b l e o f h a u l i n g e i g h t a n d t w e l v e - r o w devices b y t h e 1970s. C o r n p i c k e r s i n c r e a s e d from 110,000 in 1940 to 792,000 in 1960; g r a i n com-

K i r k e n d a l l : U p to N o w

b i n e s rose from 190,000 to I million in t h e s a m e period (Historical Statistics, p. 469).

T h e r e w e r e also biological a n d chemical com- p o n e n t s to t h e r e v o l u t i o n . H y b r i d corn h a d com- p l e t e l y d i s p l a c e d its c o m p e t i t i o n b y t h e l a t e 1940s; t h e c o n s u m p t i o n of c o m m e r c i a l fertilizer i n c r e a s e d from 9.4 million t o n s in 1940 to 39.6 million in 1970 (Historical Statistics, p. 469). O t h e r c h e m i c a l s a t t a c k e d weeds, insects, a n d o t h e r e n e m i e s of crops, e l i m i n a t i n g j o b s t h a t h a d b e e n p e r f o r m e d b y hand.

A m e r i c a n f a r m s w e r e also electrified. F e w h a d h a d e l e c t r i c i t y in t h e e a r l y 1930s; v i r t u a l l y all f a r m s h a d it soon a f t e r World War II. This c h a n g e w a s e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t for f a r m women. M a k i n g it possible for t h e m to u s e a w i d e a r r a y of appliances, it r e d u c e d t h e i r w o r k loads in t h e i r h o u s e s a n d gave t h e m m o r e t i m e for o t h e r activities. E l e c t r i c i t y affected men's la- b o r a s well, m a k i n g possible, for example, a n i n c r e a s e in t h e n u m b e r of f a r m s w i t h m i l k i n g m a c h i n e s from 175,000 in 1940 to 712,000 fif- t e e n y e a r s later.

T h e s e s p e c t a c u l a r technological c h a n g e s m a d e t h e people w h o w o r k e d on f a r m s m u c h m o r e p r o d u c t i v e of food a n d fiber for h u m a n con- s u m p t i o n . T h e m e c h a n i c a l component, for ex- ample, r e l e a s e d s o m e f o r t y to fifty million acres f r o m feed production; t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of chemi- cals a n d h y b r i d s e e d i n c r e a s e d yields p e r acre. t Consequently, t h e n u m b e r of people s e r v e d b y one f a r m w o r k e r rose from less t h a n 11 in 1940 to m o r e t h a n f o r t y - s e v e n t h r e e decades l a t e r (Historical Statistics, p. 498). T h u s A m e r i c a n f a r m e r s d e v e l o p e d t h e c a p a c i t y to s e r v e a rap- idly e x p a n d i n g u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n t h a t m o r e t h a n d o u b l e d in t h o s e t h i r t y years. A n d t h o s e f a r m s p r o d u c e d m u c h t h a t could b e sold in foreign m a r k e t s as well.

As t h e t e c h n o l o g y o f A m e r i c a n a g r i c u l t u r e c h a n g e d a t a r e v o l u t i o n a r y pace, t h e n a t i o n also e x p e r i e n c e d a d e m o g r a p h i c revolution. People m o v e d in m a s s i v e n u m b e r s from f a r m to city a n d t o w n w i t h t h e v o l u m e - - o v e r t h i r t y mil- l i o n - s i m i l a r in size to t h e m o v e m e n t of Euro- p e a n s to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s from 1815 to 1914. T h i s t i m e t h e pace w a s m u c h m o r e r a p i d for only a t h i r d of a c e n t u r y w a s r e q u i r e d to accomplish t h e shift t h a t e a r l i e r h a d t a k e n a full century.

The technological c h a n g e s s u p p l i e d m u c h of t h e force b e h i n d t h e m o v e m e n t of people. T h e y c u t farming's n e e d for people b y r e d u c i n g t h e a m o u n t of h u m a n e n e r g y r e q u i r e d to produce a u n i t of o u t p u t or, to p u t t h i s a n o t h e r way, b y i n c r e a s i n g t h e goods t h a t each p e r s o n on t h e l a n d could t u r n out, b u t t h e n e w m a c h i n e s and o t h e r t e c h n o l o g i e s w e r e m o r e e x p e n s i v e t h a n t h e w a y s t h e y displaced, a n d t h e y p u t p r e s s u r e

11

A G R I C U L T U R E A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W I N T E R 1987

on f a r m e r s to e x p a n d t h e i r l a n d holdings so as to c a p t u r e t h e full p o t e n t i a l of t h e technology. Consequently, f a r m e r s w h o could do so s o u g h t to b u y o u t t h e i r n e i g h b o r s , a n d m a n y f a r m e r s chose to sell t h e i r l a n d for t h e y could not hope to m a t c h t h e c a p i t a l r e q u i r e m e n t s of a modern- ized f a r m 2 T h u s , as some f a r m e r s p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e r e v o l u t i o n b y a d o p t i n g t h e n e w technol- ogy, o t h e r s did so b y m i g r a t i n g a w a y from farm- ing.

H a d t h e prices t h a t f a r m e r s r e c e i v e d for t h e i r p r o d u c t s b e e n h i g h e r m o r e f a r m e r s m i g h t h a v e b e e n a b l e to r e s i s t t h e p r e s s u r e from t h e tech- nology a n d hold on to t h e i r farms. E c o n o m i s t s spoke of t h e "cost-price squeeze," giving it m u c h of t h e credit for t h e m i g r a t i o n , a n d price levels did p e r s u a d e m a n y f a r m e r s to sell t h e i r l a n d a n d o t h e r s to f a r m o n l y p a r t t i m e a n d rely u p o n off-farm j o b s for m u c h of t h e i r income. F a r m prices t h a t s e e m e d too low also s t i m u l a t e d some f a r m e r s to rebel, such a s t h o s e who j o i n e d t h e N a t i o n a l F a r m e r s O r g a n i z a t i o n a n d partici- p a t e d in efforts to force price rises b y holding c o m m o d i t i e s off t h e m a r k e t . B u t h o w different w o u l d t h e r e s u l t s h a v e b e e n if prices h a d b e e n h i g h e r ? P e r h a p s t h e m o r e efficient f a r m e r s w o u l d h a v e u s e d t h e i r e x p a n d e d r e s o u r c e s to m a k e offers for l a n d t h a t o t h e r f a r m e r s could n o t h a v e refused.

H i g h e r f a r m prices m i g h t h a v e w e a k e n e d s o m e w h a t t h e pull from t h e cities a n d towns. As t h i n g s were, off-farm j o b o p p o r t u n i t i e s h a d m u c h to do w i t h t h e m i g r a t i o n . T h e y w e r e un- u s u a l l y a b u n d a n t m o s t of t h e t i m e from 1941 to 1969, a n d t h e y p u l l e d people off of t h e l a n d b y offering, or a t l e a s t a p p e a r i n g to offer, b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h a n it s u p p l i e d Apparently, m a n y f a r m people did n o t b e l i e v e t h a t f a r m i n g p r o v i d e d a s u p e r i o r w a y of life.

T h u s , t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n dropped sharply. The n u m b e r of people on A m e r i c a n f a r m s d r o p p e d from 30.5 million in 1940 to 9.7 million in 1970. In 1940, t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n m a d e up 23.1 p e r c e n t o f t h e total; b y 1970, t h e p e r c e n t a g e h a d d r o p p e d to 4.8 (Historical Statistics, p. 457). As people m o v e d off of farms, t h e c o u n t r y church declined, a n d t h e one-room school h o u s e s u r r e n - d e r e d to t h e forces of consolidation (Fuller, p. 245)

In t h e South, t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n w a s espe- cially l a r g e (Fite, 1984, chs. 9 - 1 0 ; Daniel, 1985, book 4). The r e g i o n e x p e r i e n c e d a n e n o r m o u s r e d u c t i o n in t h e n u m b e r s of f a r m s a n d f a r m people. F a r m s d r o p p e d from 3 million in 1940 to 1.16 million in 1969. In t h e Middle West from Ohio a n d M i c h i g a n to N o r t h D a k o t a a n d K a n - sas, t h e decline in t h e s a m e period w a s from 2.1 to 1.15 million; in Iowa, t h e n u m b e r m o v e d from

213,000 to 140,000. The s o u t h e r n f a r m popula- tion d r o p p e d e v e n m o r e s h a r p l y t h a n t h e n u m - b e r of farms, falling from 16.4 to 4 million. B y comparison, t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n of t h e Middle West m o v e d from 9.3 to 4.5 million; of Iowa, from 931,000 to 565,000 (Historical Statistics, pp. 4 5 8 - 9 ) .

C h a n g e s t r u c k all p a r t s of s o u t h e r n agricul- t u r e . T h e cotton South, u n t o u c h e d b y t h e first technological r e v o l u t i o n , w a s t r a n s f o r m e d b y t h i s one. O n l y 11.7 p e r c e n t of t h e cotton f a r m s h a d t r a c t o r s in 1945; 73 p e r c e n t h a d t h e m in 1970. M e c h a n i c a l c o t t o n p i c k e r s h a r v e s t e d only 5 p e r c e n t of t h e cotton in 1949 b u t 96 p e r c e n t t w e n t y y e a r s later. Scientists, technicians, and m a n u f a c t u r e r s also c h a n g e d t h e cotton p l a n t it- s e l f so t h a t it w a s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e n e w ma- chines, a n d t h e y s u p p l i e d chemical w e e d killers a n d insecticides a n d m o r e chemical fertilizers. The technological c h a n g e s e n d e d t h e h a r d l a b o r t h a t h a d b e e n involved in chopping a n d picking cotton arid c u t t h e h o u r s r e q u i r e d to produce a b a l e of cotton from 140 to 25 (Fite, 1980).

T h e r e g i o n long d o m i n a t e d b y cotton b e c a m e a v e r y different place. It h a d f e w e r mules, f e w e r croppers, f e w e r blacks, a n d m o r e w a g e laborers. P l a n t a t i o n s , w h i c h h a d b e e n f r a g m e n t e d in t h e s h a r e c r o p p e r era, w e r e i n t e g a t e d once again, al- t h o u g h w i t h m a c h i n e s a n d d a y l a b o r e r s r a t h e r t h a n t h e g a n g s of slaves n o w doing t h e w o r k (Kirby). A n d t h e r e g i o n r a i s e d m u c h less cotton t h a n before as m u c h of it w a s shifted w e s t to f l a t t e r lands. In its place, s o u t h e r n f a r m e r s grew grass, hay, corn, s o y b e a n s , w h e a t , a n d t i m b e r a n d r a i s e d livestock a n d poultry. The l a s t w a s t r a n s f o r m e d from a m i n o r e n t e r p r i s e p r e s e n t on m o s t f a r m s to a h u g e f a c t o r y - s t y l e o p e r a t i o n in c o n f i n e m e n t facilities.

The sections of t h e S o u t h d e v o t e d to tobacco a n d rice also changed. T h e tobacco h a r v e s t re- lied m a i n l y on t h e l a b o r of people u n t i l t h e 1960s w h e n t h e s e f a r m e r s b e g a n to u s e mechan- ical h a r v e s t e r s . T h e r e s u l t s w e r e a r a p i d expan- sion in t h e size of tobacco farms, a d e c r e a s e in t h e n u m b e r of t h e m , a n d a decline in t h e n u m - b e r of people. Rice, a p a r t of s o u t h e r n agricul- t u r e t h a t h a d b e e n affected b y t h e first techno- logical r e v o l u t i o n , w a s r e m e c h a n i z e d b y t h e second a s t h e combine w a s p u t to w o r k in t h e rice h a r v e s t . This technological change, like t h e others, r e s u l t e d in a s h a r p r e d u c t i o n in t h e n u m b e r of people i n v o l v e d in a g r i c u l t u r e (Dan- iel, 1984).

O t h e r c h a n g e s a c c o m p a n i e d t h e s e transfor- m a t i o n s . T h e y r a i s e d t h e income of t h e a v e r a g e s o u t h e r n f a r m e r s u b s t a n t i a l l y , t h o u g h t h e y did n o t w i p e o u t t h e p o v e r t y t h a t h a d long p l a g u e d t h e r u r a l South. (It r e m a i n e d s u b s t a n t i a l , espe-

12

cially among r u r a l blacks.) The region became increasingly u r b a n and industrial. The devel- oping southern factories provided jobs for people moving off of farms. In 1940, more t h a n 43 per- cent of the southerners worked on farms; by 1970, less t h a n 7 percent did.

In spite of this mass movement off of farms, the United States did not become totally urban. Instead, the r u r a l population remained quite large, declining only from 57.2 to 53.9 million from 1940 to 1970, a decline of less t h a n 7 per- cent t h a t left the nation more t h a n 26 percent rural (Historical Statistics, p. 11). Many rural communities survived and prospered by chang- ing their economic base, shifting from agricul- t u r e to manufacturing, trade, services, and government. The n u m b e r of r u r a l counties de- pendent on farming declined from over 2,000 to about 700 from 1950 to 1970. Thus, m a n y farm people moved into towns r a t h e r t h a n cities, and some, including some farm women, continued to live on farms while t a k i n g on jobs in towns as a consequence of industrialization and other eco- nomic changes in rural areas. The industriali- zation of r u r a l areas and increased participation in the labor force by farm women raised the standard of living of and reduced the amount of poverty among farm people. 8 Many rural com- munities, including m a n y in Iowa, however, did not reduce their dependence on agriculture and thus declined as the farm population did (Korsching).

T h e C o n t r i b u t i o n s o f G o v e r n m e n t Government policies contributed both nega-

tively and positively to the Great American Ag- riculture Revolution. In spite of the rapidly shrinking n u m b e r of farmers, the federal gov- e r n m e n t remained actively involved with agri- culture (Cochrane and Ryan; Shover, ch. 7; Fite, 1981, chs. 6-11). This was so, in part, because farmers had effective organizations in Washing- ton, such as the American Farm Bureau Feder- ation, the National Farmers Union, and various commodity groups. Furthermore, skillful and well-placed representatives of farmers served in Congress and helped shape policy. Also, agrari- anism remained a part of the scene, helping farmers get government programs. Latter-day Jeffersonians continued to employ the rhetoric about the value of family farmers, the need to keep t h e m on the land, and t h e importance of government programs for t h a t purpose. The pro- grams emphasized were those designed to m a k e farming an efficient and profitable business.

Government policies had a somewhat ambig- uous relationship with the demographic dimen- sion of the revolution. Washington made no ef-

Kirkendall: Up to Now

fort to plan the migration. There was a strong tendency to regard planning as "unAmerican" during much of the period, and Congress had destroyed the m a i n agricultural planning agency. Secretary Wallace had given t h a t re- sponsibility to the USDA's Bureau of Agricul- t u r a l Economics in 1938, and the BAE had been authorized to develop state and local planning committees to help with the work, but these de- velopments had generated fears in the Farm Bu- r e a u and among its allies in Congress, and they had killed the planning c o m m i t t e e s during the war and t a k e n away the BAE's responsibilities as central planner in 1946 (Kirkendall, 1982, chs. 9-13). So the migration went forward in an unplanned way.

The federal government also scrapped efforts to hold the r u r a l poor on the land by improving their conditions there. The New Deal had estab- lished agencies for t h a t purpose, most notably the Farm Security Administration, but they too r a n into trouble with the Farm Bureau and other powerful participants in farm politics, and Congress destroyed the FSA in 1946, replacing it with the much less ambitious Farmers Home Administration t h a t never had much money to help poor farmers improve their operations and become owners of farms (Baldwin). There con- tinued to be talk about the problems of the rural poor but little action, even during the War on Poverty during the 1960s.

The nation relied mainly on economic forces to solve the problems of the r u r a l poor. There was not even a substantial effort to t r a i n rural people for urban life. Thus, the migration ad- vanced without much guidance, regulation, or assistance and contributed to the major riots in American cities in the second h a l f of the 1960s.

Washington also failed to enforce the acreage limitation principle of national reclamation law. The principle h a d been designed to guarantee t h a t federal irrigation projects would increase the n u m b e r of family farmers by opening up new land for farming t h a t would be available only to t h e m and forcing the breakup of large farms in established farming areas when recla- mation projects were established in them, but enforcement was now defined as unrealistic, es- pecially in the gigantic Central Valley Project in California. Enforcement of the principle there, its foes argued, would deprive corporate farms of the large holdings they had earned and interfere with economic growth (Pisani; Kirken- dall, 1964, 1979; Goldschmidt; Koppes).

The federal government tried but failed to eliminate the cost-price squeeze. National poli- cymakers m a i n t a i n e d the price-support system t h a t had been established by the New Deal.

13

AGRICULTURE AND HUMAN VALUES--WINTER 1987

Some politicians, most notably Ezra Taft Ben- son, the Secretary of Agriculture during most of the 1950s, talked of getting the government out of agriculture (Schapsmeiers, Peterson), but the real debate focused on the level of price sup- ports. Washington also tried to enlarge demand, m a k i n g use of Public Law 480, the school lunch program, and the food stamp plan, to move American farm products into foreign and domes- tic markets. But in spite of such efforts, the cost- price squeeze remained a problem and was es- pecially severe in t h e mid-1950s.

What all of this means is t h a t the federal gov- e r n m e n t made some efforts to slow migration but rejected others. Obviously, given the size of the movement off of farms, the efforts t h a t were made to hold people on the land were not effec- tive. Perhaps the emphasis on farm prices was misguided. Perhaps the policymakers should have looked more closely at the problems farm people faced. And policymakers certainly did not help the cause of family farming by passing tax laws t h a t made farm land a tax shelter, thereby encouraging city people to invest in it.

Government policy had a clearly positive re- lationship with the technological dimension of the revolution. As Don Hadwiger argues, the "special interests" t h a t dominate the shaping of agricultural policy have been "firmly committed to a developmental strategy," one t h a t encour- ages the "trend toward large efficient farms" and aims at "a productive and efficient U.S. ag- riculture" (1986). "The support of the Farm Bu- reau, regional commodity interests, and the co- ops helped make technology a reality in agricul- t u r e " William P. Browne wrote in a comment on an earlier draft of this paper. "It was hardly imposed from the outside. ''7 National agencies supported prices and made payments and loans to farmers, and t h e y frequently used the result- ing resources to buy technology and land. The government supplemented what farmers could obtain from the m a r k e t and from private credit agencies and made the largest payments and loans to the largest farmers, thereby helping t h e m to expand t h e i r operations still more (Cochrane, 1985, pp. 1005-6). And policymak- ers rejected proposals to place a low cap on pay- ments, to eliminate subsidies to the largest farmers, and give special funds to smaller oper- ators. In addition, the federal government con- ducted and financed research t h a t contributed in basic ways to the revolution, and the research t h a t received federal funding was dominated by the interest in m a k i n g farming productive and profitable, not holding people on the land (High- tower; Hadwiger, 1982; Newby, pp. 130-2, 138-9).

The Agricultural System With Washington m a k i n g important contri-

butions, the agricultural revolution moved for- ward, and as it moved, it reconstructed the agricultural system. Although often called "agribusiness," the system included government agencies and public educational and research institutions as well as urban, town, and farm businesses (Fusoni; Rasmussen, p . 3408-13; McGovern, pp. 496-518; Shover, Ch. 6; Merrill; Goldschmidt). Except for the n u m b e r of farms and farmers, all parts of the system including the farms, grew larger, and the farmers grew more dependent on the system's other compo- nents.

The revolution reduced the n u m b e r and en- larged the size of American farms. The number dropped 56 percent in 30 years, moving from 6.1 million in 1940 to 2.7 million in 1969. The av- erage size expanded from 175 to 373 acres. By 1960, 23,000 farms grossed over $100,000, per year and produced and sold 17 percent of the total farm output. A decade later, although the price rise h a d been small, 53,000 farms grossed over $100,000, and they, although only 2 percent of the farms, produced and sold 34 percent of the national farm product (Cochrane, 1985, pp. 1002-3).

The revolution cut the n u m b e r of family farms but did not destroy the type. The system also included plantations and industrialized cor- porate farms, both of which employed the latest technology and people who worked for salaries and wages (Newby, 148-53). Another type, part- time farms were worked by families who often used the new technology but depended heavily on income earned from nonfarm jobs. Owner- operated farms had reached a peak of 3.96 mil- lion in 1945, but dropped to 3.92 million by 1950 and 2.95 million in 1959. A decade later, the n u m b e r h a d fallen to 2.37 million. Yet the owner-operated family farm continued to be the most numerous type. In fact, it became a larger part of the total t h a n ever before. In 1945, owners operated 67 percent of the farms. By 1969, t h e y operated 87 percent. Tenancy dropped from approximately 40 percent of the total in 1940 to about 15 percent three decades later. And sharecropping in the South virtually disappeared, falling from 446,556 farms in 1945 to 121,037 in 1959 and becoming so small in n u m b e r t h e r e a f t e r t h a t the Census Bureau ceased t r e a t i n g it as a special category (Rhodes; Rasmussen, pp. 3474-83; Historical Statistics, p. 465).

The revolution had not substituted industrial- ized corporate farms for family farms. Instead, n e a r l y all of the family farms t h a t had gone out

14

of e x i s t e n c e h a d b e e n a b s o r b e d b y o t h e r f a r m s of t h e s a m e type. C a p a b l e b e c a u s e of t h e n e w t e c h n o l o g y of f a r m i n g l a r g e r u n i t s , some f a m i l y f a r m e r s h a d e x p a n d e d t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s b y b u y - ing t h e i r n e i g h b o r s ' land. As one critic of t h e process, Wendell Berry, s u g g e s t e d , " f a r m e r s be- c a m e convinced t h a t it w o u l d be b e t t e r to o w n a neighbor's f a r m t h a n to h a v e a n e i g h b o r . . . "'

T h e r e v o l u t i o n also e n l a r g e d t h e size a n d im- p o r t a n c e of t h e off-farm c o m p o n e n t s of t h e agri- c u l t u r a l s y s t e m (Newby, 1 4 6 - 8 ) . T h e y included all of t h e b u s i n e s s e s involved in t h e production a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n of food a n d fiber, such as t h e feed, seed, chemical, a n d f a r m m a c h i n e r y com- p a n i e s a n d t h e firms t h a t processed a n d distrib- u t e d f a r m products. As t h e r e v o l u t i o n m o v e d forward, it shifted functions, such as t h e produc- tion of energy, seed, a n d fertilizer, off of farms, m a k i n g f a r m e r s m o r e d e p e n d e n t on t h e m a r - k e t - a n d on corporations a n d c o o p e r a t i v e s - - t h a n e v e r before, for t h e y n o w n o t only sold on it b u t b o u g h t m o r e things, i n c l u d i n g m o r e food. A n d off-farm c o r p o r a t i o n s also shifted r i s k s a n d m a n a g e m e n t off of some f a r m s b y d e v e l o p i n g c o n t r a c t f a r m i n g , m o s t n o t a b l y in t h e p o u l t r y b u s i n e s s .

P e r f o r m i n g a wide v a r i e t y of functions, t h e off-farm firms in t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s y s t e m ob- t a i n e d m o s t of its income. B e t t e r t h a n h a l f of t h e dollars c o n s u m e r s s p e n t on food a n d fiber w e n t to t h e processors a n d d i s t r i b u t o r s , w h i l e t h e firms t h a t s u p p l i e d c o m m o d i t i e s to f a r m e r s o b t a i n e d m o s t of t h e rest, l e a v i n g m u c h less t h a n h a l f of t h e dollars s p e n t b y c o n s u m e r s on a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s for t h e people on t h e farms.

F a r m e r s did n o t d e p e n d solely on t h e m a r k e t for t h e i r income. T h e y r e c e i v e d some from an- o t h e r i m p o r t a n t p a r t of t h e s y s t e m , t h e federal g o v e r n m e n t .

A g r i p o w e r , t h e F o o d Crisis, a n d t h e B o o m B y t h e 1970s, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d devel-

oped a n e w a n d e n o r m o u s l y p r o d u c t i v e agricul- t u r a l s y s t e m , a n d d u r i n g t h e decade, t h a t sys- t e m s e e m e d u n u s u a l l y v a l u a b l e for t h e world as well a s t h e nation. It s e e m e d to give t h e U.S. s u b s t a n t i a l power, c o m p a r a b l e to w h a t some o t h e r n a t i o n s o b t a i n e d from oil, especially in a w o r l d in w h i c h food a p p e a r e d to be a scarce com- modity. Thus, once again, as in t h e world w a r s , t h e federal g o v e r n m e n t e n c o u r a g e d A m e r i c a n f a r m e r s to p u t all of t h e i r l a n d into production, a n d t h e y e n j o y e d a boom.

T h e idea t h a t a g r i c u l t u r e s u p p l i e d a p o w e r b a s e t h a t could b e u s e d to accomplish political objectives h a d a long history, b u t t h e i d e a w a s n o w g i v e n a n e w n a m e : " a g r i p o w e r " (Weber). It

K i r k e n d a l l : U p to N o w

h a d b e e n e x p r e s s e d in s u c h slogans as " K i n g Cotton" a n d "Food Will Win t h e W a r " in t h e p r o g r a m s of o v e r s e a s r e l i e f following t h e world w a r s , in foreign aid, in P o i n t Four, a n d in Public L a w 480 ( R a s m u s s e n , pp. 3 1 9 5 - 3 2 0 9 , 3 2 2 9 - 3 7 , 3 1 0 0 - 5 ; McGovern, pp. 4 5 4 - 6 1 , 5 1 8 - 3 0 ) . Now, E a r l Butz, a m o n g others, e x p r e s s e d t h e idea w i t h g r e a t clarity. "Food is p o w e r " he insisted. " A g r i p o w e r will b e m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n petro- power." "Food is a tool in t h e k i t of A m e r i c a n diplomacy."

A p p l y i n g to i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs t h e b e l i e f in t h e s u p e r i o r i m p o r t a n c e of a g r i c u l t u r e , espe- cially A m e r i c a n a g r i c u l t u r e , a g r i p o w e r w a s in- fluenced b y n e w w o r r i e s a b o u t A m e r i c a n power. T h e n a t i o n h a d failed to m a n a g e t h e V i e t n a m War s u c c e s s f u l l y a n d t h e n e n c o u n t e r e d p r e s s u r e from t h e oil-producing s t a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e A r a b n a t i o n s in t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n of P e t r o l e u m E x p o r t i n g C o u n t r i e s w h o e m b a r g o e d t h e export of oil to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s l a t e in 1973 to p r o t e s t a g a i n s t A m e r i c a n s u p p o r t for Israel. The t h e o r y a s s u m e d t h a t food w a s of b a s i c i m p o r t a n c e , m o r e v i t a l t h a n oil or w e a p o n s , a n d t h e Ameri- c a n a g r i c u l t u r a l s y s t e m w a s v a s t l y s u p e r i o r to all others, a n d t h e t h e o r i s t s s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e U.S. could, i f t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t controlled t h e nation's a g r i c u l t u r a l e x p o r t s w h e n e v e r and w h e r e v e r t h a t w a s necessary, b e c o m e once a g a i n t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l n a t i o n , c a p a b l e of influencing others, i n c l u d i n g t h e A r a b s a n d t h e Soviets.

E v e n b e f o r e t h e oil e m b a r g o , W a s h i n g t o n em- p l o y e d t h e t h e o r y in its d e a l i n g s w i t h t h e Soviet Union. T h a t n a t i o n faced a n u m b e r of agricul- t u r a l p r o b l e m s , i n c l u d i n g a n inefficient agricul- t u r a l s y s t e m , s h o r t a g e s of a g r i c u l t u r a l machin- ery, i n a d e q u a t e rainfall, a n d a p e r c e i v e d n e e d to i n c r e a s e m e a t c o n s u m p t i o n . The N i x o n admin- i s t r a t i o n , h o p i n g for d e t e n t e as well as t h e ex- p a n s i o n of exports, n e g o t i a t e d a l a r g e g r a i n deal in 1972. U s i n g a g r i p o w e r in a positive way, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s sold to t h e S o v i e t s 19 million tons of grain, o n e - f o u r t h of t h e A m e r i c a n crop, at low prices.

Talk of a world food crisis c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e d e v e l o p i n g s e n s e of p o w e r from A m e r i c a n agri- c u l t u r e (Shover, ch. 8). The crisis s e e m e d es- p e c i a l l y s e v e r e in 1 9 7 3 - 7 4 w h e n w i d e s p r e a d d r o u g h t a n d s o a r i n g fertilizer prices dropped food s u p p l i e s a n d r e s u l t e d in millions of d e a t h s in p a r t s of A s i a a n d Africa. A l t h o u g h too m u c h p r o d u c t i o n r a t h e r t h a n too little h a d b e e n de- fined r e p e a t e d l y since 1920 as t h e b a s i c f a r m problem, n o w s o m e s t u d e n t s of such m a t t e r s m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h e n e w crisis w a s a l o n g - t e r m r a t h e r t h a n a t e m p o r a r y p h e n o m e n o n , r e s u l t i n g from a " p o p u l a t i o n explosion" t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o r l d a n d i n a d e q u a t e a g r i c u l t u r a l s y s t e m s in

15

A G R I C U L T U R E A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W I N T E R 1987

m o s t of it. To some, it s e e m e d t h a t t h e predic- t i o n s of T h o m a s M a l t h u s a b o u t t h e i n e v i t a b l e p r e s s u r e of p o p u l a t i o n on food supplies h a d come t r u e . A n d t h e crisis e x i s t e d in spite of t h e " G r e e n R e v o l u t i o n : ' R e p r e s e n t e d m o s t promi- n e n t l y b y a n a g r i c u l t u r a l s c i e n t i s t from Iowa, N o r m a n B o r l a u g , w h o w o r k e d in Mexico a n d t h e n A s i a a n d r e c e i v e d t h e N o b e l Prize for his c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e e x p a n s i o n of world food pro- d u c t i o n in t h e l a t e 1960s, t h a t r e v o l u t i o n now s e e m e d to b e faltering.

E x p o n e n t s of t h e crisis t h e o r y often criticized A m e r i c a n s . T h e y r e c e i v e d criticism for t h e i r c o n s u m p t i o n of r e d m e a t , w h i c h h a d i n c r e a s e d s p e c t a c u l a r l y since World War II as a conse- q u e n c e of u n p r e c e d e n t e d prosperity. To t h e crit- ics, t h i s s e e m e d a w a s t e f u l w a y of u s i n g grain. T h e y also objected to A m e r i c a n c o n s u m p t i o n of alcohol, energy, chemicals, c h a r g i n g t h a t Amer- i c a n p r a c t i c e s d e p r i v e d o t h e r people of food t h e y n e e d e d to survive.

The i d e a of a food crisis g e n e r a t e d v a r i o u s pro- posals. One, " T r i a g e " a concept d e r i v e d from m i l i t a r y medicine, divided n a t i o n s into t h o s e t h a t could b e s a v e d a n d t h o s e t h a t could not a n d r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t efforts b e c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h e first group. A few r e f o r m e r s proposed t h a t t h e a m o u n t of l a n d d e v o t e d to a g r i c u l t u r e should be increased, b u t o t h e r s insisted t h a t n e a r l y all l a n d c a p a b l e of b e i n g u s e d for agri- c u l t u r e w a s in use. A m o r e f r e q u e n t l y proposed solution, p o p u l a t i o n control, e n c o u n t e r e d diffi- culties for it w a s opposed b y groups as different as t h e Vatican a n d t h e P e o p l e s Republic of C h i n a a n d d e p e n d e d u p o n a c h a n g e in a t t i t u d e s as well as t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e r e q u i r e d tech- nology. To m o s t of t h o s e concerned a b o u t t h e food problem, one k e y to its solution w a s agri- c u l t u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t , w h i c h w o u l d include t h e p r o d u c t i o n a n d u s e of n e w crop v a r i e t i e s , t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of fertilizer, t h e u s e of insecticides, i r r i g a t i o n , r e f o r m s in g o v e r n m e n t a n d l a n d sys- t e m s , a n d t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of n e w s y s t e m s of cropping, i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d incentives.

D e v e l o p m e n t d e p e n d e d on o u t s i d e help. It h a d to come from t h e a l r e a d y d e v e l o p e d n a t i o n s a n d also t h e oil-rich c o u n t r i e s organized in OPEC. T h o s e g r o u p s h a d to s u p p l y capital a n d technol- ogy on a m a s s i v e scale. The U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d to c o n t r i b u t e s o m e of t h e capital, m u c h of t h e "knowhow," a n d m o s t of t h e e m e r g e n c y supplies of food. To do t h e last, t h e U.S. n e e d e d to stop l i m i t i n g f a r m p r o d u c t i o n a n d store a n d distrib- u t e grain.

M u c h c o n t r o v e r s y a t t e n d e d t h e discussions of a g r i c u l t u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t . A t times, d e b a t e re- v o l v e d a r o u n d t h e size of t h e A m e r i c a n contri- b u t i o n . C o n t r o v e r s y also focused on t h e role of g o v e r n m e n t , for, w h i l e s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e

d i s c u s s i o n i n s i s t e d t h a t only g o v e r n m e n t could r e s p o n d a d e q u a t e l y to needs, o t h e r s b e l i e v e d in t h e s u p e r i o r i t y of p r i v a t e agencies. This w a s a d i v i d i n g line b e t w e e n t h e R e p u b l i c a n a n d Dem- ocratic a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e decade.

C o n t r o v e r s y also s w i r l e d a b o u t t h e applicabil- i t y of t h e A m e r i c a n model. This p a r t of t h e de- b a t e focused on machinery. Critics of t h e model e m p h a s i z e d t h e l a r g e supplies of h u m a n l a b o r in t h e d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s and did n o t welcome t h e d e m o g r a p h i c r e v o l u t i o n involved in Ameri- can d e v e l o p m e n t . Critics also objected to t h e l a r g e role o f c h e m i c a l s in t h e A m e r i c a n s y s t e m , s t r e s s i n g t h e t h r e a t to t h e e n v i r o n m e n t .

As t h e d e b a t e m o v e d along, l e a d e r s in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D e p a r t m e n t of A g r i c u l t u r e re- sponded in 1973 to t h e i d e a of t h e food crisis b y p r o m o t i n g full production. N o w h e a d e d b y E a r l Butz, a n a g r i c u l t u r a l e c o n o m i s t from P u r d u e University, t h e d e p a r t m e n t r e l a x e d controls on p r o d u c t i o n a n d u r g e d f a r m e r s to p l a n t fence row to fence row. F a r m e r s , m o s t of w h o m h a d n e v e r l i k e d g o v e r n m e n t controls, w e l c o m e d t h e n e w advice. To p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l sys- t e m , it s e e m e d u n l i k e l y t h a t foreign m a r k e t s w o u l d d i s a p p e a r or t h a t s u r p l u s e s w o u l d reap- pear.

In 1975, t h e food s i t u a t i o n b e g a n to i m p r o v e s o m e w h a t . The c h a n g e r e s u l t e d in p a r t from h e a v i e r r a i n f a l l in s o m e areas, t h o u g h t h a t w a s offset b y poor h a r v e s t s in t h e Soviet U n i o n a n d m u c h of E u r o p e a n d c o n t i n u e d r e d u c t i o n in t h e u s e of fertilizer. T h e i m p r o v e m e n t r e s u l t e d also from a record g r a i n h a r v e s t in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t h a t e n a b l e d t h e n a t i o n to e x p a n d food aid a n d sales.

U.S. a g r i c u l t u r a l e x p o r t s r e a c h e d a record high, r i s i n g 70 p e r c e n t above t h e 1970 level b y 1976. W i t h g r a i n e x p o r t s especially large, t h e n a t i o n b e c a m e t h e l e a d i n g g r a i n exporter, sup- p l y i n g m o r e t h a n h a l f of t h e world's exports of g r a i n c o m p a r e d w i t h a t h i r d in t h e l a t e 1960s a n d a f o u r t h in t h e mid-1950s. The f a r m exports c o m p e n s a t e d for t h e i n c r e a s e d cost of oil im- ports, chiefly from t h e Middle E a s t , a n d of ex- p e n s i v e i t e m s from J a p a n a n d Europe. A l t h o u g h t h e n e w a g r i c u l t u r a l s y s t e m h a d some critics, i n c l u d i n g J i m H i g h t o w e r a n d Wendell Berry, t h e s e r e s u l t s s e e m e d to prove its g r e a t v a l u e (Cochrane, ch. 8; F i t e , 1981, ch. 11).

The exports p l e a s e d f a r m e r s b u t a l a r m e d s o m e c o n s u m e r s , c r e a t i n g a difficult s i t u a t i o n for t h e F o r d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , w h i c h also w a n t e d good r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Soviet U n i o n a n d looked u p o n g r a i n as c a p a b l e of s e r v i n g t h a t end. Sell- ing 10.3 million t o n s of g r a i n to t h e Soviets in 1975, t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n e n c o u n t e r e d p r o t e s t s from c o n s u m e r a n d l a b o r groups. So in l a t e s u m - m e r - e a r l y fall of t h a t year, W a s h i n g t o n u s e d

16

agripower negatively, embargoing grain as a means of pressuring the Soviets into a long-term agreement and responding to domestic forces, but farmers, the Farm Bureau, leading Demo- crats, rural congressmen, including Republicans from farm states, and the grain companies howled in protest. In these circumstances, the administration worked out an agreement to sell to the Soviet Union at least 6 million tons of grain per year from 1976 to 1980 as long as supplies at home were adequate.

Political leaders now backed farther away from the negative use of agripower, though some theorists continued to favor that. The Ford Ad- ministration considered a grain embargo early in 1976 as a means of pressuring the Soviet Union to withdraw Cuban troops from Angola b u t rejected the idea and then joined the Demo- crats in criticizing negative use of agricultural resources. J i m m y Carter, the Democratic can- didate for the presidency, promised t h a t he would not embargo grain as Ford had. All of this suggested t h a t agripower would be used only in positive ways, ones t h a t would enlarge rather t h a n reduce the m a r k e t for American farm prod- ucts and thus m a k e use of the great productive capacity of American agriculture.

Viewed as enormously important in the for- eign relations of the United States, American farmers enjoyed a boom similar to those they had experienced during the world wars. It began with a doubling of the world prices for wheat, rice; feed grains, soybeans, and other products from 1972 to 1974 and continued with smaller increases in 1975. Per capita income from farm- ing rose above the off-farm level in 1973, reach- ing 110.2 percent, more t h a n 35 points above the levels of the 1960s. Although net farm in- come dropped from the high of $33.3 billion in 1973, it remained quite high in 1974 ($26.1 bil- lion) and 1975 ($24.5 billion) compared with the 1969 figure ($14.3 billion).

The farm situation weakened in 1976-77 as farm prices dropped while the costs of commod- ities like fuel and fertilizer rose, and this trig- gered a new episode in farm protest. Net farm income fell to $17.8 billion by 1977, and a new farm organization, the American Agricultural Movement, emerged. It staged a series of dem- onstrations from 1977 to 1980, often with farm- ers (obviously modern farmers) mounted on their tractors in Washington, D.C. and other places of political importance. " . . . these were large f a r m e r s . . , who had embraced technology, gotten themselves in trouble with high interest rates, and wanted a bailout" William P. Browne maintains. "They might be called technocratic proponents who wrapped themselves in the . . . ~agrarian m y t h "''8 They criticized established

Kirkendall: Up to Now

farm organizations and programs, demanded 100 percent of parity, and t h r e a t e n e d farm strikes, seeking to t a k e advantage of the great importance of farmers by neither planting crops or buying city-produced goods. The AAM did at- tract serious attention, and the government did expand its help to farmers in 1977-78, b u t the strike t h r e a t failed, and the movement did not get a law g u a r a n t e e i n g parity prices at the 100 percent level. Most commercial farmers and the established farm organizations refused to sup- port the movement, and consumer groups and their political representatives opposed it.

Many farmers had grown concerned about consumers. Now enormous in size compared with the farm population, t h e y appeared to have become too powerful and to lack sympathy for farmers. So the latter embarked upon public re- lations campaigns, hoping to gain more appre- ciation in the nation's cities.

The farm situation improved in 1978 and 1979. N e t income from farming rose from $17.8 to $26.1 and then $31 billion. And the per capita income for farmers compared with nonfarmers rose from 87.1 to 102.4 percent.

The boom enhanced the value of land owner- ship. As farmers continued to substitute tech- nology for people, the farm population dropped 38 percent during the decade, which exceeded the percentage drops of the 1940s and the 1950s and equaled t h a t of the 1960s. Moving from 9.71 to 6.05 million, the farm population fell below 3 percent of the American total by 1980. The in- crease in yield per acre for most crops slowed down, so farmers expanded output mainly by increasing the acres devoted to crops and live- stock. In these circumstances, land values soared, rising over 200 percent during the dec- ade (Cochrane, 1985, p. 1003), and the owner- ship of land provided a rich resource on which farmers borrowed to b u y technology and addi- tional land. Credit organizations, including gov- e r n m e n t ones, promoted the borrowing, even raising credit limits as land values rose2

The boom slowed b u t did not halt the decline in the n u m b e r of farms. The number had dropped 30 percent in the 1950s and 26 percent in the 1960s, b u t it fell only 18 percent in the 1970s, and nearly all of t h a t took place in the first h a l f of the decade. The numbers suggest t h a t the desire and ability to hold on to a farm had increased, b u t t h e y also indicate t h a t the desire and ability to expand holdings still had considerable strength.

The figures also m e a n t t h a t production for the m a r k e t was concentrating on fewer and fewer farms. The farms grossing over $100,000 per year, 11 percent of the total n u m b e r of farms, now produced and sold 66 percent of the total

17

A G R I C U L T U R E A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W I N T E R 1987

f a r m o u t p u t (Cochrane, 1985, p. 1003). This de- v e l o p m e n t a r o u s e d t h e concern of a liberal Sec- r e t a r y of A g r i c u l t u r e , Bob B e r g l u n d , in 1 9 7 9 - 80, b u t t h i s w a s r a t h e r l a t e to e x p r e s s such a concern, for t h e n e w s t r u c t u r e of A m e r i c a n f a r m i n g h a d b e e n t a k i n g s h a p e for m a n y years.

T h e b o o m c o n t r i b u t e d to w h a t some o b s e r v e r s called a " r u r a l r e n a i s s a n c e " as r u r a l America, in spite of t h e c o n t i n u e d decline in t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n , g r e w m o r e r a p i d l y t h a n u r b a n A m e r i c a . B u t a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o s p e r i t y w a s n o t t h e m a i n factor r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e r e n a i s s a n c e , for in places like I o w a w h e r e m a n y r u r a l coun- t i e s still d e p e n d e d chiefly on a g r i c u l t u r e , t h o s e c o u n t i e s lost p o p u l a t i o n d u r i n g t h e decade. Ob- viously, e v e n d u r i n g t h e f a r m boom, r u r a l coun- t i e s n e e d e d to i n d u s t r i a l i z e or r e d u c e t h e i r de- p e n d e n c e on a g r i c u l t u r e in o t h e r w a y s in order to enjoy g r o w t h (Korsching).

F o r m a n y f a r m e r s , t h e 1970s w a s a r e l a t i v e l y good t i m e , one in w h i c h t h e y could o p e r a t e t h e i r b u s i n e s s e s a t a profit. H i g h l y productive, t h e y w e r e e n c o u r a g e d to p r o d u c e e v e n m o r e a n d re- ceived p r a i s e a s people who could save t h e world from s t a r v a t i o n a n d m a k e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l nation. As a consequence, t h e i r b a s i c r e s o u r c e - - t h e l a n d - - s e e m e d u n u s u a l l y v a l u a b l e . G o v e r n m e n t officials a n d b a n k e r s u r g e d t h e m to f a r m all t h e l a n d t h e y had, ex- p a n d t h e i r l a n d holdings a n d u p d a t e t h e i r tech- nology so as to b e c o m e m o r e efficient a n d pro- ductive, a n d b o r r o w m o n e y for t h e s e purposes. T h u s , f a r m d e b t m o u n t e d . F a r m e r s w i t h a sense of h i s t o r y m i g h t h a v e recalled t h a t s i m i l a r cir- c u m s t a n c e s from 1915 to 1920 h a d e n d e d in dis- aster, b u t m a n y f a r m e r s - - a n d m a n y people who a d v i s e d f a r m e r s - - b e l i e v e d t h e y h a d e n t e r e d a n e w s i t u a t i o n t h a t w o u l d c o n t i n u e indefinitely (Cochrane, ch. 8; Fite, 1981, chs. 11-13; Fite, 1984, ch. 11; Soth).

T h e N e w C r i s i s In 1981, however, t h e b o o m of t h e 1970s

ended, as t h e b o o m of World War I h a d in 1920. F a r m i n g a n d r u r a l life h a d b e e n revolutionized since t h e g r e a t crisis of t h e 1920s a n d 1930s, b u t t h e n e w crisis, j u s t like t h e one before it, w a s e s p e c i a l l y s e v e r e for t h o s e w h o e n t e r e d it heav- ily in debt. F o r t h e m , t h e crisis t h r e a t e n e d t h e i r s u r v i v a l a s f a r m e r s . A n d m a n y faced d e a t h as f a r m e r s e v e n t h o u g h in m o s t w a y s t h e y w e r e good f a r m e r s w h o o w n e d s u b s t a n t i a l f a r m s a n d t h e l a t e s t technology. T h e y faced extinction e v e n t h o u g h t h e y h a d p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e revo- l u t i o n a n d in t h e efforts to feed t h e world a n d m a k e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a p o w e r f u l nation.

S e v e r a l forces p r o d u c e d t h e n e w crisis (Harl, S t a n l e y J o h n s o n , Gratto). 1° O n e w a s t h e enor- m o u s p r o d u c t i v i t y of A m e r i c a n farmers. W h a t

h a d s e e m e d a b l e s s i n g n o w felt like a curse. In- flation also c o n t r i b u t e d . It h a d b e g u n w i t h t h e nation's fiscal policy d u r i n g t h e V i e t n a m War, h a d w o r s e n e d as a r e s u l t of t h e s h a r p increase in e n e r g y costs a f t e r 1972, a n d h a d become a n a n t i c i p a t e d p a r t of life b y t h e l a t e 1970s. Deci- sions m a d e b y m a n y people a s s u m e d t h a t prices w o u l d c o n t i n u e to rise a t a r a p i d pace. The h u g e d e b t b u r d e n on m a n y f a r m e r s w a s still a n o t h e r factor. O l d e r f a r m e r s e a g e r to b r i n g y o u n g fam- ily m e m b e r s into f a r m i n g h a d s o m e of t h e debt, b u t y o u n g f a r m e r s s h o u l d e r e d m o s t of t h e b u r - den. T h e decisions t h a t t h e s e different groups of f a r m e r s h a d m a d e r a i s e d t h e f a r m d e b t in t h e n a t i o n from less t h a n $50 billion in t h e e a r l y 1970s to over $200 billion b y t h e e a r l y 1980s.

The d e b t s i t u a t i o n m a d e f a m e r s h i g h l y vul- n e r a b l e to a n y difficulties t h a t m i g h t e m e r g e in t h e f a r m economy. The s i t u a t i o n w a s especially d a n g e r o u s for t h o s e w i t h d e b t s e q u a l to or above 40 p e r c e n t of assets. In t h e n a t i o n as a whole, 20 p e r c e n t of t h e f a m e r s w e r e in t h o s e circum- stances; in t h e Middle West, t h e p e r c e n t a g e w a s e v e n higher, a s h i g h as 38.3 in Iowa in 1986 (Harl, 1987).

Two m o v e s b y t h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t h i t a n d h a r m e d t h e s e f a r m e r s . B e g i n n i n g in Octo- b e r 1979, t h e F e d e r a l R e s e r v e B o a r d a t t a c k e d inflation b y forcing i n t e r e s t r a t e s to rise sharply. The policy c u t inflation from a b o u t 15 p e r c e n t to 3 - 4 p e r c e n t w i t h i n a few years. Then, in 1981, P r e s i d e n t R o n a l d R e a g a n proposed a s h a r p c u t in taxes, a n d C o n g r e s s r e s p o n d e d w i t h t h e Economic R e c o v e r y Act. One m a j o r con- s e q u e n c e w a s m a s s i v e deficits in t h e federal b u d g e t .

T h e s e policies h a d t w o i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t s for f a r m e r s . T h e y c u t exports b y s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e dollar; t h e y r a i s e d costs of p r o d u c t i o n b y push- ing u p i n t e r e s t rates.

O t h e r factors c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e w o r s e n i n g of t h e s i t u a t i o n . O f these, t h e e x p a n s i o n of food p r o d u c t i o n in t h e c o u n t r i e s t h a t competed w i t h A m e r i c a n f a r m e r s a n d in t h e d e v e l o p i n g coun- t r i e s w a s e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t . A l t h o u g h star- v a t i o n c o n t i n u e d to be a p r o b l e m in s o m e places, t h e "world food crisis" now a p p e a r e d to be a m y t h . World corn p r o d u c t i o n b y 1 9 8 6 - 8 7 w a s m o r e t h a n 40 p e r c e n t h i g h e r t h a n it h a d b e e n a decade before w h i l e s o y b e a n production h a d r i s e n 61 p e r c e n t a n d w h e a t o u t p u t h a d ex- p a n d e d 20 p e r c e n t (Harl, 1987). F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e slowing d o w n of economic g r o w t h a n d o t h e r economic t r o u b l e s in c o u n t r i e s t h a t h a d b e e n m a j o r p u r c h a s e r s of A m e r i c a n f a r m p r o d u c t s re- duced t h e i r a b i l i t y to i m p o r t food.

The v a r i o u s forces c a m e t o g e t h e r to produce a n especially l a r g e drop in A m e r i c a n agricul- t u r a l exports. T h e y fell from $43.8 billion in

18

1981 to $26.3 billion in 1986. Exports of corn and w h e a t dropped by especially large amounts; those of cotton and rice decreased by smaller quantities. American exports to Europe, the So- viet Union, and the developing nations fell off. These trends indicated t h a t American agricul- ture was not as important as had been assumed in the 1970s and t h a t alternatives to it had more strength t h a n had been believed.

The Carter administration's negative use of agripower has also been blamed for the crisis. Responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghani- stan in 1979, the administration embargoed grain sales to the Soviet Union. In doing so, Carter violated the agreement t h a t had been made four years before. According to critics, this not only slashed the Soviet m a r k e t for American grain b u t generated doubts throughout the world about the United States as a reliable sup- plier of farm commodities. A recent report by the Economic Research Service indicates, how- ever, t h a t U.S. losses of international m a r k e t share were not caused principally by the em- bargo. 11 As Lauren Soth summarized the report, the embargo and the earlier ones did not affect U.S. exports "significantly. .... Grain exports de- clined after 1981, to be sure, due to world reces- sion, the high-valued dollar and increased pro- duction of grain in other countries" Soth writes. "The embargo evidently didn't persuade import- ers t h a t the United States was unreliable, though of course t h e y claimed it did in their trade bargaining:'

The crisis hit agriculture throughout the country b u t struck the Middle West the hardest blows. The prices of agricultural commodities dropped although not as sharply as t h e y had in 1920-21, 1929-33, and 1952-53,12 and did so while prices of most other goods and services rose, although more slowly t h a n they had a short time before. The prices of farm land also fell. Grain prices, which were so important in the Middle West, dropped farther t h a n farm prices generally. And in Iowa, the price of the average acre of farm land plummeted from $2,147 in 1981 to $787 in 1986 (Des Moines Reg- ister, hereafter DMR, December 19, 1986).

Net farm income fell and would have dropped farther if government payments had not been raised. Income, which had reached $31 billion in 1979, $33 billion in 1973, moved close to $24 billion in 1986. Government payments to farm- ers, which had been less t h a n a billion dollars in 1975 and not far above a billion in 1980, rose to $9.3 billion in 1983, $10 billion in 1986.13 The average per farm, which had been only $320 in 1975, was $3,922 in 1983 (Statistical Abstract, p. 646). Writing of Iowa, a state heavily depen- dent on the export m a r k e t and increasingly de-

Kirkendall: Up to Now

pendent on grain as b e e f shifted out of the state and poultry advanced at the expense of beef, an agricultural economist, Stanley R. Johnson, ob- served in the mid-eighties: "We used to have crops and livestock. Now we have crops and gov- e r n m e n t payments!" There had been, in other words, a significant increase in the farmers' de- pendence on one p a r t of the agricultural system: the federal government.

The crisis had a number of consequences. More t h a n a normal number of farmers lost their farms through foreclosure. Many had to spend their savings, cash their insurance poli- cies, sell some of their land and machinery, re- duce health care for themselves and their fami- lies, and t a k e off-farm jobs. And m a n y of those hit hardest were among the most productive farmers. They tended to be the younger, more ambitious farmers with substantial, highly cap- italized farms.

And the crisis reached beyond the farms and farmers. It affected entire rural communities (DMR, F e b r u a r y 10, 1987). Their businesses lost sales as farmers cut their purchases and activi- ties sharply, and their governments lost tax money and were forced to cut back on budgets for schools, health facilities, and other public services. The crisis damaged larger communi- ties also, places such as Waterloo, Iowa where J o h n Deere operated large facilities for the man- ufacture of farm machinery. Many of the firms t h a t emphasized sales to farmers could not find customers for their products, could not obtain p a y m e n t s for goods they had sold earlier, and obtained assets of low value when they fore- closed. "Many of the industries t h a t support ag- r i c u l t u r e - f e r t i l i z e r , farm chemicals and ma- c h i n e r y - - o v e r e x p a n d e d right along with their customers during the boom y e a r s of the 1970s" a writer for the Des Moines newspaper com- mented recently. "And with agriculture itself, they've been struggling in the last several years to adjust to much leaner times" (DMR, F e b r u a r y 9, 1987). 14 In Iowa, one of the states with an u n u s u a l l y high level of dependence on agricul- ture, the state as a whole suffered an estimated loss of 33,000 people from 1981 to 1986 (Korsch- ing).

The crisis resulted in serious distress for fi- nancial institutions. The F a r m Credit System lost $2.7 billion in 1985; sixty-eight agricultural b a n k s failed t h a t year, and further distress seemed likely for m a n y of the borrowers from such institutions, especially those operated by the federal government, had very heavy debts. The circumstances persuaded the institutions to charge high interest rates compared with those outside the farm areas, thereby forcing farmers who were not in financial difficulty to pay for

19

A G R I C U L T U R E A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W I N T E R 1987

t h o s e w h o were. T h e difficulties g e n e r a t e d pres- s u r e for actions to h e l p b o t h b o r r o w e r s a n d lend- ers, d e b a t e over h o w to do so, a n d f e a r t h a t t h e crisis w o u l d l a s t so long t h a t b o t h t h e f a r m i n g a n d t h e finance sectors of t h e s y s t e m w o u l d b e s e v e r e l y d a m a g e d (Brake).

The crisis h a d psychological as well as eco- nomic d i m e n s i o n s (Lasley). S t r e s s levels rose; t h e r e w a s m o r e t e n s i o n b e t w e e n f a r m h u s b a n d s a n d wives; f a r m children h a d m o r e p r o b l e m s in school, a n d r u r a l n e i g h b o r s c l a s h e d m o r e fre- q u e n t l y w i t h one another. A n d t h e r e w a s evi- dence of g r o w i n g p e s s i m i s m a m o n g farmers. T h e I o w a poll r e p o r t e d in 1986 t h a t few f a r m e r s h a d p l a n s for expansion, a n u m b e r i n t e n d e d to scale d o w n b y selling or r e n t i n g some l a n d or losing it t h r o u g h forfeiture, 12 p e r c e n t p l a n n e d to sell out, 8 p e r c e n t expected to be foreclosed, m o r e t h a n 3 p e r c e n t p l a n n e d to file for b a n k - ruptcy, a n d a g r o w i n g n u m b e r b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e q u a l i t y of life for f a r m people w a s d e t e r i o r a t i n g .

U n l i k e e a r l i e r periods of f a r m crisis, this one h a s n o t g e n e r a t e d a m a s s u p r i s i n g o f farmers. It c e r t a i n l y h a s n o t p r o d u c e d a m o v e m e n t compa- r a b l e to t h e P o p u l i s t R e v o l t in w h i c h millions of f a r m e r s j o i n e d in a gigantic p r o t e s t m o v e m e n t (Goodwyn). P e r h a p s t h e d e m o g r a p h i c r e v o l u t i o n is t h e key. It h a s n o t only r e d u c e d t h e n u m b e r of f a r m e r s c a p a b l e of e n g a g i n g in rallies a n d d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , b u t b y doing so, it m a y h a v e g i v e n f a r m e r s a s e n s e of powerlessness. S m a l l in n u m b e r s now, t h e y m a y feel i n c a p a b l e of doing m u c h a b o u t t h e i r fate, a t l e a s t t h r o u g h political action of a P o p u l i s t variety. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e role of g o v e r n m e n t in agricul- t u r e , e s p e c i a l l y t h e g o v e r n m e n t p a y m e n t s , so m u c h l a r g e r n o w t h a n in e a r l i e r crises, m a y ex- p l a i n w h y f a r m e r s h a v e n o t r e b e l l e d as t h e y did earlier. T h o s e p a y m e n t s , of course, r e s u l t e d in p a r t from political action b u t of a different t y p e t h a n t h e P o p u l i s t s employed. It involved pres- s u r e g r o u p efforts b y o r g a n i z a t i o n s like t h e F a r m B u r e a u . T h a t group's l e a d e r s do n o t ap- p e a r to feel powerless. 15

T h e F i n a l C r i s i s ? T h e r e h a s b e e n s o m e p r o t e s t d u r i n g t h e cur-

r e n t crisis, m u c h of it on b e h a l f of f a r m e r s r a t h e r t h a n b y f a r m e r s t h e m s e l v e s . A n d t h e pro- t e s t h a s r e v e a l e d t h a t a g r a r i a n i s m h a s sur- vived, for t h a t is t h e ideology e x p r e s s e d b y t h e p r o t e s t e r s . One t h e m e in t h e r h e t o r i c s e e m s es- p e c i a l l y significant. It is t h e p r e d i c t i o n t h a t t h i s m a y b e t h e final crisis of t h e f a m i l y farm. T h a t i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t once h a d millions of r e p e s e n t a - t i v e s m a y die o u t a s a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e crisis, c o n c e r n e d people insist. The f a m i l y f a r m m a y be d i s p l a c e d b y t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e d corporate f a r m

o w n e d b y s t o c k h o l d e r s a n d w o r k e d b y employ- ees. " R u r a l crisis s p a w n i n g n e w corporate own- ers a s f a m i l y f a r m s fade," a h e a d l i n e in t h e Des Moines Register p r o c l a i m e d on F e b r u a r y 8 t h of t h i s year. " . . . t h e f a r m crisis h a s become a fun- d a m e n t a l force in h a s t e n i n g t h e e n d of a society b u i l t on i n d e p e n d e n t farms, s m a l l t o w n s a n d a n economic e q u a l i t y t h a t m a d e t h e r u r a l M i d w e s t a special p a r t of A m e r i c a " t h e article reported. "It w a s n o t in T h o m a s Jefferson's n a t i v e Vir- ginia, b u t in places such as O'Brien C o u n t y [Iowa], w h e r e t h e J e f f e r s o n i a n vision of a n a g r a r i a n n a t i o n c a m e closest to reality. . . . . To m a n y observers," t h e j o u r n a l i s t added, "it s e e m s e v i d e n t t h a t t h e n e x t decade or two m a y w r i n g t h e l a s t s h r e d of m e a n i n g from t h e t e r m Tamily f a r m : "

A l t h o u g h t h e r e a r e people inside a n d outside a g r i c u l t u r e w h o m a i n t a i n t h a t f a r m i n g is valu- a b l e o n l y as a source of food a n d fiber or a n o p p o r t u n i t y to succeed or fail, t h a t f a r m s m u s t c o n t i n u e to g r o w l a r g e r a n d t h a t f a r m e r s who c a n n o t g e t b i g m u s t g e t o u t (e.g., Merrill O s t e r in Comstock), o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e f a r m pol- itics of t h e p r e s e n t find o t h e r v a l u e s in f a r m i n g t h a t m u s t be p r e s e r v e d , h a v e n o t been, a n d a r e n o w t h r e a t e n e d w i t h extinction. T h e s e agrari- a n s include Wendell Berry, a K e n t u c k y f a r m e r a n d w r i t e r ; J i m H i g h t o w e r , a w r i t e r a n d Texas C o m m i s s i o n e r of A g r i c u l t u r e ; S e n a t o r Tom H a r - k i n of Iowa; t h e N a t i o n a l Catholic R u r a l Life C o n f e r e n c e a n d t h e Catholic bishops; t h e Rev. D a v i d O s t e n d o r f o f t h e U n i t e d C h u r c h of C h r i s t a n d P r a i r i e f i r e R u r a l Action, a n d groups like t h e I o w a F a r m U n i t y Coalition, t h e N o r t h A m e r i c a n F a r m Alliance, a n d t h e C e n t e r for Ru- ral Affairs. S u c h i n d i v i d u a l s a n d organizations offer a w a y of i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e crisis t h a t m a k e s it a p p e a r to b e m u c h m o r e t h a n t r o u b l e in one sector o f t h e A m e r i c a n b u s i n e s s s y s t e m (Com- stock; Agriculture a n d H u m a n Values).

T h e s e a g r a r i a n s e x p r e s s a n u m b e r of old t h e m e s . T h e y s p e a k a n d w r i t e of t h e g r e a t v a l u e of close c o n t a c t w i t h n a t u r e . T h e y p r o t e s t t h a t b i g b u s i n e s s a n d b i g g o v e r n m e n t , including p a r t s o f t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s y s t e m - - t h e F a r m Bu- r e a u , t h e l a n d - g r a n t colleges, t h e a g r i b u s i n e s s c o r p o r a t i o n s - - a r e i n s e n s i t i v e a n d oppressive. T h e y a r g u e t h a t m a n y f a r m e r s a r e t r e a t e d un- f a i r l y a n d t h a t t h r e a t s to f a m i l y f a r m e r s are t h r e a t s to t h e nation. T h e y t a l k of r e t u r n i n g p o w e r to t h e people a n d of a f a r m e r - l a b o r alli- ance, a n d t h e y i n s i s t t h a t g o v e r n m e n t should s u p p l y m o r e h e l p to real farmers: f a m i l y farm- ers. In t h i s v i e w o f things, t h e "cost-price squeeze" is a m y t h i c a l version o f t h e c r u s h i n g of f a m i l y f a r m e r s b e t w e e n g i a n t corporations on e a c h side of t h e s y s t e m allied w i t h a n d aided b y

20

the government. The results are large profits for the corporations and concentration of land own- ership.

Above all, these Jeffersonians of the late t w e n t i e t h century warn t h a t if the situation is not changed, family farms will disappear and all farming will be done by corporations. "Since World War II, corporate power and government programs have combined to eliminate three mil- lion small farms and accelerate big-business domination of farming," Hightower has written. "But until now, the family farmers have per- sisted, hunkered down, and become more effi- cient. Reaganculture promises to finally drive them to the suburbs and the factories." Accord- ing to Maurice J. Dingman, recently retired as the Catholic bishop of Des Moines: "A coporate takeover is imminent. Family farms are disap- pearing. A national policy should be adopted stating clearly and forcibly t h a t the ideal type of farm is t h a t of family farming" People such as this repeat the argument t h a t family farms are important for democracy for they distribute power and shape strong personalities; they in- sist t h a t family farms are highly efficient, more so t h a n large corporate farms, and they main- tain t h a t family farms guarantee better care of land and animals, reasonable prices for and a continuous supply of food, and superior commu- nities (e.g., DMR, F e b r u a r y 10, 11, March 8, 1987).

Is there any justification for the prediction t h a t this m a y be the final crisis of the family farm? There are some supporting facts, includ- ing the survival during the crisis of the giant operators, those with gross annual sales of over $500,000 per year. Seldom family-owned and worked farms, they obtained over one-third of the farm income and kept their expenses under control more satisfactorily t h a n mid-sized farm- ers. Because of their size, they could work out good deals on purchases and credit and could finance much of their operations (DMR, March 3, 1987). Furthermore, t h e y obtained higher p a y m e n t s from government. While the average p a y m e n t in 1983 was under $4,000, the average for farms with these large sales was nearly $47,000 (Statistical Abstract, p. 646).

There are other bases for the prediction. The farm population has continued to drop, falling from 6.05 million in 1980 to 5.75 million in 1984; the n u m b e r of farms has continued to de- cline, moving from 2.43 million in 1980 to 2.285 million in 1985 (Statistical Abstract, pp. 633, 635). And the decline has t a k e n place mostly among the middle-sized farms in acres and sales, those t h a t are, in most cases, owned and operated by families, while big farms have sur-

Kirkendall: Up to Now

vived and even increased in number. By 1985, less t h a n 5 percent of the farmers produced and sold nearly h a l f of the total farm product while 70 percent of the farmers contributed 13 percent of the total. As Cochrane points out, "the re- structuring of the farm sector continues at a rapid pace in the direction of fewer and fewer and larger and larger farms" (Cochrane, 1985, pp. 1003-4).

Yet, other facts pose difficulties for the predic- tion. Even after the great decline in farms from 1940 to 1980, only a tiny fraction of the remain- ing farms were genuine corporate farms, owned by stockholders and worked by people paid wages and salaries. In 1982, there were only 1,143 corporate farms t h a t were not owned by families and were owned by eleven or more stockholders. Nearly all corporate farms (over 50,000) were essentially family farms, owned by families and fewer t h a n eleven stockholders (Statistical Abstract, p. 638). And, as has been t r u e since the beginning of the revolution, nearly all recent purchases of farms have been made by other farmers, not by corporations or other u r b a n investors, although the actual pur- chases by corporations and other outsiders have been large enough in some places to generate alarm (DMR, F e b r u a r y 19, 1987; Farmline, April 1987, as reported in Ames Tribune, April 27, 1987).

Furthermore, farms are not declining rapidly enough for family farms to disappear in the near future. While the number of farms dropped 6 percent in the first h a l f of the 1980s and this exceeds the 4 percent decline from 1975 to 1980, the rate is far below t h a t of each five-year period from 1950 to 1975. Then, the percentage was never below 12 and reached as high as 15. Even in Iowa, where the rate of decline in the 1980s is above the national average, the decline is slower t h a n it was in the 1960s, the decade in which the n u m b e r of farms in the state fell most rapidly (DMR, F e b r u a r y 8, 1987). Some of the people who are alarmed now distinguish be- tween the present decline and the ones during the revolution, suggesting t h a t most of the ear- lier migrants from farm to town and city were incompetent farmers while those who are leav- ing now are good ones and most of those who left before the 1980s did so voluntarily while those leaving during the crisis are being forced out. As H a r k i n has put this: "What is happening in rural America is nothing less t h a n the great- est forced migration in our nation's history." Per- haps these assumptions are correct, although m a n y of the earlier decisions to migrate were made u n d e r heavy pressure and bad business decisions by farmers in the later Seventies-early

21

A G R I C U L T U R E A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W I N T E R 1987

E i g h t i e s c o n t r i b u e d to t h e loss of f a r m s in t h e Eighties. P e r h a p s t h e pace of c h a n g e will accel- erate, b u t it will n e e d to do so v e r y significantly for t h e p r e d i c t i o n to b e fulfilled.

In addition, t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l social, economic, a n d political factors w o r k i n g for t h e s u r v i v a l of f a m i l y f a r m s as t h e m a i n t y p e of A m e r i c a n farm. T h e s e i n c l u d e t h e efficiency of t h e w i s e l y capitalized, w e l l - m a n a g e d f a m i l y farm. T h e r e is also t h e desire of s o m e people to farm, a desire t h a t is so s t r o n g w i t h t h e m t h a t t h e y are willing to accept a r e l a t i v e l y low r a t e of r e t u r n on t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t a n d l a b o r (Newby, 144, 148). An- o t h e r factor is t h e poor i n v e s t m e n t o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t f a r m i n g offers as c o m p a r e d w i t h o t h e r pros- p e c t s open to c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d t h o s e who w o u l d b u i l d t h e m . H e r e , t h e t a x reforms of 1986 m a d e a c o n t r i b u t i o n b y a t t a c k i n g tax-loss farming. A n d t h a t c h a n g e in policy s u g g e s t s a n o t h e r pos- sibility t h a t could h e l p f a m i l y f a r m s survive. G o v e r n m e n t policies, a n d also corporate poli- cies, could b e d e v e l o p e d t h a t w o u l d serve t h i s goal, p e r h a p s m o r e effectively t h a n it h a s b e e n s e r v e d in t h e p a s t (DMR, F e b r u a r y 15, 1987).

E v e n t h e w e a t h e r favors f a m i l y farms. In t h e Middle West, a t least, c o r p o r a t e f a r m i n g ap- p e a r s to be a d v a n c i n g only in a r e a s like p o u l t r y a n d livestock, ones t h a t a r e not affected signifi- c a n t l y b y n o r m a l c h a n g e s in weather. Thus, t h e i r w o r k forces can b e e m p l o y e d each d a y a n d for r e g u l a r hours. Work on crops is, however, affected b y w e a t h e r a n d b e s t done b y people w i t h flexible schedules. As a f a m i l y f a r m com- b i n e s a h o m e a n d a b u s i n e s s , t h e people on it a r e a b l e to w o r k long h o u r s w h e n t h e w e a t h e r p e r m i t s , c u t b a c k w h e n it does not. TM

C o n c l u s i o n s The t r e n d t o w a r d f e w e r a n d f e w e r f a r m s con-

t i n u e s a n d s e e m s c e r t a i n to persist, y e t it s e e m s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n is t h e final crisis of t h e f a m i l y farm. P e r h a p s t h e prediction t h a t it is is o n l y a n effort to c o n t i n u e to derive political benefits from J e f f e r s o n i a n a g r a r i a n i s m . B u t if t h i s is t h e final crisis, or i f a n e w techno- logical r e v o l u t i o n f e a t u r i n g biotechnology a n d n e w i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m s finally d e s t r o y s fam- ily f a r m i n g (Office of Technology Assessment), should t h e n a t i o n as a w h o l e be u p s e t b y such a t u r n of e v e n t s ? I s n ' t t h e p r e s e n t too late to be- come concerned? N o w t h a t t h e n u m b e r of f a r m s a n d t h e size of t h e f a r m p o p u l a t i o n h a v e become so small, w h a t difference does it m a k e to t h e n a t i o n w h e t h e r o u r f a r m s a r e p l a n t a t i o n s , cor- porations, or f a m i l y u n i t s ? Certainly, one can no longer a r g u e c o n v i n c i n g l y t h a t t h e s u r v i v a l of d e m o c r a c y d e p e n d s u p o n t h e s u r v i v a l of t h e f a m i l y farm. I f t h a t political s y s t e m m u s t h a v e such a base, t h e n d e m o c r a c y in A m e r i c a m u s t

h a v e p e r i s h e d long ago! We h a v e only a few fam- ily f a r m e r s n o w - - a n d h a d only a few before t h e c u r r e n t crisis hit. In 1980 as well as in 1987, f a r m people c o n s t i t u t e d less t h a n 3 p e r c e n t of t h e t o t a l A m e r i c a n population.

The o n l y w a y to m a k e f a m i l y f a r m s signifi- c a n t from a d e m o c r a t i c p o i n t of v i e w w o u l d b e to i n c r e a s e t h e n u m b e r substantially. T h a t w o u l d i n v o l v e a large-scale p r o g r a m of l a n d re- form e m p h a s i z i n g r e d i s t r i b u t i o n so t h a t m a n y m o r e people w o u l d o w n land, live on it, and de- p e n d on it for t h e i r livelihoods. It w o u l d r e q u i r e t h a t l a r g e f a r m s b e b r o k e n into s m a l l u n i t s and t h a t t h e r e s u l t i n g s t r u c t u r e of s m a l l - f a r m agri- c u l t u r e b e p r e s e r v e d .

A l t h o u g h t h e r e a r e a d v o c a t e s of l a n d reform of t h a t t y p e , 17 t h e r e s e e m s little possibility of s u c h a change. Surely, few of t h e e x i s t i n g family f a r m e r s favor it. F u r t h e r m o r e , some a n a l y s t s ar- gue t h a t it w o u l d m o v e A m e r i c a as a whole in a n u n d e m o c r a t i c direction for it w o u l d m e a n h i g h e r food prices, a factor of g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e in t h e l i v e s of all people a n d especially t h o s e w i t h low incomes t h a t m u s t b e d e v o t e d to t h e n e c e s s i t i e s of life. In addition, t h e t h e o r y of t h e s u r p l u s f a r m p o p u l a t i o n h a s r e e m e r g e d in A m e r i c a n t h i n k i n g a b o u t a g r i c u l t u r e , providing a r a t i o n a l e for y e t m o r e r e d u c t i o n in t h e n u m b e r of f a r m s a n d f a r m e r s , a l t h o u g h also s t i m u l a t i n g s u g g e s t i o n s for m o r e i n t e l l i g e n t m a n a g e m e n t of m i g r a t i o n t h i s t i m e (Gauthier). T h e r e is, of course, a l a r g e p r o b l e m confronting t h i s solution to f a r m problems: t h e n o n f a r m economy is n o t p r o d u c i n g j o b s as a b u n d a n t l y as it did earlier.

In t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t n o w exist, t h e f a r m policy d e b a t e s e e m s m u c h m o r e likely to focus, as it h a s since t h e 1920s, on t h e issue of s t r e n g t h e n i n g f a r m i n g as a b u s i n e s s t h a n on t h e q u e s t i o n of b u i l d i n g a b a s e for democracy. The c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e b a s i c a l l y t h o s e c r e a t e d b y t h e G r e a t A m e r i c a n A g r i c u l t u r a l Revolution: a complex a n d h i g h l y p r o d u c t i v e a g r i c u l t u r a l sys- t e m t h a t i n c l u d e s w i t h i n it a small n u m b e r of f a r m s a n d f a r m e r s c o m p a r e d w i t h w h a t existed only a h a l f c e n t u r y ago. T h e d e b a t e o v e r h o w to m a k e t h o s e f a r m s profitable b u s i n e s s e s h a s de- veloped t h r e e m a j o r sides. TM One e m p h a s i z e s m o r e effective g o v e r n m e n t control of production so as to b a l a n c e s u p p l y a n d d e m a n d a t a h i g h e r level of prices. A second group a d v o c a t e s recap- t u r i n g t h e world m a r k e t for America's h i g h l y p r o d u c t i v e f a r m e r s b y l o w e r i n g prices a n d im- p r o v i n g m a r k e t i n g opportunities. A n d t h e t h i r d option is r e l i a n c e on science a n d t e c h n o l o g y to develop a d d i t i o n a l crops a n d i m p r o v e d livestock a n d p o u l t r y a n d to devise a l t e r n a t i v e u s e s for f a r m p r o d u c t s a n d f a r m land.

T h e s e proposals, u n l i k e t h e one for l a n d redis- t r i b u t i o n , accept t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s y s t e m t h a t

22

h i s t o r y h a s p r o d u c e d so far. A l t h o u g h people can b r e a k w i t h t h e past, as t h e concept of r e v o l u t i o n implies, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of doing so does not s e e m l a r g e a t t h i s j u n c t u r e . The would-be revolution- a r i e s a p p e a r to h a v e little s t r e n g t h . T h e r e s e e m s little l i k e l i h o o d of a n y t h i n g m o r e t h a n modifi- cations in t h e s y s t e m , p e r h a p s a r e d u c t i o n or r e d e s i g n of t h e role of g o v e r n m e n t for t h e costs of t h e f a r m p r o g r a m s h a v e become e n o r m o u s , m u c h of t h e m o n e y goes to f a r m e r s who a r e n o t in financial difficulties, a n d t h e p r o g r a m s h a v e n o t p r e v e n t e d f a r m s a n d f a r m e r s from declining in n u m b e r a n d h a v e e v e n c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e de- cline, " h e l p i n g " as Willard C o c h r a n e p u t s it, "one g r o u p of f a r m e r s do in a n o t h e r group" (Cochrane, 1985, pp. 1 0 0 6 - 9 ) . E v e n proposals for c h a n g e of t h i s m a g n i t u d e w o u l d s u r e l y en- counter, a n d a r e e n c o u n t e r i n g , s t r o n g opposition from g e n e r a l f a r m a n d c o m m o d i t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s w h o a r e r e s p o n s i v e to t h e larger, m o r e finan- cially s e c u r e f a r m e r s . F e a r i n g loss of price sup- p o r t funds, t h e y dislike proposals to t a r g e t ben- efits to t h e w e a k e r f a r m e r s . 19

S t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e f a r m b u s i n e s s is not t h e s a m e as g u a r a n t e e i n g t h e s u r v i v a l of f a m i l y farms. T h e A m e r i c a n h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e dur- ing t h e p a s t h a l f c e n t u r y clearly m a k e s t h a t point. Thus, i f one of t h e policy options t r i u m p h s a n d w o r k s to m a k e f a r m i n g m o r e profitable, a n d e v e n i f its l a b e l p r o c l a i m s t h a t its p u r p o s e is to save t h e f a m i l y farm, w e can expect t h a t f a m i l y f a r m s will c o n t i n u e to decline in n u m b e r as n e w m e r g e r s a r e w o r k e d out. This n e e d n o t m e a n , however, t h a t c o r p o r a t e farms, o w n e d b y stock- h o l d e r s a n d o p e r a t e d b y e m p l o y e e s , will become t h e m a j o r t y p e of f a r m in t h e U n i t e d States.

I f w e wish, we c a n m a i n t a i n t h e s y s t e m in w h i c h m o s t of t h e f a r m s a r e o w n e d a n d o p e r a t e d b y families. C h a m p i o n s of t h e "1890" l a n d - g r a n t u n i v e r s i t i e s a n d T u s k e g e e University, t h o s e t h a t w e r e e x c l u s i v e l y b l a c k i n s t i t u t i o n s in t h e past, m a i n t a i n t h e y h a v e m u c h of v a l u e to t e a c h t h e o t h e r l a n d - g r a n t schools for w h i l e t h e l a t t e r w e r e e n c o u r a g i n g m i g r a t i o n o u t of f a r m i n g b y s m a l l f a r m e r s , t h e b l a c k schools w e r e w o r k i n g w i t h s u c h f a r m e r s , h e l p i n g t h e m survive. A n d t h e s e schools h a v e b e e n s t r e n g t h e n e d b y federal l e g i s l a t i o n in t h e 1980s s u p p l y i n g m o r e ade- q u a t e financial s u p p o r t for r e s e a r c h a n d exten- sion a n d h a v e b e e n d r a w n into n a t i o n a l r e s e a r c h a n d p l a n n i n g efforts (Williams a n d Williamson, 8 - 1 7 ) .

F u r t h e r decline in t h e n u m b e r of f a m i l y f a r m s n e e d n o t m e a n t h a t s m a l l c o m m u n i t i e s m u s t c o n t i n u e to decline a n d die (Guither). Instead, t h e y could develop n e w bases, d e p e n d less on a g r i c u l t u r e a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l policies, m o r e u p o n i n d u s t r i a l a n d c u l t u r a l policies, including ones t h a t h e l p e l d e r l y people w h o h a v e r e t u r n e d to

K i r k e n d a l l : U p to N o w

r u r a l c o m m u n i t i e s f r o m t h e cities (Williams a n d Williamson, 15-16). R e d u c i n g r u r a l America's d e p e n d e n c e on a g r i c u l t u r e w o u l d not b e a n e w move. I n s t e a d , it w o u l d c o n t i n u e a t r e n d t h a t h a s b e e n u n d e r w a y for a n u m b e r of y e a r s , a n d t h u s p l a n n e r s a n d p o l i c y m a k e r s could d r a w u p o n a v a i l a b l e experiences. T h o s e e x p e r i e n c e s n e e d to b e explored a n d analyzed, as do t h e im- p l i c a t i o n s for c o m m u n i t i e s t h a t do d e p e n d on a g r i c u l t u r e of p r o p o s e d a g r i c u l t u r a l policies, s u c h as t h o s e t h a t w o u l d t a k e acres o u t of crop p r o d u c t i o n (Korsching).

To b e u s e f u l now, t h e a g e n c i e s of c h a n g e in r u r a l A m e r i c a , a b o v e all t h e l a n d - g r a n t u n i v e r - sities, m u s t h a v e a b r o a d outlook. T h e y m u s t s e r v e all r u r a l i n t e r e s t s , n o t o n l y t h e i n t e r e s t in m a k i n g t h e f a r m b u s i n e s s m o r e p r o d u c t i v e a n d profitable, a n d s e e k to e n r i c h r u r a l society in v a r i o u s w a y s . To do so, t h e u n i v e r s i t i e s m u s t h a v e s t r e n g t h in b o t h t h e b a s i c a n d t h e applied sciences a n d in t h e social sciences a n d h u m a n i - t i e s a s w e l l (Bonnen). Efforts to orient t h e s e uni- v e r s i t i e s in t h e s e w a y s s e e m c e r t a i n to g e n e r a t e conflict of t h e sort t h a t w a s so p r o m i n e n t in t h e e a r l y y e a r s of t h e l a n d - g r a n t s y s t e m , a l t h o u g h t h e p a r t i e s to t h e c o n t r o v e r s y a r e m o r e h i g h l y d e v e l o p e d n o w ( G l e n n J o h n s o n , 1984).

The a g r i c u l t u r a l s y s t e m faces s e v e r a l serious challenges. T h e decline of t h e n u m b e r of f a r m s h a s a l i e n a t e d s o m e people from it. So h a s pol- l u t i o n of t h e e n i v r o n m e n t a n d t h e food s u p p l y b y m o d e r n farming's h e a v y u s e of chemicals. T h e p r o d u c t i o n of s u r p l u s e s h a s also s u g g e s t e d to some t h a t e x p e n d i t u r e s on t h e s y s t e m , espe- cially its r e s e a r c h b r a n c h , s h o u l d b e slashed. Its economic t r o u b l e s , a l o n g w i t h t h e s m a l l n u m b e r of people r a i s e d on f a r m s in r e c e n t years, t h r e a t e n t h e s y s t e m f r o m y e t a n o t h e r angle: it m a y n o t a t t r a c t t h e " h u m a n capital," i n c l u d i n g t h e s u p p l y of w e l l - t r a i n e d scientists, n e e d e d for c o n t i n u e d d e v e l o p m e n t (Hadwiger, 1987; "Hu- m a n C a p i t a l S h o r t a g e s " ; A l l a n T. Smith).

The e n t i r e a g r i c u l t u r a l s y s t e m , not j u s t t h e f a r m i n g sector, m a y decline, b u t w o r k i n g for its s u r v i v a l is t h e long-recognized i m p o r t a n c e of t h e c o m m o d i t i e s it produces. This e l e m e n t of a g r a r i a n i s m , if no other, still s e e m s to h a v e s o m e a b i l i t y to b u i l d s u p p o r t for A m e r i c a n ag- r i c u l t u r e . It m a y p e r s u a d e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e people t h a t t h e y m u s t do w h a t t h e y can to m a k e or m a i n t a i n a s u p e r i o r a g r i c u l t u r a l system.

The q u a l i t y of t h e s y s t e m d e p e n d s in l a r g e p a r t u p o n t h e q u a l i t y of its i n t e l l e c t u a l life. It d e p e n d s u p o n its science, i n c l u d i n g its social sci- ence, w h i c h h a s t h e c a p a c i t y to sort o u t m y t h a n d r e a l i t y in a g r i c u l t u r e a n d explore, develop, a n d e v a l u a t e w a y s of m a k i n g t h e s y s t e m func- tion m o r e effectively (Bonnen). 2° And t h e n e e d for e v a l u a t i o n of b o t h proposals for c h a n g e in

23

AGRICULTURE A N D H U M A N V A L U E S - - W I N T E R 1987

t h e s y s t e m a n d t h e s y s t e m i t s e l f points to a sig- nificant role for t h e h u m a n i t i e s (Glenn Johnson, 1982; Comstock; H a y n e s ; Billington).

These conclusions no more t h a n suggest topics for social science research, b u t I have not as- s u m e d t h a t spelling t h e m out was m y responsi- b i l i t y or even w i t h i n m y r e a l m of competence. Rather, m y t a s k h a s been to supply i n s i g h t s into t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n by exploring how it h a s come to be. The definition of n e x t steps in re- search as well as policy m u s t rest upon a real- istic a p p r a i s a l of w h a t exists. How realistic I have been a n d how useful should be d e t e r m i n e d by discussion. 21

N o t e s

1. My colleague, Gary Comstock, suggested this term, offer- i n g it as t h e opposite of "modernizer" and preferable to " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t " A version of this paper was presented at t h e Social Science A g r i c u l t u r a l Project phase 1 work- shop, Minnespolis, J u n e 9, 1987.

2. W i l l i a m P. Browne, in his c o m m e n t a r y on a draft of this paper, helped me see this possibility.

3. J u n e 7, 1939, E l e a n o r Roosevelt Papers, F. D. Roosevelt Library.

4. Willard W. Cochrane to author, April 13, 1987. 5. K e n n e t h L. Deavers clarified m y t h i n k i n g on these and

o t h e r parts in a l e t t e r of April 24, 1987. 6. K e n n e t h L. Deaver's l e t t e r of April 24, 1987 was espe-

cially helpful on t h e s e points. 7. L e t t e r to author, A p r i l 21, 1987. 8. L e t t e r to author, A p r i l 21, 1987 (see Browne). 9. Conversation w i t h W i l l i a m G. Murray, April 19, 1987.

10. I n addition to t h e s e articles, r e m a r k s by Dennis Starleaf, Robert Wisner, Gene F u t r e l l , William Meyers, Daniel Otto, MiChael Duffy, Gratto, and H a r l at t h e A g r i c u l t u r a l Leaders Conference, Iowa S t a t e University, Feb. 25, 1987; r e g u l a r r e a d i n g of t h e Des Moines Register; fre- q u e n t conversations w i t h William G. Murray, and partic- ipation in Kellogg-funded workshops at Iowa State in 1985 and 1986 h a v e influenced m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e crisis.

11. Deavers to author, A p r i l 24, 1987. 12. Willard W. Cochrane to author, A p r i l 13, 1987. 13. Deavers points out in his l e t t e r of April 24, t h a t ERS has

r e c e n t l y m a d e n e w e s t i m a t e s " r e s u l t i n g from Census b e n c h m a r k i n g a n d o t h e r adjustments." They show n e t f a r m income in 1979 of $27.4 billion, 1985 of $30.5 bil- lion, and 1986 of $28 billion "(subject to upcoming revi- sion)" and direct g o v e r n m e n t p a y m e n t s for 1986 of $13 billion, also subject to revision. I n a m e m o r a n d u m to me on A p r i l 14, H a r l m a i n t a i n s t h a t "total g o v e r n m e n t price support e x p e n d i t u r e s were over $25 billion in 1986." Cochrane writes, "the n e t m o n e y costs of price supports and r e l a t e d activities in fiscal 1983 a m o u n t e d to n e a r l y $19 billion. A n d t h e n e t money c o s t s . . , for fiscal 1985 is e s t i m a t e d to a p p r o x i m a t e $15 billion" (Cochrane, 1985, p. 1004).

14. F i r m s on t h e o t h e r end of t h e s y s t e m - - t h o s e t h a t pro- cessed and sold f a r m p r o d u c t s - - d i d not suffer s i m i l a r dif- ficulties (DMR, M a r c h 8, 1987).

15. This is a n o t h e r place w h e r e Deaver's suggestions proved helpful.

16. Convers ation w i t h W i l l i a m G. Murray, May 20, 1987. 17. F o r example, J o h n H a r t of Carroll College (Montana),

18.

19.

20. 21.

adviser to t h e Catholic bishops, a u t h o r of The Spirit of the Earth, and p a r t i c i p a n t in a conference e n t i t l e d "Is T h e r e a Conspiracy A g a i n s t F a m i l y F a r m e r s ? " and held a t Iowa S t a t e University, F e b r u a r y 27, 1987. I a m g r a t e f u l to colleagues in t h e College of Agriculture, Iowa S t a t e University, especially Neil Harl, S ta nle y Johnson, Robert W. Jolly, William Meyers, and Donald G. Woolley, for h e l p i n g me u n d e r s t a n d t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s t h a t are b e i n g considered. The n a t i o n a l participants in the AgricultUral Leaders Conference (Midscourse Correc- tions in A g r i c u l t u r a l Policy), F e b r u a r y 25, 1987, also contributed, m a k i n g me, for example, more a w a r e t h a t t h e r e is also a proposal to "decouple" g o v e r n m e n t pay- m e n t s from t h e p l a n t i n g of crops. Neil E. H a r l to author, April 14, 1987. Cochrane, 1985, 1007-8. William P. Browne to author, April 21, 1987. One of t h e c o m m e n t a t o r s on this paper, t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l economist Willard W. Cochrane, draws less t h a n optimis- tic conclusions from his e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e historical rec- ord. I n a l e t t e r to m e of A p r i l 13, he wrote: "Now w h a t do we l e a r n from all this? W h a t I l e a r n is t h e following. Ag- r i c u l t u r e is a n i n h e r e n t l y u n s t a b l e industry oscillating between prosperity and depression in a completely un- predictable fashion. I n t h e 20th century, however, rapid and widspread f a r m technological advance has caused supplies of f a r m products to press a g a i n s t d e m a n d almost continuously except in w a r t i m e , and thus hold agricul- ture in a depressed state.

"The c u r r e n t f a r m crisis could be relieved by two bad crop y e a r s in a row around t h e world (always a possibil- ity). Or t h e crisis could be deepened by the inception of a world wide economic depression (a distinct possibility as of 1987). The only safe prediction is t h a t t h e future of U.S. a g r i c u l t u r e , economically speaking, is unpredict- a b l e : '

R e f e r e n c e s

Agriculture and Human Values, S p r i n g 1985; Fall, 1986. Appleby, Joyce. " C o m m e r c i a l F a r m i n g and t h e ' A g r a r i a n Myth' in t h e E a r l y Republic," Journal of American History, vol. 68, M a r c h 1982, pp. 8 3 3 - 8 4 9 . Appleby, Joyce. Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Re- publican Vision of the 1790s. N e w York U n i v e r s i t y Press, N e w York, 1984. Argersinger, P e t e r H. and J o A n n E. "The Machine Break- ers: F a r m Workers and Social C h a n g e in the R u r a l Midwest of t h e 1870s." Agricultural History, vol. 58, J u l y 1984, pp. 3 9 3 - 4 1 0 . Atack, Jeremy, and F r e d B a t e m a n . To Their Own Soil: Ag- riculture in the Antebellum North. Iowa S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y Press, Ames, 1987. Baldwin, Sidney. Poverty and Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Farm Security Administration. U n i v e r s i t y of N o r t h C a r o l i n a Press, Chapel Hill, 1968. Bender, Thomas. Toward an Urban Vision: Ideas and Insti- tutions in Nineteenth Century America. U n i v e r s i t y Press of Kentucky, 1975. Berkhofer, Robert F., J r . The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present. Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, N e w York, 1978. Berry, Wendell. The Unsettling of America: Culture and Ag- riculture. S i e r r a Club Books, S a n Francisco, 1977. Billington, Monroe. "Teaching A g r i c u l t u r a l History at Land G r a n t Institutions." O A H Newsletter, vol. 14, A u g u s t 1986, pp. 12-13. Bogue, A l l a n G. " C h a n g e s in Mechanical and P l a n t Technol-

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